Rule 111 to 115 an investigation for the determination of a

sufficient ground for the filing of the

DIO vs CA/ PEOPLE vs. DESMOND information or it is an investigation for the
GRs 178947, 179079; June 26, 2013 determination of a probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first
kind of preliminary investigation is
Facts: When Dio (majority stockholder of
executive in nature. It is part of the
HS Equities) met Desmond (CEO of
prosecution's job.1âwphi1 The second
SBMEI), several discussions were made
kind of preliminary investigation which is
onn possible business venture, and later
more properly called preliminary
Dio decided to invest a substantial amount
examination is judicial in nature and is
of money in SBMEI, a theme park.
lodged with the judge.
Subsequently Dio was appointed a BoD
and was later appointed as Treasurer. Dio
On this score, it bears to stress that a
infused more capital to SBMEI. It appears
judge is not bound by the resolution of the
however that SBMEI used the infused
public prosecutor who conducted the
capital on the negative cash flows of
preliminary investigation and must himself
SBMEI, contrary to the guarantee made
ascertain from the latter’s findings and
by Desmond made disbursements without
supporting documents whether probable
the knowledge of Dio and when Desmond
cause exists for the purpose of issuing a
refused to sign an undertaking to return
warrant of arrest. This prerogative is
the said funds, Dio suspended the release
granted by no less than the Constitution
over the remaining funds. She was ousted
which provides that "no warrant of arrest
as a BoD. Hence she filed a case of estafa.
shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge
After the PI, a Resolution was issued
after examination under oath or
finding probable cause agaist Desmond.
affirmation of the complainant and the
The RTC however issued an order that
witnesses he may produce.
there was no proabable cause since the
element of Estafa was not present.
While a judge’s determination of probable
Consequently, the RTC denied the
cause is generally confined to the limited
issuance of a warrant of arrest and hold
purpose of issuing arrest warrants,
departure order against Desmond and
Section 5(a),53 Rule 112 of the Revised
ordered the dismissal of the cases against
Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly
him. This was sustained by the CA
states that a judge may immediately
dismiss a case if the evidence on record
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in
clearly fails to establish probable cause.
finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC when it dismissed the
In this regard, so as not to transgress the
subject Informations for lack of probable
public prosecutor’s authority, it must be
cause?
stressed that the judge’s dismissal of a
case must be done only in clear-cut cases
Ruling: Petition is meritorious. The CA
when the evidence on record plainly fails
decision is set aside and RTC criminal case
to establish probable cause – that is when
is reinstated.
the records readily show uncontroverted,
and thus, established facts which
In the case of Co v. Republic, the Court
unmistakably negate the existence of the
emphasized the settled distinction
elements of the crime charged. On the
between an executive and a judicial
contrary, if the evidence on record shows
determination of probable cause, viz:
that, more likely than not, the crime
charged has been committed and that
We reiterate that preliminary investigation
respondent is probably guilty of the same,
should be distinguished as to whether it is
the judge should not dismiss the case and

1
thereon, order the parties to proceed to
trial. In doubtful cases, however, the
appropriate course of action would be to
order the presentation of additional
evidence.
In other words, once the information is
filed with the court and the judge
proceeds with his primordial task of
evaluating the evidence on record, he may
either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he
finds probable cause; (b) immediately
dismiss the case, if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause;
and (c) order the prosecutor to submit
additional evidence, in case he doubts the
existence of probable cause.
Applying these principles, the Court finds
that the RTC’s immediate dismissal, as
affirmed by the CA, was improper as the
standard of clear lack of probable cause
was not observed. In this case, records
show that certain essential facts – namely,
(a) whether or not Desmond committed
false representations that induced Dio to
invest in Ocean Adventure; and (b)
whether or not Desmond utilized the funds
invested by Dio solely for the Miracle
Beach Project for purposes different from
what was agreed upon – remain
controverted. As such, it cannot be said
that the absence of the elements of the
crime of estafa under Article 315(2)(a)57
and 315(1) (b)58 of the RPC had already
been established, thereby rendering the
RTC’s immediate dismissal of the case
highly improper.
