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John Rawls and the Common Good
The chapters in this book analyze the relationship between core concepts
of the common good and the work of American political philosopher
John Rawls.
One of the main criticisms that has been made of Rawls is his supposed
neglect of central aspects of collective life. The contributors to this
book explore the possibility of a substantive and community-oriented
interpretation of Rawls’s thought. The chapters investigate Rawls’s views
on values such as community, faith, fraternity, friendship, gender equality,
love, political liberty, reciprocity, respect, sense of justice, and virtue. They
demonstrate that Rawls fnds a balance between certain individualistic
aspects of his theory of justice and the value of community. In doing so,
the book ofers insightful new readings of Rawls.
John Rawls and the Common Good will be of interest to scholars and
advanced students working in political, moral, and legal philosophy.
1 Community 14
D A N I E L A . DO MB RO WSKI
11 Virtue 226
R O B E RTO L UP P I
The following are abbreviations for the works of John Rawls as they are
referred to in this book:
BIMSF A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith, ed. T. Nagel
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
CP Collected Papers, ed. S. Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1999).
JF Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. E. Kelly (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
LHMP Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. B. Herman
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
LHPP Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, ed. S. Freeman
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
LP The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1999).
PL Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press,
paperback edition, 1996).
PRR “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” [1997] reprinted in CP,
573–616, and in LP, 129–180.
TJ A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, revised edition, 1999).
John Rawls and the Common
Good
An Introduction
Roberto Luppi
the idea of the common good is in trouble. John Rawls speaks for
many observers in the West today when he says that the pluralism of
the contemporary landscape makes it impossible to envision a social
DOI: 10.4324/9781003143086-1
2 Roberto Luppi
good on which all can agree. This is the intellectual and theoretical
challenge to the common good today: diversity of visions of the good
life makes it difcult or even impossible to attain a shared vision of
the common good. Such a shared vision cannot survive as an intel-
lectual goal if all ideas of the good are acknowledged to be partial,
incomplete, and incompatible. This pluralism also makes it impossible
to achieve a strong form of social unity in practice without repression
or tyranny. This is the practical challenge: pursuit of a common good
as envisioned by Aristotle, Aquinas, and Ignatius must be abandoned
as a practical social objective incompatible with modern freedoms.
(Hollenbach 2004, 9)
Although Rawls has often been the main subject of these communitarian
objections, they constitute a more general critique of liberalism. With
this term, we refer here to that philosophical doctrine, which initially
spread throughout Europe following the religious wars of the 16th and
17th centuries and tried to limit the power – and, at times, abuses – of
government (especially in the form of absolute monarchy), guaranteeing
citizens equal freedoms and rights, which gradually came to be recog-
nized as inviolable. At the root of this doctrine was the awareness that
people naturally tend to disagree on central issues of their existence,
starting from the idea of ‘the good life.’ Being reasonable has thus ceased
to be seen as a guarantee of unanimity, and it has been accepted that,
in matters of supreme importance, people are destined to disagree. By
virtue of this conviction, the decisive question for liberal theory has
thus shifted from the defnition of an idea of good, which a community
must pursue, to the development of just and fair terms of coexistence,
which are then accompanied by the adopting of diferent conceptions of
the good life by individuals (Larmore 1996, 121–123; Schwarzenbach
2009, 18–20).
As stated by a signifcant portion of the liberal tradition, consequently,
rather than to personal ends and interests, or the development of ideals
of human perfection in citizens, the state should turn its attention to
maintaining peace and order, the protection of rights and of individual
freedoms, and the promotion of material prosperity. In short, liberalism
has afrmed the need for state neutrality toward the worldviews of its
citizens. This is highlighted by Dworkin, among others:
In contrast to what has been argued by many critics, this book attempts
to fnd some form of reconciliation between the liberal tradition and the
concept of the common good, preserving the great achievements of liber-
alism – such as the afrmation of freedom and rights, political and reli-
gious tolerance, and interpersonal respect – at the same time combining
them with the key values of the common good. Such an attempt will be
developed through the analysis of one of the greatest liberal thinkers of
the last century: John Rawls.
4 Roberto Luppi
Over the years, there have been attempts to demonstrate the presence
of common ground between Rawls and scholars working within a com-
munitarian perspective or, in any case, to highlight that the framework
created by the philosopher cannot do without concepts akin to those that
give substance to the defnition of the common good. With this book, we
do not want to return to the debate, which has animated the communitar-
ian critique of liberalism; this can now be considered long concluded. Nor
does this work aim to ofer an incontrovertible demonstration of the pos-
sibility of a communitarian interpretation of Rawlsian theory. Fifty years
after the frst publication of A Theory of Justice, however, an exhaustive
and general analysis of the relationship between Rawlsian thought and
the crucial values, which are constitutive of the idea of the common good,
is still needed: this is precisely the purpose of this book.
It is Rawls himself who, in A Theory of Justice, emphasizes that he
aspires to fnd a balance between certain individualistic aspects of his
theory of justice and the value of the community, deeply connected with
the “social nature of mankind” (TJ, 458):
justice as fairness has a central place for the value of community, and
how this comes about depends upon the Kantian interpretation. I
discuss this topic in Part Three. The essential idea is that we want to
account for the social values, for the intrinsic good of institutional,
community, and associative activities, by a conception of justice that
in its theoretical basis is individualistic. . . . From this conception,
however individualistic it might seem, we must eventually explain the
value of community. Otherwise the theory of justice cannot succeed.
