G.R. No. 166542 July 25, 2006 NILO L.

DOJILLO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODRIGO N. VIDAL, respondents.

1 2 3
This is a petition for certiorari of the Order dated 29 April 2003 and the Resolution dated 3 January 2005 of the Commission on
Elections En Banc ("COMELEC En Banc"). The 3 January 2005 Resolution affirmed with modification the findings of the Commission
on Elections' Second Division ("COMELEC Second Division"). The COMELEC Second Division reversed the Decision dated 8 August
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2002 of the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian, San Jacinto, Pangasinan ("trial court").

The trial court proclaimed petitioner Nilo L. Dojillo ("petitioner") the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Nibaliw Vidal, San
Fabian, Pangasinan and nullified the previous proclamation of respondent Rodrigo N. Vidal ("respondent") by the Board of Election
Tellers (BET) of Nibaliw Vidal. The COMELEC En Banc's 29 April 2003 Order was a status quo ante order directing the restoration of
conditions that prevailed before the issuance of the trial court's decision. The 29 April 2003 Order reinstated respondent to the position
of Punong Barangay of Nibaliw Vidal, San Fabian, Pangasinan.

The Facts

Petitioner and respondent were two of three candidates for Punong Barangay of Nibaliw Vidal, San Fabian, Pangasinan in the 15 July
2002 synchronized elections for the Barangay and the Sangguniang Kabataan. Respondent obtained 374 votes while petitioner
received 371 votes. The BET declared respondent as the elected Punong Barangay by a plurality of three votes.

Petitioner filed an election protest before the trial court on 19 July 2002. Docketed as Election Protest No. 012 (SF-02), petitioner
questioned the election results in Precinct Nos. 84-A, 86-A1, and 87-A1 on grounds of misappreciation of ballots and incorrect tallying
of votes. On 24 July 2002, respondent filed his answer with counter-protest on grounds of misappreciation of ballots, padding of votes,
and presence of flying voters. On 3 August 2002, the trial court issued an order dismissing the counter-protest due to respondent's
failure to pay the required filing fee within the period of filing his answer. Respondent promptly filed a notice of appeal. However, the
Regional Trial Court denied respondent's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, apart from the order being merely interlocutory.

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In his election protest, petitioner objected to 26 ballots as marked ballots for respondent and claimed two ballots as votes. For his part,
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respondent objected to 36 ballots as marked ballots for petitioner and claimed five ballots as votes.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its decision dated 8 August 2002, the trial court found that one ballot previously regarded as a stray vote should be counted in favor
of petitioner and that 11 ballots previously counted in favor of respondent should be declared as marked ballots. The trial court tallied its
findings as follows:

In Precinct 84-A:

Votes for [Petitioner] 48+1 = 49 votes

Votes for [Respondent] 54-3 = 51 votes

In Precinct 87A-1:

Votes for [Petitioner] = 28 votes

Votes for [Respondent] 77-3 = 74 votes

In Precinct 86A-1:

Votes for [Petitioner] = 48 votes

Votes for [Respondent] 63-5 = 58 votes

Thus the total votes garnered by each of the parties are as follows:

For [Petitioner] 371+1 = 372 total votes

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For [Respondent] 374-11 = 363 total votes

The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads thus:

 WHEREFORE, a Decision is hereby rendered declaring the protestant NILO L. DOJILLO, winner by nine (9) votes over
protestee as Chairman or Punong Barangay of Nibaliw Vidal, San Fabian, Pangasinan and hereby proclaims the said NILO L.
DOJILLO the duly elected Chairman/Punong Barangay of Barangay Nibaliw, Vidal, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and hereby
declares the previous proclamation of protestee Rodrigo N. Vidal as the duly elected Chairman/Punong Barangay made by the
Board of Election Tellers of Nibaliw Vidal nullified and of no effect.

Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished:

The Comelec, the Department of [Interior and] Local Government and the Commission on Audit.

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SO ORDERED.

Respondent filed his notice of appeal on 14 August 2002 and submitted his appeal brief to the COMELEC Second Division.

The Ruling of the COMELEC

The COMELEC Second Division visually scrutinized all the questioned ballots and changed the election results according to its findings.
The COMELEC Second Division tallied its findings as follows:

DOJILLO VIDAL
Total votes per Election Returns 371 374
Add valid claims 1 3
Total 372 377
Less invalid votes 2 2
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Total valid votes 370 375

In a Resolution dated 20 March 2003, the COMELEC Second Division reversed the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of
the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division reads thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian, San Jacinto, Pangasinan rendered on
August 3, 2002 in Election Protest No. 012 (SF-02) entitled "Nilo N. [sic] Dojillo, Protestant versus Rodrigo N. Nival [sic],
Protestee" is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Protestee-Appellant Rodrigo N. Vidal is hereby declared as the duly elected
Punong Barangay of Barangay Nibaliw Vidal, San Fabian, Pangasinan.

No costs.

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SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc on 25 March 2003. On 29 April 2003, the COMELEC En
Banc, through Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, issued a Status Quo Ante Order the pertinent portions of which read:

In the meantime, pending resolution of the instant motion, after due deliberation, and finding that there was no writ of
execution of decision pending appeal issued by the lower court, this Commission hereby issues a STATUS QUO
ANTE ORDER, which is the condition prevailing before the promulgation of the questioned decision of the court a quo dated
August 8, 2002 in EP No. 012(SF-02) entitled Dojillo vs. Vidal, reinstating protestee-appellant Rodrigo N. Vidal to his position
as Punong Barangay of Nibaliw [Vidal], Pangasinan, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this
Commission.

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SO ORDERED.

Respondent filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to have the Status Quo Ante Order personally served by an officer of the COMELEC. This
motion was granted in an Order dated 30 April 2003. On 5 May 2003, petitioner filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Partial
Reconsideration to Lift Status Quo Ante Order. Petitioner alleged that the Status Quo Ante Order is procedurally misplaced because he
did not include it in the prayer in his appeal. Moreover, the Status Quo Ante Order is without factual and legal basis. Petitioner asserted
that the incumbent occupied the position of Punong Barangay before the trial court promulgated its decision. Respondent never
occupied the position of Punong Barangay and thus the COMELEC cannot reinstate him to that position. On 13 May 2003, petitioner
filed his Memorandum with the COMELEC. He also filed an Urgent Motion for Early Resolution of Motion for Partial Reconsideration to
Lift Status Quo Ante Order on the same day.

Without discussing the question raised by its issuance of the Status Quo Ante Order, the COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated 3 January 2005. The COMELEC En Banc also modified the COMELEC Second
Division's findings as follows:
 DOJILLO VIDAL
Total votes per Election Returns 371 374
Add valid claims 1 3
Total 372 377
Less invalid votes 1 3
Total 371 374
Add valid votes 1 0
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Total valid votes 372 374

The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En Banc's Resolution reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the summary of findings of the Second Division is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

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SO ORDERED.

The Issues

Petitioner alleged that as the COMELEC's Resolutions are not supported by substantial evidence and are contrary to law and settled
jurisprudence, COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner raised the
following issues before this Court:

1. THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF AND/OR IN EXCESS OF
ITS JURISDICTION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS PARTICULARLY IN EXHIBITS "1-J", "A-5", "B-1", "B-2", "3-8",
"C", "C-1", "C-3" TO "C-5", WHICH SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED FOR VIDAL.

2. THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF AND/OR IN EXCESS OF
ITS JURISDICTION IN ADDING THE DECLARED STRAY BALLOTS OF VIDAL PARTICULARLY EXHIBITS "2-F", "A", "A-
1", "A-3", "B-3" "3-8" AND "C-10", TO HIS VOTES WHERE IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEDUCTED FROM HIS VOTES.

3. THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF AND/OR IN EXCESS OF
ITS JURISDICTION WHEN THE COMELEC THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY ISSUED THE 29 APRIL 2003 STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER "REINSTATING OR REINSTALLING" VIDAL
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TO THE POSITION HE NEVER OCCUPIED OR ASSUMED (Emphasis in the original).

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has partial merit.

The main issue in this appeal is whether respondent is the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Nibaliw Vidal, San Fabian,
Pangasinan. A discussion on the issues of appreciation of ballots and of the propriety of the issuance of the Status Quo Ante Order is
necessary to resolve the main issue.

Appreciation of Ballots

A ballot indicates the voter's will. There is no requirement that the entries in the ballot be written nicely or that the name of the candidate
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be spelled accurately. In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot is presumed valid unless there is a clear reason to justify
its rejection. The object in the appreciation of ballots is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be determined
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with reasonable certainty.

Petitioner separates his question on appreciation of ballots into two. First is the appreciation of ballots which petitioner previously
objected to as marked ballots and which the COMELEC should not have counted in favor of respondent. Second is the appreciation of
ballots which are stray votes and which the COMELEC should not have counted in favor of respondent.

Petitioner appeals the COMELEC's ruling on the following ballots for being marked ballots: Exhibits "1-J", "A-5", "B-1", "B-2", "3-8", "C",
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"C-1", "C-3" to "C-5."

We relied on the descriptions of the ballots given by the parties, the trial court, and the COMELEC, and weighed their assertions. Based
on jurisprudence, Section 211 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended ("Omnibus Election Code"), and Section 49 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 4846 ("Resolution 4846"), which enumerate the rules on appreciation of ballots, we find that we have no reason to
overturn the COMELEC's decision. We shall refer to the pertinent rulings of the trial court and of the COMELEC Second Division and
COMELEC En Banc accordingly.
Respondent objected to Exhibit "1-J" as a marked ballot for petitioner. The trial court ruled that this is a valid vote for petitioner. The
COMELEC Second Division reversed the trial court and stated that Exhibit "1-J" is indeed a marked ballot: "The distinctive use of, and
several impositions with blue ink on the name of Dojillo with the rest of the votes written in black ink, indicates no other intention than to
identify the ballot." The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division's finding. In affirming the ruling against the validity
of Exhibit "1-J", we apply paragraph 22 of Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, the pertinent portion of which reads: "Unless it
should clearly appear that they have been deliberately put by the voter as identification marks, xxx the use of two or more kinds of
writing shall not invalidate the ballot."

Petitioner objected to Exhibit "A-5" as a marked ballot for respondent. The trial court ruled that this is a marked ballot: "A big 'X' is
written on the space[s] 2 to 7 for kagawad after Pedeglorio Victor L. x x x The voter is quite intelligent as shown by the hand writing, but
the big X can not be considered as desistance, but to mark and identify his vote." The COMELEC Second Division reversed the trial
court and ruled that the "X" mark merely indicates the voter's desistance from voting further. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
COMELEC Second Division's finding. In affirming the ruling for the validity of Exhibit "A-5", we apply paragraph 21 of Section 211 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the pertinent portion of which reads: "[C]rosses x x x put on the spaces on which the voter has not voted shall
be considered as signs to indicate his desistance from voting and shall not invalidate the ballot."

Petitioner objected to Exhibit "B-1" as an invalid vote for respondent. The trial court stated: "What was written is neither the name or
surname of [respondent]. It can not even be considered under the rule on idem sonans, the writing seems to be in latin [sic] or greek
[sic] VIONI, VIOBI, IMBERRP, DUCA, SERONO." The COMELEC Second Division reversed the trial court and ruled that the vote is
valid under the intent and idem sonans rule. The voter intended to write "Vidal" but, due to poor handwriting, only "Vida" was legible.
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division's finding. In affirming the ruling for the validity of Exhibit "A-5", we
apply paragraph 7 of Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, which reads: "A name or surname incorrectly written which, when
read, has a sound similar to the name or surname of a candidate when correctly written shall be counted in his favor." The idem
sonans rule does not require exactitude nor perfection in the spelling of names. The question whether a name sounds the same as
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another is not one of spelling but of pronunciation.

Petitioner objected to Exhibit "B-2" as a marked ballot for respondent. The trial court agreed with petitioner. However, the COMELEC
Second Division considered the sequence of votes written on Exhibit "B-2" and ruled that Exhibit "B-2" is a valid vote for respondent
under the intent rule. The ballot contained two names on the space for Punong Barangay: "Vedal Jing" and "Vic Pedeglorio." The
COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division's finding. In affirming the ruling for the validity of Exhibit "B-2", we apply
paragraph 19 of Section 211 of the Omnibus Elections Code, which states that "[a]ny vote in favor of x x x a candidate for an office for
which he did not present himself shall be considered as a stray vote but it shall not invalidate the whole ballot." Vic Pedeglorio was not
a candidate for Punong Barangay, but for Kagawad.

Petitioner objected to Exhibit "C" as a stray ballot that should not be counted for respondent. The trial court's description of the ballot
states that the entry in the space for Punong Barangay is "JINV Pedeglorio." The trial court decreed that Exhibit "C" is indeed a stray
ballot. However, the COMELEC Second Division held that Exhibit "C" is a valid vote for respondent. It saw that the name Jing
Pedeglorio was written on the space for Punong Barangay, with the surname Vidal superimposed in capital letters over the surname
Pedeglorio. The ballot indicated the voter's intention to correct his vote for respondent. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
COMELEC Second Division's finding. In affirming the ruling for the validity of Exhibit "C", we apply paragraph 22 of Section 211 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the pertinent portion of which reads: "Unless it should clearly appear that they have been deliberately put by
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the voter as identification marks, x x x the use of two or more kinds of writing shall not invalidate the ballot." We also apply paragraph
9 of the same section, which reads: "When in a space in the ballot there appears a name of a candidate that is erased and another
clearly written, the vote is valid for the latter."

Petitioner objected to Exhibit "C-1" as a marked ballot for respondent. The trial court agreed with petitioner because respondent's name
is written in "big printed and bold capital letters" unlike the rest of the entries. Again, the COMELEC Second Division disagreed with the
trial court and ruled that the name "JING-VIDAL", which was boldly written, does not nullify the ballot as marked. The voter merely
emphasized his intent to vote for respondent. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division's finding. In affirming
the ruling for the validity of Exhibit "C-1", we apply paragraph 22 of Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, the pertinent portion of
which reads: "Unless it should clearly appear that they have been deliberately put by the voter as identification marks, x x x hyphens
between the first name and surname of a candidate x x x, the use of two or more kinds of writing shall not invalidate the ballot."

Petitioner objected to Exhibits "C-3" to "C-5" as marked ballots for respondent. The trial court agreed with petitioner's position. There
was a star drawn on Exhibit "C-3," a human head was drawn after the entry of "Juvy Vidal" for Kagawad on line 4 of Exhibit "C-4," and a
drawing was made after the entry of "Rodrigo Vidal" for Punong Barangay on Exhibit "C-5." Both the COMELEC Second Division and
the COMELEC En Banc disagreed with the trial court and stated the figures or symbols which appeared on Exhibits "C-3" to "C-5" were
written by a person other than the voter after the voting process. The COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En
Banc considered the difference in the writing materials used in Exhibits "C-3" and "C-5" and the color of the pen used in Exhibit "C-4." In
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affirming the ruling for the validity of Exhibits "C-3" to "C-5", we apply jurisprudence which ruled on marks made after the ballot was
cast. A ballot should be counted if it is marked afterwards by some person or persons other than the voter himself. Subsequent
changes in the ballot made by a person other than the voter should not be permitted to affect the result of the election or destroy the will
of the voters.

Petitioner appeals the COMELEC's ruling on the following ballots for being stray ballots: Exhibits "2-F", "A", "A-1", "A-3", "B-3", "3-8"
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and "C-10." As in the previous paragraphs, we shall refer to the pertinent rulings of the trial court and of the COMELEC Second
Division and COMELEC En Banc accordingly.
Respondent claimed that in Exhibit "2-F" the name "Jing Calong" is written in the space for Punong Barangay. "Jing" is respondent's
nickname, while "Calong" is petitioner's nickname. The trial court ruled that this is a stray ballot. The COMELEC Second Division
agreed with the trial court. The COMELEC En Banc was silent on Exhibit "2-F." In affirming the ruling against the validity of Exhibit "2-
F", we apply paragraph 14 of Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, the pertinent portion of which reads: "Any vote x x x which
does not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom it is intended shall be considered as a stray vote but shall not invalidate the whole
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ballot."

Petitioner objected to Exhibits "A", "A-1", "A-3", "B-3" and "C-10" as stray ballots and should not have been counted in favor of
respondent. These ballots had "J. Vidal" written on the space for Punong Barangay. The trial court considered these as valid votes for
respondent. The COMELEC Second Division and COMELEC En Banc upheld the trial court and stated that "J" in "J. Vidal" stands for
the initial of "Jing," Vidal's registered nickname. In affirming the ruling for the validity of Exhibits "A", "A-1", "A-3", "B-3" and "C-10", we
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apply the ruling in Gonzaga v. Seno and Moya v. Del Fierro: the initial of the nickname of the candidate may be used together with
the surname of the candidate for the purpose of identifying the candidate for whom the voter votes.

Propriety of the Issuance of the Status Quo Ante Order

Petitioner also questions the propriety of the Status Quo Ante Order as it reinstates respondent to a position which he never assumed.

We agree with petitioner that, as written, the Status Quo Ante Order raised more questions than it solved the legal problems of the
case. The Status Quo Ante order had the nature of a temporary restraining order. We agree with petitioner that the Status Quo Ante
Order had a life span of more than 20 days since the directive was qualified by the phrase "until further orders from this Commission."
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In line with Repol v. Commission on Elections, the Status Quo Ante Order automatically ceased to have effect on 19 May 2003
since the COMELEC En Banc did not issue a writ of preliminary injunction.

