1st SET

METROBANK v. CA and GTP

Respondent GTP, thru Atty. Atienza, requested from METROBANK that he be furnished a copy of the full indebtedness secured by the
real estate mortgage. In response thereto, petitioner METROBANK issued a statement of account as of September 15, 1980 which
amount was immediately settled and paid the next day amounting to P116,416.71. Petitioner METROBANK is thus barred from taking a
stand inconsistent with its representation upon which respondent GTP, as an innocent third person to the real mortgage agreement,
placed exclusive reliance. Respondent GTP had the reasonable right to rely upon such representations as true, considering that it had
no participation whatsoever in the mortgage agreement and the preparation of the statement of account, coupled with the expectation
that a reputable banking institution such as petitioner METROBANK do conduct their business concerns in the highest standards of
efficiency and professionalism. For an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be
denied or disproved as against a person relying thereon. A party may not go back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice
of the other party who relied upon them. In the law of evidence, whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising
out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it.

AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE v. GARAY

To be a valid ground for dismissal, loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly
established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from
an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's
arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. Such ground
of dismissal has never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse because of its subjective nature

SECURITY BANK AND MANHIT v. CA

It is not denied that private respondent incurred additional expenses in constructing petitioner bank's building due to a drastic and
unexpected increase in construction cost. In fact, petitioner bank admitted liability for increased cost when a recommendation was
made to settle private respondent's claim for P200,000.00. Private respondent's claim for the increased amount was adequately proven
during the trial by receipts, invoices and other supporting documents.

Further, it cannot be denied that petitioner bank derived benefits when private respondent completed the construction even at an
increased cost.

Hence, to allow petitioner bank to acquire the constructed building at a price far below its actual construction cost would undoubtedly
constitute unjust enrichment for the bank to the prejudice of private respondent. Such unjust enrichment, as previously discussed, is not
allowed by law.

2nd SET

ALANO v. LOGMAO

A careful reading of the above shows that petitioner instructed his subordinates to "make certain" that "all reasonable efforts" are
exerted to locate the patient's next of kin, even enumerating ways in which to ensure that notices of the death of the patient would
reach said relatives. It also clearly stated that permission or authorization to retrieve and remove the internal organs of the deceased
was being given ONLY IF the provisions of the applicable law had been complied with. Such instructions reveal that petitioner acted
prudently by directing his subordinates to exhaust all reasonable means of locating the relatives of the deceased. He could not have
made his directives any clearer. He even specifically mentioned that permission is only being granted IF the Department of Surgery has
complied with all the requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could not have been faulted for having full confidence in the ability of the
doctors in the Department of Surgery to comprehend the instructions, obeying all his directives, and acting only in accordance with the
requirements of the law.

Furthermore, as found by the lower courts from the records of the case, the doctors and personnel of NKI disseminated notices of the
death of respondent's son to the media and sought the assistance of the appropriate police authorities as early as March 2, 1988, even
before petitioner issued the Memorandum. Prior to performing the procedure for retrieval of the deceased's internal organs, the doctors
concerned also the sought the opinion and approval of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.
 LAUREL v. ABROGAR

The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the Penal Code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need
not be capable of “asportation,” which is defined as “carrying away.”7 Jurisprudence is settled that to “take” under the theft provision of
the penal code does not require asportation or carrying away.

The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal property which can be the object of theft under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. Business may be appropriated under Section 2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could
be object of theft

Business is likewise not enumerated as personal property under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however, it may be
appropriated. Following the ruling in Strochecker v. Ramirez, business should also be classified as personal property. Since it is not
included in the exclusive enumera-tion of real properties under Article 415, it is therefore personal property.

Indeed, while it may be conceded that “international long distance calls,” the matter alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the
form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that such international long distance calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT
since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and
transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls,
then it could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent. It is the use of these communications facilities
without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.

DREAM VILLAGE v. BASES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property only if there is a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable, together with an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth. Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. Also under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529, it is provided that before acquisitive prescription can commence, the property sought to be registered must not only be classified
as alienable and disposable, it must also be expressly declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth, or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Absent such an express declaration by the
State, the land remains to be property of public dominion.