(TJ, 233–234, emphasis added)
The idea underlying this book is that Rawls (at least in part) succeeds in
his attempt, and the demonstration of this is ofered by a groundbreak-
ing examination of the values that most distance the philosopher’s work
from a purely procedural reading, thus seeking elements of dialogue and
intersection between the concept of the common good and his philosophi-
cal system.
we can envisage the common good in very diferent ways, as high and
as low, as wide and as narrow. We can speak of this common good in
the language of justice, of freedom, security, order, morality, happi-
ness, individual well-being, prosperity, progress, and what have you.
We can, moreover, envisage the community for which such a good is
sought in diferent ways: as tribal, local, national, international, or
even global, as egalitarian or hierarchical in its order, as traditional
or freely constituted, as unifed or divided. And we can fnally also
envisage the search itself in various ways: as organized or spontane-
ous, as guided or as cooperative, as deliberate or merely implicit, as
successful or thwarted.
(Sluga 2014, 2)
In the history of political thought, its manifold nature has made it possible
to trace the common good in a plurality of theories. From ancient Greece
to Christian thought, the common good has often been interpreted as
the testing ground against which not only the formal legitimacy but also
the intrinsic goodness of any form of government is measured. The com-
mon good has thus been observed as a category that is both ethical and
political – spheres that are seen as intertwined (Campanini 2014, 16–17).
It is precisely this last connection that the political culture of modernity
has tended to reject, focusing the overall evaluation of state power more
on legitimacy than on value judgments. Inevitably, this development has
contributed to the gradual loss of centrality of the concept of the common
good in political and philosophical refection.
However, in the second half of the 20th century, this concept was
gradually rediscovered through the work of scholars interested in both
the Christian tradition and classical philosophy. Hand in hand with this
rediscovery, important disaccords with large sectors of the liberal tradi-
tion have nevertheless surfaced, preventing the revival of the common
good as a basic element of contemporary philosophy. As outlined earlier,
one of the distinctive features of liberalism is in fact the recognition of
ethical, religious, and philosophical pluralism as a central and irrepress-
ible, or rather welcome, trait of today’s societies. Related to this is the
spreading of both religious and political tolerance as a crucial element in
order to allow peaceful coexistence and cooperation within plural com-
munities. A signifcant portion of the liberal tradition has often considered
these two very elements, pluralism and the related practice of tolerance,
as difcult to reconcile with the idea of the common good, which instead
is believed to rely on a solid social bond, which can only be ensured by
the sharing of the same idea of good within community (Downing and
Thigpen 1993, 1050).
6 Roberto Luppi
The fracture that has emerged between ethics and politics must there-
fore be looked upon as one of the principal reasons for the ‘crisis’ of
the concept of the common good and its subsequent relegation to the
background, in the context of liberal philosophical contemporaneity.
However, it is possible to imagine the rediscovery of this concept based
on the idea of morality, rather than that of ethics. Here, morality is
understood as that sphere, which includes citizens’ collective and public
life, the sphere that is connected to their system of cooperation and its
rules, practices, and virtues. If, given today’s pluralism, it is impossible
to fnd a common good, which comprehensively absorbs the lives of
citizens, related to their idea of the good life, we can trace it in what is
authentically common to the whole community: indeed, its morality.
This is the idea John Rawls refers to in his interview for Commonweal
in 1998. When asked about the presence of an idea of the common good
in his theory, he replied:
You hear that liberalism lacks an idea of the common good, but I
think that’s a mistake. For example, you might say that, if citizens are
acting for the right reasons in a constitutional regime, then regardless
of their comprehensive doctrines they want every other citizen to have
justice. So you might say they’re all working together to do one thing,
namely to make sure every citizen has justice. Now that’s not the only
interest they all have, but it’s the single thing they’re all trying to do.
In my language, they’re striving toward one single end, the end of
justice for all citizens.
(CP, 622)
What emerges is the conviction that a liberal state, while active in preserv-
ing the neutrality among the various conceptions of the good, is able to
ofer its citizens a fundamental end in relation to which they can act col-
lectively: it is the “mutual good of mutual justice” (Rawls 1988, 274). The
Rawlsian idea of the common good is therefore characterized by interests
that the members of a community can publicly welcome and intrinsi-
cally value by virtue of their status as citizens, committed to respecting
the principles of public morality. This status takes precedence over other
statuses and afliations that characterize the identity of the individual as
a private person. Citizens are thus deemed to have a relational obligation
to mutually take care of the interests connected to the “position of equal
citizenship,” shared by everyone (TJ, 82–83, 217). These interests concern
the respect for and protection of the principles of justice and the institu-
tions that are inspired by them. The status of equal citizenship and its
mutual recognition are crucial, above all, in order to highlight what unites
all members of the community, partially setting aside diferences and divi-
sions and preventing – as far as possible – the rise of social envy and
erroneous competition among individuals and groups (Hussain 2018).
John Rawls and the Common Good 7
In essence, a conception of social life is put forward by Rawls, by virtue
of which everyone has a fundamental interest in ensuring that certain
basic social conditions prevail. The discussion, deliberation, and action of
citizens with a view to the common good allow them to afrm a principle
of reciprocity (and civic friendship) that leads everyone to give and receive
justice and mutual consideration. Thus, while not (necessarily) adopting
supererogatory attitudes, each individual plays their part in a collective
dynamic in view of the interests of their associates, as these interests are
common to all. Moreover, this kind of society ofers everyone the possibil-
ity to realize their personal conception of the good, in the form of their
life plans. These goods should not be seen as exclusively private but often
shared within the multiple associations that make up the social body.
