Professional Documents
Culture Documents
HERMANN BECK
BEFORE THE
HOLOCAUST
antisemitic violence and the reaction of
German elites and institutions during
the Nazi takeover
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PREFACE
The focal point of this book is the wave of antisemitic violence that
engulfed Germany in the early spring of and the reactions of
German institutions and elites to the antisemitic attacks and discrim-
ination. When I first discovered the existence and magnitude of local,
grassroots anti-Jewish violence perpetrated mostly by SA units and
uncoordinated from above, setting in a mere five weeks after Hitler
was appointed Chancellor, my first reaction was incredulity, for nei-
ther the fact that it happened nor its enormous extent are adequately
recognized in the historical literature. “Why was it not stopped?” was
my first question after discovering evidence of this antisemitic vio-
lence in the archives, since by early March the Nazi dictatorship
was not yet fully ensconced in power and some opportunities to
oppose certain actions and policies still seemed to exist. My attention
therefore naturally turned to those institutions in the German State
and society, and the elites who led them, that might have intervened
in the early spring of . If German institutions and elites could not
put a halt to antisemitic violence at this early stage of the Nazi
takeover, how could anyone reasonably expect that this might happen
at a later point, in or during the war, when the repressive
apparatus of the dictatorship was fully established? Was it not the
case that forfeiting the chance to put a stop to antisemitic violence and
legislation in March and April meant that the opportunity would
be lost for good?
These thoughts crossed my mind over a decade ago while I was
researching the relationship between the Nazi Party and Hitler’s conser-
vative coalition partner, the German National People’s Party (DNVP, or
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. See The Fateful Alliance. German Conservatives and Nazis in : The Machtergreifung in a New Light
(Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, ); “Konflikte zwischen Deutschnationalen
und Nationalsozialisten während der Machtergreifungszeit,” Historische Zeitschrift, (),
–; “The Antibourgeois Character of National Socialism,” Journal of Modern History,
(), –.
. Cyril Levitt, “The Prosecution of Antisemites by the Courts in the Weimar Republic: Was
Justice Served?” Leo Baeck Yearbook, (), –.
vi
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vii
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. The Origins of the Authoritarian Welfare State in Prussia: Conservatives, Bureaucracy, and the Social
Question, – (Ann Arbor: Michigan Press, ); “The Social Policies of Prussian
Officials: The Bureaucracy in a New Light,” Journal of Modern History, (), –;
“Die Rolle des Sozialkonservatismus in der preußisch-deutschen Geschichte als Forschungs-
problem,” Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands, (), –; “Konservative
Politik und Modernisierung in Preußen, –,” in Thomas Stamm-Kuhlmann, ed.,
Pommern im . Jahrhundert. Staatliche und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung in vergleichender Perspektive
(Cologne: Böhlau, ), –.
. The constituent element of the Bildungsbürgertum was the common Bildung of its members.
The notion was shaped by a belief in human perfectibility, specifically that an individual’s
potential could be realized through personal improvement and education. This was the
central notion of German Idealism and a cornerstone of Wilhelm von Humboldt’s reform
of the Prussian university system, from where the concept spread throughout Germany.
viii
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ix
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x
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xi
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CONTENTS
Introduction
The Search for Archival Evidence
The Wider Implications: Which Institutions Were in a
Position to Help?
