Carina Van de Wetering (Auth.) - Changing US Foreign Policy Toward India - US-India Relations Since The Cold War-Palgrave Macmillan US (2016)

CHANGING
US FOREIGN
POLICY
TOWARD
INDIA
US-India Relations since the Cold War
CARINA VAN DE WETERING

Changing US Foreign Policy toward India
Carina van de Wetering
Changing US Foreign
Policy toward India
US-India Relations since the Cold War
Carina van de Wetering
International Studies
Leiden University
The Hague, The Netherlands
ISBN 978-1-137-54861-0 ISBN 978-1-137-54862-7 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54862-7
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016956910
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Based on several years of doing research, writing, and further developing it,
this book has been a culmination of different insights which I came across.
It could therefore not have been accomplished without the generous help
and input of various people. Indeed, working at the University of Bristol
has been an enriching and invaluable experience, and at Leiden University
I was able to (re)continue on this path.
One significant debt is owed to my former colleagues at the School of
Sociology, Politics and International Studies (SPAIS) of the University
of Bristol for providing a stimulating academic environment. I am par-
ticularly indebted to my mentors Jutta Weldes and Andrew Wyatt, who
guided me throughout the process by giving constructive feedback and
encouragement, which allowed me to reflect upon my work and to grow
as a researcher. Within and outside the University of Bristol, Columba
Peoples and John Dumbrell also helped me with advancing the project. I
am grateful for their thoughtful comments.
At Leiden University, I am also appreciative of several people who
shared interesting insights with me as a student and as a researcher. There
are two people I want to single out. I would like to thank Shalendra
Sharma, a visiting professor at the time, for giving me the inspiration to
write about US-India relations back in 2007. My gratitude also goes out
to Adam Fairclough under whom I explored US foreign policy towards
India during the Cold War.
In order to gain more background information, my research also
brought me to Washington, D.C., and New York to interview experts
and/or foreign policy-makers in the field. I would like to thank all the
v
vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
interviewees, including Stephen Cohen, Teresita Schaffer, Dennis Kux,

Robert Hathaway, Alyssa Ayres, an anonymous person at the Pentagon,
Jamie Metzl, Satu Limaye, Michael Kugelman, Dhruva Jaishankar, Deepa
Ollapally, and Brian Katulis. I appreciate the time my interviewees spent
discussing US-India relations with me; they were very hospitable. Their
comments allowed me to concur my research findings while it brought the
research subject to life. This research endeavor and others have been partly
made possible by generous benefactors in the Netherlands, including the
Prins Bernhard Cultuurfonds, Fundatie van de Vrijvrouwe van Renswoude,
and Dr. Hendrik Muller Vaderlandsch Fonds. I am thankful for the finan-
cial support which I received.
I am also grateful that Palgrave supported this project. Sara Doskow,
Chris Robinson, and Anne Schult were always open to questions when there
were any. In combination with the review process, their endorsement and
encouragement gave new impetus to the project. Nevertheless, segments
of this book have also been developed from material I published at other
instances, including the article: “Policy Discourse and Security Issues: US
Foreign Policy Towards India During the Clinton Administration”. This
manuscript has been accepted for publication in Foreign Policy Analysis
(2016) published by Oxford University Press. It is available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orw043
Last but not least, my greatest debt of gratitude I owe to my family and
friends. I would like to profoundly thank them. These acknowledgements
would thus not be complete if I did not mention my parents, Cees van de
Wetering and Iris van de Wetering-Rewaty, and partner, Thomas de Jong,
for their loving and never-ending support.
CONTENTS
1 Introduction 1
2 Analyzing Policy Discourse 11
3 Developing US Relations with India: 1945–1993 29
4 India, the Underappreciated: The Clinton

Administration 83
5 India as a Strategic Partner: The Bush

Administration 119
6 India Has Already Risen: The Obama

Administration 153
7 Conclusion 191
Bibliography 199
Index 237
vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Af-Pak Afghanistan-Pakistan
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IFI International Financial Institutions
IMET US International Military Education and Training
IMF International Monetary Fund
JeM Jaish-e-Mohammed
LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba
MAD Mutual Assured Destruction
MEDO Middle East Defense Organization
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPCIL Nuclear Power Corporation of India, Ltd.
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRC US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSC National Security Council
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSS US National Security Strategy
NSSP Next Steps in Strategic Partnership
ix
x LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
PNE Peaceful Nuclear Explosion

QDR US Quadrennial Defense Review
RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
UNCIP United Nations Committee for India and Pakistan
USINPAC US India Political Action Committee
UNSC United Nations Security Council
WSAG Washington Special Action Group
WTO World Trade Organization
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The USA and India have enjoyed closer relations during the last few US
administrations than during the Cold War.1 As President George W. Bush
said in 2005, “India and the United States are separated by half a globe.
Yet, today our two nations are closer than ever before” (Bush 2005a).
During the Cold War, relations were often distant and strained. India only
gained Washington’s full attention during moments of serious interna-
tional tension in South Asia as the USA sought to “contain” the Soviet
Union. For example, in the late 1950s, the USA was interested in the
Soviet Union’s influence in the region and hence monitored the 1962 war
between China and India (Hagerty 2005, 1–2).2
After the Cold War, US-India relations changed dramatically: the USA
displayed a continuous interest in India since the Clinton administra-
tion. When both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998,
the Clinton administration’s first response was to sanction both coun-
tries, but as India appeared to be becoming a significant power, the US
administration re-evaluated its foreign policy toward India (Cohen 2002,
292). During the Kargil crisis in 1999, when Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate sent troops over the Line of Control into Kashmir
near Kargil, this was the first time, according to Stephen Cohen, that the
USA came out in full support of India against Pakistan (2010, 13). The
US support grew even stronger under the Bush Jr. administration: in
2005, the USA took the unusual step to set up a civilian nuclear agree-
ment with India, a non-signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 1

C. van de Wetering, Changing US Foreign Policy toward India,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54862-7_1
2 C. VAN DE WETERING
as India promised that nuclear material and technology would be used

for civilian purposes and kept under International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) observation. During the Obama administration, the President
even moved his own annual State of the Union address to the American
people to another day in order to be present at India’s Republic Day cel-
ebrations on January 26, 2015.
This book explores how US security policies toward India have changed
during the administrations of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack
Obama. It investigates what discursive changes made it possible for US
security policies toward India to take a different course since the Clinton
administration in 1993. The argument is that these changing security poli-
cies were made possible by changes in the underlying policy discourses
after the Cold War. Policy discourses help to construct how objects and
subjects, including security problems, security policies, but also the identi-
ties of the USA and India, should be understood. The book thus makes
use of a critical constructivist approach in which phenomena are seen as
socially constructed. If India is presented as “dangerous” or “poor”, this is
followed by different US security policies. These policy discourses enable
and constrain policy options available to foreign policy-makers. What the
book does not aim to do is to explain the causal question “why” relations
changed. Also, it does not provide a comprehensive overview of all US
security policies toward India. Instead, the book asks the “how-possible”
question in order to analyze the underlying discourse, as discussed below.3
“HOW-POSSIBLE” QUESTION
In analyzing how meanings are produced and attached to security issues and
the identities of the USA and India within policy discourses, the researcher
asks “how-possible” questions. The conventional approach of foreign pol-
icy analysis is to pose “why-questions”, which are often concerned with
“explaining why particular decisions resulting in specific courses of action
were made” (Doty 1993, 298). The problem is that foreign policy research-
ers treat the social background and material capabilities of countries as facts.
For example, when one asks why the USA wanted closer relations with
India, one could answer this question by referring to the positive effect of
India’s 1998 nuclear tests. However, this explanation is incomplete in that
“[c]ertain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships,
must already be in place” for the agent to imagine closer US-India relations
and to make subsequent policies possible (Doty 1993, 298). The US foreign
INTRODUCTION 3
policy-makers would not have imagined the effects of the nuclear tests to be
positive if India was constructed as a threat. In this book, therefore, I focus
on a “how-possible” question which asks how subjects, objects, and events
are socially constructed to make certain practices possible. With regard to
US security policy toward India, the question is then how it was possible,
“and indeed common-sensible”, for state officials to understand US security
policy toward India in a particular way (Weldes 1996, 283–284).
There has been a considerable interest in the transformation of US
security policies toward India, in particular during the second Clinton
(1996–2000) and both Bush Jr. administrations (2000–2008) (Kant Jha
1994; Rubinoff 1996; Cohen 2002; Schaffer 2009). However, these
authors tend to stress a specific event or an administration as an explan-
atory variable, instead of analyzing the changing discourses underlying
these policy changes. For instance, some researches stress the importance
of India’s nuclear tests in 1998 and the subsequent US-India dialogues,
which led to a heightened interest in India by the Clinton administra-
tion (Hathaway 2003, 7–8; Cohen 2002, 292; Talbott 2004, 4; Rubinoff
2008, 199; Schaffer 2009, 75; Malone 2011, 167–168). According to
Robert Hathaway, the nuclear tests of both India and Pakistan in 1998
and the dialogues changed the relations between India and the USA. Even
though the USA sanctioned both India and Pakistan through the imposi-
tion of military and economic sanctions as required by US legislation,
after the tests India was ready to engage in a more “responsible” atti-
tude now that it had shown its power (Hathaway 2003, 7–8). In 1999,
a dialog emerged between Indian Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant
Singh, and US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, in which both
countries tried to manage their differences and to fix a “broken” relation-
ship (Talbott 2004, 4). Accordingly, the ratification of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
(FMCT) were discussed in 12 rounds.
There has also been an interest in another explanatory variable: Bush
Jr. administration’s willingness to intensify the US-India relationship. In
the 2000 campaign, Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Adviser to
be, insisted that the USA “should pay closer attention to India’s role in
the regional balance” (2000). In April 2001, Jaswant Singh met with Rice
and President Bush in Washington, after which the Indians were informed
in advance of Bush’s speech on its Missile Defense Treaty in May 2001
(Tellis 2006, 128; Hathaway 2003, 7). The Indian government was one
of the few governments supportive of the limited missile defense system
based on ground-based interceptor missiles (Tellis 2006). Teresita Schaffer

writes that the statement helped to enhance the US-India relationship
(2009, 65). President Bush became personally interested in strategic
talks that led to the release of a joint statement between Bush and Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh on July 18, 2005, seeking to achieve full civil-
ian nuclear energy cooperation (Kapur and Ganguly 2007, 651–652).
Instead, this research focuses on the “how-possible question” and
how identities of India and the USA are constructed by the underly-
ing discourse. A few critical constructivists make use of this question for
US-India relations, for instance, Runa Das’ analysis of nuclear discourses
under the Bush administration and Himadeep Muppidi’s reconstruction
of India’s self-understanding during the Cold War (Das 2012, 2013;
Muppidi 1999, 120, 126–133). Muppidi’s work shows that asking “why-
questions” is not sufficient for understanding US-India relations. We
should also reveal more about how meanings are produced and attached
to subjects and objects. Muppidi finds it puzzling that India’s relation-
ship with the USA was so insecure compared to its relationship with the
Soviet Union (1999, 121). Since Muppidi argues that discourses affect
the relationships between the countries, he analyzes the reconstruction of
the self-understanding of India’s relations with the USA and the Soviet
Union. In order to have a systematic inquiry of these self-understand-
ings, Muppidi makes use of the concept of security imaginaries, which he
defines as an “organized set of understandings and social identities that
are productive of worlds” (1999, 120, 124).
Muppidi discovers that it is not the US alliance with Pakistan that is at
the base of this insecurity, as is often argued by other scholars; rather, it is
India’s nationalist struggle with the British (1999, 124). After its indepen-
dence there was a strong assumption in India that India was a great power.
For this reason, India conducted a non-aligned foreign policy which was
not primarily a policy of neutrality toward the superpowers; it was, rather,
a policy of showing these countries that they should recognize India as a
major power (Muppidi 1999, 126–133). The USA misunderstood this
understanding or “security imaginary” (Muppidi 1999, 124). The USA
emphasized that both countries had a shared democratic identity, but the
US articulation also sought to engage the Indian security imaginary to
gain support for the US anti-communist security imaginary. This gen-
erated insecurity as India perceived itself as being colonized again. In
contrast, the Soviet Union recognized India as a major power and did not
treat it as a colonial subject. For instance, the Soviet Union allowed India
INTRODUCTION 5
joint authorship: the Soviet Union allowed the Indian delegation to draft
a joint communiqué after their visit to the Soviet Union in 1955, which
validated India’s identity as an independent country (Muppidi 1999,
136–144).
Like Muppidi’s contribution regarding the Cold War period, I ana-
lyze US and India’s identities. However, my research concentrates on
US security policies toward India conducted by post-Cold War admin-
istrations. There are a few conventional constructivist researches which
also focus on the post-Cold War period even though they make use of
the “why-question” by treating identities as causal variables, as explained
in the next chapter.4 For instance, Jarrod Hayes writes about the impact
of India’s identity construction in light of the 1997 nuclear test and
2005 nuclear deal (Hayes 2009, 2013). In general, there is more inter-
est in the different constructions of India and the USA during the Cold
War. Several conventional constructivist analyses examine the impact
of India’s identity as a “democracy” on US policies during the Indo-
Pakistan crisis in 1971 and why this could lead to an increase or decrease
in peaceful relations (Widmaier 2005; Hayes 2012). Other contribu-
tions also address a specific explanatory variable during the Cold War:
images and perceptions (Isaacs 1958; Glazer and Glazer 1990; Heimsath
1998; Rotter 2000). They emphasize the importance of US foreign pol-
icy-makers’ perceptions of India (Glazer 1990, 4; Rotter 2000, xxx).
As Dennis Kux writes, “American images of India flickered between
exotic Hollywood portrayals of the British Raj and the adventure tales
of Rudyard Kipling” (1992, 4). It is surprising that works on post-Cold
War US security policies toward India do not pay attention to these
images and perceptions. I argue that these images and perceptions are
still important even though I focus on the “how-possible” question
rather than the “why-question”. The critical constructivist framework
allows me to analyze the meanings and social constructions that make
possible the foreign policy-makers self-understandings within the dis-
course (Weldes et al. 1999, 19–20).
PLAN OF THE BOOK

