Wakar Amin An Enquiry Into The Debates Around Kashmiriyat

University of Florida Press
An Inquiry into the Debates around Kashmiriyat

Author(s): Ashish Kumar Singh and Wakar Amin
Source: Journal of Global South Studies , Spring 2020, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Spring 2020), pp. 82-
109
Published by: University of Florida Press
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An Inquiry into the Debates
around Kashmiriyat
Ashish Kumar Singh and Wakar Amin
Jammu and Kashmir was once known as a place of communal harmony and
peaceful coexistence. The notion of religious harmony and peace, which emerged
mainly due to the strong socioreligious ties among various communities, is often
referred to as Kashmiriyat. Although it started off as a sociocultural phenomenon
with more emphasis on tolerance among different communities, the idea of
Kashmiriyat was exploited by successive political regimes to strengthen their political
positioning. After the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, and the rise
of militancy in 1989, the concept of Kashmiriyat changed form. As a system of
cohabitation and shared values, Kashmiriyat has been present in Kashmiri society
since the inception of different religious traditions in Jammu and Kashmir, however,
the term itself evolved in the latter part of the twentieth century. This article analyzes
the events and issues that have given Kashmiriyat different meanings. We make
use of the existing literature and interactions with current scholars to present our
findings. By reexamining the historical context of the term, the article provides a
better understanding of its multiple usages. The article then concludes with the note
Ashish Kumar Singh is a doctoral candidate at the National Research University Higher School of
Economics, Moscow, Russia and can be reached at ashish.tiss@gmail.c om.
Wakar Amin is an assistant professor in the Department of Social Work at the University of Kash-
mir, Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, India and can be reached at wakar@kashmiruniversity.ac.in and
wakaramin78@gmail.com.
© 2020 Association of Global South Studies, Inc. All rights reserved. Journal of Global South Studies Vol. 37, No. 1, 2020, pp. 82–109. ISSN 2476-1397.
82

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Debates around Kashmiriyat 83
that Kashmiriyat should be maintained as it was once understood—synonymous

with peaceful coexistence.
Keywords: Kashmiriyat; Kashmir; Conflict; Coexistence; Kashmiri Nationalism;

India; Pakistan.
Introduction
Kashmiriyat has become an integral part of sociopolitical discourses on Kashmir.

Historians and political scientists have not formed a consensus over the origin of
the term Kashmiriyat. It has been described as an age-old tradition of harmony
and coexistence. The existing literature suggests that Kashmiriyat emerged due
to strong socioreligious ties among various communities. It has been regarded
as a promise for the peaceful and gradual accumulation of power by the politi-
cal class, transforming it from a socioreligious idea into a purely political one.
It has also been referred to as an expression of Kashmiri nationalism. Given the
background, it is important to examine the available scholarship on Kashmiri-
yat to understand its different meanings as they have manifest over time.
The following sections will look further into the genesis of the term, parallel
debates on Kashmiriyat, and its competing explanations: from its function as
a symbol of harmony to eventual adoption as a secularization tool. The article
is structured in the manner that it first looks into the origin and genesis of the
term, explains the competing sociopolitical narratives, and goes further to show-
case the changes in its meaning over time. We examine it with the pretext that
it could be a useful concept to counter the influence of radical Islamic ideology.
The article analyzes existing material to present a variety of dimensions within
Kashmiri politics, coupled with unstructured interviews of scholars to show-
case divergent views on the theme. Accessing old Kashmiri newspapers and
books has been a practical challenge; therefore we rely on available online archives
and commentaries/reviews made by various scholars on the term. To avoid
descriptive analysis an attempt has been made to contrast and compare mul-
tiple views around this term. To trace the genealogy of the term Kashmiriyat,
we have tried to deconstruct it through several perspectives and provide insight
into the sociopolitical character of the term over time. We conclude by discussing
the steps required to save Kashmiriyat as a sociocultural practice of communal
harmony.

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84 Journal of Global South Studies (Spring 2020)
Genesis and Evolution of Kashmiriyat
The history of Kashmir is ancient. According to Nilamata Purana (an ancient

text on Kashmir), Kashmir has a special place in the subcontinent.1 The place
has a distinction of having been a center of three great religions: Hinduism, Bud-
dhism and, beginning in the fourteenth century, Islam.2 The culture of Kash-
mir is an outcome of a silent process of history. Dr. Afaq Aziz says that the
Kashmiri culture known for its tolerant elements emerged due to the fact that
every new religious philosophy was accommodated by the existing religions in
Kashmir.3 People affiliated to different faiths have lived together in Kashmir for
centuries.4 Exposure to the different religions and shared customs, rituals, and
observing of religious fairs and festivals together resulted in the evolution of a
unique culture.5 The composite culture of Kashmir evolved as the cult of Bud-
dha, the teachings of Vedanta, and the mysticism of Islam through Persian
sources have one after the other found a congenial home in Kashmir.6 There-
fore, it becomes important to reflect upon the influence of various religions
throughout the history of the sociocultural life of the people of Kashmir.
Buddhism arrived at Kashmir through Ashoka who conquered Kashmir in
250 BC.7 For almost nine centuries Buddhism stayed in Kashmir and had a great
influence on the social life of people. From the fifth through the twelfth cen-
tury, Kashmir was dominated by Hindu civilization and Shaivate culture. The
ruling class mainly consisted of upper-caste Hindus (Brahmins). It started see-
ing Buddhism as a threat.8 The expansion of Buddhism in Kashmir was resisted
by the Brahmin Hindus who had earlier tolerated the spread of Buddhism.9 The
Brahmanism degenerated because of the clash between Brahmanism and Bud-
dhism.10 The conflict between Brahmanism and Buddhism was resolved by the
fusion of the two distinct philosophies, which gave rise to Shaivism, having posi-
tive elements of both. The acceptance of this new philosophy by the masses
resulted in the rout of reactionary Brahmanism.
Kashmiri Shaivism, also known as Trika philosophy, was founded in the
eighth century by Vasugupta (a ninth-century scholar).11 It is a type of idealis-
tic monism (Advaita).12 For nearly 600 years, from the eighth to the fourteenth
century, the Trika guided the Kashmiris in shaping their personal and public
lives. This system of thought was a result of mixing Vedic and Buddhist cul-
tures, a combination of the essential elements that are to be found in almost all
religious philosophies. It had the advantage of blending knowledge gained by