However, in contrast to Repol, no execution pending appeal was ever issued to any party in the present case. Upon examination of the
events in this case, we find that respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Nibaliw Vidal, San Fabian,
Pangasinan by the BET on 15 July 2002. This was the condition prevailing before the promulgation of the 8 August 2002 decision of the
trial court. On the other hand, the trial court found that petitioner is the duly elected Punong Barangay. Thus, if an execution pending
appeal were issued by the trial court, petitioner should have occupied the position of Punong Barangay. It is the court's decision that
should prevail between the determination by the trial court of who of the candidates won the elections and the finding of the Board of
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Canvassers as to whom to proclaim.

Nevertheless, the COMELEC's subsequent ruling in favor of respondent and our succeeding affirmation of the COMELEC's ruling
defeats the execution pending appeal and brings us to the present situation: notwithstanding the previous oaths of office taken by both
parties, respondent is the duly elected Punong Barangay of Nibaliw Vidal, San Fabian, Pangasinan.

WHEREFORE,we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc dated 3
January 2005. We PROCLAIM respondent Rodrigo N. Vidal the duly elected Punong Barangay of Nibaliw Vidal, San Fabian,
Pangasinan with a total of 374 votes against petitioner Nilo L. Dojillo with a total of 372 votes, or a winning margin of two votes.
We SET ASIDE the Order of the Commission on Elections En Banc dated 29 April 2003.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. NO. 174263 : January 24, 2007] JOSE TORRES, Petitioner, v. ABELARDO M. ABUNDO, SR. and COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

1
This is a petition for certiorari of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") En Banc's Resolution dated August 18, 2006 denying
2
petitioner Jose Torres' motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC First Division's Resolution dated May 6, 2006. The COMELEC
3
First Division's Resolution dismissed Torres' petition and lifted its Order dated January 13, 2006 directing Torres to continue
performing his functions as Mayor of the Municipality of Viga, Catanduanes.

The following are the facts:

Petitioner Jose Torres and respondent Abelardo Abundo, Sr. were candidates for mayor of Viga, Catanduanes in the May 10, 2004
elections. On May 11, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Torres as the duly elected mayor.

Claiming that irregularities attended the canvassing of ballots in 17 precincts, respondent filed an election protest docketed as Election
4
Case No. 48 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Virac, Catanduanes. Petitioner, who also claimed that canvassing irregularities
prejudiced him, filed a counter-protest in the same case impugning the results in 12 precincts.
 5
On November 14, 2005, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent. It found that respondent obtained 4,230 votes over
petitioner's 4,121 votes. Thus, the trial court declared respondent the elected mayor of Viga, Catanduanes and annulled the earlier
proclamation of petitioner. The dispositive portion of the Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the protestant ABELARDO M. ABUNDO, SR., garnered a total of 4, 230 votes while the protestee
garnered a total of only 4, 121 votes during the May 10, 2004 elections for Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes and that therefore, protestant
ABELARDO M. ABUNDO, SR., was the duly elected Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes with a margin of 109 votes over the protestee.
Accordingly, the protestee JOSE TORRES is hereby directed to VACATE and RELINQUISH said position to the protestant ABELARDO
ABUNDO, SR.

6
SO ORDERED.

7
Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC (EAC Case No. A-01 - 2006). Respondent, for his part, filed with the trial court a motion for
execution of the judgment pending appeal. In its Order of December 12, 2005, the trial court granted respondent's motion, subject to
the filing of a P100,000 bond, to wit:

This Court hereby grants the protestant's motion for execution pending appeal based on the following good reasons:

1. The Court has established the protestant's right to the Office of the Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. Having been declared by the Court
as the duly elected Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes with a margin of 109 votes over the protestee, the protestant has the right to assume
the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.

2. Barely eighteen (18) months is left to the tenure of the mayor of Viga, Catanduanes and the people have the right to be governed by
8
the true winner of the election and their chosen official.

xxx

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Execution pending appeal is GRANTED. Let a writ of execution issue upon the posting of a bond by the
protestant in the amount of P100,000.00.

9
SO ORDERED.

10
A writ was issued and served on petitioner who, without filing a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's Order, filed a petition
for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction before the COMELEC. In an Order dated
December 21, 2005, the COMELEC's-First Division granted petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, thus:

In the interest of justice and so as not to render moot and academic the serious issues raised in the petition,
a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER is hereby issued effective immediately enjoining public respondent Honorable Genie G.
Gapas-Agbada, Presiding Judge of Branch 42, Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, his agents or representatives or any one
acting for and in his behalf from executing the December 12, 2005 Order of the court a quo in Election Protest Case No. 49 entitled
Abelardo M. Abundo, Sr. v. Jose Torres, granting private respondent's Motion for Execution Pending Appeal as well as the Writ of
Execution issued on the same day, pending consideration of the instant petition. In the event that Abelardo M. Abundo, Sr. had already
assumed office as Municipal Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes and commenced to perform his function pursuant to the assailed order,
a STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER is likewise issued directing the parties to observe the status prior to the promulgation or issuance of
the said Order. Accordingly, private respondent Abelardo M. Abundo, [Sr.] shall forthwith vacate the post in favor of petitioner Jose
11
Torres who shall continue to function as Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes until further orders from this Commission (First Division).

12
After due proceedings, the COMELEC's First Division issued an Order dated January 13, 2006 granting petitioner Torres' application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and forthwith issued the same, directing him to continue performing his functions as
13
mayor of Viga, Catanduanes until final orders. On May 6, 2006, the COMELEC's First Division issued the Resolution dismissing the
petition, thus:

The instant petition should be dismissed.

Sec. 2 Rule 28 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides for the manner of filing a petition for certiorari in this wise:

Sec. 2. Petition for Certiorari or Prohibition. '

When any court or judge hearing election cases has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a petition for certiorari or prohibition with the Commission alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such court or judge, or commanding it or him to desist from
further proceeding with the action or matter specified therein, as the case may be.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

The first paragraph requires that resort to a petition for certiorari can be made if there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law; and the second calls for the attachment to the petition of a certified true copy of the order sought
to be reversed or set aside. The herein petition did not meet both requirements.

First of all, the petitioner failed to fulfill an important procedural pre-requisite, which is the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed order.

A motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari . Without said motion, the petition cannot
simply prosper. x x x

x x x

For sure the rule above-cited is not without exceptions. The aggrieved party is not obliged to first file a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed resolution before filing a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended where, (1) the question is purely legal, (2)
judicial intervention is urgent; (3) its application may cause great and irreparable damage; and (4) the controversial acts violate due
process. x x x

The herein petitioner, however, did not invoke any of these exceptions. x x x

x x x

The petitioner, in contravention of the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 28 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, failed to attach to
the petition a certified true copy or even just a copy of the order granting execution of the decision pending appeal, which is ought to be
set aside or nullified.

x x x

In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that where the petitioner failed to attach to his petition for certiorari the certified
true copies of the assailed judgment or order, the said petition should be dismissed. x x x

The same is true of the present petition.

x x x

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the herein
petition.

ACCORDINGLY, the Order of the Commission First Division dated 13 January 2006 directing the petitioner Jose Torres to continue
peforming his functions as mayor of the municipality of Viga, Catanduanes until final orders from this Commission is hereby LIFTED.

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SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the COMELEC En Banc in the assailed Resolution dated August 18,
2006. Hence this petition raising the following issues:

I. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO FILE THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS DUE TO THE EXTREME URGENCY OF THE MATTER BROUGHT ABOUT BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
DESPERATE MOVE TO ASSUME THE POST AT ALL COST

II. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JUDRISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION ON TECHNICAL GROUND WHEN IT HAS GIVEN DUE COURSE TO
PETITIONER'S PRAYER FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION

III. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT FAILED/REFUSED TO RULE ON THE ALLEGED "GOOD REASONS" PROFERRED BY RESPONDENT IN
15
HIS MOTION FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.

The petition lacks merit.

 16
In Olanolan v. Commission on Elections, this Court held:

The term "grave abuse of discretion," in its juridical sense, connotes, as Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc., and a host of other
cases teach, capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must
be of such degree as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner by reason of passion and hostility. The word "capricious", usually used in tandem
with the term "arbitrary", conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a
clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative.

The COMELEC En Banc, in dismissing the petition for petitioner's failure to comply with Sec. 2, Rule 28 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, only followed its rules pursuant to its constitutional mandate to promulgate "rules of procedure to expedite disposition of
17
election cases." The dismissal of Torres' petition is warranted under the Rules and does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Strict compliance with the mandatory rules of procedure is the established norm and any relaxation of that standard could only be an
18
exception. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.

Petitioner contends that his failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's December 12, 2005 Order falls under one of the
19
exceptions recognized by law. He cites the case of Government of the United States of America v. Purganan where it was held that,
although as a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for
reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it, said motion may be dispensed with under certain exceptions such as in
case of urgency.

Petitioner Torres maintains that he opted to dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's Order since by the
time it is heard, the aforementioned Order would have been executed thereby causing him to be "forcibly" unseated as
mayor.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

We are not persuaded.

Petitioner Torres' reliance on Purganan is misplaced. The factual milieu in said case is different from the instant petition. The said case
stemmed from the Government of the United States' ("US Gov't .") request to the Philippine Government to extradite Mark B. Jimenez
("Jimenez") pursuant to an existing RP-US Extradition Treaty. The US Gov't . proceeded directly to this Court via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 in issuing two
Orders. The first Order set for hearing the US Gov't .'s application for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent Jimenez,
while the second directed the issuance of such warrant and at the same time granted bail to Jimenez. In proceeding directly to this
Court without first filing a motion for reconsideration of the assailed orders, the US Gov't . justified its action in this wise:

Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: "(1) the issues were fully
considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda and position papers on the matter and thus,
the filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal
basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample
20
opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of law." (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

In the instant case however, petitioner's claim of "extreme urgency" is untenable. When respondent, armed with a writ of execution
pending appeal duly issued by the trial court and accompanied by a Sheriff served the same to petitioner, respondent was merely
asserting his right as the duly elected Mayor of Viga pursuant to the trial court's Decision. The winning protestant, bolstered by the
Decision of the trial court declaring him the rightful occupant of the contested position will certainly be vigilant in reclaiming the same
from his rival. He cannot be expected to slumber on his hard-won right to assume the position he fought for. Petitioner must have felt a
deep sense of urgency when faced with eminent eviction from the post that he worked hard to obtain. However, such sense of urgency
is not the same as that contemplated by prevailing jurisprudence as one of the recognized exceptions to the general rule with respect to
the filing of a motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner is likewise mistaken in averring that, since the COMELEC granted his motion for issuance of TRO and Injunction, it cannot
thereafter dismiss his petition. A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the latter's
outcome. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. Its primary purpose is not
to correct a wrong already consummated, or to redress an injury already sustained, or to punish wrongful acts already committed, but to
21
preserve and protect the rights of the litigant during the pendency of the case.

Finally, petitioner faults the trial court's finding that there are "good reasons" to order execution of its decision pending appeal.

To grant execution pending appeal in election protest cases, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a motion by the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (2) there must be "good reasons" for the execution pending appeal; and (3) the order
22
granting execution pending appeal must state the "good reasons."

23
In Santos v. Commission on Elections, the Court summarized the circumstances qualifying as "good reasons," and thereby justifying
execution pending appeal, thus:
The following constitute "good reasons," and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1)
the public interest involved or the will of the electorate; (2) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and
24
(3) the length of time that the election contest has been pending. x x x

25
The trial court in the instant case, relying on the cases of Lindo v. Commission on Elections and Gutierrez v. Commission on
26
Elections, invoked two "good reasons" to justify its order allowing execution pending appeal. First, the order would "give substance
and meaning to the people's mandate, especially since the RTC has established private respondent's right to office." Second, "barely
eighteen (18) months is left to the tenure of the mayor of Viga, Catanduanes and the people have the right to be governed by the true
winner of the election and their chosen official." The COMELEC found these "good reasons" sufficient.

Finding the rulings of the COMELEC consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari for being procedurally and substantially infirm. Grave abuse of discretion implies
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of
passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to
27
perform a duty enjoined by law. This does not obtain in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated May 6, 2006 of the COMELEC First Division dismissing the
petition for lack of merit, and the Resolution dated August 18, 2006 of the COMELEC En Banc denying reconsideration thereof,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 217872, August 24, 2016 ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION, PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALFI) AND ATTY. MARIA
CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, IN HER OWN BEHALF AND AS PRESIDENT OF ALFI, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, ROSIE B. LUISTRO,
ELENITA S.A. SANDEJAS, EMILY R. LAWS, EILEEN Z. ARANETA, SALVACION C. MONTIERO, MARIETTA C. GORREZ,
ROLANDO M. BAUTISTA, RUBEN T. UMALI AND MILDRED C. CASTOR, Petitioners, v. HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, SECRETARY-
DESIGNATE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, NICOLAS B. LUTERO III, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF HEALTH, OFFICER-
IN-CHARGE, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, AND MARIA LOURDES C. SANTIAGO, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, CENTER
FOR DRUG REGULATION AND RESEARCH, Respondents. G.R. No. 221866 MARIA CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, IN HER OWN
BEHALF AND AS COUNSEL OF PETITIONERS, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, ROSIE B. LUISTRO, ELENITA S.A. SANDEJAS, EMILY R.
LAWS, EILEEN Z. ARANETA, SALVACION C. MONTIERO, MARIETTA C. GORREZ, ROLANDO M. BAUTISTA, RUBEN T. UMALI
AND MILDRED C. CASTOR, Petitioners, v. HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, SECRETARY-DESIGNATE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, NICOLAS B. LUTERO III, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF HEALTH, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, AND MARIA LOURDES C. SANTIAGO, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, CENTER FOR DRUG REGULATION AND
RESEARCH, Respondent.

Subjects of this disposition are the: [1] Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus - with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction (G.R. No. 217872); and the [2] Petition for Contempt
of Court (G.R. No. 221866).
1
The subject petitions sprouted from Imbong v. Ochoa and other cases (Imbong) where the Court declared Republic Act No. 10354 (RH
Law) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (RH-IRR) as not unconstitutional, save for several provisions which were declared as
violative of the Constitution. The decretal portion of Imbong reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible;
and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(1) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the
spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to
elective surgical procedures;
5] Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6] Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public
officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive
health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far
as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and 8] Section 3.01(a) and Section 3.01(g) of the RH-IRR,
which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for
contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013, is hereby LIFTED,
insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

G.R. No. 217872

On May 28, 2014, barely two (2) months after the promulgation of the Court's decision in Imbong, the petitioners, who were among
2
those against the constitutionality of the RH Law, wrote a letter addressed to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), inquiring about
3
the steps that the agency might have taken to carry out the decision of the Court. In reply to this letter, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) assured the petitioners that both the Department of Health (DOH) and the FDA were taking steps to comply with the
decision of the Court and that it would inform them of any developments. The petitioners claimed that, as of the date of filing, they had
not heard anything anymore from the OSG.
4
Controversy began in September 2014, when petitioner Rosie B. Luistro chanced upon the FDA's Notice inviting Marketing
Authorization Holders (MAH) of fifty (50) contraceptive drugs to apply for re-evaluation/re-certification of their contraceptive products
and directed "all concerned to give their written comments to said applications on or before October 8, 2014."

Petitioner Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) believed that the contraceptives enumerated in the Notice fell within the
definition of "abortifacient" under Section 4(a) of the RH Law because of their "secondary mechanism of action which induces abortion
or destruction of the fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
5
womb." For said reason, ALFI, through its president, Maria Concepcion S. Noche (Noche), filed its preliminary opposition, dated
6
October 8, 2014, to all 50 applications with the FDA. The same opposition also questioned some twenty-seven (27) other
contraceptive drugs and devices that had existing FDA registrations that were not subjects of any application for re-evaluation/re-
7
certification. chanrobleslaw
8
On November 24, 2014, ALFI filed its main opposition to all seventy-seven (77) contraceptive drugs. chanrobleslaw

On November 27, 2014, notwithstanding the pending opposition of the petitioners to the re-evaluation/re-certification of these
9
contraceptive products, the FDA issued two (2) certificates of product registration for the hormonal contraceptives, "Implanon" and
10
"Implanon NXT." chanrobleslaw
11
On March 19, 2015, ALFI wrote another letter to the DOH and the FDA, reiterating its opposition to the applications for re-
evaluation/re-certification. It requested, among others, that the agencies shed light on the status of their earlier opposition and that it
schedule hearings and consultations regarding the applications for re-evaluation/re-certification.

The petitioners claimed that their requests had remained unanswered.

Hence, the petitioners instituted the subject petition for certiorari, contending that the FDA committed grave abuse of discretion, not only
for violating the Court's pronouncements in Imbong, but also for failing to act on their opposition.

The petitioners also contend that due to lack of any procedure, rules and regulations and consultations for re-evaluation/re-certification
12
of contraceptive drugs and devices, the FDA had also violated the rudimentary requirements of due process. Invoking the Court's
13
power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, they seek that the Court "promulgate rules and/or disapprove (or approve)
14
rules of procedure in order to adequately protect and enforce the constitutional right to life of the unborn." chanrobleslaw

As for the certificates of product registration for the hormonal contraceptives, "Implanon" and "Implanon NXT," the petitioners contend
that these certificates of product registration were issued in haste because they were released just three (3) days after the Senate
Committee on Finance required FDA certifications for contraceptives as conditions for government funding for family planning
15
commodities. chanrobleslaw

The petitioners further aver that even before the issuance of these certificates, the DOH, as early as February 2015, had been
16
administering Implanon in Cebu City. Pointing to a news article in the Panay News, they claim that respondent Health Secretary
Janette L. Garin (Secretary Garin) even defended the decisions of the DOH to administer these contraceptives. The petitioners add that
17
photographs of several tarpaulins show that the DOH has undertaken the distribution of contraceptives as early as March 25, 2015.