In this plurality of life experiences, citizens feel pleasure and pride and
“realize their common or matching nature,” which in turn is inevitably
part of the common good of the Rawlsian community (TJ, 459; cf. Keys
2006, 35).
In this book, we will see how referring to justice as the basic frame-
work for the common good opens the door to other values and concepts,
which, although connected to justice itself, have much more substantive
features than those acknowledged by the critics of John Rawls. Contrary
to the idea that he understands justice as “a rather limited good; [as] the
good of a cold, modern, and essentially heartless world in which the issue
between us is only what you owe me and what I owe you,” the book will
explore the far from marginal role that concepts, such as for example
that of virtue, friendship, faith, or fraternity, play in the theory of justice
of the philosopher. In line with this perspective, readers will thus judge
for themselves whether the Rawlsian theory actually provides a “particu-
lar, distinctively narrow, and essentially Protestant view of the common
good” or not (Sluga 2014, 3–4).
Here, however, it is important to dwell – albeit briefy – on another
point, that is to say on whether the vision set out in this work is truly
able to speak to today’s society, a society that since 1971 has undergone
tremendous changes: technological revolution and globalized capitalism,
surveillance and interdependence, digital democracy and populisms, new
inequalities and balances of power, migration and climate change are just
some of the crucial features of today’s global village, which now takes
on a very diferent appearance from that of John Rawls’s time. Yet the
idea from which this collective work springs forth is that the philoso-
pher’s thought continues to speak to us and to ofer important insights on
debates so crucial to the history of humanity that they are likely destined
to endure forevermore, such as those on justice and freedom, equality,
and the common good. It is precisely on this last concept that doubts,
questions, and criticism will likely focus: does it still make sense to talk
about the common good in a globalized world like today’s, in which its
traditional frames of reference (family, city, and state) seem to gradually
8 Roberto Luppi
lose importance? And if so, is it not necessary to embrace a universal
perspective on the common good, given the growing interdependence
between the various areas of the world and the peoples who inhabit them?
At the same time, however, does such a universal perspective not render
this concept meaningless?
On the one hand, what arises is the thought that a common good
referred only to the polis, as in the ancient world, or to the nation, as
in the modern world, no longer makes sense in the era of globalization
and with the arising of problems, which require a global vision. Environ-
mental issues and COVID-19 represent only two, albeit very relevant,
examples in this regard. On the other hand, however, it is possible to
put forward the opinion that the global broadening of the concept of the
common good leads to such a ‘softening’ of its contents, as to render them
devoid of meaning and power of infuence.
This book does not take a stand on the possibility of rethinking the
concept of the common good from a global perspective or otherwise. This
approach is not taken into consideration here for (at least) two reasons:
one, linked to the philosopher at the center of the analysis; another of a
more general nature. In fact, adopting an approach that cost him greatly
in terms of criticism, Rawls devoted his refection predominantly to the
state as a single entity, going in search of a political conception of justice
that was applicable within a constitutional democracy seen as an island,
separate and independent from any surrounding realities. Only later, in The
Law of Peoples, did he move on to consider issues of international politics,
which ultimately occupied a rather marginal space in the general structure
of his thought. This leads to the adoption of a more traditional perspec-
tive on the common good here, addressing the community – at most, on a
national scale – but certainly not humanity as a whole. Second, at a time in
which the implementation of a policy aimed at the common good appears
so necessary and yet, concurrently, so distant, it might be advisable – even
from a theoretical point of view – to focus on the state level rather than on
a macro reality, such as a global one. Although this is an approach that will
not please some, the essential idea is that, when a house is in disarray, as our
beloved humanity in many ways is, to put things in order one must frst con-
centrate on the single rooms and then, only subsequently, should one focus
on the whole. It is already difcult to reconcile the ‘good’ of a local reality
with that of the state, given recurring tensions and conficts, be they appar-
ent or hidden. Even more complex issues arise when the criterion of the
common good is transferred to the level of political, economic, and social
choices to be adopted on the world level. Nevertheless, as the example of
the house brings to light, they are not conficting or incompatible types of
good: in order to be sustainable, in fact, the common good of a country
must not be thought of in contrast with that of other state entities, near
or far from it. Rather, the two types of common good are complementary
and – in some ways – follow on from one another.
John Rawls and the Common Good 9
II. Chapter Outlines
In short, is it possible to trace an idea of the common good in John
Rawls’s thought? This work concludes that it is. Although he uses this
term with absolute parsimony, my opinion – and I venture to say also
that of the other contributors – is that Rawls has outlined a specifc
idea of the common good for his well-ordered society. A common
good that is inextricably linked to the idea of justice, but which must
not be understood as something ‘monolithic’ and ‘well-circumscribed’
or ‘circumscribable.’ I rather like to think of it as a mosaic, never
defned in its entirety and made of multiform pieces: some larger and
well-polished, others smaller or faded in color; all, however, equally
fundamental in order to build the greater, overall image depicting the
Rawlsian idea of the common good. What the contributors of this
book do is just that: put the pieces of this mosaic under their micro-
scope, observing and analyzing them in detail and, at times, turning
them upside down.
