Received: 21 March 2021 Revised: 21 June 2021 Accepted: 6 July 2021

DOI: 10.1002/er.7060

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Optimal energy management of smart buildings under

cyber attack

Basant Kumar Sethi | Amit Singh | Devender Singh | Rakesh Misra

Department of Electrical Engineering, IIT

(BHU), Varanasi, India
Correspondence
Basant Kumar Sethi, Basant Kumar Sethi,
Department of Electrical Engineering,IIT
(BHU), Varanasi, UP, India.
Email: basantkrsethi.rs.eee17@itbhu.ac.in
Summary
A resilient optimal energy scheduling in interconnected smart buildings con-
sidering cyber-attack detection has been proposed in the present work. The
proposed resilient scheduling considers interconnected multiple smart build-
ings with power exchange capability among the smart buildings. It is consid-
ered that each smart building is equipped with different types of distributed
energy resources, battery storage systems, combined heat and power genera-
tors, thermal storage systems, and smart appliances. A comprehensive optimal
and robust scheduling is formulated considering false data injection attack.
The proposed method uses the information of anomaly between the actual and
forecasted bills for detecting the cyber attack and making a resilient scheduling
against possible attacks. The studies indicate that the optimal scheduling in
interconnected smart buildings may reduce the cost up to 4.53% for the system
depending on number of interconnected smart buildings.

KEYWORDS
energy management system, FDIA, FDIA detection, power exchange capability, real time
pricing

1 | INTRODUCTION themselves. In this way, the consumer's average energy

Smart home are end-users of power grids, and they are
essential components of the smart grid infrastructure.
Smart home appliance scheduling techniques play a sig-
nificant role in smart home energy management systems
(SHEMS) as they are responsible for energy consumption.
Multi-smart building energy management systems
(MSBEMS) are specifically used to reduce dependency on
the main utility because they can trade power among
cost is reduced, and the energy load balance of the power
grid is maintained for a fixed time horizon. A well-
designed electricity pricing scheme from the utility side
will guide the energy consumption of the MSBEMS con-
sumer. The utility also provides its consumer with a
demand response (DR) program for proper energy usage
at different time intervals. Renewable energy resources
(RERs) such as roof-top wind turbine and solar PV panels
are installed in residential smart buildings to reduce

Abbreviations: BS, Battery storage; BSS, Battery storage system; CHP, Combined heat and power; CVaR, Conditional value at risk; DERs,
Distributed energy resources; EMU, Energy management unit; EV, Electric vehicle; FDIA, False data injection attack; GA, Genetic algorithm; HAN,
Home area network; HEMS, Home energy management system; ICT, Information and communication technology; IT, Information technology; LMU,
Load management unit; MILP, Mixed-integer linear programming; MINLP, Mixed-integer nonlinear programming; MSB, Multi smart building;
MSBEMS, Multi smart building energy management system; PDL, Peak demand limit; PE, Point estimation method; PEL, Power export limit; PR,
Power ratio of CHP; PSO, Particle swarm optimization; PV, Photovoltaic cell; RE, Renewable energy; SB, Smart building; SH, Smart home; SLs,
Schedulable loads; SOC, State of charge; TC, Thermal capacity; TOU, Time of use; TSS, Thermal storage system; UN, Utility network; UNLs,
Unschedule and noninterruptible loads.

