Quinto v COMELEC

Facts:

This controversy revolves around the provisions of Republic Act No. 8436 and its subsequent
amendment by Republic Act No. 9369, particularly concerning the filing of certificates of
candidacy (CoCs) and the automatic resignation of appointive officials upon filing. Petitioners,
Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government
and intend to run in the upcoming elections, argue that they should not be considered resigned
from their positions the moment they file their CoCs. They contend that at the time of filing, they
are not yet officially candidates under the law but only become so at the start of the campaign
period. As such, they argue that the provision deeming them ipso facto resigned upon filing their
CoCs is premature and unjust, as it affects their employment status before they are officially
recognized as candidates.

Issue: WON the second proviso in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal
protection clause of the constitution.

Ruling: No. It is not unconstitutional.

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The
Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it
is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not.

GARCIA v DRILON

Facts:

Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband,
Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical
abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the
part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.

Issue:

WON RA 9262 is violative of the guaranty of equal protection clause.

Ruling:

No. R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in
the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which
are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause
does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it
goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means
that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court
has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely
than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against
women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice
McIntyre succinctly states, “the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality.”

A. Unequal power relationship between men and women

unequal power relationship between women and menotherwise known as “gender-based
violence. Violence against women (VAW) is rooted in unequal power dynamics between men
and women, perpetuated by societal norms and traditions that assign men dominant roles and
women subordinate ones. This power imbalance leads to men exerting control over women,
manifesting as gender-based violence (GBV)

B. Women are the “usual” and “most likely”

victims of violence.
Official statistics on violence against women and children in the Philippines reveal alarming
trends, with physical injuries comprising the highest number of reported cases, primarily
perpetrated by intimate partners.
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in
the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
The concept of legitimate classification is demonstrated by a precedent set in a 1960 case
concerning a city law on the disposal of manure released by animal-drawn vehicles. Despite
only applying to the owners and drivers of these particular vehicles, the law was upheld as
constitutional because it addressed a unique public health risk that these vehicles presented in
comparison to others.

Legislative classifications may result in inequality to some degree but this alone does not render
the law invalid. Instead, the classification must serve a legitimate purpose, such as protecting
public health or addressing societal issues, to withstand scrutiny under the equal protection
clause.

C. Gender bias and prejudices

Crimes against women are often treated less seriously throughout the criminal justice process
leading to what has been termed “double victimization” - first by the offender then the legal
system. The enactment of Republic Act No. 9262 aims to address discrimination against women
by combating biases and prejudices. The law's focus on women-specific measures does not
discriminate against men but seeks to correct societal norms that perpetuate gender inequality.
As a State Party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW), the Philippines is obligated to eliminate prejudices and stereotypes based on
gender roles.

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
address violence committed against women and children, as spelled out in its declaration policy.

III. The classification is not limited to existing

conditions only, and apply equally to all members

The provisions provided by R.A. 9262, is free from ambiguity which define acts of violence
against women and children (VAWC). It refutes the petitioner's argument that certain phrases
within the law are vague and could potentially label every quarrel as spousal abuse. The court
asserts that while statutes require a reasonable degree of certainty, they do not need absolute
precision, and flexibility is acceptable as long as the boundaries of the law are clear.
Additionally, it addresses the misconception that the law exclusively targets husbands or fathers
as culprits, noting that it applies to any person who has had a sexual or dating relationship with
the victim. This gender-neutral approach extends to lesbian relationships as well. Furthermore,
the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code allows for the
inclusion of individuals connected to the offender by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or
dating relationship. The example of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan illustrates how the law can
encompass broader familial relationships, holding parents-in-law accountable for their
involvement in domestic abuse against the victim, despite not being directly related to the victim
by marriage.

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v COMELEC

Facts

This is a case involving a Petition for Certiorari filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party against the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), challenging the denial of its accreditation as a party-list
organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, also known as the Party-List System Act. Ang
Ladlad is an organization representing lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgender individuals
(LGBTs), seeking recognition as a marginalized and under-represented sector.

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's application on moral grounds, citing religious beliefs and
interpretations as reasons for the denial. However, Ang Ladlad argued that the denial violated
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion, as well as its rights to privacy,
freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws. Additionally, Ang Ladlad
contended that the denial constituted discrimination based on sexual orientation, contrary to the
Philippines' international obligations.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) supported Ang Ladlad's petition, asserting that there
was no basis for the COMELEC's allegations of immorality and that LGBTs have distinct
interests and concerns deserving recognition. However, the OSG maintained that there had
been no restrictions on Ang Ladlad's freedom of speech, expression, and assembly.

