Professional Documents
Culture Documents
In her Complaint, respondent averred that: sometime in 1959, the deceased Antenor purchased from Miguela, in good faith and
for consideration, two parcels of land and registered with the Registry of Deeds; by virtue of the sale, the titles were cancelled,
and in its place were issued TCTs No. 517 and No. 518, likewise, in the name of Antenor; the two lots covered by the
aforementioned titles were thereafter subdivided by Antenor into several lots, and titles were issued thereon in Antenor’s
favor; and that sometime in March 1992, Enrique filed a claim with the DENR, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in continuous possession of the same lots owned by Antenor. Respondent further proffered that the claim of Enrique
over the subject properties created a cloud which may be prejudicial to the titles issued in the name of Antenor, and now
managed by his Estate.
RULING: Yes. Respondent was able to satisfy the requisites of the law for the filing of an action to quiet title.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.
1st requisite. Antenor paid for the properties in installment, and after having fully paid for the same, TCTs in the name of
Miguela Crisologo were cancelled, and a new TCTs were issued to Antenor. The properties were subdivided and TCTs were
issued all in the name of Antenor. Respondent was appointed administratrix of the Estate of Antenor.
2nd requisite. Enrique filed a claim with the DENR, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous
possession of the same lots owned by Antenor. The claim of Enrique over the subject properties created a cloud which may be
prejudicial to the titles issued in the name of Antenor, and now managed by his Estate.
Antero’s certificates of title, as found by the trial court and sustained by the appellate court, were issued as early as 22 October
1959. Time and again, we have upheld the fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence
of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It becomes the
best proof of ownership of a parcel of land.78 The validity of Antero’s titles were upheld by the court a quo and the Court of
Appeals and were not found to be tainted with any defect. Even as Enrique possessed certificates of title over certain portions of
the subject properties, these were issued only on 7 March 1973 and 6 March 1991. On this matter, we do not find basis to
digress from the ruling articulated by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
Well-established is the principle that the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies
on a subsequent certificate. This rule refers to the date of the certificate of title. Absent any muniment of title issued prior to
1959 in favor of appellants [Enrique, et al.] which could prove their ownership over the contested lots, this Court is left with no
other alternative but to declare appellants’ claim over the properties as void
Note: (KMF)
Antero's Certificates of Title: Antero holds certificates of title dating back to as early as October 22, 1959, which were found
valid by both the trial court and the appellate court. These certificates serve as concrete evidence of Antero's ownership of the
land described in them. The principle being upheld here is that a certificate of title represents an indisputable proof of
ownership.
Validity of Antero's Titles: The courts have determined that Antero's titles are legitimate and free from any defects. This is
important because it establishes Antero's rightful claim to the property.
Enrique's Titles: On the other hand, Enrique also possesses certificates of title, but they were issued much later than Antero's,
with the earliest being on March 7, 1973, and the latest on March 6, 1991. The legal principle being applied here is that the
person holding a prior certificate of title has a stronger claim to the land than someone relying on a subsequent certificate. In
this case, Antero's titles precede Enrique's.
Ruling: The Court of Appeals affirmed the principle that the holder of the earlier certificate of title has a superior right to the
land. Since Enrique and his associates (referred to as "appellants") couldn't provide any evidence of ownership predating 1959,
their claim to the property is deemed void.
In summary, the legal ruling is in favor of Antero because their certificates of title predate those of Enrique, giving Antero the
stronger claim to ownership based on the principle of priority in land registration.
the Petition is DENIED
2. Tandog vs Macapagal (GR No. 144208, 11 Sep 2007)
FACTS: Petitioners claim that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the land since time immemorial. They trace their rights to Casimiro Policarpio, unmarried, who died in
1945. He was survived by his nephews and nieces, now deceased, except Maria Bautista Catanyag. She and Casimiro’s grand
nieces and grand nephews (herein petitioners) have continued possessing and cultivating the land.
When petitioners decided to apply for the judicial registration of the property, they found that portions of the land have been
occupied by spouses Alfonso and Marina Calderon and Renato Macapagal, respondents. According to petitioners, spouses
Calderon used falsified documents to justify their possession of the land which they sold to the government. For his part,
Renato Macapagal applied for and was granted Free Patent which led to the issuance to him of Original Certificate of Title.
Because of these incidents, petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for quieting of title.