Int J Energy Res. 2021;1–14. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/er © 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 1
2 SETHI ET AL.
carbon emissions. In addition, to reduce the intermittent
behavior of wind and solar system, smart home user uses
battery storage systems (BSSs) in residential building.
For the effective operation of MSBEMS, a secure and
intelligent system incorporating information technology
(IT) and advanced metering infrastructure is required.
The infrastructure communication requires two main
components, the home area network (HAN) and the util-
ity network (UN), to implement scheduling of smart
home devices in MSBEMS. The components need to be
integrated with ICT along with intelligent technologies,
advanced metering structures, and different HANs (such
as WiFi, 802.11, and ZigBee) and UN (such as WiMAX,
IEEE 802.16E, and broadband power line communication
(PLC)). This system is prone to cyber-attacks. Energy
management under cyber attack will be one of the impor-
tant issues in the current power system scenario.
A lot of literature has discussed various scheduling
methods to reduce the energy cost of smart homes (SHs)
without considering the power exchange between Smart
Buildings (SBs). Researchers1 have proposed a new con-
trolled pricing scheme to maximize economic benefits in
HEMS considering EV charging/discharging. Particle
swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm2 is used in SH
architecture to reduce energy consumption cost. Time of
use (TOU) pricing based multiple-users and load priority
(MULP) algorithm3 has been used to schedule home
appliances. Authors4 have proposed genetic algorithm in
SHEMS to reduce energy cost as single objective function.
The authors5 formulate the MILP problem to reduce
energy costs by considering a single load model to inte-
grate different specific appliances. Researchers6 have pro-
posed a dynamic DR to minimize the total energy cost for
SB. Researchers7 have minimized the electricity bill in
SH, considering the consumer spending target. The
author8 has proposed an energy-efficient scheduling
algorithm for residential buildings, which considers
unpredictability in equipment operating time, the inter-
mittent nature of RERs, and BSSs. Authors9 have pro-
posed a multi-agent-based distribution system to reduce
energy consumption in the intelligent community sys-
tem. Artificial intelligent based10 tools are used to man-
age the three-level building energy management. The
authors11 propose optimal power management between
PV and battery storage in SHs.
Several studies have been done on stochastic schedul-
ing of home appliances in SHEMS. Researchers12 have
reduced the operating cost of SHEMS considering the sto-
chastic nature of loads and its consumption uncertainties.
The author13 proposed a residential load management
system to reduce the electricity bill of consumers using
dynamic DR. The author14 presented an optimization
module along with the two-point estimation method
(2PE) for HEMSs considering the conditional value at
risk (CVAR). The author15 considered a stochastic model
for electric vehicles and RERs to optimize customer
satisfaction by introducing fatigue response indices.
Researchers16 have proposed a mixed integer problem
(MIP) in SHEMS to reduce energy costs of consumer as
objective function. The author17 proposed a mixed inte-
ger nonlinear programming problem (MINLP) to sched-
ule home appliances to reduce energy costs.
Authors18 have described the effects of cascading fail-
ures and cyber-attacks in the electrical cyber physical sys-
tems. Modeling of false data injection attack (FDIA) and
their effects on the power system is studied in the litera-
ture.19 Network performance evaluation and effects in
the presence of FDIA in AC and DC power system as
well as communication system are studied.20
Researchers21 have discussed the effect of the FDIA on
the economic benefits of the power system. An anomaly-
based detection technique22 has been depicted using
Kalman filtering against the pricing cyber attack.
Authors23 have studied the impacts of coordinated cyber
attacks such as pricing attack and energy theft in the SH
energy management system. False data injection attack
detection24 in pricing cyber attack is done using anomaly
method in the smart grid. Different cyber attack models
and their impacts have been discussed25 in SHEMS.
Authors26 have proposed short and long term detection
strategy for pricing cyber attack in SHEMS. The impact
of cyber attack in SHEMS and their possible detection,
and mitigation methods has been described.27
Researchers28 have studied the cascaded impacts of pric-
ing cyber attack and also proposed detection technique in
community level of SHEMS. Authors29 discussed the
cyber attack in SH networked community, and also they
have proposed a pricing cyber attack detection technique.
From the above literature survey, it is observed that
researchers have not considered the power exchange
capabilities of SBs based on which energy scheduling of
SBs can be performed. Further, the cyber-attack is quite
probable in SB(s) architecture, hence, its impact on
scheduling program must be investigated. As cyber-attack
detection is a post-facto analysis, it is imperative to per-
form such a scheduling of energy exchange, which is
resilient to cyber-attacks.
For the first time, a multi-SB energy management sys-
tem with detection and defense strategy is proposed
against FDIA in the scheduling process. In addition, the
optimal scheduling of SH appliances, taking into account
the capability of power exchange between SBs, is pro-
posed to reduce operating costs. In the present work,
energy costs minimization with FDIA constraints in the
scheduling process is considered. The major contribu-
tions of the paper can be summarized as follows.
SETHI ET AL.
• A resilient scheduling strategy for interconnected mul-
tiple SBs, with power import and export capabilities, is
proposed to eliminate the effect of FDIA attack.
• The FDIA detection is achieved using the difference in
forecasted and actual bills also the same information is
used to make the resilient scheduling. The forecasted
bill is obtained using support vector regression
method.
The rest of the paper is organized into the following
sections. The system architecture is described in Section 2.
The SB components' modeling is discussed in Section 3.
In Section 4, the formulation of the objective function
with different types of constraints is described. In Sec-
tion 5, the results detailed for different scenarios are
FIGURE 1 Architecture of MSBEMS [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
3
deliberated. Ultimately, the conclusion of this work is
described in Section 6.
2 | ARCHITECTURE OF MSBEMS
Energy management of multi SB is considered in this
work. The basic architecture of the system is shown in
Figure 1. This architecture consists of three inter-
connected SBs, and each SB comprises four SH con-
sumers. Each SB is equipped with distributed energy
resources (DERs) such as rooftop solar PV, wind turbines,
BSSs, and Combine Heat and Power (CHP) generators.
Residential consumers use RERs such as rooftop solar PV
and small wind turbines to reduce their energy cost and
4 SETHI ET AL.
dependence on the main utility in the current scenario.
Smart home users used a battery system to improve the
reliability of MSBEMS due to the presence of uncer-
tainties of solar and wind power generation.
The MSBEMS-based novel system is proposed to
manage domestic load and battery operation (charging,
discharging) so that energy production by RER can be
used effectively. Each SH includes a variety of smart
appliances such as washing machine (WM), dish washer
(DW), tumble dryer, cooker hob, microwave, cooker
oven, lighting bulb, laptop, desktop, vacuum cleaner,
refrigerator, and electric vehicle (EV).
Each SB is equipped with its local Load Management
Unit (LMU), which is a computer-aided device used by the
operator to monitor, control, optimize generation, and
schedule home appliances. Each SB is also equipped with a
smart controller connected to all DERs, smart grids, and
smart devices. Smart controller switches smart devices and
DERs in smart building. All the SB LMUs are connected to
the main energy management unit, which manages the
total energy of the MSBEMS and checks whether it is possi-
ble to import or export electricity between buildings.
MSBEMS can obtain information about the peak demand
limit (PDL) and power export limit (PEL) as well as the
change in power price from the grid through the local area
network. This is possible with the use of the advanced
smart meter infrastructure.
3 | M OD E L I N G O F S B
CO MPONENT S
3.1 | Wind turbine and solar PV model
The amount of power generated by a wind turbine
depend on parameters, such as swept area of wind tur-
bine and wind speed. Similarly, solar energy also depends
on various parameters such as solar radiation, ambient
temperature, and weather conditions. A mathematical
model defining the RES power and different parameters
is taken from the article.30
The wind power Pwb ðt Þ is given as,
Pwb ðt Þ ¼ 0:5  CP  ρ  A  V 3 ðt Þ,
where CP , ρ, A, and V ðt Þ are power co-efficient, air den-
sity, swept area, and wind speed, respectively. CP value
varies in the range 0.25 to 0.45, ρ is taken as 1:255kg=m3 ,
and A value is considered 3:24 m2 .
The solar power Psb ðt Þ is given as,
G r ðt Þ
Psb ðt Þ ¼ Df  PSTC   ½1 þ ðT C  T STC Þ  C T ,
GSTC
where, Df is known as derating factor and its value is
considered 0.8, PSTC is the rated power of solar PV array
in kW under standard conditions, Gr ðt Þ is the
global radiation in kW=m2 , C T is the co-efficient of tem-
perature of solar PV, which is equal to 0.0011 C, T STC
is the temperature under standard condition, which is
equal to 25 C. T C is the solar cell temperature, and it
depends on the ambient temperature ðT a Þ and G is the
global solar radiation on horizontal plane, which is
given as.
T N  20
T C ðt Þ ¼ T a ðt Þ þ  G, ð3Þ
0:8
where T N is the normal temperature of PV cell, whose
value is taken as 48 C.
Therefore, the total renewable energy generation
power PRb ðt Þ is given as
PRb ðt Þ ¼ Psb ðt Þ þ Pwb ðt Þ: ð4Þ
3.2 | Load models
In this work, we have considered four SH consumers
inside each SB, and they use different types of home
appliances for their comfort. Therefore, it is necessary to
model the load based on their operating parameters such
as temperature set point, rating, and time. Such loads are
classified into three categories, that is, Temperature
Dependent Loads (TDLs), Unschedule and Non-
interruptible Loads (UNLs), and Schedulable Loads
(SLs). The modeling of various SH loads for MSBEMS
under consideration is derived from the literature.30
3.2.1 | Model of TDLs
TDLs models are designed according to their set point
and user's comfort temperature, which is given in Equa-
tion (5), for example, refrigerator. The inner temperature
of refrigerator can be modeled as
ð1Þ


