Fahey Et Al 2022

Electoral Studies 77 (2022) 102469
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Electoral Studies
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud
When populists win: How right-wing populism affects democratic

satisfaction in the U.K. and Germany
James J. Fahey a, *, Trevor J. Allen b, Hannah M. Alarian c, 1
a
Department of Political Science, University of Florida, Anderson Hall, 1507 W. University Ave, Gainesville, FL, 32611, USA
b
Department of Political Science, Central Connecticut State University, Ebenezer D, Bassett Hall 316-05, 1615 Stanley St, New Britain, CT, 06050, USA
c
Department of Political Science, University of Florida, 004 Anderson Hall, 1507 W. University Ave, P.O. Box 117325, Gainesville, FL, USA
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T
Keywords: Right-wing populists have emerged and endured in democracies globally, threatening democracy through their
Populism attacks on liberal institutions. Beyond these proximate threats, relatively little is known about how right-wing
Democratic satisfaction populists impact public opinion. This article addresses this gap, exploring change in democratic satisfaction
Far right
among non-populist voters in two recent elections with right-wing populist success: the 2016 Brexit referendum
United Kingdom
Germany
in the U.K. and the 2017 election of the far-right, populist Alternative für Deutschland in Germany. Leveraging
high quality panel data, we reveal democratic satisfaction among the mainstream electorate declines after right-
wing populists win. Conversely right-wing populist voters appear to be no more or less satisfied in democracy
regardless of the election outcome. In addition, we find mainstream variation in democratic satisfaction is not
due to an election loss generally, but right-wing populist success specifically. These findings hence demonstrate
the threat that right-wing populism poses to democratic support even among its opponents.
1. Introduction prime minister, a crash in the value of the British pound, and a doubtful
future for London’s role as a global economic and banking hub. Thus, as
The global rise of populism has forced states to confront the nature successful RWP movements spread within and outside of parliaments, so
and quality of democratic representation. Although populism can exist too do questions about democratic stability (Galston 2018).
across the ideological spectrum, populist threats to liberal democracy in Yet the nature of right-wing populism’s precise threat to democratic
Western Europe have largely come from the right (Iakhnis et al., 2018; attitudes–especially among non-populist voters—is contested. For some,
Norris and Inglehart 2019; Spittler 2018). Key institutional features of RWPs’ allegedly negative relationship with democracy may be over
Western Europe’s democracies—such as proportional representation, stated (Kriesi, 2020; Spittler 2018) or even positive, by increasing voter
minimal electoral thresholds, and cordons sanitaires—have generally turnout (Leininger and Meijers 2021), galvanising pro-democracy atti
prevented far right premierships. Right-wing populist (RWP) parties and tudes among individuals with negative perceptions of RWPs (Meléndez
movements nonetheless wield significant political influence. For and Kaltwasser 2021), or increasing democratic trust among RWP sup
instance, in 2017 the populist Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for porters in the wake of RWP victories (Mauk 2020). Conversely, others
Germany, AfD) became the first far-right party to gain representation in find that once in office, RWPs undermine the bulwarks of liberal
the Bundestag, complicating Germany’s commitment to Europe and constitutionalism, eroding the independence of the judiciary, attacking
stoking fears of a return to a more destructive form of national politics. the press, and restricting minority rights (Diamond, 2021; Levitsky and
In the United Kingdom (U.K.), the United Kingdom Independence Party Ziblatt 2018) which consequently can reshape voter perceptions of de
(UKIP) leveraged their success in European Parliament elections2 to mocracy itself. RWPs are also widely supported by disaffected citizens
force a referendum on whether the country would remain in the Euro (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Kriesi 2020), with democratic dissatis
pean Union (EU). In the subsequent ‘Brexit’ referendum, voters faction often predicting support for populist parties (Werts et al. 2013).
narrowly voted to leave the EU, leading to the resignation of a sitting Given the importance of democratic satisfaction for maintaining
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: jamesfahey@ufl.edu (J.J. Fahey), allentj@ccsu.edu (T.J. Allen), halarian@ufl.edu (H.M. Alarian).
1
Authorship in reverse, alphabetical order.
2
UKIP members have held three MP seats in the U.K., two of which were former Conservatives who resigned in order to run as UKIP members.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102469
Received 14 October 2021; Received in revised form 29 March 2022; Accepted 5 April 2022
Available online 20 April 2022
0261-3794/© 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
J.J. Fahey et al. Electoral Studies 77 (2022) 102469
democratic stability (Linz and Stepan, 1996), this possible association movements.3
between RWP and democratic dissatisfaction may pose a threat to This piece examines how RWPs as defined above affect democracy
democracy’s attitudinal foundations. through their electoral success. The significance of democratic elections
Most voter-level research on RWPs focuses on the relationship be extends beyond the mechanical determination of who occupies the seat
tween right-wing populism and democratic satisfaction among sup of power. The act of voting itself is associated with increased happiness
porters of RWPs. These voters may be generally dissatisfied with how and satisfaction with democracy (Plescia et al. 2021), especially for
democracy works, or celebrate populist success, but how do those who those who supported winning candidates (Blais and Gélineau 2007a).
do not support RWPs respond to a RWP electoral win? We argue RWPs Elections can also affect the salience of particular issues, increasing their
may challenge democratic stability by decreasing democratic satisfac coverage in media outlets (Sheafer and Weimann 2006) and generating
tion among the non-populist electorate. In so doing, we shift attention support for those viewed as “owning” a given issue (Abbe et al., 2003).
from the potential challenges RWPs and their supporters directly pose, Consequently, support for RWPs increases alongside the of salience of
to examine the effect that RWPs have on their opponents when RWPs issues associated with the party family—such as immigration and
realise electoral gains. When right-wing populism prevails, does the Euroscepticism (Dennison 2020). Similarly, in the context of the EU,
non-populist electorate grow less satisfied with democracy? supranational and regional elections can increase the visibility of chal
We address this question with high quality panel data from the U.K. lenger parties, with success in these elections frequently followed by
and Germany, considering democratic satisfaction following two RWP breakthroughs in national contests (Schulte-Cloos, 2018).
electoral successes: the 2016 Brexit referendum in the U.K. and the AfD’s Building on this literature, we expect RWP success to engender
success in the 2017 German national election. The panel nature of our democratic dissatisfaction among the general, non-RWP supporting
data, surveying the same individuals in the months leading up to and public. We propose two ways that RWP may depress democratic satis
following RWP wins, allows us to examine whether these events cause faction. First, RWPs’ attacks against the political system may reshape the
significant changes in democratic satisfaction among non-RWP voters. public’s relationship with democracy in the populist image (i.e., a spill
Across both cases, we find that RWP electoral success significantly de over effect). The spill over pathway suggests that RWP victories may
presses satisfaction with democracy (SWD) among the general public. decrease SWD among non-RWP voters by presenting an alternative
Specifically controlling for previous attitudes in the lead up to the Brexit model for democratic engagement—the populist perspective that mod
referendum in the U.K., SWD meaningfully declined among those not ern liberal democracy is fatally flawed by its incrementalism and insti
voting Leave. Similarly, in Germany, those who did not support a RWP tutionalism. A similar phenomenon has been observed in Germany,
party in AfD-winning constituencies expressed greater democratic where the direct election of far-right MPs moved mainstream voters to
dissatisfaction than those in other constituencies. Further tests reveal endorse far-right positions on migration policy (Alarian 2020). A spill
this effect is not simply an artefact of losing an election but instead over effect was also observed in the Netherlands, where exposure to
specifically a function of a RWP win. Consequently, our findings suggest far-right populism led non-populist supporters to support positions ar
that populist success might beget further success by amplifying an ticulated by their far-right populist competitors (Rooduijn et al. 2021). If
important predictor of support: disaffection with democracy (e.g., Ber populists are capable of generating support for their policy positions, it
man, 2019; Arzheimer and Berning 2019). is worth considering whether a populist vision of democratic partici
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. First, we briefly pation finds purchase among the wider electorate in the aftermath of
define right-wing populism and second propose a theoretical relation their success.
ship between this form of populism and (dis)satisfaction with de To wit, the RWP position on democracy is often manifestly illiberal.
mocracy. In so doing, we use the existing literature to contrast our RWP rhetoric seeks to exploit the gap between the promise and practice
expectations with alternative explanations. We next justify our cases of of liberal, constitutional democracies (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018),
the U.K. and Germany both conceptually and methodologically. After contending that the mainstream parties have fundamentally betrayed
discussing our data and modelling strategy, we begin with the suggestive and con-spired against the sovereign people, thereby justifying direct
case of Brexit in the U.K. before our more in-depth analysis of the AfD in appeals to the people against liberal institutions. Because voters are less
Germany, including a direct test of several theories contrary to our own satisfied with democracy when they perceive parties to be substantively
expectations. We present the results for each analysis independently identical (Ridge, 2021b), RWPs may increase dissatisfaction by suc
before concluding with a joint discussion of our results and implications cessfully arguing that there is no meaningful difference between these
for future research. mainstream parties. The direct and emotional connection between RWP
leaders and their supporters (Weyland 2001) may be especially potent
2. Democratic dissatisfaction: A populist consequence? when contrasted with the byzantine European Union and seemingly
remote political elites. Similarly, RWPs provide a communitarian
Before proceeding, it is necessary to briefly define right-wing alternative to liberal individualism, and economic nationalism operates
populism. We understand populism as a discourse which emphasises against liberal economic tenets (Binev, 2022; Bornschier 2010). Taken
the righteousness of the ‘common people’ and the importance of their together, right-wing populism—and perhaps populism simpliciter—is
own sovereignty, while simultaneously criticising political or financial largely antagonistic to received understandings of liberalism (Canovan
elites as having betrayed the general will of the people (e.g., Aslanidis, 1999). Thus, although individuals may not vote for the RWP party or
2016; Fahey 2021). A movement or party can therefore be identified as movement, they may still be partially swayed by RWPs’ critique of
populist if it routinely employs this discourse in its party platform, existing democratic principles, promoting dissatisfaction.
campaign rallies, television advertisements, or other discursive outlets. Second, citizens may respond negatively to the success of a move
