PECLARO VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 111091 AUGUST 21, 1995;
DOCTRINE:
A private individual hired on a contractual basis as Project Manager for a government undertaking falls under the non-career service
category of the Civil Service and thus is a public officer as defined by Sec 2(b) of RA 3019.
FACTS:
Accused, CLARO J. PRECLARO, is a project manager/consultant of the Chemical Mineral Division, Industrial Technology
Development Institute, Department of Science and Technology, a component of the Industrial Development Institute which is an agency of
the DOST.

He is to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD (JICA) Building at the DOST Compound in Bicutan, Taguig, undertaken by Jaime
Sta. Maria Construction, with Engr. Alexander Resoso, as the company's project engineer. The structure is jointly funded by the
Philippine and Japanese Governments.

While Resoso was in the process of evaluating a Charge Order for some electricals in the building, the petitioner approached him and made
some overtures that expenses in the Change Order are deductive by P280,000 (will be charged to the contractor by deducting from the contract
price), instead of additive (instead of charging it to the owner).

Petitioner intimated that he can forget about the deductive provided he gets P200,000.00, from the expected profit of the contractor.

Resoso conveyed the proposal to Jaime Sta. Maria, owner of Sta. Maria Construction. Sta. Maria, Sr. directed Resoso to proceeded to NBI
to report the incident, the latter suggested for an entrapment plan to which the Sta.Maria conformed. Sta. Maria produced the grease
money of 50k in P500 denominations which was dusted with flourescent powder and placed inside an attache case.

Resoso and Sta. Maria, Jr. arrived at their meeting place, Wendy's. From the moment petitioner received the two envelopes with his
right hand, thereafter placing them under his left armpit, he was accosted by the NBI men. Petitioner's right palmar hand was tested
positive of flourescent powder.

Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with a violation of Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 for committing said offense in relation to
the performance of his official duties.

SANDIGANBAYAN: convicted the petitioner.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:
 asserts that he is not a public officer because he was neither elected nor appointed to a public office, but merely a private
individual hired by the ITDI on contractual basis for a particular project and for a specified period, as evidenced by the
contract of services he entered into with the ITDI.
o not issued with appointment paper; not required to record his working hours by means of a bundy clock neither
did he took an oath of office
 he could not be prosecuted under the RA 3019 because his intervention "was not required by law but in the performance of a
contract of services entered into by him as a private individual contractor,"
 asserts that it was improbable for him to have demanded P200,000.00 from Engr. Resoso, when he could have just talked directly to
the contractor himself.
 impossible for him to make any demands because the final decision regarding accomplishments and billing lies with the DOST
technical committee
 claim that he was set up by Engr. Sta. Maria Sr. and Engr. Resoso for revenge on account, for petitioner's failure to recommend
the Sta. Maria Construction to perform the extra electrical works.

ISSUE:
WON accused, a private individual hired on a contractual basis by the government is a public officer.

RULING:
YES. The accused falls under the non-career service category (formerly termed the unclassified or exemption service) of the Civil
Service and thus is a public officer as defined by RA No. 3019. The fact that the petitioner is not required to record his working hours
by means of a bundy clock or did not take an oath of office became unessential considerations in view of the Sec. 2 (b), RA 3019 clearly
including the petitioner within the definition of a public officer.

Section 2 (b) of RA 3019 defines a public officer to “includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
government…”

The word "includes" used in defining a public officer in Sec. 2(b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive. The terms "classified,
unclassified or exemption service" were the old categories of positions in the civil service which have been reclassified into Career Service
and Non-Career Service by PD 807 providing for the organization of the Civil Service Commission and by the Administrative Code of
1987.

N on-career service in particular is characterized by —

(1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career service ; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period
specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a
 particular project for which purpose employment was made.
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job,
requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed
one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the
hiring agency;

Consequently, a private individual hired on a contractual basis as Project Manager for a government undertaking falls under the non-
career service category of the Civil Service and thus is a public officer as defined by Sec 2(b) of RA 3019.

Furthermore, among petitioner's duties as project manager is to evaluate the contractor's accomplishment reports/billings hence, as
correctly ruled by the Sandiganbayan he has the "privilege and authority to make a favorable recommendation and act favorably in
behalf of the government," signing acceptance papers and approving deductives and additives are some examples. Even,
assuming arguendo that petitioner does not make the final decision, as supervisor/consultant, his recommendations will necessarily carry much
weight

All of the elements of Sec. 3(b) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act are, therefore, present.

It is quite irrelevant from whom petitioner demanded his percentage share of P200,000.00 whether from the contractor's project engineer, Engr.
Alexander Resoso or directly from the contractor himself Engr. Jaime Sta. Maria Sr. That petitioner made such a demand is all that is
required by Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 and this element has been sufficiently established by the testimony of Engr. Resoso.

As related by Engr. Resoso, petitioner considers the P200,000.00 percentage proper compensation since he has allegedly done so much for
the Sta. Maria construction company.

Likewise, petitioner's alleged refusal to see Mr. Jaime Sta. Maria Sr. when the latter tried to arrange meetings with him regarding his
demand does not weaken the cause against petitioner. It does not at all prove that petitioner did not ask for money. Conceivably
petitioner did not muster enough courage to ask money directly from the contractor himself. Getting the amount through the project
engineer would be safer because if Mr. Sta. Maria, Sr. had refused to give money, petitioner could always deny having made the demand.