Therefore, in this book, the goal is not to focus on the Rawlsian defni-
tion of the common good as such, nor to defnitively judge whether it is
feasible or not. The belief is that an approach of this kind would lead to an
overall image that is always lacking in some parts, due to the multifaceted
nature of this notion. The approach is rather to concentrate on a multi-
plicity of concepts, all intimately linked to the category of the common
good, in the hope that from this multiplicity the reader will be able to
extrapolate its uniqueness, that is, what unites these elements and allows
them to ensure the substance and multiform vitality that are essential if
the concept of the common good wants to make its contribution within
the community it addresses.
In Chapter 1, Daniel A. Dombrowski devotes himself to the analysis
of the concept of community in Rawlsian theory. To be exact, the chap-
ter contains a defense of Rawlsian, political communitarianism, which is
seen as a moderate stance between the weak communitarianism found in
Hobbes and related thinkers, and the strong communitarianism found
in Aristotle and the many thinkers infuenced by him. Thus, the charac-
teristics of the Rawlsian political community are highlighted, wherein
there is widespread acceptance by the population of a certain conception
of justice (contra Hobbesian views), but where there is not widespread
acceptance of any view of the good or of any particular comprehensive
doctrine (contra Aristotelian views).
In Chapter 2 on faith and the common good, David A. Reidy sets out
the “fdeism” to which Rawls claims to have been committed through-
out his adult life. Taking into account the important diferences between
A Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism, and The Law of Peoples, the
author shows how this fdeism relates in each case to the common good
at which Rawls believed free equals properly aimed in political and
10 Roberto Luppi
law-making activity, suggesting that in his philosophical work Rawls was,
among other things, “turning inside out” his fdeism.
In Chapter 3, Marco Martino deals with fraternity. In A Theory of
Justice, Rawls associates his diference principle with the concept of fra-
ternity, drawing attention to the revolutionary tripartite motto of 1789,
“liberty, equality, fraternity.” Through the diference principle, Rawls
attempts to think rationally about fraternity, seeing it as something intrin-
sic to political processes, rather than external to them. Martino traces the
evolution of this reasoning: in his investigation, the crucial features of the
‘indirect’ treatment of the principle of fraternity developed by Rawls are
brought to light, even if ultimately it is concluded that the philosopher
does not provide fraternity with an adequate theoretical foundation.
In Chapter 4, Ruth Abbey examines what Rawls says in A Theory of
Justice about friendship as an interpersonal relationship. In particular,
she underlines the key points in TJ in which friendship plays a crucial
role: as one of society’s smaller associations or social unions, as a human
good, and – to be exact – as the clearest of Rawls’s examples of a comple-
mentary good, as a central aspect in the morality of association stage of
moral development, and in his discussion of guilt and shame. Further-
more, Abbey shows that a focus on friendship brings some important
Aristotelian features of the philosopher’s thinking to light.
In Chapter 5, Elizabeth Edenberg deals with the question of whether
Rawls’s theory of justice is capable of secure justice for women and how
this relates to the common good. In particular, Edenberg points out how
many injustices rooted in the gender structure of society were justifed by
appealing to the common good. Yet to properly account for how a just
society can meet the needs of the common good, surely the common good
should be good for all members of that society, rather than relying on sub-
ordinating some to allow for the fourishing of others. Edenberg under-
lines how by Rawls’s own measures of justice that rely on the acceptability
of principles of justice to people understood as free and equal, a sexist
society or any society that seeks the common good through the exploita-
tion or subordination of some groups to others would not pass Rawls’s
own hypothetical acceptability test. Nevertheless, Rawls’s own discussion
of gender justice has been the subject of extensive feminist critique: both
Rawls’s discussions of gender justice and the critical responses to them
are the subject of the chapter.
In Chapter 6, Paul Voice goes through the analysis of the concept of
love in Rawlsian theory. Since Rawls wants to leave room for citizens
to love for reasons and in ways that align with their idea of the good,
Voice outlines that love relationships are only partially constrained by
the philosopher’s two principles of justice. From this observation, the
author argues that the partial constraints on love, which Rawls’s theory
of justice imposes, are insufcient, resulting in systematic injustices that
ought to be corrected. However, Voice also claims that love and justice
John Rawls and the Common Good 11
can be aligned and reconciled both with Rawls’s principles of justice and
with his own notion of love. To this end, the author advances a notion of
proper or just love.
In Chapter 7, M. Victoria Costa examines the role of the political liber-
ties in Rawls’s theory of justice and discusses how they ought to be distrib-
uted to promote justice and the common good. Her chapter acknowledges
that one way to defend the equal distribution of the political liberties
appeals to their contribution to self-respect. But, since Rawls holds that
the fair value of the political liberties ought to be guaranteed, as well
as the equal distribution thereof, Costa argues that it is a concern with
preventing political domination that best explains the measures required
to guarantee their fair value. The twin requirements of equal distribution
and fair value are seen to contribute to the common good by operating
at the institutional level. But these requirements, Costa highlights, can be
supplemented by a principle: the principle of the common good, guiding
the ways in which citizens interact with each other when they make use
of their political liberties.
In Chapter 8, Paul Weithman deals with the concepts of “reciprocity”
and “justifcation” in Political Liberalism. Liberalism requires that politi-
cal arrangements be justifable to those who are subject to them. Some
critics argue that any view committed to this Justifability Condition is
caught in a dilemma, which arises when we ask whether the condition
applies to itself. The author argues that Rawlsian political liberalism
avoids the dilemma that self-application is thought to imply. The aim
of Rawlsian political liberalism is to identify principles citizens have to
honor to relate to one another as free equals. Weithman’s answer shows
that Rawlsian political liberalism is the most defensible form of liberalism
because of its commitment to a form of reciprocity that is needed for our
politics.
