KESAVANANDA v. KERALA (Mathew, J.

) 857
The argument in these cases lasted for well nigh six months.
Acres of paper and rivers of ink have been employed before and du-
ring the argument in supplying the Court with materials from all
sources. It will be a tragedy if our conclusion were to fail to give ade-
quate guidance to the Bench concerned in disposing of these cases. I
do not, want the conclusions to which I have reached to remain a
Delphic oracle. I would, therefore, sum up my findings.

I hold that the decision in Golakna.th Case that the Parliament

. had no power to amend Fundamental Rights in such a way as to take
away or abridge them· was ·wrong, that the power to amend under
article 368 as it stood before .the 24th Amendment was plenary" in
character ·and ·extended to all ·the provisions of the Constitution, that
the 24th Amendment .did not add anything to the content of article
368 ~ it 'stood before the ·amendment, that it is declaratory in chara-
cter except as regards the compulsory nature of the assent of the Presi-
.dent t6 11 bill for amendment and that the article as amended makes
it clear that all the. provisions of the Constitution can be amended by
way of addition, variation or repeal. The only limitation is that the
.COOStitution cannot be 'repealed or abrogated in the exercise of the
jiower of amendment without substituting a mechanism by which the
'State is i::onsdtuted and organized. That limitation flows from the Ian-
.guagc of the article itself.
I d(> nOt think there were or are any implied or inherent limita-
tions upon the power of amendment under the article:
J:he .24th · Amendment is valid.
.;•"' •;1_ ' .' ' ' ' .
_ .The 25th Amendment, including article 31C, is valid. The word
.'amunt' in· article 31(2), as amended; docs not convey the idea of any
; norm. •The fixation of the amount or the principle for determining the
,amount is. a matter· within the absolute discretion of the Parliament
or tlic State Legislatures. The Court cannot go into the question whether
the amount fixed by law or the principle laid down for determining the
amount is adequate or relevant.

The declaration visualized in article .31C that the law gives effect
· to the policy of. the State towards .~g the principles spec.ifi~d !8
art'icle 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution would not oust the JUn~
tion of the Court to go into the question whether the law gives effect
· to .the policy. The jurisdiction' of Parliament or the· State legislatura
· to ilicorporate the declaration.in a law is conditioned upon the circum-
stllnce .that the law is one for giving effect to the State policy towards
securing the aforesaid principles.
158 SUPREMJ! COUllT REPORTS ( 1973) Supp. S,c.ll.

The 29th Amendment is valid.

T would have the wdt petitions disposed of i.11 the. lighit of these
findings. I would make no order as to costs here. · ·
BEG, /.-This reference to a special bench .of thirteen .Judges,
brger than .any previous bench hearing a case in· th.is Court, was made
so that the correctness of a view which became binding law of this
country by a narrow majodty ri ·one, as a result of the. eleven Judgc
decision of this·Court, in Golak Nath & Ors. v. State of Pun;ab.&
Anr.,(') may be if need be reconsidered. That view was that the prohl-
bition contained in Article 13(2) of our Constimtion against the mak-
ing of any law by the State "which takes away or abridges the rights
conferred" by the chapter on Fundamental Rights making laws made
in contravention of this provision void "to the extent of the contra-
vention" applies to Constitutional amendments also. A\though that
was a decision on a limit?;tion held tp exisl!, under our Constitution, .as
it then stood, on the power of amendment contained :in Articic 368 .
of the Constitution, yet, it did not decide what the position would be,
if Article 368 was itself amended under the expl'Clls power of such
amendment recognised by clause_ (e) of the proviso to Article 368 t2)
ef the Constitution. Although, that question, which . then neith~
arose nor was decided, is before us now. directly for. decision, yet, I
think, we cannot avoid pronouncing upon the correctness of the ma-
jority deci.sion in the Golak Nath's case (Supra), which h~ a bearirig
upon the scope of the power of amendmene contained in the unamend-
ed Article 368. .
The cases before us have become so much loaded with ·learning
and marked. by brilliance of exposition of all the points inV<>lved, either
directly O£ indirectly, both by my learned brethren and the Il\embers
of the ·Ear of this Court, in view of the crucial importance, for
the
future 9oJlstifut:iorial history of this country, of the hs\te$ placed· be-
fore us," that it would· be presumptuous on my part 1IO .autCJDpt to deal
with eifery point which has been raised. Indeed, it is not necessary
for me to repeat ~eh views as I accept as correct expressed by my
learned brethren with whose conclusion I agree. The reason.~ for· my
very respectful disagreement with those conclusions of some of my other
learned brethren with which I do not concur will become evident in
the course of the few Observations with whkh l shall content myscl£
before recording my conclusions. I venlture to make these o)Jscrvations ·
because, as my learned Brother Marhew has pointed" our, jn cases oi .
the nature be£ore us, the healthier practice is to follow the ~mple
of House of Lords even though a multiplicity of <>pinions may pr0o
duce a "thicket", which, according to Judite Learned Hand, it :is the:
function of judicial learnirig and wisdom to remove. I do hope that
( 1) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762.