 
T h ðt þ 1Þ ¼ ε  T h ðtÞ þ ð1  εÞ  T o  ηair  Prf ðt Þ =a ,
ð5Þ
where T o is the ambient temperature of h SH. ε, ηair , and
a are known as system inertia constant, efficiency, and
insulation constant of refrigerator, respectively. Typically
the values of ε, ηair , and a are taken as 0:95, 1, and 3:21,
ð2Þ
respectively.
SETHI ET AL. 5

The total power consumption by the refrigerator for 3.3 | Price and bill prediction
time t is given as
To forecast price data given in Table 1, 3 months of his-
Prf ðt Þ ¼ Prrf  Sr ðt Þ, ð6Þ torical time series price data has been taken. The
machine learning model has been trained with 8640 sam-
where Prrf and Sr ðt Þ are rated capacity in kW and operat- ples of historical time series price data. The total data set
ing status of refrigerator, respectively, and operating sta- is split into 60% for training and 40% of the data has been
tus, Sr ðtÞ defined as follows. used for testing. A validation set of 10% of training data
has been used for model validation. To prevent model
(
0, if T ≤ T min over fitting, L2 regularization has been adopted. Optimal
S r ðt Þ ¼ h
: ð7Þ hyperparameters were chosen, which minimizes the Root
1, if T ≥ T max
h
Mean Square Error (RMSE) loss function. Figure 2 shows
the details of price forecasting based on machine leaning
The set temperature range is considered from 4 C regression model. Reference bill, BR , prediction is done
to 8 C. based on scheduling of the demand with consideration of
this forecasted price as given in Equation (10)
X
3.2.2 | Model of UNLs BR ¼ μðt Þ:PRb ðt Þ, ð10Þ