The above proclamations notwithstanding, Fort Bonifacio remains property of public dominion of the State, because although declared
alienable and disposable, it is reserved for some public service or for the development of the national wealth, in this case, for the
conversion of military reservations in the country to productive civilian uses. Needless to say, the acquisitive prescription asserted by
Dream Village has not even begun to run.

MANECLANG v. IAC

The stipulations contained in the Compromise Agreement partake of the nature of an adjudication of ownership in favor of herein
petitioners of the fishpond in dispute, which, as clearly found by the lower and appellate courts, was originally a creek forming a
tributary of the Agno River. Considering that as held in the case of Mercado vs. Municipal President of Macabebe, a creek, defined as a
recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property belonging to the public domain which
is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, and as a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens
System in the name of any individual; and considering further that neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National
Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and out of the subject fishpond, nor its converson into a fishpond,
alter or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public domain, the Court finds the Compromise Agreement null and void and
of no legal effect, the same being contrary to law and public policy.

3rd SET

BOGO-MEDELLIN v. CA

Extraordinary prescription

There is no dispute that the controversial strip of land has been in the continuous possession of petitioner since 1929. But possession,
to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under a claim of title, that is, it must be adverse. Unless coupled
with the element of hostility towards the true owner, possession, however long, will not confer title by prescription. Instead of indicating
ownership of the lot, these receipts showed that all petitioner had was possession by virtue of the right of way granted to it.

While it is true that, together with a persons actual and adverse possession of the land, tax declarations constitute strong evidence of
ownership of the land occupied by him, this legal precept does not apply in cases where the property is declared to be a mere
easement of right of way.
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal immovable property of another, by virtue of which the owner has
to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do, something on his property, for the benefit of another thing or person. It exists only
when the servient and dominant estates belong to two different owners. It gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on
the land but grants no title thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to
another. Petitioner maintains that its possession immediately became adverse to the owner in the late 1950s when the grant was
alleged by respondent heirs to have expired. It stresses that, counting from the late 1950s (1959 as found by the trial court), the 30-year
extraordinary acquisitive prescription had already set in by the time respondent heirs made a claim against it in their letters dated March
1 and April 6, 1989.

We do not think so. The mere expiration of the period of easement in 1959 did not convert petitioners possession into an adverse one.
Mere material possession of land is not adverse possession as against the owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless such
possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner. There should be a hostile use of such a nature and exercised under
such circumstances as to manifest and give notice that the possession is under a claim of right.

In the absence of an express grant by the owner, or conduct by petitioner sugar mill from which an adverse claim can be implied, its
possession of the lot can only be presumed to have continued in the same character as when it was acquired (that is, it possessed the
land only by virtue of the original grant of the easement of right of way), or was by mere license or tolerance of the owners (respondent
heirs). It is a fundamental principle of law in this jurisdiction that acts of possessory character executed by virtue of license or tolerance
of the owner, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription.

The only time petitioner assumed a legal position adverse to respondents was when it filed a claim over the property in 1965 during the
cadastral survey of Medellin. Since then (1965) and until the filing of the complaint for the recovery of the subject land before the RTC
of Cebu in 1989, only 24 years had lapsed. Since the required 30-year extraordinary prescriptive period had not yet been complied with
in 1989, petitioner never acquired ownership of the subject land.

Laches

Neither can petitioner find refuge in the principle of laches. It is not just the lapse of time or delay that constitutes laches. The essence
of laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it had either abandoned or declined to
assert it. Its essential elements are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainants rights after he had knowledge of defendants acts and after he has had the
opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit;
and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the complainant.

Acquisition of Easement of Right of Way By Prescription Under Art. 620 of the Civil Code

Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised,
not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of such easements. Thus, an easement is
continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the intervention of any act of man, like the easement of drainage; and it is
discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of way.

The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person passes or sets foot on somebody
elses land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous because
the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a person passes over another's property. In other words, the very exercise of
the servitude depends upon the act or intervention of man which is the very essence of discontinuous easements.

