Other Publication» of the COR N E LIO FABRO

Cornelio Fabro Cultural Project

Essential Thinker
I'hilosophcr of' l3ei ng and f<
) Freedom

Introduction to Cornelio Fabro

8): I:lvio C. Fontana
Acts of the Fabro Symposium
Cotnmernorating 20 Years Since Fabro's Death
Vol. I: Selected Articles on Metaphysics and Participation
Thc C:athnlic University of An>erica
IVtth Introd»ctton b)' John I. IVippel
April 1 — 2, 2016
Vol. 9: God: An Introduction to Problems in Theology
IVith Introduction h? hlichael J. I?odds

FC? KTH(:C?MI I» Cx.

Vol. 2: Selected Articles on S0ren Kierkcgaard

IVi th Introduction fry' Josh»a Fut nal

Vol. 3: Sclccted Articles on Atheism «nd Freedom

Vol. 19: Introduction to St. 'I'homas

F.dited by
Introduction to Seren Kierkcgaard
Nathaniel Dreyer
Cornelio Fabro CI,Iltwral Project

S TUDI A FA B R I A N A

Volume 1
 Contents

Preface
Contributors
Abbreviations xltt

Introduction to Cornclio Fabro

.'<)athani el Orever

Jounney through thc Destiny of Being

Gianlaca Ti ontbini
Edited by the Cornclio I-'abro Cultural Project
of' thc Institute of the Incarnate v<'ord
F ather Cornelio Fabro: Stigmatine -- Devotee of Ilis Founder 2 3
Joseph C, Henchey
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Printed in the t.:nited States ol'America Patricia Pintaclo
Fabro's Double Participation and
AcIuinas's Double Exemplarism

(rid.E(i<.)R.Y 'l'. 1)(DOLAN, PhD

I fr<' (;<itltttltr I nivetstty «fi l ut('pic<i
Ass<i<tat<' I>>'<f<s><)r
> of Pft t'f<t<t>phy

or students of Thomas Aquinas, Cornclio Fabr<) is v cll known t'or

his thorough examinations of Thomas's metaphysical doctrine of
participation. Less well known, however, is Fabro's occasional
reference to a doppia, or double, participation of thc creature in thc
divine: one for its essence, the other for its act of existing (e~se).' Looking
at such statements, Jan A. Acrtsen and Rudi tc Vcl<le have scen I abro
as affirming tv o lines of so-called "transccn<lcntal participation" and
consequently as affirming thc problematic view of a double creation for
a single creature. More recently, Jason A. Mitchell has del'ended I:abro
against the critiqucs of'these scholars, arguing that despite his language
Fabro in fact presents only a single line of such participation and hence
does not affirm a double creation.
In this paper, I w i l l e x a mine Fabro's references to ' d o u ble
participation" by looking at another related doubling explicitly affirmed
by Thomas Aquinas: double cxemplarism. l.rom his earliest writings,
Thomas drav s a distinction between two kinds ot divine exentplarism:
one of thc divine ideas and thc other of the divine nature. As I will shov,
despite affirming thi» double cxemplarism — or, morc precisely, because

5< e > 1!I, 31, 1 ' (>,2 >(X I'abru, I <»rr< p<>Z'<'>ir «' '<>><r)rr<>,2' ' cd.. Opere « >rnnlctc ! ');Set>n>:
kDI VI , 2nll>), 24H, 3 9, 43'), 4')(>, 5')1 — 595, (>41. 1>abc<> ala<> urea the tern> r>)<p<i'><when
at>' aint <> u: el<>ub'.c particinati<>n. Scc I'z>renp«Z.'<»er <»u «i>r<i, 379, 55', =))1