In Chapter 9, Boettcher focuses his analysis on the concept of respect,
in reference to the Rawlsian idea of public reason. According to the latter,
government ofcials and even ordinary citizens should decide fundamen-
tal matters of law and policy on the basis of reasons that are in principle
acceptable to others in light of some reasonable political conception of
justice along with other publicly accessible standards of evaluation. One
requirement of public reason is restraint, that is, the willingness to refrain
from supporting such laws and policies solely on the basis of nonpublic
reason. Boettcher revisits Rawls’s remarks on respect and self-respect and
argues that the restraint requirement is based primarily on an underlying
duty of mutual respect. However, the author outlines how an ideal of
civic friendship plays an important complementary but secondary role in
grounding the main requirements of public reason.
In Chapter 10, Jon Mandle describes two basic roles played by the
idea of a sense of justice in Rawls’s theory. On the one hand, he exam-
ines Rawls’s characterization of justice as fairness itself as an attempt to
12 Roberto Luppi
describe our sense of justice in refective equilibrium. On the other hand,
Mandle analyzes TJ’s account of the psychological development of a sense
of justice in individuals, which is part of Rawls’s argument for the stabil-
ity of a well-ordered society – the other component being his argument
for the congruence of the right and the good. Mandle highlights that
understanding how the moral psychology described by Rawls sets the
stage for the congruence argument helps to clarify the nature of refective
equilibrium and the Rawlsian vision of moral justifcation.
Chapter 11 analyzes the role of cooperative virtues in Rawlsian thought
and, in particular, ofers a reading of the twofold value they have within
his framework: they are seen to have an intrinsic value in the life of his
citizens and, at the same time, an instrumental one from the point of
view of society. The intrinsic value of cooperative virtues concerns the
fact that, without their acquisition, the individual does not become a
moral person, that is, a fully cooperative member of society. However,
cooperative virtues also play an essential role from an instrumental point
of view: their presence in citizens constitutes in fact the condicio sine qua
non for a well-ordered society to be able to frst establish itself and then
remain stable over time.
Notes
1. This accusation has been accompanied by the criticism against the preponder-
ant role assigned by Rawlsian theory to procedural aspects in the attempt to
maintain a position of neutrality toward the diferent worldviews competing
on the social stage. Liberalism has thus been accused of indiference toward the
multiple conceptions aimed at the fourishing of the human being, the so-called
privatization of good (MacIntyre 1990). It is important to underline that the
communitarian criticisms have especially turned to the early works of Rawls,
pertaining to the period of his philosophical theorizing before the publication
of Political Liberalism (1993). At the same time, it is also useful to mention
that, with the ascription as “communitarian,” some notable philosophers of
this group such as Michael Walzer, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Michael Sandel
have not always been ‘satisfed.’
2. The book does not analyze the communitarian objections in detail, nor does
it aspire to examine whether they are well founded or not. On this topic, see
Buchanan (1989), Gutmann (1985), and Mulhall and Swift (2003).
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bridge University Press.
1 Community
Daniel A. Dombrowski
Introduction
Perhaps the safest characterization of John Rawls’s view of community (or
social union) is that his stance is a moderate one between two extremes.
At one extreme is a weak sense of community found in Hobbesian stances
wherein there is a modus vivendi established between contesting parties
that do not share a sense of justice. This is merely an expedient truce
that is meant to halt hostilities among the contesting parties, hence it is
an inadequate basis for stability over time in that if one of the contesting
parties got the upper hand, the truce could be broken and the party with
the greatest threat advantage could, in efect, ram its views down the
throats of everyone else. At the other extreme are Aristotelian stances
that prescribe a unity constituted by widespread acceptance of a particu-
lar conception of the good life or of what Rawls calls a comprehensive
doctrine. These views can be called weak and strong communitarianism,
respectively (see Nickel 1990).
The moderate stance found in Rawls is that of a political community
wherein there is widespread acceptance by the population of a certain
conception of justice (contra Hobbesian views), but where there is not
widespread acceptance of any particular view of the good or of any par-
ticular comprehensive doctrine (contra Aristotelian views). This political
community in PL comes about through an overlapping consensus regard-
ing justice among people who afrm (very often uncompromisingly)
diferent conceptions of the good. This means that Rawlsian political
community may very well be afrmed by people for somewhat diferent
reasons. But Rawlsian community is indeed afrmed for moral reasons in
contrast to the reasons of expediency that characterize Hobbesian views.
One consequence of this Rawlsian view is that Aristotelian or strong
communitarianism (often in popular discourse referred to simply as com-
munitarianism), which has a state-endorsed conception of the good life,
should be abandoned in a condition of pervasive pluralism regarding the
comprehensive doctrines that citizens afrm. Comprehensive doctrines
apply to many topics other than political justice. Rawls is happy to afrm
DOI: 10.4324/9781003143086-2
Community 15
a consensus regarding the latter only, given the wide array of compre-
hensive doctrines: utilitarianism, various types of perfectionism, various
(and sometimes contentious) religious conceptions of the good, Marxism,
hedonism, etc. The hope is that we could attain a political community that
could accommodate diversity by removing many difcult philosophical/
religious issues from the political agenda.