The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not in any way convert the nature of an easement of right of way to one
that is continuous. It is not the presence of apparent signs or physical indications showing the existence of an easement, but rather the
manner of exercise thereof, that categorizes such easement into continuous or discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual signs
only classifies an easement into apparent or non-apparent.Thus, a road (which reveals a right of way) and a window (which evidences
a right to light and view) are apparent easements, while an easement of not building beyond a certain height is non- apparent.

In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioners trains denotes the existence of an apparent but discontinuous
easement of right of way. And under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may
be
 acquired only by title. Unfortunately, petitioner Bomedco never acquired any title over the use of the railroad right of way whether
by law, donation, testamentary succession or contract. Its use of the right of way, however long, never resulted in its acquisition of the
easement because, under Article 622, the discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way can only be acquired by title and not by
prescription.

But when is a party deemed to acquire title over the use of such land (that is, title over the easement of right of way)? In at least two
cases, we held that if: (a) it had subsequently entered into a contractual right of way with the heirs for the continued use of the land
under the principles of voluntary easements or (b) it had filed a case against the heirs for conferment on it of a legal easement of right
of way under Article 629 of the Civil Code, then title over the use of the land is deemed to exist.
 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. TIANGCO

Briefly about eminent domain and valuation of property

In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of the complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto. Hence, in this case,
the value of the property at the time of the filing of the complaint on November 20, 1990 should be considered in determining the just
compensation due the respondents.

Paying just compensation in full.

True, an easement of a right-of-way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and the respondents would retain full ownership of
the property taken. Nonetheless, the acquisition of such easement is not gratis. The limitations on the use of the property taken for an
indefinite period would deprive its owner of the normal use thereof. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just
compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land taken.

While the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated pro perty, no
cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property,
without loss of title and possession. However, if the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his
proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property or
through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of
structures or objects which, by their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property
found on the land is necessary, then the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land.

FERNANDO v. ST. SCHO

The government lost. There was an an invalid exercise of police power in this case. The setback requirement is unconstitutional as it
encroaches on the property rights of the private respondents without due process of law. There was an unlawful taking without just
compensation. The 80% see thru requirement is also invalid as it is not reasonably necessary in fulfilling the said legitimate purpose of
the government which is to deter crimes and for beautification purposes. It also violates the right to privacy of the private respondents.

4th SET

DOMALSIN v. VALENCIANO

Ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to
possession of property. Title is not involved. The sole issue to be resolved is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or
material possession of the premises or possession de facto.

The Court of Appeals erred when it preferred the present and actual possession of respondents vis - à-vis the prior possession of
petitioner on the ground that the parties do not and cannot own the lot in question. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful
withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession
can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor
prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects
him.

The fact that the parties do not and cannot own the property under litigation does not mean that the issue to be resolved is no longer
priority of possession. The determining factor for one to be entitled to possession will be prior physical possession and not actual
physical possession. Since title is never in issue in a forcible entry case, the Court of Appeals should have based its decision on who
had prior physical possession. The main thing to be proven in an action for forcible entry is prior possession and that same was lost
through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, so that it behooves the court to restore possession regardless of title or
ownership.

Abandonment

Inasmuch as prior physical possession must be respected, the Court of Appeals should have ruled squarely on the issue of
abandonment because it gave precedence to the actual present possession of respondents. If, indeed, there was abandonment of the
land under consideration by petitioner, only then should respondents be given the possession of the same since abandonment is one
way by which a possessor may lose his possession.

Abandonment of a thing is the voluntary renunciation of all rights which a person may have in a thing, with the intent to lose such thing.
A thing is considered abandoned and possession thereof lost if the spes recuperandi (the hope of recovery) is gone and the animus
revertendi (the intention of returning) is finally given up.

In the case before us, we find that petitioner never abandoned the subject land. His opposition to the construction of respondents'
house upon learning of the same and the subsequent filing of the instant case are clear indicia of non-abandonment; otherwise, he
could have just allowed the latter to continue with the construction.

Furthermore…

In actions for forcible entry, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the
plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by
any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals pronounced that petitioner cannot interpose an action for forcible entry against respondents and that the same
should have been filed against Gloria Banuca. It added that the right to file against the latter had already lapsed because more than a
year had passed by from the time she wrestled possession of the property from the petitioner.