The petitioners allege that despite the Court's declaration that several portions of the RH Law and the RH-IRR are unconstitutional, the
DOH has not effected any amendment in the RH-IRR to conform with the Court's judgment. They claim that the RH-IRR posted on the
 18
DOH website still contain the provisions which were declared by the Court to be unconstitutional. chanrobleslaw

Thus, the petitioners assert that absent any compliant rule of procedure issued by the FDA, or consultation regarding its re-
evaluation/re-certification, or consideration of their opposition, the approval, procurement, distribution, administration, advertisement,
and promotion of contraceptive use by the FDA and the DOH should be enjoined as they are tainted with grave abuse of
19
discretion. chanrobleslaw

In support of their prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory
Injunction, the petitioners assert that the actions of the FDA and the DOH violate the right to life of the unborn and, thus, must be
20
restrained to ensure their protection. chanrobleslaw
21
On June 17, 2015, the Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the respondents from: [1] granting any and all
pending applications for reproductive products and supplies, including contraceptive drugs and devices; and [2] procuring, selling,
distributing, dispensing or administering, advertising, and promoting the hormonal contraceptives, "Implanon" and "Implanon NXT."

Comment of the Respondents

22
In their Comment, the respondents, through the OSG, argued that petitioners failed to establish not only the direct injury that they had
suffered, or would suffer, but also the transcendental importance of the issues raised as a result of [1] the issuance of certificates of
registration and the re-certification of contraceptive drugs and devices; and [2] the purchase of Implanon and Implanon NXT.

The OSG also contended that the petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts for failing to allege any special and compelling
reasons to justify their direct resort to the Court. For the OSG, the Court's concurrent jurisdiction with the lower courts to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus did not give the petitioners the unrestrained freedom to file a Rule 65 petition directly before the
Court.

The OSG further argued that the re-certification of contraceptive drugs and devices involved the scientific determination of fact and that
it was conducted by the FDA in the exercise of its regulatory power. Thus, the OSG explained that the re-certification process
conducted and the conclusions arrived at by the FDA [1] lay outside the ambit of a Rule 65 petition; [2] did not require any notice and
hearing; and [3] need not comply with the standard of substantial evidence required in quasi-judicial proceedings. For the OSG, the
FDA might even use extraneous and credible scientific data and was not limited by the evidence submitted by those seeking re-
23
certification considering that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3720 mandated that the FDA utilize "the latest medical
24
knowledge." chanrobleslaw

Finally, the OSG dismissed the petitioners' call for the Court to promulgate the necessary rules of procedure for re-certification, arguing
that the rule-making power of the Court was confined to promulgating, approving or disapproving rules of procedure of courts and
quasi-judicial bodies, and not to bodies like the FDA. The OSG asserted that the re-certification process undertaken by the FDA was
not without basis, as the FDA was guided not only by the RH-IRR Law, but also by Bureau Circular (BC) No. 5, series of 1997,
Administrative Order (AO) No. 2013-0021, AO No. 67, series of 1989, AO No. 2006-2021, AO No. 2005-0030, BC No. 2006-005, BC
No. 2006-007, among many others.
25
In their Reply, cralawred the petitioners pointed out that the Court sanitized the RH-IRR, dated March 15, 2013, by declaring Section
3.01 (a) and Section 3.01(j) thereof as unconstitutional. For this reason and the acknowledged constitutional right to life of the unborn
from fertilization, the mandate of the FDA was understood to necessarily include the duty to recertify certain contraceptives that had
already been approved and registered and had been made available to the public, but this time using the constitutional yardsticks and
standards expounded by the Court in its decision. In this process of registration and/or re-certification, the FDA had to ensure that only
contraceptives that were non-abortifacient and safe would be purchased and distributed to the public.

The petitioners stated that the re-certification was not automatic and that there had to be an actual re-examination and re-testing of all
contraceptives to ensure that they were compliant, not with the old standards utilized by the DOH and the FDA which, the Court had
determined could open the floodgates to abortion, but with the new standards it laid out that aimed to ensure protection of the life of the
unborn from injury or death starting from fertilization to implantation in the mother's womb.

The registration and/or re-certification of drugs are in the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the FDA. By registering and/or re-
certifying the drugs listed in the Table and shown in the DOH list, the FDA has adjudicated in favor of the applications for re-certification
of the pharmaceutical companies and against the oppositions of the petitioners.

The applications for registration and/or re-certification were granted by the FDA without observing the basic tenets of due process -
without due notice, without public hearing and without any supporting evidence in the face of clear and irrefutable evidence of the
abortifacient character of the registered/re-certified drugs.

The petitioners claim that viewed within the broad power of the Court to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, the power to disapprove the rules of procedure of quasi-judicial bodies necessarily includes the power of the Court to look into
the sufficiency of the rules of procedure of the FDA insofar as they adequately protect and enforce the constitutional right of the unborn
from conception/fertilization. Also, this power to disapprove the said rules of procedure necessarily includes the power to modify them
by requiring that such rules of procedure incorporate safeguards such as the rudimentary requirements of due process to meaningfully
and sufficiently protect and enforce the constitutional right to life.

For the petitioners, both the principle of prudence and the precautionary principle are relevant and applicable in matters affecting and
related to the right to life of the unborn. Thus, any uncertainty as to the adverse effects of making contraceptives universally accessible
should be resolved in a way that will preserve and promote life and health. And the burden is on the proponent to prove that a
contraceptive is non-abortifacient. Any doubt should always be resolved in favor of life and against anything that threatens or poses a
risk to it.

Accordingly, the petitioners pray that the TRO be maintained.

G.R. No. 221866

The petitioners in this case, with the exception of ALFI, are the same as those in G.R. No. 217872. In their subject petition for contempt,
the petitioners averred that notwithstanding the receipt of the TRO, respondent FDA continued to grant applications for registration and
26
re-certification of reproductive products and supplies. According to them, the FDA website showed that on November 13, 2015,
several reproductive products and supplies, including the contraceptives "Implanon and Implanon NXT," had been granted certification
27
and/or re-certification. This was confirmed by the Certification of Product Registration of the FDA allowing the marketing of Implanon
NXT until November 19, 2015.
28
The petitioners also mentioned the November 16, 2015 Letter of DOH Undersecretary Lilibeth C. David (USEC David), addressed to
Senator Vicente C. Sotto III (Senator Sotto), informing him that the DOH granted the certification of several contraceptive drugs and
family planning supplies and was submitting to the Senate a list of contraceptives and family planning supplies for its approval in the
2016 budget. Citing the Senate deliberations, the petitioners claimed that the DOH deceived the Senate so it would provide the
necessary funding for these products by convincing the said body that the TRO only applied to the new applications for reproductive
products and supplies, contraceptive drugs and devices and not to existing ones, which could be re-certified.

For the petitioners, by granting registration and/or re-certification of reproductive products and supplies, contraceptive drugs and
devices, and by advertising that these products were available to the public through their website, the respondents have violated the
TRO of the Court.
29
Additionally, in their Supplement to (Petition for Contempt of Court), the petitioners averred that on December 21, 2015, the Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) issued Philhealth Circular No. 038-2015 which was about the "Subdermal Contraceptive
Implant Package" to be offered by it in order "to increase access to long acting reversible family planning methods;" that the
Chairperson of the Board of Directors of Philhealth was Secretary Garin; that Philhealth fell within the category of "respondents, their
representatives, agents or other persons acting on their behalf that are enjoined from [2] procuring, selling, distributing, dispensing or
administering, advertising and promoting the hormonal contraceptive 'Implanon' and 'Implanon NXT.'"; that Implanon is a subdermal
30
implant; and that the circular is a clear attempt to go around the TRO. chanrobleslaw

Thus, the petitioners pray that the respondents be held guilty of contempt of Court for disobeying the June 17, 2015 TRO issued by the
31
Court. chanrobleslaw

Comment of the Respondents

32
In its Comment, the OSG denies petitioners' claim that the FDA continued to grant applications for registration and/or re-certification
of a contraceptive drug or device despite the issuance of the Court's TRO on June 17, 2015. According to the OSG, the attached
certified true copies of Certificates of Product Registration (CPR) of various contraceptive drugs and devices showed that the dates of
registration and/or recertification of the questioned contraceptive drugs and devices, including the drug "Implanon" and "Implanon
33
NXT," were all granted prior to the Court's issuance of its TRO on June 17, 2015. chanrobleslaw

As to the registration of the drug Medrogest on September 23, 2015, the OSG, citing its own medical research, argues that the same is
34
not a contraceptive drug and, therefore, not covered by the Court's TRO. chanrobleslaw

Regarding the November 16, 2015 Letter of USEC David, the OSG contends that a reading of the letter would simply show that it was
just to inform Senator Sotto of the status of recertification of contraceptive drugs as o/November 13, 2015. For said reason, the OSG
asserts that petitioners were in error in claiming that intra-uterine devices were granted recertification on November 13,
35
2015. chanrobleslaw

The OSG further argues that the FDA's act of posting of the product information on "Implanon" and "Implanon NXT" in its website was
not made with the objective of advertising the questioned contraceptive drug but, rather, made by the FDA pursuant to its ministerial
36 37
duty under Section 7.08, Rule 7, Chapter 2 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law. chanrobleslaw

Finally, the OSG asserts that respondents should not be cited in contempt with respect to the implementation of Philhealth Circular No.
038-2015, not only because Philhealth is a separate entity not being administered by the Secretary of Health, but also because
Philhealth was never impleaded as a party in G.R. Nos. 217872 and 221866. For the OSG, the Court's TRO only prohibits respondents
from procuring, selling, distributing, dispensing, administering, advertising, and promoting "Implanon" and "Implanon NXT." It does not
cover the public procurement, sale, distribution and availment of other registered and recertified intra-uterine devices prior to the FDA's
38
receipt of the Court's TRO on June 29, 2015. chanrobleslaw

Reply to the Comment

39
Petitioners once more insist that respondent were guilty of contempt, stating in their Reply that despite the June 17, 2015 TRO of the
Court, the Certificate of Product Registration for "Implanon NXT" submitted by respondents themselves not only showed that the
"marketing authorization" of the contraceptive drug remained to be valid until November 19, 2015, but was also re-certified and
extended after the June 17, 2015 TRO of the Court until May 29, 2020. Petitioners explain that "marketing authorization" as defined by
the World Health Organization, is "[a]n official document issued by the competent drug regulatory authority for the purpose of marketing
40
or free distribution of a product after evaluation safety, efficacy and quality. xxx" chanrobleslaw

Regarding the implementation of PhilHealth Circular No. 038-2015, petitioners argue that PhilHealth is covered by the June 17, 2015
TRO of the Court even if it is not impleaded as a party because it is considered within the terms "respondents, their representatives,
41
agents or other persons acting on their behalf in Court's order. Citing Article IV, Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7875, petitioners
points out that PhilHealth is a government corporation attached to the Department of Health for policy coordination and guidance. They
likewise point out that respondent Secretary Garin cannot disclaim liability considering that she is also the Chairperson of PhilHealth,
and that other secretaries and other heads of the departments and agencies of government are members of the Board of
42
PhilHealth. chanrobleslaw

Consolidation
43
On February 3, 2016, the Court ordered the consolidation of these two cases. chanrobleslaw

The Court's Ruling

In resolving the foregoing petitions, it behooves the Court to first address the issues on whether the petitioners have the locus standi to
file the subject petitions and whether their resort to the subject recourse is proper.

Petitioners have Locus Standi

As stated above, the OSG questioned the legal standing of the petitioners to file the subject petition as citizens and taxpayers, not only
because of their failure to establish any direct injury, but also because of their failure to show that the issues raised were of
transcendental importance.

In Imbong, it was already stated that "(from) the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be
given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards." Thus, the public, including the petitioners in these cases, have the right to question any
approval or disapproval by the FDA of any drugs or devices which they suspect to be abortifacient on the ground that they were not
properly tested or were done in haste or secrecy.
44
As early as David v. Arroyo, the Court has already ruled that "[t]axpayers, voetrs, concerned citizens, xxx may be accorded standing
to sue, provided that xxx for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional xxx for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early. xxx"

Considering that the Court in Imbong already declared that the issues of contraception and reproductive health in relation to the right to
45
life of the unborn child were indeed of transcendental importance, and considering also that the petitioners averred that the
respondents unjustly caused the allocation of public funds for the purchase of alleged abortifacients which would deprive the unborn of
its the right to life, the Court finds that the petitioners have locus standi to file these petitions.

Certiorari proper to challenge acts of the FDA

As to the contention that the subject recourse is improper as it involves the FDA's exercise of its regulatory powers, suffice it to say that
the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials as there is no other plain, speedy or
46
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. chanrobleslaw

Consequently, the Court dismisses the notion that the re-certification of contraceptive drugs and devices by the FDA in exercise of its
regulatory function is beyond judicial review. After all, the Constitution mandates that judicial power include the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
47
Government. chanrobleslaw

Thus, certiorari is proper.

Violation of Due Process

48
It is on record that sometime in September 2014, the FDA issued a Notice inviting MAH of fifty (50) contraceptive drugs to apply for
re-evaluation/re-certification of their contraceptive products and directed "all concerned to give their written comments to said
applications on or before October 8, 2014."

ALFI, in the belief that the contraceptives enumerated in the Notice fell within the definition of "abortifacient," filed its preliminary
opposition, dated October 8, 2014, to all 50 applications with the FDA. The same opposition also questioned twenty-seven (27) other
contraceptive drugs and devices that had existing FDA registrations which were not subjects of any application for re-evaluation/re-
certification.
On November 24, 2014, ALFI formally filed its opposition to all the seventy-seven (77) contraceptive drugs, but despite the pending
opposition to the re-evaluation/re-certification of these contraceptive products, the FDA issued two (2) certificates of product registration
for the hormonal contraceptives, "Implanon" and "Implanon NXT."
49
On March 19, 2015, ALFI wrote another letter to the DOH and the FDA, reiterating its opposition to the applications for re-
evaluation/re-certification and requesting, among others, that the agencies shed light on the status of their earlier opposition and
schedule hearings and consultations regarding the applications for re-evaluation/re-certification.

The petitioners' oppositions were all ignored.

Now, one of the guarantees sacrosanct in this jurisdiction is that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. An essential component of the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause, undoubtedly occupies a position of primacy in the
fundamental law.

Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural due process. In order that a particular act may not be impugned as
violative of the due process clause, there must be compliance with both the substantive and the procedural requirements
50
thereof. chanrobleslaw
51
Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to his property. Procedural
due process, on the other hand, means compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity
52
with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it. chanrobleslaw

Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt
53
from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. chanrobleslaw
54
In Ang Tibay v. CIR, the Court laid down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings, as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof;

2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

3) The decision must have something to support itself;

4) The evidence must be substantial;

5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;

6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and cralawlawlibrary

7) The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
55
know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After an assessment of the undisputed facts, the Court finds that the FDA certified, procured and administered such contraceptive
drugs and devices, without the observance of the basic tenets of due process, without notice and without public hearing,
despite the constant opposition from the petitioners. From the records, it appears that other than the notice inviting stakeholders to
apply for certification/re-certification of their reproductive health products, there was no showing that the respondents notified the
oppositors and conducted a hearing on the applications and oppositions submitted.

Rather than provide concrete evidence to meet the petitioners' opposition, the respondents simply relied on their challenge questioning
the propriety of the subject petition on technical and procedural grounds. The Court notes that even the letters submitted by the
petitioners to the FDA and the DOH seeking information on the actions taken by the agencies regarding their opposition were left
unanswered as if they did not exist at all. The mere fact that the RH Law was declared as not unconstitutional does not permit the
respondents to run roughshod over the constitutional rights, substantive and procedural, of the petitioners.

Indeed, although the law tasks the FDA as the primary agency to determine whether a contraceptive drug or certain device has no
abortifacient effects, its findings and conclusion should be allowed to be questioned and those who oppose the same must be given a
56
genuine opportunity to be heard in their stance. After all, under Section 4(k) of R.A. No. 3720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711, the FDA
is mandated to order the ban, recall and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death, serious illness or serious
injury to a consumer or patient, or found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, after due process.

Due to the failure of the respondents to observe and comply with the basic requirements of due process, the Court is of the view that
the certifications/re-certifications and the distribution of the questioned contraceptive drugs by the respondents should be struck down
as violative of the constitutional right to due process.

Verily, it is a cardinal precept that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, the courts are ousted from their jurisdiction.
The violation of a party's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.
Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack
of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or
57
administrative) where he stands to lose the same. chanrobleslaw

In re: Motion to Lift the Temporary Restraining Order

58
Supplementing their Comment, the OSG sought to have the June 17, 2015 TRO of the Court lifted, arguing that given the expiry date
of these contraceptive drugs, the continued effectivity of the June 17, 2015 TRO of the Court would result in the waste of vast quantities
of "Implanon" and "Implanon NXT" which remain in government warehouses. In addition to insisting on the safety of these contraceptive
drugs, respondents added that the continued effectivity of the June 17, 2015 TRO of the Court would also result in the depleted supply
of contraceptive drugs and devices in both accredited public health facilities and in the commercial market.
59
This was opposed by petitioners who asserted that in light of the lack of any clear and transparent procedure and rules for the
determination of the safety and non-abortifacient character of the contraceptive drugs, the June 17, 2015 TRO should be maintained. In
support of their argument, petitioners cited the Principle of Prudence espoused by the Framers of the Constitution, that is, "should there
60
be the slightest iota of doubt regarding questions of life and respect for human life, one must try to be on the safe side." chanrobleslaw

In view of the foregoing, the Court denies the motion to lift the TRO issued by this Court at this time. The public respondents, their
representatives, agents or other persons acting on their behalf are still enjoined from distributing and administering the certified and re-
certified drugs and devices, considering that the FDA will still be conducting a hearing on the opposition of the petitioners. To lift the
TRO at this time is to grant a motion for execution before a trial.