67
 Gregory T. Doolan
of the way he affirms it — Thomas presents only a single line of what
Fabro would term "transcendental participation." Moreover, like Mitchell,
I will argue that Fabro in fact follows Thomas on this point, a reading that
can be strengthened through a careful consideration of what Thomas's
doctrine of double exemplarism entails.
What follows, therefore, will be less an interpretation of Thomas in
light of Fabro than an interpretation of Fabro in light of Thomas, To this
end, my paper will have four parts: The first part will look at Fabro's
language of double participation to see how he applies it. The second
part will present Thomas's account of a twofold divine exemplarism,
along with both Fabro's reading of this account as well as the criticisms
of that reading raised by Aertsen and te Velde. The third part of my paper
will briefly consider the role of the divine ideas in Thomas's doctrine of
participation, in an effort to show how he adopts an account of double
exemplarism without affirming double participation, In light of the
foregoing, my paper will conclude in the fourth part with a consideration
of how Fabro, in turn, could be read as aflirming a single line of
transcendental participation despite his language of double participation.
1. FABRO S LANGUAGE OF DOUBLE PARTICIPATION
To begin to understand what Fabro means by "double participation,"
we must first situate this phrase in the context of other distinctly
Fabroistic terms: notably, "transcendental" vs. "predicamental partici-
pation" as well as his language of "diremption" and "derivation." With
the exception of that last term, none of this language is employed as such
in Thomas's writings on participation; nevertheless, Fabro's language
maps onto key notions in those writings. With that in mind, we should
briefly review the fundamental distinctions made by Thomas regarding
participation to see what Fabro intends by some of his distinctive
terminology.
The topic of participation is addressed in a number of places
throughout Thomas's writings, but his most detailed and systematic
consideration occurs in his Commentary on Boethius's De Itebdomadibsts
(1257 — 1259),' In chapter 2 of this commentary, Thomas explains that
a being (ens), or "that-which-is" (id quod est), is (exists) because it
participates in esse. And he explains that "'to participate' fparticipareJ
2 Dating of Thomas's texts followsJean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomus Aquinus,voL 1, Tbe
Perron und His Work,rev. ed., trans. Robert Royal (CUA Press, 2005).
Fabro 's Double Participation and Aquinas's Double Eresnplartsnt
is, as it were, 'to take a part' [partem capereJ." Going beyond this
etymological account, he explains that when something receives in a
particular way what belongs to another in a universal way, the former is
said toparticipate in what belongs to the latter.' Thomas then proceeds,
without providing any technical names, to present three different modes,
or kinds, of participation.
As regards the first mode, he simply provides two examples:man
participates inanimal, and Socrates in titan.' Although Thomas docs not
tell us as much, we can infer &om these examples that any species can
be said to participate in its genus and any individual in its species,
because neither participant has the intelligible content(ratio) of what it
participates, namely, the more universal notion, Thus, this first mode has
traditionally been interpreted by scholars as a logical, or conceptual,
participation rather than a real one.'
As regards the second mode of participation, Thomas again merely
provides examples: a subject participates in an accident, and matter
participates in form, Here, again, something receives in a particular way
what another has in a universal way since, as he explains, both substantial
and accidental forms are common according to their ratio but are
determined by their subject.' Unlike the first mode of participation,
however, this one is presented as an ontological, or real, one. In his
examples of both the subject and matter, Thomas presents a participant
that really participates in the form that it receives, resulting in a real
composition between the receiver and the received perfection.
Finally, as regards the third mode of participation, before giving an
example, Thomas provides us with an account this time: an effect is
said to participate in its cause, especially, he notes, when the effect is not
equal to the power of its cause. Thus, we are told, air participates in
the light of the sun since it does not receive that hght with the same
brightness as is in the sun.' As Thomas presents it, this mode of
s Expositie hbri Bostii De ebdomudsbsss,lectio 2 (Leon. 50,271:68 —
71): "Secundam dH'Ierenciam
ponit ibi: gssed est pursiipureetc. Que quidem diEerencia sumitur secundum rationcm
participationis, Est autem participare quasi p attern caperc. Et ideo quando aliquid
particulatiter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet universaliter, dicitur participare iiiud."
' Ibid. (Leon. 50.271:74-77).
' See NMP, 33-34, 143 — 148; Louis-Bertrand Geiger,Lu purtissputie» duns hs pbiksepbis de
S. Thomas d'Aqssin, 2~ ed. (Paris: I.ibrairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1953), 48-49; Rudi A.
te Velde, Pueisipudon aed Substuntiuh'tyin Thomas Aquinas(New York: E.J. Brill, 1995), 7&82;
John F. Wippel, Tbe hfesupbyss'sulThought ef Themes Aquinas(CUA Press, 2000), 96-97.
s &ctesino Ds ebdomudibus,lectio 2 (leon. 50271:77-80).
t Ibid. (Leon. 50.271:8&85).
Gregory T. Dooian
participation appears to entail three kinds of causality: the focus is on
efficient causality (the air being affected by the sun), but this mode also
entails both an intrinsic formal causality (light as presentin the air), as
well as an extrinsic exemplar causality (the light of the sun). Moreover,
if we consider Thomas's observation regarding the power of the cause,
the sort of efficient cause he seems to have in mind is what he elsewhere
terms an equivocal or analogical agent.' And, as with the second mode
of participation, this third mode is presented as ontological, or real.
Considering these three modes, Fabro identifies what he sees as two
fundamental kinds of participation, presented both here and throughout
Thomas's writings. One kind Fabro terms "predicamental participation"
and the other "transcendental participation." Predicamental participation,
he explains, entails individual participants all sharing the same univocal
formality that they have through their essential content. Although the
participants really exist in themselves, what they participate in does not;
rather, it exists only in the participants.' Furthermore, we are told, both
the participant and the participated belong to the realm of finite substance
outlined in Aristotle's Categories. It is for this reason that Fabro refers
to this sort of participation as predicamenta/. And he identifies it
with the first two modes outlined in Thomas's Commentary on the
De ifebdomadibus. to
In contrast to predicamental participation, what Fabro terms
"transcendental participation" does not involve participants sharing in
the same way in a formality; rather, they participate in a given perfection
according to a d eficiency
of likeness. Such a perfection, unlike those of
predicamental participation, really exists outside of the participant either
(1) as a property of a higher entity, or (2) in itself as a pure and subsistent
formality in its fuH possession — for example, in the way that beings
participate in esse. Since the participated perfections here are shared in
according to differing degrees, these perfections cannot be predicated
univocally of the participants; hence, this sort of participation entails
analogicity. Fabro regards transcendental participation as the strongest
meaning of "participation," and he connects it with Thomas's third
mode."
' See ST I, q. 13, a. 5, ad 1 (Leon. 4.147).
"' AMP, 305-307.
Ibid., 143 — 144. Moreover, Fabro explains that since predicamental participation is the
foundation of gencric and specific perfections, it concerns univocal formalities(Pariecspa~ne