The failure of the NBI to take photographs of the actual turn-over of the money to petitioner is not fatal to the People's cause. The
transaction was witnessed by several people, among whom were Engr. Resoso, Mr. Sta. Maria Jr. and the NBI agents whose testimonies on
the circumstances before, during and after the turn-over are consistent, logical and credible.

According to NBI Agent Francisco Balanban Sr., they purposely took no photographs of the actual turn-over so as not to alert and scare off the
petitioner. (Intended only to take photos on arrest)

For another, the claim of accused that there was ill-will on the part of the construction company is hardly plausible. It is highly
improbable for the company to embark on a malicious prosecution of an innocent person for the simple reason that such person had
recommended the services of another construction firm. And it is extremely impossible for such company to enlist the cooperation and
employ the services of the NBIfor such an anomalous undertaking. It is more in accord with reason and logic to presuppose that there was
some sort of a mischievous demand made by the accused in exchange for certain favorable considerations, such as, favorable
recommendation on the completeness of the project, hassle-free release of funds, erasure of deductives, etc. Indeed, the rationale for the
occurrence of the meeting and the demand for money is infinite and boundless.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Engr. Sta. Maria Sr., who was then engaged in the construction of another DOST
building, would not risk his business or livelihood just to exact revenge which is neither profitable nor logical.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean that which produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or "that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind."
 MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, OCT. 6, 1998;
DOCTRINE: The following elements of the Section 3(g) of RA 3019 must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:
1] that the accused acted as a public officer;
2] that subject Contract or transaction entered into by the latter is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

All of the elements of SEC. 3 (g) are not present in this case. 1st: Petitioner not having signed Lease Agreement" as a Public officer, there is
neither legal nor factual basis for her conviction under Section 3(g) of Rep Act 3019. 2nd: The rental rate therein provided was based on a study
conducted in accordance with generally accepted rules of rental computation. There is no established standard by which the contract’s rental
provisions could be adjudged prejudicial to LRTA or the entire government. The lease agreement alone does not prove any offense. Neither
does it together with the Sub-lease Agreement prove the offense charged. It could happen that in both contracts, neither the LRTA nor the
Government suffered any injury. There is, therefore, insufficient evidence to prove petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Moreover, neither can petitioner be considered as in conspiracy with Jose P. Dans, Jr., who has been found without any criminal liability for
signing the same Lease Agreement. Absent any conspiracy of petitioner with Dans, the act of the latter cannot be viewed as an act of the
former.
FACTS:
IMELDA R. MARCOS was Minister of Human Settlement while JOSE P. DANS, Jr. was the Minister of Transportation and
Communication. The two served as ex oficio Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a
government corporate entity created under EO No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

Petitioner Marcos was also Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the PGHFI (Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc.)

Petitioner, in her capacity as Chairman of PGHFI, and Jose P. Dans, Jr. as Vice Chairman of LRTA, signed the Lease Agreement by
virtue of which LRTA leased to PGHFI subject lot with an area of 7.340 square meters, at a monthly rental of P102,760.00 for a period of
twenty-five (25) years.

Then, the PGHFI, represented by its Chairman Marcos, sublease the subject property to Transnational Construction Corporation, wherein
said lessee rented the same area for P734,000.00 a month, for a period of twenty-five (25) years.

For executing the Lease Agreement petitioner Marcos and Jose P. Dans, Jr. were charged for violation of SECTION 3(G) OF RA NO. 3019
for conspiring and confederating with each other in entering into subject Lease Agreement under terms and conditions alleged to be
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

SANDIGANBAYAN: Convicted the both the accused.

THIRD DIVISION: Affirmed judgement for Imelda but reversed the same for Dans.

ISSUE:
WON all the elements of Sec. 3 (g) of RA 3019 have been duly substantiated

RULING:
NO. All of the elements of SEC. 3 (g) are not present in this case. Petitioner not having signed Lease Agreement" as a Public officer,
there is neither legal nor factual basis for her conviction under Section 3(g) of Rep Act 3019. Neither can petitioner be considered as in
conspiracy with Jose P. Dans, Jr., who has been found without any criminal liability for signing the same Lease Agreement. Absent any
conspiracy of petitioner with Dans, the act of the latter cannot be viewed as an act of the former.

The following elements of the Section 3(g) of RA 3019 must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:
1] that the accused acted as a public officer;
2] that subject Contract or transaction entered into by the latter is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

As to the FIRST ELEMENT, it is clearly stated on the face of the subject contract that the accused Imelda Marcos signed the lease contract
in her capacity as PGHFI Chairman, and not as Human Settlement Minister nor as ex-officio LRTA Chairman. It was Jose P. Dans, Jr.
who signed said Contract, as ex-officio Vice Chairman of LRTA. Although the petitioner was the ex-officio Chairman of the LRTA, at the
time, there was no evidence to show that she was present when the Board of Directors of LRTA authorized and approved the subject
lease agreement.

In light of the foregoing antecedent facts and circumstances, the irresistible conclusion is that the accused did not sign the subject Lease
Agreement as a public officer, within the contemplation of RA No. 3019 and, therefore, the first element of the offense under Section
3(g) is wanting.