Nothing in this resolution, however, should be construed as restraining or stopping the FDA from carrying on its mandate and duty to
test, analyze, scrutinize, and inspect drugs and devices. What are being enjoined are the grant of certifications/re-certifications of
contraceptive drugs without affording the petitioners due process, and the distribution and administration of the questioned
contraceptive drugs and devices including Implanon and Implanon NXT until they are determined to be safe and non-abortifacient.

Any decision of the FDA is appealable to the Court of Appeals thru a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
61
The Court notes that Section 32 of R.A. No. 3720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711, and its implementing rules provide that a party
aggrieved by the orders, rulings or decision (or inaction) of the Director-General of the FDA has the remedy of appealing the same to
62 63
the Secretary of Health. The Court likewise notes that under Section 9 of E.O. No. 247, the decisions of the Secretary of Health
would first have to be appealed to the Office of the President, in conformity with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Notwithstanding, considering that the Secretary of Health is the principal respondent in these petitions, any decision by the FDA in this
particular case should be directly appealable to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. Verily, procedural rules, whether issued by quasi-judicial agencies or embodied in statutes enacted by the Congress, are subject
to alteration or modification by the Court in the exercise of its constitutional rule-making power.
64
In First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court, on the strength of Circular No. 1-91 (now Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court), allowed an appeal from the decision of the Board of Investment to the CA, notwithstanding the express provision of Section 82
65
of the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 that any appeal from a decision of the Board of Investment should be directly taken to this
Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxx [T]his Court, pursuant to its Constitutional power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing
the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial
agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of procedure.

Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not strictly a statute or law, it has, however, the force and effect of law
according to settled jurisprudence. In Inciong v. de Guia, a circular of this Court was treated as law. In adopting the recommendation of
the Investigating Judge to impose a sanction on a judge who violated Circular No. 7 of this Court dated September 23, 1974, as
amended by Circular No. 3 dated April 24, 1975 and Circular No. 20 dated October 4, 1979, requiring raffling of cases, this Court
quoted the ratiocination of the Investigating Judge, brushing aside the contention of respondent judge that assigning cases instead of
raffling is a common practice and holding that respondent could not go against the circular of this Court until it is repealed or otherwise
modified, as "(L)aws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
customs or practice to the contrary."

The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right
which, under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not
entirely defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final
orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such appeal can be brought. These latter
portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making
powers.

The case of Bustos v. Lucero distinguished between rights created by a substantive law and those arising from procedural
law:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Substantive law creates substantive rights .... Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal
system prior to the disturbance of normal relations (60 C.J., 980). Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and
regulates rights, or which regulates rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action, as oppossed to adjective or remedial law,
which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains a redress for their invasion.
Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI should be brought pertains only to procedure or
the method of enforcing the substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or final
orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from
decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It
66
did not make an incursion into the substantive right to appeal. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The fact that the FDA is not among the agencies enumerated in Rule 43 as subject of a petition for review to the CA is of no
67
consequence. In Cayao-Lasam v. Ramolete, the Court disagreed with the opinion of the CA that the enumeration of the agencies
mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 43 was exclusive. Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Indeed, the PRC is not expressly mentioned as one of the agencies which are expressly enumerated under Section 1, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. However, its absence from the enumeration does not, by this fact alone, imply its exclusion from the coverage of said
Rule. The Rule expressly provides that it should be applied to appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-
judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The phrase "among these agencies" confirms that the enumeration made
68
in the Rule is not exclusive to the agencies therein listed. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
More importantly, to require the petitioners to first challenge any adverse decision of the FDA before the Secretary of Health and then to
the Office of the President, will unduly delay the final resolution of the current controversies. It should be remembered that
69
in Ginete v. Court of Appeals, it was held:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant
case.

xxx

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that
70
rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. [Emphasis Included]
Considering that in the case at bench, what is mainly involved is the protection of the constitutionally protected right to life of the
unborn, this Court finds that any controversy involving it should be resolved in the most expeditious manner possible.

Petition for Contempt

In the absence of a clear contumacious act committed against the Court with respect to the TRO, contempt is not warranted. It has
been shown that the questioned acts were performed or done prior to the issuance of the TRO. Moreover, the charge that the
respondents are continuing to engage in the distribution of the contraceptive drugs Implanon and Implanon NXT has not been
substantiated. The mere fact that the subject drugs were re-certified up to May 29, 2020 is not proof that they continue to violate the
TRO. In fact, the respondents are praying that it be lifted which is an indication that they are respecting and observing it.

At any rate, this controversy would not have been brought about if only the public respondents acted in accordance with the mandate of
the Court in Imbong. Despite the Court's pronouncements in Imbong, they have not amended the RH-IRR to conform to the said
pronouncements. Several provisions were struck down by the Court as unconstitutional, but they remain in the RH-IRR. Positive steps
should have been taken by the concerned agencies.

Moreover, the Court notes that the RH-IRR has failed to provide the procedural mechanism by which oppositors may challenge the
safety and the non-abortifacient character of contraceptive drugs and devices. The FDA should address this glaring omission.

To be sure, and to avoid any dispute in the future, the Court will adopt and embody in the dispositive portion the studied instructions of
one of their esteemed colleagues, Hon. Mariano C. Castillo, in his Concurring Opinion in Imbong. Due to the inaction of the public
respondents, the Court will adopt them as part of this resolution to serve as guidelines for all concerned.

In line with pronouncements made herein and in the decision of the Court in Imbong, the FDA should afford the petitioners their
constitutional right to due process by conducting a summary hearing on the applications and oppositions, guided by the cardinal rights
of parties laid down in Ang Tibay as stated above, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this disposition.

WHEREFORE, the case docketed as G.R. No. 217872 is hereby REMANDED to the Food and Drugs Administration which is hereby
ordered to observe the basic requirements of due process by conducting a hearing, and allowing the petitioners to be heard, on the re-
certified, procured and administered contraceptive drugs and devices, including Implanon and Implanon NXT, and to determine whether
they are abortifacients or non-abortifacients.

Pursuant to the expanded jurisdiction of this Court and its power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, the Court hereby:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. DIRECTS the Food and Drug Administration to formulate the rules of procedure in the screening, evaluation and approval of all
contraceptive drugs and devices that will be used under Republic Act No. 10354. The rules of procedure shall contain the following
minimum requirements of due process: (a) publication, notice and hearing, (b) interested parties shall be allowed to intervene, (c) the
standard laid down in the Constitution, as adopted under Republic Act No. 10354, as to what constitutes allowable contraceptives shall
be strictly followed, that is, those which do not harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception /fertilization, (d) in weighing the
evidence, all reasonable doubts shall be resolved in favor of the protection and preservation of the right to life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization, and (e) the other requirements of administrative due process, as summarized in Ang Tibay v. CIR, shall be
complied with.

2. DIRECTS the Department of Health in coordination with other concerned agencies to formulate the rules and regulations or
guidelines which will govern the purchase and distribution/dispensation of the products or supplies under Section 9 of Republic Act No.
10354 covered by the certification from the Food and Drug Administration that said product and supply is made available on the
condition that it will not be used as an abortifacient subject to the following minimum due process requirements: (a) publication, notice
and hearing, and (b) interested parties shall be allowed to intervene. The rules and regulations or guidelines shall provide sufficient
detail as to the manner by which said product and supply shall be strictly regulated in order that they will not be used as an abortifacient
and in order to sufficiently safeguard the right to life of the unborn.

3. DIRECTS the Department of Health to generate the complete and correct list of the government's reproductive health programs and
services under Republic Act No. 10354 which will serve as the template for the complete and correct information standard and, hence,
the duty to inform under Section 23(a)(l) of Republic Act No. 10354. The Department of Health is DIRECTED to distribute copies of this
template to all health care service providers covered by Republic Act No. 10354.
The respondents are hereby also ordered to amend the Implementing Rules and Regulations to conform to the rulings and guidelines in
G.R. No. 204819 and related cases.

The above foregoing directives notwithstanding, within 30 days from receipt of this disposition, the Food and Drugs Administration
should commence to conduct the necessary hearing guided by the cardinal rights of the parties laid down in CIR v. Ang
71
Tibay. chanrobleslaw

Pending the resolution of the controversy, the motion to lift the Temporary Restraining Order is DENIED.

With respect to the contempt petition, docketed as G.R. No. 221866, it is hereby DENIED for lack of concrete basis.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

G.R. No. 217872 ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION, PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALFI) and ATTY. MARIA CONCEPCION S.
NOCHE, in her own behalf and as President of ALFI, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, ROSIE B. LUISTRO, ELENITA S.A. SANDEJAS,
EMILY R. LAWS, EILEEN Z. ARANETA, SALV ACION C. MONTEIRO, MARIETTA C. GORREZ, ROLANDO M. BAUTISTA, RUBEN
T. UMALI, and MILDRED C. CASTOR , Petitioners
vs.
HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, Secretary-Designate of the Department of Health; NICOLAS B.LUTERO III, Assistant Secretary of
Health, Officer-in-Charge, Food and Drug Administration; and MARIA LOURDES C. SANTIAGO, Officer in-Charge, Center for
Drug Regulation and Research, Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 221866 MARIA CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, in her own behalf and as counsel of Petitioners, JOSE S. SANDEJAS,
ROSIE B. LUISTRO, ELENITA S.A. SANDEJAS, EMILY R. LAWS EILEEN Z. ARANETA, SALVACION C. MONTEIRO MARIETTA
C. GORREZ, ROLANDO M. BAUTISTA, RUBEN T. UMALI, and MILDRED C. CASTOR, Petitioners
vs.
HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, Secretary-Designate of the Department of Health; NICOLAS B. LUTERO III, Assistant Secretary of
Health; NICOLAS B. LUTERO III, Assistant Secretary of Health, Officer-in-Charge, Food and Drug Administration; and MARIA
LOURDES C. SANTIAGO, Officer-in-Charge, Center for Drug Regulation and Research, Respondents.

1
Subject of this resolution is the Omnibus Motion filed by the respondents, thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking partial
2
reconsideration of the August 24, 2016 Decision (Decision), where the Court resolved the: [1] Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
Mandamus with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction
(G.R. No. 217872); and the [2] Petition for Contempt of Court (G.R. No. 221866), in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, the case docketed as G.R No. 217872 is hereby REMANDED to the Food and Drugs Administration which is hereby
ordered to observe the basic requirements of due process by conducting a hearing, and allowing the petitioners to be heard, on the re-
certified, procured and administered contraceptive drugs and devices, including Implanon and lmplanon NXT, and to determine whether
they are abortifacients or non-abortifacients.

Pursuant to the expanded jurisdiction of this Court and its power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, the Court hereby:

1. DIRECTS the Food and Drug Administration to formulate the rules of procedure in the screening, evaluation and approval of
all contraceptive drugs and devices that will be used under Republic Act No. 10354. The rules of procedure shall contain the
following minimum requirements of due process: (a) publication, notice and hearing, (b) interested parties shall be allowed to
intervene, (c) the standard laid down in the Constitution, as adopted under Republic Act No. 10354, as to what constitutes
 allowable contraceptives shall be strictly followed, that is, those which do not harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization, (d) in weighing the evidence, all reasonable doubts shall be resolved in favor of the protection and
preservation of the right to life of the unborn from conception/fertilization, and (e) the other requirements of administrative due
process, as summarized in Ang Tibay v. CIR, shall be complied with.

2. DIRECTS the Department of Health in coordination with other concerned agencies to formulate the rules and regulations or
guidelines which will govern the purchase and distribution/ dispensation of the products or supplies under Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 10354 covered by the certification from the Food and Drug Administration that said product and supply is
made available on the condition that it will not be used as an abortifacient subject to the following minimum due process
requirements: (a) publication, notice and hearing, and (b) interested parties shall be allowed to intervene. The rules and
regulations or guidelines shall provide sufficient detail as to the manner by which said product and supply shall be strictly
regulated in order that they will not be used as an abortifacient and in order to sufficiently safeguard the right to life of the
unborn.

3. DIRECTS the Department of Health to generate the complete and correct list of the government's reproductive health
programs and services under Republic Act No. 10354 which will serve as the template for the complete and correct
information standard and, hence, the duty to inform under Section 23(a)(l) of Republic Act No. 10354. The Department of
Health is DIRECTED to distribute copies of this template to all health care service providers covered by Republic Act No.
10354.

The respondents are hereby also ordered to amend the Implementing Rules and Regulations to conform to the rulings and guidelines in
G.R. No. 204819 and related cases.

The above foregoing directives notwithstanding, within 30 days from receipt of this disposition, the Food and Drugs Administration
should commence to conduct the necessary hearing guided by the cardinal rights of the parties laid down in CIR v. Ang Tibay.

Pending the resolution of the controversy, the motion to lift the Temporary Restraining Order is DENIED.

With respect to the contempt petition, docketed as G.R No. 221866, it is hereby DENIED for lack of concrete basis.

3
SO ORDERED.

Arguments of the Respondents

Part 1: Due Process need not be

complied with as the questioned
acts of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) were in
the exercise of its Regulatory Powers

In the subject Omnibus Motion, the respondents argued that their actions should be sustained, even if the petitioners were not afforded
notice and hearing, because the contested acts of registering, re-certifying, procuring, and administering contraceptive drugs and
4
devices were all done in the exercise of its regulatory power. They contended that considering that the issuance of the certificate of
5
product registration (CPR) by the FDA under Section 7.04, Rule of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
10354 (RH-IRR) did not involve the adjudication of the parties' opposing rights and liabilities through an adversarial proceeding, the due
6
process requirements of notice and hearing need not be complied with.

Stated differently, the respondents assert that as long as the act of the FDA is exercised pursuant to its regulatory power, it need not
comply with the due process requirements of notice and hearing.

Corollary to this, the respondents wanted the Court to consider that the FDA had delineated its functions among different persons and
bodies in its organization. Thus, they asked the Court to make a distinction between the "quasi-judicial powers" exercised by
7
the Director-General of the FDA under Section 2(b) of Article 3, Book I of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
8 9
9711, and the "regulatory/administrative powers" exercised by the FDA under Section 2(c )(1) of the same. For the respondents,
the distinction given in the above-cited provisions was all but proof that the issuance of CPR did not require notice and hearing.

After detailing the process by which the FDA's Center for Drug Regulation and Research (CDRR) examined and tested the
10
contraceptives for non-abortifacience, the respondents stressed that the Decision wreaked havoc on the organizational structure of
11
the FDA, whose myriad of functions had been carefully delineated in the IRR of R.A. No. 9711. The respondents, thus, prayed for the
12
lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order (TR0).

Part 2: The requirements of due

process need not be complied with as
the elements of procedural due
process laid down in Ang Tibay v.
CIR are not applicable

The respondents further claimed in their omnibus motion that the requirements of due process need not be complied with because the
13
standards of procedural due process laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR were inapplicable considering that: a) substantial evidence could
14
not be used as a measure in determining whether a contraceptive drug or device was abortifacient; b) the courts had neither
15
jurisdiction nor competence to review the findings of the FDA on the non-abortifacient character of contraceptive drugs or devices; c)
16
the FDA was not bound by the rules of admissibility and presentation of evidence under the Rules of Court; and d) the findings of the
17
FDA could not be subject of the rule on res judicata and stare-decisis.

The respondents then insisted that Implanon and Implanon NXT were not abortifacients and lamented that the continued injunction of
the Court had hampered the efforts of the FDA to provide for the reproductive health needs of Filipino women. For the respondents, to
require them to afford the parties like the petitioners an opportunity to question their findings would cause inordinate delay in the
distribution of the subject contraceptive drugs and devices which would have a dire impact on the effective implementation of the RH
Law.

The Court's Ruling

After an assiduous assessment of the arguments of the parties, the Court denies the Omnibus Motion, but deems that a clarification on
some points is in order.

Judicial Review

The powers of an administrative body are classified into two fundamental powers: quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial. Quasi-legislative
power, otherwise known as the power of subordinate legislation, has been defined as the authority delegated by the lawmaking body to
18
the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of law and implement legislative policy. "[A]
legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details
19
thereof." The exercise by the administrative body of its quasi-legislative power through the promulgation of regulations of general
application does not, as a rule, require notice and hearing. The only exception being where the Legislature itself requires it and
20
mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation.

Quasi-judicial power, on the other hand, is known as the power of the administrative agency to determine questions of fact to which
21
the legislative policy is to apply, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself. As it involves the exercise of discretion in
determining the rights and liabilities of the parties, the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power requires the concurrence of two
elements: one, jurisdiction which must be acquired by the administrative body and two, the observance of the requirements of due
22
process, that is, the right to notice and hearing.

On the argument that the certification proceedings were conducted by the FDA in the exercise of its "regulatory powers" and, therefore,
beyond judicial review, the Court holds that it has the power to review all acts and decisions where there is a commission of grave
abuse of discretion. No less than the Constitution decrees that the Court must exercise its duty to ensure that no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is committed by any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Such is
committed when there is a violation of the constitutional mandate that "no person is deprived of life, liberty, and property without due
process of law." The Court's power cannot be curtailed by the FDA's invocation of its regulatory power.