Overview of Contents
Previous Literature on Antisemitic Violence in
. Murder
Categories of Anti-Jewish Murder
The “Spontaneous” Murder
Murder while in Custody
The Planned Murder
. Boycott
Boycott Movements before April
Global Protests and Boycotts against Germany
The Boycott of April
Psychological Implications of the Boycott
Continuation of the Boycott Movement
xv
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Bibliography
Acknowledgements
Index
xvi
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
LIST OF ARCHIVES
Hamburg
Stettin
Bremen
Berlin
Hanover
Magdeburg
Duisburg Leipzig
Dresden Breslau
Cologne Chemnitz
Nuremberg
Stuttgart
INTRODUCTION
I n the Preface I outlined how I happened upon the problems and events
discussed in this book while researching the conflict-ridden relation-
ship between the Nazi Party and the conservative German National
People’s Party, whose coalition brought Hitler to power at the end of
January . As I went through what is left of the conservative party
files,1 I was surprised by the large number of complaints about antise-
mitic attacks from members of the conservative party, by the violent
attacks on Jewish businesses, and pleas for help from conservative Jewish
Germans. Had Weimar’s legal system, which was still largely functional
in February, stopped working so abruptly within the space of less than
a month? Once I fully realized the extent of antisemitic violence in
March and April , one question immediately sprang to mind: if
anti-Jewish violence was so widespread during this time, why has previ-
ous research on the period of the Nazi takeover rarely stressed the
prevalence of violent antisemitism? Studies dealing with the period
from the perspective of the fate of German Jews focus primarily on
the economic aspects of violence and exclusion, such as the boycott of
shops and lawyers’ and doctors’ offices on April , as well as on the
discriminatory legislation of April , but antisemitic violence as such,
though mentioned, is rarely thoroughly examined, let alone in the
. Until the early s, these were housed in the Zentrales Staatsarchiv I of the German
Democratic Republic in Potsdam and then relocated to the Bundesarchiv Berlin in Berlin-
Lichterfelde.
Before the Holocaust: Antisemitic Violence and the Reaction of German Elites and Institutions during the Nazi Takeover.
Hermann Beck, Oxford University Press. © Hermann Beck 2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192865076.003.0001
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context of relevant social and political forces that may have impacted or
mitigated it.2 The answer gradually became clear: the surviving documen-
tation, as far as it still exists, is deeply hidden in different archival holdings,
since antisemitic attacks went, for the most part, unreported and therefore
cannot be found in police files. This section thus deals with the search for
archival evidence to gain as complete a picture as possible of the extent of
antisemitic violence, though it should be kept in mind that since many
crimes against Germany’s Jews went unrecorded, even a systematic explor-
ation of German archives can yield only fragmentary results.
As the vast number of complaints in conservative party files left no
doubt that there must have been countless attacks, I began to dig deeper
and searched for further information in other archival holdings. In the
files of the Reich Chancellery I found hundreds of complaints from
foreign delegations in Berlin that protested against violent attacks per-
petrated against their Jewish citizens, including reports from the Polish,
French, Swiss, and United States consulates about acts of provocation
and violence directed against Jewish citizens of those countries.3 In the
holdings of the Prussian Ministry of Justice in the Geheimes Staatsarchiv
Preußischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin-Dahlem I discovered documents relat-
ing to several antisemitic murders committed in the spring of .4 And
among the files of the British military government after I found trial
documents on anti-Jewish attacks, murders, and so-called Prangermärsche
(“pillory marches”) that occurred in but were prosecuted only after
the Second World War and collected under the heading “Crimes Com-
mitted during the National Socialist Revolution.”5
. For previous research on antisemitic violence in , see the fourth section of this
Introduction.
. BA Berlin, R II, no. , “NSDAP,” –; –; –; –; –; –.
. GStAPK Dahlem, Rep. a, no. , “Wegen Ermordung des jüdischen Milchhändlers Max
Kassel, März–Mai ;” Rep. a, no. , “Wegen Ermordung des jüdischen Rechtsan-
walts Schumm aus Neidenburg;” Rep. a, no. , “Ermittlungsverfahren gegen Unbe-
kannt wegen Ermordung des jüdischen Zahnarztes Dr. Alfred Meyer, Kommunist in
Wuppertal-Barmen am . Mai .”
. See, for example, BA Koblenz, Oberster Gerichtshof für die Britische Zone, Z, no. ,
“Strafsache gegen Karl Saucke wegen Freiheitsberaubung und Misshandlung von Angehöri-
gen linksgerichteter Parteien und Juden in Seesen;” no. , “Tötung eines jüdischen
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. This happened, for example, in the murder cases of Max Kassel, Peter Stieldorf, Friedrich
Schumm, Felix Fechenbach, Fritz Solmitz, Wilhelm Spiegel, and Alfred Meyer, all of which
are discussed in Chapter below.