The COMELEC, in its response, reiterated its position that Ang Ladlad lacked a genuine
national political agenda and was properly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued that the
LGBT sector was not enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, and accused Ang Ladlad of
making untruthful statements regarding its national existence.

Issue:

WON the denial of the partylist accreditation by COMELEC to Ang Ladlad violates equal
protection clause

Ruling:

Yes. Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall
any person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision
as an absolute prohibition on classification. The equal protection clause guarantees that no
person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by
other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances . The COMELEC
posits that the majority of Filipinos view homosexual conduct as immoral, justifying Ang
Ladlad's disqualification. However, this assertion lacks basis as there's no law criminalizing
homosexuality, and public opinion doesn't reflect such views. even if we were to assume that
public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here - that is, moral
disapproval of an unpopular minority - is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy
rational basis review under the equal protection clause.The COMELEC's differentiation and
claim that Ang Ladlad can't contribute to legislation benefiting the nation serve no legitimate
state interest beyond disliking a marginalized group.

RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES

STONEHILL v DIOKNO

Facts:

Petitioners, who have prior deportation cases pending, and the corporation they form were
alleged to committed "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code and the Revised Penal Code, to which they were served 4 search warrants.
These warrants authorized the search and seizure of specific documents and items related to
alleged offenses such as violations of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, the Internal
Revenue Code, and the Revised Penal Code. The petitioners challenged the validity of these
warrants, arguing that they did not specify the items to be seized with sufficient particularity,
among other reasons.

The petitioners filed an original action with the Supreme Court seeking certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, and injunction against the enforcement of the search warrants. They also requested
the return of the seized documents, papers, and cash. Respondents-Prosecutors argued that
the warrants were validly issued and any defects were cured by the petitioners' consent. They
also contended that the seized items were admissible as evidence regardless of any alleged
illegality in the searches and seizures.

The Supreme Court initially granted a writ of preliminary injunction, restraining the use of the
seized items in deportation cases against the petitioners. However, the injunction was later
partially lifted or dissolved concerning papers, documents, and things seized from the offices of
the corporations, while remaining in effect for items seized from the residences of the
petitioners.

Issue: 1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under
the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the
negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against
petitioners herein

Ruling:
 1. No. It is not valid. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional
mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements
has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were
abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to
have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction
of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As
a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned
applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or To uphold
the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general
warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife,
when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal
means.
2. The documents and papers are inadmissible as evidence. Respondent Diokno rely upon
the Moncado vs. People’s Court which provides that the evidence seized unlawfully
could still be admitted in court. However most common law jurisdictions have long
abandoned this approach and adopted the exclusionary rule. This rule is fundamentally
rooted in constitutional principles, dictates that evidence obtained in violation of an
individual's constitutional rights cannot be used against them in a court of law. The rule
iis the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

BURGOS v CHIEF OF STAFF AFP

Facts:

PEOPLE v CA ( particularly described the place to be searched)

Facts:

The search warrant, initially sought against Mr. Azfar Hussain for alleged possession of firearms
and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang
Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, was executed at a different location. Instead of the
specified Abigail Variety Store, the search was conducted at Apt. No. 1, which was immediately
adjacent to the intended site. This deviation led to the arrest of four Pakistani nationals and the
seizure of their personal belongings, including cash, which were not mentioned in the warrant.
Moreover, certain items listed in the warrant were not found during the search, while additional
unlisted items were confiscated.

Further the return of seized articles was delayed, exceeding the prescribed timeframe of 48
hours. Additionally, the search was carried out without the presence of lawful occupants, who
were reportedly handcuffed and immobilized during the operation, thus violating legal
procedures . These procedural lapses raised serious questions about the validity and integrity of
the search and seizure process.

In response to these irregularities, the private respondents, upon arraignment, promptly filed an
"Extremely Urgent Motion" to quash the search warrant and declare the obtained evidence
inadmissible. Subsequent motions and pleadings were submitted by both parties, culminating in
Judge Casanova's decision to grant the motion to quash the search warrant on February 9,
1996. This ruling was further supported by an ocular inspection conducted by the respondent
Judge, which corroborated the discrepancies between the search warrant's description and the
actual search location.

Issue:

whether or not a search warrant was validly issued as regards the apartment in which
private respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that
particular apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.

Ruling:

No. Because there is a discrepancy between the place described in the search warrant
and the actual location searched by the police officers. Despite having personal
knowledge of the premises, the officers failed to ensure that the warrant accurately
reflected the intended search location. This failure led to the execution of the search
warrant at a different place from that specified, constituting a violation of constitutional
safeguards.