In so arguing, the respondents cited Atty. Carlo L. Cruz in his book, Philippine Administrative Law.

Lest there be any inaccuracy, the relevant portions of the book cited by the respondents are hereby quoted as follows:

xxx.

B. The Quasi-Judicial Power

xxx

2. Determinative Powers

To better enable the administrative body to exercise its quasi judicial authority, it is also vested with what is known
as determinative powers and functions.

Professor Freund classifies them generally into the enabling powers and the directing powers. The latter includes
the dispensing, the examining, and the summary powers.
The enabling vowers are those that permit the doing of an act which the law undertakes to regulate and which would be
unlawful with government approval. The most common example is the issuance of licenses to engage in a particular business or
23
occupation, like the operation of a liquor store or restaurant. x x x. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

From the above, two things are apparent: one, the "enabling powers" cover "regulatory powers" as defined by the respondents; and
two, they refer to a subcategory of a quasi-judicial power which, as explained in the Decision, requires the compliance with the twin
requirements of notice and hearing. Nowhere from the above-quoted texts can it be inferred that the exercise of "regulatory power"
places an administrative agency beyond the reach of judicial review. When there is grave abuse of discretion, such as denying a party
of his constitutional right to due process, the Court can come in and exercise its power of judicial review. It can review the challenged
acts, whether exercised by the FDA in its ministerial, quasi-judicial or regulatory power. In the past, the Court exercised its power of
24 25 26
judicial review over acts and decisions of agencies exercising their regulatory powers, such as DPWH, TRB, NEA, and the
27 28
SEC, among others. In Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, the Court properly exercised its power of judicial review
over a Comelec resolution issued in the exercise of its regulatory power.

Clearly, the argument of the FDA is flawed.

Petitioners were Denied their

Right to Due Process

Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. In order that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the
29
due process clause, there must be compliance with both the substantive and the procedural requirements thereof. Substantive due
30
process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to his property. Procedural due process, on the
other hand, means compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of
31
fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it.

The undisputed fact is that the petitioners were deprived of their constitutional right to due process of law.

As expounded by the Court, what it found to be primarily deplorable is the failure of the respondents to act upon, much less address,
the various oppositions filed by the petitioners against the product registration, recertification, procurement, and distribution of the
questioned contraceptive drugs and devices. Instead of addressing the petitioners' assertion that the questioned contraceptive drugs
and devices fell within the definition of an "abortifacient" under Section 4(a) of the RH Law because of their "secondary mechanism of
action which induces abortion or destruction of the fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb,"32 the respondents chose to ignore them and proceeded with the registration, recertification,
procurement, and distribution of several contraceptive drugs and devices.

A cursory reading of the subject Omnibus Motion shows that the respondents proffer no cogent explanation as to why they did not act
on the petitioners' opposition. As stated by the Court in the Decision, rather than provide concrete action to meet the petitioners'
opposition, the respondents simply relied on their challenge questioning the propriety of the subject petition on technical and procedural
33
grounds. The Court, thus, finds the subject motion to be simply a rehash of the earlier arguments presented before, with the
respondents still harping on the peculiarity of the FDA's functions to exempt it from compliance with the constitutional mandate that "no
person shall be deprived oflife, liberty and property without due process of law."

The law and the rules demand

compliance with due process
requirements

A reading of the various provisions, cited by the respondents in support of their assertion that due process need not be complied with in
the approval of contraceptive drugs or devices, all the more reinforces the Court's conclusion that the FDA did fail to afford the
petitioners a genuine opportunity to be heard.

As outlined by the respondents themselves, the steps by which the FDA approves contraceptive drugs or devices, demand compliance
with the requirements of due process viz:

Step 1. Identify contraceptive products in the database. Create another database containing the following details of contraceptive
products: generic name, dosage strength and form, brand name (if any), registration number, manufacturer, MAH, and the period of
validity of the CPR.

Step 2. Identify contraceptive products which are classified as essential medicines in the Philippine Drug Formulary.

Step 3. Retrieve the contraceptive product's file and the CPR duplicate of all registered contraceptive products. Create a database of
the contraceptive product's history, including its initial, renewal, amendment, and/or variation applications.

Step 4. Conduct a preliminary review of the following:

 a. general physiology of female reproductive system, including hormones involved, female reproductive cycle, and conditions
of the female reproductive system during pregnancy.

b. classification of hormonal contraceptives;

c. regulatory status of the products in benchmark countries; and

d. mechanism of action of hormonal contraceptives based on reputable journals, meta-analyses, systemic reviews, evaluation
of regulatory authorities in other countries, textbooks, among others.

Step 5. Issue a notice to all concerned MAHs, requiring them to submit scientific evidence that their product is non-
abortifacient, as defined in the RH Law and Imbong.

Step 6. Post a list of contraceptive products which were applied for re-certification for public comments in the FDA website.

Step 7. Evaluate contraceptive products for re-certification.

A. Part I (Review of Chemistry, Manufacture and Controls)

1. Unit Dose and Finished Product Formulation

2. Technical Finished Product Specifications

3. Certificate of Analysis

B. Part II (Evaluation of Whether the Contraceptive Product is Abortifacient)

1. Evaluation of the scientific evidence submitted by the applicant and the public.

2. Review and evaluation of extraneous evidence, e.g., scientific journals, meta-analyses, etc.

Step 8. Assess and review the documentary requirements submitted by the applicant. Technical reviewers considered scientific
evidence such as meta-analyses, systemic reviews, national and clinical practice guidelines and recommendations of international
34
medical organizations submitted by the companies, organizations and individuals, to be part of the review. [Emphases and
Underlining supplied]

The Court notes that the above-outlined procedure is deficient insofar as it only allows public comments to cases of re-certification. It
fails to allow the public to comment in cases where a reproductive drug or device is being subject to the certification process for the first
time. This is clearly in contravention of the mandate of the Court in lmbong that the IRR should be amended to conform to it.

More importantly, the Court notes that Step 5 requires the FDA to issue a notice to all concerned MAHs and require them to submit
scientific evidence that their product is non-abortifacient; and that Step 6 requires the posting of the list of contraceptive products which
were applied for re-certification for public comments in the FDA website.

If an opposition or adverse comment is filed on the ground that the drug or devise has abortifacient features or violative of the
RH Law, based on the pronouncements of the Court in Im bong or any other law or rule, the FDA is duty-bound to take into account and
consider the basis of the opposition.

To conclude that product registration, recertification, procurement, and distribution of the questioned contraceptive drugs and devices
by the FDA in the exercise of its regulatory power need not comply with the requirements of due process would render the issuance of
notices to concerned MAHs and the posting of a list of contraceptives for public comment a meaningless exercise. Concerned MAHs
and the public in general will be deprived of any significant participation if what they will submit will not be considered.

35
Section 7.04, Rule 7 of the IRR of the RH Law (RH-IRR), relied upon by the respondents in support of their claims, expressly allows
the consideration of conflicting evidence, such as that supplied by the petitioners in support of their opposition to the approval of
certain contraceptive drugs and devices. In fact, the said provision mandates that the FDA utilize the "best evidence available" to
ensure that no bortifacient is approved as a family planning drug or device. It bears mentioning that the same provision even allows an
independent evidence review group (ERG) to ensure that evidence for or against the certification of a contraceptive drug or device is
duly considered.

Structure of the FDA

As earlier mentioned, the respondents argue that the Decision "wreaked havoc on the organizational structure of the FDA, whose
36
myriad of functions have been carefully delineated under R.A. No. 9711 IRR." Citing Section 7.04, Rule 7 of the RH-IRR, the FDA
insists that the function it exercises in certifying family planning supplies is in the exercise of its regulatory power, which cannot be the
subject of judicial review, and that it is the Director-General of the FDA who exercises quasi-judicial powers, citing Section 2(b) of
37
Article 3, Book I of the RH-IRR.

The FDA wants the Court to consider that, as a body, it has a distinct and separate personality from the Director-General, who
exercises quasi-judicial power. The Court cannot accommodate the position of the respondents. Section 6(a) of R.A. No. 3720, as
38
amended by Section 7 of R.A. No. 9711, provides that "(a) The FDA shall be headed by a director-general with the rank of
undersecretary, xxx." How can the head be separated from the body?

For the record, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3720, as amended by Section 5 of R.A. No. 9711, also recognizes compliance with the
requirements of due process, although the proceedings are not adversarial. Thus:

Section 5. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3720, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in
the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions,
powers and duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend standards of
identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization and
spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug
outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;

"xxx

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety,
efficacy, purity, and quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users
of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death,
serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;

"G) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified com plaint for health products, whether or not registered with the
FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty
(60) days only after due process has been observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused the death, serious illness
or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require
all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;

"(l) To strengthen the post market surveillance system in monitoring health products as defined in this Act and incidents of adverse
events involving such products;

"(m) To develop and issue standards and appropriate authorizations that would cover establishments, facilities and health products;

"(n) To conduct, supervise, monitor and audit research studies on health and safety issues of health products undertaken by entities
duly approved by the FDA;

"(o) To prescribe standards, guidelines, and regulations with respect to information, advertisements and other marketing instruments
and promotion, sponsorship, and other marketing activities about the health products as covered in this Act;
"(p) To maintain bonded warehouses and/or establish the same, whenever necessary or appropriate, as determined by the director-
general for confiscated goods in strategic areas of the country especially at major ports of entry; and

"(q) To exercise such other powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities
under this Act. [Emphases supplied]

The Cardinal Rights of Parties in

Administrative Proceedings as
laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR

39
In Ang Tibay v. CJR, the Court laid down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings, as follows:

1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof;

2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

3) The decision must have something to support itself;

4) The evidence must be substantial;

5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;

6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and

7) The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
40
know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

In the Decision, the Court found that the FDA certified, procured and administered contraceptive drugs and devices, without the
observance of the basic tenets of due process, that is, without notice and without public hearing. It appeared that, other than the notice
inviting stakeholders to apply for certification/recertification of their reproductive health products, there was no showing that the
respondents considered the opposition of the petitioners. Thus, the Court wrote:

Rather than provide concrete evidence to meet the petitioners' opposition, the respondents simply relied on their challenge questioning
the propriety of the subject petition on technical and procedural grounds. The Court notes that even the letters submitted by the
petitioners to the FDA and the DOH seeking information on the actions taken by the agencies regarding their opposition were left
unanswered as if they did not exist at all. The mere fact that the RH Law was declared as not unconstitutional does not permit the
respondents to run roughshod over the constitutional rights, substantive and procedural, of the petitioners.

Indeed, although the law tasks the FDA as the primary agency to determine whether a contraceptive drug or certain device has no
abortifacient effects, its findings and conclusion should be allowed to be questioned and those who oppose the same must be given a
genuine opportunity to be heard in their stance. After all, under Section 4(k) of R.A. No. 3720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711, the FDA
is mandated to order the ban, recall and/ or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death, serious illness or serious
injury to a consumer or patient, or found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, after due process.

Due to the failure of the respondents to observe and comply with the basic requirements of due process, the Court is of the view that
the certifications/re-certifications and the distribution of the questioned contraceptive drugs by the respondents should be struck down
as violative of the constitutional right to due process.

Verily, it is a cardinal precept that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, the courts are ousted from their jurisdiction.
The violation of a party's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.
Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative)
41
where he stands to lose the same.

The Court stands by that finding and, accordingly, reiterates its order of remand of the case to the FDA.

Procedure in the FDA; No Trial-Type Hearing

The Court is of the view that the FDA need not conduct a trial-type hearing. Indeed, due process does not require the conduct of a trial-
type hearing to satisfy its requirements. All that the Constitution requires is that the FDA afford the people their right to due process of
law and decide on the applications submitted by MAHs after affording the oppositors like the petitioners a genuine opportunity to
present their science-based evidence. As earlier pointed out, this the FDA failed to do. It simply ignored the opposition of the
42
petitioners. In the case of Perez, et al. v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, et al., it was stated that:

A formal trial-type hearing is not even essential to due process. It is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based.

43
In the fairly recent case of Vivo v. Pagcor, the Court explained:

The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process. The essence of due
process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary,
and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals elaborates on the well-established meaning of
due process in administrative proceedings in this wise:

x x x Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is
satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
[Emphasis supplied; citations omitted]

Best Evidence Available

Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 5. In all cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicialbodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported
by substantialevidence, or the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

44
As applied to certification proceedings at the FDA, "substantial evidence" refers to the best scientific evidence available, "including
but not limited to: meta analyses, systematic reviews, national clinical practice guidelines where available, and recommendations of
international medical organizations," needed to support a conclusion whether a contraceptive drug or device is an abortifacient or not.
The FDA need not be bound or limited by the evidence adduced by the parties, but it can conduct its own search for related scientific
data. It can also consult other technical scientific experts known in their fields. It is also not bound by the principle of stare decisis or res
judicata, but may update itself and cancel certifications motu proprio when new contrary scientific findings become available or there
arise manifest risks which have not been earlier predicted.

On the Competence of the Court

to review the Findings of the FDA

The fact that any appeal to the courts will involve scientific matters will neither place the actions of the respondents beyond the need to
comply with the requirements of Ang Tibay nor place the actions of the FDA in certification proceedings beyond judicial review.

It should be pointed out that nowhere in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, are the courts ousted of their jurisdiction whenever the
issues involve questions of scientific nature. A court is not considered incompetent either in reviewing the findings of the FDA simply
because it will be weighing the scientific evidence presented by both the FDA and its oppositors in determining whether the
contraceptive drug or device has complied with the requirements of the law.

Although the FDA is not strictly bound by the technical rules on evidence, as stated in the Rules of Court, or it cannot be bound by the
principle of stare decisis or res judicata, it is not excused from complying with the requirements of due process. To reiterate for
emphasis, due process does not require that the FDA conduct trial-type hearing to satisfy its requirements. All that the Constitution
requires is that the FDA afford the people their right to due process of law and decide on the applications submitted by the MAHs after
affording the oppositors, like the petitioners, a genuine opportunity to present their sciencebased evidence.

The Appellate Procedure;

Appeal to the Office of the President

Incidentally, Section 32 of R.A. No. 3720 and Section 9 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 247 provide that any decision by the FDA would
then be appealable to the Secretary of Health, whose decision, in tum, may be appealed to the Office of the President (OP). Thus:

Sec. 32. The orders, rulings or decisions of the FDA shall be appealable to the Secretary of Health. - An appeal shall be deemed
perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal and posting of the corresponding appeal bond.
An appeal shall not stay the decision appealed from unless an order from the Secretary of Health is issued to stay the execution
thereof.

Sec. 9. Appeals. - Decisions of the Secretary (DENR, DA, DOH or DOST) may be appealed to the Office of the
President. Recourse to the courts shall be allowed after exhaustion of all administrative remedies.

In view thereof, the Court should modify that part of the Decision which allows direct appeal of the FDA decision to the Court of
Appeals.1âwphi1 As stated in the said decision, the FDA decision need not be appealed to the Secretary of Health because she herself
is a party herein. Considering that the Executive

Secretary is not a party herein, the appeal should be to the OP as provided in Section 9.

On the Prayer to Lift the TRO

The respondents lament that the assailed decision undermines the functions of the FDA as the specialized agency tasked to determine
whether a contraceptive drug or device is safe, effective and non-abortifacient. They also claim that the assailed decision requiring
notice and hearing would unduly delay the issuance of CPR thereby affecting public access to State-funded contraceptives. Finally, in a
veritable attempt to sow panic, the respondents claim that the TRO issued by the Court would result in "a nationwide stockout of family
45
planning supplies in accredited public health facilities and the commercial market. "

On this score, it should be clarified that the Decision simply enjoined the respondents from registering, recertifying, procuring, and
administering only those contraceptive drugs and devices which were the subjects of the petitioners' opposition, specifically Implanon
and Implanon NXT. It never meant to enjoin the processing of the entire gamut of family planning supplies that have been declared as
unquestionably non-abortifacient. Moreover, the injunction issued by the Court was only subject to the condition that the respondents
afford the petitioners a genuine opportunity to their right to due process.

As the Decision explained, the Court cannot lift the TRO prior to the summary hearing to be conducted by the FDA. To do so would
render the summary hearing an exercise in futility. Specifically, the respondents would want the Court to consider their argument that
Implanon and Implanon NXT have no abortifacient effects. According to them, "the FDA tested these devices for safety, efficacy, purity,
quality, and non-abortiveness prior to the issuance of certificates of registration and recertification, and after the promulgation of
46
Imbong." The Court, however, cannot make such determination or pronouncement at this time. To grant its prayer to lift the
TRO would be premature and presumptuous. Any declaration by the Court at this time would have no basis because the FDA, which
has the mandate and expertise on the matter, has to first resolve the controversy pending before its office.

This Court also explained in the Decision that the issuance of the TRO did not mean that the FDA should stop fulfilling its mandate to
test, analyze, scrutinize, and inspect other drugs and devices. Thus:

Nothing in this resolution, however, should be construed as restraining or stopping the FDA from carrying on its mandate and duty to
test, analyze, scrutinize, and inspect drugs and devices. What are being enjoined are the grant of certifications/re-certifications of
contraceptive drugs without affording the petitioners due process, and the distribution and administration of the questioned
47
contraceptive drugs and devices including Implanon and Implanon NXT until they are determined to be safe and non-abortifacient.