Some loads such as TV, laptop, and fluorescent lamp

operating time depends on the consumer comfort and where μðt Þ and PRb ðtÞ are forecasted price and demand of
their requirement are known as UNLs. So the power con- SB, respectively.
sumption of these loads depends on consumer usage pat-
tern. The total power consumption, PUNLs ðtÞ, of UNLs is
sum of the power consumption of each UNLs. 4 | PROB LEM FOR MULATION

4.1 | Energy cost minimization

3.2.3 | Model of SLs
In this paper, the objective is to reduce energy costs by
Dishwasher, dish dryer, WM, cloth washer, cloth dryer, real time pricing (RTP) based scheduling of SH appli-
tumble dryer, etc., are known as SL. The total consumed ances. Different types of constraints employed in the cur-
power, PSL ðt Þ, of the SLs is calculated as rent work are related to consumers requirement as
reflected in terms of operation and duration of equip-
X
A ment, RERs power availability, battery storage con-
PSL ðtÞ ¼ S a ðt Þ  P a , ð8Þ straints, CHP generator constraints, and PDLs. The
a¼1
flowchart given in Figure 3 depicts the overall scheduling
mechanism in this paper.
where Pa is the rated capacity of smart devices a, Sa ðt Þ As some loads such as laptops, televisions, electric
represents the ON/OFF status of SLs, aεf1, 2, …, Sg, where bulbs, desktops, and fans depend on the consumers activ-
S is the number of SLs, and ity, thus EMU does not have the authority to control
these type of loads. When total power consumption will

1, for working be more than the PDL, a warning signal is generated by
S a ðt Þ ¼ ð9Þ
0, for idle: the EMU. But the EMU has the authority to control the

TABLE 1 Forecasted and real time received price

Time (Hour) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Forecasted 2.9 2.7 3 3 1.8 3 3.75 3.5 3.2 3 3.1 3.15 2.8 2.7 2.65 2.75 3 4.25 3.5 3.15 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.6
price(₹)

Received 2.9 2.7 3 3 3.5 3 2.5 2.75 3.2 3 3.1 3.15 2.8 3 3.5 4 3.25 3 2.75 3 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.6
price(₹)
6 SETHI ET AL.

TDLs such as refrigerator and air conditioners by consid-

ering their temperature priority. It determines the on/off
status of the TDLs according to temperature set point.
Therefore, the EMU has the flexibility to turn on/off
these loads as described in the literature.30
To reduce the energy cost of the consumer, the EMU
operator tries to shift the load from peak hours to the off-
peak hours. In addition, SBs exchange power at a rate
lower than the utility selling price but higher than the
utility purchase price according to their surplus and defi-
cit status. For example, if one SB has a lower power
demand than the RER generated power, and if the
power demand of other SBs is greater than the RER gen-
erated power, then they exchange power. Therefore, the
function of MSBEMS is to make effective use of RER and
CHP generation and maintain power demand below
PDL. To reduce electricity bills and reduce utility depen-
dency, the scheduling of loads and power exchange capa-
bility is indispensable. The purpose of this paper is to
FIGURE 2 Flowchart depicts price forecasting propose strategy to reduce energy costs in SB architec-
tures considering the CHP generator natural gas price
and battery maintenance costs. Cyber attack detection
and defense strategy have also been taken into consider-
ation. Thus, the objective function can be formulated as
follows
X
Obj ¼ min CðbÞ, ð11Þ
b

X
CðbÞ ¼ P dis ðb, t Þ  λbmc þ Pchp ðb, t Þ  λg
t
þPgimp ðb, t Þ  μðt Þ  Pgexp ðb, t Þ  λðt Þ
þðPbim  Pbex Þ  λðt Þ, ð12Þ

here, CðbÞ and Pdis ðb,t Þ are the energy cost and battery
discharging power of b-th building at time slot t, respec-
tively, λbmc is the battery maintenance cost, Pchp ðb, t Þ is
the CHP power of b-th building at time slot t. λg is natural
gas price, Pgimp ðb, t Þ and Pgexp ðb, t Þ are the grid import
and export powers, respectively, μðt Þ is the forecasted
electricity price, λðt Þ is the export price, Pbim and Pbex are
the building import and export powers, respectively.
The time and power consumption constraint of appli-
ance, i, should satisfy Equations (13) and (14),
respectively.
X
x i ðt Þ ¼ T min , ð13Þ
t

Pi ðt Þ ¼ x i ðt Þ  Pirated , ð14Þ

here, T min is the minimum ON time of i-th appliance,

FIGURE 3 Scheduling algorithm x i ðt Þ is the binary variable (1 for i-th appliance ON status
SETHI ET AL. 7

at time slot t, 0 otherwise), Pi ðt Þ is the total power con- Pb ðt Þ ≤ Pmax ðt Þ, ð21Þ

sumption of i-th appliance, and Pirated is the rated power
of i-th appliance. where Pmax ðt Þ is the maximum demand limit defined by
The set of smart devices is operating according to the utility.
their start time and end time. The ON or OFF status, CHPs are subject to its rating for generating electric
x i ðtÞ, of i-th appliance can be described as follows. power output as given in Equation (22) and the total heat
generated from the CHP generator can be described as