RULING: No. As a general rule, a cloud which may be removed by suit to quiet title is not created by mere verbal or parol
assertion of ownership of or an interest in property. This rule is subject to qualification, where there is a written or factual basis
for the asserted right. Thus, a claim of right based on acquisitive prescription or adverse possession has been held to constitute a
removable cloud on title.
While petitioners alleged that respondents’ claim of adverse possession is a cloud on their (petitioners’) interest in the land,
however, such allegation has not been proved. The alleged falsified documents relied upon by respondents to justify their
possession were merely marked as exhibits but were never formally offered in evidence by petitioners. We have consistently
ruled that documents which may have been marked as exhibits during the hearing, but which were not formally offered in
evidence, cannot be considered as evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value.
It is also important that petitioners must first establish their legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is
the subject matter of the action. Petitioners failed to do so. Parenthetically, they did not present any evidence to prove that
Casimiro Policarpio "existed" and that he is their predecessor-in-interest.
Green Acres sought to quiet its title and alleged that it is a purchaser in good faith and for value, claiming that it had no notice or
knowledge of any adverse claim, lien, or encumbrance on the properties. Neither was it a party to the DARAB proceedings nor
did it have notice of the said proceedings. Green Acres claimed that the DARAB decision casts a cloud on its titles.
ISSUE: Whether the DARAB decision in favor of Cabral constitutes a cloud on Green Acres’ title over the subject properties.
RULING: Yes. A cloud on title consists of (1) any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is
apparently valid or effective; (3) but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable; and (4) may be
prejudicial to the title sought to be quieted.
The DARAB decision in favor of Cabral satisfies all four elements of a cloud on title.
1st element. As Green Acres correctly points out, the DARAB decision, a final one at that, is both an "instrument" and a
"record." Black’s Law Dictionary defines an instrument as a document or writing which gives formal expression to a legal act or
agreement, for the purpose of creating, securing, modifying or terminating a right. A record, on the other hand, is defined as a
written account of some act, court proceeding, transaction or instrument drawn up under authority of law, by a proper officer,
and designed to remain as a memorial or permanent evidence of the matters to which it relates. It is likewise a "claim" which is
defined as a cause of action or a demand for money or property since Cabral is asserting her right over the subject lots. More
importantly, it is a "proceeding" which is defined as a regular and orderly progress in form of law including all possible steps in
an action from its commencement to the execution of judgment and may refer not only to a complete remedy but also to a
mere procedural step that is part of a larger action or special proceeding.
2nd element. DARAB decision is apparently valid and effective. It is a final decision that has not been reversed, vacated or
nullified.
3rd element. It is ineffective and unenforceable against Green Acres because Green Acres was not properly impleaded in the
DARAB proceedings nor was there any notice of lis pendens annotated on the title of Filcon so as to serve notice to Green
Acres that the subject properties were under litigation. As such, Green Acres is an innocent purchaser for value.
4th element. It is likewise apparently may be prejudicial to Green Acres’ titles since it orders the cancellation of the titles of the
Spouses Moraga and Filcon all from which Green Acres derived its titles.
Petition GRANTED.
Respondent claimed that the petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint stated no cause
of action. Since OCT No. 670 was genuine and authentic on its face, then OCT No. 670 and all of respondent’s land titles derived
therefrom, are incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive against the petitioners and the whole world. Even assuming
arguendo that the petitioners entered and occupied the Subject Property, they did so as mere intruders, squatters and illegal
occupants, bereft of any right or interest, since the Subject Property was already covered by Torrens certificates of title in the
name of respondent and his predecessors-in-interest.
RULING: Yes. Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their action was one for removal of a cloud on or quieting of
title, it does arrive at the same conclusion as the trial court and the CA that petitioners had no personality to file the said
action, not being the parties-in-interest, and their Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a cause of action.
According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title, must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in, the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Petitioners failed to establish in
their Complaint that they had any legal or equitable title to, or legitimate interest in, the Subject Property so as to justify their
right to file an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title. Without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property, the
petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their Complaint was
properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of action.
N.B.: Cloud on Title. – A cloud on title is an outstanding instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is actually
invalid or inoperative, but which may nevertheless impair or affect injuriously the title to property. The matter complained of
must have a prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. The cloud on title is a semblance of title which appears in some
legal form but which is in fact unfounded. The invalidity or inoperativeness of the instrument is not apparent on the face of such
instrument, and it has to be proved by extrinsic evidence
Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of
his interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the
property.