We find such pronouncement to be flawed. An action of forcible entry and detainer may be maintained only against one in possession
at the commencement of the action, and not against one who does not in fact hold the land. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, the action may be filed against persons unlawfully withholding or depriving possession or any person claiming under them.
Considering that respondents are the ones in present actual possession and are depriving petitioner of the possession of the land in
question, it is proper that they be the ones to be named defendants in the case. The fact that Gloria Banuca was supposedly the one
who first committed forcible entry when she allegedly demolished the house of petitioner does not make her the proper party to be sued
because she is no longer in possession or control of the land in controversy.

PEARL AND DEAN v. SM

On Issue of Copyright Infringement

Petitioner P & D’s complaint was that SMI infringed on its copyright over the light boxes when SMI had the units manufactured by Metro
and EYD Rainbow Advertising for its own account. Obviously, petitioner’s position was premised on its belief that its copyright over the
engineering drawings extended ipso facto to the light boxes depicted or illustrated in said drawings. In ruling that there was no copyright
infringement, the Court of Appeals held that the copyright was limited to the drawings alone and not to the light box itself. We agree with
the appellate court.

P & D secured its copyright under the classification class "O" work. This being so, petitioner’s copyright protection extended only to the
technical drawings and not to the light box itself because the latter was not at all in the category of "prints, pictorial illustrations,
advertising copies, labels, tags and box wraps." Stated otherwise, even as we find that P & D indeed owned a valid copyright, the same
could have referred only to the technical drawings within the category of "pictorial illustrations." It could not have possibly stretched out
to include the underlying light box.

Trademark v. Copyright v. Patent

Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual property rights that cannot be interchanged with one another. A trademark is
any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped
or marked container of goods. In relation thereto, a trade name means the name or designation identifying or distinguishing an
enterprise. Meanwhile, the scope of a copyright is confined to literary and artistic works which are original intellectual creations in the
literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation. Patentable inventions, on the other hand, refer to any technical
solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an inventive step and is industrially applicable.

On issue of Patent Infringement

This brings us to the next point: if, despite its manufacture and commercial use of the light boxes without license from petitioner, private
respondents cannot be held legally liable for infringement of P & D’s copyright over its technical drawings of the said light boxes, should
they be liable instead for infringement of patent? We do not think so either.

For some reason or another, petitioner never secured a patent for the light boxes. It therefore acquired no patent rights which could
have protected its invention, if in fact it really was. And because it had no patent, petitioner could not legally prevent anyone from
manufacturing or commercially using the contraption.

In the oft-cited case of Baker vs. Selden, the United States Supreme Court held that only the expression of an idea is protected by
copyright, not the idea itself.
 DIAZ v. PEOPLE and LEVI’S

The elements of the offense of trademark infringement under the Intellectual Property Code are, therefore, the following:

1. The trademark being infringed is registered in the Intellectual Property Office; 


2. The trademark is reproduced, counterfeited, copied, or colorably imitated by the infringer; 


3. The infringing mark is used in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising of any goods, business or services; or the
infringing mark is applied to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used upon
or in connection with such goods, business or services; 


4. The use or application of the infringing mark is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers or others as to the
goods or services themselves or as to the source or origin of such goods or services or the identity of such business; and 


5. The use or application of the infringing mark is without the consent of the trademark owner or the assignee thereof.

As can be seen, the likelihood of confusion is the gravamen of the offense of trademark infringement. There are two tests to determine
likelihood of confusion, namely: the dominancy test, and the holistic test. The dominancy test focuses on the similarity of the main,
prevalent or essential features of the competing trademarks that might cause confusion. Infringement takes place when the competing
trademark contains the essential features of another. Imitation or an effort to imitate is unnecessary. The question is whether the use of
the marks is likely to cause confusion or deceive purchasers. The holistic test considers the entirety of the marks, including labels and
packaging, in determining confusing similarity. The focus is not only on the predominant words but also on the other features appearing
on the labels.