1, tini ≤ t ≤ touti Equation (23).
x i ðt Þ ¼ : ð15Þ
0, otherwise
Pchp
b ðt Þ ≤ Pc , and
chp
ð22Þ
Power and heat demands of each SH are described by
Equations (16) and (17), respectively.
Pchp
b ðt Þ
X H chp
b ðt Þ ¼ , ð23Þ
PR
P h ðt Þ ¼ Pi ðt Þ, ð16Þ
i
where Pchp is CHP generator rated capacity, H chp
b ðt Þ is the
X c
H h ðt Þ ¼ H i ðt Þ, ð17Þ total heat generated from CHP generator, and PR is
i the power ratio of CHP.
Some home appliances operate in a particular range
here, Ph ðt Þ and H h ðtÞ are power and heat demand of h-th of temperatures such as,
SH, H i ðt Þ is the heat required by i-th appliance.
Equations (18) and (19) represent the load demand T min ≤ T ðt Þ ≤ T max , ð24Þ
and power balance equation of SB without power
exchange capability, respectively, where, T ðt Þ is known as operating temperature of the
X temperature depended load at time interval t.
P b ðt Þ ¼ Ph ðt Þ, ð18Þ Battery storage system is constrained by specific
h parameters, that is, battery capacity, maximum charge-
discharging rating, and SOC limits. Available state of
Pb ðtÞ ¼ Pbchp ðt Þ þ PRb ðt Þ þ Pbdis ðt Þ charge of the battery is calculated as follows.
ð19Þ
þ Pbimp ðt Þ  Pbch ðt Þ  Pbexp ðt Þ,
SOCðtþ1Þ,b ¼ SOCt,b ð1  σ ÞðΔt,b =V b Þ


dis 
 Pch
b ðt Þη  P b ðt Þ=η
ch dis
: ð25Þ
here, Pb ðt Þ is the total demand of b-th building, Pchp
b ðt Þ is
the electric output power of CHP generator, PRb ðt Þ is the
renewable power generation of b-th SB, Pch b ðt Þ and Pb ðt Þ
dis
The SOC of BSS should be maintained within its max-
are the battery charging and discharging power of b-th imum and minimum limits as described in Equation (26).
SB, respectively. Pimp exp
b ðt Þ and P b ðt Þ are the grid import
and export power of b-th SB. SOCmin ≤ SOCb ðt Þ ≤ SOCmax : ð26Þ
The power balance equation incorporating power
trading between SBs is given by Equation (20) Battery cannot charge and discharge simultaneously,
that is,.,
Pb ðt Þ ¼ Pchp imp exp
b ðt Þ þ PRb ðt Þ þ P b ðt Þ þ Pb ðt Þ  P b ðt Þ  P b ðt Þ
dis ch
X X
þ Pim ðb, n, t Þ  Pex ðb, n, t Þ , b ðt Þ ≤ αB  Bb ðt Þ, and
Pch ð27Þ
n,b ≠ n n,b ≠ n

ð20Þ b ðt Þ ≤ αB  ð1  Bb ðt ÞÞ,
Pdis ð28Þ

where, Pim ðb, n, t Þ is the import power from the n-th SB at

time t and Pex ðb, n, t Þ is the export power to the n-th SB.
The total power consumption by the SB during any
interval should not exceed the PDL defined by the grid or
utility in order to reduce the energy cost. This constraint
can be formulated as follows
where, Bb ðt Þ is a binary variable. When battery is charg-
ing at a given time interval t, then Bb ðt Þ ¼ 1 and it is
0 when the battery is discharging.
Charging and discharging power of battery are con-
strained by Equations (29) and (30) and, respectively.
8 SETHI ET AL.

  
BC
 Pim ðb, n, t Þ ¼ αex  bex ðb, t Þ, ð37Þ
η ch Pbch ðtÞ ≤ min Pbchmax ðtÞ, SOC max  SOCðt1Þ, b , and b≠n
100
ð29Þ
Pex ðb, n,t Þ ¼ ð1  αex Þ  bex ðb, t Þ, and ð38Þ
   b≠n
b ðt Þ
Pdis BC

≤ min Pdismax ðt Þ, SOCðt1Þ,b  SOCmin ,
ηdis b
100 Pim ðb, n, t Þ  Pex ðb, n, t Þ ¼ 0, ð39Þ
ð30Þ b≠n b≠n

where αB , Bb ðt Þ, σ, and V b are maximum capacity, binary where αex is the maximum limit of power exchange and
variable, self discharging, and battery voltage of BSS, bex ðb, t Þ is the binary variable for power exchange
respectively. Δt,b is the time interval. between SBs.
Similarly, following constraints specify the thermal The total heat demand by b-th SB is calculated as,
storage in specified parameters. Available SOC of TSS is
obtained from the following expression as Hdðb, t Þ ¼ H chp
b ðt Þ þ TTPdðb,t Þ  TTPcbðb, t Þ, ð40Þ
 