As previous work reveals the enduring importance of left-right cleavages ment or party viewed as anathema to the existing political order, rep
in European politics (Hooghe and Marks 2018), with supporters of resenting a psychic shock. RWP parties and movements are disliked by
populist movements varying significantly across the ideological spec much of the electorate (Harteveld et al., 2021; Meléndez and Kaltwasser
trum (Rooduijn 2018), we focus solely on right-wing populist (RWP) 2021), and are especially likely to break historical taboos with victories
3
Further, we recognise that attempting to construct and identify an ideal
“populist voter” based on attitudinal preferences is quixotic (Rooduijn 2018).
We therefore classify ‘non-populists’ simply as those who do not support RWP
movements or parties, i.e. Brexit and the AfD respectively.
2
garnering unusually high attention (Bischof and Wagner 2019). RWP 3. Case selection: the U.K. And Germany
success hence represents a break with politics as usual, generating
cynicism and frustration with the system’s inability to contain or There are numerous events that might provide an opportunity to
confront RWPs, depressing SWD overall. The zero-sum, ‘us versus them’ examine the effect of breakthrough RWPs on SWD in consolidated de
Weltanschauung of the populist right might cause the general electorate mocracies: the 2002 French Presidential election; the 2016 Brexit ref
to feel especially pessimistic about democracy in the wake of RWP erendum in the UK; the arrival of the AfD into German parliament in
success (Pappas 2019). These effects are likely to be exacerbated by the 2017; or the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States
behaviour of traditional party elites, who are often unsparing in their in 2016. Yet as we are interested in the direct effect of RWP success on
criticism of RWPs (Adamson 2019). As elite cues are powerful in shaping democratic satisfaction, we consider cases which allow us to assess in
public attitudes and norms (Goodman, 2019; Tankard and Paluck 2017), dividual variation, as opposed to aggregate change. To meet our con
citizens may become dissatisfied as their own party leaders dismiss RWP ceptual and empirical standards, we select two cases experiencing a
incursions. This is especially likely when combined with high levels of RWP electoral success with panel data surrounding the election: the U.K.
affective polarisation in contemporary Western democracies, as in and Germany.4
dividuals who score higher in negative partisanship are also more sus These two cases, occurring just over a year apart, represent the first
ceptible to democratic dissatisfaction in the wake of electoral losses or significant national post-war breakthrough of a RWP movement in our
disempowerment (Ridge, 2020; Spoon and Kanthak 2019). An in cases.5 Moreover, they represent two different forms of RWP success-a
dividual’s distaste for RWP movements may therefore undermine successful referendum in the U.K. and party emergence in Germany.
democratic satisfaction after RWP success. In this model, RWP electoral RWP parties in the U.K. are largely stymied in national elections, real
success may impact SWD not by convincing voters of their ideological ising greater success in second-order elections on which voters place
position but because their success represents the proverbial barbarians comparatively less importance (Lefevere and Van Aelst 2014). In
at the gates of liberal democracy, disheartening democracy’s defenders contrast, the Brexit referendum was highly publicised, yielding sub
(Meléndez and Kaltwasser 2021). stantial turnout and media attention with a campaign that overlaps
In sum, we expect that RWP parties and movements are especially significantly with other RWP movements across Western Europe. Leave
capable of depressing democratic satisfaction in well-institutionalised voters’ sociodemographic profiles, the campaign and voter’s association
democracies. We hypothesise: with UKIP, and the Leave campaign’s focus on nativism, immigration,
and Eurosceptism (e.g., Goodwin and Heath 2016) ensures Brexit pos
1. Right-wing populist success decreases democratic satisfaction among in sesses all the hallmarks of a RWP movement. In Germany, the AfD’s
dividuals who did not vote for the right-wing populist party or movement. 2017 success came on the heels of a near-miss showing in the 2013
election as a party targeting Eurosceptics. Change in AfD party leader
ship, capitalising on far-right protest movements in the East, solidified
2.1. Alternative explanation: Winners and losers the party’s identity as both right-wing and populist (Arzheimer and
Berning 2019). Their strong showing in 2017 represented the first time a
It is worth noting, however, that diffuse, generalised attitudes such far-right party crossed the 5% electoral threshold and realised repre
as SWD may be so stable as to be immovable by RWP wins. As above, the sentation in the Bundestag.6 Both Brexit and the AfD’s 2017 election
effect of populist success on democracy is contested, with either no therefore rep-resent significant RWP incursions into two of Europe’s
noticeable (Kriesi 2020; Spittler 2018) or a salubrious impact on de largest economies and democracies in the post-war period.
mocracy (Kaltwasser 2012; Leininger and Meijers 2021). In other words, Though few would disagree with the RWP characterisation of the
this literature suggests that the populist’s bark may be greater than their AfD,7 identifying the Brexit referendum as RWP may be less obvious.
attitudinal bite. Observing depressed SWD after an RWP victory in our This classification is appropriate for three reasons, justifying its inclu
cases would therefore represent an important step in delineating how sion alongside other RWP phenomena in extant research (e.g., Norris
and under what conditions populism poses a threat to democratic and Inglehart, 2019). First, the discourse articulated by elites who
attitudes. supported the Leave position was consistently populist. In the lead-up to
Finally, any potential decline in SWD may not necessarily be and immediate aftermath of the EU referendum, prominent elite
attributed to the success of a RWP movement, but rather the effect of Leavers-including UKIP leader Nigel Farage and future Conservative
losing in any given election. This alternative explanation suggests that Prime Minister Boris Johnson-adopted right-wing populist rhetoric,
partisans of a losing party become more distrustful of government and making the case for citizens to vote Leave to fight against “… big mer
dissatisfied with democracy as compared to election winners (Anderson chant banks … big politics … lies, corruption and deceit” (Withnall
and Tverdova 2001; Esaiasson 2011) regardless of whether the loss 2016) and “take control of their country’s destiny.“8 The Leave
comes from a RWP or mainstream movement. Despite robust support for campaign similarly used right-wing, nativist discourse, including
such a ‘winner-loser gap’ (Anderson et al., 2005; Blais and Gélineau anti-migrant posters and election paraphernalia which claimed the U.K.
2007b), others suggest democratic quality moderates this relationship was at the “breaking point” in terms of immigration (Stewart and Mason
(Dahlberg and Linde, 2017). Specifically, in countries with very high 2016).
levels of institutionalised democracy–including Germany and the U.
K.–SWD among those who lose elections actually appears to increase as
compared to abstainers (Nadeau et al. 2021). Most winner-loser 4
To our knowledge, the German and British surveys below are the only two
research, however, relies on cross-sectional data-analysing whether sources that satisfy our criteria.
5
satisfaction is lower or higher in the aggregate among winners, losers, We elect to analyse first cases of RWP success as we expect that the shock of
and abstainers post-election. Therefore, we cannot be sure whether any populist victories likely provides an additional effect (Bischof and Wagner
effect is caused by the direct impact of an election, or can instead be 2019).
6
accounted for by variations between voter and abstainer satisfaction The Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands; NPD, had previously won
seats in several state parliaments, but has never been represented in the
with democracy. Hence, we specifically consider this alternative
Bundestag.
explanation in the test of our hypothesis, modelling within-subjects 7
For instance, both the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al., 2017) and the
variation to simultaneously advance our knowledge of the PopuList classify the AfD as both right-wing and populist.
winner-loser gap in the context of two RWP electoral wins. 8
@BorisJohnson. “Less than 3 days until your chance to Vote Leave + take
control of our country’s destiny …” Twitter. June 20th, 2016, 1:58 p.m., https
://twitter.com/BorisJohnson/status/744952543327981569.
3
Fig. 1. Percentage of BES respondents reporting intent to vote leave by party ID.
Second, Leave voters appear to have received these right-wing, And despite the Green party adopting populist tendencies on the left,
populist messages. Immediately preceding the referendum, the words voting Leave among party voters appears no different from other
most commonly associated with the Leave vote were “immigration,” mainstream parties. Thus, although Brexit was supported by voters from
“sovereignty,” “control,” “back,” “Brussels,” “country,” and “laws,” a broad swath of parties, Leave was clearly concentrated among those
(Prosser et al. 2016). In contrast, the words most commonly associated with RWP affiliations.
with the referendum by Remainers were “economy,” “Europe,” “rights,” Finally, our population of interest-those who do not support RWP
“trade,” “future,” and “security.” Thus, whereas Remain voters appeared movements-connected Brexit with right-wing populism. In the post-
to be more or less motivated by classic liberal concerns about economic election period, non-Leave voters identified Brexit with the most
security and free trade, those who voted Leave were more likely to prominent RWP politicians in Britain at the time. When asked who was
indicate that their voting was motivated by a right-wing populist desire to blame for Brexit post-referendum, nearly three out of four non-Leave
to return power to the people and eschew the influence of elite Euro voters identified UKIP, Nigel Farage, or Boris Johnson.11 In the lead-up
peanists in Brussels. to the Brexit referendum, non-Leave voters were also more likely to view
The connection between Brexit and RWPs is further born out in the Leave supporters as RWP (i.e., UKIP), as opposed to the traditional right-
party affiliation those who ultimately voted Leave. Combining evidence wing Conservative voters.12 Together, the consistent populist rhetoric of
from the British Election Survey and the 2017 Chapel Hill Expert Survey elite Leave supporters; the clear relationship between RWP party sup
(CHES), Fig. 1 plots those who voted Leave among all Brexit voters by port and support for Brexit; and the general public’s association between
partisan affiliation. Parties are classified as populist if they scored six or RWP actors and Leave all support the classification of the Brexit refer
greater out of ten on both populist dimensions measured in CHES,9 endum as a RWP phenomenon.
whereas party affiliation represents party support immediately before
the referendum.10 As viewed here, Leave voting was most likely among
supporters of the two right-wing parties (UKIP and the Conservatives),
with nearly 100% of UKIP supporters voting Leave in the referendum.
11
Estimated using the BES, wave 9. 73.5% of voters blamed UKIP; 79% Nigel
9
We include parties at least 1% support at the time of the referendum. These Farage; and 78% Boris Johnson. By comparison, other traditional, non-RWP
dimensions are “position on direct vs. representative democracy,” and “salience actors were less likely to be blamed. 38% blamed then Labour leader Jeremy
of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric.” Populist here includes both right- Corbyn, 51% David Cameron, and 51% the Conservative party.
12
and left-wing articulation of populism. 38% reporting Leave voters were more likely to be voters of UKIP than the
10
Response to the survey item: “Which party would you support if the election Conservative party compared to 16% who believed Leave voters were more
were held today?” likely to be Conservative than UKIP voters.
4
4. Data & results in the 2015 general election.