e casssailta,650).
" NMP, 305 — 306.
70
Fafsro 's Doufsfe Partlet)sation and Aquinas 's Doufsfe Exentpfarfssn
Thus, Fabro considers a creature to be a being by participation in a
twofold manner: in one 'way, according to the predicamental order
inasmuch as it is a composite either of matter and form, or of substance
and accidents; in another way, inasmuch as the creature is a composite
of essence and esse." Although Fabro emphasizes the distinction between
these two sorts of participation, he is careful to note that Thomas
considers them to be in close relationship to one another." Still, regarding
this structure of participation, Fabro stresses the importance of the real
composition between essence and esse within a creature."
As for his language of "double participation," for the most part Fabro
employs it in the context of drawing this fundamental distinction between
the predicamental and the transcendental." But there are other note-
worthy instances when he employs this language to draw a distinction in
his treatment of transcendental participation alone. In these contexts,
Fabro seemingly presents two lines of transcendental participation: one
to account for the creature's essence, the other for its esse."
We might well ask, why does Fabro use this language of a twofold
participation in these contexts? As Thomas himself presents his third
mode of participation, there is no immediate indication that it admits of
a further division. The answer comes from what Thomas has to say
elsewhere regarding the sort ofsimilitude that participation in the divine
entails. These considerations are what Fabro has in mind when he speaks
of transcendental participation as twofold: namely, considerations of what
Thomas explicitly presents as a double divine exemplarism.
ta Corneho Fabro, "The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of
f Mekpphysr'cs 27, no. 3, A Commemorarive
Participation," trans. B. M. Bonansea, Reeietu ss
Issue: Thomas Aquinas 1224-1274 (March 1974): 48~81.
ts Ibid.; 47'1-472.
t4 As Fabro explains, "since the essence of a creature has also its own participated act of
being (adus essencfs),its actualization is not merely a relation of extrinsic dependence; rather,
it is based on the act of esse in which it participates and which it preserves within itself and
is the proper terminus of divine causality" (Ibid.: 481).
ts See Fabro, Parsecijsarvfsne e sasssafsfcf,592-593.
" See ibid., 595: "Secondo Ia doppia partecipazione trascendentale, e quanto all'essenza e
quanto all'esse, c'e anche un doppio momento dell'analogia; uno formale per imitazione della
forms divine, ed un altro reale per derivazione della causalita divina." Fabro cites as support
for this observation De per.,q. 7, a. 7, ad 2 and SCG I, ch. 31.
Gregory T. Doolan
2. AQUINAS'S DOUBLE EXEMPLARISM AND FABRO S READING OF IT
According to Thomas, the fundamental characteristic of an exemplar
is the characteristic of likeness, or similitude (similitudo). He tells us
that a likeness can exist in something in one of two ways: either as in
a principle, or as in something that shares a likeness to a principle.
The latter sort of likeness has the character (ratio) of an image. Only
the former likeness has the character of an exemplar. Hence, Thomas
commonly describes an exemplar as "that in the likeness of which
something is made."" He thus presents an exemplar as the measure of
its effect and, as such, its formal cause — albeit an extrinsic one whose
causality presupposes both eKcient and final causality." That all three
kinds of causality are entailed in exemplarism is clear from the case of
human artisanship: for example, the idea of a house in the mind of an
architect can actually exemplify a house only if the architect as agent is
motivated to execute his plan (his end) and in fact does so.
As for God's exemplar causality, Thomas consistently presents it
from the time of his earliest writings as twofold. Thus, we find him
explaining in 1n II Sententiarum, distinction 16 the following:
The likeness of a work can be said [to be] in the worker in two ways:
either [1] as that which he has in his own nature, as man generates
man, or [2] as that which he has in his own intellect, as a work of alt
proceeds from the artisan in likeness to his own art. In both ways
does a creature proceed from God in his likeness: [1'] according to
the first way because beings are from Being (ab ente sunt entia) and
living things from Life; [2'] according to the second way because
they proceed from ideal notions (ratiotu'bus iderdibus). Since,
'7 Sana' Tbomae deAquino Super libncmDe eaasir eseposisie, prop. 14, ed. H. D. Saffrey (Fribourg:
Socle' philosophique, 1954), p. 85, lines 1213: — ' *exemplar est id ad cuius similitudinem fit
aliud." Cf. De eer., q. 3, a. 1 (Leon.22.1.99 177 —
182);guedbbes V III, q. 1, a. 2 (Leon. 25.1.54:
42 —43); In /ibrum BeasiDianysii De diuinis nemini bus mpesisie, caput 5, lectio 3, no. 665, ed.
C. Pcra (I'min-Rome: Marietti, 1950), 249; ST I, q. 35, a. 1, ad 1 (Leon. 4.372). By contrast,
Thomas notes that an image is called such because it is produced in imitation of something
else, namely, in imitation of an exemplar. See SCG IV, ch. 49 (icon. 15.34:51 — 56); ST I,
q. 35, a. 1, ad 1 (Leon. 4.372); ST I, q. 93, a. 1 (Leon. 5.401). Regarding Thomas's treatment
of the different types of czemplarism, see Gregory 'I'. Doolan, rfqainas on sbe Divine ideasas
Po p l ar C~ases(CUA Press, 2008), 21 — 25.
re As Thomas explains, an effect need not imitate its exemplar in every respect; but this
much is always the case: "exempiata oportet conforman exemplari secundum rationem
Formac" (ST I, q. 18, a. 4, ad 2 [Leon. 4.230]). I'or a defense of exemplarism as a type of
formal causality for Thomas, see Doolan, Dieme Ideas, 33-41,
72
pabro s Double Participation and Aquinas s Double Exemplarisrn
therefore, every single thing attains a perfect imitation of that which
is in the divine intellect (for any kind of thing is of the sort he has
ordained it to be), then in this sense of "likeness" any creature what-
soever can be called the "image" of an idea existing in the divine
mind. For this reason Boethius says that the forms that are in matter
can be called "images" in that they have come from those forms that
are without matter."
With this distinction, we see Thomas present the divine nature as the
exemplar of transcendental and simple perfections in creatures; whereas
he presentsthedivine ideas asexemplars ofcreated essences.Fabro sees
this double exemplarism as two "moments" (conceptually speaking)
within the structure of participation, accounting for the formal derivations
of transcendental and predicamental perfections in finite beings. In
presenting these derivations, he is careful to explain how such a division
can occur both within and I'rom God without compromising the divine
simplicity. To do so, he adopts the Hegelian language of "diremption"
(shorn of certain Hegelian commitments)."
Thomas Aquinas,In II Seas., d. 16, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2 (Mandonnet, vol. 2, 400): "sirnilirudo
operis potest dici ad operantem dupliciten aut quantum ad id quod habet in natura sua, sicut
homo generat hominem; aut quantum ad id quod habet in intcllectu suo, sicut artificiatum
ab arti6ce in similitudinem artis suae procedit, Utroque modo procetgt creatura a Deo in
similitudinem cjus. Primo modo, quia ab ente sunt entia, et a vivo viventia. Secundo modo,
quia procedunt a rationibus idealibus. Cum ergo unaquaequc res pertingat ad perfectam
imitationem ejus quod est in intellectu divino, quia talis est qualem earn esse disposuit; ideo
quantum ad hunc modum similitudinis quaelibet creatura potest dici imago ideae in mentc
divina existentis; unde dicit Boetius. .. quod formac quae sunt in materia possunt dici
imagines, eo quod ab his formis vcnerunt quac sine materia aunt."
m lmr a consideration of Fabro's adoption of this Hegelian term "diremptjon"
(also
sometimes spelled "diremtion" ), see Jason A. Mitchell, Being and P~aseb n: Tbe IVlesbodand