As regards the SECOND ELEMENT: the Sadiganbayan merely based its findings against Marcos & Dans, by comparing the two rental rates, it
then concluded that the rental price of P102,760.00 a month is unfair, unreasonable and disadvantageous to the government, compared to the
monthly rent of P734,000.00 in the Sub-lease Agreement.

Certainly, such a comparison is purely speculative and violative of due process . The mere fact that the Sub-lease Agreement provides a
monthly rental of P734,000.00 does not necessarily mean that the rental price of P102,760.00 per month under the Lease Agreement is
very low, unreasonable and manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. There are many factors to consider in the
determination of what is a reasonable rate of rental.
What is more, as stressed by Jose P. Dans Jr., when subject Lease Agreement was inked, the rental rate therein provided was based on a
study conducted in accordance with generally accepted rules of rental computation.

Notably, the real estate appraiser who testified in the case as an expert witness assured the court that the rental price stipulated in the Lease
Agreement under scrutiny was fair and adequate. In facts, the reasonable rental for subject property at the time of executionof the contract
was only P73K PER MONTH.

Succinctly, the subject Lease Agreement by itself does not prove that the said contract entered into by petitioner is "manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government." There is no established standard by which the contract’s rental provisions could be
adjudged prejudicial to LRTA or the entire government. The lease agreement alone does not prove any offense. Neither does it
together with the Sub-lease Agreement prove the offense charged.

At most, it creates only a doubt in the mind of the objective readers as to which between the lease and sub-lease rental rates is the fair and
reasonable one, considering the different circumstances as well as parties involved. It could happen that in both contracts, neither the
LRTA nor the Government suffered any injury. There is, therefore, insufficient evidence to prove petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

Furthermore, that the lessee, PGHFI, succeeded in obtaining a high rental rate of P734,000.00 a month, did not result in any disadvantage to
the government because obviously, the rental income realized by PGHFI from the Sub-lease Agreement, augmented the financial support for
and improved the management and operation of the Philippine General Hospital, which is, after all, a government hospital of the people and
for the people.

GO VS. THE FIFTH DIVISION OF SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 172602 APRIL 13, 2007;
DOCTRINE: CONSPIRACY
Generally, only a public officer can be helf criminally liable for violation of RA No. 3019However, if there is conspiracy, the act of the public
officer in violating RA 3019 is imputable to the private individual, although they are not similarly situated in relation to the object of the crime.
Moreover, Sec. 9 provides a penalty for public officer or private persons for crime under Sec. 3.

Hence, private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent
offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.

FACTS:
The Court declared in a case as null and void the 1997 Concession Agreement, the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement ( ARCA),
and the Supplemental Contracts entered into between the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) and the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), and PIATCO.

By these PIATCO contracts, the Government awarded in favor of PIATCO the project for the development of the NAIA Passenger
Terminal III under a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) scheme pursuant to BOT Law as amended.

The Court, however, later on ruled that PAIRCARGO CONSORTIUM, PIATCO’s predecessor-in-interest, was not a qualified bidder as it
failed to meet the financial capability requirement under the BOT Law. Moreover, the PIATCO contracts were declared null and void for
being contrary to public policy considering that the 1997 Concession Agreement contains material and substantial amendments,
converting the 1997 Concession Agreement into an entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon:.

Subsequently, the Ombudsman filed a complaint before the Sandiganbayan charging VICENTE C. RIVERA, then DOTC Secretary, in
conspiracy with petitioner HENRY GO, Chairman and President of PIATCO, with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 in relation to the
voided 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA specifically for the substantial amendment therein providing that the government shall
assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter’s default which term is more beneficial to PIATCO and in violation of the BOT
law, and manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines

Petitioner Go was arraigned and entered a plea of "not guilty.

Petitioner Go filed a Motion to Quash and contended that it was error to charge him with the violation given that he was not a public officer,
which is a necessary element of the offense under Sec 3(g) of RA 3019.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:
 conspiracy by a private party with a public officer is chargeable only with the offense under Sec3(e) the elements of which
include that "the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them. Unlike Section 3(e) of RA 3019,
Section 3(g) thereof penalizes only public officers as the operative phrase in the latter provision is "on behalf of the government."
Thus, Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019, by its text, cannot be extended or even enlarged by implication or intendment to bring within its
limited scope private persons.
 As a private person, he could not allegedly enter into a contract "on behalf of the government ," there being no showing of any
agency relations or special authority for him to act for and on behalf of the government.
o In support thereof, petitioner invoked the case of Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, and claimed that in the same manner, the first
element of the offense charged against him is absent because he is not a public officer who is authorized by law to bind
the government through the act of "entering into a contract." hence, there is no other recourse but to quash the
Information.
  He insists that the allegation of conspiracy between Rivera and himself is not supported by any evidence. His mere signing of the
ARCA does not allegedly establish culpability for violation of RA 3019.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner Go, a private person, may be charged with violation of Sec 3(g) of RA 3019.

RULING:
YES. The application of the anti-graft law extends to both public officers and private persons.