Our main dependent variable—Democratic Satisfaction—measures
4.1. The United Kingdom—2016 EU referendum SWD in the U.K. after the results of the Brexit referendum were known.
This data collection began one day and concluded eleven days after the
To assess whether RWP affects democratic satisfaction, we first use Brexit vote. This short window provides reasonable likelihood that no
the combined British Election Study (BES 2020), containing four waves other events impacted democratic satisfaction outside of the referendum
surrounding the Brexit referendum in the U.K.13 The BES includes sur itself. We additionally control for democratic satisfaction measured
vey waves that conclude the day prior to and begin the day after the monthly, beginning one year before the referendum and ending one day
referendum. The structure of this data thus allows us to measure the prior to the referendum. The panel nature of our data thus allows us to
precise effect of the Brexit outcome on democratic satisfaction, while control for prior fluctuations in SWD over time.
controlling for individuals’ attitudes at multiple time points. As the Beyond prior democratic satisfaction, we also include sociodemo
referendum result affected all individuals in the U.K. at a single time graphic traits relevant to SWD and RWP support, including gender,
point, we are able to more precisely estimate the effect of a populist win. employment status, religious identification, racial identity, in-come, and
We identify our population of interest as those who did not vote to political ideology (e.g., Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Bischof and
Leave the European Union. That is, we exclude any individual who voted Wagner 2019; Goodwin and Heath, 2016). Each model also includes
Leave as a potential RWP supporter. This operationalisation means we fixed effects for country (i.e., England, Scotland, Wales) and region (e.g.,
include both those U.K. citizens who voted Remain as well as those who London, West Midlands), to subsume any contextual effects of one’s
abstained from voting in the referendum. We identify these abstainers residence. Finally, given the range and scope of our variables of interest,
for inclusion only if they had indicated they did not expect to vote Leave our data naturally includes individuals with small amounts of missing
immediately preceding the European Referendum. As the collection of data. We impute missing data with multiple imputation (MI) using
this survey item concluded the day before the referendum was held, we chained equations,15 to achieve higher inferential power with unbiased
can be reasonably certain that those preferences endured.14 estimates even when data is not assumed to be missing at random (e.g.,
Still, not all of non-Leave intending abstainers may have ultimately Lall 2017). After imputation, our U.K. data represents a balanced panel
supported the Remain position had they turned out to vote. More of 4721 individuals measured at four time periods-two preceding the
importantly, those who abstain from elections can express lower satis referendum and two in its aftermath.16
faction with democracy than voters (e.g., Allen 2017; Ridge 2020),
introducing the possibility that any observed effect is a consequence of 4.1.1. Analysis
our inclusion criteria. Furthermore, we recognise that Remain voters Regardless of the statistical model used, we would expect to see
may nevertheless support RWP parties which could similarly bias our average SWD be affected by the Brexit referendum as the entire popu
subsequent analysis. In an effort to accurately capture our population of lation of interest was treated by this RWP even. Fig. 2 represents this first
interest (i.e., U.K. citizens who do not support RWPs), we specify two step, presenting average SWD reported by U.K. citizens who did not vote
alternative characterisations: first including only Remain voters and to Leave prior to and after 2016 the referendum. The results here are
second excluding any Remain voter who also voted for UKIP or the BNP striking. After the referendum, SWD drops sharply before rebounding
Fig. 2. Average Democratic support over time among Britons not voting Leave, with 95% confidence intervals. Dotted line represents Referendum.
15
Monte Carlo simulations include 10 imputations.
13 16
Appendix BES A.1.1 includes survey wave dates. 18,884 individual-wave observations. Appendix C.1.1 includes a compari
14
See Appendix A.1.3 for the survey items used to identify our samples. son of the imputed and non-imputed means. Robustness checks using listwise
Appendix A.1.2 includes all other item phrasing and coding. deletion are substantively identical—see Appendix C.1.2.
5
Fig. 3. Predicting Democratic Support by Brexit Referendum. Unstandardised beta Coefficients, presented with 90 and 95% Confidence Intervals.
slightly, although failing to return to pre-referendum levels even five winner-loser gap effect. As mentioned above, cross-sectional research
months after Brexit. finds that the winner-loser gap is significantly smaller in well-
We next estimate a series of random-effects general least squares institutionalised democracies such as Germany and the U.K. (Nadeau
regressions, with robust standard errors clustered by respondent esti et al. 2021). Further, according to the same study, nearly 80% of the
mating the effect of the Brexit referendum on democratic satisfaction.17 winner-loser gap appears to be driven by an increase in democratic
Fig. 3 presents the effect of the Post-Election variable on SWD, measured satisfaction among winners, rather than a decrease in democratic
immediately following the Brexit referendum across the three inclusion satisfaction among losers. In our data, the gap in SWD is a function of
strategies.18 First, for those who did not vote Leave in the referendum nearly equivalent increases in SWD among Leave voters and decreases in
(including abstainers), we find a pattern similar to the simple average SWD among Remain voters. Among all Remain voters, SWD increased by
satisfaction over time: public SWD is significantly lower post-Brexit. an average of 13% after the election, while SWD among Leave voters
Limiting our sample of interest to those who voted Remain or those decreased by an average of 11%.21 This suggests a RWP impact beyond
who voted Remain without voting for a right-wing populist party pre the winner-loser effect. We turn to our second case, the AfD’s break
viously yields substantively identical effects. This suggests that through performance in the 2017 election in Germany, to further
depressed SWD post-referendum is not driven by referendum abstainers. explore this possibility and approach the counterfactual question: would
Further, given the limited variation in effect size between Remain and there still be a shift in democratic satisfaction had the populists lost?
non-UKIP, Remain voters provides additional support that our initial
inclusion criteria accurately captures our sample of the general, non- 4.2. Germany-the AfD and the 2017 federal election
RWP supporting public.
Substantively, this is suggestive evidence for our hypothesis that a Our German case study relies on the German Longitudinal Election
RWP success can dampen democratic support among the non-populist Study (GLES) Short-Term 2017 Election Panel (GLES 2019), a
public. However, it is possible that this effect may be fleeting. high-quality panel assessing individual political attitudes and behav
Although Fig. 2 suggests lowered SWD endures, we do not know if this iours at multiple time points directly before and after the 2017 election.
effect remains statistically significant when post-Brexit attitudes are Like the BES panel, the pre-election and post-election waves bookend
extended to include SWD five months post-referendum.19 As such, we the RWPs’ successful election. The pre-election wave ended one day
replicate our initial U.K. analysis, inclusive of the five-month post Brexit before the 2017 election, and post-election data collection began three
survey wave for each sample population. Results of this analysis indicate days after and concluded two weeks after the election.22 We are again
that the effect of RWP success on SWD persists and remains relatively relatively confident that any observed variation in SWD can be attrib
consistent beyond the days following Brexit, and up to nearly half a year uted to the election, as opposed to some other post-election event. In
later.20 sum, the GLES panel data allows us to access attitudinal changes within
There are also reasons to believe that this consistent and persistent individuals due to the 2017 election results.
decrease in democratic satisfaction is not simply the function of a Our population of interest is the general electorate who did not
support the AfD. As in the U.K., our first specification excludes in
dividuals who supported the RWP (i.e., the AfD), including those who
17
Random effects ordered logistic regression (Appendix C.1.3) generates the voted for other parties or abstained. In our second specification, we
same pattern of results as reported here across each sample.
18
Tables found in Appendix B.1.1.
19 21
The five-month wave is the next wave for which democratic satisfaction is On a five-point scale, mean SWD among Leave voters increased from 2.33 to
assessed. 2.63, while SWD among Remain voters decreased from 2.42 to 2.16.
20 22
See Appendix B.1.1. See Appendix A.2.1.
6
include only voters sup-porting a non-AfD party, excluding abstainers.23 year before the election (i.e., October 6, 2016).27 Models include clus
The far-right nature of an AfD win in Germany, however, makes it more tered robust standard errors at the individual level, in addition to con
likely that respondents misremember or misreport their vote choice trols for a variety of individual level indicators at various time points
(Holbrook and Krosnick 2010). We consequently use a broad definition throughout the survey.28 Due to the inclusion of a number of control
for both samples, including only who did not feel close to, vote for, or variables, coupled with normal survey attrition rate, we again impute
intend to vote for the AfD in the 2017 election in either vote. This cri our missing data.29 Subsequently, our analysis includes a total of 11,639
terion thereby includes pre-election vote intention, post-election vote non-AfD voting German citizens surveyed between October 2016 and
choice, and party leaning. We characterise vote intention and actual October 2017.30
vote choice beginning when postal voting became available to German
voters, therefore increasing the probability that voters were informed 4.2.1. Analysis
and their intentions and reported vote choices were stable.24 How did non-RWP satisfaction with democracy change after the
The structure and nature of the German data–as well as Germany’s AfD’s 2017 success? As a preliminary answer to this question, we