. This occurred, for example, in the post-war murder trials of Max Kassel and Felix Fechen-
bach. In the latter case the chauffeur, who was only marginally involved, was sentenced to
five years’ imprisonment.
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. Documents on British Foreign Policy –, nd series, IV (London: HMSO, ), –;
vol. V (London: HMSO, ), –; Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers ,
vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, ), –.
. Michael Williams, “Nazi Deeds Worst in History,” NYT, June .
. The figure for murders and manslaughters compares with , male and , female
suicides (); Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, (Berlin: Statistisches Reichsamt,
), –.
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of , which parties and other institutions of the German State and
society were in a position to intervene on behalf of the victims?
. Ironically, it was drafted by Hitler’s predecessors in office with an eye toward controlling
the activities of the Nazi Party.
. In , Prussia had ,. sq. km (Germany without the Saar ,. sq. km), with a
population of ,, (total German population: ,, million); Statistisches Jahrbuch
(), –.
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. Heinrich August Winkler, Der Weg in die Katastrophe. Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der
Weimarer Republik bis , nd ed. (Bonn: Dietz, ), ; Erich Matthias, “Die
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands,” in Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey, eds.,
Das Ende der Parteien (Düsseldorf: Droste, ), –.
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Party. Now letters could be opened, houses searched, and suspects held
without a warrant. Those interned had no right of appeal and redress for
false arrest. Since the Reichstag fire decree was not accompanied by
provisions about how to implement the law, as was customary, its
execution was left to the ministers of interior of the different German
states. It also authorized the Reich government to take over full
powers in any of the German states whose governments were unable
to restore public order, which was significant in the case of those states
where the NSDAP was not yet part of government. These states—
Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, Schaumburg-Lippe, Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden,
Württemberg, Saxony, and Bavaria—were taken over in the weeks
following the March elections.
Perhaps most significant of all was the fact that the Reichstag fire and
the seemingly decisive actions of the new Nazi government against the
perceived communist threat (by early March the NSDAP was clearly
considered the dominant force in the coalition) changed the public
mood in favor of Hitler and the NSDAP, widely seen as the only leader
and party ready to save Germany from communism. As the Nazi oppon-
ent Theodor Eschenburg wrote in his memoirs, the Reichstag fire was
“the first event that sent chilling fright through our bones . . . A premon-
ition went through Germany: Now things are getting dangerous.”19
During the last week of the election campaign the NSDAP therefore
enjoyed a decided advantage that was reflected in the voter turnout
(. percent) and, to a certain extent, in election results: the NSDAP
gained . million votes (from . to . million) and rose from . to
. percent of the national electorate, while conservative support
remained stagnant at percent. Together the NSDAP/DNVP coalition
enjoyed an absolute majority after March . Nazi tactics of outlawing
the KPD while letting voters cast their ballot for the communists now
bore fruit. The Communist deputies who had been elected (the KPD
. Theodor Eschenburg, Letzten Endes meine ich doch. Erinnerungen, – (Berlin: Siedler,
), .
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had received . percent of the vote) went into hiding or were arrested,
and without them the Nazi deputies alone had an absolute majority
in parliament.
All of this had been accomplished without flagrantly violating consti-
tutional provisions, which is the reason why some historians emphasize
that this was a “legal” or “semi-legal” takeover, though political violence
increased throughout March and reached a first high point in the course
of the Nazi takeover of the German Länder between and March.20 As
a result of National Socialist successes and the lack of resistance to the
takeover, there was growing defeatism in the ranks of those political
forces that had opposed Nazism. With the Communist Party already
outlawed, resignation now spread within the ranks of the SPD and Center
Party. In February and March, long-standing members of the Social
Democratic Party returned their membership cards,21 and after March
countless members of the Republican Reichsbanner applied to the veterans’
organization Stahlhelm for membership to protect themselves from Nazi
retribution, while the leadership of the General German Trade Union
Federation (ADGB) declared its willingness to sever its long-standing ties
with the SPD.22 All were stunned by the energy and dynamism of the
movement and the ruthlessness with which any opposition was swept
aside. The leaders of the Reichsbanner and other organizations, whose rank
and file would have been willing to oppose the new regime more openly,
were also paralyzed by the seeming legality of the Nazi conquest of
power, since open rebellion against the new government would have
. Karl Dietrich Bracher stresses the “pseudo-legal” character of the Nazi takeover in Die
nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung, while Klaus Hildebrand speaks of a “semblance of
legality.” See Karl Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer, and Gerhard Schulz, Die Nationalso-
zialistische Machtergreifung, nd ed. (Cologne and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, ); Karl
Dietrich Bracher, Die deutsche Diktatur. Entstehung, Struktur, Folgen des Nationalsozialismus, th
ed. (Berlin: Ullstein, ); Klaus Hildebrand, Das dritte Reich, rd ed. (Munich: Oldenbourg,
), .