The fact that one of the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is "that the accused is a public officer" does not necessarily preclude its
application to private persons who, like petitioner Go, are being charged with conspiring with public officers in the commission of the offense
thereunder.

Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent
offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.

Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan is inapplicable to Go’s case. It is true that Marcos’ acquittal was based on the finding that she signed the subject
lease agreement as a private person, not as a public officer. As such, the first element was wanting. However, this acquittal should also be taken
in conjunction with the fact that, Dans, the public officer and with whom Marcos had allegedly conspired with in committing Section
3(g) of RA 3019, had already been acquitted. Marcos could then not be convicted, on her own as a private person, of the said offense.

In contrast, petitioner Go cannot rightfully assert the total absence of the first element in his case because he is not being charged alone
but in conspiracy with Rivera, undoubtedly a public officer by virtue of his then being the DOTC Secretary. The case against both of them is
still pending before the Sandiganbayan.

xxxx
As correctly outlined by the Office of the Ombudsman, the facts alleged in the Information, if admitted hypothetically, establish all the
elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 vis-à-vis petitioner Go:
(1) 1ST ELEMENT: Conspiracy
(2) 2nd ELEMENT: Conspiracy
(3) 3RD ELEMENT: ARCA substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III
providing that the government shall assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter’s default which terms are more
beneficial to PIATCO and in violation of the BOT Law and manifestly grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic
of the Philippines

The finding of probable cause against petitioner by the Office of the Ombudsman is a function duly belonging to the latter. The exercise of such
function cannot be meddled with by the courts by virtue of the doctrine of non-interference except for compelling reasons.

To be indicted of the offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, the following elements must be present:
1) that the accused is a public officer;
2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government

MARZAN VS. PP, OCT. 11, 2021

DOCTRINE:
The elements of Section 3(a) of RA 3019 are:
(i) The offender is a public officer;
(ii) The offender persuades, induces or influences another public officer to perform an act or the offender allows himself to be persuaded, induced,
or influenced to commit an act;
(iii) The act performed by the other public officer or committed by the offender constitutes a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duty of the latter

Section 3(a) of RA 3019 may be committed in either of the following modes:

(1) when the offender persuades, induces or influences another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the public officer; or

(2) when the public officer allowed himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced to perform said act which constitutes a violation of
rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the public officer.

The law is clear that the second mode merely requires that the offender who allowed himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced, is a public officer,
such as Marzan. Thus, in reference to the second mode of Section 3(a) of RA 3019, it is immaterial whether the one who induced him was likewise a public
officer or a private individual,

FACTS:
Atty. RUPISAN was a Provincial Department Head, being then the Provincial Legal Officer of Nueva Vizcaya. He a prominent figure in the
political and legal arena and a close ally of the Provincial Governor. While Accsued MARZAN was a Senior Jail Officer 3 (SJO3) of
the BJMP. The two were charged with violation of Section 3(a) of RA 3019 before the Sandiganbayan when the former

It was alleged that Atty. Rupisan issued a Recognizance without Court approval stating therein that he will take under his custody the detained
persons (Cyrus & Pascua), verbally citing further, in apparent intent to confuse Marzan that the commitment and detention of the accused are
unlawful since no warrant for their arrest was issued which should preclude the issuance of a commitment order,

Consequently, Manzan release Cyrus and Pascua by virtue of said Recognizance signed by Atty. Rupisan, knowing fully well that the same
was in violation of the law and BJMP rules and regulations.

Cyrus Dulay [Cyrus] and Wendell Pascua [Pascua] were arrested in flagrante delicto during the night duty of SPO2 Tapiru and his team
members, when latter passed by a commotion involving some persons who were throwing bottles of Red Horse Beer. Pascua, Cyrus and a
certain Maximo Pascus were apprehended and brought to the patrol car. After gathering information from bystanders, SPO2 Tapiru's team
learned that Dulay, Pascua, and Maximino attacked a certain DENNIS F. BUTIC (BUTIC), who suffered a broken teeth after being hit
with a bottle of Red Horse Beer.

A criminal complaint for Frustrated Homicide was subsequently filed against Dulay and Pascua. They were detained by virtue of the
Commitment Order issued by MTC.

However, when SPO2 Tapiru reported back to the police station and was informed that Cyrus and Pascua were released on recognizance under
the custody of Atty. Rupisan and with the consent of Marzan. SPO2 Tapiru noticed that the Recognizance was issued by Atty. Rupisan and not
by a court.

Meanwhile, Jail Chief Inspector was also informed of the said release and ordered Marzan to re-arrest Cyrus and Pascua as their release being
in violation of BJMP Manual.

In view of the foregoing, Mazan and Atty. Rupisan were both charged with violation of Section 3(a) of RA 3019.

MANZAN’S DEFENSE: The subject "Recognizance" and unsigned Commitment Order were shown by his superior, Goyo. Thereafter, the
latter instructed him to release Cyrus and Pascua from detention, to which he obliged.

ATTY.RUPISAN’S DEFENSE: The father of Cyrus, requested that he intercede for the release of Cyrus, to which he obliged and wrote a
letter requesting any officer of the law to release Cyrus, if there is no case filed against him yet.

SANDIGANBAYAN: convicted both of the accused. MR denied. Atty. Rupisan took advantage of his position as Provincial Legal Officer
to exert influence on Marzan as a jail officer.