This book thus looks at how changes in US security policies toward India
were enabled by policy discourses during each of the Clinton, Bush Jr.,
and Obama administrations. It examines how meanings are attached
to security issues and US and India’s identities, also referred to as the
countries’ subject-positions, within policy discourses. In order to analyze

this, presidential administrations are identified as the main cases within
this book.5 Although the US political system is divided and fragmented
between different government branches, it is with the transferral of presi-
dential power—barring large crises—that policies can change most pro-
foundly (Kernell et al. 2008, 68, 71).6
To get a clear picture of how the security policies were made pos-
sible in each administration, one should also ask what “security policies”
exactly are. As mentioned above, policy discourses construct security
problems, objects, and subjects, but they also articulate security policies
to solve them. Since “security policies” are deemed to be socially con-
structed, this book first identifies the US security policies toward India
and the security issues involved during the Clinton, Bush Jr., and Obama
administrations and then ask how changes in policy discourses made the
changes in security policies possible in each administration. This means
that there are several subquestions to be asked: What were regarded as
the main US security issues related to India? What security policies did
the USA conduct toward India? What policy discourses made these poli-
cies possible?
The structure of the chapters is thus as follows: Chap. 2 sets out the
theoretical approach and the core concepts. It discusses critical construc-
tivism and poststructuralism, policy discourses, the concept of security,
Self and Other, and articulation and interpellation. All the subsequent
chapters (Chaps. 3, 4, 5 and 6) concerning the 1945–1993 period, and
the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, have the same structure.
Each chapter set out the US security issues and attendant security policies
related to India and then it reveals the subject-positions and meanings
attached within the US policy discourses. In Chap. 7 the conclusions and
implications are drawn from all the chapters, which will be related to the
main question. It sets out the changes with regard to the security poli-
cies and the US and Indian subject-positions within the policy discourses
of the Clinton, Bush Jr., and Obama administrations. Also, it examines
whether there are any differences or commonalities in comparison to the
1945–1993 period. Lastly, it discusses avenues for further research regard-
ing India’s representation in the US discourse.
All in all, it is argued that US security policies were made possible by
several constructions of India’s subject-positions within the policy dis-
course, while the US subject-position, a leader with large responsibilities
and a liberal democracy, did not change that much. Since the Clinton
INTRODUCTION 7
administration, India’s representation went through large changes and

helped to reconstruct any attendant security issue. Especially in 1997
changes became apparent within the policy discourse, which made possible
future US security policy changes and closer US-India relations: India was
presented as holding back its economic potential due to the Indo-Pakistan
conflict. Soon India’s representation as a growing economy became more
acceptable within the policy discourse: the development theme started to
overshadow the instability theme.
In fact, the book identifies four themes which were particularly salient
with regard to India since the 1940s: the development theme, the insta-
bility theme, the non-aligned theme, and the democracy theme. They
re-emerged at different instances and in different forms through tropes,
which are a figure of speech. Within the development theme, several
tropes emerged over time: India was constructed as poor, developing,
with successes and challenges, a growing market, a rising power, and
finally a competitor and a country which had already risen. As part of
the instability theme, India was articulated as emotional, critical, chaotic,
violent, hegemonic, being held back by conflict, and linked to Pakistan.
The non-aligned theme included tropes such as India as a neutral, non-
aligned, passive, an isolated power, and more recently, a reticent world
power. Finally, the democracy theme was reproduced throughout differ-
ent periods as India was articulated as free, democratic, great in terms of
numbers, a moral country, a model, having shared values, a natural ally,
a partner, and a pluralist. These representations enabled and constrained
foreign policy options available to foreign policy-makers.
To get to these findings, government documents were examined, which
outline both overarching US security policies/strategies and specific US
security policies toward India.7 The criteria for selection in US govern-
ment documents were either that the document was concerned with main
security policies of the USA or that it referred to India. With regard to
the main security documents, I examined documents officially published
in the period 1945–2015, such as the national security strategies, annual
defense and foreign policy reports, and the State of the Union addresses.
With regard to the USA and India, all the published documents that
could be found were analyzed. These documents include the speeches of
the President, press releases/press conferences by the White House and
Department of State, congressional documents, internal documents from
the Department of State (1945–1976), and the US Embassy cables avail-
able on Wikileaks.8
NOTES
1. The Cold War period can be defined in different ways, such as the period
1947–1991 or 1945–1989. For instance, both the fall off the Berlin Wall in
1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 can be associated with
the end of this period. During the Cold War, two superpowers, the USA
and the Soviet Union, were in ascendancy, and they were engaged in an
ideological battle and a military standoff involving many allies on different
continents.
2. Also, the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971 and the Soviet Union’s invasion into
Afghanistan in 1979 drew Washington’s attention.
3. Also, the book concentrates on state-to-state relations rather than society-
to-society connections. The USA and India have developed strong private
US-India ties between businesses and through the Indian-American dias-
pora, but this is not the focus of this book.
4. Identities can be approached with “how-possible” questions and “why-
questions”. Asking the “why-questions”, conventional constructivists exam-
ine identities as causal variables. The differences between critical
constructivists and conventional constructivists will be explained in Chap. 2.
5. The administrations are identified based on the comparative politics dis-
cipline’s interest in comparing internal political structures or single com-
ponents of a political system (Caramani 2008, 1, 6). This book deploys
three analytical strategies for the administrations: a qualitative method,
alongside a multiple case study, and a comparative case study. The differ-
ence between method and analytical strategy is as follows: a method
observes an object of which “the goal is to reproduce true knowledge
about a given object” and for which rules and procedures are needed to
produce scientific knowledge (Andersen 2003, xiii). An analytical strat-
egy, in contrast, aims at questioning our presuppositions so that we obtain
different knowledge than we already were aware of in our own world of
meaning. These three analytical strategies—the qualitative method, case
studies, and comparative method—are compatible with the discourse
framework that is used in my research. They are quite common in dis-
course analytical work (Howarth and Torfing 2005, 329, 332). For
instance, discourse analysts implicitly and explicitly make use of compara-
tive methods to have a better understanding of one phenomenon or to
use one interpretation for several phenomena (Howarth and Torfing
2005, 332).
6. According to John Gaddis, policies do not have to change with each presi-
dency. When it comes to containment policies during the Cold War, the US
presidents had five different “codes” or assumptions about the US role in
the world and the potential threats to its position, which did not change
INTRODUCTION 9
during each administration (Gaddis 1982, ix). Nevertheless, the codes

“tend to be formed either before or just after an administration takes office”
and do not change much after that (Gaddis 1982, ix). For instance, presi-
dents have entered the White House with different foreign policy agendas:
Clinton claimed “assertive multilateralism”, while the Bush Jr. officials
assumed unilateralism from the first moment in office, even though Bush Jr.
was following a pre-existing trend of unilateralist inclinations during the
Clinton administration, such as the rejection of international treaties
(Bennis 2003, 1–3; Dumbrell 2002, 282).
7. Government documents are the source of security issues, policies, and dis-
courses in this book. Documents are neither value-free nor propaganda
material; they are socially accepted and produced on the basis of certain
norms, ideas, or theories, thus not objective or factual (MacDonald 2008,
287). They refer not only to social relations but also to the institutions
within which they are produced, revealing something about the organiza-
tion’s ethos and culture (Bryman 2008, 526). They constitute thus a sepa-
rate reality: there is a “documentary reality” which is not a “transparent
representation” of the organization. For instance, documents are written in
such a manner that they are favorable to the author and to the organization,
such as the US administration that they represent; they have a certain pur-
pose (Atkinson and Coffey 1997, 47, 60–62). Foucault also argues: “The
document is not the fortunate tool of a history that is primarily a fundamen-
tally memory; history is one way in which a society recognizes and develops
a mass documentation with which it is inextricably linked” (1972, 7). In
terms of critical constructivism, this means that “documentary reality”
refers to the idea that “constructions of reality reflect, enact and reify rela-
tions of power” that need to be denaturalized (Weldes et al. 1999, 13).
8. The intertextuality among these documents is of importance.
“Intertextuality” indicates that “[t]exts are not meaningful individually; it is
only through their interconnection with other texts, the different discourses
on which they draw, and the nature of their production, dissemination, and
consumption that they are made meaningful” (Philips and Hardy 2002, 4).
Government documents do not only refer to each other but also to other
texts. They are situated within a larger political and public sphere, relying
sometimes on representations that are articulated by individuals, institu-
tions, and the media (Hansen 2006, 7). This also means that there are often
no differences with regard to discursive meanings articulated in publically
published or internal documents.
CHAPTER 2
Analyzing Policy Discourse
Although various authors discuss the state of US security policies toward

India during and after the Cold War, some are reluctant to make use of the-
ories. As one author argues, he is interested in diplomatic relations between
the Indian and American governments “without much attempt at theoriz-
ing” (Kux 1992, xiii). However, the argument here is that our knowledge
and facts are never objective and value-neutral: it is important to know one’s
position up front.1 This foreign policy research thus makes use of a critical
constructivist approach, grounded in poststructuralism. This choice affects
how the world and its social phenomena are viewed and analyzed, as laid out
in this chapter. In short, critical constructivism is concerned with how sub-
jects, objects, and events are socially constructed by underlying discourses.
These articulations are important in shaping foreign policy-making.
There are a growing number of foreign policy researchers, in general,
who are involved in critical constructivist research in all its varieties, includ-
ing Roxanne Doty, Jutta Weldes, and Ted Hopf. But David Houghton
argues that in foreign policy analysis, more constructivist work is needed
in order to revitalize the approach (2007, 24). The popularity of foreign
policy analysis has waxed and waned in International Relations (IR). In
part, the rise or decrease of appeal depends on historical events, bureau-
cratic- or psychological-level insights within foreign policy analysis, and
the popularity of structuralism and rational choice within IR (Houghton
2007, 25–26). A deeper reason for its shifting popularity is that “it has
not fully engaged with the rest of the discipline, and does not appear to

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54862-7_2
fit anywhere within the framework of the contemporary debates going on

in IR” (Houghton 2007, 25–26). Walter Carlsnaes agrees that foreign
policy analysis “has to a considerable degree become one of eclecticism
and defensiveness within a larger scholarly milieu which, on the whole, is
not especially engaged with the issues at the head of the agenda of foreign
policy analysis” (2002, 331). Foreign policy researchers have thus been
marginalized within the IR discipline.
This chapter shows the importance of foreign policy analysis for the
IR discipline by making use of critical constructivist and poststructuralist
insights and, more specifically, discourse analysis. It shows how it was pos-
sible that certain meanings were articulated and attached to subjects and
objects, such as the USA and India, within the policy discourses concern-
ing US security policies toward India. In this chapter, I further elaborate
on the lack of theory in the literature on post-Cold War US security policy
toward India. Then I discuss my use of theories, including critical con-
structivism and poststructuralism, and compare them with realism and
constructivism. Following this discussion, policy discourses, the concept
of security, and the articulation of the Self and Other (US and India’s
subject-positions) are examined. Lastly, it asks what “articulation” itself
means in combination with “interpellation”.
LACK OF THEORY
There are various theories that capture how foreign policy-making works.
What they share is a concern “with the way in which states understand and
respond to the world around them” (Hansen 2006, 17). However, litera-
ture on post-Cold War US security policies toward India is often descrip-
tive and makes use of an “implicit” conventional theoretical framework
such as realism and liberal institutionalism. This is most clearly reflected
in articles that concentrate on the (national) interests of both the USA
and India (See: Ayoob 2000; Schaffer 2002; Gupta 2005; Rubinoff 2006;
Mohan 2006; Perkovich 2010). For instance, Anil Gupta asks whether
India and the USA can create a partnership that will advance both security
policy interests (2005, v). His main concern is their divergent world views:
the different ideas about India’s nuclear status, the worry about the USA
as a reliable supplier of high technology, and continued US support of
Pakistan. C. Raja Mohan also refers to interests when he discusses whether
the partnership will be long-term; this will partly depend on mutual inter-
ests and the capacity to work together (2006, 32).
ANALYZING POLICY DISCOURSE 13
However, there have been growing examinations of post-Cold War US

security policies toward India, in which there is “explicit” use of a theoret-
ical framework. There are some works that make clear their engagement
with realist/liberal institutionalist theory (Nayar and Paul 2003; Hagerty
2006; Pant 2008 and 2009, with Joshi 2016; Ayres and Mohan 2009).
The study by Devin Hagerty concentrates on the emerging strategic
relationship in the context of security concerns and short-term interests.
Making use of alliance theory and the different kinds of alliances, including
alignments, ententes, and ad hoc coalitions, Hagerty concludes that the
relationship constitutes an evolving entente rather than an alliance. The
entente is unlikely to change into an alliance since security threats, such
as the alleged global jihad, have become more diffused and less related to
states. This requires states to have a greater degree of flexibility concern-
ing their alignments (Hagerty 2006, 14–15, 26–28). Baldev Raj Nayar
and T.V. Paul analyze India’s attempts to enter the “world’s major-power
system” and the possible prospects of this integration. They argue that this
has become especially relevant with India’s nuclear tests in 1998 (Nayar
and Paul 2003, 1). The major powers such as the USA and China have
pursued constraining policies by aligning with and providing Pakistan with
arms supplies (Nayar and Paul 2003, 1–2).
Some works also make use of a (critical) constructivist framework,
as mentioned earlier, even though they take a somewhat more narrow
focus in comparison to this book (Widmaier 2005; Hayes 2009, 2012,
2013; Das 2012, 2013). In the book Constructing National Security:
US Relations with India and China, for instance, Hayes analyzes solely
India’s democratic identity. He reveals why democracies do not fight each
other, based on securitization and social identity theory (Hayes 2013).
By exploring several security crises between the USA and India, he finds
that political leaders within democracies can securitize external states as
threats, but domestic audiences do not accept this construction in refer-
ence to democratic states (Hayes 2013, 1; Wetering 2014, 331). Das is
merely interested in US-India nuclear discourses after 9/11 as she argues
that security should be analyzed as a gendered construction (2012, 86;
2013, 1). She addresses “how the post-9/11 neo-liberal climate of glo-
balization has served as the context within which is articulated masculinist
and orientalist forms of nuclear discourses between India and the United
States” (2013, 1). In other words, she demonstrates how the US-India
neoliberal climate is constructed as a “value-neutral environment” (Das
2013, 14). Also, she shows how masculinity underlies these neoliberal
nuclear discourses of India and the USA and that masculinity plays a
role between the USA as the “West” and India as the postcolonial state.
Exploring the post-9/11 nuclear discourses, the USA is thus represented
as an “orientalist masculine” country, while India is striving to find its
“regional-hegemonic masculinist self” (Das 2013, 14). In the process of
this identity-making, India constructs Pakistan in oriental terms: it is seen
as a non-democratic country which needs to be taught how to become
democratic (Das 2013, 13).
Making use of a critical constructivist framework, this book does not
merely examine the nuclear discourse and India’s democratic identity, but
it also includes other discursive constructions. The next section further
elaborates on the theoretical underpinnings of (critical) constructivism
before it moves to policy discourses.
CRITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND POSTSTRUCTURALISM