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the Kashmiri intellectuals with their own understandings and experiences.13 In

terms of ideas and religious movements, Kashmir proved to be a melting pot.14
Islam, like Buddhism, revolutionized the social life of Kashmiris. The oppo-
sition to Islam by orthodox Brahmins and its critical Shaiva philosophers resulted
in the emergence of a new culture. In its essence, it may be described as reli-
gious humanism, and eventually came to be known as Kashmiriyat.15 It was
spearheaded by saints such as Nund Reshi, a Sufi saint who was well versed in
both Hindu and Islamic philosophy. He would often complement his teachings
and messages by citing various verses from the Holy Quran and Bhagwat Geeta.16
In the words of Dr. Aziz, “Islam that emerged in Kashmir had all the traits of
Shaivism and Buddhism. It was the accommodating nature of Shaivism and Bud-
dhism that allowed Islam to get absorbed in Kashmir.”17 It could be the reason
why Islam in Kashmir has various practices having a resemblance to practices
of Buddhism and Shaivism.
After the arrival of Muslim Sufi saints from central Asia during the thirteenth
century, the valley of Kashmir witnessed rapid socioreligious changes with more
and more religious conversions happening within a small period of time. Hindu
society was divided along caste lines. The lower strata of Hindu society were dis-
criminated against by the upper-caste groups.18 The same treatment was given
to the Buddhists. Furthermore, the monetary disparities and oppression were
also prevalent in the society. By contrast, Islam, free from caste structure, pro-
vided equality due to which many Hindus and Buddhists converted to Islam.19
The conversion allowed them to attain a new religious identity far from caste-
and religion-based discrimination. These conversions did not affect social inte-
gration and communal harmony.20 The conversion of large masses to Islam was
facilitated by the spread of the message of religious humanism spearheaded by
the Sufi saints. Therefore, Islam in Kashmir had imbibed the devotionalism of
Vaishnavism, renunciation and nonviolence of Buddhism, and the monothe-
ism of Shaivism. This unique feature of Muslim saints (and their Hindu follow-
ers) prompted the creation of a sociocultural environment that was tolerant and
communally harmonious.21
The teachings of Sufi saints are credited with the introduction of Islam in
Kashmir, which included the ancient or pre-Islamic culture and practices. These
included, for example, the teachings of the famous Shaivite Saint Lal Ded of
Kashmir.22 The composite culture Sufism brought never let people’s religious
affiliations come between them.23 In the words of Dr. Aziz, “Kashmir has a

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distinction of getting Islam without violence. It was perhaps due to the two
facts—first, the existing religions were more tolerant and soft in their outlook,
and second, the Islam that reached Kashmir was spread by Sufi saints from
central Asia and not from the Arabian Peninsula. Unlike Arabian Islam, central
Asian Islam was relatively soft and accommodating.”24 Sufis integrated closely
with non-Muslim Hindus, sharing many cultural practices.25 This multicul-
tural and multiethnic intermingling of society has resulted in the soft nature of
Islam. The Wahabi and Salafi ideologies, considered as a harder form of Sunni
Islam originated in Saudi Arabia,26 has been absent in Kashmir for a very long
period of time. In the later part of the article, we will briefly discuss their effects
on Kashmiriyat.
Kashmiriyat as an idea was central to the Sufi tradition with its different form
of devotion to the local shrines. It distinguishes both Muslim and Hindu forms
of worship in Kashmir from practices elsewhere.27 The best example of this can
be found in the practice of visits by Hindus to Sufi shrines and Muslims gifting
walnuts on the day of Shivratri.28 Another such example is that the Muslims do
not eat fish from ponds; they even feed them near Hindu temples, because ponds
are sacred to Kashmiri Hindus.29 This blend of Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim
ideals, inherent in Kashmiriyat, brought harmony. It differs from religious pre-
scriptive practices at other places. Islam that Kashmiris follow has been a rela-
tively open system of beliefs and attitudes that have stopped the overlapping of
Islamic element of the Kashmiri identity from becoming a hindrance to a com-
mon shared Kashmiri identity with the Hindus.30 Communal factionalism was
not part of the Kashmiri memory. This can be attributed to the kind of Islam
that was preached to the Kashmiris by Sufi saints. The Kashmiri population
enjoyed religious coexistence for a long period of time. Both Hindus and Mus-
lims worshipped Sufi mausoleums, which were later destroyed by extremist
groups.31
This whole phenomenon was unique as religious changes were not followed
by social division. This new norm of social existence was referred to as Kash-
miriyat—at its origin an apolitical concept that allowed mutual trust, harmony,
and integration. Kashmiriyat is also understood as social consciousness and a
system of shared cultural values common to the whole population of Kashmir
irrespective of their religious beliefs.32 It is argued that the tolerant nature of
people, their traditions, culture, social existence, and a harmonious relationship
resulting out of mutual respect gave birth to Kashmiriyat.33 This term is often

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used to describe the cordial socioreligious relationship between the majority and
minority religious communities. An example of this phenomenon is the annual
Amaranth Yatra,34 a Hindu pilgrimage in the Muslim majority Kashmir valley.35
For a long time it has represented a binding force between the people of vari-
ous religious and cultural affiliations. The portrayal of Kashmiriyat as a unified
cultural identity is fashioned by religious syncretism and harmony.36 It has been
called a notion which not only means harmonious relationship among commu-
nities but an institution with societal, political, economic, and cultural currents
and undercurrents.37
The Sociopolitical Reflections of Kashmiriyat
Kashmiriyat has been called as a signifier of centuries-old indigenous secular-

ism of Kashmir. Despite the religious differences, the Muslims and Hindus of
Kashmir share many cultural practices, which have a reflection of each other’s
religion with features of Kashmiri devotional and philosophical norms. One such
act is the traditional folk theater of Kashmir known as Bhand Pather.38 It cov-
ers various acts depicting legends associated with Hinduism but is performed
by Muslim actors. It shows the religious diversity and harmony existing in Kash-
miri society.
The concept of Kashmiriyat is presented as an ethnonational one, which
relates to the social consciousness of the people of Kashmir.39 The notion of sec-
ularism and Kashmiriyat overlap each other in meaning as both concepts exem-
plify the appreciation of sociocultural differentiation and promote communal
and social harmony.40 The shared religiosity can be found in the cultural aspects
of the social life of all religious communities. Both Muslims and Hindus taking
part in each other’s festivals and marriage ceremonies was common until the
mass exodus of Kashmiri Hindus (commonly referred to as Kashmiri Pandits
in the discussions of post-conflict Kashmir) from Kashmir after the emergence
of armed insurgency in Kashmir Valley in 1989.41
Kashmiriyat is also understood as the love for the homeland, a common
speech, shared customs, and a pattern of social interaction. It includes visiting
shrines and reverence for holy relics, folklore, folk music, and the like. All of
these things were instrumental in creating a social atmosphere that was based
on mutual respect and community unity.42 Likewise, the reflections of the com-
posite culture of Kashmir can be found in various other aspects of Kashmiri