Hence, this petition for review filed by Manzan.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
 he released Cyrus and Pascua from detention pursuant to the instruction of his superior, Goyo, and not by virtue of Atty.
Rupisan's inducement or influence.
 if indeed he was persuaded, induced or influenced to release Cyrus and Pascua from detention, it was through a private
individual Ciriaco, the father of Cyrus, who was a relative of the town's Vice Mayor (Not a public officer)

ISSUE:
WON Marzan is liable for Section 3(a), RA 3019

RULING:
YES. Marzan is guilty of the second mode of SEC. 3(A), RA 3019 for allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced by Atty.
Rupisan who unlawfully issued the Recognizance and consequently caused the release of both Cyrus and Pascua. The law is clear that
the second mode merely requires that the offender who allowed himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced, is a public officer,
such as Marzan.

Thus, in reference to the second mode of Section 3(a) of RA 3019, it is immaterial whether the one who induced him was likewise a public
officer or a private individual, such as Ciriaco

The elements of Section 3(a) of RA 3019 are:

(iv) The offender is a public officer;
(v) The offender persuades, induces or influences another public officer to perform an act or the offender allows himself to be
persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit an act;
(vi) The act performed by the other public officer or committed by the offender constitutes a violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duty of the latter

All of the elements are present in this case.

First: it is undisputed that Marzan was a public officer at the time of the commission of the crime.
Second: Section 3(a) of RA 3019 may be committed in either of the following modes:
(3) when the offender persuades, induces or influences another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of
rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of
the public officer; or
 (4) when the public officer allowed himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced to perform said act which constitutes a
violation of rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official
duties of the public officer.

Atty Rupisan is guilty of the first mode in view of his unauthorized intervention in the processing of the release of Cyrus and
Pascua in the form of a Recognizance despite the pendency of the preliminary investigation.

While Marzan was guilty of the second mode for allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced by Atty. Rupisan
who unlawfully issued the Recognizance and consequently caused the release of both Cyrus and Pascua. The law is clear
that the second mode merely requires that the offender who allowed himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced, is a
public officer, such as Marzan.

Thus, in reference to the second mode of Section 3(a) of RA 3019, it is immaterial whether the one who induced him was
likewise a public officer or a private individual, such as Ciriaco

Third: Marzan unlawfully released Cyrus and Pascua.

To stress, Cyrus and Pascua were lawfully detained pursuant to a duly issued commitment order of a court of law and yet
they were released pursuant to an improperly issued Recognizance, without an accompanying Court Order, in violation of the
law and BJMP rules and regulations.

In the instant case, all the elements of the offense under Section 3(a) of RA 3019, were established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court, in imposing the penalty provided under Sec. 9, took into consideration that this is Marzan's very first time during his long service
with the BJMP, thus, Instead of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to ten (10) years as maximum, he is sentenced
to the reduced period of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to seven (7) years as maximum.

PELIGRINO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

, AUGUST 13, 2001;
DOCTRINE:
To convict the accused in a prosecution for the violation of Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft Law, mere receipt of a gift or any other
benefits is enough, even without any express demand for it. The duration of the possession is not controlling.

Section 3(b) or (c) penalizes three distinct acts — (1) requesting; (2) receiving; or (3) requesting and receiving — any gift, present, share,
percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any
other party, wherein a public officer in. an. official capacity has to intervene under the law. These criminal acts are distinct and different
from each other. Proof of the existence of any of them suffices to warrant conviction.
FACTS:
Petitioner Pelegrino, an examiner of BIR, together with his supervisor Revenue Offier Atty. Buenafe were assigned to examine the
books of Dr. Antonio N. Feliciano in connection with the investigation of the books of accounts for income and business tax
returns earned by professionals.

Petitioner Pelegrino and Atty. Buenafe went to the complainant’s office and told Dr. Feliciano that his tax deficiencies would amount
to P500k. Shocked, because his books were not even examined, complainant entertained the idea that it was the beginning of an
extortion, and he tried to negotiate for a smaller amount, and finally the two (2) accused agreed to the amount of 200k, of which 50k
would be paid to the BIR, and the rest to them.

Dr. Feliciano immediately wrote a letter to the NBI requesting for assistance, and an NBI Agent went to his office where they
talked and arranged for an entrapment. On the said entrapment date, neither accused appeared.

The following day, NBI agents returned to the office clinic before lunch time and waited for the two (2) suspects. The arrangement was
that, the NBI agents would stay in one of the rooms of the clinic, would wait for the signal of the Doctor which was the sound of the
buzzer, and when the buzzer was heard they would proceed to arrest the subject of the operation.

At around 4:30 p.m., accused Peligrino arrived, and so upon hearing the sound of the buzzer, NBI agents immediately proceeded to the
room of Dr. Feliciano, and on seeing the accused in possession of the brown envelope which contained the marked money, arrested
him, and made a body search on him. "The accused was then brought to the NBI Office in Manila where he was examined for the
detection of the fluorescent powder [o]n his hands and body.

Buenafe and PPeligrino were both charged with violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019.

