Modelling and Simulation of Electronic Combat

Wayne R. Philp
Electronic Warfare Division
Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO)
PO Box 1500
SALISBURY SA 5108

Keywords:
Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, Command and Control

ABSTRACT: Electronic and Information Attack capability is increasingly able to undermine situational awareness,
communications, command and control within modern high-technology combat systems, as reliance on COTS
information systems, data pre- processing and knowledge management becomes deeply embedded in warfighting
practice. Offensive electronic warfare using portable electronic devices and computers may soon provide powerful
means to those who may wish to penetrate enemy's lines, deny lines of communication and engage in decisive battle,
without the risk of ever being shot. This paper describes initial DSTO efforts to model, simulate and visualise
electronic/information attack in tandem with physical combat. Simulation technology that provides battlefield capability
through applications such as command decision support, real-time operational analysis, mission
visualisation/awareness, and logistic/materiel support, needs to be mindful of new threats in the next decade.

1. Introduction accuracy. If one can force an enemy commander to

make too-hasty or misinformed decisions, then an
The terrorist and the policeman upper-hand can generally be achieved, which when
both came from the same basket. maintained, leads inevitably to the adversary’s demise.
Joseph Conrad, The Secret Agent (1907) Furthermore, if an enemy commander cannot
communicate decisions
The aim of Electronic Warfare (EW) is to control the
electromagnetic (EM) spectrum for one’s own use
while denying such to an adversary. Electronic Attack Desired effect is to induce the greatest
the time difference between our
(EA), as one element of EW, involves the use of EM, n adversary.
i oan
decision cycle and thattof
directed energy, or anti-radiation technology to attack rm a
O b ser ve In f o
personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of ns
deceiving, degrading, denying or destroying enemy r a ti o
O pe
combat capability. The EM weapon is the tool of both
law-enforcer and law-breaker, friend or foe; the O b ser ve
Time

policeman and terrorist must therefore master the same

D ecid e
capabilities, or be defeated.
O wn Adv ersary
O r ie n t
Decision D ecide Decision
The Australian Army has sponsored research within Cycle Cycle
the Electronic Warfare Division of DSTO to investigate
the impact of cyberwarfare, 2015-2030. Cyberwar is
here defined as military operations, within virtual A ct