The task of political philosophy in such a community is to analyze and
give a coherent linguistic formulation to popular culture in constitutional
democracy. In periods of turmoil political philosophy may be highlighted
more than when there is a stable concept of justice at work in political
institutions and in popular culture, when the work of politicians, jour-
nalists, and others comes to the fore. One is reminded here of Thomas
Kuhn’s famous distinction between revolutionary and normal science (see
Kuhn 1970). The important thing is that toleration on the ground be
widespread and a matter of intuitive conviction on the part of citizens,
given the fact of pervasive pluralism. That is, one need not have general
agreement about the good life in order to have political community and
agreement about justice.
The thesis of the present chapter is that the aforementioned moderate
Rawlsian view of community is worthy of explication and defense. This
explication and defense will occur over several stages in that I will frst
deal with the topic of individuation through community in Rawls and
then move to the complementarity among citizens that characterizes a
just society. The communal virtues in Rawls will be considered along with
the importance of the diference principle for the concept of community.
Contemporary critics like David Hollenbach, Louis Dupre, and Michael
Walzer will be considered, as well as historical thinkers who are often
assumed to ofer resistance to Rawlsian views, like Aristotle and Thomas
Aquinas. We will see that justice as fairness is by no means opposed to the
importance of community in Rawls; nor is the concept of goodness. The
chapter ends with a consideration of the relationship between communal
love/benevolence and Rawlsian justice.
II. Complementarity
Thus far I have tried to call attention to two points (in reverse order): (a) a
citizen’s sense of justice and concept of the good presuppose habituation
into some communal values at the familial and associational levels and
(b) due to the pervasive pluralism of concepts of the good and compre-
hensive doctrines in contemporary societies, strong communitarianism
can hold sway at the societal level only through the illegitimate use of
force. Nonetheless there can be a political community based on a com-
mon view of justice, rather than a common view of the good. Rawlsian
communitarian justice can more accurately be described as a (just) social
union of (particular communal) social unions (TJ, 527, 529; PL, 201,
304, 323). Any social union, including that found in the original position,
involves complementarity, which Rawls analogizes to the musical play-
ers in a symphony orchestra (TJ, 524; PL, 321). Each player could have
learned to play well every instrument in the orchestra, but each becomes
profcient on a single instrument due to the difculty involved in learning
them all. The word “symphony” itself literally means to sound together,
to harmonize together, despite individual diferences among the players.
The orchestra metaphor evokes the democratic harmonic resolution of
any tension between individual and society. Behind the veil of ignorance,
as it were, each participant could theoretically play any instrument, but
in reality each has to rely on the other players to complement individual
insufciencies. When the veil – on this metaphor, a curtain – lifts, we can
play together in an aesthetically pleasing way (see Love 2003).
As is well known, over time Rawls became somewhat dissatisfed with
the shape his theory of justice had originally taken. The principles of
justice in TJ were seen as parts of an overarching moral theory. A soci-
ety based on them would be stable because all reasonable and rational
people would agree with them. Rawls came to see that a better concept
of stability was needed, which led in PL to the idea of overlapping con-
sensus. We have seen that this idea operates even in a condition of plural-
ism with respect to comprehensive doctrines yet nonetheless provides a
18 Daniel A. Dombrowski
greater sense of community than the weak sort found in a modus vivendi.
Overlapping consensus is admittedly not deep, but this is a commend-
able feature in that overlapping consensus is, as a result of its not being
deep but wide, conducive to widespread agreement regarding justice in a
democratic society.
Establishing terms for social cooperation for mutual beneft remains
Rawls’s primary concern, but the principles of justice are now seen more
accurately in PL as political, rather than as comprehensive. These princi-
ples function as modules that can be inserted into various comprehensive
doctrines with their deeper communal ties. Even if citizens disagree stren-
uously regarding some particular issue or piece of legislation, they may
nonetheless be committed members to political community in that the
community in question centers on the basic framework of a just society
and on institutional essentials, rather than on various concrete particulars.
Stability for the right reasons requires that commitment to this framework
not be a mere compromise, but a matter of principled conviction so as
to secure political community and the complementarity involved in such
community (see Martin 2015; Riker 2015).
V. Hollenbach’s Criticisms
The purpose of the present chapter is to explore the concept of commu-
nity or, to use a roughly synonymous designation, the common good in
Rawls’s thought. It will no doubt be objected that political liberalism is
basically a political philosophy meant to justify toleration, but toleration
is not enough. Critics might wonder where the Rawlsian notion of com-
munity or the common good is to be found. These critics might not be
willing to buy into political liberalism without a clear indication of how
this view is conducive to community or the common good. David Hol-
lenbach provides a prominent example of this sort of skepticism regarding
Rawls’s thought. To achieve a polis, it will be alleged, one needs to do
more than show toleration and a live-and-let-live attitude that avoids
introducing concepts of the full human good into political discourse.
Rawls’s method of avoidance is part of a commendable hope to neutralize
potential conficts, according to Hollenbach, but the result of this method
is seen to be disastrous:
X. Goodness
A further challenge comes from Paul Sigmund, who thinks that democ-
racy should be based not only on a Rawlsian thin theory of the good,
but also on a thick theory. There are several reasons to take Sigmund’s
challenge seriously, one of which is that clarifcation of “the good” is
necessary to understand better “the common good” (see Sigmund 1994).