PELEGRINO: co-accused Buenafe gave him three (3) copies of ATIPO to deliver the same to Dr. Feliciano, and get the check if it is already prepared.
He arrived at the Office of the Doctor at around 4:00 to 4:30 p.m. While waiting for the ATIPO to be xeroxed, Dr. Feliciano asked him if he would accept
payment in cash to which he said No and he would accept only check payable to the BIR. Thereafter, the Doctor took a brown envelope from his drawer,
threw it in front of him and said 'yan ang bayad.' The envelope landed close to his arms and so he pushed it asking: 'What is that sir? My purpose in
coming here is to get the check in payment for the BIR'. Instead of answering him, the Doctor stood up and told him he [was] going to get the xerox copy
of the ATIPO.

'The Doctor returned followed by two (2) persons one of whom grabbed his hands from behind while the other standing behind him wanted him to hold the
envelope but he resisted[,] placing his hands against his chest, and since the two men realized he [could] not be forced to hold the envelope, they let him
go, picked the envelope and pressed it against his breast.

SANDIGANBAYAN: Convicted petitioner of the offense charged, but acquitted his co-accused;
 As regards to Buenafe, there was no sufficient proof that he conspired with petitioner.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
 avers that he merely informed complainant of his tax deficiencies, and that it was the latter who requested the reduction of
the amount claimed. He
 incident in complainant's clinic was a frame-up, thus, there could not have been any payoff, inasmuch as there was no
demand.
 Denied that he received payoff money from the complainant.
o According to him, receive, as contemplated in the offense charged, connotes a voluntary act coupled with
knowledge.
o Hence, where the giving of the money affords the accused no opportunity either to refuse or to return it to the giver,
no punishable offense ensues.
o the 40 seconds or less that the boodle money was in his hands was merely a momentary possession that could
not prove "receipt," which the law requires for the offense charged to be consummated.

ISSUE:

RULING:

The elements of SEC. 3(B),RA 2019 are the following:

(1) the offender is a public officer
(2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or a benefit
(3) on behalf of the offender or any other person
(4) in connection with a contract or transaction with the government
(5) in which the public officer, in .an official capacity under the law, has the right to intervene.

Petitioner is a BIR examiner assigned to the Special Project Committee tasked to undertake verification of tax liabilities of various
professionals particularly doctors. Since the subject transaction involved the reassessment of taxes due from private complainant, the
right of petitioner to intervene in his official capacity is undisputed. Therefore, elements (1), (4) and (5) of the offense are present.

Section 3(b) of RA 3019 penalizes three distinct acts –

(1) demanding or requesting;
(2) receiving; or
(3) demanding, requesting and receiving
-- any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the government and any other party, wherein a public officer in an official capacity has to intervene under
the law. These modes of committing the offense are distinct and different from each other. Proof of the existence
of any of them suffices to warrant conviction.

The lack of demand is immaterial. Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 uses the word or between requesting and receiving.

Like bribery, this crime is usually proved by evidence acquired during an entrapment, as the giver or briber is usually the only one
who can provide direct evidence of the commission of this crime. Thus, entrapment is resorted to in order to apprehend a public
officer while in the act of obtaining undue benefits.

Accordingly, the Court ruled that there must be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and
consider it as his or her own property from then on. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance or act
to show acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime has been committed. To hold otherwise would
encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by simply putting within their physical custody some gift, money or
other property.

The duration of the possession is not the controlling element in determining receipt or acceptance. In the case at bar, petitioner
opened the envelope containing the boodle money, looked inside, closed it and placed the envelope beside him on the table. Such
reaction did not signify refusal or resistance to bribery, especially considering that he was not supposed to accept any cash from
the taxpayer. The PROXIMITY OF THE ENVELOPE relative to petitioner, as testified to by NBI Agent Ragos, also belies
petitioner's contention that he refused the bribe.

A person found in possession of a thing taken from the recent execution of a wrongful act is presumed to be both the taker and
the doer of the whole act.

Petitioner alludes to the doctrine that if the conviction of the accused rests upon the same evidence used to convict the co-accused,
the acquittal of the former should benefit the latter. Such doctrine does not apply to this case. The strongest pieces of evidence
against petitioner were the ones obtained from the entrapment, in which Buenafe was not involved. Hence, the evidence against
petitioner and that against his co-accused were simply not at par with each other.
In "instigation," officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure the accused into committing an offense, which the latter
otherwise would not commit and has no intention of committing. In "entrapment," the criminal intent or design to commit the offense
charged originates in the mind of the accused, and the law enforcement officials merely facilitate the commission of the crime
 VILLAUNEVA VS. PP, JULY 8, 2020;
DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
RACE (Rayborn-Agzam Center for Education, Inc) is a private competency assessment center accredited by TESDA. RACE conducts
competency assessment in NC II programs which are needed by applicants for work in hotels and restaurants domestic or abroad.

The complainant, Raymundo, Manager of RACE, sought the help of Nida in establishing RACE. Petitioner Nida then became one of the
incorporators of RACE. To commence the incorporation of RACE, an indorsement from TESDA was obtained as a requirement in its
application for registration with the SEC.

An Indorsement Letter was issued and signed by Petitioner, EDWIN S. VILLANUEVA (Edwin) was the Provincial Director of TESDA, Aklan
Provincial Office.