information, knowledge and psychological domains,

Time
which adversely effect command and control.
Cyberwarfare is subtly different from Information Figure 1: OODA loop [Future Land Warfare
Warfare (IW) in that it includes manipulation of the 2000, Army draft publication, 1999].
adversary’s perception of events and circumstances
(cognition), rather than more simply the manipulation of
to the physical domain of the battle assets, defeat is
the quality and timeliness of the knowledge available to
certain. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to
the adversary. For example, cyberwar would seek to
address the emerging role of EA within Command and
exercise control over an enemy commander’s reflexive
Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence,
decisions in response to perceived crises that were
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) [1].
created by virtual means – akin to orchestrating the
adversary’s every move.
1.1 Technology for Electronic Attack
The exercise of virtual control over an adversary may
EM (white) noise makers, decoy emitters, tuned
be considered in terms of an OODA loop, as illustrated
jammers, High Power Microwaves (HPM) and Non-
in Figure 1. The Orient, Observe, Decide, Act loop in
Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (NNEMP) generators
the decision making cycle is subject to varied tempo and
are a few relatively new weapons of war which may be
found on some military shelves. It is also quite
possible that in some countries, libraries of software
viruses may already be coded into innocent guise, for
transmission via e-mail, innocuous netware downloads
or floppy disk. The aim in either case, hardware-kill or
software-kill, is to adversely effect (deceive, degrade,
deny or destroy) command decision making processes
(Command & Control, Communications and
Computing and Intelligence – C4I). C4I, in
conjunction with Surveillance, Reconnaissance and
Electronic Support (ES) capabilities, is given the
acronym of C4ISREW (commonly used in Australia).
Modern knowledge-based warfighting is critically
dependent on accurate and resilient C4ISREW.
Over the next decade, it is certain that EM jammers
will be able to deceive or block aerial or spaceborne
surveillance systems such as Synthetic Aperture Radar.
Ground-based radars will be equally susceptible to
manipulation. Other EM jammers or noise makers will
be able to: deny access to analogue or digital cellular
communications networks; block satellite navigation
and communication systems; degrade data transmission
LANs/WANs, and cause unshielded/unhardened
computer systems to fail. In the worst case, customised
emitters may be able to generate bogus signals that
deceive or confuse operational and tactical command
and control by providing false or misleading
information and intelligence. The tools necessary to
wage these actions are already, or very nearly, in the
hands of many military powers.
As military acquisition authorities around the globe
migrate from costly C4ISREW Military Specified
(MILSPEC) hardened systems toward cheaper,
unprotected Commercial-Off-The-Self (COTS) systems
(personal computers and OEM CPU/microchip
circuitry, mobile and satellite telephones, cameras and
videos, modems and satellite networks), the
vulnerability to EA increases. It is technically
practicable to design and construct robust systems for
military use but these are usually an order of magnitude
in cost over COTS products. As economic rationalist
policy continues to insist on low cost options for
peacetime Defence acquisition, it is feared that present
and planned future C4ISREW systems may be flawed
and vulnerable to compromise or failure in time of
earnest need.
A simple example is provided in the case of
Situational Awareness derived from automated ES data
pre-processing. Unlike the radar warning receivers of
old, modern systems collect and process data about
detected possible threats and display these to the user as
geographically referenced icons. The user (a pilot in
this example) can then, in principle, steer a safe course.
However, if a plethora of bogus signals simply
overload the pre-processing algorithms, causing the
threat warning system to fail, the pilot is placed in
jeopardy. The outcome is the same for a military
commander making decisions derived from corrupted
information or absent vital facts.
1.2 Synthetic Environment
The work addressed by this paper concerns the
construction development and implementation of a
synthetic environment (SE) through which to model
and simulate IW, EA and electronic protection (EP).
The research and development challenge lies in the
fusion of Situational Awareness (ISREW) and C4, as
“flow and process” networks, with the spatial and
temporal domains of the Computer Generated
Battlespace (CGB). The Information flow has a
different topology to the physical object interaction of
the computer wargame. Moreover, a human-in-the-loop
is critical to implement the cognitive affect of
cyberwarfare on the officer in tactical command; so the
OODA loop must also be included within the SE.
To achieve this end, a framework provided by
merging three software systems is proposed: a CGB is
to be synchronised in real-time with an open-
architecture process re-engineering package, having an
external spreadsheet to facilitate data exchange. The
CGB in this work is STAGE (Virtual Prototypes Inc.,
Montreal, Quebec, Canada H4P 1T7), the process re-
