KESAVANANDA ti. KERALA (Beg, J.

) 885
by law, takes the place of judicial consideration by tbc Courts and
involves consideration of the question whether it is reasonable and
necessary to attach such a declaration to a particular law.
I do not think that it is necessary for me to decide what the exact
nature of the function in giving the declaration is or whether it carries
with it, by implication, the proposition that some rules of natural justice
must be complied with. Such questions were not argued before us by
any party. Nevertheless, I think that the concession could only be made
on the strength of the view that the declaration by itself would not
preclude• a judicial examination of the nexus so that Courts can still
determine whether. the law passed is really one covered by the field
carved out by Artide 31C or merely pretends to be so protected by
parading under cover of the declaration. I, therefore, adopt this reason
as perfectly good one for making the concession. Hence, I hold that
both parts of Article 31C arc valid.
On questions relating to the Amendment of Article 31 (2) and the
29th Amendment of the Constitution, I adopt the reasons of my learned
brethe.rn Ray, Mathew and Dwivedi with whose conclusions I concur
<>n these and other questions.
My conclusions may now be stated as follows :
(1) The majority view in Golak Nath's case (supra), holding that
Article 13 operated as a limitation upon the powers of Consti-
tutional amendment found in Article 368, was erroneous. The
minority view there was correct on this question.
(2) The 24th Amendment is valid.
(3) The 25th Amendment, including addition of Article 31 C, 1s
valid.
(4) The word 'amount' in Article 31(2), as amended, does not
convey the idea of any prescribed norm. The fixation of the
amount or the laying down of a principle for determining the
amount are matters within the exclusive power of Parliament
or the State Legislature concerned. In other words, the norms
and their satisfaction on the question of adequacy of com-
pensation or its reasonableness, are matters within the exclu-
sive competence of the legislative authorities to determine.
(5) The declaration contemplated by Article 31 C is like a certi-
ficate given after considering the relevancy of the principles
specified in Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution, and,
therefore, the jurisdiction of the Court is not ousted. The
Courts can still consider and decide whether the declaration
is really good or a mere pretence attached to a colourable piece
886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1973] Supp. S.C.R,

of legislation or to a law which has no bearing on or nexus

·with the principles found in. Article 39(b) and (c) of the
Constitution. Out of two equally acceptable views, even on the
question of nexus, the one in conformity with the legislative
verdict should prevail.
(6) The 29th Amendment is valid.

I would also have the petitions disposed of in the light of decisions

given above. I make no order as to costs incurred by partiep for this
stage of hearing

DWIVEDI, /.-I concur with the conclusions reached by brother

Ray with respect to the constitutionality. of the 24th, 25th and 29th
amendments. But in view of the importance of the case I wish to add
my own reasons in support of those conclusions.

Idtas which failed to win the minds of Englishmen in the Stuart

period and died in discomfiture are seeking transmigration into
the Constitution of India now. Perceive some resemblances :

Ideas duritlg the Stuart Period Arguments of Sri Palkhiwala

I. "Acts of Parliament 'r\lay take away fto·
wer3 andorna'llents of the crown but not
the crown ine!f.. , •.... "{1)
t. By virtue of Art. 368 Partiament
carinot so amend the Con~titution
as to take away or abridge the
essential features of the Cons.
ti tu ti on.

2. "The ParHament tannot deliver over 2. Parliament cannot so amend the

the free... peopte of England to a foreign Con1titution as to make the Republic
government, or to laws imposed by of India a satellite of a foreign coun·
foreigners ......... "(') try.

S. "The Parliament cannot deprive the free 3. Parliment cannot so amend the Con ..
peopte of Engtand.oftheir innate ri~hts stitution as to damage or destroy the-
of electin~ knights, citizens and burge. core ofthefundamentalrightsinPart
sses for Parliament. In these· things III of the Con,titution.
of the nature of these tending to
the fund mental rights and law.1 of the
peop!e the parliament cannot nor ought
not any way to violate thepeopleor
nation."(1 )

(') Sir John Finch C.J., Fundamental Law in English Constitutional His-
tory by J. W. Gough, 1955 Edn. p. 73.
(2) William Ball of Barkham Esquire, Ibid, p. 107.