The government argues that the officers had sufficient probable cause and personal
knowledge to justify the search. However, this argument overlooks the fundamental
requirement that a search warrant must precisely describe the place to be searched.
While probable cause may have been established, the warrant's failure to accurately
delineate the search location rendered it invalid for the specific premises in question.

Moreover, the attempt to justify the search based on the officers' prior knowledge and
evidence submitted during the warrant application process is untenable. Such
justifications would effectively grant law enforcement officials discretion to choose the
search location, circumventing the strict requirements outlined in the Constitution.

ISSUE ON MOTION TO QUASH

The Solicitor General's Office asserts that the proper recourse for challenging a search
warrant issued by a court other than the one trying the main criminal case is to file a
motion to quash the warrant before the issuing court. However, if no such motion is filed
in the issuing court, the interested party may alternatively move in the court where the
criminal case is pending for the suppression of evidence obtained under the warrant.
This alternative remedy is subject to the omnibus motion rule and the prohibition against
forum shopping.

In this case, the search warrant was issued by Branch 216 of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, while the criminal action was filed in Branch 80 of the Bulacan Regional
Trial Court. Since no motion to quash the warrant was filed in the Quezon City court, the
Bulacan court properly considered the motion to suppress evidence, falling within the
guidelines provided. Thus, the Bulacan court acted within its jurisdiction in addressing
the motion.

PEOPLE v TOMAWIS

Accused-appellant Basher Tomawis y Ali is appealing the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), specifically Branch 204 in Muntinlupa City, which found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, also known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The prosecution's version of events revolves around a buy-bust operation conducted by

Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) agents. According to their testimony, a
confidential informant reported illegal drug activities involving a person known as "alias Salim"
operating in Muntinlupa, Alabang. As part of the operation, Intelligence Officer 1 (IO1) Mabel
Alejandro was assigned as the poseur buyer, equipped with marked bills. The transaction
allegedly took place in a mall in Alabang, where Tomawis, identified as "alias Salim,"
purportedly sold methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) to IO1 Alejandro. Following the
exchange, Tomawis was arrested, albeit amidst a commotion from bystanders. The drugs
seized during the operation were then subjected to an inventory in the presence of barangay
officials.

In contrast, the defense, led by Tomawis himself, presents a different narrative. Tomawis
testified that he was with his mother in the said mall when he was allegedly accosted by
unidentified individuals. He claims that these individuals forcibly restrained him, confiscated his
belongings, and eventually accused him of drug-related activities. Tomawis asserts that he was
unlawfully apprehended, beaten, and coerced into admitting to crimes he did not commit. He
maintains that the drugs were planted on him, and the entire operation was fabricated by the
PDEA officers. Furthermore, Tomawis alleges that his arrest and subsequent detention were
carried out without proper legal procedures and in violation of his rights.

Issue: Whether or not Tomawis' guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Ruling:

No. Section 21 of RA 9165 outline the procedure to be followed by the buy bust team in the
seizure, initial custody and handling of confiscated illegal drugs and or paraphernalia including
establishing the identities of the buyer, seller, object, and consideration, as well as proving the
delivery of the drugs and payment for them. Additionally, compliance with the procedural steps
outlined in Section 21 is crucial. This involves conducting a physical inventory and
photographing the seized drugs immediately after seizure and confiscation, and it must be done
in the presence of the accused or his representative or counsel; a representative from the
media; a representative from the DOJ; and any elected public official. Furthermore, the
inventory must take place either at the location of the seizure or at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending officer/team. Any deviation from these procedures must be properly
justified, ensuring the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items remain intact.
Moreover, establishing an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs, from the moment of
seizure to their presentation in court, is essential.

In the case at bar, however, the prosecution failed to meet these requirements adequately,
leading to doubts about the identity and integrity of the seized drugs. The buy-bust team
involved in the operation committed several procedural lapses, including the failure to conduct
the inventory immediately after seizure and the absence of the 3 witnesses during the inventory
process. Instead of conducting the inventory at the location of seizure or at a nearby police
station, it was conducted at a barangay hall, deviating from the prescribed procedure. Moreover,
there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the buy-bust team members regarding custody
of the seized drugs, raising questions about the integrity of the chain of custody. Additionally,
the failure to take photographs of the seized drugs and uncertainty about where the marking of
the drugs was done further weakened the prosecution's case.