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culture.43 Kashmiris, including both Hindus and Muslims, tend to share many
inhibitions, superstitions, and practices, as well as social liberties and intellec-
tual freedoms different than those in the other parts of the Islamic world. The
tradition of tolerance, social harmony, and mutual respect have been part of
Kashmiri life mainly because they did not give up the old practices such as visit-
ing each other’s shrines and temples.44 Most of these traditions remain very
close to their original form. However, Kashmiris are trying to retain their tradi-
tion of shared religiosity.45 For instance, the rituals governing the naming of
newborn babies and the shaving of boys’ heads are the same. This is an example
of how some common social aspects in two distinct religions can become a
source of social integration, rather than disintegration, of cultures.46
Kashmiriyat discourse has served various political projects throughout his-
tory. The widespread usage of the term denotes that it acts as a truth beyond
representation and falsification which reflects an imaginary rather than actual
phenomenon.47 Past inquiries into the emergence of the term and its sociopo-
litical existence have often met with contesting views. The issues pertaining to
its existence in the sociopolitical environment of Kashmir have witnessed diverse
views in light of the political history of the state. Another important historical
transition needs to be discussed here. The Kashmiri masses, around the time
of the partition of India and Pakistan, believed that Pakistan would free them
from India, but the actions of Pakistan towards Kashmir before and during the
tribal invasion in 1948 spoke otherwise. The same populations started to look
up to the National Conference (NC) as it became a political party that called in
its writings and leaders’ speeches for the recognition of a unique Kashmiri cul-
ture. This culture would be later known as Kashmiriyat.48 In the view of
Dr. Idrees Kanth, “The notion of Kashmiriyat has been a creation of National
Conference mainly to justify its political stand.”49 This understanding of Kash-
miriyat might be true as far as the politicization of the term is concerned, but
its sociocultural origin has to be seen in the light of its historical usage, as well
as the ideologies and actions associated with it.
Contesting Narratives around Kashmiriyat
Scholars have tried to define the term Kashmiriyat and trace its emergence
according to their own understanding of the sociopolitical climate of the Kashmir
region and the Kashmir dispute. The debate has raised the question of whether

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Kashmiriyat is an idea that emerged during the 1980s or whether it is something

that has existed for a long period of time. Some believe that Kashmiriyat emerged
as a concept that became visible in the mid-1930s to represent the composite
culture of Kashmir.50 Others argue, on the contrary, that the notion of Kash-
miriyat arrived on the sociopolitical scene mainly during the politically active
period (the 1970s) of Jammu and Kashmir State in general, and Kashmir valley
in particular, suggesting that the idea did not appear before 1975.51 It is said to
be an artificially produced clone of Punjabiyat and a recent coinage of no earlier
than the 1980s.52 Scholars argue that it has been used by the media to promote
the interests of the Indian state.53 Dr. Idrees says, “The Indian State has been
instrumental in creating this notion through various political entities to keep a
tab on anti-Hindu sentiments in the state especially in Kashmir valley.”54
Kashmiriyat was mentioned in an article published in the Urdu newspaper
Srinagar Times, dated September 23, 1975. This article, entitled “Srinagar ke akh-
barat aur urdu zaban” (“The Newspapers of Srinagar and Urdu Language”),
mentioned that the writers of Urdu newspapers in Kashmir are not used to the
correct type of Urdu language. The article added that as Urdu newspapers in
New Delhi were influenced by the Punjabi, it would not be surprising to see if
Kashmiriyat started appearing in the local (Kashmiri) Urdu newspapers.55 It is
to be noted here that the values of shared religiosity, harmony, and peaceful
coexistence were found in Kashmir for a long time; however, the term Kash-
miriyat does not find its mention earlier. Here, one can argue that Kashmiriyat
has no local origin and has not been coined before the 1970s.
During the years 1975–87, people from both Hindu and Muslim communi-
ties produced literature on Kashmiriyat to counter the forces dangerous to Kash-
mir’s indigenous identity.56 Dr. Idrees adds that the history of Kashmir shows
that before the rise of militancy Kashmiris had been tolerant and secular. There
was no need for introducing such a term. The other reason for the creation of
such a term was to showcase Kashmir as a model of secular India. Being the only
Muslim majority state, Kashmir was the perfect example.57
Subscribing to the notion of Kashmiriyat was also politically conducive for
the governments of the time. The majority population of the valley was Mus-
lim, while the minority population previously controlled almost all spheres of
administrative power.58 Kashmiryat has been used by the state as a tool to check
the influence of Islamic fundamentalists. It has also been carried forward by some
Kashmiri Muslims who are known for their loyalty to the secular polity of India.

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It is used to provide psychological relief to the people living in Kashmir during

times of conflicts, killings, and insurgency. Kashmiriyat is promoted by the state
to show that both communities have been living happily for a long time. How-
ever, historical evidence shows otherwise. It has been questioned as being a state-
sponsored term to promote official integration with India. It is said to be an
artificial concept.59
Later in the 1980s, with the beginning of the insurgency in the state, the cul-
ture of Kashmiriyat was affected badly, mainly due to the rise of various mili-
tant organizations whose ideology was based on the ideals of Wahabi Islam. It
led to forced migration and violence against religious minorities. The radicals
and fundamentalists sought to break the tolerant values of Sufism and Hindu
traditions in Jammu and Kashmir. This created a different meaning of Kashmiri-
yat in the minds of non-Muslims.60 The changes in the religious ideology of Kash-
mir resulted in a change in the sociocultural attitudes and beliefs of the people.
The separatist movement supposedly represents the demographic majority of
Muslims devoid of cultural differences in order to create an undivided Islamic
majority.61 The world perceives the issue of Jammu and Kashmir as a problem
of unsettled territory between India and Pakistan, whereas Muslims in the region
continue to be manipulated by the factions claiming to fight on their behalf. This
results in further factionalism and fundamentalism. In the political debate of
sovereignty over Kashmir, Kashmiriyat is also interpreted as nationalism and
a metaphor for political independence from both India and Pakistan.62 Dr. Idrees
Kanth puts a question mark on the way most Indian authors have described the
concept of Kashmiriyat. He says that most Indian authors have tried to project
the soft and secular image of Islam followed by Kashmiri Muslims by repeat-
edly referring to Hindu-Muslim sociocultural bonding. Many authors are try-
ing to highlight Kashmiriyat in order to check the growth of radical Islamic
ideology in Kashmir.63 The Indian state’s narrative on Kashmiriyat was built along
with the perception that the Sufi saints did not preach a hard form of Islam,
resulting in Muslims becoming more tolerant and friendlier with people of other
faiths.64
Political Journey of Kashmiriyat
The Dogra rulers (Hindu Rajput rulers of Kashmir) were reportedly biased. 65
They attempted to prefer Hindus over Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir for state

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jobs. The Muslim population suffered both economically and socially during the
Dogra rule.66 It resulted in religiously affiliated movements as the communities
of Hindus and Muslims formed separate groups willing to create their respec-
tive national identities. The Hindus sided with the Indian secular national move-
ment, whereas the Muslim majority called for greater political and religious
freedom. Though during the 1930s, Kashmiri Hindu organizations also joined
Muslims in a movement against the autocratic policies of the Dogra Rulers.67
This culminated in a united struggle against the Dogras and British.68 The lead-
ers of the Muslim Conference created a platform to provide a space for nation-
alism and socialism. In addition, they sought to make the Muslim Conference
a more secular, nationalist party. In order to achieve these objectives, Sheikh
Abdullah and other prominent Kashmiri nationalist leaders forwarded the idea
of Kashmiriyat, without focusing on religious unity. It was a shift from earlier
known conceptualizations of the term, which focused mainly on differences of
religion and ethnicity between different groups in Kashmir.69 The name of the
Muslim Conference was later changed to National Conference (NC). It appears
that the term was created to make the politics of the National Conference more
inclusive and secular in its outlook. NC used Kashmiriyat to counter the deci-
sive policies of the Dogra rulers with secular and harmonious politics to achieve
a representative character to lead the masses from all regions of the state.
Politicians in Jammu and Kashmir (especially in the Kashmir valley) and
India have used the term Kashmiriyat differently. National Conference leader-
ship took credit for creating the notion and claimed to be the only heirs of Kash-
miriyat.70 The nationalism of National Conference leadership was secular in
character.71 Sheikh Abdullah was against the involvement of religion in politics.
He used the term “Kashmiriyat” as an antidote to pan-Islamic and pan-Pakistani
sentiments, and an antonym to communalism. It has been projected as a solu-
tion to the Kashmir problem by the NC, which promoted Kashmiriyat in order
to garner the support of Kashmiri Pandits. Sheikh Abdullah and many other
Kashmiri nationalists spread the idea of Kashmiriyat through various means
using newspaper articles, rallies, appeals for land reform and political equality,
and religious sermons.72 In 1936, Ghulam Ahmad Mahjoor composed the poem
“Arise, O Gardner” to be read at a rally of Sheikh Abdullah, calling for revolu-
tion. Other poems written on the Hindu-Muslim amity in Kashmir expressed
similar sentiments. The mainstream media in Kashmir writes that the National
Conference had adapted the ideals of the Indian National Congress and these