engineering package is PLANIMATE
(InterDynamics Pty. Ltd., Adelaide, South Australia,
Australia 5001), and the spreadsheet/ODBC-datasource
intermediary is EXCEL/ACCESS (Microsoft
Corporation, USA). It is also intended to integrate this
system with the US military software ModSAF (via
DIS) in the Synthetic Environment Research Facility
(SERF) provided by Land Operations Division, DSTO.
The system of three software packages is represented
in Figure 2. As a base requirement, the CGB and the
process re-engineering software packages must be
locked synchronously to real-time and capable of
information review and exchange during run-time.
1
INFORMATION WARGAME
DATABASE
SITUATIONAL COMPUTER
GENERATED
AWARENESS
(ISREW) BATTLEFIELD
PROCESS RE-ENGINEERING
COMMUNICATE, COMPUTE
COMMAND AND CONTROL
2 (C4)
3
Figure 2: Three domains of a synthetic environment
intended to study cyberwarfare. Annotations are
provided in the text
The notations to Figure 2 are:
{ Intelligent agents within the wargame attach to each
platform in BLUE/RED/NEUTRAL force to
interrogate sensors and systems. Detections are then
tagged and written to a database for reference and
retrieval.
| The database is constantly searched to collect and
package requested information for display. A ignorance of these matters need not be “bliss”. The
commander-in-the-loop acts within a process re-
engineering package (to mimic C4I) to make decisions.
} Command decisions are translated into new object
parameters and duly modified within the CGB.
An alternative schematic of the above is Figure 3.
KNOWLEDGE SPATIAL & TEMPORAL
Detect
Classify
Intelligent Adversary
Identify
Agents Neutrals
Data fuse
Recognise
Own Forces
Appreciate
Orient
Observe
Decide
Act
Control
Inform Communicate
FLOW & PROCESS
Figure 3: Framework for SE.
In mimicking command and control interaction
within a computer wargame, having information and
knowledge flows exposed, it will be possible to explore
the affect of Information Operations on a Commander’s
decision making. Where there is timely and reliable
Situational Awareness, denial of that awareness (or
false awareness) may be keenly felt. Where there exists
clear means of communication, denial or “spoofing”
(the insertion of false communications at event
junctures) may prove critical. Where there is timely
and effective command decision-making to operational
and tactical advantage over an adversary, the combined
affect of planned and coordinated cyberwar (within the
SE) may be sufficient to prove the relative merit of
such tactics. If the use of Information Operations
within a SE demonstrates loss of tempo and agility in
battlefield command and control, then strong arguments
may then be levied to better prepare the Australian
Defence Force (ADF) against such threats to our own
C4ISREW systems.
1.3 Advice to the Australian Defence Force
The purpose of presenting this paper is to note the
commencement of this study and to outline initial plans
to model, simulate and visualise electronic/information
attack in tandem with physical combat. The outcome,
in due course, will be the means for timely and quality
advice to the ADF on matters relating to IW and EA.
In consideration of the possible public sensitivity to
R&D activities into cyberwarfare, a SE is an ideal tool
for evaluation and subsequent operational analysis,
with no risk to the public domain. However, in
mentioning public sensitivity, it should be added that
ADF must be prepared and ready to counter any
emergent or perceived threat to the security of Australia
and its national interests.
Cyberwar also has implications for modellers and
programmers seeking to provide battlefield capability
through applications such as command decision aids,
real-time operational analysis and simulation, mission
visualisation/awareness, and logistic/materiel support.
Heavy reliance on networked COTS operating systems
(such as Microsoft Windows or NT), especially where
such applications are reliant on e-mail or web-browsers,
are perfect targets for cyberwarfare. For example, one
interesting concept is that of “flaming” an e-mail
recipient: the use of commercial bulk e-mail generators
to transmit 100’s of communications a minute to a
single targeted addressee. By sequential renaming of
the sender’s address with each transmitted
communication, filtering of “junk e-mails” can be quite
difficult. If the addressee was reliant on open e-mail
access in the process of his/her command and control,
this simple act of “flaming’ could have serious
consequence on the tempo of operations. The emphasis
here is not on technique or method but that reliance on
any electronic/information service, that is accessible via
cyberspace, may be subject to attack or misuse. The
ADF needs to be informed and aware of its
vulnerability to cyberwarfare.
1.4 Redundancy
The issue of redundancy is also most relevant.
Reliance on high-technology computer controlled
C4ISREW systems is the product of the current
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) or Information
Revolution. The advantage to military command
through maintaining the “knowledge-edge” has been
evident in recent operations in both the Persian Gulf
and Bosnia. The advantage of enhanced situational
awareness through sensor and systems networking
cannot be denied. However, in the movement toward
network-centric warfare, precision targeting, total-
visibility of logistic support and command support
systems, it is important that older redundant systems