Genuino vs. De Lima
Facts: Criminal complaints were filed
against former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo before the DOJ.
Pursuant to her authority under DOJ
Circular No. 41, then DOJ Secretary De
Lima placed Arroyo and her husband in
the Bureau of Immigration's watchlist.
Arroyo requested for the issuance of an
Allow-Departure Order, so that she may
seek medical attention for her
hypothyroidism and metabolic bone
mineral disorder. She intended to see
specialists in 6 countries: USA, Germany,
Singapore, Italy, Spain and Austria.
Before the resolution of her application,
Arroyo filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65, with Prayer for
the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. Her husband did
the same. They assailed the
constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 41
and the Watch List Order against them.
On the same day, De Lima denied GMA's
application for several discrepencies. The
Supreme Court eventually granted a TRO,
which allowed Arroyo to leave the country.
Issue: Constitutional?
Ruling: NO. It is unconstitutional because
it assumes that the Executive Department
has the responsibility to fill in the gaps
within the authority and responsibilities
given to the Judiciary. It assumes that the
DOJ Sec is the sole authority to issue or
cancel an HDO or WLO, in determining the
sufficiency of the grounds for an ADO.
This indiscriminately subjects to the
discretion of the DOJ Sec the exercise of
the right to travel of persons subject of
preliminary investigation or criminal
cases. The HDO and WLO remains
efffective even after the lapse of its
validity period, since the DOJ Sec can
either lift or prolong. This makes it an
arbitrary measure beyond the powers
granted to the Executive Department.
Enrile vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 213847. August 18, 2015
Facts: On June 5, 2014, the Office of the
Ombudsman charged Enrile and several
others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan
on the basis of their purported
involvement in the diversion and misuse
of appropriations under the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus
Motion and Supplemental Opposition,
praying that he be allowed to post bail
should probable cause be found against
him.
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Enrile claims that before judgment of
conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as
matter of right; that it is the duty and
burden of the Prosecution to show clearly
and conclusively that Enrile comes under
the exception and cannot be excluded
from enjoying the right to bail; that the
Prosecution has failed to establish that
Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua
considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances — his age and his voluntary
surrender; that the Prosecution has not
come forward with proof showing that his
guilt for the crime of plunder is strong;
and that he should not be considered a
flight risk taking into account that he is
already over the age of 90, his medical
condition, and his social standing.
Ombudsman contends that Enrile's right
to bail is discretionary as he is charged
with a capital offense; that to be granted
bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be
conducted to determine whether there is
strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of
it; and that entitlement to bail considers
the imposable penalty, regardless of the
attendant circumstances.
Issue: Whether or not Enrile can bail.
Ruling: Yes, Enrile's poor health justifies
his admission to bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the trial court.
The amount of bail should be high enough
to assure the presence of the accused
when so required, but it should be no
higher than is reasonably calculated to
fulfill this purpose.
The general rule is, therefore, that any
person, before being convicted of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless
he is charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. For
purposes of admission to bail, the
determination of whether or not evidence
of guilt is strong in criminal cases
involving capital offenses, or offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment lies within the discretion of
the trial court.
Enrile is not a flight risk because of his
social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon being charged in court.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s
health is a compelling justification for his
admission to bail. (Chronic hypertension,
diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular
disease, Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia,
etc.)
Granting provisional liberty to Enrile will
then enable him to have his medical
condition be properly addressed and
better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice.