On Delay

The respondents claim that this judicial review of the administrative decision of the FDA in certifying and recertifying drugs has caused
much delay in the distribution of the subject drugs with a dire impact on the effective implementation of the RH Law.

In this regard, the respondents have only themselves to blame. Instead of complying with the orders of the Court as stated in the
Decision to conduct a summary hearing, the respondents have returned to this Court, asking the Court to reconsider the said decision
claiming that it has wreaked havoc on the organizational structure of the FDA.

Had the FDA immediately conducted a summary hearing, by this time it would have finished it and resolved the opposition of the
petitioners.1âwphi1 Note that there was already a finding by the FDA, which was its basis in registering, certifying and recertifying the
questioned drugs and devices. The pharmaceutical companies or the MAHs need not present the same evidence it earlier adduced to
convince the FDA unless they want to present additional evidence to fortify their positions. The only entities that would present
evidence would be the petitioners to make their point by proving with relevant scientific evidence that the contraceptives have
abortifacient effects. Thereafter, the FDA can resolve the controversy.

48
Indeed, in addition to guaranteeing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law, the
Constitution commands that "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and
49
administrative bodies."

WHEREFORE, the August 24, 2016 Decision is MODIFIED. Accordingly, the Food and Drug Administration is ordered to consider the
oppositions filed by the petitioners with respect to the listed drugs, including Implanon and Implanon NXT, based on the standards of
the Reproductive Health Law, as construed in lmbong v. Ochoa, and to decide the case within sixty (60) days from the date it will be
deemed submitted for resolution.

After compliance with due process and upon promulgation of the decision of the Food and Drug Administration, the Temporary
Restraining Order would be deemed lifted if the questioned drugs and devices are found not abortifacients.

After the final resolution by the Food and Drug Administration, any appeal should be to the Office of the President pursuant to Section 9
of E.O. No. 247.

As ordered in the August 24, 2016 Decision, the Food and Drug Administration is directed to amend the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 10354 so that it would be strictly compliant with the mandates of the Court in lmbong v. Ochoa.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC G.R. No. 206794, November 26, 2013 BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PERRY L.
PE, Petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

The petitioners, Bankers Association of the Philippines and Perry L. Pe, assail the constitutionality and legality of the respondent
1
Commission on Elections’ (Comelec’s) Resolution No. 9688 dated May 7, 2013, entitled “In the Matter of Implementing a Money Ban
2
to Deter and Prevent Vote-Buying in Connection with the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections” (Money Ban Resolution). The
petitioners included a prayer for the issuance of a status quo ante/temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin its implementation.

THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION

Under the Money Ban Resolution, the Comelec resolved:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. To prohibit the withdrawal of cash, encashment of checks and conversion of any monetary instrument into cash from May 8
to 13, 2013 exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or its equivalent in any foreign currency, per day in banks,
finance companies, quasi-banks, pawnshops, remittance companies and institutions performing similar functions. However, all other
non-cash transactions are not covered.

For this purpose, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and other financial agencies of the government are hereby deputized to implement
with utmost dispatch and ensure strict compliance with this resolution without violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 , as
amended, and Republic Act No. 6426[.]

2. To prohibit the possession, transportation and/or carrying of cash exceeding Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) or its equivalent in any foreign currency from May 8 to May 13, 2013. For this purpose, all cash being transported and
carried exceeding such amount shall be presumed for the purpose of vote-buying and electoral fraud in violation of the money
ban. xxx.

3. All withdrawals of cash or encashment of checks or series of withdrawals or encashment of checks in cash involving a
total amount exceeding Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) within one (1) banking day from date of the publication
of this resolution until May 13, 2013 shall be presumed to be for the purpose of accumulating funds for vote-buying and
election fraud and shall therefore be treated as a “suspicious transaction” under Republic Act No. 9160 or the “Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001” as amended by Republic Act No. 9194. For this purpose, the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) is
hereby deputized to monitor and initiate investigations, and if necessary, inquire into and examine the deposit and related accounts
3
involved in the suspected transaction pursuant to procedure and requirements of Republic Act No. 10167.
4
The Comelec’s Resolution No. 9688-A, issued on May 9, 2013, amended the Money Ban Resolution by:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. exempting withdrawals that are routine, regular and made in the ordinary course of business of the withdrawing client on the
basis of the prevailing “Know-Your-Client/Customer” policy of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), which requires banks
“not only to establish the identity of their clients but also to have background knowledge of their normal business
5
transactions,” and

2. presuming that the possession or transportation of cash in excess of P500,000.00 from May 8 to 13, 2013 was for the purpose
of vote-buying and electoral fraud when the same was without tenable justification or whenever attended by genuine reason
engendering belief that the money would be used for vote-buying.

The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9688-A on the same day that the petitioners filed the present petition.
 6
On May 10, 2013, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order, enjoining the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing before the
issuance of the Money Ban Resolution.

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

The petitioners invoke the Court’s power of judicial review to strike down the Money Ban Resolution.

They contend that the Comelec’s Money Ban Resolution was issued without jurisdiction since the Comelec’s power to supervise and
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of franchises or permits under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution does not extend to the
BSP which is not a holder of any special privilege from the government. The BSP’s power to regulate and supervise banking
7
operations stems from its mandate under the Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 8791 (The General Banking Law of
8
2000). Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution states –chanrobleslaw

Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants,
special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure
equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns
and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections. [emphasis ours]

They thus conclude that the Comelec’s power of supervision and regulation cannot be exercised over the BSP and the Anti-Money
Laundering Council (AMLC) as they can exercise authority only over public transportation and communication entities given special
privileges by the government.

The petitioners also posit that the Comelec’s power to deputize extends only to law enforcement agencies and only if the President
concurs. Section 2(4), Article IX-C of the Constitution states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

xxxx

4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government,
including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections. [emphasis ours]

They argue that the BSP and the AMLC are not law enforcement agencies unlike the National Bureau of Investigation and the
Philippine National Police. Assuming they may be considered as such, the Comelec failed to secure the concurrence of the President
to the deputation.

The petitioners note that paragraph 3 of the Money Ban Resolution effectively amended RA No. 9160 (Anti-Money Laundering Act of
2001 or AMLA) by treating the withdrawal of cash or encashment of checks exceeding P500,000.00 within one banking day from May 8
to 13, 2013 as a “suspicious transaction,” thus authorizing the AMLC to monitor, initiate investigations, inquire into and examine the
deposit. This type of transaction, however, is not among those enumerated as suspicious under Section 3(b) of the AMLA. As an
administrative issuance, the Money Ban Resolution cannot amend a law enacted by Congress.

The petitioners also claim that the Money Ban Resolution violates a number of constitutional rights.
9
The Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law. The Money Ban
Resolution violates an individual’s due process rights because it unduly and unreasonably restricts and prohibits the withdrawal,
possession, and transportation of cash. The prohibition effectively curtails a range of legitimate activities, and hampers and prejudices
property rights. Though the intent (i.e., to curb vote-buying and selling) is laudable, the means employed is not reasonably necessary
and is oppressive on an individual’s rights. The limitation on withdrawal also goes against the non-impairment clause because the
prohibitions and restrictions impair the banks’ contractual obligations with their depositors.

Finally, the petitioners claim that the Money Ban Resolution violates the constitutional presumption of innocence because it declares
that “all cash being transported and carried exceeding [P500,000.00] shall be presumed for the purpose of vote-buying and electoral
10
fraud in violation of the money ban.” There is no logical connection between the proven fact of possession and transportation of an
amount in excess of P500,000.00 and the presumed act of vote-buying because there are many other legitimate reasons for the proven
fact.

The Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment on the petition, insisting on the validity of the Money Ban
Resolution and its amendment.

The Comelec argues that it has the constitutional authority to supervise and regulate banks and other financial entities, citing Section 4,
Article IX-C of the Constitution. It alleges that its power to regulate covers banks and other finance companies, since these entities
operate under an “authority” granted by the BSP under Section 6 of RA No. 8791. This authority is of the same nature as “grants,
special privileges, or concessions” under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution; thus, it may be validly regulated by the Comelec.
The Comelec also claims that it may validly deputize the BSP, since the latter is a government instrumentality covered by Section 2(4),
Article IX-C of the Constitution. Contrary to the petitioners’ claim, the Comelec’s power to deputize is not limited to law enforcement
agencies, but extends to instrumentalities of the government. The constitutional intent is to give the Comelec unrestricted access to the
full machinery of the State to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

The Comelec further contends that Presidential concurrence with the exercise of the Comelec’s deputation power is required only if it
involves agencies and instrumentalities within the Executive Department, of which the BSP is not a part. Even assuming that
11
Presidential concurrence is required, this has been secured through Memorandum Order No. 52, s. 2013, where the President gave
12
his blanket concurrence to the deputation of all “law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government[.]”

That the BSP is constitutionally and statutorily tasked to provide “policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit,” and
vested with “supervision over the operations of bank,” does not preclude the Comelec from exercising its power to supervise and
regulate banks during the election period. Notably, the Comelec’s power is limited in terms of purpose and duration, and should prevail
in this specific instance.

If the Comelec deems the supervision and regulation of banks necessary to curb vote-buying, this is a political question that the Court
may not inquire into. The choice of the measures that the Comelec may undertake to ensure the conduct of a free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible election is a policy question beyond the scope of judicial review.

The Comelec lastly defends the Money Ban Resolution as a reasonable measure that is not unduly oppressive on individuals. It merely
limits transactions involving cash (withdrawal, encashment, possession, etc.), but does not affect other non-cash transactions such as
those involving checks and credit cards. Hence, only the medium or instrument of the transaction is affected; the transaction may
proceed using non-cash medium or instrument. There is, therefore, no impairment of rights and contracts that would invalidate the
Money Ban Resolution.

THE COURT’S RULING

We resolve to dismiss the petition for being moot and academic.

By its express terms, the Money Ban Resolution was effective only for a specific and limited time during the May 13, 2013
elections, i.e., from May 8 to 13, 2013. The Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order on May 10, 2013; thus, the Money Ban Resolution
was not in force during the most critical period of the elections – from May 10, 2013 to actual election day. With the May 13, 2013
elections over, the Money Ban Resolution no longer finds any application so that the issues raised have become moot and academic.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. The Court, as a rule, will decline to exercise jurisdiction over a
case and proceed to dismiss it when the issues posed have been mooted by supervening events. Mootness intervenes when a ruling
from the Court no longer has any practical value and, from this perspective, effectively ceases to be a justiciable
13
controversy. “[W]ithout a justiciable controversy, the [petition would] become a [plea] for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme
14
Court has no original jurisdiction.”

While the Court has recognized exceptions in applying the “moot and academic” principle, these exceptions relate only to situations
where: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is
involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
15
(4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

In the present case, we find it unnecessary to consider the presence of the first, second and third requirements when nothing in the
facts and surrounding circumstances indicate the presence of the fourth requirement, i.e., the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.

We note that the Comelec did not make any parallel move on or about the May 13, 2013 elections to address the evil that its Money
Ban Resolution sought to avoid and, in fact, it did not issue a similar resolution for the October 28, 2013 barangay elections. If the May
13, 2013 elections had come and gone without any need for the measures the assailed Resolution put in place and if no such measure
was necessary in the elections that immediately followed (i.e., the October 28, 2013 barangay elections), we believe that it is now
premature for the Court to assume that a similar Money Ban Resolution would be issued in the succeeding elections such that we now
have to consider the legality of the Comelec measure that is presently assailed.

We consider it significant that the BSP and the Monetary Board continue to possess full and sufficient authority to address the
Comelec’s concerns and to limit banking transactions to legitimate purposes without need for any formal Comelec resolution if and
when the need arises. Congress, too, at this point, should have taken note of this case and has the plenary authority, through its
lawmaking powers, to address the circumstances and evils the Money Ban Resolution sought to address. In other words, Congress
can very well act to consider the required measures for future elections, thus rendering unnecessary further action on the merits of the
assailed Money Ban Resolution at this point.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for having become moot and academic. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the
Court on May 10, 2013, having been rendered functus oficio by the May 13, 2013 elections, is hereby
formally LIFTED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 206844-45 July 23, 2013 COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST), represented herein by its Chairperson and First Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL,
Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 206982 COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS),
represented by its President and Incumbent Representative in the House of Representatives, ATTY. GODOFREDO V.
ARQUIZA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions within the same party-list organization, the Coalition of Associations of Senior
Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS) that are now praying for essentially the same reliefs from this Court.

One group is headed by Godofredo V. Arquiza (Rep. Arquiza), the organization’s incumbent representative in the House of
Representatives. This group shall be hereinafter referred to as the Arquiza Group. The other group is led by Francisco G. Datol, Jr., the
organization’s erstwhile third nominee. This group shall be hereinafter referred to as the Datol Group.

G.R. Nos. 206844-45 is the Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer for the Forthwith Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
1
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] and/or Status Quo Ante Order [SQAO]) filed in the name of SENIOR CITIZENS by
Francisco G. Datol, Jr. For brevity, we shall refer to this petition as the Datol Group’s petition.

G.R. No. 206982 is the Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
2
Injunction) filed on behalf of SENIOR CITIZENS by Rep. Arquiza. We shall refer to this as the Arquiza Group’s petition.

3 4
The above petitions were filed pursuant to Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, both assailing the Omnibus
5
Resolution dated May 10, 2013 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191
(PLM). Said Resolution disqualified SENIOR CITIZENS from participating in the May 13, 2013 elections and ordered the cancellation of
its registration and accreditation as a party-list organization.

THE ANTECEDENTS

6
On March 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc accredited SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list organization in a Resolution issued on even
date in SPP No. 06-026 (PL).

SENIOR CITIZENS participated in the May 14, 2007 elections. However, the organization failed to get the required two percent (2%) of
7
the total votes cast. Thereafter, SENIOR CITIZENS was granted leave to intervene in the case of Barangay Association for National
8
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections. In accordance with the procedure set forth in BANAT for the
allocation of additional seats under the party-list system, SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated one seat in Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then
the organization’s first nominee, served as a member of the House of Representatives.

Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections.

On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant, the relevant terms of which
we quote:

IRREVOCABLE COVENANT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENT

We, in representation of our respective personal capacity, hereby covenant and agree as follows:

ARTICLE I
PARTIES AND PERSONS

1. ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 1881 C.M. Recto Avenue,
Sampaloc, Manila, and representing the Senior Citizens Party-list in my capacity as President with our General
Headquarters at Room 404 West Trade Center, 132 West Avenue, hereinafter referred to as the FIRST PARTY;
 2. ATTY. DAVID L. KHO, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 35 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, hereinafter
referred to as the SECOND PARTY;

3. FRANCISCO G. DATOL, JR., of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at North Olympus Blk., 3, Lot 15 Ph4
Grieg St., Novaliches, Quezon City, hereinafter referred to as the THIRD PARTY;

4. REMEDIOS D. ARQUIZA, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 1881 C.M. Recto Avenue, Sampaloc,
Manila, hereinafter referred to as the FOURTH PARTY;

5. LINDA GADDI DAVID, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 150 Don Francisco, St. Francis Vil., San
Fernando, Pampanga City (sic) hereinafter referred to as the FIFTH PARTY;

xxxx

ARTICLE III
THE LIST OF CANDIDATES

We agree that official candidates of the SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST and in the following order shall be:

Name CTC No. Issued at Issued on

1. Godofredo V. Arquiza S.C.I.D.#2615256 Manila 04-02-04

2. David L. Kho 16836192 Quezon City 03-15-09

3. Francisco G. Datol, Jr. 27633197 Quezon City 02-10-10

4. Remedios D. Arquiza S.C.I.D.#50696 Quezon City 01-02-07

5. Linda Gaddi David CCI2009 12306699 Pampanga 01-04-10

ARTICLE IV
SHARING OF POWER

The Nominees agreed and pledged on their legal and personal honor and interest as well as the legal privileges and rights of the
respective party-list offices, under the following circumstances and events:

ELECTION RESULTS

Where only ONE (1) candidate qualifies and is proclaimed, then No. 1 shall assume the Office of Party-list Representative in
CONGRESS from July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2012 and shall relinquish his seat in Congress by the proper and legal acts and No. 2 shall
assume said seat from July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013;

In the event TWO (2) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then, No. 1 shall serve for three (3) years, and No. 2 and No. 3 will each
serve for one-and-a-half years.

In the event THREE (3) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then No. 1 shall serve for three years; No. 2 will serve for two (2) years
and afterwards shall relinquish the second seat to No. 4 nominee, who will then serve for one (1) year; No. 3 will occupy the third seat
for two (2) years and afterwards shall relinquish said seat on the third year to Nominee 5, who will serve for the remaining one (1) year.

In Fine:

If only one (1) seat is won If three (3) seats are won:
No. 1 nominee = 2 years
No. 2 nominee = 1 year No. 1 nominee = 3 years
No. 2 nominee = 2 years
If two (2) seats are won No. 3 nominee = 2 years
No. 1 nominee = 3 years No. 4 nominee = 1 year
No. 2 nominee = 1½ years No. 5 nominee = 1 year
 No. 3 nominee = 1½ years
All beginning July 1, 2010

SHARING OF RIGHTS
BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES

That serving incumbent Congress Representative in the event one or more is elected and qualified shall observe proper sharing of
certain benefits by virtue of his position as such, to include among others, appointment of persons in his office, projects which may
redound to the benefits and privileges that may be possible under the law.

The above mentioned parties shall oversee the implementation of this COVENANT.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands this MAY 05 2010 in QUEZON CITY.