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poems reflected its propaganda clearly. The term “Kashmiriyat” to be used as a

political tool was not born until then.73
By 1947, around the time of Kashmir’s accession to India, Sheikh Abdullah’s
party, the National Conference, was involved in creating a nationalistic atmo-
sphere in Kashmir. Kashmiriyat had become a source for uniting and organiz-
ing such sentiments. In postcolonial Kashmir-India relations, the call for Azadi
(independence) has emerged as the nationalist politics of Kashmiriyat. The polit-
ical agency of the Azadi movement finds its roots in the nature of Kashmiri eth-
nicity.74 The parallel argument is that Kashmiriyat has been used unsuccessfully
to score political gains by many political entities.75 Kashmiriyat is the intrinsic
pluralism of Kashmiri society. It is about accepting and mingling with others,
of rejoicing in a cosmopolitan Kashmir, of letting others come to the state and
thrive. Scholars who criticize political use of Kashmiriyat argue that Kashmiri-
yat is not a political ideal, but a limiting concept, and it cannot solve political
differences.76
Kashmiriyat was also understood as the eradication of the feudal structures
of Kashmiri society.77, 78 The Big Landed Estates Abolition Act 1950 of Kashmir,
popularly known as the Land To Tiller Act, changed Kashmir’s social landscape.
The act ensured that no family could retain more than 22.75 acres of land, result-
ing in the transfer of land from the landlords to cultivating peasants.79 Kash-
miriyat became a catch-all notion that incorporated the efforts of Sheikh Abdullah
towards land reform, gender equality, and the availability of educational and
medical facilities. Due to the geopolitical forces resulting from the competing
nationalisms of India and Pakistan, Kashmir got excluded as it did not find a
place on account of its distinct culture and history. Kashmiriyat is a theoretical
fiction that originates from a selective reading of community histories and select-
ing cultural fragments from an imagined past that enfolds the Pandits, Muslims,
Dogras, and Ladakhis.80 Although Kashmiriyat has been part of different dis-
courses on Kashmir, little attention has been paid to its historical context and
the conceptual changes that came with it. Kashmiriyat, as the political idea to
describe the communal harmony in Kashmir, emerged during the post-partition
period. There is an involvement of the political leadership of India in this pro-
cess. Pandit Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, changed his narrative on
Kashmir between 1946 and 1953, from calling it the extension of Punjab (with
its communal character) to an example for the rest of India of what communal
unity can achieve.81 In the later years, for Nehru, Kashmir became the symbol

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of communal harmony not just due to the harmonious relations between the
Muslim majority and the Hindu minority there, but also a symbol/model for
positive relations between the Hindu majority and Muslim minority across
India.82, 83 Kashmir served as a microcosm of India’s interreligious harmony.
Kashmir’s political nationalism saw two phases, one in the 1960s and the other
in the 1980s, which were different in their relative level of intensity. Kashmiri-
yat grew in between these two. India and Pakistan both are responsible for the
changes in the notion of Kashmiriyat.84 It was a cross-cultural, tolerance-based
notion that altered its meaning when Indian leaders tried to assimilate the reli-
gious differences in Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian secular philosophy.
In the popular discourses, it is used as a solution to the Kashmir problem.
It is also looked at as a proxy for Indian nationalism. Furthermore, Kashmiri-
yat is limited to only the Kashmiri speaking areas of Kashmir. By contrast, it loses
relevance in places where the ethnolinguistic characters of population change.85
During the Vajpayee-led NDA government in India, Kashmiriyat got atten-
tion once more. Despite the India-Pakistan war in 1999, he consistently tried
to improve the situation of Jammu and Kashmir, while working towards the
peace process. He emphasized Kashmiriyat, Jamhuriyat (nationalism), and
Insaniyat (humanism) as three important pillars of peace in the valley. The cur-
rent Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, also refers to Vajpayee’s formula
in his speeches as a solution to Kashmir tension.86 However, it has remained
mostly a reference to what Vajpayee used to believe in.
Kashmiriyat, Kashmiris, and the Conflict
The 1971 Indo-Pakistani war set the tone of propagating the Islamic brother-
hood against the prevailing notion of Kashmiriyat. General Zia-ul-Haq invoked
religious feelings of Muslims to indoctrinate the masses of Kashmir as opposed
to the tolerant facets of Islam’s universal brotherhood. Religion was used merely
as a tool to tear apart the sociocultural fabric to promote the ideology of Mus-
lim fundamentalism. It also brought a strong pro-Pakistani Islamic current.87
General Zia-ul-Haq and Pakistan under his leadership believed that the Kash-
mir dispute would be solved in the context of an Islamic government in Afghan-
istan, a struggle in Kashmir, and an uprising in Indian Punjab. This would lay
the foundation of the “freedom struggle” in Kashmir. As a result, the late 1980s
saw the beginning of Islamic fundamentalism, where many locals joined the

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ranks of militant organizations.88 The government of India was accused of rig-

ging elections in 1987 that resulted in the loss of almost all candidates repre-
senting the Islamic ideology.89 This event is often regarded as being responsible
for the emergence of political insurgency in 1989 and was aptly used by Paki-
stan to promote the violent separatist movement in Jammu and Kashmir.
Jammu and Kashmir witnessed a change in almost all spheres of the socio-
political environment after the emergence of the armed insurgency. The socio-
cultural environment, which was a result of peaceful interaction and exchange
of religious philosophies of Hinduism, Islam, and Buddhism, remained stable
until 1989 when a wave of insurgency struck in the state of Jammu and Kash-
mir (especially in the valley of Kashmir). One of the biggest casualties of this
insurgency was the destruction of the notion of Kashmiriyat as understood by
the common population. Furthermore, events like 9/11 and subsequently the
United States’ War on Terror changed the situation around the globe altogether.
Post-9/11 Muslims have been consigned en masse to the ranks of the fanatics
and terrorists of this world.90 Soon after 9/11, on October 1, 2001, there was a
suicide attack on the Kashmir assembly, killing thirty-eight.91 On December 13,
2001, the Indian parliament in New Delhi was attacked by gunmen that killed
twelve people. These attacks were said to be coordinated by the Islamic terrorist
outfits operating in Kashmir and were thought of being related to the 9/11.92
Islamic religious extremism has mainly strengthened itself on the narrative
that atrocities such as the genocide of Muslims have, and continue to be, car-
ried out by non-Muslims. For the propagators of extremist Islam, the idea of
Kashmiryat is not just irrelevant but contrary to the notion of Islamic Ummah,
a term to define brotherhood among Muslims throughout the world.93 The influ-
ence of Wahabi ideology has altered the meaning of Kashmiriyat.94 Salafism,a
branch of Sunni Islam, is radicalizing youths and killing the spirit of Kashmiri-
yat.95 These ideologies are asking to convert Kashmir into a place just for Mus-
lims and evacuate others from the valley. The fight of militants changed its
meaning from being a fight for freedom of Kashmir to a fight for an Islamic
fundamentalist state.
The insurgency, with an objective of separation from the Indian state, pri-
marily found support from the Muslim majority population of the valley, result-
ing in the creation of fear among the non-Muslim population of Kashmir.
Militancy has increased the gap between Hindus and Muslims in the valley. It