100 TPdbðb, t Þ
TSOCðt þ 1, bÞ ¼ TSOCðt,bÞ þ  TPcbðb, tÞ TTPdðb,t Þ ¼ , and ð41Þ
  TC T ed
100
  TPdbðb, t Þ: ð31Þ
TC
TPcbðb, tÞ
TTPcbðb, t Þ ¼ , ð42Þ
T ec
The state of charge of TSS cannot violate its maxi-
mum and minimum state of charge limits as given in where Hdðb, t Þ is the total heat demand of the b-th SB,
Equation (32), TTPdðb, tÞ and TTPcbðb, t Þ are total discharging and
charging heat of TSS, respectively. T ed and T ec are dis-
TSOCmin ≤ TSOCðt,bÞ ≤ TSOCmax , and ð32Þ charging and charging efficiency of TSS, respectively.

simultaneous charge and discharge of TSS are prohibited

as follows,
TPdbðb, t Þ ≤ ð1  stchpðb, t ÞÞ  TPdmax,
TPcbðb, t Þ ≤ stchpðb, t Þ  TPcmax:
In the above equations, TSOC is the SOC of TSS,
TPcbðb, tÞ, and TPdbðb,t Þ are TSS charging and dis-
charging power, respectively, stchpðb, t Þ is the binary sta-
tus of TSS and TC is thermal storage capacity.
Buying and selling of power to/from the utility grid is
not possible at the same time and can be specified by the
following equations,
grid
Pimp
b ðt Þ ≤ αG  Bb ðt Þ, and
 learning. The scheduled outputs, that is, predicted bill
grid
Pexp ð t Þ ≤ α  1  B b ðt Þ ,
b G
where αG is the maximum limit of power trade from the
grid
grid and Bb ðt Þ binary variable for an SB.
Similarly, an SB cannot simultaneously import and
export electricity from other SBs, that is,
4.2 | FDIA detection and defense
strategy
ð33Þ
The price defined by the utility is prone to FDIA by the
ð34Þ attacker. The attacker can change the utility's price by
injecting some positive or negative value into the actual
price. It is difficult for the user to estimate the
actual change in the utility price by an attacker. Users
can reduce the impact of FDIA on their scheduling to a
certain level. In general, a particular residential user fol-
lows an almost similar pattern of daily load demand. In
addition, the price of electricity may vary, but the shape
of the price curve is roughly the same as the previous
days' shape. Both of these assumptions can be used to
ð35Þ detect FDIA. In this work, a power tariff is forecasted
based on data from the previous 90 days using machine
ð36Þ
BR , consumption pattern PRb ðt Þ, import, and export pow-
ers based on this predicted value are used as a reference.
This reference data is compared with scheduling based
on the actual price received by the smart meter. If B and
Pb ðtÞ are the bill and demand based on actual price data,
a bill increase/decrease rate ΔB can be calculated as,
SETHI ET AL. 9

B  BR
ΔB ¼ : ð43Þ
BR

The rate of change in demand can be calculated as

Pb ðt Þ  PRb ðt Þ
ΔPðt Þ ¼ , ð44Þ
PRb ðtÞ

and these two changes are compared with tolerance

limits δb and δp. If j ΔB j > δb, or j ΔP j > δp, then it
detects the possible FDIA in the price data. In such case,
the following constraints are used for the resilient
scheduling.
!
X XX
Pimp
b ðt Þ þ Pim ðb, n,t Þ T ¼ Pimp,R
b,avg , ð45Þ
t t n b≠n

!
X XX
Pexp
b ðt Þ þ Pex ðb, n,t Þ T ¼ Pexp,R
b,avg , ð46Þ
t t n b≠n

! FIGURE 4 Detection strategy flowchart

X XX
0:9Pbimp, R ðt Þ ≤ Pbimp ðt Þ þ Pim ðb, n, t Þ
t t n b≠n ð47Þ
≤ 1:1Pbimp, R ðt Þ, installed at each SB. CHP is installed at each SB with
specifications as depicted in Table 3. The specifications of
! the RERs are depicted in Table 4. The hourly reference
X XX
0:9Pbexp, R ðt Þ ≤ Pbexp ðt Þ þ Pex ðb, n, t Þ price generated from machine learning and received
t t n b≠n ð48Þ
price in smart meter is shown in Table 1. The renewable
≤ 1:1Pbexp, R ðtÞ, energy generated from solar and wind is depicted in
Figure 5. The natural gas price λg and battery mainte-
P imp,R P exp,R
where Pimp,R
b,avg ¼ T
1
t Pb ðt Þ and Pexp,R
b,avg ¼ T
1
t Pb ðt Þ are nance cost, λbmc are considered 2.7 and 0.5 ₹/kWh,
the average predicted import and export power, respec- respectively. The PDL is considered 15 kW for each
tively. Equations (45) and (46) constraint describes the SB. The proposed MIP framework is implemented in
average import and export power, respectively, after GAMS and CPLEX solver is used to solve the problem.
FDIA. Pimp,R
b ðt Þ and Pexp,R
b ðtÞ are predicted import and
export power in t-th interval, respectively. Equations (45)
and (48) are used to capture users' past behavior. The 5.1 | Energy cost minimization with and
complete detection mechanism is given in a flow chart as without power exchange among SBs
Figure 4.
Two cases are considered in this study, that is, schedul-
ing without inter SB power exchange ðCaseIÞ and
5 | R ES U L T S A N D D I S C U S S I O N scheduling with inter SB power exchange ðCaseIIÞ.
Scheduled demand with and without considering power
The proposed MSBEMS is legitimized by considering dif- exchange between SBs are shown in Figure 6. It is
ferent dwelling loads, DERs, and CHP generators. Differ- observed that each SB tries to consume the load during a
ent types of dwelling loads, viz. refrigerator, TV, laptop, low tariff period or during a high RER generation period.
Fluorescent lamp, WM, DW, tumble dryer, cooker oven, The SB operator avoids purchasing power from the grid
vacuum cleaner, EV, along with their ratings are given in during high price periods, that is, 7:00 to 9:00 hours and
Table 2. 10 kWh battery storage capacity having 10 kWh 18:00 to 19:00 hours, as shown in the price Table. As
charging/discharging limit and 20 kWh thermal storage shown in the Figure 6, there is a higher demand for SBs
capacity having 20 kWh charging/discharging limit are during these time periods in CaseI than in the CaseII.
10 SETHI ET AL.