electoral system–adds several unique challenges and opportunities to compare the average, individual change in democratic satisfaction in the
our study and measurement of our main independent variable. Chief two waves prior to the election with that directly after the 2017 election
among the challenges is identifying the effect of an RWP breakthrough, for both AfD winning and losing constituencies. Viewed in Fig. 4, SWD
rather than simply the experience of a democratic election. A related prior to the election does not meaningfully vary across eventual AfD-
concern is the possibility that all voters were treated by a RWP success winning and AfD-losing constituencies. Post-election, however, we see
by virtue of the AfD entering parliament, limiting the extent to which SWD in AfD-winning constituencies significantly declined among non-
our analysis can adjudicate between multiple potential causes and RWP supporters-representing an average 1.3% decrease. In constitu
capture the effect of an RWP win on SWD. Any post-election change in encies where the AfD did not win a seat in the first vote, respondents
SWD could be the result of a number of factors, including the (under reported an equivalent post-election increase in SWD (i.e., a 1.4% in-
whelming) victory of the CDU/CSU, a historically poor performance of crease). Together, this 2.7% gap provides suggestive evidence that the
the SPD, the potential return of the Grand Coalition, the re-emergence of general public’s perception of an election depends on who wins: a RWP
the Free Democrats, or of course, the arrival of the AfD. This signal or a mainstream party.
becomes even more complicated by the nature of the two-vote electoral Finding this preliminary support, we proceed with regression anal
system, where voters directly elect a representative for their constitu ysis estimating three models: one containing all German citizens who
ency (i.e., first vote), and a party for proportional representation (i.e., did not support the AfD; a second including only non-AfD voters, and the
second vote). third including only non-AfD voters residing in Saxony—the only Land
We address these concerns by using first vote results. Although the where constituencies directly elected AfD representatives. Restricting
second vote is substantively more important for the allocation of seats to our sample to the only state with successful AfD elections provides a
the Bundestag, we focus on the first vote returns. Whereas all citizens strong test of our hypothesis, reducing environmental and contextual
were exposed to the election itself and its overall results, only those variation between the treated (i.e., RWP winning) and untreated (i.e.,
residing within AfD-winning constituencies experienced a direct, RWP RWP losing) respondents. As above, models were estimated using
win. This allows us to estimate the impact of residing in an AfD-winning random-effects general least squares regressions and include a fixed
constituency after the election on SWD. Further, if all Germans are effect for regional variation (i.e., state for the German-wide and con
treated by the election, our estimate of a RWP win would be conserva stituency for Saxon analysis respectively).31
tive, biased toward a null finding. And despite elite understanding of the Fig. 5 reports the effect of our indicator of interest—AfD Win X Post-
second vote as substantively more important than the first, this Election—for all populations.32 Substantively, this represents the effect
perception is not always shared by the German public, who show little of an individual residing in a constituency where an AfD candidate won
evidence of strategic voting (Schoen 1999) and sometimes appear to after the election. Here, we report that a successful RWP win corre
believe the first vote to be most important. Constituency-level electoral sponds with a decline in average SWD for both non-AfD supporting
outcomes can also meaningfully moderate the impact of national-level Germans and voters. In districts that directly elected an AfD candidate,
results on SWD and the ‘winner-loser gap’ (Ridge, 2021a; VanDus we observe a significant decline in democratic satisfaction after the 2017
ky-Allen and Utych 2021). In sum, the first vote provides a unique op election.33 We expect that this is a conservative estimate of the effect, as
portunity to assess the effect of a constituency directly mandating a RWP those without a populist win in the first vote were still affected by RWP
enter parliament on the general, non-RWP supporting electorate. success via the second vote (i.e., the AfD entering the Bundestag). This
The effect of interest consequently is represented as an interactive effect therefore estimates the marginal increase of a populist win,
effect (i.e., AfD Win X Post-Election), which indicates whether an indi moving from winning seats in the Bundestag as a whole to also winning
vidual resides within a constituency the AfD would eventually win post- seats directly from one’s constituency.
election.25 Our dependent variable measures SWD in Germany,26 In isolating our sample from the entire country to only those voters in
measured at multiple time points prior to the election beginning nearly a Saxony, we find a similar, albeit smaller and marginally significant ef
fect. Non-RWP supporting voters reported a decline in democratic
satisfaction when residing in AfD winning constituencies compared to
23
Appendix A.2.3 reports the English translation of the survey items used to
identify the sample. Unfortunately, data on voters for other, smaller parties who
might also fit our classification of RWP (e.g., Die Republikaner, Nationalde
27
mokratische Partei Deutschlands) are unavailable within the GLES public use Appendix A.2.1 includes these waves and dates for each survey period.
28
file. Yet support for these parties were marginal and are therefore unlikely to Appendix A.2.2 lists variable survey measurement (translated) and coding.
29
alter our findings. Monte Carlo simulations with 10 imputations. See Appendix C.2.1 for a
24
See https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/2017/in comparison of the imputed and non-imputed means. Robustness checks using
formationen-waehler. listwise deletion yields substantively identical results (see Appendix C.2.2).
25 30
Respondent constituency is coded using election returns from the Federal A total of 34,917 individual-wave observations.
31
Returning Officer https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2017. Appendix C.2.3 reports output from a random-effects ordered logistic
html. regression, yielding a consistent pattern of results.
26 32
See Appendix A.2.2 for survey item English translation, measurement, and Appendix B.2.1 reports the full output, including controls, for each model.
33
coding. Again, Appendix B.2.1 includes these estimates including standard
deviations.
7
Fig. 4. Average change in democratic satisfaction among German electorate before and after 2017 election.
those within CDU or Die Linke winning constituencies—the only parties the 2013 and 2017 elections, using panel data surrounding the 2013
outside of the AfD to win constituency seats in Saxony. In other words, election (i.e., GLES 2013).36 As in the 2017 election, the 2013 election
we again find evidence of a statistically significant decay in democratic resulted in a top-two performance for the CDU/CSU and SPD. But in
satisfaction in the aftermath of a populist electoral win, mirroring our U. contrast to 2017, the AfD did not meet the five per cent threshold.37 For
K. findings. RWP supporters here, the 2013 election was largely a failure while to the
An important final caveat to the above analysis is that not all German non-RWP public, the election represented politics as usual. This com
citizens could be possibly treated by a RWP win as the AfD did not run parison between elections with RWPs on the ballot to those without
candidates in every constituency. Of the 299 constituencies in Germany, them allows us to compare the average change in SWD across a typical
the AfD did not run a candidate in 13 constituencies across six states.34 election and one with a RWP win.
This substantively means our sample subject to an AfD win are As shown in Fig. 6, the comparison before and after the 2013 and
compared to those Germans who either had an AfD candidate lose one’s 2017 elections reveal a marked difference in SWD for non-RWP sup
constituency or resided in a constituency without an AfD candidate porting Germans regardless of the constituency winner. After the 2013
contesting a seat. To ensure this variation does not account for our re election, SWD increased by over 5%, as expected by previous cross-
sults, we conduct an additional analysis including only constituencies sectional findings of the winner-loser gap in well-institutionalised de
with an AfD candidate on the first ballot.35 Our findings remain mocracies (Nadeau et al. 2021). The mainstream public therefore ap
consistent even when excluding these constituencies: SWD is lower for pears to be more satisfied with democracy once a typical election
non-RWP voters when a RWP candidate won one’s constituency. occurs–and one that kept a RWP from parliament. Yet in the period
following the 2017 breakthrough election, the post-election SWD
4.2.2. Alternative explanation: A loss or a populist win? “bump” was much smaller (1.6%). Although SWD marginally increased
We thus far find support for our hypothesis that RWP victories after the election, this variation appears reduced by the 2017 election
depress post-election democratic satisfaction. Remaining unexplored, results. This trend is replicated after constricting the sample solely to
however, are two possible alternative explanations for this pattern of those in Saxony. Saxon non-RWP voters in 2013 reported an average 6%
results. First, it may be the case that democratic satisfaction varies in the increase in democratic satisfaction after the election compared to a
wake of any election, and so any patterns we observe are simply a meagre 1.5% in 2017. Thus, we are relatively confident that the
function of an election taking place. Second, the decline in SWD among observed relationship between the AfD’s electoral success and SWD is
non-RWP may not be the result of an RWP win per se, but simply the related to the substantive results of the election, as opposed to simply a
result of losing in general. function an election itself.
To examine the first alternative explanation, we calculate the overall Next, we consider whether the decline in SWD is a function of any
change in SWD of German citizens who did not vote for RWP parties in
36
We exclude from our 2013 sample both those indicating support for the AfD
34
Lower Saxony (Aurich – Emden, Stadt Osnabrück), Saxony-Anhalt(Börde – and those supporting the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD).
37
Jerichower Land), North Rhine West-phalia (Rhein-Sieg-Kreis I, Recklinghausen 2013 was the first federal election contested by the AfD, which was in many