This will not only aid in his adequate
preparation of his defense but, more
importantly, will guarantee his appearance
in court for the trial.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Marvic
M.V.F. Leonen
where the crime charged is plunder and
the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua. The grant of bail is a special
accommodation for the petitioner.
given the opportunity to rebut the
allegation that petitioner suffers from
medical conditions.
rights principle does not provide clear
legal basis for the grant of bail on
humanitarian grounds. It is neither
presently provided in our Rules of Court
nor found in any statue or provision of the
Constitution. This sets a dangerous
precedent for the granting of bail on the
basis of humanitarian conditions, which is
determined by the personal discretion of
the trial judge.
3

petitioner without any determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong
violates the clear and unambiguous text of
the constitution.
IVLER vs. MODESTO-SAN PEDRO
G.R. No. 172716. November 17, 2010
Facts: Following a vehicular collision in
August 2004, Jason Ivler was charged
before the MeTC with two separate
offenses:
1. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal
Case No. 82367) for injuries
sustained by Evangeline Ponce;
and
2. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for
the death of Ponce's husband
Nestor Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponce's vehicle.
Ivler posted bail for his temporary release
in both cases. Thereafter, he pleaded
guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No.
82367 and was meted out the penalty of
public censure. Invoking this conviction,
he moved to quash the Information in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him
in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no
identity of offenses in the two cases. After
unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration,
Ivler elevated the matter to the RTC in a
Petition for Certiorari. Meanwhile, he
sought from the MeTC the suspension of
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366,
including the arraignment invoking the
Petition for Certiorari as a prejudicial
question. Without acting on Ivler's motion
to suspend, the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of Ivler's
absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his
arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued
a resolution denying Ivler's motion to
suspend proceedings and postponing his
arraignment until after his arrest. Ivler
sought reconsideration but the motion
remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against Ivler,
Ponce sought in the RTC dismissal of the
Petition for Certiorari. She contends that
Ivler lost his standing to maintain the suit.
Thereafter, RTC dismissed the case. Ivler
sought reconsideration but this proved
unavailing.
In his petition under Rule 45, Ivler argues
that his constitutional right not to be
placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense bars his prosecution in
Criminal Case No. 82366, having been
previously convicted in Criminal Case No.
82367 for the same offense of reckless
imprudence charged in Criminal Case No.
82366. He further submits that the
multiple consequences of such crime are
material only to determine his penalty.
Issues:
1. Whether Ivler forfeited his standing
to seek relief in the petition for
review case when the MeTC
ordered his arrest following his
non-appearance at the arraignment
in Criminal Case No. 82366. (NO)
2. If in the negative, whether Ivler's
constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366. (YES)
Ruling:
1. Ivler’s non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366 did not divest him of standing
to maintain the special civil action for
certiorari.
Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
defendant's absence merely renders his
bondsman potentially liable on its bond
(subject to cancellation should the
bondsman fail to produce the accused
within 30 days); the defendant retains his
standing and, should he fail to surrender,
will be tried in absentia and could be
convicted or acquitted.
4

Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the
bondsman to produce the accused
underscores the fact that mere non-
appearance does not ipso facto convert
the accused's status to that of a fugitive
without standing.
2. Ivler’s Conviction in Criminal Case No.
82367 bars his prosecution in Criminal
Case No. 82366.
The two charges against Ivler, arising
from the same facts, were prosecuted
under the same provision of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article
365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses. Quasi-crimes under Article 365
are distinct species of crimes and not
merely methods of committing crimes.
Reason and precedent both coincide in
that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for
that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies
in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done,
would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless
act, not the result thereof. The gravity of
the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does
not qualify the substance of the offense.
And, as the careless act is single, whether
the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and cannot be split into different
crimes and prosecutions.
Add. Info.: Article 48 of the RPC does not
apply to acts penalized under Article 365
of the RPC. It is conceptually impossible
for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
single act constituting two or more grave
or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense
which is a necessary means for
committing another. The issue of double
jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts
is penalized as a light offense and the
other acts are penalized as grave or less
grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is
not deemed to apply and the act penalized
as a light offense is tried separately from
the resulting acts penalized as grave or
less grave offenses.