A defnition of goodness can proceed by way of two stages. First, A is a
good X if and only if A has the properties it is rational to want in an X.
Second, A is a good X for K if and only if A has the properties it is rational
for K to want in an X. These two points illustrate the Rawlsian beliefs that
goodness depends, in part, on context; that goodness depends, in part, on
the aim of a rational agent; and that the good develops rationality. One
can say that a person is a good assassin without approving the assassin’s
skills. Whether the assassin is a good person is a diferent issue. There
is a descriptive, rather than a prescriptive, character to the goodness of
many things in that these things are good if they have the properties it is
rational to want in these things. When “good” is used prescriptively, it
carries recommendatory force precisely because of its descriptive sense
(TJ, 399–400, 403–407).
A distinction between primary and nonprimary goods is required for
understanding Rawls’s view. Any person with self-respect would, from
the perspective of the original position, desire that the former be present
no matter what else is wanted. Further, there is general agreement among
philosophers of various persuasions that goodness be seen, as mentioned
earlier, as rationality. Hence, it makes sense to suspect that a good person,
rather than a good assassin or a good farmer, is one who has to a higher
degree than the average person the properties that, from the perspective
of the original position, it is rational to want in a person. These properties
would include, I assume, being a self-respecting member in good standing
30 Daniel A. Dombrowski
of some particular community and engaging in cooperative eforts with
members of other communities. Evil people, by way of contrast, violate
the rights of others in ways that parties in the original position would
deem unjustifable. Beyond primary goods (freedom of thought, move-
ment, and choice of occupation; income and wealth; etc.) and those prin-
ciples mentioned earlier that would be chosen in the original position;
however, we should remain cautious (TJ, 433–440, 456; also PL, 308).
This caution is due to several factors, including the possibility that citi-
zens will change their minds about which conception of the good they will
adhere to. One’s moral power to form and rationally pursue a conception
of the good is such that this conception is, for various reasons, subject to
revision. Therefore, we should not stipulate in detail what the good will be
for each person based on the community to which they belong. It is true
that if we suddenly lost the convictions that dominate our community, we
would become disoriented. Usually when changes occur to our view of the
good they are gradual, but sometimes they occur suddenly such that in a
very real sense we are not the same person as before. Rawls himself cites
the example of Saul of Tarsus on the road to Damascus, who became St.
Paul (PL, 30–31; also Laborde 2017).
For the purposes of public life, Saul of Tarsus and St. Paul are the same
person, and it is important from a political point of view that people
be allowed to convert from one community to another without being
persecuted. Otherwise people are, to varying degrees, treated like slaves
who are, in efect, socially dead because they are not sources of claims.
By way of contrast, citizens who at any given time have a determinate
conception of the good are politically autonomous. They are free within
the limits of political justice to pursue any permissible conception of the
good. Each of these permissible conceptions will, presumably, require
primary goods that are the necessary conditions for pursuing higher-order
interests, whether in public or nonpublic life (PL, 32–33, 74, 76, 79).
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THE BATTLE OF APACHE CAÑON.
The history of the world has never exhibited more exalted devotion
to an idea, nor a more splendid patriotism than that of the people of
East Tennessee. We may almost challenge the records of religious
history to produce anything more like holy enthusiasm, than the lofty
inspiration which has characterized these people. In no country, and
among no class can be found more heroic persistence or unfaltering
adherence to principle than has exalted the patriotism of this region.
With many inhabitants of the eastern portion of the State, loyalty
and devotion to the Union became in truth a part of their religion.
The rebel leaders knew that they had very little sympathy in East
Tennessee, and took measures to crush out all Union sentiment with
the iron heel of military despotism. Any expression of sympathy with
the Union cause, any co-operation of its inhabitants with the
loyalists, either for their own protection or for the aid of the
Government, was punished as a crime. The presses of that part of the
State had all been silenced or converted to their own use by the
Secessionists, with one exception. The Knoxville Whig remained true
to the Union. Its vigorous defence of the Government, its exposures
and denunciations of the rebel leaders, its unsparing invective
against the rebellion, and its bold, defiant appeals to the people, rang
like a clarion through the hills and valleys of East Tennessee, and as
the echo gathered from thousands of loyal voices, it made itself heard
through all the valleys and mountain passes of that noble border
State.
The heroic editor of this paper was not to be silenced either in his
voice or his press without a vigorous struggle. The Rev. Wm. G.
Brownlow had learned how to denounce and how to endure, for that
is a lesson most Methodist clergymen are called upon to learn; and
being brave in deeds as well as words, he stood forth in defence of
the country he loved, when she greatly needed the power of his
eloquence and the strength of his arm. The popularity which this
man had won by his uprightness, his courage, and firm adherence to
the Constitution, gave his opinions a force that made him an object
of peculiar importance to the enemy—yet they hesitated to lay violent
hands upon a man whose words were more potent than their
bayonets.
He was frequently threatened by soldiers passing through
Knoxville from other States, yet none dared to execute their threats.
His family were inspired with the same lofty heroism, and on one
occasion when a company of rebels came to his house to haul down
the Stars and Stripes, which was kept floating over his domicil, one
of his daughters stepped out to meet them, and by her courage and
decision protected the flag.