TABLE 2 Appliances Specification during the low price period (13:00-15:00 hours), but due
to the maximum limit of electricity imports from the grid,
Length of
Sl. no Name of appliances P rated ðkWÞ operation (Hour) SB1 needs to transfer some of the load in the higher price
period (17:00-19:00 hours) in CaseI. In CaseI, SB has only
1 Laptop 0.1 2
one option to power exchange, that is, grid whereas the
2 Refrigerator 0.3 24
SB can exchange power from the grid as well as other
3 Fluorescent lamp 0.84 6 SBs in CaseII. SB1 imports power from both grid and SB2
4 TV 0.3 3 in CaseII during 13:00-15:00 hours. Therefore, the SB1
5 Washing machine 2.1 2 has high demand during this time period in CaseII. The
6 Dish washer 2.1 2 inter-SB power exchange is shown in Figure 7. The inter
SB power exchange price is assumed to be the same as SB
7 Tumble dryer 4 2
to grid export price. Therefore, the seller SB received
8 Cooker hob 3 1
same revenue either it sells energy to grid or other
9 Microwave 1.7 1 SB. But, buyer SB can purchase energy at a low cost
10 Cooker oven 5 1 from other SB as compared to grid. As shown in Figure 8,
11 Vacuum cleaner 1.2 1 SB2 reduces the export power to grid in CaseII as com-
12 Electric vehicle 3.5 3 pared to CaseI during 13:00 to 15:00 hours. Instead of
grid, SB2 exports power to SB1. It has been observed
that, when power exchange capacity is considered, the
TABLE 3 CHP generator specification total power import/export to the grid is less than the
power import/export without considering the power
SB Capacity (kW) Efficiency Power ratio exchange capacity. The power exchange between the
1 20 35 1.3 buildings decreases import and export power from/to the
2 20 40 1.2 grid due to maximum utilization of renewable energy
3 40 35 1.3 generation of SBs. Similarly, all SB alter their scheduling
in CaseII.
The energy cost with inter-SB power exchange is less
TABLE 4 Renewable energy resources specification as compared to energy cost without inter-SB power
exchange, as depicted in Table 5. It is found that the total
Total
Sl. Rating rating
energy cost of the MSBEMS for a particular day without
no Components (kW) Count (kW) inter-SB power exchange is ₹ 736.7557 whereas it is
₹ 703.334 with inter-SB power exchange. It can be con-
1 Solar PV 0.1 24 2.4
cluded that the inter-SB power exchange in MSBEMS
2 Wind turbine 1 2 2
reduces the total electricity bill for a particular day by
using the diversity of consumer demand in SBs.

5.2 | Analysis of FDIA detection and

defense strategy

This section describes the effectiveness of FDIA detection

F I G U R E 5 RER generation [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
For example, compared to CaseII, SB1 demand for CaseI
is lower during 13:00 to 15:00 hours, while higher during
17:00 to 19:00 hours. SB1 tries to import more power
and resilient scheduling. Table 6 depicts the energy cost
under different cases and rate of increased cost under
FDIA. As shown in the Table 6, the values of ΔB are very
large, that is, 56.41%, 32.04%, and 34.05% for SB1, SB2,
and SB3, respectively. But in real life, there is no sudden
change in consumer behavior or market price. This
change in energy costs reflects some malicious activity,
that is, FDIA in utility price, which is a potential threat.
From the given Table 6, it is noticed that energy cost with
resilient scheduling is nearly equal to the energy cost
with predicted scheduling cost. The energy cost with the
FDIA defense strategy is ₹ 714.535, while it is ₹ 703.334
without attack.
SETHI ET AL. 11

(A) (B) (C)

F I G U R E 6 Demand with and without power exchange: A, SB1; B, SB2; and C, SB3 [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]