Constructivism is a broad theoretical approach based on the assump-
tion that identities, practices, and institutions are “the product of human
agency, of social construction” (Hopf 1998, 182). Alexander Wendt, one
of the most prominent conventional constructivists, writes, for instance,
that social phenomena, such as threats or identities, have no fixed mean-
ings but are produced through dialogue and discourse between individu-
als and groups. As Wendt argues, “[I]dentities and interests of purposive
actors are constructed by [...] shared ideas rather than given by nature”
(1999, 1). They are a product of intersubjective interactions between peo-
ple. A threat does not exist independently of our social life and knowledge
but is brought into existence by processes and actors, that is, through
characterizations of threats in, for example, the media or political state-
ments (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, 5).
Constructivism differs from realist theories. Realists argue that states
display self-interested behavior within an anarchical world, where there is
no overarching authority and where states need to survive by maximizing
either their power or security relatively to other states. Instead, construc-
tivists characterize “anarchy” within world politics as a social construc-
tion. Or, as Wendt puts it: “Anarchy is what states make of it,” by which
he means that social interaction between states can change their shared
understanding of anarchy to a more cooperative system (1992, 401–403).
Realist scholars make a distinction between “material” and “ideational”
factors. Realist theories focus more on “material” factors, such as military
capabilities, than “ideational” considerations, including ideas, norms, and

identities, even though the latter is said to interfere in the decision-making
of states (Rathbun 2008, 296, 300). In fact, realism has included more
ideational factors since the 1990s because military capabilities alone do
not explain why the USA is less alarmed by British nuclear weapons than
North Korean ones. An attack by either one of them would have devastat-
ing physical consequences (Hurd 2008, 301).2 Nevertheless, realists do
not argue that ideational or material factors are intersubjectively shared
between people (Rathbun 2008, 300).
A critical constructivist framework is also different from a conventional
constructivist one as proposed by, for instance, Alexander Wendt, Peter
Katzenstein, and John Ruggie. When drawing comparisons between both,
as part of the postpositivist approach to knowledge, “Critical constructiv-
ists reject the proposition that discourses are merely ‘neutral’ or ‘objec-
tive’ forms of knowledge” (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, 6).3
We are not neutral observers who can step outside of discourse. David
Campbell also writes, “Discourse is [...] not something that subjects use
in order to describe objects; it is that which constitutes both subjects
and objects” (2007, 226).4 Conventional constructivists want to analyze
the social world without critiquing their own role as a researcher, that
is, the observer as actor. For instance, some conventional constructivists,
including Alexander Wendt (1992) and Bruce Cronin (1999), agree with
(neo)realists that anarchy is the foundational organizing principle of the
international system even though they maintain that it can be subject to
change through institutions or interactions between people. Critical con-
structivists question this shared assumption among these theories (Hurd
2008, 308–309). They find that conventional constructivists do not “self-
consciously recognize their own participation in the reproduction, consti-
tution, and fixing of the social entities they observe” (Hopf 1998, 184).
There are also other distinctions between critical and conventional con-
structivism. The latter makes use of causal concepts: they argue that a mea-
sure of causality is necessary to show how the norm or discourse matters.
According to Wendt, theories “imply hypotheses about the world that can
and should be tested” (1999, 87). But critical constructivists argue that
knowledge does not involve the uncovering of causal truths: this positivist
idea is historically and politically situated. Referring to Michel Foucault,
Lene Hansen writes, “Causal epistemology is [...] a particular discourse of
knowledge, which cannot sustain its privilege outside of its own historical
and political location” (2006, 10). Also, conventional constructivists tend
to focus on the content of norms and their role-defining qualities which

they treat as relatively fixed social constructions. These norms become
variables of their own. Critical constructivist authors, however, concen-
trate on how identities are imposed through dominant representations
and discourses. They assert that identities are too fluid to be treated as
variables (Klotz and Lynch 2007, 68–70).
Critical constructivism is, in fact, grounded in poststructuralism.
Poststructuralism is concerned with the analysis of “meaning-producing
structures” and identities (Campbell 2007, 223). Poststructuralists focus
on dualisms that structure identities, in particular, the inside/outside
binary according to which “[the] inside is deemed to be the self, good,
primary and original while the outside is the other, dangerous, secondary,
and derivative” (Campbell 2007, 225). In other words, poststructuralists
do not see identity as given: “they see identity as culturally constructed
through a series of exclusions” (Campbell 2007, 225). Power relations
establish the boundaries of the inside and the outside. The operation of
this power and identity takes place within discourses (Campbell 2007,
225–226). Like poststructuralist works, in critical constructivist analyses,
an emphasis is not merely placed on the constitutive or fundamental role of
discourses, in other words, on how discourses construct actor’s identities,
but also placed on how power relations between the actors are constituted
by discourses (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, 6). Ted Hopf indeed
argues that while conventional constructivists remain neutral on the issue
of power relations and have allowed for “premature closure”, meaning
that the analyst “risks hiding the patterns of domination that might be
revealed if closure could only be deferred”, critical constructivists claim
that power is important in any social exchange (1998, 183, 185). Critical
constructivism is about how social “constructions of reality reflect, enact
and reify relations of power” (Weldes et al. 1999, 13).
To trace these power relations, critical constructivists make use of
discourse analysis. Discourses refer to “systems of meaningful prac-
tices that form the identities of subjects and objects” (Howarth and
Stavrakakis 2000, 3–4).5 Jennifer Milliken agrees that discourses are
“structures of signification which construct social realities” (1999,
229). These structures of signification convey the meaning of things
through, for instance, language. Discourses are about the link between
social relations and signs.6 There is thus no distinction between linguis-
tic and non-linguistic practices within discourses. According to Ernesto
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, the difference between “the linguistic and
the behavioural aspects of social practice” should be collapsed (2001,

107). The idea is that everything, texts and practices, is meaningful as
discourses are systems of meaningful practice.
Making use of these critical constructivist and poststructuralist insights,
this book reveals how subjects and objects are discursively constructed
by denaturalizing, defamiliarizing, and making strange common sense
understandings.7 Everyday assumptions, including the nature of agents,
the relationships among them, and identities should be denaturalized
(Fierke 2007, 82). Denaturalizing takes place when you reveal “how the
institutions and practices and identities that people take as natural, given,
or matter of fact, are, in fact, the product of human agency, of social con-
struction” (Hopf 2000, 1763). In other words, although it is perfectly
reasonable to take social facts for granted when one is interested in under-
standing agent’s perceptions, critical constructivists are more interested
“in going beyond the agent’s point of view to examine those structures of
meaning and social practices that are the conditions of possibility for the
agent’s self-understanding in the first place” (Weldes et al. 1999, 19–20).
For this reason, “[a] critical constructivist approach denaturalizes domi-
nant constructions […] and facilitates the imagining of alternative life-
worlds” (Weldes et al. 1999, 13).
In order to denaturalize common sense understandings, the “how-
possible” question becomes useful, which asks how subjects, objects, and
events are socially constructed to make certain practices possible. As men-
tioned above, according to Doty, the causal “why-questions” presuppose
identities and meanings of subjects and objects, while the “how-questions”
examine “how meanings are produced and attached to various social sub-
jects and objects, thus constituting particular interpretive dispositions that
create certain possibilities and preclude others” (1996, 4). This question
can add something extra to foreign policy analysis. With regard to the
national interest, threats, or, in this case, US security policy toward India,
one can then ask how it is possible, “and indeed common-sensible”, for
foreign policy-makers to view US foreign policy toward India in a cer-
tain manner (Weldes 1996, 283–284). As Doty argues, “The possibility
that a particular decision or course of action could happen is taken as
unproblematic” (1993, 298). In addition, the “how-possible” question
implicitly addresses power relations which the “why-question” does not
touch upon by highlighting and problematizing the way in which power
produces meanings, subject-positions, and the relationship between them
(Doty 1996, 4).
By making use of poststructuralist and critical constructivist viewpoints,

one can thus analyze the relationship between the identities of subjects
and objects and foreign policies as put forth by politicians and the govern-
ment (Hansen 2006, xvi). I make use of various concepts, including policy
discourses, the notion of security, the concepts of Self and Other, and
articulation and interpellation, as the following sections further elaborate.
POLICY DISCOURSES
In traditional approaches, policy is what government is involved with: it
is something that “governments do” (Bacchi 2000, 48).8 Within these
approaches some scholars argue that policy should be about administrators
who try their best to resolve issues, even smoothing out citizens’ dissatis-
faction, while other scholars assert that there is a need for citizens’ input in
the policy-making process to keep the bureaucracy in check (Bacchi 2000,
48). Either way, policy analysts are thought to “stand outside this process
and can identify and monitor the impact of their values” after which they
apply a solution to the policy problem (Bacchi 2000, 49). These types of
policy analyses view policy issues as technical matters that can be pursued
through administrative processes (Fischer 2003, 4). In other words, they
embrace “a technically oriented rational model of policy making” in their
reference to the application of a scientific tool kit and objectivity (Frank
Fischer and Herbert Gotweiss 2012, 2).
In contrast, “policy-as-discourse approaches” take a different view of a
particular policy discussion. Policy-as-discourse does not frame policy as
whatever a government chooses to do with a problem but as a discourse
in which both problems and solutions are constructed (Bacchi 2000,
48–49). Problems only come to be seen as such if they are being articu-
lated as part of a discourse and the discourse “sets limits upon what can be
said” (Bacchi 2000, 48). In public-policy studies, for example, there has
been a rising interest in “policy-as-discourse” (Fischer 2003, vii). Writing
about welfare policies in the USA, Sanford Schram argues that the role of
discourses in policy-making should be highlighted. Schram writes, “Such a
perspective allows questioning how welfare policy discourse helps to con-
struct the ostensibly pregiven problems it is supposed to address” (1995,
xxiv). Bacchi also argues that we should ask ourselves “What’s the prob-
lem?” which is shorthand for “What’s the problem represented to be?”
(1999, 1). With traditional approaches, these policies are studied as if they
are attempts to deal with a pre-given, objective “problem” (Bacchi 1999,

1). Instead, these policy “problems” or issues are social constructions,
and they should be problematized; we should acknowledge that how we
construct a problem will affect how we think it will be solved. Bacchi refers
to this as “problem representations”, which policy analyses should try to
identify first (1999, 1, 17).
Less research is done with regard to the link between “policy-as-
discourse approaches” and policies in IR and foreign policy analysis,
although Michael Shapiro writes on strategic discourses. He explains that
these discourses are “the linguistic practices through which security policy
is represented” (Shapiro 1990, 327). Based on Shapiro’s work, Hansen
also writes that “policy discourses construct – as do discourses in general –
problems, objects, and subjects, but they are also simultaneously articu-
lating policies to address them” (2006, 21). She adds, “Foreign policies
need an account, or a story, of the problems and issues they are trying to
address” (Hansen 2006, xvi). For instance, one cannot set up develop-
mental policies without deciding who the poor are, how they differ from
the developed world, and how their identity can be transformed (Hansen
2006, xvi). Policy-making can therefore be regarded as a continuous dis-
cursive struggle over meanings, boundaries, definitions, and criteria of
problems (Fischer 2003, 60).
Within policy discourses, policies and identities are thus interlinked.
Policies are different from identities, in that they are about a “particu-
lar direction for action, whereas the construction of identity in discourse
is seen more broadly as a political practice” (Hansen 2006, 21). But,
although identities and policies are analytically distinct, they are both con-
stituted by policy discourses (Hansen 2006, xvi). For instance, welfare
policies do not only have material consequences for people’s benefits but
also help to reproduce discursive understandings of “the poor” and “dys-
functional families” (Schram 1995, xxiv). With regard to foreign policies,
politicians will not sit down and discuss their identity and their foreign
policy separately (Hansen 2006, 29). As Hansen argues, “[I]t is only
through the discursive enactment of foreign policy, or in Judith Butler’s
terms ‘performances’, that identity comes into being, but this identity is at
the same time constructed as the legitimization for the policy proposed”
(Hansen 2006, 21).9 If India is contextualized as a threatening country,
the USA will pursue different policies toward it, and these policies will
continue to articulate India as a security threat.
THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY

With the analysis of the US changing security policies toward India, the
policy discourse thus constructs identities, security policies, and security
issues. The question then arises: What is security? Security can be described
as an “essentially contested concept” (Buzan 1991, 7). This means that it
is inherently impossible to agree on since no neutral definition is possible.
All definitions are theory-dependent, which entails that different positions
can be taken. As Barry Buzan argues, “Such concepts necessarily generate
unsolvable debates about their meaning and application” (1991, 7). The
only consensus among scholars is that security has something to do with
threats and survival (Collins 2007, 2). The notion of security also needs
a referent object, something or someone that needs to be secured; oth-
erwise, “the idea makes no sense” (Buzan 1991, 13). Nevertheless, “the
once dominant association of the concept of security with military threats,
and with the protection of the state—or ‘national security,’ the study of
which has in turn provided the original foundation for disciplinary secu-
rity studies—is no longer unquestioned” (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams
2010, 2).10
I make use of both a traditional and a social constructivist definition
of security. The traditional definition emphasizes military security and
prioritizes the state as referent object. The analysis of US security poli-
cies indeed concentrates on policies adopted by the state, but these state
policies do not necessarily refer to military security. What is regarded as a
security issue depends on policy discourse. Security issues should not be
taken as a priori and given but as constructed in policy discourses. As an
essentially contested concept, this definition of security is thus not neu-
tral: it is theory-dependent on social constructivism. Like other concepts
within social constructivism, according to Ronnie Lipschutz, security is
a socially constructed concept that can have multiple meanings within a
specific context and that changes as a result of transforming discourses and
discursive practices (1995, 10). Of course, policy-makers define security
based on certain assumptions they have about their interests, enemies, and
scenarios in the context of history and the social environment of a particu-
lar country. But, “while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have mate-
rial existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they cannot
be regarded simply as having some sort of ‘objective reality’ independent
of these constructions”. Interests, enemies, and scenarios are thus socially
constructed within a discourse (Lipschutz 1995, 10).
This book makes use of “security issues” in order to show that the
concept of security includes multiple issues. The US policy discourse iden-
tified a variety of security issues with regard to India after the Cold War:
– Globally: terrorism, nuclear proliferation, the China threat, the
safety of the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, Iran’s non-proliferation,
and the United Nations Security Council seat.
– Regionally: Indo-Pakistan tensions and the Kargil conflict in
Kashmir.
– Economically: high-technology trade, civilian nuclear coopera-
tion, and economic and financial relations.
– Humanitarian security: education, women’s empowerment, and
India’s development.
– Environmentally: agriculture, food security, and climate change.
– Politically: democracy promotion.
These security issues are thus very broadly defined within this research.
Many of these are “threats requiring non-military responses” (Weldes and
Rowley 2012, 516).
SELF AND OTHER

In addition to security issues, policy discourses also construct states’
subject-positions. Subject-positions refer to the “multiple forms” by
which a social actor is constituted: a subject can take different positions
as it can be identified as “poor”, “great”, and “democratic”. In other
words, it does not have a homogeneous identity (Howarth and Stavrakakis
2000, 13). States also do not possess stable identities: the states’ subject-
positions are in permanent need of reproduction; they never find closure
as they are “never finished as entities” (Campbell 1998, 12). There is a
continuous tension between the practices, such as adopting the national
flag or anthems, that constitute the identity and the identity itself. As
Campbell argues, “[W]ith no ontological status apart from the many and
varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be)
always in a process of becoming” (Campbell 1998, 12).
Most importantly, subject-positions are relational; the role of the Self’s
identity depends on the relations to Others. As Weldes et al. argue, “[I]
dentity, that is, can only be established in relation to what it is not – to
difference” (1999, 11). Identity and difference are thus mutually consti-
tutive: identity is constituted in relation to difference and the other way
around. There exists nothing prior to that (Campbell 1998, 9). Moreover,
as William Connolly argues, “Identity requires difference in order to be
and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-
certainty” (1991, 64). For example, the identity of, say, a woman is con-
nected with various meanings through the “process of linking” which is
juxtaposed to the identity of a “man” through the “process of differentia-
tion”. Identity is thus constructed in relational terms since it juxtaposes a
“privileged sign” with a “devalued one” (Hansen 2006, 19).
The Other can be seen as a radically different Other; it can be converted
“into evil” (Connolly 1991, 64). Some authors, including Campbell
and Connolly, focus on identities which are constructed through radical
Otherness as the state’s identity is articulated through threats and degen-
erate others (Hansen 2006, 40–41).11 This relationship between Self and
Other has also been discussed in depth in works on colonial discourse.
Colonialism centered around a Western view of the world, creating a logic
of binaries such as developed/developing, first world/third world, core/
periphery, industrialized/rural, colonizer/colonized, civilized/uncivi-
lized, and modern/traditional (Doty 1996, 2). The colonized was con-
structed as the “degenerate” and stereotypical Other which created a need
for the Other to be controlled (Doty 1996, 94). It was the “phantasy” of
the colonizer about the stereotypical Other that became the official knowl-
edge regarding the colonized populations (Bhabha 1994, 116–119). The
Orient was also a Western creation which reflected a relationship of power
between the Orient and the Occident as it said more about the identity
of the West than the nature of the area constituted as the Orient (Said
1978, 3, 5, 12). Of course, the creation of dichotomies between Self and
Other is not a process unique to colonialism. After the end of the colonial
empires, they continue to be mobilized in our understanding of the Other.
Derrida refers to “the third world” as the different and deferred “first
world”, calling into attention the importance of the construction of the
West itself (In Doty 1996, 7). Campbell also writes how during the Cold
War the US state was constructed through dangers based on drawing dif-
ferences between “us” and “them” (1998, 89–90).12
In fact, there are varying degrees of radical Otherness. Identities can be
articulated through ambiguous articulations of Otherness: the “less-than-
radical-others”, of which there are many forms (Hansen 2006, 40–41).
For instance, Doty refers to a developmental discourse where the Self and
the Other are compared in different time periods (1996). The Other is
seen as progressing toward the Western Self even though the Other is often
regarded as lacking progress and being backward (Hansen 2006, 36).13

In fact, Bhabha also argues that colonizers engaged in mimicry, which
represents “the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of
a difference that is almost the same, but not quite” (1994, 86). The iden-
tity is thus not construed through “a radical delineation of difference,
but through articulations of ‘other Others’ with less radical identities”
(Hansen 2006, 213).14
ARTICULATION AND INTERPELLATION

In order to trace the constructions of the Self and the Other within the
US policy discourse underlying US security policies toward India, the
book makes use of the analytical concepts: articulation and interpellation.
Articulation carries a “sense of language-ing, of expressing”, but the term
can also be seen as a “form of connection that can make a unity of two
different elements, under certain conditions” (Hall 1986, 53). In social
terms, according to Stuart Hall, the theory of articulation is about the
linkage of an articulated discourse and the social forces that come together
under certain historical circumstances. Hall elaborates as follows:
Thus, a theory of articulation is both a way of understanding how ideologi-

cal elements come, under certain conditions, to cohere together within a
discourse, and a way of asking how they do or do not become articulated, at
specific conjunctures, to certain political subjects. Let me put that the other
way: the theory of articulation asks how an ideology discovers its subject
rather than how the subject think the necessary and inevitable thoughts
which belong to it (1986, 53).
Hall demonstrates, for instance, how Thatcherite discourse articulated

ideological elements (1983). The construction of this ideology involved
the connection of certain values, including law and order, tradition and
patriotism, and family but also the free market and “economic man” (Hall
1983, 29). These elements could be linked with different factions in the
Conservative party, for instance, the “wets” who supported the strength-
ening of the union leadership and the “drys”, the Thatcherites, whose
strategy was to weaken this. Political frontiers were thus drawn between
different subject-positions.
Articulation therefore refers to the “process through which meaning
is produced out of extant cultural raw materials or linguistic resources”
(Weldes 1996, 285). Meaning is produced “and temporarily fixed by

establishing chains of connotations among different linguistic elements”,
and these ideas and words (e.g. nouns, adjectives, metaphors, and so on)
are, in turn, linked and welded together into “associative chains”. In the
process of articulation, linguistic elements are combined to create specific
representations of the world (Weldes 1996, 285). In US foreign policies,
for instance, certain representations for the USA as “benevolent hege-
mon” or India as a “rising power” are invoked. When successful, it appears
that these linguistic terms have always been connected with each other,
while their linkage is actually socially constructed. For example, the terms
“United States” and “unipolar power” were successfully articulated at the
start of the millennium. The result of this articulation is that events, sub-
jects, and objects are “represented in specific ways and given particular
meanings on which action is then based” (Weldes 1996, 286).
“Interpellation” is about the relationship between concrete individuals
and discursive subject-positions. As Laclau argues, “[W]hat constitutes
the unifying principle of an ideological discourse is the ‘subject’ inter-
pellated and thus constituted through this discourse” (1977, 101). The
struggle over discourse takes place through articulations of meanings fol-
lowed by the interpellation of the subject into this discourse. The person
will recognize him or herself in the practices and will thus be “hailed” or
“interpellated” into this discourse. This means that the person embraces it
and behaves accordingly. As Louis Althusser argues,
I shall then suggest that ideology “acts” or “functions” in such a way that
it “recruits” subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or “trans-
forms” the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very
precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which
can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police
(or other) hailing: “Hey, you there!” Assuming that the theoretical scene
I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed individual will turn
round. By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion,
he becomes a subject. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail was
“really” addressed to him, and that “it was really him who was hailed” (and
not someone else) (1971, 174).
Interpellation is thus “a dual process whereby identities or subject-

positions are created and concrete individuals are ‘hailed into’” them
(Weldes 1996, 287). Weldes adds, “Once [people] identify with these
subject-positions, the representations make sense to them and the power
relations and interests entailed in them are naturalized. As a result, the

representations appear to be common sense, to reflect ‘the way the world
really is’” (1996, 287). In the case of the USA and India, various repre-
sentations are created regarding both the Self’s and the Other’s identity
or subject-position, such as the claim that the USA and India are diverse
democracies. The USA embraces this shared identity, and it wants to pur-
sue a foreign policy based on this representation.
CONCLUSION
All in all, I explored several key theoretical and conceptual elements,
including critical constructivism, poststructuralism, policy discourse, the
meaning of security, Self and Other, and articulation and interpellation.
In the following chapters, these analytical concepts are deployed to show
how US security policies toward India were made possible by particular
policy discourses, revealing how meanings were produced and attached to
subjects such as the USA (i.e. the Self) and India (i.e. the Other) within
policy discourses. In order to demonstrate that the US security policies
toward India under the last few administrations were different from the
Cold War period, Chap. 3 discusses security issues and attendant security
policies from 1945 to 1993, followed by the US and India’s subjection-
positions. The analysis reveals the saliency of four themes in particular:
democracy, instability, development, and non-alignment.
NOTES
1. As John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens argue, theories are used
to simplify the complex world as they highlight which facts are more
important than others. One may not be aware of these theories because
they are conveyed by family members, education, media, or one’s socio-
economic situation. That is why the authors add, “It may just seem com-
mon sense to you and not at all anything complicated like a theory.”
Nevertheless, they argue that these “implicit” theoretical presumptions
should be made “as explicit as possible when it comes to thinking about
world politics” (Baylis et al. 2011, 3).
2. According to constructivists, the American claim that North Korea will act
more aggressively is based on interpretations of political statements,
expectations of future behavior, and understanding of past experiences
(Hurd 2008, 301).
3. Conventional constructivism and realism are both based on positivist

foundations. Positivism claims that there is such a thing as value-free sci-
ence with neutral facts. Second, there is a belief in an objective external
reality which exists outside us. Also, there is the argument that both the
natural and the social world have regularities and can, therefore, be exam-
ined in the same way (Vasquez 1995, 217).
4. Nelson Philips and Cynthia Hardy also argue that discourses are integral
to the social world: “Without discourse, there is no social reality, and with-
out understanding discourse, we cannot understand our reality, our expe-
riences, or ourselves” (2002, 2). This means that our social reality is
produced through discourses that give objects and subjects meaning.
5. Often the notion of discourse is seen as originating with Foucault,
although it derived from other French schools. Foucault refers to it in The
Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), but he did not employ it as an analytical
concept throughout his works, and he is ambivalent about the definition
and its usage, referring to other key concepts such as discursive formations
(Sawyer 2002, 434–437).
6. Trevor Purvis and Alan Hunt also insist that “all social relations are lived
and comprehended by their participants in terms of specific linguistic or
semiotic vehicles that organize their thinking, understanding and experi-
encing” (1993, 476). In other words, discourses are “individual social
networks of communication through the medium of language or non-
verbal sign-systems” (Purvis and Hunt 1993, 485).
7. Common sense is what Gramsci refers to as the “diffuse and unco-
ordinated features of a generic mode of thought” (In Weldes et al. 1999,
20).
8. For instance, Thomas Dye writes how policy can be understood to be
“whatever governments choose to do or not to do” (1984, 1).
9. In other words, “[I]dentities are [...] articulated as the reason why policies
should be enacted, but they are also (re)produced through these very
policy discourses: they are simultaneously (discursive) foundation and
product” (Hansen 2006, 21).
10. In the eighties and the nineties, scholars have been redefining the notion
of security as known in the traditional realist and liberal approaches.
Scholars have broadened the security agenda away from the focus on the
military sector to an analysis of environmental, economic, political, and
societal sectors (Krause and Williams 1996, 231). Other scholars, such as
Buzan, have deepened the definition, writing that the state is not the only
referent object of security (1991, 13). They ask what or who is it, exactly,
that is being secured? (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, 2–5).
11. However, Campbell also writes that “a simple contrast need not automati-
cally result in the demonization of the other”, even though difference can
always transform into something negative (1998, 70).
12. With regard to the USA, Campbell looks at how the “ethical boundaries”
are demarcated between inside/outside, Self/Other, and domestic/for-
eign and how these identities are constituted through the discussion of
dangers and threats (1998, x, 202). He suggests that the “Others” are
regarded as inferior: they can be seen in terms of being part of “a mob or
horde (sometimes passive and sometimes threatening) that is without cul-
ture, devoid of morals, infected with disease, lacking in industry, [...] [or]
whatever ‘we’ are not” (Campbell 1998, 89).
13. Doty also adds that there was a “Western bond”, in which “England,
Spain, and the rest of Europe were to a certain degree the US ‘other(s)’”
through Europe’s imperial practices, but these differences were overcome
by the adversarial relationship between the West and the non-West (1996,
33). Jennifer Milliken also argues that constructivists should not merely
focus on oppositional relations between the Self and the Other. In the
Korean War, the USA was not merely addressing the Soviet Union, but it
was also creating a bond through interactions and processes of meaning-
making with its allies, South Korea and the UN (2001, 223).
14. Hansen notes that there are instances in which “the Self can be con-
structed through an identity that is articulated as both superior to the self
and as identical to it”, referring to the identities of central European coun-
tries after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (Hansen 2006, 40). Within
the policy discourse, “Europe” was articulated as superior to central
European countries, but they were also articulated through numerous
perceived “facts” which showed that “Europe” and central European
countries were identical (Hansen 2006, 40).
CHAPTER 3
Developing US Relations with India:

1945–1993
During and immediately after the Cold War, US-India relations could
be characterized as “estranged” or as a “cold peace” (Kux 1992; Brands
1990).1 Relations were marked by “dramatic oscillations, characterized, in
the main, by tension and suspicion” (Nayar 1975, 133). In fact, already in
1954, Norman Palmer notes that the relations “have gone up and down
like a Yo-yo [sic] since 1947” (1954, 113). Various explanatory variables
are coined to demonstrate why the relationship was so distant. Surprisingly,
hostile and indifferent perceptions are often seen as more important than
security interests in shaping US foreign policy toward India (Glazer 1990,
4). Andrew Rotter claims that the negative stereotypes had an effect
on how American and Indian policy-makers viewed each other’s coun-
try; they did not leave “their images of others like raincoats at the door”
(2000, xx).2
A particular emphasis, for instance, is placed on misunderstandings of
each other’s cultures. Palmer argues that the contacts between the USA
and India had been too limited to provide for a correct understanding
of each other. US policy-makers displayed “ignorance, misunderstanding
and ‘waspish’ impatience regarding South Asia”, which led to a lack of
effective policies, and therefore, a “major effort of education and men-
tal reorientation, on official and unofficial levels, is clearly needed” (In
Rusch 1967, 328). These cultural misunderstandings also included colo-
nial experiences. Henry Brands observes that Americans read India’s
history through their own experiences with British colonialism, but they
did not understand its nationalism and its insistence on non-alignment,

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54862-7_3
which was seen as procommunist. This was exacerbated by the suspicion

and arrogance of the leaders in each country and each nation’s view of
itself as a model to be imitated (Brands 1990, ix–xii). Likewise, Dennis
Kux notes that Mohandas Gandhi’s nationalist struggle received favorable
coverage in American newspapers and magazines (1992, 11).3 But even
though Americans were interested in India’s struggle against the British,
Katherine Mayo’s negative book Mother India (1927) was widely sold,
going through 27 American editions and sold over a quarter of a million
copies in the USA by the mid-1959s (Isaacs 1958, 270). Mayo argued for
continued British rule because she claimed that Indian society was politi-
cally, culturally, and religiously backward. Not surprisingly, a 1928 poll
indicated that immigrants from India were regarded “as the most undesir-
able” of all the new immigrants in the USA (Rubinoff 2008, 175).
These negative perceptions and images continued in the 1950s as evi-
denced by Harold Isaacs’ Scratches on Our Minds, in which he conducted
a series of interviews about India with 181 Americans in 1954 and 1955,
including academics, mass media professionals, and government officials
(Isaacs 1958, 13–14; Heimsath 1998).4 When asked for the first reaction
called up by India, many thought of Hinduism, castes, or poverty. One
respondent said, “[S]acred cows roaming the streets, mobs of religious
fanatics hurling themselves into the Ganges; the naked ascetics, scrawny
fakirs on nails; the multi-armed goddess; the burning ghats” (Isaacs 1958,
259; Glazer 1990, 15–17).5 Americans had thus “uninformed and para-
doxical perceptions” of India (Rubinoff 1996, 500).
Nevertheless, the lack of security concerns was sometimes preferred as
an explanation.6 Kux claims that the USA and India disagreed on funda-
mental national security issues (1992, xiii).7 In the late 1940s, India pur-
sued a neutralist foreign policy rather than aligning with the USA or the
Soviet Union. Accordingly, after 1954, the USA transferred arms to India’s
enemy Pakistan through its alliance system. India established a closer rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union after its Treaty of Friendship in 1971. As
a result, each country was aligned with the other’s major foe. According
to Robert McMahon, this showed that the US containment policy often
contradicted its regional policy toward South Asia, which Lloyd Rudolph
refers to as conflicting global and regional perspectives (McMahon 1994,
12–13; Rudolph 2008, 12). Rudolph argues that imperial presidents,
such as Presidents Nixon and Johnson, tended to pursue a global per-
spective through top–down “imperative coordination” within the admin-
istration instead of “deliberative coordination” with foreign policy experts
DEVELOPING US RELATIONS WITH INDIA: 1945–1993 31
knowledgeable of South Asia (Rudolph 2008, 12; In Wetering 2011).

According to this view, this explains the volatile relations as global concerns
took priority over a more consistent policy.8
However, negative perceptions and changing security interests are
related: they are both informed by changing policy discourses. Based on
a discourse analysis of joint communiqués and the documents produced
during the visits by the Soviet Union and the USA to India in 1955 and
1959, Muppidi asks how it was possible that India’s relationship with the
USA was so insecure in comparison to the Indo-Soviet Union relationship
(1999, 121). As mentioned above, according to Muppidi, the US alliance
with Pakistan was not at the basis of this insecurity. Instead, the USA mis-
understood India’s self-understanding (Muppidi 1999, 124–131). India
considered itself as a great power, and it wanted to be recognized as such.
The USA, however, emphasized the countries’ shared democratic iden-
tities within its own anti-communist security imaginary. For India, US
articulations invoked the British colonial pursuit of a colonial empire, and
the USA was seen as the successor of these colonial policies (Muppidi
1999, 136–144).
Focusing on the “how-possible” question, I agree with Muppidi that
discursive understandings of the USA and India allowed for estranged
US-India relations and US security policies toward India.9 Yet, a review
of the evidence shows a more nuanced US-India relationship. The rela-
tions improved when the USA was interested in India, as evident from
the constructions of security issues within the US policy discourse. In the
next section, I discuss the construction of security issues/problems and
security policies within the US policy discourse from 1945 to 1993. Like
nearly all other analyses of US Cold War security policies toward India, I
demonstrate that the security issues constructed in relation to India and
the security policies toward India were often linked to US containment
policy. I then discuss the attributes which are attached to the US and
India’s subject-positions within the discourses. Similar to the literature
on perceptions and images, this chapter shows that constructions of India
and the USA are important for US foreign policy-making. Unlike these
authors, however, I argue that the US and India’s subject-positions are
constructed through discursive representations.
In order to show this, I refer to five time periods, specifically pre-
independent India (1945–1947), the establishment of the Cold War policy
until the first Eisenhower administration (1947–1957), India’s growing
importance under the second Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations
(1957–1963), the unraveling of relations under the Johnson and Nixon

administrations (1963–1974), and the focus on nuclear issues and
Afghanistan during the Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations
(1974–1993). Several themes about development, instability, non-aligned,
and democracy are shown to be significant throughout this period, and
they resurged in different forms in future administrations.
PRE-INDEPENDENT INDIA
India’s independence was articulated as a security problem for the USA
during the Second World War. Before the Second World War, India was
constructed as a distant country with which the USA had little economic
and political contact aside from missionary activities and favorable press
coverage of Gandhi’s nationalist movement (Hess 1971, 2; Cohen 2002,
269). On the eve of America’s entry into the Second World War, how-
ever, India was represented as having a “vast reservoir of manpower, and
[occupying] a dominant position in supplying certain strategic war mate-
rials” (FRUS vol. III 1941, 177). The American administration saw pos-
sibilities for the subcontinent to make a contribution to the war effort.
Nevertheless, Indian national leaders such as Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru wanted to achieve their independence before they would aid the
war effort against Nazi Germany’s allies, which was deemed unaccept-
able by the British government (Clymer 1995, 15). The US administra-
tion problematized the British government’s response toward India’s call
for independence: “[I]f it remains in this [dominion] status [it] may well
become an active danger to the whole situation in the not distant future”
(FRUS vol. III 1941, 176). In fact, on February 15, 1942, Singapore, the
premier base of British Pacific air and sea power, fell into the hands of the
Japanese, the newest Axis power (Wolpert 2006, 14–15).
Accordingly, the US policy discourse presented a few security initia-
tives. President Franklin Roosevelt (1933–1945) tried to change the
British minds on India’s independence by sending, for instance, several
presidential envoys and special representatives, including Colonels Louis
Johnson and William Phillips, to London to discuss a “new relationship
between Britain and India” (Wolpert 2006, 30; Clymer 1995, 58, 128;
FRUS vol. I, 1942, 604).10 But these negotiations failed: there were dif-
ferences between the British and the US officials on the drafting process
of India’s self-government proposal (Wolpert 2006, 30–33). After the
perceived Japanese threat subsided and in order to preserve Allied unity,
the Roosevelt administration was no longer actively involved with India

and its call for its independence, although the US government continued
to voice concern about the British position, arguing that Great Britain
should “open the door to negotiation” as it is “of consequence to our mil-
itary effort” (Kux 1992, 35–36; FRUS vol. IV 1943a, 300–301; 1943b,
301–302).
India’s unity was also articulated as a security issue under the Truman
administration (1945–1953). The US interests were constructed as best
served by the early establishment of an Indian federal union “in which
all elements [of the] population including Muslims have ample scope [to
realize] their legitimate political and economic aspirations” (FRUS vol.
V 1946a, 97). In fact, Secretary of State Dean Acheson said in the same
telegram to the UK that the decisions made by Indian leaders would affect
“world peace and prosperity” (FRUS vol. V 1946a, 97). After the Second
World War, there had been tensions between the Muslim League and the
Indian Congress Party about India’s independence.11 The new ruling
party in Great Britain, the Labour Party, wanted to establish an interim
government and review India’s future before India gained its indepen-
dence. Subsequent Indian constituent assembly elections in 1946 resulted
in a major victory for the League although the Congress Party remained
the largest party (Sarkar 1989, 417, 426–428). After several months of
discussions between the British Cabinet Mission and the two parties about
India’s independence and constitution, Nehru, the leader of the Congress
Party, publicly announced on July 10, 1946, that the Congress Party
reserved the right to change any British Cabinet Mission plans after inde-
pendence. In August, Muhammad Ali Jinnah withdrew his support from
the interim government and mass demonstrations broke out. Violent riots
began to spread all over India (Jalal 1985, 215–216).
Since China was experiencing a civil war between communists and
nationalists—the latter backed by the USA—the USA wanted to avoid
another security issue in Asia (Rubinoff 2006, 41). As Acheson said on
November 30, 1946, a cessation of India’s constitutional process could
lead to “widespread chaos similar [to] China” (FRUS vol. V 1946a, 97).
The meanings attached to the security issue were thus organized in such a
manner that the Truman administration hoped that a compromise could
be found that would leave India united after independence. On December
3, 1946, Dean Acheson spoke out during a press conference in favor
of mutual concessions to allow for a united India. He said, “I feel most
strongly that it will be in the interest of India, as well as that of the whole
world, for its leaders to grasp this opportunity to establish a stable and
peaceful India” (FRUS vol. V 1946b, 99–100). As a policy solution, he
urged the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress to accept the
British Cabinet Mission Plan for a federation. In the following weeks, dip-
lomats, including junior diplomat George Merrell, also pressed Pakistan
to accept the Cabinet’s plan. However, these efforts were all unsuccessful
(FRUS vol. V 1946c, 106–107; Kux 1992, 50, 52).
The USA and the UK began to lose interest in India’s unity. With no
solution in sight, on February 20, 1947, Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s
government issued a statement in London promising to hand over British
power to India no later than June 1948 (Wolpert 2006, 131). However,
the British left already in 1947, and India was partitioned during its inde-
pendence. Chaos followed the British departure: ten million panicked
Indian and Pakistani refugees rushed to either country. In the turmoil,
one million people died through famine and violence according to realis-
tic estimates (Wolpert 2006, 1). Even so, this would receive only limited
attention from the USA. During the summer of 1947, the Soviet Union
was naturalized as the largest security problem as the US government and
public were successfully interpellated into this policy discourse that limited
the imagination of other security policy options, as the following section
shows.
ESTABLISHING COLD WAR POLICY