Ssruesuref eMeAiphysieat ~ n c m ording so Contebe I'abro,
vol. 1 (Rome: Ateneo Ponti6cio
Relp'na Apostolorum, 2012), 191-197. Mitchell sums up Fabro's usage of this term as
follows: 'To conclude, the use of 'Oiremsian'by Fabro, when spealdng about Thotnistic
metaphysics, normany concerns some type of dialectic and refers to a process oF sublation
in the sense of a negation and consequent synthesis. Two key uses of the term emerge.
A 6rst use is in the explanation oF the derivation of creatures from God, where, according
to Fabro, there is a certain negation-conservation of esse. The creature is not esse, but rather
has esse or participates in esse... . A second key use of the term 'Diremsebnregards the
fimdamental and primary structure of the creature: its composition of esse-essenefa. In this
case,Diremse'enrefers to the distinction or dialectic ("negation-synthesis") of essence and esse
within ens. The creatm'e's essence, in this case and in Fabrian terms, is not esse, yet is a
'positive-negative' which limits arse(negating motnent), determining it to a speci6c mode or
degree (synthetic-conserving moment)" (196 — 197).
Gregory T. Doolan
As Fabro explains in his work Participation and Causality, the first
moment within the structure of participation is constituted by the
diremption, or division, of the divine essence in the formal order such
that it comprises the multiplicity of divine ideas that are the exemplars
of created things." Because of this diremption, every real created
formality is referred to its respective exemplar according to its mode of
being. This moment constitutes the derivation of the created essence.
The second moment, he explains, entails the derivation of all the
transcendental perfections that follow from the divine nature, which
embraces esse in all of its intensity.~ And this double exemplarism, Fabro
explains, is founded before all on that very act of intensive esse that is
the divine essence."
It is in Fabro's account of this twofold derivation that some scholars
see him as affirming a twofold creation to account for a single created
being. Complicating the matter is his explicit use of the very expression
"double creation" (double creation) in the French edition of Participation
and Causality." Leoking at this edition of the work, Jan A. Aertsen takes
issue — not simply with Fabro's language — but with this notion of a
double derivation: one of created essence, the other of created esse.
Aertsen points out that esse and form are presented by Thomas as
inseparable, with esse as consequent upon form. Thus, Aertsen explains,
God for Thomas "brings forth, through creation, thc thing together with
all its principles." This leads Acrtsen to ask, "How then can one still
speak of a 'double creation' (Fabro)!"zs
A similar concern is raised by Rudi te Velde. Also citing the French
edition of Participation and Causality, he notes Fabro's position that
essence must have in God its own derivation (derivation propre), distinct
n Fabro Parteccpagione e cansahth259
n Ibid., 505 —
507.
~ Ibid., 259 —
260. In his later I 974 articIe, "Intensive Hermeneutics," Fabro sums up the
relation between these two modes of divine exetnplarism within the structure of Thomas's
doctrine of participation: "To the extent that participation allows one to conceive the created
universe in the complexity of its natures as a reflection of divine ideas or exemplary, one
may speak of participation by similitude (per similitnch'nem)in the transcendental order
according to a relation of dependence of the ftnite on the In6nite" (476).
~ As will be discussed shortly, Fabro's use of the expression "double creation" appears only
in, the French version of this work. See C. Fabro,Purticspation et cuasalite scion S. Tbosnas d'Again
(Louvain: publications universintires, 1961), 468. For a companson of relevant passage in
the French and Italian editions of this work, see n28 below.
" Jan A. Aertscn, A~re encl Creature,trans. Herbert Donald Morton (New York: L'.J. Brill,
I 988), 334.
Fubro 's Double Participation and Aquinas s Double Exentplanssn
from that of esse. It is for this reason, we are told, that Fabro adopts the
language of a "double creation." In te Vclde's estimation, the result
is "a fatal separation between the categorical causality of form and
the transcendental causality with respect to being as such." Thus, hc
concludes, Fabro "ultimately leaves the unity of God's act of creation
unexplained.'~'
More recently, Jason A, Mitchell has responded to both Aertsen
and te Velde, drawing attention to the fact that the French edition of
Participation and Causality on which they rely was updated by Fabro in
his Italian version, which he describes as his "definitive redaction.""
In this edition, Fabro abandons his earlier language of "double
creation," replacing it with the phrase "double participation.'"' Mitchell
acknowledges, however, that Fabro still employs the phrase "distinct
creation"when discussing the derivations of created essence and esse."
Procecihng beyond this terminological consideration, Mitchell addresses
what Fabro is in fact referring to with this language. According to his
reading (with which I am sympathetic), Fabro's terminology is really
intended to convey a notion expressed by the term "concreation," a term
Thomas himself employs when discussing God's simultaneous produc-
tion of co-principles in composite substances."
~ Te Veld e, Pa ticipution unct gubstantiuli@ 222.
n Fabro, Purteciparsone e cuusah'tu,9; Mitchell, Being unct Particspution,vol. 2, 488-489. The
volume Partinpatiem encl Cansuhtyresulted from Fabro's 1954 "Chaire Cardinal Mercier"
lecnues on "Participation and Causality according to St. Thomas Aquinas" given at the
University of Louvain. Although both the French and Itahan editions were licensed for their
6rst publication in the same year (1 960), Fabro's Italian translation came after his writing
and redaction of the French; moreover, the Italian edition contains a number of addiinons
to the French edition text along with some rearrangements of portions oi' that earlier
version. These changes are nicely cataloged by Mitchell, Being encl Pusn'cipation,vol. 2,
438 —
440.
~ The corresponding texn ate as follows (iuthcs in original; bold font added for emphasis):
"Ilessecommunecomme actus essench,participe par les btres individuels, cst te9u dans I'essence
et par consequent multiplie. C' est dire que ce qui est I'esse per essentiumen Dieu, acte pur et
totalitc de la perfection, s'epanche dans la creature par une double creation: de I'essence
et de i *arse" (Fabro,Purtictpution etcansah'te, 468). "L'essecommscne,come ucisccessench'partecipato
nei singoli esistenti, e ricevuto neil'essenza e cosi moltiplicato: vale a dire, cio ch'e 1'esse per
essentiumin Dio, Atto puro e totalita di perfezione, si dirime neiia creatura in una dupilce
partecipazione, dell'essenza e deil'esse"(Fabro,Purteccparsone e cunsalitu,379).
n CE Fabro, Purtictpation et cansah'ei, 468, and Pastecspaqione e cuusuhta,379.
~ Mitchell, Being unct Purticspation,vol. 2, 488 —89. 4 See ST I, q. 7, a. 2, ad 3 (Leon. 4.74);
ST I, q. 45, a 4, co. (Leon. 4.468).
Gregory T. Doolan
Whether or not Aertsen or te Velde were aware that Fabro had
abandoned his earlier language of "double creation," this much is
clear: te Velde, at least, is no more comfortable with the language
of "double participation." In his estimation, the upshot is the same:
"A double participation makes an empty metaphor of the concept of
participation.'"' And so, te Velde concludes that: "There is no place for a
double participation in Aquinas."' Whether or not Fabro truly espouses
a doctrine of double participation, this much we must grant with te Velde:
Thomas himself never speaks in these terms.
As we have seen,however, Thomas does speak of a twofold divine
exemplarism. Nevertheless, here again, te Velde is dismissive — this
time not of Fabro, but of Thomas's own words. Granting the explicit
distinction Thomas makes between the two modes of exemplarism,
te Velde nevertheless insists that the distinction does not have for him