. NHStA Hannover, Hann II A, no. , –.
. Hermann Beck, The Fateful Alliance. German Conservatives and Nazis in : The Machtergreifung
in a New Light (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, ), –.
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automatically summoned up the forces of law and order and the institu-
tions of the State against them.23
The Center and liberal parties’ support for the March Enabling Act,
in which Hitler asked for absolute rule for four years and which required
a parliamentary two-thirds majority, was another ominous sign of the
momentous change in the political climate. While there were threats and
intimidation outside and inside the Kroll Opera House in which the
voting took place, its ready acceptance cannot be explained solely as a
combination of opportunism and fear of Nazi reprisals if the decree were
rejected. As one of the liberal deputies, Hermann Dietrich, wrote after the
war, never before in his life had he received such an enormous acclaim of
approval as on the occasion of this vote. The outcome ( to in favor
of approval, with only SPD deputies voting against) was thus greatly
favored by the public mood, which demanded acceptance.24 In the spring
of , the overbearing propaganda and domineering publicity for the
Hitler government went to such extremes that even the newly appointed
Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels ( March ) spoke out against
“nationalist kitsch,” which a contemporary (anti-Nazi) diarist commented
upon: “All the lowest instincts of taste seem to have been unleashed by
the National Socialist movement and its victory. Busts of the Führer
made out of lard are the least of it. Toilet paper: ‘we crack down’ is not
bad either. And the postcard industry!”25 In petitions to the Reich
Chancellery, owners of coffeehouses asked permission to name their
shops after Hitler, rose growers their roses, and the mayor of the East
Prussian village Sutzken requested a name change to “Hitlershöhe,” while
a registrar official in Düsseldorf reported to local Nazi Party authorities
that a party member requested to name his child “Hitlerine” but had to
. On the willingness of the rank and file of the Reichsbanner to resist at the local level, see
William S. Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power, rev. ed. (New York: Watts, ), –.
. Rudolf Morsey, Das Ermächtigungsgesetz (Düsseldorf: Droste, ), –; Eric Kurlander,
Living with Hitler. Liberal Democrats in the Third Reich (New Haven: Yale University Press,
), –.
. Erich Ebermayer, Denn heute gehört uns Deutschland (Hamburg and Vienna: Zsolnay, ),
(entry from April ).
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settle for “Adolfine” instead.26 And this was just the tip of an adulation
iceberg. As administrative reports suggested, a generally favorable mood
toward the new government seemed to catch on even among former
opponents. In the second half of April, for example, the Regierungspräsident
(district governor) of middle and upper Franconia summarized reports
from his counties to the effect that “the takeover is viewed more sympa-
thetically, even among those not previously well disposed toward the
NSDAP, and there are indications, namely in workers’ circles, that point
to a certain leaning toward the new government.”27
This powerful wave of hopeful enthusiasm, which was often boosted
by opportunism but sometimes also genuine, buoyed and sustained the
“semi-legal” conquest of State and society. It was one characteristic of the
period; violence was another. This violence manifested itself not only in
rabble-rousing grassroots initiatives by local Nazi organizations against
perceived opponents and, after March, antisemitic attacks throughout
Germany, but also in countless acts of revenge and intimidation against
political opponents, neighbors, business rivals, or anyone who had ever
crossed prominent Nazis or Nazi organizations. Ubiquitous terror was
the essential lubricant in eliminating opponents and in rendering innocu-
ous potential enemies, convincing them that accommodation with the
new regime was the only option they had. It would be wrong to assume
that social and political prominence was a protective shield against Nazi
attacks even at the beginning of Hitler’s rule. Every German, regardless of
social standing, who had ever fallen foul of the Nazis was now in danger.