(A) (B) (C)

FIGURE 7 Inter-smart building power exchange: A, SB1; B, SB2; and C, SB3 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

(A) (B) (C)

FIGURE 8 Smart buildings' grid power exchange: A, SB1; B, SB2; and C, SB3 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Figure 9 shows demand consumption patterns with
and without FDIA, and with resilient scheduling. It is
observed that FDIA in price can shift demand peak and
valley. This shifting may increase consumers' energy cost.
In resilient scheduling, SB scheduling does not just
depend on utility price, it also depends on past consumer
demand pattern. Figure 9 shows that demand patterns do
not unexpectedly change in forecasted scheduling and
resilient scheduling. The import power from the grid at
different scheduling (without attack, with attack, and
attacked with resilient constraints) is shown in Figure 10.
This figure shows that, the import power for the case of
12 SETHI ET AL.

TABLE 5 Energy cost

No of SB Without exchange(₹) With exchange (₹) Reduction (%)
1 228.68 215.489 5.76
2 257.67 240.487 6.66
3 250.406 247.358 1.21
Total cost 736.7557 703.334 4.53

TABLE 6 Energy cost under FDIA and resilient scheduling

Cost with real-time Predicted Increase Cost with resilient

No of SB price data (B) cost (BP ) rate (ΔB) (%) scheduling
1 337.056 215.489 56.41 218.684
2 317.552 240.487 32.04 242.55
3 331.602 247.358 34.05 253.301
Total cost 986.211 703.334 40.21 714.535

(A) (B) (C)

F I G U R E 9 Demand without attack, with attack, and with resilient: A, SB1; B, SB2; and C, SB3 [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]

(A) (B) (C)

F I G U R E 1 0 Grid import and export power without attack, with attack, and with resilient: A, SB1; B, SB2; and C, SB3 [Colour figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

without attack and for the case of attacked with resilient
constraints are nearly similar to each other. The total
import power for the case of without attack is 83.122 kW
whereas, it is 91.535 kW in case of FDIA with resilient
constraints, which is nearly equal to import power in the
case of without attack.
5.3 | Comparison with existing method
A cyber attack detection technique, which is an anomaly
detection method, is proposed in Reference 24. It states
that if j B  M j > kV , a false data probably exists. Where,
M and V represent the mean and SD of the total bill of
SETHI ET AL.
TABLE 7 Comparison
Existing method24
FDIA j B  M j > kV Detection
Attacked price (Table 2) 281.211 > 20 (Yes) Yes
Attack with GN(0,0.75) 3.952 > 20 (No) No
all buildings, respectively. k is a user defined threshold
parameter, which is considered 0.5.21 In the present
work, the values of M and V are estimated at 705 and 40,
respectively. Two different FDIA are considered for com-
parison of proposed detection technique with anomaly
detection method. Case-a: FDIA in price signal as shown
in Table 1. Case-b: FDIA with Gaussian Noise GN
(0,0.75). The optimal total bill in case-a and case-b are
₹986.211 and ₹701.048, respectively. The performance of
proposed and existing method is summarized in Table 7.
In case-a both methods detect the FDIA. The existing
method is unable to detect the FDIA in case-b because
j B  M j > kV is not satisfied. In addition, the value of
ΔB in the proposed method is too small to detect the
attack. But the power demand constraint ΔP detects the
attack in the proposed method.
6 | C ON C L U S I ON
An energy scheduling problem for interconnected SBs
having energy exchange capability has been formulated
as a MILP problem. The proposed energy cost minimiza-
tion approach is resilient toward FDIA. The function of
resilience is embedded in terms of (a) detection of FDIA
through the difference between the forecasted and actual
bill, and (b) energy scheduling considering the forecasted
bill if the difference is more than a predefined tolerance.
For the studied sample system, it has been observed that
the proposed formulation successfully detects the FDIA
and accordingly performs energy scheduling without
succumbing to the attack. The detection algorithm in the
proposed formulation uses an additional metric based on
difference of forecasted and actual power, which makes
the proposed algorithm more sensitive toward FDIA as
compared to existing method based on anomaly detec-
tion. From the sample system studies, it was observed
that when the system is under attack the energy cost
without resilient scheduling is ₹986.211 whereas when
resilient scheduling is performed the energy cost is
₹714.535, establishing the efficacy of the proposed
formulation.
Further studies could be conducted toward the inclu-
sion of other types of cyber attacks such as Denial of Ser-
vice and Man in the-middle attack. In addition, it may be
13
Proposed method
j ΔB j > δb j ΔP j > δp Detection
40.21 > 5 (Yes) 59.3 > 5 (Yes) Yes
0.32 > 5 (No) 59.3 > 5 (Yes) Yes
worthwhile to include the stochastic nature of RERs in
the formulation.
ORCID
Basant Kumar Sethi https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7777-
881X
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How to cite this article: Sethi BK, Singh A,
Singh D, Misra R. Optimal energy management of
smart buildings under cyber attack. Int J Energy
Res. 2021;1-14. https://doi.org/10.1002/er.7060