what te Velde terms a "principal character." As evidence, he cites the
fact that Thomas often mentions the two modes together, implying
(presumably) that they arc in fact one and the same." In contrast to
te Velde„ I would contend that we should simply give a face value reading
of these texts: namely, that when Thomas presents the two modes of
divine exemplarism together, he wishes to highlight the distinction
between them. Moreover, I would contend that in such texts, Thomas's
concern is also to indicate (however briefly) the manner in which
these modes of exemplarism are interrelated. A careful consideration
of these texts reveals — not only that he embraces a doctrine of double
exemplarism b u t also that Thomas does so in such a way that afIirms
neither double creation nor double participation. To see how the two
modes of divine exemplarism are interrelated, it will help to begin with
a brief summary of his doctrine of divine ideas.
3. AQUINAS ON PARTICIPATION AND THE DIVINE IDEAS
Considering the ratio of an idea in general, Thomas tells us that it is
"a form that something imitates because of the intention of an agent who
predetermines the end for hi mself."~ In light of this definition, Thomas
n Te Velde, partierpados and Snbstantiabty, 282.
~ Ibid., 114n46.
" Ibid., 111.
~ De ver., q. 3, a. 1, co. (Leon. 22.1.100:209 —23
2 ): "Haec ergo vidctur cssc ratio idcae, quod
idea sit forms quam aliquid iimitatur cx intentionc agentis qui praedeterminat sibi fmem."
Fabro 's Double Participation and Aquinas s Double Exemplarism
maintains that there must be, within the mind of God, a multiplicity of
divine ideas, yet in such a way that does not compromise the divine
simplicity." It is not a real multiplicity, but a conceptual one consisting
of multiple understood intentions. Thomas resolves the tension between
this multiplicity and the divine simphcity by situating the divine ideas
within the proper context of his theory of participation.
In the Prima Pars of the Summarheologiae, among other places, he
explains that the condition for the possibility of a multiplicity of divine
ideas is grounded in the imitability of the divine essence, We are told
in question 15, article 2 that every single creature has a proper form
(species) because it participates in some way in a likeness (similirudo)
of the divine essence. Since God.knows his essence perfectly, he knows
it not only as it is in itself, but also as it can be participated by creatures
according to any manner of likeness. In this way, God knows his essence
as the proper ratio, or idea, of any and all creatures.~
Thomas makes clear in his replies to the objections from this article
that this multiplicity of ideas does not compromise the divine simplicity,
precisely because the multiplicity is according to the order of God *s
understanding rather than the order of reality." The divine ideas are
indeed distinct from each other and from God, but only conceptually
distinct. To say this, however, is not to dismiss these distinctions. Thomas
is careful to make clear time and again that the conceptual multiplicity
of divine ideas is not only according to our understanding a s though it
were a mere helpful model — but it is according to God's understanding
as well."
Regarding these divine ideas, Thomas draws a distinction from the
time of his relatively early De verirare (1256-1259), namely, between a
strict and a broad sense of "idea." Given his definition noted earlier,
Thomas holds that ideas strictly speaking belong to practical knowledge
since they are the forms of things that can be made. Since universals such
as genera and species cannot have extramental existence as universals,
they are thus not producible and do not have ideas in the mind of God
according to this strict sense. Only individuals such as Socrates can be
" ST I, q. 15, a. 2, co. (Leon. 4.201 202).
—
~ Ibid.
" Ibid., ad 1-4 (Leon. 4.202).
~ See In I Sent., d. 36, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2 (Mandonnet, vol. 1, 842); De pet.,q. 3, a 16, ad 14
(1949), 90; De ter., q. 3, a. 2, ad 8 (Leon. 22.L107:5~) . O n t he conceptual distinction
between the divine ideas, see Doolan, Divine Ideas,115 ff.
Gregory T, Doola»
made; thus, strictly speaking, Thomas concludes, there are divine ideas
only of individuals." With that said, he acknowledges that according to
a broad sense of the term, an idea can be taken as simply the intelligible
notion (ratio) or likeness (sinulitudo) of a thing. In this way, they can also
belong to speculative knowledge. And, Thomas concludes, according to
this broader sense of the term there are divine ideas of genera and species
as well."'
The implications of the foregoing distinctions for the doctrine of
divine exernplarism are brought out mcely in Thomas's reply to one
objector's concerns. If there are divine ideas for individual things, the
objection goes, there would be many ideas corresponding to one thing,
which seems problematic, Thomas replies by acknowledging that if
we take the term "idea" according to the broad sense as a like-
ness (similitudo) or notion (ratio) that belongs to God's speculative
knowledge, then there are indeed different ideas that corrcspond to
Socrates as Socrates, as man, and as animal, since he differs in these
various respects according to the order of understanding. But, Thomas
next explains, if we take the term "idea" according to its proper, or strict,
sense as an exemplar belonging to God's practical knowledge, "one idea
corresponds to the individual, the species, the genus, and what is
individuated in the individual itself, because Socrates, man, and animal
are not distinguished according to [the order of] being (esse)."' In short,
divine ideas of genera and species do not tunction as exemplar causes,
but only ideas of singulars do, such as God's idea of Socrates.
Thomas's insistence that a divine idea, properly speaking, pertains
to an individual is reflected in his very use of the term "exemplar." Over
the course of his career, he comes to restrict the meaning of this term
when speaking of the divine ideas. By the time he writes the Prima Pars
~ Namely, individual substances as well as individual accidents, See De ter., q. 3, a. 7 — 8
(Leon. 22.1.113 —
116); ST I, q. 15, a. 3 (Leon. 4.204). See Doolan, Di»i»e Ideas,esp. 143-147.
+' Regarding the divine ideas of genera and species, seeDe eer., q, 3, a 3 (Leon. 22.1.106-
109);De ver.,q. 3, a. 8 (Leon. 22.1.1'15 —116); guedhbeeVIII, q. 1, a. 2 (Leon. 25.1.53-55);
ST I, q. 15, a. 3 (Icon. 4.204). See Doolan,Diei»e Ideas,123-155.
4' Dr ver,,q. 3, a. 8, ad 2 (Leon. 22.1.116:74-44): "si loquamur de idea proprie secundum
quod est rei co modo quo cst in esse productibilis, sic una idea respondct singulan, speciei
et generi, individuatis in ipso singulati, eo quod Socrates, homo et animal non distinguuntur
secundum esse; si autetn accipiamus ideam communiter pro similitudine vei ratione, sic curn
diversa sit consideratio Socratis ut Socrates est et ut homo est et ut est animal, rcspondebunt
ei secundum hoc plures ideae vd similitudines."
Fabro 8 Double Parricipano» a»d Aquinas s Double Ere»tplaris»t
(1266 —1268), he comes to reserve the word "exemplar" for those divine
ideas of individual things that God makesat some point in time, since
only such ideas in fact exemplify anything. All other divine ideas
(namely, speculative ones) he instead terms "notions" (rationes)."
With the foregoing in mind, if we return to the text quoted earlier
Irom In II S ententiarum and to consider Thomas's treatment of the
exemplarism of the divine ideas there, we find a s~ g o bservation. As
regards the likeness a created being such as Socrates has to its exemplar
idea, Thomas tells us there that "every single thing attains aperfect
imitation of that which is in the divine intellect.'"' This is a striking claim.
Within the Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition, the ideated always falls
short of the Idea, the exemplified of thc exemplar. Why — how — can
Thomas claim that the creature's imitation of its divine idea isperfect7
An explanation follows immediately in the next line: "for any such