(KMF)
the Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in their favor, attached to and an integral part of their
Complaint, revealed that petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject Property on the
Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
P.D. No. 892 divests the Spanish titles of any legal force and effect in establishing ownership over real property.
P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14 August
1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering the Subject Property. In the absence of an allegation in petitioners’
Complaint that petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest complied with P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do
so. Since they failed to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined
from presenting the Spanish title as proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in registration proceedings.
A holder of a Spanish title may still lose his ownership of the real property to the occupant who actually possesses the same
for the required prescriptive period.38 Because of this inherent weakness of a Spanish title, the applicant for registration of his
Spanish title under the Torrens system must also submit proof that he is in actual possession of the real property, so as to
discount the possibility that someone else has acquired a better title to the same property by virtue of prescription.
Note that the tenor of the whole presidential decree is to discontinue the use of Spanish titles and to strip them of any
probative value as evidence of ownership. It had clearly set a deadline for the filing of applications for registration of all Spanish
titles under the Torrens system (i.e., six months from its effectivity or on 14 August 1976), after which, the Spanish titles may no
longer be presented to prove ownership.
Claiming ownership of the same land as legal heirs of the deceased spouses, petitioners filed with the RTC at Rosales,
Pangasinan a complaint for Quieting of Title and Cancellation of Encumbrance on TCT against respondents Republic and Sheriff
Juan C. Marquez.
ISSUE: whether the trial court’s dismissal of petitioners’ complaint for Quieting of Title was proper.
RULING: Yes. For an action to quiet title to prosper, 2 indispensable requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has
a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
The foregoing requisites are wanting in this case. Petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest lost whatever right they had over land in
question from the very moment they failed to redeem it during the 1-year period of redemption. Certainly, the Republic’s
failure to execute the acts referred to by the petitioners within 10 years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in
any way, operate to restore whatever rights petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest had over the same. For another, and worse,
petitioners never put in issue, as in fact they admit in their pleadings, the validity of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale. The second
requisite of an action to quiet title, namely, that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding alleged to cast cloud on a
plaintiff's title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy, is likewise absent.
ISSUE: W/N THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONERS HAVE NO TITLE TO THE PROPERTY THAT WOULD SUPPORT AN
ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE.
RULING: No. Having established that the disputed property is public land, the trial court was therefore correct in dismissing the
complaint to quiet title for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had no jurisdiction to determine who among the parties have
better right over the disputed property which is admittedly still part of the public domain.
In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for "an adjudication that a claim of title or interest in property
adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger of hostile claim, and to remove a cloud upon or quiet title to land
where stale or unenforceable claims or demands exist." Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two indispensable
requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) that there is a cloud on his title by reason of any instrument, record, deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding, which must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity.
The records reveal that petitioners do not have legal or equitable title over the disputed property, which forms part of Lot 43,
a public land within the Baguio Townsite Reservation. Petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, the heirs of Pocdo Pool, were not
even granted a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim over Lot 43, which remains public land. Thus, the trial court had no other
recourse but to dismiss the case.
Respondents presented a 1963 Joint Affidavit signed by Delfin and his sisters stating that Genaro originally owned Lot. No. 3341.
Sps. Tappa claimed that the affidavit was executed through force and intimidation. The RTC ruled in favor of Sps. Tappa stating
the title in the name of the Tappa is stronger and more persuasive than their 1963 affidavit presented by respondents. CA ruled
in favor of respondents and stated that their possession over Lot No. 3341 has already ripened into ownership through
acquisitive prescription (30 years na kasi na andun sa lupa yung respondents eh 1999 lang nagfile yung petitioner tapos hindi
naman dineny ng petitioner na since 1963 pa naka-occupy yung respondents).
The CA also held that the free patent granted to Sps. Tappa has no legal effect considering that Lot No. 3341 was a private land
and that no other evidence was presented to prove the allegation of fraud and intimation other the testimony of Delfin.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action to quiet title by the petitioner may prosper?
RULING: No, the Sps. Tappa failed to meet the 2 requisites in an action for quieting of title.