DE LIMA v REYES

Facts:

The Petition for Review on Certiorari challenges the Court of Appeals' decision and resolution
that nullified Department of Justice Order No. 710, which was issued by the Secretary of Justice
to establish a second panel of prosecutors for the reinvestigation of a murder case. The case
involves the killing of Dr. Gerardo Ortega, a veterinarian and radio show host in Palawan, who
was shot dead in 2011. Initially, Marlon B. Recamata confessed to the crime and implicated
several others, including former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes. Subsequently, a
special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) was formed to conduct a preliminary investigation.
Despite efforts by Dr. Ortega's wife to introduce additional evidence, the First Panel dismissed
the complaint. Dissatisfied with the decision, a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) was
created through Department Order No. 710. This led to legal challenges, with former Governor
Reyes arguing that the Secretary of Justice abused her discretion by forming a new panel. The
Court of Appeals sided with this argument, ruling that the Secretary should have modified or
reversed the First Panel's resolutions instead of creating a new panel. This failure to follow
established procedures led to the nullification of Department Order No. 710 and the
reinstatement of the First Panel's resolutions.

Issue: WON SOJ have the authority have the authority to order investigation of the murder case
under existing law, rules of procedure and jurisprudence.

Ruling:
Yes. The Secretary of Justice has the authority, under Republic Act No. 10071, to act directly on
matters involving national security or probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of
prosecutors.

the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal establishes a procedural avenue for aggrieved parties to seek
redress from decisions made by prosecutors. Within 15 days of receiving a resolution, parties
may file a verified petition for review before the Secretary of Justice, allowing for a thorough
review of the prosecutor's findings and recommendations. This mechanism serves as a
safeguard against potential errors or biases in prosecutorial decisions, thereby upholding the
principles of fairness and due process.

Additionally, the Secretary of Justice possesses the authority to order reinvestigations when
deemed necessary to address any deficiencies or oversights in the initial investigation process.
This discretionary power enables the Secretary to rectify any perceived injustices or gaps in the
evidentiary record, thereby promoting the integrity and completeness of the investigative
process.

In the present case, the Secretary of Justice exercised her authority to order a reinvestigation
after the First Panel's dismissal of Dr. Inocencio-Ortega's complaint and subsequent denial of
her motions to reopen and for partial reconsideration. This decision was guided by the
Secretary's duty to uphold the principles of fairness and impartiality in the administration of
justice.

The issuance of Department Order No. 710 was a proactive measure aimed at ensuring that all
relevant evidence, including that previously rejected by the First Panel, was thoroughly
considered in the reinvestigation process. By doing so, the Secretary sought to prevent any
potential miscarriage of justice and uphold the rights of the parties involved.

PEOPLE v FIGUEROA

Facts:

The case revolves around the appeal of Robert Figueroa, referred to as OBET, who was
convicted of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The prosecution's case rested on a
series of events, starting with a buy-bust operation where OBET was apprehended with marked
money. Following OBET's arrest, a search was conducted at the house of his former partner,
Betty, where he said that his sources of shabu came from. Indeed the officers discovered shabu
paraphernalia. The police admitted that they conducted the search without a search warrant but
with the consent of Betty.

In his defense, OBET claimed that his constitutional rights were violated during his custodial
interrogation, as he was allegedly not properly informed of his rights to remain silent and have
legal representation. Furthermore, OBET argued that Betty's acquittal should absolve him due
to the principle of conspiracy, as their actions were supposedly interconnected.

However, the trial court upheld OBET's conviction based on the evidence presented by the
prosecution, which included OBET's knowledge of the location of the hidden paraphernalia. The
court deemed the warrantless search of Betty's house valid, citing her purported consent to the
search. The OSG contended that Betty's acquittal did not automatically exonerate OBET, as the
evidence against him was independent of Betty's actions. So, the court upheld OBET's
conviction, rejecting his arguments regarding the violation of his constitutional rights and the
significance of Betty's acquittal in relation to his case.

Issue: WON the warrantless search and seizure is valid.

Ruling:

No. It is not valid because it is not incidental to valid arrest. The arrest of the co- accused did not
precede the search.

The search conducted on Betty's house was allegedly consented to by Betty. Indeed, a consented
search is one of the exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant. In People v. Chua Ho San @

Tsay Ho San, we pointed out that:

This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such
warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in
instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4)
waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6) search incidental
to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally
valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid
warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest
flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee, against obtrusive searches,
it is fundamental that to constitute, a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the
person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and

(3)the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The third condition does not exist in
the instant case. The fact is, Betty asked for a search warrant,

The search conducted at Betty's house cannot be considered a search incidental to a valid
warrantless arrest of either Betty or OBET. Betty's arrest did not precede the search, and OBET was
not arrested for possession or sale of drugs during the buy-bust operation; rather, he surrendered
after taking hostages. Moreover, there is no evidence showing that the house and the confiscated
articles belonged to OBET. Even if OBET pointed out the location of the articles, it does not establish
ownership. Additionally, since the seizure was a result of an invalid custodial investigation, the
seized articles cannot be used against OBET to establish his criminal liability.