After the incorporation of RACE, Nida was employed by RACE as an In-House Assessor.

RACE'S accreditation as a Competency Assessment Center was approved and signed by petitioner Edwin and was confirmed by TESDA
Director

Based from the foregoing, Spouses Villanueva were charged for violation of Section 3 (d) of RA 3019: Accepting or having any member of his
family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year
after its termination.

NIDA: noble purpose of putting up a TESDA accredited training center; Edwin was not aware of her employment with RACE.

EDWIN: denied having knowledge that his was was an incorporator of RACE when he signed the Indorsement Letter to SEC AND THAT his
function is ministerial in nature.

SANDIGANBAYAN: Convicted the petitioner for SEC. 3(d)

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
 RACE, being a non-stock and non-profit TESDA accredited educational association, may not be within the purview of the
"private enterprise" indicated in Section 3 (b)
o "enterprise" referred to in the law connotes an entity primarily organized for profit.
 despite being a relative of a public officer, Nida's profession falls under the exempted professions under AdminCode
o Nida's roles as a competency assessor is considered in the category of that of a teacher under the RACE

ISSUE:
WON provisions of Section 3 (d) of RA 3019 are applicable in this case, considering that the entity into which Nida was employed is not
considered a private entity in contemplation of the law.

RULING:
YES. The law is very clear and straightforward. A public officer or any member of his family cannot accept employment in a private
enterprise with whom such public officer has a pending official business with during the pendency thereof or within one year from its
termination as it is considered a corrupt practice.

The fact that RACE is a non-stock and non-profit educational association is immaterial. Regardless if the enterprise is for profit or
not, stock or nonstock, the law does not distinguish. It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that: where the law does not
distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. Thus, mere acceptance by Nida, a family member, of employment with RACE, which is a
private non-stock and non-profit enterprise, renders petitioners liable under the law.

Violation of Section 3(d) of RA No. 3019 is considered malum prohibitum. Mere acceptance by the co-accused, a family member, of
employment with RACE rendered the accused liable under the law.

In addition, All the elements of violation of Section 3 (d) of RA 3019 are present and duly proven and established in THIS CASE.

For one to be found guilty under SEC. 3(D), RA 3019, the following elements must be present and proven beyond reasonable doubt:
(a) the accused is a public officer;
(b) he or she accepted or has a member of his or her family who accepted employment in a private enterprise; and,
(c) such private enterprise has a pending official business with the public officer during the pendency of official business or
within one year from its termination.

1ST: Edwin was the Provincial Director of TESDA at the time of commission of the crime
 His wife Nida, though a private citizen, can be validly charged in conspiracy with her husband in the commission of the crime.
It has long been settled that private individuals may be sued and indicted together with the co-conspiring public officer in abidance
with the policy of RA 3019.
 Additionally, Section 9 of RA 3019 concretizes the conclusion that the anti-graft practices law applies to both public and private
individuals.
2ND: Nida accepted employment in RACE, which is a private enterprise, as an In-House Competency Assessor. She is not only an employee
but also an incorporator or part owner of the said entity.

3RD: During the time that Nida accepted employment with RACE, the latter had a pending official business with TESDA over which
Edwin had control and supervision as Provincial Director thereof.
 There is no doubt that Nida's act of accepting employment occurred when RACE, a private enterprise, had a pending official
business with TESDA-Aklan, which is under Edwin's control and supervision.

In the present case, the issuance of the subject Indorsement Letter to SEC and even the signing of the RACE'S TESDA accreditation cannot be
deemed a merely ministerial act on the part of Edwin. It is a discretionary act or function of a TESDA Provincial Director to sign the foregoing
Indorsement Letter in accordance with certain law

Likewise, petitioners cannot extricate themselves from the claws of law by denying Edwin's knowledge of Nida's employment with RACE.
Unsubstantiated denial is a weak defense and cannot be given credence as it is self-serving. There is sufficient evidence to support the
conclusion that Edwin was aware of the involvement of Nida with RACE.

Therefore, Edwin, in conspiracy with his wife, was held liable for corruption under Section 3(d) of RA No. 3019. Because of conspiracy,
his wife is also liable. Moreover, under Section 9(a), a private person committing any of the unlawful acts under this law shall also be
punished.

MEJORADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN JUNE 30, 1987

DOCTRINE:
Section 3(e) is not applicable exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions.

FACTS:
Eight informations were filed by the Provincial Fiscal against the petitioner and jointly tried before the Sandiganbayan, and substantially
allege the same set of circumstances constituting the offense charged under RA 3019.

Accused Mejorada, a Right-of-Way-Agent of the Office of the Highway District Engineer. As a right-of-way agent, his main duty was to
negotiate with property owners affected by highway constructions or improvements for the purpose of compensating them for the damages
incurred by said owners.

petitioner contacted the complainants and informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or
improvements affected by the widening of said highway.

In the process, Mejorada required the claimants to sign blank copies of the “Sworn Statement on the Correct and Fair Market Value of
Real Properties and “Agreement to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct improvements'' pertinent to their claims. The claimants
complied without bothering to find out what the documents were all about as they were only interested in the payment of damages.