The free patent granted to Sps. Tappa is null and void and produces no legal effect considering that the Lot No. 3341 has already
become private land by virtue of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the respondents. At the time the
patent and the certificate of title were issued in 1992, Sps. Tappa were already in possession AT LEAST TO THE HALF OF THE LOT,
since 1934 and the respondents were also in possession of THE OTHER HALF since 1963. THEREFORE, THE FREE PATENT AND
OCT OF THE PETITIONERS ARE VOID NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT COVERS A PRIVATE LAND BUT ALSO BECAUSE THEY
FRAUDULENTLY INCLUDED RESPONDENTS PORTION.
The claim of the petitioner that the 1963 Affidavit was through force and intimidation was held to be “unsubstantiated”
considering the no other evidence was presented to prove such matter and only the testimony of Delfin Tappa was presented
which is at most self-serving.
NONE.
The Certificate of Title was not collaterally attacked. Section 48 of PD 1529 provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a proceeding in accordance with law.
NOTES:
FOR AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE TO PROSPER:
1. The plaintiff or complainant has A LEGAL OR AN EQUITABLE TITLE TO OR INTEREST IN THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THE
ACTION
2. The deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title MUST BE SHOWN TO BE IN FACT
INVALID OR INOPERATIVE despite its prima facie appearance of validity.
Sps. Yu claimed that prior to the purchase of the said property, they conducted a relocation survey and built a fence
thereafter. RTC ordered for the survey of the said property and reported that an existing structure of Sps. Yu were built inside
the property of Topacio. RTC ruled in favor of Sps. Yu stating that there was no sufficient proof that there was no instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that instituted a cloud of doubt to Topacio’s title. The CA modified the ruling of the
RTC and ordered the Sps. Yu to transfer possession of their TCT to Topacio.
RULING: None.
While Topacio was able to prove his legal title over the disputed property, he however failed to show that the title relied
upon by Sps. Yu as basis for their claim of possession, was in fact, invalid or ineffective. No such evidence of fraud was
adduced in this case. The survey ordered by the RTC was attended by all the parties with the assistance of their counsels and
private surveyors. The Sketch Plan Sheet 1 submitted by the Engineer categorically SHOWS THAT TWO CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
DO NOT COVER THE SAME LAND. THE TCT OF TOPACIO EULOGIO COVERS AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT PARCEL OF LAND THAN
THAT OF TCT OF SPS. YU. Therefore, there is no reason to quiet the title of Topacio and invalidate the title of Sps. Yu.
Topacio relied mainly on the last part of the Survey on his complaint. However, the records DO NOT SHOW that Sps. Yu was in
bad faith when they possessed the disputed portion of Topacio’s land since said Sps. Honestly believed that it was covered by
their TCT. Since they had introduced improvements on the said portion of land in good faith, Topacio as owner thereof, may
exercise his option of choosing (PURSUANT TO ART. 448 OF THE CIVIL CODE) between appropriating as his own the structures
constructed thereon by Sps. Yu paying the proper indemnity or value; or obliging Sps. Yu to pay the price of the said lot if its
value is considerably not more than that of the improvemets. Otherwise, reasonable rent must be paid by Sps. Yu if Topacio did
not chooses the appropriate improvements.
The Gaetos heirs denied and maintained that their family owned the property by virtue of SUCCESSION from a common
ancestor several years before World War II. Both parties presented several witnesses and pieces of documentary evidence.
Petitioners presented tax declarations, proof of mortgage over the subject property and witnesses. Respondents presented
witnesses and a San Juan, La Union Cadastre Cad 9739-D to show that the subject property was partitioned among the six
children of Leon and Praxedes Gaetos. The RTC ruled in favor ruled in favor of Gaetos and found that the evidences were
insufficient and they did not have requisite title to pursue an action for quieting of title. CA affirmed and ruled that the TAX
DECLARATIONS UNDER THE NAME OF THEIR DECEASED MOTHER, COUPLED WITH THEIR ALLEGATIONS DID NOT SUFFICE TO
SUBSTANTIATE THEIR CLAIMS.
ISSUE: Whether tax declarations and testimonies of witnesses is valid in an action for quieting of title?
RULING: NO.
In an action for quieting of title, it is essential that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property
which is the subject matter of the action. In the absence of such legal or equitable title, or interest, there is no cloud to be
prevented or removed.
In this case, petitioners did not have a legal title to the subject property. There were no certificates of title in their respective
names. The tax declarations under the names of their predecessors-in-interest, documentation alluding to mortgages and the
testimonial evidence did not convincingly establish their equitable title over the subject property. In view of their lack of title,
legal or equitable, there is no cloud to be prevented or removed and there is no case of quieting of title to speak of.