thing," he explains, "is as he [God] has ordained it to be."~ In other
words, the creature is precisely as God has intended. It is precisely the
intentional character of the divine ideas that allows for the perfect
assimilation, here, between exemplified and exemplar: between Socrates
and God's idea of him.
Considering again the twofold divine exemplarism in his later
De potentia (1265 — 1266), Thomas explains the basis of this perfect
assimilation in terms of the similitude that intellectual exemplarism
entails:
There is a twofold likeness between a creature and God. One likeness
is of the creature to the divine intellect, and in this way the form
that is understood by God is of one and the same formality (unius
rationis) as the thing that is understood — although it does not have
es ST I, q. 15, a. 3 (Leon. 4.204). In the eadier Dereeiease(1256 —1257), Thomas hdd that
something can be called an exemplar simply from the fact that another thing ea» be made in
imitation of it even though that other thing is never made (De ver,, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3;
Leon. 22,1.108:185 — 194). Regarding the development of Thomas's thought on this
matter, see Doolan, Diui»e Ideas,143 — 147; Lawrence Dewan, "St. Thomas, James Ross,
and Exemplarism: A Reply," America»CaehehePhilasopi»eatg» artery 65, no. 2 (Spring 1991):
233-234.
's I» li Snit., d. 16, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2 (Mandonnet, vol. 2, 400): "Cum ergo unaquaeque res
pertingat ad perfectam imitationem ejus quod est in intellectu divino, quis talis est qualem
earn esse disposuit." Emphasis added in translation. For the complete Latin text of this
response, see n19 above.
~ See n43 above for Latin.
Gregory T. Doolan
the same mode of existing (modusessendi) because the understood
form exists only in the intellect, whereas the form of the creature
exists also in reality.4'
In this text Thomas is indicating to us that the similitude of an effect
to its intellectual exemplar — even to an idea in the mind of God — is of
the same formality as its exemplar precisely because the idea is an
intentional similitude. As he makes clear, the relevant point of focus here
concerns the formality (ratio) of the exemplar, not its modus essendi. By
contrast, the second sort of likeness — concerning the exemplarism of
the divine nature — necessarily takes into account the modus essettdi
of the exemplar because that exemplar is nothing less than subsisting
esse. Thomas addresses this mode of divine exemplarism in the same
text when he continues by noting:
The other way in which there is a likeness between a creature and
God is insofar as the divine essence itself is the super-excelling
likeness of all things and is not of the same formality. From this
manner of likeness, and not the first, it occurs that good and other
such I attributes] are predicated commonly of God and of creatures.
For we do not say "God is good" because he understands the
goodness of a creature.~
Thus, Thomas presents a double divine excmplarism: onc mode that
entails a perfect simihtude of the exemplified to the cxcmplar (creature
to divine idea); the other that entails an imperfect similitude (creature to
divine nature). But, does that mean that Thomas is thcrcfore presenting
a corresponding double participation'/ To begin to answer this question,
let us return to his treatment of the divine ideas in the Prima Pars of thc
Summa theolagiae and read the text closely in light of our own question.
In the course of answering the question of whether there are many divine
ideas (q. 15, a. 2), Thomas explains how the ideas are "constituted" in
the mindof God:
" Dt pot., q. 7, a. 7, ad 6 (1949), 204 — 205: "inter crcatutam et Deum est duplex similitudo.
Una creanuae ad intellectum divinum: et sic forma intellects per Deum est unius rationis
curn te intellects, licet noa habeat eumdem modum essendi; quia forms intellects est tantum
in intcllecnt, forma autem crcaturae est etiam in re."
4s Ibid.: "Alia modo secundum quod ipsa divina essentia est omnium rerum similitudo
superexceliens, et non unius ratioais. Et ex hoc modo simiTitudinis contingit quod bonum
ct huiusmodi praedicantur communiter de Deo et creaturis, aon autcm cx primo. Noa cairn
haec est ratio Dei curn dicitur, Deus est bonus, quia bonitatem cteatutae intelligit."
80
Fobro k Double Participation and Aquinas s Double Exemplansm
God perfectly knows his own essence; hence he knows it according
to every way by which it is knowable. But it can be known not only
as it is in itself, but also as it is "participable" by creatures according
to any manner of likeness. Now, each and every creature has its
proper form (species) insofar as it participates a likeness of the divine
essence. Thus, inasmuch as God knows his essence as imitable in
such a way by such a creature, he knows it as the proper notion and
idea of that creature. And similarly regarding other creatures."
Notice that in employing the language of participation here, Thomas
does not speak of the divine ideas as participated; rather, what he
describes as participated is the likeness of the divine nature. The divine
ideas, instead, are presented as God's knowledge of the various ways in
which his likeness canbe participated. As Thomas explains elsewhere,
it is in God's knowing thcsc "participabilities" of his likeness, that
he has, as it w erc, "thought out" the divine ideas: rationes quasi
excogitatav." Indeed, this is the way Thomas consistently presents the
ST I, q. 15, a 2, co. (Leon, 4,202)..
Noa est autem comra simplicitatcm divini inteliectus, quod multa intelligan sed contra
simplicitatem eius esset, si per plures species eius intellectus formaretur. Unde pluses
ideae aunt ia mente divina ut intellectae ab ipso.
Quod hoc modo potest videri. Ipse enim essentiam suam pcrfecte cognoscit: unde
cognoscit earn sccundum omnem modum qua cognoscibilis est. Potest autem cognosci
aon solum secuadum quod in se est, sed secundum quod est participabilis secundum
aliquem modum simiTitudinis a creaturis. Unaquaequc autcm creatura habet propriam
specietn, sccundum quod aliquo modo participat divinae esseatiae similitudinem. Sic
igitur inquantum Deus cognoscit suam essentiam ut sic imitabilem a tali creatura,
cognoscit earn ut propriam taaonem et ideam huius creaturae. Et similiter de aliis. Et
sic patet quod Deus intelliyt plates rationes ptoprias plurium rerum; quae suat plures
ideae.
's Depot.,q.1, a 5, ad 11 (1949), 20. For another use of ttttagitertin speaking of the divine
ideas, see ST I, q. 44, a. 3 in n49 below. 'I'homas's reference to "excogitation" in these
coatexn; should aot be taken to suggest that he thinks God somehow "comes up +4th" new
ideas in the process of thinking. On this point I foHow Wippel, who differs with Norris
Clarke. Clarke contends that God "does not 6nd them [the divine ideas] somehow ready-
made in His essence(what could that possibly mean ontologically?) but literally *invents,'
'excogitates' th em" (W. Norris Clarke, 'What is Really ReaL>," in
Pngretti » Philos'@;ed.J.A.
McWiliiams [Milwaukee: Bruce, 1955], 85n45). Wippel responds that "I prefer to stress the
fact that God, in knowing his own essence, also knows (or 'discovers') the many ways in
which it is imitable and, therefore, the divine ideas and the possibles" (]ohn E Wippel, '"I'he
Reality of Nonexisting Possibles According to Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and
Godfrey of Fontaiaes," Revietr foAfttuphyst?s34, no. 4 I]une 1981]: 738a19). Still, Wippel
observes that his difference with Clarke seems to be "mainly a matter of emphasis" (739a19).
Gregory T. Doolan
role of participation wheil discussing divine exemplarism." Well aware
of the Platonic language of participation in ideas, Thomas however never
makes that language his own.
If we consider again his definition of participation offered in his
Comm entary o n the De hebdomadibus as well as the three modes of
participation he identifies there, it becomes clear why Thomas does not
treat the divine ideas as participated. Recall that his first mode of partici-