(Signed) (Signed)

Godofredo V. Arquiza David L. Kho

S.C.I.D. #2615256 Iss. at Manila CTC#16836192 Iss. at
on 04-02-04 Quezon City on 03-15-09

(Signed) (Signed)

Francisco G. Datol, Jr. Remedios D. Arquiza

CTC#16836192 Iss. at S.C.I.D.#50696 Iss. at
Quezon City on 03-15-09 Quezon City on 01-02-07

(Signed)

Linda Gaddi David

CTC#CCI2009 12306699 Iss. at
9
San Fernando, Pampanga on 01-04-10

After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the party-list candidates and was
allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second
was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).

The split among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENS came about not long after. According to the Datol Group’s petition, the members of
SENIOR CITIZENS held a national convention on November 27, 2010 in order to address "the unfulfilled commitment of Rep. Arquiza
10
to his constituents." Further, a new set of officers and members of the Board of Trustees of the organization were allegedly elected
during the said convention. SENIOR CITIZENS’ third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., was supposedly elected as the organization’s
Chairman. Thereafter, on November 30, 2010, in an opposite turn of events, Datol was expelled from SENIOR CITIZENS by the Board
11
of Trustees that were allied with Rep. Arquiza.

Thenceforth, the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had been engaged in a bitter rivalry as both groups, with their own sets of officers,
claimed leadership of the organization.

The Resignation of Rep. Kho

12
On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza informed the office of COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. in a letter dated December 8,
2011 that the second nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS, Rep. Kho, had tendered his resignation, which was to take effect on December
31, 2011. The fourth nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, was to assume the vacant position in view of the previous expulsion from the
organization of the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr.

13
The letter of Rep. Arquiza was also accompanied by a petition dated December 14, 2011 in the name of SENIOR CITIZENS. The
petition prayed that the "confirmation and approval of the replacement of Congressman David L. Kho, in the person of the fourth
nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, due to the expulsion of the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., be issued immediately in order to
14
pave the way of her assumption into the office." Before the COMELEC, the petition was docketed as E.M. No. 12-040.

15
Attached to the petition was the resignation letter of Rep. Kho, which was addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
The letter stated thus:

THE HONORABLE SPEAKER

House of Representatives
Congress
Republic of the Philippines
Quezon City

Sir:

I am hereby tendering my irrevocable resignation as Representative of the Senior Citizens Party-list in the House of Representatives,
effective December 31, 2011 in the event that only two (2) seats are won by our party-list group; and will resign on June 30, 2012 in
case three seats are won.

As a consequence thereof, the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. shall nominate my successor
pursuant to law and Rules on the matter.

Please accept my esteem and respect.

Truly yours,

(Signed)
Rep. David L. Kho
Party-list Congressman

Copy furnished:
The Board of Trustees
16
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.

According to the Datol Group, Rep. Kho submitted to them a letter dated December 31, 2011, notifying them of his resignation in this
wise:

December 31, 2011

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF
SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILS., INC.
Rm. 405, 4th Floor, WTC Building
132 West Avenue, Quezon City

Gentlemen/Ladies:

It is with deepest regret that I inform this esteemed organization of my decision to resign as the party-list nominee for the House of
Representatives this 15th Congress for personal reason already conveyed to you.

Thank you for the opportunity to serve the Senior Citizens of our dear country.

Very truly yours,

(Signed)
17
DAVID L. KHO

18
In the interim, during the pendency of E.M. No. 12-040, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 was promulgated on February 21, 2012.
Pertinently, Section 7 of Rule 4 thereof provided that:

SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. Filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement among nominees of winning party-list
groups/organizations shall not be allowed.
On March 12, 2012, the Board of Trustees of SENIOR CITIZENS that were allied with Rep. Arquiza issued Board Resolution No. 003-
2012, which pertinently stated thus:

BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 003-2012

Series of 2012

A RESOLUTION RECALLING THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE BOARD IN RESOLUTION NO. 11-0012 OF THE RESIGNATION OF
CONGRESSMAN DAVID L. KHO AND ALLOWING HIM TO CONTINUE REPRESENTING THE SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST IN
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ALLOWING HIM TO CONTINUE HIS TERM AND IMPOSING CERTAIN CONDITIONS ON
HIM TO BE PERFORMED WITH THE COALITION;

WHEREAS, the second nominee, Congressman David L. Kho, tendered his resignation as representative of the Senior Citizens Party-
list effective December 31, 2011, x x x;

WHEREAS, the said resignation was accepted by the Board of Trustees in a resolution signed unanimously, in view of the nature of his
resignation, and in view of his determination to resign and return to private life, x x x;

WHEREAS, after much deliberation and consultation, the said nominee changed his mind and requested the Board of Trustees to
reconsider the acceptance, for he also reconsidered his resignation, and requested to continue his term;

WHEREAS, in consideration of all factors affecting the party-list and in view of the forthcoming elections, the Board opted to reconsider
the acceptance, recall the same, and allow Cong. David L. Kho to continue his term;

WHEREAS, the Coalition, in recalling the acceptance of the Board, is however imposing certain conditions on Cong. Kho to be
performed;

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED to recall the acceptance of the resignation of Congressman
19
David L. Kho in view of his request and change of mind, hence allow him to continue his term subject to conditions stated above.

Thereafter, on April 18, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc conducted a hearing on SENIOR CITIZENS’ petition in E.M. No. 12-040. At the
hearing, the counsel for SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza Group) admitted that Rep. Kho’s tender of resignation was made pursuant to the
20
agreement entered into by the organization’s nominees. However, said counsel also stated that the Board of Trustees of the
21
organization reconsidered the acceptance of Rep. Kho’s resignation and the latter was, instead, to complete his term. Also, from the
transcript of the hearing, it appears that the Arquiza Group previously manifested that it was withdrawing its petition, but the same was
22
opposed by the Datol Group and was not acted upon by the COMELEC.

23
On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution in E.M. No. 12-040, dismissing the petition of the SENIOR CITIZENS
(Arquiza Group). The pertinent portions of the Resolution stated, thus:

First, resignation of Kho,

pursuant to the party nominees’
term-sharing agreement, cannot
be recognized and be given effect
so as to create a vacancy in the
list and change the order of the
nominees.

Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7941, the withdrawal in writing of the nominee of his nomination is one of the three (3) exemptions
to the rule that "no change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to
the COMELEC." While we can consider the resignation of Rep. Kho as akin to the withdrawal of his own nomination, we are
constrained however NOT to recognize such resignation but only in so far as to change the order of petitioner’s nominees as submitted
to the Commission.

xxxx

Considering that it is an admitted fact that the resignation of Rep. Kho was made by virtue of a prior agreement of the parties, we
resolve and hereby rule that we cannot recognize such arrangement and accordingly we cannot approve the movement in the order of
nominees for being contrary to public policy. The term of office of public officials cannot be made subject to any agreement of private
parties. Public office is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made subject of any private agreement. Public office is
vested with public interest that should not be reined by individual interest.

In fact, to formalize the policy of disallowing term sharing agreements among party list nominees, the Commission recently promulgated
Resolution No. 9366, which provides:
"SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. – Filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement among nominees of winning party-list
groups/organizations shall not be allowed."

Considering all these, we find the term sharing agreement by the nominees of the Senior Citizen’s Party-List null and void. Any action
committed by the parties in pursuit of such term-sharing arrangement—including the resignation of Congressman David Kho—cannot
be recognized and be given effect. Thus, in so far as this Commission is concerned, no vacancy was created by the resignation of Rep.
Kho and there can be no change in the list and order of nominees of the petitioner party-list.

Second, the expulsion of Datol –

even if proven true – has no effect
in the list and in the order of
nominees, thus Remedios Arquiza
(the fourth nominee) cannot be
elevated as the third nominee.

xxxx

It must be noted that the list and order of nominees, after submission to this Commission, is meant to be permanent. The legislature in
crafting Republic Act No. 7941 clearly deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of
nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except for three (3) enumerated instances such as when: (a) the nominee dies;
(b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated.

xxxx

Thus, even if the expulsion of Datol in the petitioner party-list were true, the list and order of nominees of the Senior Citizen’s party-list
remains the same in so far as we are concerned as it does not fall under one of the three grounds mentioned above. Neither does it
have an automatic effect on the organization’s representative in the House of Representatives, for once a party-list nominee is "elected"
into office and becomes a member of the House, he is treated similarly and equally with the regular district representatives. As such,
they can only be expelled or suspended upon the concurrence of the two-thirds of all its Members and never by mere expulsion of a
party-list organization.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, there being no vacancy in the list of nominees of the petitioner organization, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The list and order of nominees of petitioner hereby remains the same as it was submitted to us there being no legally
24
recognizable ground to cause any changes thereat. (Citation omitted.)

25
The Datol Group filed A Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the above resolution, but the same remained unresolved.

The Review of SENIOR CITIZENS’ Registration

Meanwhile, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Party-list System
26
of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections under the name of SENIOR CITIZENS. The Manifestation of the Datol Group was
docketed as SPP

No. 12-157 (PLM), while that of the Arquiza Group was docketed as SPP No. 12-191 (PLM).

27
On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513, which, inter alia, set for summary evidentiary hearings by the
COMELEC En Banc the review of the registration of existing party-list organizations, which have filed their Manifestations of Intent to
Participate in the Party-list System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections.

The two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS appeared before the COMELEC En Banc on August 24, 2012 and they both submitted their
28
respective evidence, which established their continuing compliance with the requirements of accreditation as a party-list organization.

29
On December 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution in SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) and 12-191 (PLM). By a vote of 4-3,
the COMELEC En Banc ordered the cancellation of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS. The resolution explained that:

It shall be recalled that on June 27, 2012, this Commission promulgated its resolution in a petition that involved SENIOR CITIZENS
titled "In Re: Petition for Confirmation of Replacement of Resigned PartyList Nominee" and docketed as EM No. 12-040. In the process
of resolving the issues of said case, this Commission found that SENIOR CITIZENS nominees specifically nominees David L. Kho and
Francisco G. Datol, Jr. have entered into a term-sharing agreement. x x x.
Nominee David Kho’s term as party-list congressman is three (3) years which starts on June 30, 2010 and to end on June 30, 2013 as
directed no less than by the Constitution of the Philippines. Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states:

"Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election."

But following the term-sharing agreement entered into by SENIOR CITIZENS, David Kho’s term starts on June 30, 2010 and ends on
December 31, 2011, the date of effectivity of Kho’s resignation. By virtue of the term-sharing agreement, the term of Kho as member of
the House of Representatives is cut short to one year and six months which is merely half of the three-year term. This is totally opposed
to the prescription of the Constitution on the term of a Member of the House of Representatives. Hence, when confronted with this issue
on term sharing done by SENIOR CITIZENS, this Commission made a categorical pronouncement that such term-sharing agreement
must be rejected.

xxxx

From the foregoing, SENIOR CITIZENS failed to comply with Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 7, Rule 4 of
Comelec Resolution No. 9366. This failure is a ground for cancellation of registration under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941 which
states:

"Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization
or coalition on any of the following grounds:

xxxx

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to CANCEL the registration of Coalition
of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines (SENIOR CITIZENS) under the Party-List System of Representation.

The rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS challenged the above resolution before this Court by filing their respective petitions for
certiorari. The petition filed by the Datol Group was docketed as G.R. No. 204421, while the petition of the Arquiza Group was docketed
as G.R. No. 204425.

On December 11, 2012, the Court initially granted status quo ante orders on said petitions, directing the COMELEC to include the name
of SENIOR CITIZENS in the printing of official ballots for the May 13, 2013 party-list elections. Eventually, both petitions were
consolidated with the petition in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, which was docketed as G.R. No. 203766.

On April 2, 2013, the Court promulgated its Decision in Atong Paglaum, which ordered the remand to the COMELEC of the petitions
that have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of the petitioners in the printing of ballots. Following the parameters
set forth in the Court’s Decision, the COMELEC was to determine whether said petitioners, which included the two factions of SENIOR
CITIZENS, were qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the May 13, 2013 elections. For this purpose, the
Court stated that the COMELEC may conduct summary evidentiary hearings.

Thereafter, on May 10, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc rendered the assailed Omnibus Resolution in SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) and 12-
191 (PLM), ruling in this wise:

Guided by these six new parameters [enunciated by the Court in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections], as well as the
provisions of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 7941 ("R.A. No. 7941") or the Party-List System Act, and other pertinent election laws,
and after a careful and exhaustive reevaluation of the documents submitted by the petitioners per their compliance with Resolution No.
9513 ("Res. No. 9513"), the Commission En Banc RESOLVES as follows:

I. SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) & 12-191 (PLM) – SENIOR CITIZENS

To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and to CANCEL the registration and accreditation, of petitioner Senior Citizens, for
violating laws, rules, and regulations relating to elections pursuant to Section 6 (5) of R.A. No. 7941.

The Commission En Banc finds no cogent reason to reverse its earlier finding in the Resolution for SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) & 12-191
(PLM) promulgated on 04 December 2012, in relation to the Resolution for E.M. No. 12-040 promulgated on 27 June 2012. The sole
ground for which the petitioner Senior Citizens was disqualified was because of the term-sharing agreement between its nominees,
which the Commission En Banc found to be contrary to public policy. It will be noted that this ground is independent of the six
parameters in Atong Paglaum, and there is nothing in the doctrine enunciated in that case which will absolve the petitioner Senior
Citizen of what, to the Commission En Banc, is a clear bastardization of the term of office fixed by Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution as implemented by Section 14 of R.A. No. 7941, which expressly provides that Members of the House of Representatives,
including party-list representatives, shall be elected for a term of three years. A term, in the legal sense, is a fixed and definite period of
time during which an officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, a fixed interval after which the several incumbents succeed
one another. Thus, service of the term is for the entire period; it cannot be broken down to accommodate those who are not entitled to
hold the office.

That the term-sharing agreement was made in 2010, while the expression of the policy prohibiting it was promulgated only in 2012 via
Section 7, Rule 4 of Resolution No. 9366 ("Res. No. 9366"), is of no moment. As it was in 2010 as it is now, as it was in 1987 when the
Constitution was ratified and as it was in 1995 when R.A. No. 7941 was enacted into law, the agreement was and is contrary to public
policy because it subjects a Constitutionally-ordained fixed term to hold public elective office to contractual bargaining and negotiation,
and treats the same as though it were nothing more than a contractual clause, an object in the ordinary course of the commerce of
men. To accept this defense will not only open the floodgates to unscrupulous individuals, but more importantly it will render inutile
Section 16 of R.A. No. 7941 which prescribes the procedure to be taken to fill a vacancy in the available seats for a party-list group or
organization. For this mistake, the petitioner Senior Citizens cannot hide behind the veil of corporate fiction because the corporate veil
can be pierced if necessary to achieve the ends of justice or equity, such as when it is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
or protect fraud. It further cannot invoke the prohibition in the enactment of ex post facto laws under Section 22, Article III of the
Constitution because the guarantee only the retrospectivity of penal laws and definitely, Reso. No. 9366 is not penal in character.

From the foregoing, the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of the petitioner Senior Citizens is therefore in order, and
consequently, the two Manifestations of Intent to Participate filed with the Commission should be denied.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the Commission En Banc RESOLVES:

A. To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and CANCEL the registration and accreditation, of the following parties, groups,
or organizations:

(1) SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) & SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) – Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.;

xxxx

Accordingly, the foregoing shall be REMOVED from the registry of party-list groups and organizations of the Commission, and shall
NOT BE ALLOWED to PARTICIPATE as a candidate for the Party-List System of Representation for the 13 May 2013 Elections and
30
subsequent elections thereafter. (Citations omitted.)

On May 13, 2013, the elections proceeded. Despite the earlier declaration of its disqualification, SENIOR CITIZENS still obtained
677,642 votes.

Questioning the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS’ registration and its disqualification to participate in the May 13, 2013 elections, the
Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed the instant petitions.

2
On May 15, 2013, the Datol Group filed a Very Urgent Motion to Reiterate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status
31
Quo Ante Order, alleging that the COMELEC had ordered the stoppage of the counting of votes of the disqualified party-list groups.
The Datol Group urged the Court to issue a TRO and/or a status quo ante order during the pendency of its petition.

32
Meanwhile, on May 24, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution, which considered as final and executory its May 10, 2013
Resolution that cancelled the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS. On even date, the COMELEC En Banc, sitting as the National Board
33
of Canvassers (NBOC), promulgated NBOC Resolution No. 0006-13, proclaiming fourteen (14) party-list organizations as initial
winners in the party-list elections of May 13, 2013.

34
The Arquiza Group filed on May 27, 2013 a Supplement to the "Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari," also reiterating its application for a
TROand a writ of preliminary injunction.

35
On May 28, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13, which partially proclaimed the winning party-list
organizations that filled up a total of fifty-three (53) out of the available fifty-eight (58) seats for party-list organizations.

36
On May 29, 2013, the Chief Justice issued a TRO, which ordered the COMELEC to submit a Comment on the instant petitions and to
cease and desist from further proclaiming the winners from among the party-list candidates in the May 13, 2013 elections.
On June 3, 2013, the Datol Group filed a Most Urgent Motion for Issuance of an Order Directing Respondent to Proclaim Petitioner
37
Pendente Lite.