ISSUE: WON petitioners have a cause of action to quiet title against respondents.
RULING: NO. Petitioners have no positive evidence that their predecessor had legal title nor they are qualified beneficiaries
under the Agrarian Reform Law. Also, the documentary evidence petitioners presented, Certification and Pagpapatunay, did
not confirm their title over the disputed lot. Thus, petitioners did not have a cause of action to quiet title.
Note: Under Articles 476 and 477 of the New Civil Code, there are two indispensable requisites in order that an action to quiet
title could prosper: (1) that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to
be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy
11. PNB vs Traders Royal Bank (GR No. 217082, 29 Nov 2021)
FACTS: Spouses Calinawan entered into two credit agreements with PNB; said loans were secured by a real estate mortgage
covered by TCT No. T-26790; upon default, PNB foreclosed on the subject property. Spouses Calinawan caused the issuance of
TCT No. T-54000, that cancelled TCT No. T-26790. Spouses Calinawan secured another loan from TRB; the subject property was
again sold in a foreclosure sale with TRB as the highest bidder; and, TRB later consolidated its title and was issued TCT No. T-
76888 in its name. PNB filed a complaint for quieting of title against TRB and the spouses. Spouses answered that they already
paid the first loan and only the second loan is unsettled. TRB insisted on its right of ownership and prayed for dismissal. RTC
and CA ruled in favor of TRB and held that PNB’s action for quieting of title could not prosper.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in holding that PNB’s action for quieting of title against TRB could not prosper.
RULING: NO, CA did not err. Here, PNB already admits the registration of said titles to spouses Calinawan and TRB,
respectively, but claims that said registration were erroneous or wrongful because of fraud committed by spouses Calinawan.
PNB is clearly raising fraud as the ground for cancellation or nullification of TCT Nos. T-54000 and T-76888. Hence, PNB's
complaint may be considered an action for reconveyance and not action for quieting of title.
Note: Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of
the action.
RULING: Yes. Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper party to bring an action to quiet title. However, it has
been held that this remedy may also be availed of by a person other than the registered owner because, in Article 476 of the
Civil Code, ‘title’ does not necessarily refer to the original or transfer certificate of title. Thus, lack of an actual certificate of
title to a property does not necessarily bar an action to quiet title.
the agreement between the parties as a contract to sell, not a contract of sale. Ownership is retained by the vendors, the
Portics; it will not be passed to the vendee, the Cristobals, until the full payment of the purchase price. Such payment is a
positive suspensive condition, and failure to comply with it is not a breach of obligation; it is merely an event that prevents
the effectivity of the obligation of the vendor to convey the title.24 In short, until the full price is paid, the vendor retains
ownership.
The mere issuance of the Certificate of Title in favor of Cristobal did not vest ownership in her. Neither did it validate the alleged
absolute purchase of the lot. Time and time again, this Court has stressed that registration does not vest, but merely serves as
evidence of, title. Our land registration laws do not give the holders any better title than that which they actually have prior to
registration.
On 1970, Spouses Rumarate discovered that Hernandez was able to obtain a certificate of title over the land. Hernandez
claimed that the land was sold by Santiago to his parents on 1961 thus having succeeded the rights of Santiago, resulting to the
issuance of the certificate under their name over the lot in a cadastral proceeding held regarding the lot in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Rumarate, who here in possession and cultivated the lot, be declared as owners.
RULING: Yes, Teodulo Rumarate’s open, continuous, and notorious possession of the lot in the concept of an owner for more
than 30 years vested him with title over the lot pursuant to Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, thus becoming part of his private
property. When the conditions specified therein are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of
law, a right to a government grant, without necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
14. Aviles vs CA (GR No. 95748, 21 Nov 1996)
An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute.
FACTS: Eduardo Aviles, the predecessor of the petitioners is the bother of defendant Camilo. They inherited their lands from
their parents and have agreed to subdivide the same amongst themselves. The area alloted (sic) to Eduardo Aviles is 16,111
square meters more or less, to Anastacio Aviles is 16,214 square meters more or less, while the area alloted to defendant Camilo
Aviles is 14,470 square meters more or less.