II, Borken II, Coesfeld – Steinfurt II, Ennepe-Ruhr-Kreis II, Märkischer Kreis II), ways still a party in development, over-representing Eurosceptic academics.
Saxony (Zwickau), Rhineland-Palatinate (Montabaur), and Bavaria (Schwan However, with regard to party position on both economic and social di
dorf, Weiden). mensions, the AfD offered substantively similar platforms to voters and already
35
Results in Appendix C.2.6. occupied the right-wing pole on both scales (Polk et al., 2017).
8
Fig. 5. Predicting Democratic Engagement by Populist Wins among the German public. Un-standardised beta Coefficients, presented with 90 and 95% Confi
dence Intervals.
electoral loss, as opposed a loss to an RWP in particular. Here, we esti identifying voters for the AfD as those who voted for the party in either
mate two additional models separately for all non-AfD supporting Ger the first or second vote in the 2017 election. This method grants us
mans and only non-AfD voters. First, we categorise each individual by greater statistical power while ensuring no overlap between our two
their stated first-vote party preference38 and second identify whether populations of interest-the mainstream public and voters of RWP parties.
their preferred first-vote party won (i.e., 0) or lost (i.e., 1) their con We next code constituencies as to whether they elected (1) or failed to
stituency. This categorisation allows us to examine whether the same elect a non-AfD candidate (0). Should the decline in SWD democratic be
democratic decline arises with constituency loss regardless if a RWP due to favoured party loss as opposed to a RWP win, we would expect to
party won among the non-RWP public. see similar findings of the interaction term between AfD Loss and Post-
Finally, the nature of the German electoral system means that in election as presented in Fig. 5.
dividuals can vote for multiple parties in a single election (i.e., cross- Nevertheless, for these RWP voters, we find no statistically signifi
party voting). As a result, a loss coded at the constituency level may cant variation in SWD for residing within an AfD losing constituency
not represent a true loss should the winner be from a similarly supported after the election. If we reduce our sample to Saxony in an effort to more
party (e.g., Ridge, 2021a). We therefore reclassify ‘loss’ in a final set of closely match our winning and losing AfD voters, we again fail to find
models for both non-AfD voting citizens (including abstainers) and any variation in respondent satisfaction with German democracy. These
non-AfD voters. Here, a loss is counted only if the constituency elected results therefore strongly suggest that RWP wins, rather than electoral
an individual from a party that an individual did not vote for in either losses in general, have a uniquely negative impact on the general pub
their first or second vote. In this stricter categorisation of a ‘loser,’ lic’s SWD. Right-wing populism’s success consequently appears
winners are classified as those residing in constituencies that elected distinctive in its ability to reshape individual perception of democracy in
either one’s first or second vote choice; whereas losers did not support Germany, with little evidence this democratic backlash is due simply to
the party representative elected in either vote. Regardless of the strict or a ‘sore loser’ effect.
broad definition of a ‘winner,’ Fig. 7 reports no statistically significant
impact on SWD among the non-RWP supporting public in losing con 5. Conclusion
stituencies.39 Put simply, the meaningful decrease in democratic satis
faction appears unique to suffering an electoral loss to a RWP. At the time of writing, the reverberations of RWP success can still be
As a final test of the alternative explanation—that our findings felt in both the U.K. and Germany. In Germany’s 2021 National Election,
capture the effect of losing over-all, as opposed to a RWP win—we turn the AfD remained an electoral force—capturing 10.3% of the second
our attention away from the non-RWP public to consider voters for the vote, expanding from three to sixteen mandated first vote seats, and
AfD. Whereas the AfD certainly performed well in the 2017 elections, sending 83 MPs to the 20th Bundestag. In the U.K., the ongoing effects of
they were unsuccessful in the majority of constituency votes. If Brexit have led to worker, gas, and grocery shortages and a plummeting
depressed SWD is driven only by electoral loss and not specifically a loss approval rating for the government. As right-wing populism continues to
to a RWP, we might expect AfD voters in AfD-losing constituencies to impact the two largest economies and democracies in Europe, under
display similarly depressed SWD. As such, we conduct a final analysis, standing the consequences of RWP success on public satisfaction with
38
Again, we are unable to assess ‘other parties’ due to data protection clauses
in the GLES 2017. This should not affect the substantive interpretation of the
data as only four political parties won seats in the 2017 first vote: the CDU/
CSU; SPD, Die Linke, the AfD, and the Greens (GRÜNE).
39
Appendix C.2.4 reports this analysis.
9
Fig. 6. Change in democratic Support Post 2013 and 2017 elections.
democracy remains paramount. democratic regimes beyond the direct impact they might have while in
We find RWP electoral success is associated with a consistent office.
decrease in democratic satisfaction across two distinct instances of RWP This conclusion additionally suggests avenues for future research.
success: after the AfD’s entry into the Bundestag and passage of the Brexit and the AfD’s 2017 returns represent the most recent, meaningful
Brexit referendum. Although these effects are occasionally modest in RWP incursions in the U.K. and Germany. Voters were therefore espe
size, they are consistent, substantively meaningful, and durable. More cially likely to be attentive to the results (Bischof and Wagner 2019).
over, we show that this effect is not simply the function of losing an Future scholars could examine if subsequent RWP wins continue to
election. Neither loss in the first vote nor second vote in Germany among depress SWD among those unsupportive of RWP movements and parties.
mainstream or AfD voters moved democratic satisfaction, suggesting Such developments might imply a vicious cycle, where RWP success
that not all losses affect democratic satisfaction equally (e.g., Blais and generates democratic dissatisfaction, itself an important predictor of
Gélineau 2007a). This conclusion is particularly striking given that for RWP support. Conversely, the surprise and ensuing disaffection may
the elections we observed, the “shock” of the populist victories may have lessen after subsequent RWP wins. To this point, additional analyses in
been limited. In the U.K., public opinion polls suggested that a Leave Germany suggest that voters do not appear to warm toward the move
vote was eminently possible, and UKIP had won the most votes in the ment itself in light of an AfD win.40 This pattern may indicate that RWP
previous European Parliament election. In Germany, polls indicated that are able to move public opinion without needing to appear more
the AfD would almost certainly be represented in parliament after the attractive as a party. Future research on democratic stability might also
2017 election. Individuals may have already priced both the possible consider examining whether RWP failures similarly lead to a decrease in
success of the Leave campaign and the AfD into their respective electoral democratic satisfaction among RWP supporters, and how these voters
calculations, providing less room for RWP wins to impact citizen satis respond. This is especially germane given events in the United States,
faction with democracy. where supporters of former president Donald Trump remained unwilling
Demonstrating that RWP success is capable of decreasing democratic to recognise the legitimacy of his electoral defeat, eventually storming
satisfaction has important consequences for our understanding of dem the U.S. capitol in an attempt to prevent the transfer of power.
ocratic stability in consolidated democracies. The maintenance of liberal Indeed, it is also worth considering whether mainstream parties can
democracy requires widespread support for the regime type (Linz and no longer expect business as usual after a democratic election, and how
Stepan, 1996). When individuals become dissatisfied with the perfor they—and their voters—respond. Traditionally mainstream parties
mance of liberal democracy, the space opens for political entrepreneurs might opt to fight fire with fire, incorporating elements of populism into
who propose illiberal solutions to pressing social problems. This is their strategy and rhetoric (Mazzoleni 2008). Likewise, it is possible that
additionally noteworthy in light of the decrease in satisfaction with newly dissatisfied non-RWP voters eventually turn to populist parti
democracy among new generations of voters in Western Europe (Foa es—left or right—as democratic disaffection predicts populist support. If
and Mounk 2016). While West European publics are generally capable of populism is understood as a response to the crises of liberalism gripping
distinguishing distrust in particular political actors from diffuse regime
support (Dalton 2004), it is worth considering how long
anti-establishment populism can exist before its impacts redound on the
40
democratic regime type itself. Our project therefore serves to identify See Appendix C.2.7: “What do you think of the different parties in general?”
another potential pathway through which RWPs may destabilise AfD ranging 0–1, I do not think much of the party at all to I think a great deal of
the party.
10
Fig. 7. Predicting Democratic Satisfaction by First Vote Loss including Non-AfD and AfD voters. Unstandardised beta Coefficients, presented with 90 and 95%
Confidence Intervals.
democracies across the globe, the fact that RWP wins are able to further Data availability
depress democratic satisfaction should give defenders of liberal de
mocracy pause. Together, understanding the relationship between RWP Data is publicly available as indicated in manuscript and replication
success and SWD will be critical for navigating the inherent tension of code will be provided upon request.
liberalism and populism in the 21st century.
Acknowledgements
Credit author statement
The authors thank Stephen M. Utych, Nathan Henceroth, and
James J. Fahey Conceptualisation, Methodology, writing (original members of the Alarian Political Behavior Lab at the University of
draft & editing). Trevor J. Allen Conceptualisation, Writing (original Florida for their thoughtful comments on previous versions of this piece.
draft & editing). Hannah M. Alarian Conceptualisation, Methodology,
writing (original draft & editing), visualisation, data curating.
Appendix A. Dataset Details
A.1. United Kingdom
A.1.1. BES Survey Wave Dates