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is pertinent to mention that the non-Muslims see the demand for separation
as an effort to convert the state of Jammu and Kashmir into an Islamic state. This
fear was a great blow to intercommunity relations. The void created by the exodus
of non-Muslims and the spread of a more orthodox ideology of Islam made the
majority of Muslims of Kashmir move away from the ideology of Kashmiriyat. In
other words, they ceased to appreciate the idea of coexistence and secularism.
Some events during the turmoil years in Kashmir deserve special mention
here. In 1993, Harkut-ul-Ansar, a Pakistan-based terrorist organization,
announced a ban on the Amarnath yatra, a Hindu pilgrimage journey in the
Himalayas. In the year 2000, the yatris (pilgrims) were attacked, leaving twenty-
one dead. In 2008, when the state government of Jammu and Kashmir decided
to transfer ninety-nine acres of land for creating pilgrimage facilities, there were
widespread protests across the Kashmir valley, forcing the government to take
back this decision. Between 2000 and 2017, there have been six attacks and sev-
eral attempts on the Amarnath Yatra. These attacks were messages by the extrem-
ists that Hindu pilgrims were not welcome in the Kashmir valley.96
The attack on Amarnath yatra pilgrims should be seen as an attack on the
Kashmiri culture of religious harmony and coexistence. It is important to point
out that the Kashmiri public, which has been struggling with various challenges,
has criticized the attacks on Yatra.97 After the forced migration, only a few thou-
sand Kashmiri Pandits remain in the valley. Such events pose a threat to the cul-
ture of harmony, coexistence, and hospitality that Kashmir once celebrated. Amid
this crisis, there is also visible hostility of the majority population of Kashmir
towards India, but less hatred of Hindus as such.98 The statement that Kashmiri
self-determination is religious self-determination based on a two-nation the-
ory, which posits that majority Muslim Kashmiris must join Pakistan, must be
intensively crosschecked on whether demand for Kashmiri self-determination
is religiously driven in nature or not. The Jammat-e-Islami of Kashmir (and many
other Islamic organizations) believe that as a Muslim majority region, Kashmir
must be in Pakistan. A few also believe in pan-Islamism as an ideology. Shabir
Ahmed Shah, one of the Hurriyat Conference leaders, makes a distinction
between religious fundamentalism and political fundamentalism. For him, reli-
gious fundamentalism based on hatred or denigration of other religions is wrong,
while political fundamentalism—the inseparability of religion and politics—is
acceptable. He has even asked the Pandit refugees in Jammu to come back to

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the valley, arguing that Kashmir is incomplete without them. His views clearly
show that even if Jammu and Kashmir becomes independent, Kashmir will be
a place for people of all faiths. Islam for the average Kashmiri Muslim means
the humane and tolerant tradition of the religion as it was sung by the Kash-
miri Sufis.99 We must note that these views are of those who promote Kashmiri-
yat as an essential part of Kashmiri society.
During the exodus of the Kashmiri Pandit community, the state also pro-
moted the idea of Kashmiriyat more among the Muslims of Kashmir than among
the Pandit community. There is still confusion among the Kashmiri public about
whether Kashmir will be a secular democracy or a theocracy. Those believing
in humane traditions have stated a preference for a possible democracy for all
faiths, whereas fundamentalists respond with hesitation that it is for the peo-
ple to decide.100 The rise of Jamaat-i-Islami as a contrast to the National Con-
ference tried to politicize Islam and divert it toward a revivalist goal. Political
Islam is a negative force stemming from the resentment of the people against
successive union governments as well as from the transnational Islamic influ-
ences from across the border and elsewhere.101 Kashmiriyat found another mean-
ing when the Indian army-supported counterinsurgency groups professed their
ideology of saving the tolerant and humane traditions of Kashmir. In one of the
interviews, Kuka Parray, one of the leaders of such groups, had said that his
enmity with Pakistani-supported groups such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen was to
save Kashmiriyat.102
Kashmiriyat has been questioned on the premise of why the policymakers
of India only refer to it, when the atrocities against Kashmiri Pandits, Sikhs, and
other minorities take place (but not when a Kashmiri Muslim is injured, harassed,
or killed by the armed forces or by any other means).103 Kashmiriyat worked not
just as a social space for intercommunity interactions but also as a value that
increased the possibility of intercommunity tolerance and coexistence in Kash-
mir.104 The rise of militancy may have promised freedom for some, but for others,
it burned their hopes and futures. The forced migration of Kashmiri Pandits cre-
ated a rivalry between Pandits and Muslims, who lived in harmony for ages. They
started to blame each other for creating an environment that bred hatred and
forced migration. Two competing narratives emerged from it: the first con-
cerns Pandits and their exile, the other centers on the oppression of Muslims
by the Indian armed forces. There have been attempts by successive govern-
ments to resettle and rehabilitate the displaced community back in Kashmir.

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For Kashmiriyat to attain its true meaning, both communities must live
together, as they once did.
Kashmiriyat has been seen as a response to the radicalization of Islam. Pri-
marily an idea based on the values of secularism, communal harmony, and coex-
istence, it lost its value among the people of Kashmir when it got overly politicized
and became a tool for winning elections. One needs to understand that the grow-
ing influence of fundamentalism, particularly during the insurgency years, fur-
ther pushed this notion to the walls. For militants, the notion of Kashmiriyat
goes against their idea of the establishment of an Islamic nation. Furthermore,
the mainstream political parties politicized this notion to the extent that it lost
its social relevance; consequently, it is now thought to be something promoted
by the state to serve its political interests. The separatists, especially the ones who
follow Islamic ideology, think that Kashmiriyat has been used to further the con-
trol of the Indian state over Kashmir.
Intercommunity Interactions, Regional Divisions,

and Kashmiriyat
In the mainstream media, Kashmiriyat finds its mention with a slightly differ-
ent (and maybe more generalized) meaning. Stories showing the interactions
and relationships between different communities are usually published with pic-
tures to exemplify Kashmiriyat. In this section, we will share a few such exam-
ples, along with a discussion about the return of Kashmiri Pandits.
Kashmiriyat is often recalled when communities come together to help each
other. A story entitled, “Kashmiriyat on Full Display at Mavan Village” published
in the Kashmir Observer on February 2, 2016, talks about the death of a Kash-
miri Pandit in his ancestral home in Kulgam district. He decided to stay in his
village when the militancy was at its peak. He was sick for five years and when
he died he was left with his neighbors, who are predominantly Muslims but were
associated with him as his own family members. They took care of him and per-
formed his last rites.105
Similarly, the perception of Kashmir among Kashmiri Pandits changed dras-
tically due to militancy. The story of Nisha, who belongs to Jammu and got mar-
ried to Satish of Pulwama (a district in South Kashmir), is one such story that
appears in Kashmiri media showing the bonding of Kashmiri population even
today, after decades of consistent conflict and the rise of fundamentalism.106