There were house searches in the homes of prominent parliamentarians,
such as Siegfried von Kardorff, the former Vice-President of parliament,
the house of former President Ebert’s widow was searched for Republican
flags, and in Einstein’s (empty) house Nazi stormtroopers looked for
explosives. Any pretext would do to intimidate those seen as enemies.
. Beatrice Heiber and Helmut Heiber, eds., Die Rückseite des Hakenkreuzes. Absonderliches aus den
Akten des Dritten Reiches, nd ed. (Munich: DTV, ), –.
. Martin Broszat et al., eds., Bayern in der NS Zeit. Vol. , Soziale Lage und politisches Verhalten der
Bevölkerung im Spiegel vertraulicher Berichte (Munich and Vienna: Oldenbourg, ), .
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In the same vein, members and even leaders of the German National
People’s Party, the NSDAP’s coalition partner, were not spared either.
Many German National mayors were forcibly replaced by SA leaders, and
numerous pitched battles were fought between the SA and members of
the conservative German National Kampfring. Since conservatives were
usually outnumbered, they mostly came out on the losing side. Attacks
against members and leaders of the conservative party were carried out
with astonishing brutality. The files meticulously list the injuries, such as
knocked-out teeth, head wounds, and the occasional bullet wound. Even
prominent conservative politicians, such as Paul Rüffer, leader of the
German National workers’ movement, were subjected to such attacks.28
It goes without saying that the political Left suffered incomparably
more. Terror against KPD, SPD, the trade unions, and the Republican
Reichsbanner was more systematic and on a much larger scale. Hermann
Göring’s so-called Schießerlaß of February, demanding co-operation
with “national associations” and the ruthless use of firearms against the
political Left, created a legal double standard and amounted to an invi-
tation to attack leftist parties and organizations. The vast majority of the
, inmates kept as “protective detainees” in camps, the more than
, prisoners temporarily kept in the “wild” concentration camps of
the SA, and the – murdered political opponents were members of
the Left.29 The opening of the first large concentration camp in Dachau
had been announced in the newspapers, and the existence of a large
number of SA “wild” camps and torture cellars was widely known. So
was the fact that neither the law courts nor the police could offer protec-
tion, and rumors as to what was happening inside these “extra-legal
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spaces” abounded. Fear nipped potential resistance in the bud. It was this
atmosphere of nationalist ecstasy and lawlessness, of seeming euphoria
and wanton arbitrariness, of fear, brutal repression, and the beginning of
tight surveillance coupled with hopes for a better tomorrow that char-
acterized the political climate of the late winter and spring of and
that forms the backdrop of assessing the problem of who remained in a
position to protest against antisemitic violence and come to the aid of the
victims.
Given the speed of the Nazi takeover and the political and psycho-
logical implications arising from the largely unopposed conquest of State
and society, few German State or societal institutions remained in a
position to intervene and lend active support on behalf of the victims
by the end of March . Those democratic parties of the Weimar
Republic that had traditionally opposed antisemitism, in particular the
left liberal German Democratic Party (DDP) and the Social Democratic
Party (SPD), had been severely weakened. The DDP, once the third
strongest party in the early Republic with . percent of the vote and
seventy-five deputies in Weimar’s first elections on January ,
whose predecessor in the Empire had already stood up for the rights of
German Jews, had merged with the antisemitic Jungdeutscher Orden (Young
German Order) in , even though this supposed accretion of its
strength had failed to arrest its decline. By it had been reduced to a
splinter party with a mere percent of the vote. In the second half of
March , it was fighting for its very survival and its five deputies
elected in March all voted in favor of the Enabling Act.30
The SPD, which had emerged as far and away the strongest party after
the first elections in January , had managed to salvage parts of its
support base and remained (a distant) second to the NSDAP in the
elections of , with about one fifth of the electorate behind it. The
party had once been a vigorous defender of the position of German Jews,
. On their position on the “Jewish Question,” see Philip Bernard Wiener, “Die Parteien der
Mitte,” in Werner E. Mosse, ed., Entscheidungsjahr . Zur Judenfrage in der Endphase der
Weimarer Republik, nd ed. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, ), esp. –.