Wave Date
7 14 April - 4 May 2016

8 6 May - 22 June 2016
Brexit Referendum - 23 June 2016
9 24 June - 4 July 2016
10 24 November - 12 December 2016
11
A.1.2. BES Survey Items

Variable Survey Item Response Options Coding
Democratic Satisfaction On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in the UK? Very dissatisfied 0
A little dissatisfied 0.33
Fairly Satisfied 0.66
Very satisfied 1
Femalea Are you … ? Male 0
Female 1
Employedb Which of the following best de-scribes what you were doing last week? Unemployed; Less than 8 h 0
per week
Employed full-time; Part-time; full-time 1
student
Religious Do you regard yourself as belong-ing to any particular religion? No 0
Identificationa Yes 1
Whitea To which of these groups do you consider you belong? Non-White British category 0
White British 1
Incomea Gross personal income is an individual’s total income received from all sources, Under £5000 per year 1
including wages, salaries, or rents and before tax deductions … what is your gross personal £5000 to £9999 per year 2
income? £10,000 to £14,999 per year 3
£15,000 to £19,999 per year 4
£20,000 to £24,999 per year 5
£25,000 to £29,999 per year 6
£30,000 to £34,999 per year 7
£35,000 to £39,999 per year 8
£40,000 to £44,999 per year 9
£45,000 to £49,999 per year 10
£50,000 to £59,999 per year 11
£60,000 to £69,999 per year 12
£70,000 to £99,999 per year 13
£100,000 and over 14
Left-Right Composite scale, derived by Left 0
Scaleb c YouGov |
Right 1
*Table excludes Age, a profile variable calculated by YouGov by last pre-election wave.
a
Item collected at intervals determined by YouGov (i.e., Profile variable).
b
Asked to all respondents in the first wave in which they participated (i.e., top-up question).
c
Composite taken from answers to five left-right ideology questions.
A.1.3. BES Population Defining Items

Variable Survey Item Response Options Coding
Non-Leave How did you vote in the EU referendum? Stay/remain in the 1

Britons (wave 9) EU
Leave the EU 0
Don’t know 1
In this upcoming referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union, voters will be asked “Should the United Kingdom Stay/remain in the 1
remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?” How do you think you will vote? EU
(wave 8) Leave the EU 0
I would/will not 1
vote
Don’t know 1
Remain Voters How did you vote in the EU referendum? Stay/remain in the 1
(wave 9) EU
Leave the EU 0
Don’t know 0
Voted Which did you vote for?a Conservative 0

Right-Wing (wave 6) Labour 0
Populist Liberal Democrat 0
Party Scottish National 0
Party
Plaid Cymru 0
UKIP 1
Green Party 0
British National 1
Party
a
Item appeared for only those respondents who indicated voting in the 2015 General Election.
Solid lines indicate items used to identify (i.e,. X ‘or’ Y) as opposed to conditions individuals must have met (i.e., X ‘and’ Y).
12
A.2. Germany
A.2.1. GLES 2017 Survey Wave Dates

Wave Date
1a 6 October-10 November 2016

2 16 February-03 March 2017
3 11 May-23 May 2017
4 06 July-17 July 2017
5b 20 July-28 August 2017
6a 4 September-13 September 2017
7 18 September-23 September 2017
Federal Election - September 24, 2017

8a 27 September - 09 October 2017
a
Denotes wave with dependent variable measurement.
b
Includes refreshment sample (Wave A1 in original
documentation).
A.2.2. GLES 2017 Short-term Panel Survey Items