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Kashmiriyat is said to have resurfaced in the discussions when in the recent

wake of Indo-Pak tensions, hotels owned by Kashmiri Muslims have offered free
food and accommodation to tourists as it shows the hospitality of Kashmiri cul-
ture.107 Similarly, local youths seen helping an injured soldier in a road accident
in Budgam district is also perceived as an example of Kashmiriyat.108
Although the Indian government has tried to bring Pandits back to the val-
ley by way of establishing colonies for the Kashmiri Pandits, these colonies are
said to have further alienated the community. All efforts of the state towards
bridging the gap between the two communities (Muslims and Pandits) have been
restricted to making Pandits live in housing colonies established in Kashmir val-
ley. There have been objections to the establishment of colonies for Pandits, but
the Muslim population in Kashmir wants the Pandits to return.109 There is a belief
among the majority population that the colonies are symbolic of intolerance and
hatred of Muslims for Pandits. The whole exercise did not yield any fruit until
the government announced an employment package for the Pandit community,
which made it mandatory for them to return to the valley to live in colonies.110
The major hurdles in their return to Kashmir valley were lack of safety and secu-
rity, as well as the inability of the state government to implement the rehabili-
tation policy. The apprehensions of the community regarding their safety in
Kashmir valley turned out to be true when they fled due to stone pelting on their
camps in Kashmir following the killing of Hizbul Mujahideen division com-
mander Burhan Wani in July 2016 (Wani was a local youth who rose in the mili-
tant ranks and became a poster boy of the terrorist organization). However, there
have been voices from the political circles asking for the fostering and protec-
tion of ethnic and religious diversity based on the rights of Kashmir Pandits so
that they can reintegrate into the social fabric of Kashmir.111 Kashmiriyat in its
true sense would require the state to have more emphasis on social integration
of Kashmiri Pandits than just developing housing colonies to facilitate their
return. The focus seems to be wrong in terms of interpreting the notion of
Kashmiriyat, as it has resulted in social isolation of Kashmiri Pandits in Kash-
mir valley. In order to give Kashmiriyat its real meaning, a serious effort on part
of the state, devoid of any political interest, has to be made.112
Kashmiri Pandits who decided to stay back in the valley believe they could
live in the valley because they never experience discrimination.113 They observe
all their festivals and their customs without a problem. Even if it may seem that

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the establishment of such colonies is the only way to bring Kashmiri Pandits
back, it is important to work towards the promotion of intercommunity
interactions. This would allow the Pandits to live freely and without fear. Inter-
community dialogue and cultural exchange is a prerequisite for Kashmiriyat (in
both its meanings related to harmony and coexistence as well as humanistic
nationalism).
The regional division of the state has always been associated with the reli-
gious identity of the population. Since the eruption of the armed conflict, the
regions of the state have found it difficult to engage with each other in socio-
cultural terms. Many have argued to give equal importance to Dogariyat and
Ladakhiyat as well, as all three regions are important and the aspirations of peo-
ple from Jammu and Ladakh regions cannot be ignored.114
Conclusion
This paper has examined the multiple meanings of Kashmiriyat as they have
changed over time in response to contextual forces. The concept of Kashmiri-
yat has reached a point where it seems to have lost its pure sociocultural char-
acter and taken on political characteristics. However, one cannot deny that it
continues to be nurtured by the native populations of Kashmir, despite the polit-
icization of the notion by various political dispensations, especially since National
Conference started using Kashmiriyat to instill a sense of nationalism in its ide-
ology to influence the masses. NC’s objective was to present itself as a sole rep-
resentative of all parts of the state. This new avatar of the NC asked for a change
in the social aspect of the Kashmiri composite culture of Kashmiriyat to a notion
which would fetch it a political image acceptable to all sections of the society.
Before the emergence of armed insurgency in 1989, Kashmiriyat had largely been
a tool in the hands of political parties like the National Conference whether they
were in power or not, but after 1989 it has been used mainly by the state to con-
tain and restrict the spread of radical Islam in the valley of Kashmir. On the other
hand, during these years the separatists have been blaming the state for its abuse
and politicization of Kashmiriyat. For them, the notion of Kashmiriyat has been
used by the state to malign the separatist movement in the state by blaming the
separatists for destroying the notion and using it for their political and religious
objectives. The Kashmiri population, otherwise oppressed and bearing the

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burden of conflict, shows its humane face and helps the needy. There are numer-
ous examples that establish the point made above. Various events in Kashmir,
before and after the insurgency, impacted the understanding of Kashmiriyat
resulting in an alteration of its perception, especially among academicians. In
addition to such events, the political class of the state is equally responsible for
the transformation of this notion from being related to a sociocultural aspect
of the way of life in Kashmir to becoming a sociopolitical tool. The mistrust in
Kashmiriyat among the majority population is related to the way it has been used
by the ruling elites for the interest of the state, particularly after the emergence
of armed insurgency in 1989. The post-1989 situation required some serious
efforts on part of the state to bring confidence back for the majority population
towards the state and the political institutions. But the strategy, which has largely
been dependent on the promotion of the sociocultural aspect of Kashmiriyat,
has not yielded significant results, perhaps due to the meaning that Kashmiri-
yat has been given by successive regimes. The shrinking space for religious har-
mony and coexistence has been a major reason for the spread of hatred and void
between two major religious communities of the Kashmir valley. In a conflict-
ridden Kashmir, the need of the hour, we believe, is to depoliticize this notion
and promote it in such a way that it regains its importance in the sociopolitical
life of Kashmir, reflecting the peaceful coexistence of different ethnicities.
Reading the words of Agha Shahid Ali is the best way to conclude this dis-
cussion. For Agha Shahid Ali, Kashmir was a country without a post office. The
exile of the Pandits is the loss of a way of life. Without the Pandits, there cannot
be a true Kashmiriyat, just as there is no love without the lover. In the words of
Shakeel Shan, a Kashmiri singer;
You needed me.

You needed to perfect me:
In your absence you polished me into the enemy.
I hid my pain even to myself;
I revealed my pain only to myself.115
His loss of Kashmiriyat is the loss of a lover. When the lover leaves there is no
recovery. The distance, departing, and memories turn lovers into enemies. The
loss of Kashmiriyat symbolizes a new form of politics that thrives on the
absence of a shared cultural space.