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but this particular concern had gradually receded into the background
during the Republic’s last phase.31 Given their own precarious position in
the spring of , leading Social Democrats were first and foremost
concerned about the survival of their party and saving their own remain-
ing members and leaders. The issue of antisemitic attacks does not seem
to have been a major issue of discussion among party leaders.32 My
suspicions in this respect were confirmed during a visit to the Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung in Bonn-Bad Godesberg, where I found little information
on this issue,33 but was surprised to see that the prevailing preoccupation
of the SPD leadership at the very end of the Republic, much more so than
in the s, was to present the party as national-minded. Exertions to
emphasize one’s loyalty to the nation left even less space for the defense
of German Jews, who, in popular consciousness and despite all evidence
to the contrary, were frequently regarded as unpatriotic. At the end of the
day, of course, by the second half of March all political parties other
than the NSDAP were most concerned about fighting for their very
survival. They were then banned or dissolved between June and
July. In fact, among the political parties, only Hitler’s alliance partner,
the conservative German National People’s Party, retained vestiges of
political influence. This small but still very influential party, representing
large parts of the Protestant elites, was a doubtful last resort, since its own
past was tinged with antisemitism. The party’s position, as well as the
divergent views of some of its members and leaders on how to respond
to anti-Jewish discrimination and often-violent attacks, still deserve to be
. See Donald Niewyk, Socialist, Anti-Semite, and Jew. German Social Democracy Confronts the
Problem of Anti-Semitism, – (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, ); Hans-Helmuth Knütter,
“Die Linksparteien,” in Mosse, ed., Entscheidungsjahr, –, esp. –: On the historical
background, see Lars Fischer, The Socialist Response to Antisemitism in Imperial Germany
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ).
. See also David Bankier, “German Social Democrats and the Jewish Question,” in David
Bankier, ed., Probing the Depths of German Anti-Semitism. German Society and the Persecution of the
Jews, – (New York: Berghahn, ), –. The meticulously researched accounts
of the SPD’s history from to by Winkler, Katastrophe, and from to by
Michael Schneider, Unterm Hakenkreuz, also have little to say about the SPD’s reaction to
antisemitism.
. In the holdings of the “SOPADE,” and in the available literary bequests and press organs.
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examined here in some detail, not least in order to show that in Jews
in Germany had very few influential champions left.34
Apart from the DNVP, there were only three institutions in German
society that remained in a position to protest effectively, insofar as they
had preserved at least a semblance of independence: first, the Christian
Churches, in particular the Protestant Church, to which almost two-
thirds of all Germans belonged as tax-paying members.35 As will be
discussed comprehensively in Chapters , , and below, leaders of
the Protestant Church considered themselves as moral authorities,
responsible for upholding ethical standards throughout the country,
and frequently got involved in the political issues of the day; in ,
several Protestant leaders outspokenly opposed the Nazi party on a
variety of issues. Secondly, the administrative bureaucracy, which tackled
complaints from foreign consulates, and the judicial branch of the civil
service, which was charged with prosecuting and sentencing the perpet-
rators of antisemitic crimes. The reasons for their failure to do so
constitute an important part of the story presented in this book. Thirdly,
the Reichswehr, Germany’s small but highly professional army, which still
seemed autonomous and nominally free of Nazi influence in the first half
of . Yet it quickly became apparent that army leaders were, for the
most part, not interested in the issue, and not prepared to lend succor in
any form. At the German military archives in Freiburg, for example, only
two slender folders deal with antisemitism in . They focus on the
prehistory of the introduction of the “Aryan clause” in the Reichswehr in
February and also contain appeals by national-minded German Jews
to have their war service recognized as frontline duty.36 In the early
s, the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich prepared
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. At the military archives in Freiburg, I was given a list of possible research assistants who,
for a fee, would scour the files for visiting historians. Some of these researchers had worked
there for decades and knew the files probably better than some of the archivists. After
having spent a week in Freiburg with little to show for my efforts, I decided to discuss my
topic with some of the most experienced of these paid researchers. Without exception they
told me that they did not want to squander their time and my money. In their opinion,
senior German officers were simply not interested in this particular issue. In the
Reichswehr thus abdicated any responsibility for protecting Jewish Germans from Nazi
attacks, even those who had been decorated during the First World War, and it is therefore
not a topic of discussion in this book.