pation consists of a conceptual relation of participant to participated; by
contrast, we find that the relation of similitude of a creature to its
exemplar idea is a real one: Socrates is really like the divine idea of
Socrates." Thomas's second mode of participation entails an inner
composition of participant and received perfection; by contrast, he is
clear that created beings do not c a nnot — enter into composition with
their divine ideas. Recall that Thomas presents the divine ideas as only
conceptually distinct I'rom God and hence ontologically identical with
the divine essence. Werc created beings to participate in them according
to Thomas's second mode, they would enter into composition with
God — a position he decidedly rejects.»
What, then, of Thomas's third mode of participation: that of an eQect
in its cause? As I noted earlier, the sort of cause he has in mind here seems
to be what he terms elsewhere an equivocal or analogical cause. It
is for this reason that Fabro terms this third mode "transcendental
participation," and others term it participation "by similitude" or "by
formal hierarchy," because it entails the participants sharing in various
degrees a limited similitude of what belongs to their cause in an
ss Cf, ST I, q. 44, a. 3,co. (Leon. 4.460):
Deus est prima causa exemplaris omnium rerum. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum
est quod ad productionem alicuius rei ideo necessarium cst exemplar, ut effectus
determinatam forrnam consequatur: artifex enim producit determinatam formam in
materia, propter exemplar ad quod inspicit, sive iliud sit exemplar ad quod extra
intuetur, sive sit exemplar intcrius mente conceptum. ~ cst u m est autern quod ea
quae naturalitcr Gunt, determinatas Eormas consequuntur. Haec autem formarum
determinatio oportet quod reducatur, sicut in primum principium, in divinam sapientiam,
quae ordinem universi excogitavit, qui in rerum distinctione consistit. Et ideo oportet
dicere quod in divina sapientia aunt rationes omnium renun: quas supra diximus nisus,
id est Eormas exemplares in mente divina existentes.Quae quidem licet multiplicentur
secundum respectum ad res, tamen non aunt realiter aliud a divina essentia, prout eius
similitudo a diversis participari potest diversimode. Sic igitur ipse Deus est primum
exemplar omnium.
~ Moreover, Thomas is dear that Socrates is Socrates, a man and ananimal psr esssnruuu and
not by participation.
" See ST I q. 3, a. 8 g~on. 4.47-48).
Fabro 's Double ParnciPauon and Aquinas's Double Fsernpfarisjn
unlimited, or absolute, way." Could the divine ideas be participated in
this manner? Here again, the answer for Thomas is "no."
To see why, let us consider again the texts on double exemplarism
cited earlier. Recall that Thomas presents the divine nature inDe potenria
as the "super-excelling" likeness of creatures which, as such, is not of
the same formality as its exemphfied effects; thus, although Socrates as
a being does indeed share a likeness to God, he does so in a deficient
way. It is this sort of divine exemplarism, then, that indeed entails the
third mode of participation. By contrast, in the same text, Thomas
presents a divine idea as of the same formality as its exemplified e6ect
Hence, as we have seen in the text &om In II Senrentiarum, God's effect
can, and does, perfectly imitate its exemplar idea. Socrates is exactly as
God intends him to be in linc with the divine idea of Socrates. This sort
of similitude doesnot admit of the degrees of perfection entailed in the
third mode of participation. Simply put, to be Socrates does not admit of
degrees: he either is Socrates, or he is not, So too, with Socrates's likeness
to his divine idea. The imitation here is either perfect, or there is no
imitation at all.
Thus, we find that for Thomas the exemplarism of the divine ideas
is accounted for neither by his de6nition of participation nor by any of
the modes of participation that he identi6es. Moreover, as I have noted,
he never employs the language of participation when speaking of the
relation of created beings to their exemplar ideas. Thus, we can con-
clude that Thomas's twofold divine exemplarism does nor entail a
corresponding double participation in the divine, despite tc Velde's
concern. What I believe te Velde misses in his critique of double
exemplarism is the status of the divine ideas, for Thomas, as intentional
similitudes within the mind of God." Whereas God's nature as a
subsistent exemplar has essereale and its likeness can be participated,
a divine idea taken as an idea has only esseinlelligibile and so it cannot
be participated.~
Regarding participation by similitude, or formal hierarchy, Geiger notes"LaparrurP alion
suPrune l'lras Aiminue, parruularsss,er,e» I sem, par6rspi rgune essenre,chequefois qu'slk n'sss
par
dahss'e rknsiapienduck absohredeson cenrsnuferjnsP (Laparruiparien, 28-29).Emphasis in o~
" Norris Clarke, in highlighting Thomas's clear break E'rom the Platonic presentation o E the
Ideas as real, subsistent entities, sums up the situation nicdy by noting that "l'he die is cast.
The divine ideas are no longer the very forms, the true being, of creatures, buttheirinrsnrional
rim'&@des,whose only being is that of the one divine act of knowing" ~%'. Norris Ciarlse,
"The Problem of the Reality and Multiplicity of Divine Ideas in Christian Neoplatonism,"
in ¹e plurenisnsand Christen Thought, ed. Dominic J. O'Meara [Albany: State llniversity of
New York Press, 1982], 1221. Emphasis added.
~ Regarding the ssssintelligibile of divine ideas, see ST l, q. 15, a. 1, co. (Leon. 4.1991.
83
Gregory T. Doolan
Granted these distinctions, one might well ask at this point how,
then, can the divine ideas exercise real exemplar causality given their
intenfional status? If their reality is ontologically reduced to that of the
divine nature, would not their causality also be so reduced, as te Velde
suggests? The answer to these questions will provide us with the occasion
to return to a consideration of Fabro to discern whether in fact he affirms
a doctrine of double participation that falls prey to the critiques of both
Aertsen and te Velde.
4. FABRo s DQUBLE PARTIcIFATIGN READ IN LIGHT oF AQUINAs
I will begin to answer these questions regarding thc causality of the
divine ideas with my own reading of Thomas before turning to Fabro.
When we consider the role of double excmplarisrn in Thomas's account
of creation, I would argue that we find him presenting (at least implicitly)
the following logical "moments": in the first moment, there is the divine
essence, or nature, which is imitable in itself — the pure, infinite esse
that is Esse Subsistens; in the next moment, God knows himself; and
consequently, in the third moment he knows his nature as imitable
and participable — in this way "thinking out" or "dicerning" (excogitare)
the divine ideas;s' finally, in the fourth moment, he looks to some of these
ideas and, by an act of his will, creates finite beings whose essences are
perfectly like their exemplar ideas but simultaneously fall short of
a perfect likeness of the divine nature — which is to say that they
participate in the likeness of God.
Te Vclde has termed such a reading of Thomas whereby a created
being's essence is determined by its exemplar idea and its actual
existence by the divine wil l a s t h e "traditional . . . m e t aphysics of
creation." And i t i s j u s t such an i nterpretation that, he contends,
"breaks thc unity of the act of creation" leading to an unacceptable
double participation.~ As I have argued, however, the reason such
a double participation docs not in fact result from this reading is duc
to the fact that, for Thomas, a created being does not participate in its
divine idea since that exemplar is an intentional similitude and not a
subsistent entity.
And yet, despite what he identifies as the intentional status of a divine
idea, Thomas clearly presents its exemp/arism (exemplar causality) as
real. How? Because the created being that is made in its likeness is
ta See n48 above regarding Thomas's language of ssssgtlarsin discussing the divine ideas.
Tc Velde,P