Between 1947 and 1949, the USA established its original containment
policy within a policy discourse that continued to change during the Cold
War (Gaddis 1982, ix). The containment policy’s aim was to prevent the
Soviet Union from expanding its power and position after the Second
World War (Gaddis 1982, 4). Security issues were located within this stra-
tegic framework and those were constituted as more important.
The US policy discourse did not initially construct India as an important
security issue. Establishing the original US containment policy, US diplo-
mat George Kennan crafted a compelling narrative, arguing that “only five
centers of industrial and military power in the world […] are important to
us from the standpoint of national security” (In Gaddis 1982, 30–31).12
These centers were the USA, Great Britain, Germany and Central Europe,
the Soviet Union, and Japan. In this context, it was common-sensible that
US interests under the Truman administration were initially constructed as
limited in the region after India’s independence in 1947; South Asia was not
articulated as a security issue as it was often not on the US administration’s

list compared to other regions. For instance, in a September 12, 1947,
Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) report on worldwide developments,
India and Pakistan were listed along with colonial areas of North Africa
in fourth and last place regarding most important areas in the world to
US security (In McMahon 1994, 14). But, even though South Asia was
not subject to direct communist aggression, “economic dislocation, social
unrest, political instability, and military weakness” in the region were seen
as harmful to US security (In McMahon 1994, 14). As the British left the
region, the Soviet Union could increase its influence and exploit the dif-
ficult conditions to undermine the USA (McMahon 1994, 14–15). Also,
the National Security Council (NSC) document 48/2 said, “Recognizing
that the non-Communist governments of South Asia already constitute a
bulwark against Communist expansion in Asia, the United States should
exploit every opportunity to increase the present Western orientation”
(FRUS vol. VII-2 1949, 1220).
The Truman administration also became involved with the Kashmir
conflict through the UN although it was not represented as an important
security issue. It was articulated as a serious dispute between India and
Pakistan, but not an issue that concerned important US national interests;
the USA was already “spread out very thinly in its present commitments”
(FRUS vol. V-1 1948a, 278; Kux 1992, 60, 67; McMahon 1994, 32).
The conflict occurred after Partition when the princely states within India
had to decide based on demographics and geographic position whether
to join India or Pakistan. By August 1947, hundreds of princely states
had made their decision, except for the two largest states, Hyderabad and
Kashmir. The latter gave rise to the first Indo-Pakistan war of 1947–1948
(Ganguly and Kapur 2010, 10–11). As a policy solution, the USA did not
initially interfere in the conflict, except through UN involvement (FRUS
vol. III 1947, 181–183). With the US and the British delegations tak-
ing the lead, the Security Council adopted a resolution setting up a UN
Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) on April 21, 1948 (FRUS
vol. V-1 1948b, 280–282). The UNCIP tried in vain to reach an agree-
ment in 1948: India and Pakistan agreed to a cease-fire in January 1949.
As Pakistan was represented as more cooperative than India, the USA
raised the topic during Nehru’s 1949 visit to the USA and at the UN (Kux
1992, 60–63; 2001, 29–31; FRUS vol. VI 1949a, 1750–1752).
The US policy discourse produced other issues as more important in
relation to containment strategy. Several assessments constructed Pakistan
as valuable for its military assets and India for its politically central location
(McMahon 1994, 18). However, Nehru pursued a neutral policy that was
very different from Truman’s containment policy. Nehru said that there
should be more room for “attempted cooperation” between the USA
and the Soviet Union (FRUS vol. VI 1949b, 1754). The disagreement
was especially noticeable with regard to India’s reaction to one of the
main containment policies during the Truman administration: the Korean
War (Kux 1992, 77; Nayar 1975, 139). The US containment policy had
started to shift under NSC-68. Instead of limiting the focus on Kennan’s
“power centers” as security issues, NSC-68’s pursued the defense of “free
institutions” on a global scale: “The assault on free institutions is world-
wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat
of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere” (Truman 1950a,
8). Accordingly, after North Korea’s invasion of South Korea on June
25, 1950, President Truman said in a radio and television address to the
American people in July: “This attack has made it clear, beyond all doubt,
that the international communist movement is willing to use armed inva-
sion to conquer independent nations. An act of aggression such as this
creates a very real danger to the security of all free nations” (Truman
1950b). Although India supported the Security Council’s condemnation
of North Korea’s invasion, the Truman administration’s emphasis on the
connection between this conflict and the worldwide communist threat was
contested within India’s policy discourse (Chaudhuri 2014, 53, 55).13 In
July 1950, Nehru attempted to set up a peace effort between the Cold
War parties with Indian envoys opening up discussions in the UK, the
Soviet Union, and the USA.14 As Muppidi writes, “Indian ‘independence’
manifested itself initially as a self-conscious intervention in, and a refusal
to accept as legitimate, the attempts of the United States and the Soviet
Union to define the nature of international reality for all other states”
(1999, 127). With the US refusal to cooperate, this counterdiscursive
articulation was not intelligible within US discourse. In the early 1950s,
an Office of Intelligence research report articulated Nehru as “clearly pro-
Russian” and “Indian neutralism [was seen as] a major obstacle to US
efforts to rally and unite the free nations of Asia in the struggle against
Soviet world domination” (In Rubinoff 1996, 503).
After the Korean War, the USA became interested in containing Soviet
communism in South Asia through security alliances with Pakistan. In
January 1951, NSC 98/1 stated that “[t]he loss of India to the Communist
orbit would mean that for all practical purposes all of Asia will have been
lost; this would constitute a serious threat to the security position of the
United States” (FRUS vol. VI-2 1951a, 1651). The USA did not want
to lose India to the communists, as had happened in China. Instead, the
USA wanted to gain Indian support and to establish better relations in the
field of economic aid, supply of military equipment, and India–Pakistan
relations. As Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, argued about India’s
critical role in Asia: “[I]f we fail, we have another China on our hands”
(In McMahon 1994, 114). Nevertheless, “[t]he most effective military
defense of South Asia would require strong flanks”, such as Turkey, Iran,
and Pakistan (FRUS VI-2 1951b, 1666). When Bowles returned to
Washington in 1952 to lobby for $250 million per year in aid for India,
his policy articulation was thus not entirely accepted. The economic devel-
opment program was cut down to $70 million, after which Bowles directly
appealed to the President and received $115 million (McMahon 1994,
114–116).15 Washington became particularly supportive of the British
proposal for a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) in which the
USA wanted to include Pakistan.
Under the first Eisenhower administration (1953–1957), Pakistan
became a central element in the US security policy: it was of geo-strategic
importance as a common front against communism that manifested itself in
a “defense association” like MEDO (FRUS vol. XI-2 1952–1954a, 1095).
“Regional groupings to ensure security against aggression”, President
Eisenhower asserted in February 1954, constituted “the most effective
means to assure survival and progress” (1954). This was reflected in the
changing US decision-making on Pakistan’s requests for US arms. After
several refusals in 1947, 1948, and 1950, the Department of State decided
to review this request (Kux 1992, 84, 86). In India this decision was
met with outrage: Indian politicians decried that India would eventually
become the target of Pakistan’s militarization and these arms would have
far-reaching consequences for the relationship between India and Pakistan
(Gould 2008, 116). Nevertheless, the USA signed a mutual defense assis-
tance agreement with Pakistan on May 19, 1954, and it became a member
of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), a replacement of MEDO,
in 1955. Throughout the 1950s Pakistan received $1.3 billion for “infra-
structural support” and $700 million worth of Patton tanks (Hewitt 1997,
91–92). For the USA, the strengthening of the collective security system
and Pakistan’s role as an ally were necessary in containing communism by
encircling the Soviet Union.16 India’s outrage was thus rendered unim-
portant. Even though President Eisenhower stated on January 14, 1954,
that as a regional policy “every possible public and private means at our
disposal be used to ease the effects of our actions on India”, in NSC 5409,
a policy document on South Asia, the administration predicted that the
downturn in relations would not be long-lasting. The report stated, “A
result may be intensification of differences in US-Indian relations and pos-
sibly more friendly Indian relations with the Soviet bloc, [but] there would
probably not be any major change in India’s foreign policies” (FRUS vol.
IX-1 1952–1954; FRUS vol. XI-2 1952–1954b, 1091–1092).
The USA and India did experience a downturn in relations under the
first Eisenhower administration. Nehru paid a successful visit to the Soviet
Union in June 1955, which was followed by reciprocal visits by Soviet
leaders to India in November and December 1955, although he did not
sign a proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union
(Kux 1992, 118; McMahon 1994, 216–217). Nehru advocated peace-
ful coexistence as a security policy instead of military alliances. As Nehru
observed, “It is said there are only two ways of action in the world today,
and that one must take this way or that. I repudiate that attitude of mind.
If we accept that there are only two ways, then we certainly have to join
the Cold War – and if not an actual military bloc, at least a mental military
bloc” (In Muppidi 1999, 127). Nehru’s statement produced a different
vision; it imagined a different lifeworld, bringing with it different sets of
security issues and policy solutions. Accordingly, at the first gathering of
the leaders of all independent African and Asian nations at Bandung in
Indonesia in 1955, Nehru articulated non-alignment as a way to avoid
divisions into two blocs and large wars (Kux 1992, 122–123). As Muppidi
writes, “[N]onalignment was not just a specific foreign-policy practice
that asserted an active Indian presence in the international system but an
alternative discursive construction of the international system itself—one
that refused to be limited by the categories, definitions, and constructions
of the dominant Western powers, and in particular the United States”
(1999, 128).
INDIA’S GROWING IMPORTANCE

The second Eisenhower administration (1957–1961) reversed the down-
turn in Indo-US relations. India was now articulated as important with
regard to new security issues within US containment policy. This changing
assessment of India was surprising because Nehru and Eisenhower did
not agree on the dangers of communism during Nehru’s second visit in
December 1956, in which the US President articulated the Soviet Union’s

aim at “domination” of other countries (FRUS vol. VIII 1955–1957a).17
According to Kux, both leaders became more understanding of each
other’s viewpoints, but I argue that we should go beyond the leaders’
self-understandings and examine the meanings which enabled the con-
struction of this alternative lifeworld (Kux 1992, 140–144). The shift
toward improved relations with India was reflected in the January 1957
NSC review of South Asia policy. NSC 5701 focused on how the Soviet
Union could undertake diplomatic, economic, and propaganda efforts in
South Asia: economic measures rather than military measures should be
put into place to meet the Soviet challenge.18 The report stressed that
“[t]he risks to US security from a weak and vulnerable India would be
greater than the risks of a stable and influential India” (FRUS vol. VIII
1955–1957b).19 Meanings such as weakness and vulnerability were thus
articulated. The USA feared that if the West failed to support decoloniza-
tion and economic development, the Asian and African countries would
turn to the Soviet Union and communism (McMahon 1994, 218–219;
McGarr 2013, 55–56). Aid became an important US security policy and
US assistance to India grew substantially, amounting to $822 million in
1960, up from $400 million in 1957 (Kux 1992, 145, 149–150; Merrill
1990, 4). India was now favored over Pakistan within US containment
policy. The US policy discourse emphasized less on the strengthening of
Pakistan’s defense forces and more on increasing economic assistance to
India. Although a US–Pakistan bilateral security agreement was signed
on March 5, 1959, this affirmed the status quo. In case of aggression the
USA would take action although the USA would not aid Pakistan in an
attack on India (Kux 2001, 102).20
The US policy discourse also rearticulated a regional security issue:
the UN Security Council debate on Kashmir in 1957. The 1957 Special
National Intelligence Estimate said that there would be political “ten-
sions” over Kashmir in the next few months even though “the likeli-
hood of major hostilities remains small” (FRUS vol. VIII 1955–1957c).
When the USA brought the issue before the Council, it supported the
idea that a plebiscite should be held to determine Kashmir’s fate.21 A
mission led by Council President, Gunnar Jarring from Sweden, was
sent to Kashmir, but the report stated that the issue remained dead-
locked. Later that same year, Pakistan also brought the Kashmir issue
to the Security Council after which another mission was sent to South
Asia. But again there were no results: Pakistan was willing to accept
a plebiscite while India was not (Kux 1992, 156–157). President

Eisenhower’s administration pressed on, constructing the Indo-Pakistan
enmity as important to its containment policy because US “national
interest demands that they be as politically stable and as economically
prosperous as possible” (FRUS vol. XV 1958–1960a). South Asia was
depicted as vulnerable to external threats, especially from the Soviet
Union. Backed by President Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Dulles
wanted to use leverage through its economic assistance programs, to
press for a solution on Kashmir, but Prime Minister Nehru did not go
along with the US proposal (Kux 1992, 158–159).22
Like the second Eisenhower administration, the Kennedy administra-
tion (1961–1963) continued to articulate India as an important country
within its containment policy. Economic aid was transferred to India “as
a basis for a viable political structure and defense against Bloc pressures”
(FRUS vol. XIX 1961–1963a). The Kennedy administration financed the
first two years of India’s Third Five-Year plan to strengthen its economy,
which started in 1962 following a task force on economic assistance to
India appointed by President Kennedy. The administration committed
$500 million for each year, tripling the development lending provided in
1960 ($135 million) (Kux 1992, 186).
These good relations with India became salient with the Sino-Indian
conflict in 1962.23 China–India tensions were constituted as a major secu-
rity issue and as part of a larger communist assault even though it was over-
shadowed by the Cuban Missile crisis with the Soviet Union’s deployment
of missiles in Cuba (McGarr 2013, 154–155). President Kennedy said
afterward that if something happened to India, it would be a “destructive
blow to the balance of power” (1963a). China had attacked India follow-
ing a border conflict which had been lingering for several years (Maxwell
1970, 7–21). The Soviet Union’s response, asking India to accept the
Chinese proposals and halting the sale of military equipment, was seen as
disappointing by the Indians. At the end of October 1962, Nehru reversed
course and asked reluctantly for military assistance from the USA. Kennedy
willingly gave his support to fight off the Chinese communists as part of
the containment policy (Chaudhuri 2014, 97–99; 101–102).24 This aid
appeared not to be enough, however. In mid-November 1962, a state of
panic reigned in India, amidst worries that China would attack Calcutta.
Prime Minister Nehru sent off two highly secret letters to President
Kennedy urging air support and extra equipment; he asked, in other
words, for direct intervention. Before Kennedy could reach a decision,
China announced a unilateral cease-fire on 22 November and pulled back