. The first quotation is from a March letter Seeckt wrote to his wife; the second from a
letter Fritsch wrote to his friend Joachim von Stülpnagel in November , quoted in
Francis L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ), , . For a
later period see Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, –. German Troops and the Barbarization
of Warfare (London: Macmillan, ); Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army. Soldiers, Nazis, and War in
the Third Reich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ).
. “Der Soldat und die nationale Revolution,” Militär-Wochenblatt, ( August ),
–, esp. .
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/5/2022, SPi
apolitical army that proved only too eager to jump on the Nazi
bandwagon.40
Overview of Contents
Part I: This book is subdivided into three parts: Part I focuses on violence
against foreign Jews (mostly from Eastern Europe) who lived in Germany
without citizenship; Part II on different forms of violence, from assaults
to pillory marches, murder, and boycotts against German Jews; and Part
III on the reaction of those institutions that were still in a position to
protest in the spring of —the Christian Churches, the bureaucracy,
and Hitler’s coalition partner, the DNVP. Foreign Jews were the most
vulnerable and thus became the initial targets of attacks by SA and SS
bands, who felt free to vent their hatred on them in the most brutal
fashion, unencumbered by fear of legal accountability. Chapter deals
with violence against “Ostjuden” (mostly from Poland), since they consti-
tuted the largest group and attacks against them are best documented.
Violence against them fell into five categories: (i) physical violence and
robbery; (ii) financial damages such as the forced cancellation of debts,
vandalism of property, and destruction of goods; (iii) rituals of humili-
ation, such as “pillory marches,” in which victims were paraded through
streets; (iv) kidnapping, often in combination with pressure on victims to
relinquish their businesses and emigrate; and (v) aggravated bodily
assault and murder. While German authorities were initially reluctant
to introduce specific discriminatory legal measures against Polish Jews,
as these might trigger administrative retaliation against the German
minority in Poland, SA and SS members felt themselves under no such
constraints as they threatened, humiliated, and intimidated “Ostjuden.”
. There were exceptions to this rule. For example, former Chancellor Kurt von Schleicher
intervened with Hindenburg in the spring of with regard to the treatment of German
Jews; BA Koblenz, N/, fol. (my thanks to Professor Thomas Weber for this
reference).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/5/2022, SPi
. In Germany, discrimination against “Ostjuden” goes back to the Empire. In the United
States, immigrants from Eastern Europe were also identified as an undesirable group of
newcomers. Leonard Dinnerstein, Anti-Semitism in America (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, ), –.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/5/2022, SPi
many of which are reminiscent of organized crime, and politics was often
used as a pretext for enrichment and for venting pent-up frustration on
defenseless victims. One cause célèbre, the July attack on the American
businessman Philip Zuckerman in Leipzig, shows that even when attacks
were an embarrassment for Germany’s reputation, so that it would have
been in the government’s interest to apprehend the attackers, arrests
proved difficult as the perpetrators were shielded by their SA superiors.
As a result of the publicity the attacks received worldwide, Germany’s
image abroad, which had just begun to recover from the country’s
stigmatization following World War I thanks to Gustav Stresemann’s
foreign policy, rapidly deteriorated.