In one case the Solicitor General stresses
in his brief that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not be joined with the
accusation for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, because
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
allows only the complexing of grave or
less grave felonies. The court held that
such contention might be true, however,
neither was the prosecution obliged to
first prosecute the accused for slight
physical injuries through reckless
imprudence before pressing the more
serious charge. Having first prosecuted
the defendant for the lesser offense of
which he was acquitted, such acquittal
prevents his prosecution for serious
physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. The second accusation places
the defendant in second jeopardy for the
same offense.
The prosecution under Article 365 should
proceed from a single charge regardless of
the number or severity of the
consequences. In imposing penalties, the
judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short,
there shall be no splitting of charges
under Article 365, and only onE
information shall be filed in the same first
level court.
Causing vs. Dela Rosa
Atty. Causing and his client, Mabasa
(Complainants), charged respondent
Judge Dela Rosa with gross ignorance of
the law, gross misconduct and gross
incompetence for reversing the dismissal
of a libel case against Mabasa. Said libel
case was dismissed because it violated the
accused's right to speedy trial. This is
5
equivalent to a dismissal on the merits of
the case. Furthermore, they argued that
he acted in bad faith when he reported
Atty Causing to the IBP after the latter
wrote Facebook and Blogspot posts
against Judge Dela Rosa.
In his Comment, Dela Rosa averred that
he has reversed his earlier reversal. He
said his decision was based on liberality,
because the delays were mostly caused by
herein complainants. He denied that he
was motivated by bad faith, ill will, fraud,
dishonesty, corruption or caprice.
The Office of the Court recommended that
the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit. This was adopted by the Supreme
Court. It ruled that, for liability to attach
for ignorance of the law, the assailed act
of the judge must not only be erroneous.
It must also have been motivated by bad
faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other ill
motive.
Judge Dela Rosa himself rectified his
earlier decision. He thus cannot be held
liable, as this would be nothing short of
harassing judges to take the fantastic and
impossible oath of rendering infallible
judgments. Furthermore, the judge's
contempt power must be exercised
judiciously and sparingly, not for
retaliation or vindictiveness. As such,
there was no need to use it against Atty
Causing when reporting him to the IBP
would do.
Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan
Every accused has the rights to due
process and to speedy disposition of
cases. Inordinate delay in the resolution
and termination of a preliminary
investigation will result in the dismissal of
the case against the accused. Delay,
however, is not determined through mere
mathematical reckoning but through the
examination of the facts and
circumstances surrounding each case.
Courts should appraise a reasonable
period from the point of view of how much
time a competent and independent public
officer would need in relation to the
complexity of a given case. Nonetheless,
the accused must invoke his or her
constitutional rights in a timely manner.
The failure to do so could be considered
by the courts as a waiver of right.
On 10 February 2003, the Office of the
Ombudsman received an anonymous
complaint, accusing employees of the Vice
Governor of Sarangani Province's office of
graft and corruption. They did this by
diverting public funds given as grants or
aid, using barangay officials and
cooperatives and "dummies". The
complaint was referrred to the
Commission on Audit for investigation.
7 years later, the Ombudsman filed
informations for violation of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and Malversation of
Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents against the accused. The latter
filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with
Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of
Arrest, because there was an inordinate
delay in filing the Informations. This was
denied by the Sandiganbayan, which also
denied the MR.
The Supreme Court held that there was no
inordinate delay.
The constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases does not only include
the period from which a case is submitted
for resolution. Rather, the right covers the
entire period of investigation, even
BEFORE trial. Thus, it may be invoked as
early as the preliminary investigation
stage.
However, the fact of delay is not
determined through mere mathematical
reckoning. There must be an examination
of the facts and circumstances
surrounding each case. Furthermore, the
accused must invoke constitutional rights
in a timely manner. Here, while there may
have been a long investigation period,
petitioner did not assert rights during this
period.