its troops (Maxwell 1970, 79–80; Chaudhuri 2014, 106–111).
Clearly, the conflict weakened Nehru’s policy of non-alignment: Nehru
went from being a founding father of the non-alignment movement to a
leader who had asked for US military aid. A moment of dislocation had
become now evident within the US discourse as the Sino-India conflict
gave rise to new expectations: could the USA convince India to accept
more US military aid, strengthen it against China, and hold onto positive
US–Pakistan relations in light of India’s arms request, thereby exposing
non-alignment as a folly? As US Ambassador to India, John Galbraith
said on November 17, 1962, the US was on “the edge of great oppor-
tunity” with regard to several security issues: Indo-Pakistan relations and
“a decisive reverse for communism” on the subcontinent (FRUS vol. XIX
1961–1963b).25 After Nehru’s second letter, Secretary of State Dean Rusk
claimed, however, that military assistance to Nehru clashed with other US
security concerns, including India’s role in Kashmir against Pakistan.26 In
addition, it amounted not merely to “a military alliance between India and
the United States but a complete commitment by us to a fighting war”,
which did not match with “any further pretense of non-alignment” (FRUS
vol. XIX 1961–1963d). In order to gain “leverage on Kashmir” and to
assess India’s resolve, President Kennedy was prepared with the British
government to send more military aid after the crisis in exchange for a
solution with Pakistan (FRUS vol. XIX 1961–1963e).27 But once the per-
ceived threat subsided, India was not hailed into this self-understanding:
India did not embrace the USA and enter into an alliance (Maxwell 1970,
79; Chaudhuri 2014, 83, 117).
UNRAVELING RELATIONS
While the Johnson administration (1963–1969) was engaged in Vietnam,
US ties with both India and Pakistan unraveled. A narrative was produced
in which South Asia’s relevance to US containment policy and many of
the area’s security issues were constituted as unimportant. South Asia was
articulated as having achieved poor results in the US strategic buildup
against communism. Instead of fighting the communist enemy, India and
Pakistan were occupied with each other due to their “irrational attitudes
and policies” (McMahon 1994, 333; FRUS vol. XXV 1964–1968a). As
a 1966 Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum said, “US national interests
are best served by maintaining a stable, economically sound, and secure
subcontinent. The military postures of both India and Pakistan prior to

the 1962 ChiCom aggression reflected an acceptable military situation
from the US point of view. However, significant change now has been
induced, and reversion to the status quo ante 1962 is highly improbable”
(FRUS vol. XXV 1964–1968a).
This was illustrated by the 1965 Indo-Pakistan wars in which the USA
took a back seat when serious clashes broke out first in April 1965 and
then in August 1965.28 Despite the risk of an all-out war between India
and Pakistan, there were silences: the USA did not articulate it as a large
security issue. It decided not to intervene directly or involve itself in dip-
lomatic efforts. The USA continued to rely on the UN to sort out the
question, with the USA playing a supporting role. It only articulated the
conflict as a security issue in so far that both sides used US military arms.
As the State Department claimed, “Kashmir has now clearly reached [a]
point of major Pak-Indian military confrontation, involving use of US
MAP equipment”, even though the government would not “make any
demarche to either side” (FRUS vol. XXV 1964–1968b). Also, the 1967
Special National Intelligence Estimate said, “India’s arms buildup began
after the Indo-Chinese war of 1962, and was initially directed to improv-
ing India’s military capabilities against China, particularly in mountain
warfare and air defense. Since the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, India has
further expanded its forces and has strengthened units facing Pakistan”
(FRUS vol. XXV 1964–1968c). India was thus fighting Pakistan instead
of communist forces, putting decades of heavy American investment in
military equipment against China at risk (Gould 2008, 128–129). As a
policy solution, the USA suspended military assistance to both countries.
Also, it allowed the Soviet Union to get involved in the peace process of
the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war: the Soviet Union hosted the peace talks at
Tashkent in 1966. Secretary of State Rusk argued later on, “We encour-
aged the Russians to go ahead with the Tashkent idea, because we felt we
had nothing to lose” (In Gould 2008, 129).
While the decline in security issues within the region was normalized
within the policy discourse, the Johnson administration started reduc-
ing economic aid and PL 480 food programs. Between 1946 and 1966
India received $6810.2 million from the USA in economic aid while
receiving large amounts of food under the 1954 Agricultural Trade and
Development Act (Hewitt 1997, 91). The poor results of India’s economic
buildup against communism came again to the forefront. During a 1965
meeting on Indian and Pakistani aid, the Johnson administration “seriously
question[ed] whether we’re getting our money worth from this huge
investment” (FRUS vol. XXV 1964–1968d). A policy review should be
undertaken, and the Indian and Pakistani leadership should “have soft-
ened both up to the point where they want to come for help” (FRUS vol.
XXV 1964–1968d).
President Johnson became merely interested in India’s food problem.
The food issue was presented in such a way that it “ought to be attacked
as if we were in a war” (FRUX vol. XXV 1964–1968e). As Johnson ques-
tioned the performance of Indian agriculture, he started to limit assistant
commitments to India in order to “strike” an “economic bargain” over
changes in India’s agricultural policies (FRUS vol. XXV 1964–1968f).
The Johnson administration also suggested in 1966 that India should
“liberalize” its market. If India would implement economic reforms, the
USA and the World Bank would work out the details and transfer food
(Kux 1992, 250; FRUS vol. XXV 1964–1968f). Initially, Mrs. Gandhi
accepted all these recommendations and the Indian government worked
out a reform package with the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). However, one of these policies, a major devaluation of the
rupee, was met with hostility by left-wing Indian politicians and her own
colleagues. Also, after India suffered a drought in 1966 following a failed
harvest in 1965, the USA did not initially authorize more food exports.
Only after a few months, Johnson instructed to send the necessary ship-
ments of grain. To pacify the left-wing critique in India, Indira Gandhi
became more interested in the Soviet Union’s policies by visiting Moscow
in July 1966 and critiquing US bombing of Vietnam (Kux 1992, 251,
254–257; Frank 2002, 296–298).
When President Richard Nixon entered the White House (1969–1974),
the administration had no objections to Johnson’s disengaged foreign
policy toward South Asia. In a summary regarding South Asia and US
military aid, prepared for the NSC review in November 1969, it was
concluded that “in the short term our interests there seem less important
than those in the Atlantic and Pacific areas—particularly Western Europe
and Japan. In the immediately foreseeable future, moreover, this area
poses no threat to our security” (FRUS vol. E-7 1969–1972a). Other
security issues were more important to the administration. In keeping
with South Asia’s construction as of low priority, President Nixon’s
1970 annual report to Congress discussed South Asian affairs in only
a few paragraphs out of 160 pages; the 1971 annual report contained
only three pages on South Asia (Nixon 1970; Nixon 1971a). Security
concerns were limited to seeing that neither China nor the Soviet Union
became dominant. About Pakistan and India, Nixon said, “We have no
desire to try to press upon them a closer relationship than their own
interests lead them to desire” (1971a). The main US aim continued to
be the promotion of economic development, the transfer of aid during
humanitarian crises, and the encouragement of good relations between
India and Pakistan (Nixon 1970, 1971a).
Nevertheless, the Nixon administration articulated the 1971 South
Asia crisis as a major security issue and simultaneously wanted to make
plausible the renewal of US containment policy in the region. In the
South Asia crisis, people from East Pakistan, later Bangladesh, elected
the Awami League, an East Pakistan party, in December 1970 to gain
more autonomy. West Pakistan responded with a military crackdown on
East Pakistan in March 1971, and millions of East Pakistanis fled to India
(Sisson and Rose 1990; Dallek 2007, 335). A May 1971 study on “Indo-
Pakistani hostilities” argued that the USA may not have any “vital security
interest” on the South Asian subcontinent, but “[t]he situation in the last
three months has moved from a level in which our interests were only
secondarily involved to one that, because of the danger of war, could pose
a direct threat to the bases of US policy in South Asia” (FRUS vol. E-7
1969–1972b). Surprisingly, India was depicted as the problem: the mean-
ing of “Indian-Soviet collusion” was attached to the security issue (FRUS
vol. E-7 1969–1972c). In addition, Nixon and Kissinger disagreed with
India’s support for the Bangladeshi struggle for independence when the
burden of East Pakistani refugees became too heavy. The refugee crisis was
silenced: President Nixon did not refer to it during his toast with Prime
Minister Gandhi at the White House on November 1971 (Nixon 1971b).
However, these articulations were not always accepted as common
sense.29 Counterarticulations emerged about Pakistan’s role as the audi-
ence was not interpellated into Nixon’s and Kissinger’s understanding of
the crisis: Consul-General Archer Blood in Dacca sent several cables with
firsthand reports about incurred violence by West Pakistan, which was
followed by a letter of 20 US employees on April 6, dissenting strongly
to the US government’s “moral bankruptcy” as “[o]ur government has
failed to denounce atrocities” and is “bending over backwards to placate
the West Pak dominated government” (FRUS vol. XI 1971a; FRUS vol.
XI 1971b).30 The next day an editorial in The New York Times declared,
“Washington’s persistent silence on recent events in Pakistan is increas-
ingly incomprehensible in light of eye witness evidence that the Pakistani
Army has engaged in indiscriminate slaughter” (1971). Congress was also

critical of the Nixon administration’s actions. As one of the Members
of Congress who traveled to the crisis area during the summer, Senator
Edward Kennedy (D-Mass) said in a hearing on the relief problems in
South Asia that it was “distressing” how the Nixon administration con-
tinued “to gloss over a basic cause of the crisis: the continued violence in
East Pakistan and the increasing flow of refugees into India” (1971, 355).
The US containment policy took priority: Nixon was secretly about to
improve relations with China through a West Pakistani channel, which
was only known by a few officials. To maintain this secrecy, the channel
needed protection, and US–Pakistan relations improved.31 In response,
India moved closer to the Soviet Union by signing the 1971 Indo-Soviet
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The crisis eventually became an
Indo-Pakistani armed conflict in December 1971, in which Pakistan con-
tinued to receive Nixon’s support to the dismay of the Indian government
(Wetering 2010, 94–96). On December 4, a high State Department official
told a reporter that “India bears the major responsibility” as Indian policy
“has led to the perpetuation of the crisis [and] a deepening of the crisis”
(Welles 1971). India was also branded the “main aggressor” by the UN
Ambassador—and future President—George Bush Sr., after which eco-
nomic loans to India were cut (Gwertzman 1971). In fact, on December
6, President Nixon wrote to Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev that the
Soviet Union had “aligned” itself with India in its efforts to “dismember
the sovereign state of Pakistan” (FRUS vol. XI 1971c). As a policy solu-
tion, President Nixon ordered the USS Enterprise, a nuclear aircraft car-
rier, along with four escorts, to proceed to the Bay of Bengal on December
10 (Wetering 2010, 85).32 Nevertheless, India and Pakistan moved toward
a cease-fire on December 17, 1971.
Clearly, US-Indian relations did not improve when the Nixon admin-
istration became more interested in security issues in the region. After
the South Asia crisis, however, no issues were constructed again as secu-
rity issues. Even India’s 1974 nuclear test on May 18, articulated as a
“peaceful nuclear explosion” by the Indian government, was constructed
as a “low-key” issue in a Department of State telegram on the same day
(FRUS vol. E-8 1973–1976a).33 The challenge was to keep “containing
the Pakistani reaction” and to start “stabilizing” a nuclear power within
the international framework in order to keep tabs on Indian policies
(FRUS vol. E-8 1973–1976a). It was argued that test’s implications were
limited as Pakistan’s “capabilities for doing this [were] extremely limited”
and the Indian test was constructed as “irrelevant to the South Asian arms
balance” due to India’s superiority (FRUS vol. E-8 1973–1976a). The
issue was not raised: in July 1974, President Nixon did not refer to India
in his response to Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s concerns
about Soviet’s, Afghan’s, and India’s ambitions within the region (FRUS
vol. E-8 1973–1976b). It had become implausible within the discourse
for India to be an aggressor: it was not constructed as a threat within the
Cold War framework.34
NUCLEAR ISSUES AND AFGHANISTAN

Relations with India improved somewhat during the Ford, Carter, Reagan,
and Bush administrations in comparison to the Johnson and Nixon admin-
istrations. After Gerald Ford became President (1974–1977) with the res-
ignation of President Nixon, Kissinger visited India in October 1974 in his
role as National Security Advisor. There he delivered a major statement in
which he represented India as pre-eminent in the region and accepted its
non-aligned policies (Kux 1992, 327–328). Nevertheless, the relationship
remained somewhat fragile. Some security issues were silenced, while oth-
ers were not. The US administration did not construct Indira Gandhi’s
national emergency as a security issue, a period from 1975 to 1977, when
opposition leaders were arrested and press censorship enacted. As Kissinger
said with regard to India’s criticism of US journalists’ reports: “I think you
are familiar with the American situation. We have tried as a Government to
show restraint. We have not encouraged the press to be critical of India. I
said we attach importance to our relationship with India” (FRUS vol. E-8
1973–1976c).35
The US policy discourse started to slowly articulate India’s nuclear
test of 1974 as a security issue (Rubinoff 1996, 505). As the 1968 NPT
mentioned, only a state that exploded nuclear devices prior to January
1, 1967, was deemed a legitimate nuclear state (IAEA 1970, 4).36
Kissinger thus declared in his 1975 speech at the UN General Assembly:
“The Indian nuclear explosion of a year ago raises anew the spectre
of an era of plentiful nuclear weapons in which any local conflict risks
exploding into a nuclear holocaust. As nuclear weapons proliferate,
nuclear catastrophe looms more plausible—whether through design or
miscalculation, accident, theft, or blackmail” (1975). A group of seven
members, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), was established in wake
of the Indian test in 1975, whose aim was to reduce nuclear weaponry
trade (Schaffer 2009, 91).37 However, “[W]hen India poses a threat,