Defendant’s land composed of the riceland portion of his land is 13,290 square meters, the fishpond portion is 500 square
meters and the residential portion is 680 square meters, or a total of 14,470 square meters.
Petitioners claim that they are the owners of the fish pond which they claim is within their area. Defendant Camilo Aviles
asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property with an area of approximately 1,200 square meters by
constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession
of the plaintiffs over said portion.
Petitioners say that the fences were created to unduly encroach to their property but the defendant said that he merely
reconstructed the same. Petitioners brought an action to quiet title but were denied thus this case.
RULING: No, Petitioners filed the wrong action. This is obviously a boundary dispute and as such the action must fail.
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to the said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to real property or any interest therein.
Petitioners fail to point out any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that could be a “cloud” to their title. In
fact, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted the existence of the agreement of partition dated June 8, 1957 and in accordance
therewith, a fixed area was allotted to them and that the only controversy is whether these lands were properly measured.
A special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and the petitioners should
have instituted an ejectment suit instead. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70,
or for recovery of possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners, in which
proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out.
RTC : (1) Declared Llanes’ certificate of title as null and void ab initio and all transfer of certificates of title as invalid and
ineffective; and (2) FEMCO is to be entitled to the ownership
and possession of the land in question
CA : Reversed RTC’s decision. (1) FEMCO’s Complaint for Quieting of Title must be dismissed
in accordance with the doctrine that a certificate of tile cannot be subject to a collateral attack; (2) action for quieting of title is
NOT the appropriate remedy where the action would require the modification/interference with the judgment/order of another
co-equal court;
(3) FEMCO had no personality to institute the Complaint for Quieting of Title because if FEMCO’s prayer would be granted, the
land in question would be reverted to the government.
ISSUE: Whether/not FEMCO’s Complaint for Quieting of Title is prohibited collateral attack on a certificate of title?
RULING: No. As a rule, an action to quiet title or to remove the clouds over a title is a special civil action governed by Section 1,
paragraph 2 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. It is a common law remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants for the benefit of both so that he who has the right
would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterward without fear introduce the improvements
he may desire, to use and to abuse the property.
Here, FEMCO’s complaint sufficiently proved the 2 indispensable requisites of an action to quiet title. Also, FEMCO has a legal
right in the subject property and the deed claimed to be casting a cloud on its title is invalid, null, and void. The SC also
pointed out that raising the invalidity of a certificate of title in an action for quieting of title is NOT a collateral attack because
it is central, imperative and essential in such an action that the complainant shows the invalidity of the deed which casts cloud
on his title. Hence, the heart of the FEMCO’s complaint is the nullification of Llanes’ certificate of title in order to remove the
cloud besetting its own title. Therefore, the CA was mistaken in deeming FEMCO’s Complaint for Quieting of Title a prohibited
collateral attack. Wherefore, FEMCO’s petition is granted.
RULING: YES. The evidence discloses that the Disputed Portion was originally possessed openly, continuously and
uninterruptedly in the concept of an owner by Juan Caragay, the deceased father of JULIANA, and had been declared in his name
under Tax Declaration No. 28694 beginning with the year 1921 (Exhibit "2-C"), later revised by Tax Declaration No. 2298 in 1951
(Exhibit "2-B"). Tacking the previous possession of her father to her own, they had been in actual open, continuous and
uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner for about forty five (45) years, until said possession was disturbed in 1966
when ESTRADA informed JULIANA that the Disputed Portion was registered in Mariano DE VERA's name. DE VERA had failed to
assert any rights over the Disputed Portion during his lifetime, nor did he nor his successors-in-interest possess it for a single
moment: but that, JULIANA had been in actual, continuous and open possession thereof to the exclusion of all and sundry. The
foregoing conclusion does not necessarily wreak havoc on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title. For, mere possession of a
certificate of title under the Torrens System is not conclusive as to the holder's true ownership of all the property described
therein for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included. Prescription cannot
be invoked against JULIANA for the reason that as lawful possessor and owner of the Disputed Portion, her cause of action for
reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to the property, falls within settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet
title to property in one's possession is imprescriptible.