As to what test should be applied in a trademark infringement case

In trademark cases, particularly in ascertaining whether one trademark is confusingly similar to another, no set rules can be deduced
because each case must be decided on its merits. In such cases, even more than in any other litigation, precedent must be studied in
the light of the facts of the particular case. That is the reason why in trademark cases, jurisprudential precedents should be applied only
to a case if they are specifically in point. The case of Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, which involved
an alleged trademark infringement of jeans products, is worth referring to. Applying the holistic test, the Court ruled that there was no
infringement. The holistic test is applicable here considering that the herein criminal cases also involved trademark infringement in
relation to jeans products (Diaz’s “LS JEANS TAILORING” won, not confusing as compared with “LEVI’S STRAUSS 501”)

CALANASAN v. DOLORITO

Rules of contract govern the onerous portion of donation; rules of donation only apply to the excess, if any.

We agree with the CA that since the donation imposed on the donee the burden of redeeming the property for ₱15,000.00, the donation
was onerous. As an endowment for a valuable consideration, it partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract; hence, the rules of
contract will govern and Article 765 of the New Civil Code finds no application with respect to the onerous portion of the donation.

Insofar as the value of the land exceeds the redemption price paid for by the donee, a donation exists, and the legal provisions on
donation apply. Nevertheless, despite the applicability of the provisions on donation to the gratuitous portion, the petitioner may not
dissolve the donation. She has no factual and legal basis for its revocation, as aptly established by the RTC. First, the ungrateful acts
were committed not by the donee; it was her husband who committed them. Second, the ungrateful acts were perpetrated not against
the donor; it was the petitioner's sister who received the alleged ill treatments. These twin considerations place the case out of the
purview of Article 765 of the New Civil Code.

ARANAS v. MERCADO

Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the important purpose of resolving the difficult issues
of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Coderequired every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse,
herein Teresita herself, to “bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.” Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided
that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir “may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.” Rule
90 thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the i nventory of
the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any
compulsory heir by the decedent.
5th SET

VENCILAO v. CA

The rule is well-settled that prescription does not run against registered land. Thus, under Sec. 47 of PD 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, it is specifically provided that "no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession." A title, once registered, cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious
possession. The certificate of title issued is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole world. All persons must take notice and no one can plead
ignorance of the registration

Neither can the tax declarations and tax receipts presented by petitioners as evidence of ownership prevail over respondents' certificate
of title which, to reiterate, is an incontrovertible proof of ownership. It should be stressed that tax declarations and receipts do not by
themselves conclusively prove title to the land. They only constitute positive and strong indication that the taxpayer concerned has
made a claim either to the title or to the possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. Stated differently, tax declarations
and tax receipts are only prima facieevidence of ownership or possession.

Mirror Doctrine

As a general rule, where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to
rely on what appears on the face of the title. He is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the
vendor appearing on the face of the certificate. By way of exception, the vendee is required to make the necessary inquiries if there is
anything in the certificate of title which indicates any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property. Otherwise, his mere refusal to
believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title, will not
make him an innocent purchaser for value if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such
notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably be required
of a prudent man in a like situation.

The exception does not apply. The exception contemplates a situation wherein there exists a flaw in the title of the vendor and the
vendee has knowledge or at least ought to have known of such flaw at the time he acquired the property, in which case, he is not
considered as an innocent purchaser for value. In the instant case, we discern nothing from the records showing that the title of PNB,
the vendor, was flawed. Petitioners not only failed to substantiate their claim of acquisitive prescription as basis of ownership but they
also failed to allege, and much less adduce, any evidence that there was a defect in the title of PNB.

ALMIROL v. REGISTER OF DEEDS

Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and
transmission of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed. Whether a
document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.

Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion
when confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section,
when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all
that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and
hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question. Section 4 of R.A. 1151 reads as follows:

Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. — When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the
proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for
registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the question
shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question
upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after
consideration of the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing,
shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and
binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the
Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from
and after receipt of the notice thereof.

CALACALA v. REPUBLIC

Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a
legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy.
For one, it bears stressing that petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest lost whatever right they had over land in question from the very
moment they failed to redeem it during the 1-year period of redemption. Certainly, the Republic’s failure to execute the acts referred to
by the petitioners within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate to restore whatever
rights petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest had over the same. For sure, petitioners have yet to cite any provision of law or rule of
jurisprudence, and we are not aware of any, to the effect that the failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale to secure a Certificate of Final
Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the property thus acquired, within ten (10)
years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale will operate to bring ownership back to him whose property has been previously
foreclosed and sold.

Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses the obligor’s right to redeem and that the sale
thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title
that is already vested in the purchaser.

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY v. AYING

We agree with the ruling of the RTC and the CA that the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is valid and
binding only as to the heirs who participated in the execution thereof, hence, the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta Aying, who
undisputedly did not participate therein, cannot be bound by said document.

However, the facts on record show that petitioner acquired the entire parcel of land with the mistaken belief that all the heirs have
executed the subject document. Thus, the trial court is correct that the provision of law applicable to this case is Article 1456 of the Civil
Code which states:

ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

Prescription Rules on Implied or Constructive Trust

Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years
from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

It has also been ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date of registration of the deed or the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but if the person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the
property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.

If registration is ineffective. In Spouses Abrigo vs. De Vera, it was held that registration of instruments must be done in the proper
registry, in order to affect and bind the land and, thus, operate as constructive notice to the world.Therein, the Court ruled:

x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act (and has therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the subsequent sale
is registered not under the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not considered REGISTERED x x x.

In this case, since the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under Act No. 3344 and not
under Act No. 496, said document is deemed not registered. Accordingly, the ten-year prescriptive period cannot be reckoned from
March 6, 1964, the date of registration of the subject document under Act No. 3344. The prescriptive period only began to run from the
time respondents had actual notice of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale.

6th SET

CALICDAN v. CENDANA

The records show that the subject land is an unregistered land. When the petitioner filed the instant case on June 29, 1992, respondent
was in possession of the land for 45 years counted from the time of the donation in 1947. This is more than the required 30 years of
uninterrupted adverse possession without just title and good faith. Such possession was public, adverse and in the concept of an
owner. Respondent fenced the land and built his house in 1949, with the help of Guadalupe’s father as his contractor. His act of
cultivating and reaping the fruits of the land was manifest and visible to all. He declared the land for taxation purposes and religiously
paid the realty taxes thereon. Together with his actual possession of the land, these tax declarations constitute strong evidence of
ownership of the land occupied by him.

Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good
indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of
a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to
the Government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

Moreover, the deed of donation inter vivos, albeit void for having been executed by one who was not the owner of the property donated,
may still be used to show the exclusive and adverse character of respondent’s possession. Even assuming that the donation propter
nuptias is void for failure to comply with formal requisites, it could still constitute a legal basis for adverse possession. With clear and
convincing evidence of possession, a private document of donation may serve as basis for a claim of ownership.

RAGUDO v. FABELLA ESTATE

It is not disputed that at the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. In a long line of cases, we
have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

Petitioners would take exception from the above settled rule by arguing that FETA are guilty of laches and should, therefore, be already
precluded from asserting their right as against them, invoking, in this regard, the rulings of this Court to the effect that while a registered
land may not be acquired by prescription, yet, by virtue of the registered owner’s inaction and neglect, his right to recover the
possession thereof may have been converted into a stale demand.

While, at a blush, there is apparent merit in petitioners’ posture, a closer look at our jurisprudence negates their submission. To start
with, the lower court found that petitioners’ possession of the subject lot was merely at the tolerance of its former lawful owner. In this
connection, Bishop vs. Court of Appeals teaches that if the claimant’s possession of the land is merely tolerated by its lawful owner, the
latter’s right to recover possession is never barred by laches.

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their property.
This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioner’s occupation of the property, and regardless of
the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the
possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.

RESTAR v. CICHON

When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate succession. Respondents never
possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition
subject of the present petition. In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restar’s death and exercised acts of dominion thereon
– tilling and cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof.

The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith,
secured a tax declaration in his name and may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed ownership of the lot (first act of
repudiation). And respondents were also deemed to have been on said date become aware of the adverse claim. Indeed, the following
acts of Flores show possession adverse to his co-heirs: the cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and
securing another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion of
respondents; payment of real estate tax and irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any share therein; and
continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion of respondents. And Flores’ adverse possession was continued by
his heirs.

Flores’ possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with the
earlier quoted Article 1137 of the New Civil Code.