Variable English Translation Response Options Coding
Democratic On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with Not at all satisfied 0
Satisfaction the way democracy works in Germany? Not very satisfied 0.25
Neither satisfied/dissatisfied 0.5
Fairly Satisfied 0.75
Very satisfied 1
Female Please state your gender Male 0
Female 1
Employed What categories from this list ap- ply to you? Not employed full-time or part- 0
Time
Employed full-time; Part-time 1
Religiosity How religious are you? Not religious at all 0
Not that religious 0.25
Moderately 0.5
Religious 0.75
Very Religious 1
Left-Right Ideology In politics people often talk about ‘left’ and ‘right’. Left 0
Where would you rate yourself? – .1
– .2
– .3
– .4
– .5
– .6
– .7
– .8
– .9
Right 1
Income Taken all together, would you please indicate what the Below 500€ 1
monthly net income of your household is? By net income, I mean the amount that you have left after taxes 500 up to 750€ 2
and social security. 750 up to 1000€ 3
1000 up to 1250€ 4
1250 up to 1500€ 5
1500 up to 2000€ 6
2000 up to 2500€ 7
2500 up to 3000€ 8
3000 up to 4000€ 9
4000 up to 5000€ 10
5000 up to 7500€ 11
7500 up to 10,000€ 12
10,000€ and more 13
* Age, included as a control variable, is calculated by GLES using birth year.
A.2.3. GLES Population Defining Items

Non-AfD You had two votes in the federal election. The first vote was for a candidate in your local CDU/CSU 1
Citizens constituency, the second vote was for a party. How did you mark your ballot? SPD 1
(wave 8) FDP 1
Bundnis 90/Die Grunen 1
Die Linke 1
AfD 0
Other party 1
I did not cast a first/ 1
second vote
CDU/CSU 1
(continued on next page)
13
(continued )
You had two votes in the SPD 1

absentee ballot. The first vote was for a candidate in your local constituency, the second vote was for a party. How did you FDP 1
mark your ballot? (waves 5–7) Bundnis 90/Die Grunen 1
Die Linke 1
AfD 0
Other party 1
second vote
You have two votes in the federal election. The first vote is for a candidate in your local constituency, the second vote is for CDU/CSU 1
a party. How will you mark your ballot? SPD 1
(waves 5–7) FDP 1
Die Linke 1
AfD 0
Other party 1
second vote
In Germany, many people lean towards a particular party for a long time, although they may occasionally vote for a CDU/CSU 1
different SPD 1
party. How about you, do you in general lean towards a particular party? If so, which one? FDP 1
(waves 5–7) Bundnis 90/Die Grunen 1
Die Linke 1
AfD 0
Other party 1
No party 1
Non-AfD You had two votes in the federal election. The first vote was for a candidate in your local constituency, the second vote was CDU/CSU 1
Voters for a party. How did you mark your ballot? SPD 1
(wave 8) FDP 1
Die Linke 1
AfD 0
Other party 1
You had two votes in the CDU/CSU 1
absentee ballot. The first vote was for a candidate in your local constituency, the second vote was for a party. How did you SPD 1
mark your ballot? (waves 5–7) FDP 1
Die Linke 1
AfD 0
Other party 1
Solid lines indicate items used to identify (i.e, X ‘or’ Y) as opposed to conditions individuals must have met (i.e., X ‘and’ Y).
Appendix B. Analytical Models
B.1. United Kingdom
B.1.1. Predicting Democratic Satisfaction by Populist Win (Imputed)

Democratic Satisfaction
One Week Post Referendum Five Months Post Referendums
Non-Leave Britons Remain Voters Remain, Non- RWP Non-Leave Britons Remain Voters Remain, Non- RWP
Post-Election − 0.091** − 0.083** − 0.084** − 0.078** − 0.078** − 0.080**

(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female 0.025** 0.025** 0.021** 0.024** 0.024** 0.020**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Employed 0.027** 0.028** 0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.030**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Religious Identification 0.067** 0.068** 0.070** 0.068** 0.069** 0.071**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Income − 0.002 − 0.002+ − 0.002 − 0.003* − 0.003* − 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
White 0.012 0.012 0.016 0.013 0.012 0.016
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Left-Right Ideology 0.049** 0.049** 0.049** 0.050** 0.050** 0.049**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.285** 0.289** 0.298** 0.290** 0.291** 0.299**
(0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Fixed Effects Country & Country & Country & Country & Country & Country &
Region Region Region Region Region Region
Observations 14,163 32,781 30,541 18,884 18,732 17,452
14
Unstandardised beta coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, in parentheses.

+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
B.2. Germany
B.2.1. Predicting Democratic Satisfaction by AfD Win (Imputed)

Non-AfD Citizens Non-AfD Voters Saxon Non-AfD Voters
Post-Election 0.028** 0.032** 0.030**

(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
AfD Win − 0.035+ − 0.039+ 0.014
(0.019) (0.020) (0.044)
AfD Win X Post-Election − 0.031* − 0.036* − 0.034+
(0.016) (0.017) (0.019)
Female − 0.051** − 0.049** − 0.036**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.014)
Age 0.000* 0.000** − 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employed − 0.005 − 0.002 − 0.021
(0.004) (0.004) (0.016)
Religiosity 0.073** 0.064** 0.065*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.026)
Left-Right Ideology − 0.006 0.040** 0.097*
(0.012) (0.011) (0.044)
Income 0.018** 0.016** 0.018**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Constant 0.467** 0.461** 0.410**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.045)
Fixed Effects State State Const.

Observations 34,917 32,952 1965
Unstandardised beta coefficients with robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.
+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
Appendix C. Alternative Specifications
C.1. United Kingdom
C.1.1. Comparing Means of Imputed and Non-Imputed Data

Meansa (SD)
Full Imputation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
U.K. 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47
Sat. (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.27) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Female 0.49 – – – – – – – – – –
(0.50) – – – – – – – – – –
Age 55.87 – – – – – – – – – –
(14.12) – – – – – – – – – –
Employed 0.47 – – – – – – – – – –
(0.50) – – – – – – – – – –
Relig. Ident. 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Income 4.95 4.89 4.91 4.91 4.88 4.89 4.89 4.89 4.91 4.88 4.91
(3.01) (2.99) (3.02) (2.98) (3.00) (3.00) (3.01) (3.01) (3.01) (2.99) (3.00)
White 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
Left-Right 2.99 3.00 3.01 3.00 3.00 3.01 3.01 3.00 3.01 3.01 3.00
(2.24) (2.22) (2.22) (2.22) (2.22) (2.22) (2.22) (2.22) (2.23) (2.23) (2.22)
a Entire sample averages and standard deviations presented inclusive of both populist (Leave) and nonpopulist voters. No missing data exists for age, sex, or
employment status and are therefore are not imputed.
15
C.1.2. Predicting Democratic Satisfaction by Brexit: U.K. (Listwise Deletion)

Non-Leave Britons
Post-Election − 0.079**
(0.003)
Age 0.001**
(0.000)
Female 0.019*
(0.008)
Employed 0.041**
(0.010)
Religious Identification 0.073**
(0.008)
Income − 0.003+
(0.001)
White 0.013
(0.016)
Left-Right Ideology 0.052**
(0.002)
Constant 0.261**
(0.033)
Fixed Effects Country & Region

Observations 13,282
Unstandardised beta coefficients. Robust standard errors, clus
tered by individual, in parentheses.
+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
C.1.3. Ordered Logit Results (Listwise Deletion)

Non-Leave Britons
Post-Election − 1.011**
(0.041)
Age 0.014**
(0.004)
Female 0.228*
(0.101)
Employed 0.522**
(0.123)
Religious Identification 0.934**
(0.101)
Income 0.033+
(0.018)
White 0.173
(0.193)
(0.024)
Cut 1: Very Dissatisfied 0.453

(0. 414)
Cut 2: A little dissatisfied 2.547**
(0.415)
Cut 4: Fairly satisfied 7.531**
(0. 424)
σ2u 6.364**
(0.256)
Fixed Effects Country & Region
Observations 13,282
Log likelihood − 12398.939
χ2 1511.47
Ordered log-odds with standard errors in parentheses.
+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
16
C.2. Germany
C.2.1. Comparing Means of Imputed and Non-Imputed Data

Meansa (SD)
Full Imputation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dem. 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54
Sat. (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Female 0.51 – – – – – – – – – –
(0.50) – – – – – – – – – –
Age 48.26 – – – – – – – – – –
(14.78) – – – – – – – – – –
Employ. 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Relig. 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
Income 6.72 6.72 6.72 6.73 6.72 6.73 6.72 6.72 6.72 6.72 6.73
(2.60) (2.59) (2.59) (2.59) (2.59) (2.59) (2.60) (2.60) (2.59) (2.60) (2.60)
Left -Right 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.46
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
a Entire sample averages and standard deviations presented - inclusive of both populist (AfD) and non-populist voters. No missing data exists for age and sex, and are
therefore are not imputed.
C.2.2. Predicting Democratic Satisfaction by Populist Win (Listwise Deletion)