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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Dr. Afaq Aziz (Assistant Professor, Center for
Central Asian Studies University of Kashmir) and Dr. Idrees Kanth (Scholar of
History, University of Leiden, Netherlands) for sharing their knowledge on the
topic. We are grateful to Prof. Mikhail Ilyin (HSE, Moscow) and Dr. Aijaz
Ashraf (University of Kashmir) for comments and insights that greatly improved
the manuscript. We also want to acknowledge Dr. Satyendra Nath Mishra,
Dr. Neelmani Jayaswal, Dr. Ranjit Dehury, Prof. Arild Ruud (UiO, Norway), Par-
tha Ray, Patrick Sawyer, Kristoffer Tangård, and two anonymous reviewers for
reading the text and posing questions relevant to the discussion. Comments
given by the journal editor Ryan Alexander have helped us improve the article;
thank you, Ryan. While we were revising the paper for final submission, the
Modi-led Indian Government changed the status of Jammu and Kashmir. We
believe it will have an impact not just on the perception and display of Kash-
miriyat, but also on the whole sociopolitical discourse of Kashmir. That needs
further research, without a doubt.
NOTES
1. Irfan Ahmed and D. P. Saklani, “Evolution of Kashmiriyat, a Case of Socio Cultural

Assimilation During 14th and 15th Century,” Remarking an Analisation 1, no. 8 (2016): 73.
2. Gerald James Larson, “The Aesthetic (Rasāsvadā) and the Religious (Brahmāsvāda) in
Abhinavagupta’s Kashmir Śaivism,” Philosophy East and West 26, no. 4 (1976): 371–87,
doi:10.2307/1398282. See also, Mohammad Ishaq Khan, “The Impact of Islam on Kashmir
in the Sultanate Period (1320–1586),” The Indian Economic & Social History Review 23,
no. 2 (June 1986): 187–205.
3. Dr. Afaq Aziz (Asst. Professor, Centre for Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir),
in discussion with Wakar Amin, April 2019.
4. Andrea Remes, “Kashmiriyat: Culture, Identity and Politics” (bachelor’s thesis, Leiden
University, 2017), 10.
5. Nyla Ali Khan, “The Land of Lalla-Ded: Politicization of Kashmir and Construction of the
Kashmiri Woman,” Journal of International Women’s Studies 9 (2007): 22–41, accessed March 10,
2019, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e430/3093aa7ece57bc1e50d7f330b307d0e333d3.pdf.
6. G. M. D. Sufi, Islamic Culture in Kashmir (Jammu and Kashmir: Light & Life Publishers,
1979), 19–20.

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7. Anand Mohan, “The Historical Roots of the Kashmir Conflict,” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 15, no. 4 (1992): 283–308, doi:10.1080/10576109208435908.
8. Ibid.
9. Yoginder Sikand, “Hazrat Bulbul Shah: The First Known Muslim Missionary in Kashmir,”
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 20, no. 2 (2000): 362–363.
10. Tahir Amin, “The Kashmir Question” in Different Aspects of Islamic Culture, vol. 6, ed.
Abdulrahim Ali, Iba Der Thiam, and Yusof A. Talib (Paris: UNESCO, 2016), 350. See also
Gull Mohd Wani and Nasir A. Naqash, Reflections on Kashmir Politics (New Delhi: Ashish
Publishing House, 1993).
11. V. N. Drabu, Śaivāgamas: A Study in the Socio-economic Ideas and Institutions of Kashmir
(New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company, 1990): 41.
12. S. M. Iqbal and K. L. Nirash, The Culture of Kashmir (New Delhi: Marwah Publishers,
1978), 103.
13. Prem Nath Bazaz, Kashmir in Crucible (New Delhi: Pamposh, 1967), 10.
14. Balraj Puri, “Kashmiriyat: the vitality of Kashmiri Identity,” Contemporary South Asia, 4,
no. 1 (1995): 61.
15. Bazaz, Kashmir in Crucible, 10.
16. Vijay K. Sazawal, “The True Meaning of Kashmiriyat,” Kashmirforum.org, last modified
February 6, 2009, https://www.kashmirforum.org/the-true-meaning-of-kashmiriyat/.
17. Aziz, interview.
18. Aziz Ahmad, “Conversions to Islam in the Valley of Kashmir,” Central Asiatic Journal 23,
nos. 1/2 (1979): 3–18, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41927246.
19. Philip Mathew, “Examining the Concept of ‘Kashmiriyat’ in Kashmir from the 15th to
17th Century Under the Muslim Rulers of Sultan Ghayas-ud-Din Zain-ul-Abidin, and
Mughul Emperor Akbar” (Doshisha University, 2014), 65, accessed March 10, 2019,
http://www.cismor.jp/uploads-images/sites/2/2014/01/sekai45.pdf.
20. Mathew, “Examining the Concept,” 66–68. See also Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in
Kashmir (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 2012), 50.
21. Prem Nath Bazaz, “Influence of Shaivism on Nund Rishi,” Indian Literature 16, nos. 1/2
(1973): 265–66, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24157466.
22. Ahmad, “Conversions to Islam,” 8–10.
23. Ahmed and Saklani, “Evolution of Kashmiriyat,” 73.
24. Aziz, interview.
25. A. R., “Why India’s Muslims Are So Moderate,” The Economist, last modified September 8,
2014, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2014/09/07/why-indias
-muslims-are-so-moderate.

106.221.234.107 on Wed, 10 Apr 2024 06:42:55 +00:00
26. Ibid. See also: Neeraj Chauhan, “From Sufi to Salafi: Spirit of Kashmiriyat in danger,”
Times of India, last modified January 18, 2019, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com
/articleshow/67581269.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text
&utm_campaign=cppst.
27. Suvir Kaul, “ ‘An’ You Will Fight, Till the Death of It. . . .’: Past and Present in the Challenge
of Kashmir,” Social Research 78, no. 1 (2011): 173-202, accessed April 15, 2019, http://www
.jstor.org/stable/23347208.
28. Shivratri is a Hindu festival on which devotees observe fast and keep vigil all night. It is
also believed that Lord Shiva was married to Parvati on this day. Origin of the word
“Shaivism” is from “Shiva”. Therefore, Shivaratri has a special place in Kashmir.
See: Daily Excelsior, “Heirath Vatuk Puja to be observed on Feb 26, Maha Shivratri on
Feb 27,” last modified February 12, 2014, https://www.dailyexcelsior.com/heirath-vatuk
-puja-to-be-observed-on-feb-26-maha-shivratri-on-feb-27/. See also: James North,
“Staying Awake With Shiva,” The Guardian, last modified February 17, 2010, https://www
.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/feb/17/maha-shivratri-india-shiva.
29. Harinder Baweja, “BJP Rants About Temples in Kashmir Being Destroyed, but Claims Fall
Flat,” India Today, last modified August 14, 2013, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine
/investigation/story/19930228-bjp-rants-about-temples-in-kashmir-being-destroyed-but
-claims-fall-flat-810723-1993-02-28.
30. K. Balagopal, “Kashmir: Self-Determination, Communalism and Democratic Rights,”
Economic and Political Weekly 31, no. 44 (1996): 2917, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4404738.
31. Nilanjan Raghunath, “Jammu and Kashmir: Competing Concepts of Nationalism,” Yale
Journal of International Affairs, 2, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2006): 47, accessed April 15, 2019,
http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/062105raghunath.pdf.
32. Fatima Noori, “Kashmiriyat: Creation and Destruction: A Study of Select Texts and
Customs,” The Creative Launcher, accessed April 10, 2019, http://www.thecreativelauncher
.com/upload/83.%20Kashmiriyat_TCL.pdf.
33. Ibid.
34. Amarnath Yatra is an annual pilgrimage. It has a special place in Hinduism. Every year
hundreds of people from different parts of India take this journey. See: https://www.jktdc
.co.in/amarnath-yatra.aspx, https://www.jktourism.org/amarnath-cave.
35. Abid Ahmad Shah, “Kashmir’s Plural Ethos and Communal Harmony,” ModernDiplomacy,
last modified November 17, 2018, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/11/17/kashmirs
-plural-ethos-and-communal-harmony/.
36. Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of
Kashmir (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003), 18.