Part II: The second part of this book concentrates on violence against
German Jews. Since boycott actions were often causally connected to
physical violence, they are discussed here as well. Chapter , “Violent
Attacks,” begins with a brief examination of antisemitic violence in the
Weimar Republic. While there was a significant amount of anti-Jewish
crime during the Weimar Republic, including assaults and cemetery and
synagogue desecrations, political opponents of the Nazi Party, in par-
ticular the SPD and DDP, usually made them public, if only to show up
their political adversary. Offenders, when apprehended, were sentenced
by the courts, though punishments were often lenient. In early March
, by contrast, violence was widespread, and the perpetrators mostly
went unpunished even when they were apprehended, as the documen-
tary evidence for crimes against Jews for the two-day period between
and March in this chapter illustrates. Following these case studies
is an investigation into the frequent instances of expulsions from Germany
instigated by violent attacks and threats, which tore many families apart.
The chapter concludes with attacks in prisons and in the workplace, such as
against Jewish livestock dealers and butchers in stockyards.
Chapter focuses on pillory marches and the so-called “Perfidy
Decree,” which was designed to repress rumors, criticism, and news
unwelcome to the regime. A widespread form of violence directed
against Jews and those who remained on a friendly footing with them
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/5/2022, SPi
. Paragraph of the ordinance read: “Whoever intentionally puts forward or circulates an
untrue or grossly misrepresented claim of a factual nature that is designed to seriously
harm the welfare of the Reich or a Land or the reputation of the Reich or a Land
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body; a projection from the thoracic side-pieces, forming a long
pouch, into which a fold on the inner side of the elytra fits, the two
being subsequently locked by the action of some special projections.
This arrangement is similar to that which exists in the anomalous
family of water-beetles Pelobiidae. In order to make this mechanism
more perfect the side-pieces in Belostoma form free processes.
Martin has informed us that the young have the metasternal
episternum prolonged to form a lamella that he thinks may be for
respiratory purposes.[499] About twelve genera and upwards of fifty
species of Belostomidae are known. None exist in our isles, but
several species extend their range to Southern Europe. In the waters
of the warm regions of the continents of both the Old and New
Worlds they are common Insects, but as yet they have not been
found in Australia.
Song.—Cicadas are the most noisy of the Insect world; the shrilling
of grasshoppers and even of crickets being insignificant in
comparison with the voice of Cicada. Darwin heard them in South
America when the Beagle was anchored a quarter of a mile from the
shore; and Tympanoterpes gigas, from the same region, is said to
make a noise equal to the whistle of a locomotive.[503] A curious
difference of opinion prevails as to whether their song is agreeable
or not; in some countries they are kept in cages, while in others they
are considered a nuisance. The Greeks are said to have decided in
favour of their performances, the Latins against them. Only the
males sing, the females being completely dumb; this has given rise
to a saying by a Greek poet (so often repeated that it bids fair to
become immortal) "Happy the Cicadas' lives, for they all have
voiceless wives."[504] The writer considers the songs of the
European species he has heard far from unpleasant, but he is an
entomologist, and therefore favourably prepossessed; and he admits
that Riley's description of the performances of the seventeen-year
Cicada is far from a satisfactory testimonial to the good taste of that
Insect; Riley says, "The general noise, on approaching the infested
woods, is a combination of that of a distant threshing-machine and a
distant frog-pond. That which they make when disturbed, mimics a
nest of young snakes or young birds under similar circumstances—a
sort of scream. They can also produce a chirp somewhat like that of
a cricket and a very loud, shrill screech prolonged for fifteen or
twenty seconds, and gradually increasing in force and then
decreasing." The object, or use of the noise is very doubtful; it is said
that it attracts the females to the males. "De gustibus non est
disputandum!" perhaps, however, there may be some tender notes
that we fail to perceive; and it may be that the absence of any
definite organs of hearing reduces the result of a steam-engine
whistle to the equivalent of an agreeable whisper. No special
auditory organs have been detected[505] as we have already
intimated; and certain naturalists, amongst whom we may mention
Giard, think that the Insects do not hear in our sense of the word, but
feel rhythmical vibrations; it is also recorded that though very shy the
Insects may be induced to approach any one who will stand still and
clap his hands—in good measure—within the range of their
sensibilities. There is a good deal of support to the idea that the
males sing in rivalry.