In said "Sworn Statements" and "Agreements to Demolish", the value of the respective properties of the claimants were made to appear very
much higher than the actual value claimed by them. Likewise, the said "Agreements to Demolish" reflected the value of the improvements as
per assessor" which on the average was only P2,000.00 lower than the value declared by the owners in their sworn statements. The value as per
assessor was, in turn, supported by the Declarations of Real Property in the names of the claimants containing an assessed value exactly the
same as that stated in the Agreements to Demolish "as per assessor", except the claims of De la Cruz and Aran where there is only a difference
of P400.00 and P200.00, respectively.

Later it turned out that said Declarations of Property are not really intended for the claimants as they were registered in the names of
other persons, thus showing that they were all falsified.

accused accompanied the claimants to the Office of the Highway District Engineer to receive payments and personally assisted the claimants in
signing the vouchers and encashing the checks.

After said claim was approved and the corresponding PNB Check was issued and encashed in the amount of P7,200.00, Mejorada accompanied
them to his car which was parked nearby where they were divested of the amounts paid to them leaving only the sum of P1,000.00 to each,
except Isaac Carlos to whom P5,000.00 was left, explaining to them that there were many who would share in said amounts. All the claimants
were helpless to complaint because they were afraid of the accused and his armed companion.

Thereafter, they went with their counsel to the Provincial Fiscal Office of Pasig City wherein informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTON:
 he is not charged with the duty of granting licenses, permits or other concessions, then he is not the officer contemplated by Section 3
(e).
 denies that there was injury or damage caused the Government because the payments were allegedly made on the basis of a document
solely made by the Highway District Engineer to which petitioner had no hand in preparing.
 For the third element to be present, the alleged injury or damage to the complainants and the government must have been caused by
the public officer in the discharge of his official functions and inasmuch as when the damage was caused to the complainants, he was
no longer discharging his official administrative functions, therefore, he is not liable for the offense charged.
  cannot be convicted for a violation of the Anti-Graft Law because the evidence adduced by the prosecution is not the violation of
Section 3 (e) but the crime of robbery.
 The penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan which totals fifty-six (56) years and eight (8) days of imprisonment is contrary to the
three-fold rule and insists that the duration of the aggregate penalties should not exceed forty (40) years.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the essential elements constituting the offense penalized bysection 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graftand Corrupt Practices Act have been clearly and convincingly proven by theprosecution;
(2) Whether or not there is a variance between the offense charged in theinformation and the offense proved
(3) WON the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is excessive andcontrary to the three-fold rule as provided for by Article 70 of the
RevisedPenal Code;

RULING:
1. YES.
The three essential elements for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
(2) that the accused acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
(3) that the accused caused undue injury to any party including the Government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 refers to “any public officer”. It makes no distinction or qualification and specifies the acts declared
unlawful. A violation may occur when an officer takes advantage of his position and divests private parties of compensation they must receive.

Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 provides that: this provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The last sentence of Section 3(e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of public officers granting lcenses or permits or other
concessions. It should not be interpreted as an exclusionary rule. In sum, Section 3(e) is not applicable exclusively to public officers charged
with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions.

1st: accused must be a public officer.

2nd: the government suffered undue injury as a result of the petitioner's having inflated the true claims of complainants which became the basis
of the report submitted by the Highway District Engineer to the Regional Director of the Department of Highways and which eventually
became the basis of payment.

His contention that he had no participation is belied by the fact that as a right-of-way-agent, his duty was precisely to negotiate with property
owners who are affected by highway constructions for the purpose of compensating them.

On the part of the complainants, the injury caused to them consists in their being divested of a large proportion of their claims and receiving
payment in an amount even lower than the actual damage they incurred. They were deprived of the just compensation to which they are
entitled.

3rd: the fact that the petitioner took advantage of his position as a right-of-way-agent by making the claimants sign the aforementioned
agreements to demolish and sworn statements which contained falsified declarations of the value of the improvements and lots. There was
evident bad faith on the part of the petitioner when he inflated the values of the true claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share
of the amounts due them.

All of the elements are present in this case.

2. NO. As to the argument of the petitioner that the evidenced adduced by the prosecution is that of robbery, the Court ruled that there is no
variance between the offense charged in the information and the offense proved. The prosecution was able to establish through the
corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented how through evident bad faith, petitioner caused damage to the claimants and the
Government. The manner by which the petitioner divested the private parties of the compensation they received was part of' the scheme
which commenced when the petitioner approached the claimants and informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the
values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of the Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road. The evidence presented by the
prosecution clearly establish a violation of Section 3(e).

3. NO. Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as setforth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

This article is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed.
Article 70 speaks of “service” of sentence, “duration” of penalty and penalty “to be inflicted.” Nowhere in the article
is anything mentioned about the “imposition of penalty.” It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more
than three times the most severe of these penalties the maximum of which is forty year.

Even without the authority provided by Article 70, courts can still impose as many penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses
committed, since for every individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed by law. Each single crime is an outrage
against the State for which the latter, thru the courts of justice, has the power to impose the appropriate penal sanctions

The Sandiganbayan, therefore, did not commit any error in imposing eight penalties for the eight informations filed against the accused-
petitioner. Hence, petitioner cannot assail the penalty imposed upon him as harsh, cruel and unusual.