artletjtation andSnbstantiahty,282.
Fabro s Double Participation and Aquinas 's Double Exemptaristn
really as God has ordained it to be: like his essence inthat respect, as
God really intended. Thus, whereas there is a deficiency on the side of
the creature in its likeness to the divine nature taken simp/ici ter, there is
no deficiency on the side of God's intention to make the creature really
like himself in this limited way — for example,as Socrates, Moreover, it
should be noted that this intentionality is both an intellectual and
volifional intentionality: the exemplarism of the divine ideas entails a
real formal causality, but it is a formal causality that must be "realized"
in the order of efficient causality. For a divine idea to be the formal
likeness of a created being such as Socrates, God must will to make such
a being.
So much for my ow n r eading of T h omas's doctrine of d i v i ne
exemplarism. What of Fabro's? Does it allow for a double creation? For
the moment, let us leave aside his language of double participation.
Like Thomas, Fabro acknowledges a participation in the likeness of the
divine nature; and, like Thomas, nowhere does he explicitly say (to my
knowledge) that the divine ideas are participated. With that said, I must
also grant that nowhere (again, to my knowledge) does Fabro explicitly
say that the divine ideas are unparti cipated. Nevertheless, I read this view
as implicit in his treatment of Thomas's double exemplarism. Consider
the following from Participation and Causality:
Thomism does not seem to admit of doubts regarding this order:
c reated essences are derived from th e d i v ine essence by t h e
intermediary of the divine Ideas, and this derivation formally follows
the relationship of exemplarity. Next, every cssencc, although it is
act in the formal order, is created as potency that becomes actualized
by the participated esse that it receives: its actuality is thus given by
the "mediation" of esse."
st Here I atn translating the French edition since this is the text upon which both Aertsen
and te Vdde rely: "IA: thomisme ne semble pas admettre dc doutes quant b cet ordre: les
essences crhhes dhrivent de l'essence divine par l'mtertnediaire des Idhes divines, et cette
dhrivation suit sinai formellement le rapport d'exemplarith. Ensuite, toute essence, bien
qu'elle snit acte tlans I'ordre formel, est crhee comme puissance qui devient actualiseepar
1'ssssparticiph qu'elle reqoin son actualith cst ainsi donnee par la «mediation» de I'ssss"
(Fabro,
Partitijtatt'on et rausalid, 630).
The Italian edition admits of n o substantive variation: ' *Nel tomismo la situaaione
non sembra ammetta contestaxionh le esscnac create sono derivate dali'essenaa divina,
coll'intermediario dclle Idee divine, e quindi formalmente la derimaione h secondo il
tapporto di esemplarits. Agni essenza poi, benche sia atto nell'ordine formale,i: crests come
potenaa che va attuata dali'esse par tecipato che in se riccve: la sua attualita e «mediata» quindi
dali'esse" (Fabro, Parteap~ions e causah'ta,643).
Gregory T. Doolun
From the perspective of Aertsen and te Velde, this text at Grst appears
to advocate the sort of double creation that they accuse Fabro of
affirming. If, however, we view his temporal language as referring to
logical rather than chronological moments (the charitable reading), and
if we also consider that he presents the derivation of essences as prior in
what he terms the "formal order," Fabro can be read as indicating the
inef
ficacyof the divine ideas as creative principles taken in themselves.
Thus, we see his reference to them as intermediaries rather than as direct
causal principles. In short, I take Fabro to be indicating that the divine
ideas are not that which is participated, but that through which or
by which a created being participates in the more foundational exemplary
likeness that is the divine nature.
In support of this reading, let us next consider Fabro's interpretation
of the same text on double exemplarism that I presented earlier from
De potentia. Fabro explains, again in Participation and Causali ot (both
the French and Italian editions), that as regards the exemplarism of the
divine ideas, the resemblance of a created being to its divine idea is of a
formal nature that, in his words, "leaves intact the divine isolation.'""
Here, again, I take him to be highlighting the status of the divine ideas
as intentional similitudes, whose causality as exemplars depends upon
the efficient causal act of the divine will. By contrast, Fabro observes,
with the exemplarism of the divine nature the relationship becomes "real
and fundamental." An d h e a dds parenthetically fo r c l a rification:
"(causality)."" Hcic, I take liinl to bc icfcrring to tlic sort of cfficiciit
causality entailed in Thomas's third mode of participation, whereby the
creature is made like God because he has willed it into existence as a
being with actual existence. Read in this way, Fabro's account of
Thomas's double exemplarisrn presents a single line of transcendental
participation, namely, a line that entails a participation in the likeness of
thc divine essence and not in the divine ideas.
" Fabro, Purtiripusr
b n et suusulit, 5i9: "Dans lc premier cas cn effct ia rcsscmhiancc cst de
nature formelle et laisse intact I'isolemeni rhvin, tanrlis balue dans le second cas le rapport
devient (dans la creature) riel et fondamental (causalitb) et de la nait la possibilitb de
1'analogie." As before, the Italian edition has no substantive variation from the French:
"Si tratta che nel primo casr> la somiglianaa b di natura formaie e lascia inratto il divino
isolamento, mentre nel secondo caso il rapporto diventa (nella creatura) reale e fondante
(causalita) e sorgc percio la possibilita dell'analogia" (Fabro, Purtsapugions c cuttsutitu,506).
s9 See n58 above.
86
Fubro 's Double Participation und A rtrrinus s Double Exempturism
What then of Fabro's explicit language of "double participation,"
which seems to affirm a twofold transcendental participation' In light
of Fabro's presentation of double exemplarism, I would agree with
Mitchell's response to Aertsen and te Velde. As he puts it, an "attentive
reading" shows that Fabro is not in fact affirming two lines of tran-
scendental participation, but rather two "moments" within its structure:
one moment entails what Mitchell terms a "direct" line of transcendental,
or causal, participation in esse(exemplarism of the divine nature); the
other what Mitchell identiIies as a "mediated" line according to which
the created being'8 essence "measures" its received actus essendi but is
itself"measured" by its divine idea (exemplarism of the divine intellect).
From this perspective, what Fabro terms a "double participation" is not
properly double but in fact a single creative act accounting for a single
created being.~
As for Fabro himself, we have seen that after his 1961 edition
of Participation et causalite, hc abandoned his language of "double
creation," presumably because he recognized the problematic implica-
tions of this expression — implications later brought out by scholars
such as Aertsen and te Velde. Unfortunately, Fabro's revised language
of "double participation" is not much better, lending easily to a reading of
him such as te Velde's. And yet, despite what I take to be a misreading
of Fabro, I would agree with te Velde on this point: in Thomas's meta-
physics of creation, there is no place for a double participation. With that
in mind, I think Fabro should have avoided the phrase in this context,
reserving the language of "double participation" to refer instead to that
fundamental distinction in Thomas that Fabro was so keen &om the
outset to draw our attention to: not between two lines of transcendental
participation, but instead between the transcendental and the predica-
mental. Otherwise, it would have been better for Fabro to stay true to the
language of his source and speak simply in terms of that other double
that Thomas himself speaks of so clearly, namely, double exemplarism.
~ Mitchell, Being unrt Purtiapution,vol. 2, 492. Cf. 485.