ISSUE: w/n the action is barred by prescription on the ground that "as more than ten (10) years had elapsed counted from the
registration of the extrajudicial declaration of heirship on December 2, 1966 and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-31151”
RULING: NO. Respondent court manifestly failed to take into account the averments of petitioners' complaint that they "and
defendants are co-owners and possessors of the property" and that "the malicious and illegal acts committed by defendants
were known to the plaintiffs only during this year 1977, after Soledad Rapiz and her children were already claiming full
ownership and possession of the whole of the property”. An action to quiet title to property in the possession of plaintiff is
imprescriptible and that where there are material facts to be inquired into and resolved on the basis of evidence adduced by
the parties which will determine the legal precepts to be applied. Respondent court issued its dismissal order based on
prescription on the basis of its theory that "essentially the cause of action is one for reconveyance based upon a constructive or
implied trust resulting from fraud." Without any evidence in the record, the Court cannot put its imprimatur on such a
peremptory dismissal in the light of the pleas of the petitioners-plaintiffs to justly share in the inheritance and partition of their
common predecessor's estate.
18. Mun Rural Bank of Libmanan vs Ordonez (GR No. 204663, 27 Sep 2017)
FACTS: On June 20, 2000, herein respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur a Complaint
for Quieting of Title against herein petitioner bank. respondent alleged that: she is the owner of a 2,174 square meter parcel of
land in Fundado, Libmanan, Camarines Sur; she acquired the property through inheritance; she and her predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, peaceful, adverse, uninterrupted possession of the subject land. petitioner denied the material allegations of
respondent contending that it is, in fact, the true and absolute owner of the subject land; and the property was previously
owned by one Roberto Hermita (Roberto) who mortgaged the said land to petitioner but defaulted. The RTC ruled that, before
entering into the contract of mortgage with Roberto Hermita, petitioner, through its manager, did its best to ascertain
Roberto's claim of ownership and possession by conducting the requisite investigation. The RTC concluded that the weight of
evidence preponderates in favor of herein petitioner. The CA reversed the Decision.
ISSUE: w/n Court of Appeals gravely erred when it held that respondent has prior possession over the property through her
caretaker Roman Zamudio.
RULING: NO. Article 477 of the Civil Code further provides that the plaintiff in an action to quiet title must have legal or
equitable title to or interest in the real property, which is the subject matter of the action, but need not be in possession of
said property. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant
has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy. For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation
of every square inch of the property at all times. Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact
that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.
Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. In the present case, it has been established that respondent and her predecessors-
in-interest authorized Zamudio as caretaker of the subject land. Thus, Zamudio's occupation of the disputed land, as
respondent's caretaker, as early as 1975, is considered as evidence of the latter's occupation of the said property. Moreover,
respondent and her predecessors-in-interest declared the disputed property for tax purposes and paid the realty taxes
thereon, as early as 1949. Settled is the rule that although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. On the other
hand, it was only in 1970 that Roberto's father declared the subject property for taxation purposes.
Note: it is ruled by the court that the bank did not exercise due diligence in ascertaining who the owner of the land was before
entering into a mortgage contract with Roberto. In this case the possession of the owner, prior to the issuance of the tax
declaration to Roberto, is proof to quiet the petitioner’s claims.
FACTS: On Nov. 1988 petitioner-spouses filed a complaint against private respondents for "Quieting of Title To Property,
Annulment of Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-122 and P-138. The trial court issued an order on November 7, 1989 dismissing
the complaint finding that the plaintiff does not have legal and equitable title, further stating that “Legal title means registered
ownership and equitable title meant beneficial ownership. Since the plaintiffs have no legal or equitable title to the parcels of
land in question, it is obvious that there is no cloud to be removed or to be prevented from being cast upon. The voice of
judicial conscience calls for the dismissal of the instant action.”
ISSUE: THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE COMPLAINT HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION ON THE GROUND THAT
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO LEGAL OR EQUITABLE TITLE TO THE LAND IN QUESTION.
RULING: An action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession of the property. The rule is that the
petitioners may wait until their possession is disturbed or their title is attacked before they may take steps to vindicate their
right. The statute of limitation is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title over property in possession
of the petitioners. Further, the lower court interpreted legal title to mean registered ownership and equitable title to mean
beneficial ownership. It is not necessary that the person seeking to quiet his title is the registered owner of the property in
question. Thus, "title" to property does not necessarily mean the original transfer certificate of title. It can connote acquisitive
prescription by possession in the concept of an owner thereof. Since the action in this case is one to quiet title to property
whereby petitioners claim to have acquired title to the same by prescription, the property was thereby effectively withdrawn
from the public domain and became property of private ownership.