38
In a Resolution dated June 5, 2013, the Court issued an order, which directed the COMELEC to refrain from implementing the
assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM), insofar as SENIOR CITIZENS
was concerned and to observe the status quo ante before the issuance of the assailed COMELEC resolution. The Court likewise
ordered the COMELEC to reserve the seat(s) intended for SENIOR CITIZENS, in accordance with the number of votes it garnered in
the May 13, 2013 Elections. The Court, however, directed the COMELEC to hold in abeyance the proclamation insofar as SENIOR
CITIZENS is concerned until the instant petitions are decided. The Most Urgent Motion for Issuance of an Order Directing Respondent
to Proclaim Petitioner Pendente Lite filed by the Datol Group was denied for lack of merit.

39
On June 7, 2013, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Comment on the instant petitions. In a
40
Resolution dated June 10, 2013, the Court required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. On June 19, 2013, the Arquiza
41
Group filed its Reply to the Comment of the COMELEC. Subsequently, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their separate
42 43
memoranda. On the other hand, the OSG manifested that it was adopting its Comment as its memorandum in the instant case.

THE ISSUES

The Datol Group’s memorandum raised the following issues for our consideration:

IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

4.1

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ADDED ANOTHER GROUND (VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY) FOR CANCELLATION OF
REGISTRATION OF A PARTY–LIST GROUP AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 6, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7941.

4.2

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CANCELLED PETITIONER’S CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

4.3

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY ON TERM SHARING.

4.4

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE AUTOMATIC REVIEW BY THE EN BANC OF THE
REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION GRANTED BY ITS DIVISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION THAT
THE EN BANC CAN ONLY REVIEW DECISIONS OF THE DIVISION UPON FILING OF A MOTION FOR
44
RECONSIDERATION. (Citation omitted.)

Upon the other hand, the memorandum of the Arquiza Group brought forward the following arguments:

4.1. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTION of MAY 10, 2013 is invalid for being contrary to law and having been
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?

(1) The Comelec En Banc Resolution of May 10, 2013 was issued pursuant to the directive of the Supreme Court in
Atong Paglaum. Therefore, the SUBSIDIARY ISSUES arising therefrom are:

a. Are there guidelines prescribed in Atong Paglaum to be followed by respondent Comelec in determining
which partylist groups are qualified to participate in party-list elections?

b. If there are these guidelines to be followed, were these adhered to by respondent Comelec?

(2) Is the ground -- the Term-Sharing Agreement between Senior Citizens nominees -- a legal ground to cancel
Senior Citizens’ Certificate of Registration?
 4.2. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTION of MAY 24, 2013 is invalid for being contrary to law and having been
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?

(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:

a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?

b. Has the Comelec En Banc Resolution of May 20, 2013, in fact, become final and executory?

4.3. Whether or not NATIONAL BOARD of CANVASSERS’ (NBOC) RESOLUTION No. 0006-13 of MAY 24, 2013 is invalid for
being contrary to law and having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction?

(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:

a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?

b. Is the total of the party-list votes cast which was made as the basis thereof correct?

c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula prescribed in Banat vs. Comelec been followed?

4.4. Whether or not NBOC RESOLUTION No. 0008-13 of MAY 28, 2013 is invalid for being contrary to law and having been
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?

(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are identical with those of Issue No. 4.3, namely:

a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?

b. Is the total of the party-list votes cast which was made as the basis thereof correct?

c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula prescribed in Banat vs. Comelec been followed?

4.5. What is the cardinal rule in interpreting laws/rules on qualifications and disqualifications of the candidates after the
election where they have received the winning number of votes?

4.6. May the COMELEC En Banc Resolutions of May 10 and 24, 2013 and NBOC Resolutions of May 24 and 28, 2013 be
45
annulled and set aside?

THE COURT’S RULING

After reviewing the parties’ pleadings, as well as the various resolutions attached thereto, we find merit in the petitioners’
contentions.1âwphi1

SENIOR CITIZENS’ Right to Due Process

First, we shall dispose of the procedural issue. In their petitions, the two rival groups of SENIOR CITIZENS are actually one in asserting
that the organization’s disqualification and cancellation of its registration and accreditation were effected in violation of its right to due
process.

The Arquiza Group argues that no notice and hearing were given to SENIOR CITIZENS for the cancellation of its registration on
account of the term-sharing agreement of its nominees. The Arquiza Group maintains that SENIOR CITIZENS was summoned only to
a single hearing date in the afternoon of August 24, 2012 and the COMELEC’s review therein focused on the group’s programs,
accomplishments, and other related matters. The Arquiza Group asserts that SENIOR CITIZENS was not advised, before or during the
hearing, that the issue of the term-sharing agreement would constitute a basis for the review of its registration and accreditation.

Likewise, the Datol Group faults the COMELEC for cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS without giving
the latter the opportunity to show that it complied with the parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum. The Arquiza Group confirms that
after the promulgation of Atong Paglaum, the COMELEC conducted summary hearings in executive sessions, without informing
SENIOR CITIZENS. The Arquiza Group says that it filed a "Very Urgent Motion To Set Case For Hearing Or To Be Included In The
Hearing Set On Thursday, May 9, 2013," but its counsel found that SENIOR CITIZENS was not included in the hearings wherein other
party-list groups were heard by the COMELEC. The Arquiza Group subsequently filed on May 10, 2013 a "2nd Very Urgent Motion To
Set Case For Public Hearing," but the same was also not acted upon. The Arquiza Group alleges that it only found out after the
elections that the assailed May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution was issued and the Arquiza Group was not actually served a copy
thereof.

46
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941 provides for the procedure relative to the review of the registration of party-list organizations, to
wit:

SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition
on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before the COMELEC may properly order the
cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list organization. In connection with this, the Court lengthily discussed in
47
Mendoza v. Commission on Elections the concept of due process as applied to the COMELEC. We emphasized therein that:

The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in
the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, quoted below:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof. x x x.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial."
"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected.

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this
aspect of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the
requirements for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process.

The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the
inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the evidence presented during the hearing.
These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the material and substantial components of
decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the
case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a
subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence.

Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body, further complements the
hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court
must state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based. As a component of the rule of fairness that underlies due process, this
is the "duty to give reason" to enable the affected person to understand how the rule of fairness has been administered in his case, to
expose the reason to public scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought through by the decision-maker.
(Emphases ours, citations omitted.)

In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 through
a summary evidentiary hearing carried out on August 24, 2012 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). In this hearing,
both the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group were indeed given the opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance
with the requirements for party-list accreditation. Nevertheless, the due process violation was committed when they were not apprised
of the fact that the term-sharing agreement entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material
consideration in the evaluation of the organization’s qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, both
factions of SENIOR CITIZENS were not able to answer this issue squarely. In other words, they were deprived of the opportunity to
adequately explain their side regarding the term-sharing agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in support of their position.

48
In its Comment to the petitions, the COMELEC countered that petitioners were actually given the opportunity to present their side on
49
the issue of the term-sharing agreement during the hearing on April 18, 2012. Said hearing was allegedly conducted to determine
petitioners’ continuing compliance for accreditation as a party-list organization.

The Court is not persuaded. It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival groups of SENIOR CITIZENS admitted to the
existence of the term-sharing agreement. Contrary to the claim of COMELEC, however, said hearing was conducted for purposes of
discussing the petition of the Arquiza Group in E.M. No. 12-040. To recall, said petition asked for the confirmation of the replacement of
Rep. Kho, who had tendered his resignation effective on December 31, 2011. More specifically, the transcript of the hearing reveals
that the focus thereof was on the petition filed by the Arquiza group and its subsequent manifestation, praying that the group be allowed
to withdraw its petition. Also, during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did admonish the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS
about their conflicts and warned them about the complications brought about by their term-sharing agreement. However, E.M. No. 12-
040 was not a proceeding regarding the qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list group and the issue of whether the term-
sharing agreement may be a ground for disqualification was neither raised nor resolved in that case. Chairman Brillantes’s
remonstration was not sufficient as to constitute a fair warning that the term-sharing agreement would be considered as a ground for
the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS’ registration and accreditation.

Furthermore, after the promulgation of Atong Paglaum, which remanded, among other cases, the disqualification cases involving
SENIOR CITIZENS, said organization should have still been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the matter of the term-sharing
agreement, either through a hearing or through written memoranda. This was the proper recourse considering that the COMELEC was
about to arrive at a final determination as to the qualification of SENIOR CITIZENS. Instead, the COMELEC issued the May 10, 2013
Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) without conducting any further proceedings thereon after its
receipt of our Decision in Atong Paglaum.

The Prohibition on Term-sharing

The second issue both raised by the petitioners herein constitute the threshold legal issue of the instant cases: whether the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Omnibus Resolution,
disqualifying and cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS solely on account of its purported violation of the
prohibition against term-sharing.

The Datol Group argues that the public policy prohibiting term-sharing was provided for under Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9366, which was promulgated only on February 21, 2012. Hence, the resolution should not be made to apply
retroactively to the case of SENIOR CITIZENS as nothing therein provides for its retroactive effect. When the term-sharing agreement
was executed in 2010, the same was not yet expressly proscribed by any law or resolution.
Furthermore, the Datol Group points out that the mere execution of the Irrevocable Covenant between the nominees of SENIOR
CITIZENS for the 2010 elections should not have been a ground for the cancellation of the organization’s registration and accreditation
because the nominees never actually implemented the agreement.

In like manner, the Arquiza Group vehemently stresses that no term-sharing actually transpired between the nominees of SENIOR
CITIZENS. It explained that whatever prior arrangements were made by the nominees on the term-sharing agreement, the same did
not materialize given that the resignation of Rep. Kho was disapproved by the Board of Trustees and the members of SENIOR
CITIZENS.

Still, granting for the sake of argument that the term-sharing agreement was actually implemented, the Arquiza Group points out that
SENIOR CITIZENS still cannot be held to have violated Section 7 of Resolution No. 9366. The term-sharing agreement was entered
into in 2010 or two years prior to the promulgation of said resolution on February 21, 2012. Likewise, assuming that the resolution can
be applied retroactively, the Arquiza Group contends that the same cannot affect SENIOR CITIZENS at it already earned a vested right
in 2010 as party-list organization.

Article 4 of the Civil Code states that "laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." As held in Commissioner of
50
Internal Revenue v. Reyes, "the general rule is that statutes are prospective. However, statutes that are remedial, or that do not
create new or take away vested rights, do not fall under the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes." We also
51
reiterated in Lintag and Arrastia v. National Power Corporation that:

It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate prospectively unless the legislative
intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary implication because the retroactive application of a law usually
divests rights that have already become vested. This is based on the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward, not
backward). (Citations omitted.)

True, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 does not provide that it shall have retroactive effect. Nonetheless, the Court cannot subscribe to
the argument of the Arquiza Group that SENIOR CITIZENS already earned a vested right to its registration as a party-list organization.

52
Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections teaches that "a public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a
‘Public office is a public trust.’ No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a
public office." Under Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC is entrusted with the function to "register, after
sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or
program of government." In fulfilling this function, the COMELEC is duty-bound to review the grant of registration to parties,
organizations, or coalitions already registered in order to ensure the latter’s continuous adherence to the requirements prescribed by
law and the relevant rulings of this Court relative to their qualifications and eligibility to participate in party-list elections.

The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object to the retroactive application of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 on the ground of the
impairment of SENIOR CITIZENS’ vested right.

Be that as it may, even if COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 expressly provided for its retroactive application, the Court finds that the
COMELEC En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS.

The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing agreement among the nominees of
SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact was manifested by the Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing
conducted by the COMELEC En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was withdrawing its petition for
confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho’s replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in E.M. No. 12-040, the
COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC
even declared that no vacancy was created despite the execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication
that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement.
Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all
intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his term as a member of the House of Representatives, in
accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is
silent on this point.

Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a
party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on
the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of
an election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its
registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand on.

In sum, the due process violations committed in this case and the lack of a legal ground to disqualify the SENIOR CITIZENS spell out a
finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC En Banc. We are, thus, left
with no choice but to strike down the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191
(PLM).
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court finds no need to discuss the other issues raised by the petitioners. In particular, the
dispute between the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS, not being an issue raised here, should be threshed out in separate
proceedings before the proper tribunal having jurisdiction thereon.

Having established that the COMELEC En Banc erred in ordering the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its
registration and accreditation, said organization is entitled to be proclaimed as one of the winning party-list organizations in the recently
concluded May 13, 2013 elections.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules that:

(1) The Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer for the Forthwith Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] and/or Status Quo Ante Order [SQAO]) in G.R. Nos. 206844-45 and the Very Urgent
Petition for Certiorari (With Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) in G.R. No.
206982 are GRANTED;

(2) The Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 of the Commission on Elections En Banc in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP
No. 12-191 (PLM) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,
Inc. is concerned; and

(3) The Commission on Elections En Bane is ORDERED to PROCLAIM the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the
Philippines, Inc. as one of the winning party-list organizations during the May 13, 20 13 elections with the number of seats it
may be entitled to based on the total number of votes it garnered during the said elections.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999 LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.

For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990
temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission
of public respondents that:

1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of
the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive
authority;
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to
litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question may now be
raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this Honorable
Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at the past, . . .
the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.
5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of
the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:

a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty
involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator
Pimentel.

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629
introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representative to reject any move to
review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the
Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means
under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113)
congressman.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not
trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was
reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public
respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will
not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.

Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the
death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The instant motions were filed in this case,
G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was
assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa
"Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal
standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor General.

We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.

First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar
and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final
judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there
1
should be a place to begin litigation." To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to
examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly
spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitled case was filed in this Office, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed statute
(Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the
Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby
declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review and
approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the
manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and
counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No.
8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic
Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.

and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of
Entries of Judgment.

Manila, Philippine.

Clerk of Court

By: (SGD) TERESITA G.

DIMAISIP

Acting Chief

Judicial Records Office

The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court
on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in
compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he has
caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the
Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17
and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and
implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear
that this Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of
judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason
synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as
2
follows:

xxx xxx xxx

the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the
judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has
3
become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction
of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even
after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the
4
judgment becomes final. . . . For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which
5
can render the execution unjust or impossible.

In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as
6
1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, viz:

This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that
in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same cannot change or
alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been
returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in
issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference
to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive.
The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution,
in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the
person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must
be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point.
It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date
set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this
postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and
(3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion
in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to
investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is
acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after
the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a
circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency
and to order a postponement. Then the question arises as to whom the application for postponing the execution
ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and so to who has jurisdiction to make the
investigation.

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction
7
for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events
may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It
is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control
8
of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when
by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into
effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically
pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the
spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it
reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular
misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.1âwphi1.nêt

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution
of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have
been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all
predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of
execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs
judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted
by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and
9
integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our
Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of
this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with
legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are
hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and
modify the same. The Congress have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

10
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan Congress in the exercise
of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of
11
1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and
71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . .
. the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the
bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less
certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these
12
department would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is
obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed
by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license."
By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of
this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed, altered
or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which,
however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power
13
to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of
this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987
Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no
jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time
immemorial.

To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the
implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and executory on November 6, 1998. The
records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction
of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104,
Quezon City to provide him ". . . a certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated
execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution
date fixed by such trial court to the public when requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the
Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:

xxx xxx xxx

5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however, herein respondent is

submitting the instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of
the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of
his statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the constitutional guarantee that recognizes the
people's right to information of public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide the
appropriate relief.

6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information
necessary for the exercise of his power of supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections
pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to Title
III, Book IV of such Administrative Code, insofar as the enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and
the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for the
discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence
are faithfully observed.

7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the precise day of
execution limits the exercise by the President of executive clemency powers pursuant to Section
19, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out
"without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive powers at all times." (Emphasis
supplied) For instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a
sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date
to reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might even work to the prejudice
of the convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution and the applicable statute as when the
date at execution set by the President would be earlier than that designated by the court.

8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of execution to herein
respondent and the public violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II
(Declaration of Principles and State Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which read:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development shall, be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.

9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "the rules by means of which the
right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167
[1972]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of
information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon
the ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165)
What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the
access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full
public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However,
it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the
right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the
 adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987].

The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty.
Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the public's right to information. The Solicitor
General, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction
over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of
the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are
now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend
on the convenience of litigants.

II

Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having become final and executory, its
execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in
14
effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." Public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19,
Article VII of the Constitution which reads:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.

The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the
source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the
Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions
after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be
claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while
15
in a state of insanity. As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the government
16
from executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution." The suspension of such a death sentence
is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the same —
the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time
amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of
commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be
considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher
right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the
power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of
the President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of
an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.

III

Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it has been
grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of
TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January 4, the
first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law
authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and
that capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and
Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has
also sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen are
demanding review of the same law.

When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only resume session on January 18,
17
1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on January 4, 1991 at 10. a.m. to deliberate
on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3
p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or
amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not
immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a
pleading under oath and were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is
a new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed.
The present Congress is therefore different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal
Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was
hardly a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was impossible as
Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious
stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension was temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the
constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the
law is going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court
in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the
Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the
legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable considerations demand no less before
allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens.

The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is
disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate beyond
doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law. He names these supervening events as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving
heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
18
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel.

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by
Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No.
7659 which provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the
position of the House of Representative on this matter and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately
implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon
session yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of Representative with minor, the House of Representative with
minor amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment
that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not
request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these
developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.

A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital punishment had been the subject of
19
endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment." In our clime and time when heinous
crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by
emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To
be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to
discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this
Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very
purpose of the Constitution — and particularly the Bill of Rights — to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of
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temporary political majorities." Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will
bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be
ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair
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and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.

The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set
anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without
further delay.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., Please see Separate Opinion.

Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.