Non-AfD Citizens
AfD Win X Post-Election − 0.048**

(0.016)
AfD Win − 0.029
(0.024)
Post-Election 0.027**
(0.002)
Age 0.000*
(0.000)
Female − 0.048**
(0.004)
Employed − 0.004
(0.005)
Religiosity 0.072**
(0.008)
Income 0.017**
(0.001)
White 0.013
(0.016)
(0.012)
Constant 0.461**
(0.014)
Fixed Effects State

Observations 22,146
Unstandardised beta coefficients. Robust standard errors, clus
tered by individual, in parentheses.
+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
C.2.3. Ordered Logit Results (Listwise Deletion)

Non-AfD Citizens
AfD Win X Post-Election − 0.776*

(0.307)
AfD Win − 0.451
(0.388)
Post-Election 0.433**
(0.032)
Age 0.006*
(0.002)
Female − 0.842**
(0.069)
Employed − 0.081
(0.077)
Religiosity 1.181**
(0.125)
17
(continued )
Non-AfD Citizens
Income 0.283**
(0.015)
White 0.013
(0.016)
(0.178)
Cut 1: Not at all satisfied − 4.190**

(0.245)
Cut 2: Not very satisfied − 1.493**
(0.240)
Cut 3: Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 2.379**
(0.240)
Cut 4: Fairly satisfied 7.212**
(0.249)
σ2u 7.659**
(0.223)
Fixed Effects State

Observations 22,146
Log likelihood − 23576.401
χ2 1066.536
Ordered log-odds with standard errors in parentheses.
+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
C.2.4. Democratic Satisfaction by Party Loss (Imputed)

Non-AfD Citizens Non-AfD Voters
First First & Second First First & Second
Loss X Post-Election 0.002 0.004 − 0.001 0.002

(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Post-Election 0.029** 0.028** 0.032** 0.031**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
First & Second Vote Party Loss − 0.007+ − 0.021**
(0.004) (0.004)
First Vote Party Loss 0.001 − 0.014**
(0.004) (0.004)
Female − 0.051** − 0.052** − 0.049** − 0.050**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employed − 0.005 − 0.005 − 0.002 − 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Religiosity 0.071** 0.070** 0.062** 0.061**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Left-Right Ideology 0.027* 0.023* 0.033** 0.029*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Income 0.017** 0.017** 0.016** 0.016**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.449** 0.455** 0.472** 0.477**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Fixed Effects State State State State

Observations 34,917 34,917 32,952 32,952
+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
C.2.5. AfD Democratic Satisfaction by First Vote Loss (Imputed)

Germany Saxony
First Vote Second Vote First Vote Second Vote
AfD Loss X Post-Election 0.018 − 0.018 0.018 − 0.019
(0.020) (0.044) (0.021) (0.046)
Post-Election 0.016 0.064 0.016 0.064
(0.020) (0.044) (0.020) (0.045)
AfD Loss 0.045+ 0.047 − 0.034 0.095
(0.024) (0.042) (0.049) (0.123)
Female − 0.036** − 0.030** − 0.014 − 0.032**
(0.004) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010)
Age 0.000 − 0.001+ − 0.001+ − 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
18
(continued )
Employed − 0.004 0.023* − 0.023 0.021+
(0.005) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012)
Religiosity 0.094** 0.084** 0.095** 0.087**
(0.008) (0.019) (0.031) (0.020)
Left-Right Ideology − 0.147** − 0.057* − 0.099* − 0.062*
(0.012) (0.027) (0.044) (0.028)
Income 0.018** 0.008** 0.016** 0.007**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Constant 0.450** 0.279** 0.487** 0.303**
(0.028) (0.060) (0.050) (0.069)
Fixed Effects State State Const. Const.

Observations 26,688 10,338 1932 5421
+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
C.2.6. Excluding Constituencies without AfD Candidates

AfD Win X Post-Election − 0.036* − 0.036* − 0.034+
(0.016) (0.017) (0.019)
Post-Election 0.030** 0.032** 0.030**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
AfD Win − 0.031 − 0.039+ 0.014
(0.020) (0.020) (0.044)
Female − 0.052** − 0.049** − 0.038**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.014)
Age 0.000* 0.000** − 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employed − 0.004 − 0.002 − 0.016
(0.004) (0.004) (0.016)
Religiosity 0.067** 0.060** 0.071*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.028)
Left-Right Ideology 0.024* 0.039** 0.077+
(0.012) (0.012) (0.044)
Income 0.017** 0.016** 0.018**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Constant 0.453** 0.463** 0.410**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.046)

Observations 33,528 31,629 1839
+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
C.2.7. AfD Favourability by Right-Wing Populist Win (Imputed)

AfD Attitudes
AfD Win X Post-Election 0.014 0.017 0.008
(0.017) (0.018) (0.020)
Post-Election − 0.023** − 0.023** − 0.015+
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
AfD Win 0.029 0.036+ − 0.037
(0.019) (0.020) (0.043)
Female 0.012** 0.009** 0.015
(0.003) (0.003) (0.014)
Age − 0.002** − 0.002** − 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employed 0.007+ 0.009* 0.053**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.016)
Religiosity 0.007 0.009 − 0.019
(0.006) (0.006) (0.030)
Left-Right Ideology 0.267** 0.259** 0.288**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.042)
Income − 0.010** − 0.009** − 0.011**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Constant 0.163** 0.156** 0.125*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.053)

Observations 93,112 87,872 5240
+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
19
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Electoral Studies 77 (2022) 102469

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

When populists win: How right-wing populism affects democratic

4. Data & results in the 2015 general election.

Fig. 6. Change in democratic Support Post 2013 and 2017 elections.

Appendix A. Dataset Details

A.1. United Kingdom

A.1.1. BES Survey Wave Dates

7 14 April - 4 May 2016

A.1.2. BES Survey Items

A.1.3. BES Population Defining Items

Non-Leave How did you vote in the EU referendum? Stay/remain in the 1

Voted Which did you vote for?a Conservative 0

A.2.1. GLES 2017 Survey Wave Dates

1a 6 October-10 November 2016

Federal Election - September 24, 2017

A.2.2. GLES 2017 Short-term Panel Survey Items

A.2.3. GLES Population Defining Items

You had two votes in the SPD 1

Appendix B. Analytical Models

B.1. United Kingdom

B.1.1. Predicting Democratic Satisfaction by Populist Win (Imputed)

One Week Post Referendum Five Months Post Referendums

Post-Election − 0.091** − 0.083** − 0.084** − 0.078** − 0.078** − 0.080**

Unstandardised beta coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, in parentheses.

B.2.1. Predicting Democratic Satisfaction by AfD Win (Imputed)

Non-AfD Citizens Non-AfD Voters Saxon Non-AfD Voters

Post-Election 0.028** 0.032** 0.030**

Fixed Effects State State Const.

Appendix C. Alternative Specifications

C.1. United Kingdom

C.1.1. Comparing Means of Imputed and Non-Imputed Data

C.1.2. Predicting Democratic Satisfaction by Brexit: U.K. (Listwise Deletion)

Fixed Effects Country & Region

C.1.3. Ordered Logit Results (Listwise Deletion)

Cut 1: Very Dissatisfied 0.453

C.2.1. Comparing Means of Imputed and Non-Imputed Data

C.2.2. Predicting Democratic Satisfaction by Populist Win (Listwise Deletion)

AfD Win X Post-Election − 0.048**

Fixed Effects State

C.2.3. Ordered Logit Results (Listwise Deletion)

AfD Win X Post-Election − 0.776*

Cut 1: Not at all satisfied − 4.190**

Fixed Effects State

C.2.4. Democratic Satisfaction by Party Loss (Imputed)

Non-AfD Citizens Non-AfD Voters

First First & Second First First & Second

Loss X Post-Election 0.002 0.004 − 0.001 0.002

Fixed Effects State State State State

C.2.5. AfD Democratic Satisfaction by First Vote Loss (Imputed)

Fixed Effects State State Const. Const.

C.2.6. Excluding Constituencies without AfD Candidates

Fixed Effects State State Const.

C.2.7. AfD Favourability by Right-Wing Populist Win (Imputed)

Fixed Effects State State Const.

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Post-Election − 0.091 − 0.083 − 0.084 − 0.078 − 0.078 − 0.080

Post-Election 0.028 0.032 0.030**