106.221.234.107 on Wed, 10 Apr 2024 06:42:55 +00:00
37. Rattan Lal Hangloo, “Kashmiriyat: The Voice of the Past Misconstrued,” in The Parchment
of Kashmir, History, Society and Polity, ed. Nyla Ali Khan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2012), 37–68.
38. Bhand pather is a form of folk theater, which traces its roots to the pre-Mughal period in
Kashmir. The bhands were a troupe of travelling artists that would travel from village to
village for their performances. The performances focused on social issues, usually with a
satirical bent. See Javaid Iqbal Bhat, “Loss of a Syncretic Theatrical Form,” Folklore:
Electronic Journal of Folklore, 34 (2006): 41–42.
39. John G. Cockell, “Ethnic Nationalism and Subaltern Political Process: Exploring
Autonomous Democratic Action in Kashmir,” Nations and Nationalism 6, no. 3 (2000):
319–45.
40. Note that this is a limited explanation of the term “secularism”. The authors refer to one of
the meanings of Kashmiriyat, that is, the process of shared religiosity as the synonym of
secularism. We do not discuss further upon the definitional disparities of secularism.
41. Remes, “Kashmiriyat: Culture, Identity and Politics,” 10.
42. Hangloo, “Kashmiriyat: The Voice,” 44.
43. Balraj Puri, “Kashmiriyat: The vitality of Kashmiri identity,” Contemporary South Asia, 4,
no. 1 (1995): 59, doi:10.1080/0 9584939508719751. See also Mobasher Jawed Akbar,
Kashmir: Behind the Vale (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1990).
44. Riyaz Punjabi, “Kashmir: The Bruised Identity,” in Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of
Conflict in South Asia, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), 131–152.
See also Shweta Keshri, “Hindu Heritage in Kashmir: Finding the Traces,” Media India
Group, July–August 2016, https://mediaindia.eu/heritage-culture/hindu-heritage-in
-kashmir/.
45. T. N. Madan, Muslim Communities of South Asia: Culture, Society, and Power (New Delhi:
Manohar Publication, 1995).
46. Somnath Wakhlu, The Rich Heritage of Jammu and Kashmir: Studies in Art, Architecture,
History, and Culture of the Region (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 1998), 241–43.
47. Neil Aggarwal, “Kashmiriyat as Empty Signifier,” Interventions: The International Journal
of Postcolonial Studies 10, no. 2 (2008): 231.
48. Toru Tak, “The Term ‘Kashmiriyat’: Kashmiri Nationalism of the 1970s,” Economic and
Political Weekly 48, no. 16 (2013): 28–32, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23527257.
49. Dr. Idrees Kanth (Phd, Leiden University, Nederlands. Works on modern history of
Kashmir), in discussion with Wakar Amin, April 2019.
50. Rayees Ahmad Bhat, “Political Awakening and the Religious Fissures in Kashmir Prior to
1947,” Arts and Social Sciences Journal 8 (2017): 268.

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51. Mohammad Ishaq Khan, “Rediscovering Kashmiriyat,” Greater Kashmir, August 14, 2008.
See also: T. N. Madan, “Meaning of Kashmiriyat: Cultural Means and Political Ends,” ed.
Gull Mohd Wani (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1995), 63. And, Arsilan, 2018.
52. T. N. Madan, “Meaning of Kashmiriyat: Cultural Means and Political Ends,” 63.
53. Mohammad Ishaq Khan, “Rediscovering Kashmiriyat”, Greater Kashmir, August 14, 2008.
54. Kanth, interview.
55. Arsilan, “Deconstructing ‘Kashmiriyat’: A myth woven around history,” The Free Press
Kashmir, January 30, 2018, https://freepresskashmir.com/2018/01/30/deconstructing-kash
miriyat-a-myth-woven-around-history/. See also Tak, “The Term ‘Kashmiriyat,’ ” 28–32.
56. Increasing influence of Wahabi Islamic ideology is considered as a threat against the spirit
of Kashmiriyat. See N. Chauhan, “From Sufi to Salafi,” 2019, http://timesofindia.indiatimes
.com/articleshow/67581269.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text
&utm_campaign=cppst.
58. Walter Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir (New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 2005),
179–203. See also Sumantra Bose, Transforming India: Challenges to the World’s Largest
Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 225–286; Christopher
Snedden, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris (London: Hurst & Co., 2013).
59. Nandita Haksar, The Many Faces of Kashmiri Nationalism: From the Cold War to the
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106.221.234.107 on Wed, 10 Apr 2024 06:42:55 +00:00

Wakar Amin An Enquiry Into The Debates Around Kashmiriyat

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An Inquiry into the Debates around Kashmiriyat

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48660345

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that Kashmiriyat should be maintained as it was once understood—­synonymous

Keywords: Kashmiriyat; Kashmir; Conflict; Coexistence; Kashmiri Nationalism;

Kashmiriyat has become an integral part of sociopolitical discourses on Kashmir.

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Genesis and Evolution of Kashmiriyat

The history of Kashmir is ancient. According to Nilamata Purana (an ancient

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the Kashmiri intellectuals with their own understandings and experiences.13 In

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The Sociopolitical Reflections of Kashmiriyat

Kashmiriyat has been called as a signifier of centuries-­old indigenous secular-

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Contesting Narratives around Kashmiriyat

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Kashmiriyat is an idea that emerged during the 1980s or whether it is something

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It is used to provide psychological relief to the people living in Kashmir during

Political Journey of Kashmiriyat

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poems reflected its propaganda clearly. The term “Kashmiriyat” to be used as a

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Kashmiriyat, Kashmiris, and the Conflict

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ranks of militant organizations.88 The government of India was accused of rig-

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Intercommunity Interactions, Regional Divisions,

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Kashmiriyat is said to have resurfaced in the discussions when in the recent

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You needed me.

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1. Irfan Ahmed and D. P. Saklani, “Evolution of Kashmiriyat, a Case of Socio Cultural

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that Kashmiriyat should be maintained as it was once understood—synonymous

Kashmiriyat has been called as a signifier of centuries-old indigenous secular-

1. Irfan Ahmed and D. P. Saklani, “Evolution of Kashmiriyat, a Case of Socio Cultural