The suppression of this undaunted advocate of the Union, and
faithful and fearless witness against secession, became an inevitable
necessity; and at last, in the hope that he would at least become
silent on political affairs, it was resolved to offer him the alternative
of the oath of allegiance or the cell of a prison. He chose the latter,
and in a valedictory to his readers, published October 26, which must
ever be memorable for its heroic defence of the Union, its bold
denunciation of the rebels and their course, he announced to his
readers the suspension of his paper. This remarkable address, which,
under the circumstances, rises to the sublime in its moral courage,
closed with these words:
“Exchanging, with proud satisfaction, the editorial chair and the sweet
endearments of home for a cell in the prison, or the lot of an exile, I have the honor
to be, &c.
William G. Brownlow.”
Mr. Brownlow was sent to prison, and for months occupied a room
with several other patriots who preferred imprisonment to denial of
the government they loved. Here he was in daily expectation of being
led forth to execution. Though suffering from ill-health he was no
way daunted by the dark fate that threatened him. Nor were these
anticipations groundless, for during his stay there, many a brave
man left that prison to meet a violent death, and he had no reason to
expect a happier destiny.
During the closing months of the summer and fall the hopes of the
people were excited by promises of aid from the government. Loud
and earnest appeals were made for help, and with the energy of
despair the people clung to their principles, through every species of
persecution, robbery, arson, and imprisonment. Hundreds were
hung or assassinated, and the records of Tennessee are among the
most heart-rending that this war for the Union will leave to posterity.
The position of the rebel armies in western Tennessee was at that
time very strong, but the importance of keeping their lines of
communication open with the Atlantic States was great, and
thoroughly understood by the loyalists. To cut these lines was to the
Federals a work of pressing necessity; and in view of the probable
redemption of East Tennessee, the loyalists organized, and on the
night of November 8 they destroyed several bridges, and broke the
lines. Two of these were on the Georgia State road, two on
Chickamanye Creek, Hamilton county, and one on the East
Tennessee and Georgia railroad, on Hiawassee river, Bradley county.
Besides these, two bridges on the East Tennessee and Georgia
railroad on Lick Creek, Green County, and another on Holstein river,
were also burned. The rebels were thrown into consternation by
these events, and their leaders took the most active measures to
arrest and punish the perpetrators. A correspondence between some
of the prominent men ensued, and a large portion of the letters was
discovered among other papers and effects captured after the battle
of Mill Spring, which took place on the 19th of January, 1862. This
correspondence, in which the names Colonel William B. Wood and
General F. K. Zollicoffer appear, prove that the majority of the people
were unalterably for the Union, and that they could only be
restrained by the most oppressive and cruel measures. Colonel Wood
wrote to J. P. Benjamin, the Secretary of War, asking what
disposition should be made of the bridge-burners, to which Mr.
Benjamin replied—“All such as can be identified as having been
engaged in bridge-burning are to be tried summarily by drumhead
court-martial, and if found guilty, executed on the spot by hanging. It
would be well to leave their bodies hanging in the vicinity of the
burnt bridges.”
The loyalists were encouraged in their cause by the devotion of
Hon. Andrew Johnson, U. S. Senator, and Hon. Horace Maynard, M.
C., for Tennessee, whose eloquent and powerful appeals, and
confident assurances of aid, cheered the hearts of the people.
Thousands of East Tennesseeans escaped by night, wandering
along unfrequented roads, until they reached Kentucky, where they
organized regiments, under the direction of the Federal
commanders. Their cherished desire was to return to their own State,
with a powerful army, and redeem their soil. The atrocity of the rebel
guerrillas drove them almost to a passion of revenge, and when
disappointed at the announcement that their time had not come, and
that they must await a more favorable condition of the army,
hundreds of them, when ordered to retreat from the border lines of
their State, strayed from the ranks, despairing and heart-sick, and
falling down by the way, wept bitterly. Several of them, exhausted by
hard labor and forced marches, never rose again, but were
afterwards found dead on the road to Mount Vernon.
On the 26th of November the house of a gentleman named Bell
was attacked by an armed party of the enemy and set on fire. The
inmates, a large family of nine persons, were consigned to the
flames. Two alone of the whole household escaped this horrible fate.
On the 29th a band of twenty-one Union prisoners at Nashville
were compelled to take the oath of allegiance, and enter a company
in the rebel army.
Leadbetter, the secession commander in East Tennessee, had his
headquarters at Greenville, and on the 30th of November issued a
proclamation promising protection and pardon to all who would lay
down their arms and submit to the Confederate government. From
this clemency he excepted bridge-burners and destroyers of railroad
tracks. He closed his proclamation with the assurance that “they will
be tried by drumhead court-martial, and be hung on the spot.” This
terrible order was put into execution a few days afterward. Jacob M.
Hemslier and Henry Fry, two Unionists, being tried and pronounced
guilty of these offences, were hung.
The days of hope for the Unionists were weary and prolonged, but
deliverance was drawing nigh. The loyal men of the western part of
the State organized to oppose the measures of the leaders, and early
in January a bold resistance was made in Carroll, Weakly, McNairy,
and other counties, against the conscription act. Rebel troops were
sent into these counties to compel submission, and enforce
obedience.
The defeat and death of Zollicoffer, the breaking up of his army,
and the destruction of his stronghold, at last gave a brilliant promise
to these persecuted people that their deliverance was drawing nigh.
This event, succeeded in a few weeks by the capture of Fort Henry,
Fort Donelson, the evacuation of Bowling Green and Columbus, and
the occupation of Nashville, filled every true heart with rejoicing, and
the good old flag once more swept its folds freely over the houses of
East Tennessee.
February 6, 1862.