remain extant and personnel are trained in their use. At
least then, when cyberwar is a legitimate mode of
combat, there may be graceful degradation of capability
with backup provision from older, more robust,
redundant systems. Existing military copper land-line
communication grids should not be hastily discarded or
allowed to fall into disrepair in favour of satellite-based
telephones. Likewise, manual systems for logistic
demand and supply should not be forgotten in favour of
automatic accounting and replenishment software based
on computer connectivity and networking.
1.5 The future battlefield
As the ADF seeks, in collaboration with DSTO and
Australian industry, to better shape the Australian
Defence Organisation to meet emergent threats over the
next few decades, it is important to appreciate
vulnerability that may be inherent through legacy
systems. Capability solutions have, and will continue
in the current economic climate, to be weighted toward
cost effectiveness under the current strategic guidance
and perceived threat, rather than serviceability in some
alternative or possible future battlefield. Pragmatic and
objective analyses of vulnerabilities within future
scenarios and capabilities, using SEs, is a most cost
effective, versatile and necessary means of developing
logical argument in support of various alternative force
and capability mix.
Simulation of a future battlespace by SE can help
elucidate “low-tech” counters to “high-tech”
capabilities. It is likely that simple counters will, as
demonstrated in recent history, effectively undermine
too-vulnerable and overly-complex systems. As greater
reliance is placed on COTS systems, ready access to
those systems by foreign powers or non-state parties,
through the normal commercial market, means that
some guarded military systems may invite close
inspection and possible re-engineering. Open, intimate
knowledge of COTS products permits the development
of elegant and very effective countermeasures. The
“flaming” example is such a countermeasure, as is any
reliable method by which an operating system may be
caused to experience a “fatal error”. Undoubtedly, high
technology warfighting will evolve with the trends and
advancements of the day, measure meeting
countermeasure.
It is important to note that there are two types of
warfare - "Conflict of Arms" and, "Conflict of Men at
Arms". Most of the conflicts we have witnessed on
CNN over the past 30 years have been Conflicts of
Arms. The Falklands and The Gulf Wars, for example,
have been mostly exercises in technology and weapons
platforms. Air, maritime and land assets have been
deployed to win the day with minimal observable
casualties. Many have admired the surgery performed
by precision guided weapons, aerial bombing, ever-
enhanced C4ISR data-fusion and commando teams
exercising stealth and high-tech wizardry. However,
we are possibly fooling ourselves if we expect warfare
over the next 20+ years to be much of the same with
network-centric, on-line intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance technology stealing the show. Should
cyberwarfare become practicable to deploy and engage,
it may be a far baser form of warfare that Australia and
her allies find themselves facing, when by neglect,
simpler and robust C3ISR systems have been allowed
to degrade beyond repair.
1.6 Conclusion
IW and EA as instruments of war, are becoming
increasingly real. Heavy reliance on “high-tech”
command and control, proprietary information
technology and commercial telecommunication,
satellite and navigation systems, may prove to be a fatal
weakness when those COTS products are subject to
open scrutiny and testing by potentially adversaries. It
is the intention of this author and the Australian Army
to create a SE to investigate the affect and effect of
cyberwar on command decision-making. This SE will
initially stand-alone, but in time will integrate into the
larger SE provided by the SERF. The R&D interest in
this SE is mainly the information exchange been the
CGB, interactive database and the commander-in-loop
OODA process. It is hoped that the SE and the concept
demonstration facility it so provides, will greatly
advance our study of Information Operations and EA
tactics within the combat arena of a virtual battlespace.
Developers and planners of C4ISREW systems that
will be operating twenty years from now, should be
mindful of the potential dynamics and effectiveness of
cyberwarfare. Today’s acquisitions will surely become
a legacy for tomorrow’s Defence Force. As the quote
at the head of this paper reminds us; in order to counter
the designs of the terrorist, the policeman must know,
understand, and be able to defend against, the tools of
destruction.
2. References
1. Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Army).
Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of
Land Warfare.
3. Author Biography
Dr Wayne Philp is a Senior Research Scientist in the
Electronic Warfare Division of the Defence Science
and Technology Organisation (DSTO) Australia,
specialising in the planning, modelling and simulation
of strategic-level electronic warfare and information
operations. He has particular military technical
expertise within electro-optic technology and an
operational focus on "joint" littoral warfare. Dr Philp
presently leads the Land Systems Studies of the
Strategic EW Group where his work is sponsored by
the Director General, Future Land Warfare, Army
Headquarters.