it is not directly to the United States but to the control of prolifera-
tion,” as Hayes argues, “Here proliferation – aided by India’s nuclear
test – is the fundamental threat” (2013, 83–84). In other words, the
referent object to be secured was the non-proliferation regime. In this
context, the shipment of enriched uranium fuel for the Tarapur nuclear
reactor became problematic for the USA. The Ford administration was
initially of the position that the USA had a legal obligation to continue
its shipments or it would lose its influence over India’s nuclear poli-
cies. Nevertheless, the Ford administration announced stricter nuclear
export controls in October 1976 (Kux 1992, 340–341). In the end, the
Ford administration refused to ship the uranium to India.
Under the Jimmy Carter administration (1977–1981), nuclear issues
became a major security issue as his campaign took a tough approach on
US non-proliferation. Accordingly, Carter said in his speech to the UN
General Assembly, there is an “ominous” nuclear arms race between the
Soviet Union and the USA which has only “increased the risk of con-
flict” (1977a). He articulated the importance of nuclear talks such as the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, a cessation of nuclear testing, and non-
proliferation (Carter 1977a). In the meantime, however, the Carter admin-
istration also depicted North–South issues as important. As President
Carter said to the Indian parliament during his 1978 visit, “This pursuit
of justice and peace and the building of a new economic order must be
undertaken in ways that promote constructive development rather than
fruitless confrontation. Every country will suffer if the North-South dia-
log is permitted to founder” (1978a). Under Carter and the new Indian
Prime Minister Morarji Desai, there was thus an upswing in relations,
which was reflected in the about-face on nuclear shipments. The Carter
administration allowed the shipments when India guaranteed their use for
non-military purposes and showed willingness to discuss non-proliferation
(Gould 2008, 136). Under a lot of pressure from the Carter administra-
tion, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved the shipment in
1977 (Kux 1992, 349). With the 1978 Nuclear Non-proliferation Act,
sensitive nuclear material could only be transferred to countries that placed
their atomic facilities under the safeguards of the IAEA. Nevertheless, the
Carter administration again supported the shipment to India and Congress
voted with the President (Kux 1992, 356–359; Carter 1980a).
The relations improved under the Carter administration until Carter’s
1980 Address to the Nation interpellated the US audience into the next major
security issue: the Soviet Union’s invasion into Afghanistan (Carter 1980b).
As President Carter argued in an interview with editors and news directors
on January 15, 1980, he believed that “we are now facing one of the most
serious threats to peace since the Second World War” and one of the neces-
sary steps was to increase “the capability of Pakistan to successfully defend
itself” (1980c).38 The administration crafted a compelling narrative in which
Pakistan was featured as a frontline state against Soviet expansionism: arms
sales were unfrozen after 15 years of no significant relations (Gould 2008,
136; Cohen 2002, 273). At the end of January 1980, the USA sent one mis-
sion to Pakistan at the end of January 1980, led by National Security Adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and
one to India, led by special presidential emissary Clark Clifford, seeking to
allay India’s concern about the continued arms transfers to Pakistan and to
urge India to ask for the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. The
Indian government argued that it was difficult to get involved as the USA
gave Pakistan arms, leaving India vulnerable (Gould 2008, 136–137).39
The Reagan administration (1981–1989) also represented South Asia
as a region of principal concern because of the Soviet Union’s invasion in
Afghanistan. During Pakistan’s President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq’s visit to
the USA, President Reagan said, “[T]oday the people of the United States
and Pakistan are seeking the same goals. Your commitment to peace and
progress in South Asia and the Middle East has reinforced our commitment
to Pakistan” (1982). While economic and military assistance continued to
Pakistan, India was initially depicted as both politically and economically
irrelevant to US interests. The rearmament of Pakistan took higher priority
in light of the Soviet invasion: in 1981 a package of $3.2 billion in arms and
economic aid for Pakistan was authorized by Congress (Rubinoff 2008,
187). India was merely articulated as a country of interest in so far as it
was a battleground between the Soviet Union and the USA. According
to Kux, this view gradually changed through closer personal relations
as evidenced by the several summit and private meetings between Mrs.
Gandhi and Reagan and Mrs. Gandhi’s 1982 visit to Washington through
which she wanted to reduce India’s dependence on the Soviet Union’s
arms and technology (1992, 387–391). The improvement of relations
seemed to be reflected in a US willingness to transfer technology, includ-
ing computers and 155-mm howitzers, to India and a Memorandum of
Understanding on sensitive material, though the USA continued to supply
arms to Pakistan (Kux 1992, 393–395). As the Reagan administration said
in October 1987 about US-India relations following discussions with the
newly elected Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, “We’re […] building
on a strong foundation of cooperation in the fields of science, technol-
ogy, and space, which permits us with confidence to set ambitious new
goals” (1987). However, the discourse did not allow for this policy option:
US containment policy still took priority within the policy discourse. The
Reagan administration added, “On the subject of US security assistance to
Pakistan, I assured Mr. Gandhi that our objective is stability and reduced
tensions in South Asia and that our assistance is not directed at India”
(1987). The USA thus blocked the sale of the world’s most advanced
computer, the Cray XMP-24, to India. There was the fear that the Soviet
Union would steal the information. Instead, the USA offered the CRAY
XMP-14, a model with less capabilities (Kux 1992, 404, 410).
During the Bush Sr. administration (1989–1993), US interest in
India declined again when the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from
Afghanistan and the US attention turned toward Eastern Europe after
the fall of the Berlin Wall (Kux 1992, 425, 429–430). The US policy
discourse only represented Indo-Pakistan tensions as a security issue.
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Robert Kimmitt, publicly
called on the two countries not to engage in actions “which could lead
events to spin dangerously out of control” (In Kux 1992, 433). There had
been unrest in Kashmir in 1989 when dissidents switched to terrorist tac-
tics, stirring mass disturbances. India enacted direct rule, and the Indian
forces responded harshly (Kux 1992, 432–434). The insurgency became
radicalized. India blamed Pakistan for the insurgency after which tension
between the countries rose. With the threat of a nuclear confrontation in
the region, the USA became directly involved in South Asia for the first
time in many years. President Bush sent National Security Advisor Robert
Gates to South Asia to urge restraint, warning India that a war could
be costly and asking Pakistan to close the Kashmiri insurgents’ training
camps. After a few weeks, the threat receded (Ganguly and Kapur 2010,
40–41). Several years later, the Bush administration’s unofficial Defense
Planning Guidance of 1992 was leaked to The New York Times, which
argued that the rise of a new rival should be blocked because it posed a
threat to the US global position. In South Asia, Pakistan was articulated as
the preferred partner over India and South Asia was constructed a security
issue because the USA wanted to “prevent the further development of a
nuclear arms race on the Indian subcontinent” (Department of Defense
1992). Nevertheless, the American public was not interpellated into the
full narrative and the initial draft was rejected.
As this section shows, various US security issues and security policies

vis-à-vis India were articulated from 1945 onward: India’s independence
and unity in 1947, US containment strategy, the Korean War in 1950,
the Kashmir conflict in the 1940s and 1950s, India’s economic develop-
ment in the 1950s and 1960s, and Sino-Indian conflict in 1962. From
the 1970s until the early 1990s, several other security issues also emerged,
including the South Asia crisis in 1971, India’s nuclear test in 1974,
the North–South relations, the Soviet Union’s invasion in Afghanistan
in 1979, and Indo-Pakistan tensions in 1989. These security issues and
security policies were often part of the US containment policy; security
issues were understood to be more important when they fitted the narra-
tive of containment. US-India relations only improved significantly dur-
ing the second Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations when the USA
construed India’s economic development and the Sino-Indian conflict as
important to its national interests.
The next section discusses the meanings which were attached to India
and US subject-positions within US policy discourse that enabled these
US security policies toward India. It follows the same structure, which
means that US and India’s constructions are analyzed during the afore-
mentioned five periods: pre-independent India; the Truman and first
Eisenhower administrations; the second Eisenhower and Kennedy admin-
istrations; the Johnson and Nixon administrations; and the Ford, Carter,
Reagan, and Bush administrations. Interestingly, various meanings were
attached to the USA and India across all administrations. Several themes
became particularly salient: those about development, non-alignment,
democracy, and instability were articulated throughout these periods. I
highlight in each section how these themes re-emerged in different forms.
PRE-INDEPENDENT INDIA (1945–1946):

INDIAN MENTALITIES
After the Second World War, the US subject-position was articulated as
part of the Western world; it was represented as an advanced and civilized
country in comparison to the Soviet Union, the radical Other within the
policy discourse. Although the term “containment” still had to be coined
by Kennan in July 1947, a few staff members within the Roosevelt admin-
istration already discussed from 1941 onward the dilemma of meshing the
long-term objectives of controlling the Soviet Union’s expansionism with
the short-term goal of defeating the Axis (Gaddis 1982, 4–5). After the
Second World War, these ideas became more salient with George Kennan’s
“Long Telegram” of February 22, 1946. Kennan argued that there was a
“traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity” which first emerged
when the peaceful agricultural people came into contact with the nomads
(1946). This came to the surface again when the Russians encountered
the “economically advanced West” as there was a fear of “more compe-
tent, more powerful, more highly organized societies”. In other words,
the Soviets were represented as unsophisticated and backward. It did not
matter what actions the Americans undertook against the Soviets because
Soviet policy channeled “basic inner-Russian necessities” (Kennan 1946).
According to Campbell, the Cold War was a “coded struggle between the
civilized and the barbaric” (1998, 139). Within the US policy discourse,
multiple boundaries were drawn between, for example, civilized/barbaric,
modern/traditional, and industrialized/rural (Campbell 1998, 169; Doty
1996, 2).
While the USA was interested in talks between the Indian political lead-
ers and the British government about India’s federal union in the con-
text of the Chinese civil war, the policy discourse also constructed India
as a backward country. As Kennan argued, “Toward colonial areas and
backward or dependent peoples, Soviet policy, even on official plane, will
be directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of
advanced Western nations” (1946). This will create “a vacuum which will
favor Communist-Soviet penetration” (Kennan 1946). The “backward
and dependent” peoples were represented as easily affected by the Soviet
Union since they had little will of their own. Also, India was represented
as a country “too obsessed with the idea of independence” and its anti-
British climate could potentially draw in communists through its “inter-
mingling of anti-British and anti-class impulses” (FRUS vol. V 1946d, 80;
1946e, 86). Like the Soviets, the Indians’ subject-position was articulated
as emotional and irrational, its people subjected to their feelings, obses-
sions, and impulses. Roxanne Doty similarly finds that in US foreign policy
toward Philippines, it was presupposed that there were different sorts of
mentalities. As Doty writes, “‘Asian thinking’ differed fundamentally from
non-Asian thinking and was characterized by the prevalence of passion
and emotion, in contrast to reason and rationality” (1996, 312). India was
represented by Americans as disorderly and unruly, while Westerners had
self-discipline and self-control: the USA was constructed as the voice of
reason (Rotter 2000, 12). Criticism in Indian newspapers was thus articu-
lated as “hypercritical” and dismissed (FRUS vol. V 1946f, 92).
Central to US policy discourse was also produced the instability theme.

The language of chaos and unsteadiness was attached to India’s subject-
position within a world where “there are so many dark clouds on [the]
international horizon elsewhere” (FRUS vol. V 1946g, 103). As soon as
the conflicts began to spread between the supporters of the Muslim League
and the Congress Party, Dean Acheson informed Waldeman Gallman, the
US Chargé in the UK, that the USA was deeply concerned about the
“serious deterioration” in India as a discontinuation of the constitutional
process could cause “widespread chaos similar [to] China” which “could
have worldwide repercussions” (FRUS vol. V 1946a, 97). India was rep-
resented as an unstable country with many conflicts, which provided a
possible avenue for Soviet Union interference. Nevertheless, Acheson said
in December, “We have expressed in tangible form our confidence in the
ability of the Indian leaders to make the vital decisions that lie immediately
ahead with full awareness that their actions at this moment in history may
directly affect world peace and prosperity for generations to come” (FRUS
Vol. V 1946b, 100). The USA conceded that the Indians were capable
of making a wise decision even though they had been unruly. What is
silenced here was India’s sovereignty: the Indian leaders were not legiti-
mized on the basis of their future statutory role but by their acceptance by
an outside power. The Indian leaders and their “forward-looking spirit”
had to fit with the US subject-position as a global power which had to pre-
serve stability (FRUS Vol. V 1946b, 100). The “forward-looking spirit”
should conform to anti-communist and pro-US behavior, which became
especially important in the next section.
ESTABLISHING COLD WAR POLICY: FREE INDIA

Between 1947 and 1949, the USA established its original containment
policy, in which the US subject-position was articulated as part of the
“free peoples”. Both Kennan’s essay “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”
and the Truman Doctrine speech were prepared in the first three months
of 1947, and they were seen as the first announcements of straightforward
American opposition against the Soviet Union (Frazier 2009, 4; Gaddis
1982, 22–23).40 Asking for aid for Greece and Turkey during Greece’s civil
war, Truman put forth the doctrine by proclaiming on March 12, 1947,
that “it must be the policy of the United states to support free peoples
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside
pressures” (1947).41 Intertextually connected to the “Long Telegram” of
1946 through its depictions of the Soviet Union’s behavior, the Truman
administration constructed the USA as part of the “free peoples” in a
global society, while the Soviet Union was naturalized within the discourse
as diametrically opposing the USA. It was an authoritarian country which
was “subjugating” other people. Freedom came to represent Western lib-
eration through US leadership, especially since “[t]he concept of freedom
lies at the heart of American identity” (Foley 2007, 4, 19).42 For Kennan,
the Truman doctrine was universalistic because the US subject-position
was represented as free but also as willing to remake others in its own self-
image (Frazier 2009, 3). As Michael Hunt argues, the USA was a nation
born out of authoritarianism that had gained “liberty sanctified greatness”
and with it a special mission to spread this liberty (1987, 42).
Following the Truman doctrine, the language of “freedom” or “free
people” became salient within US policy discourse with regard to India,
which was an early variation of the democracy theme as articulated
throughout the next few decades. When Prime Minister Nehru arrived in
Washington in 1949, President Truman stressed that Nehru was the chief
minister but also the “loved and respected leader of a great nation of free
people” (1949).43 Within Indian policy discourse, the notion of freedom
was often articulated in reference to India’s independence movement. In
Nehru’s speech on August 14, 1947, called “A Tryst with destiny”, which
alluded to Roosevelt’s 1936 speech “A rendezvous with Destiny”, Nehru
said that “we rejoice in [this] freedom [...]. But freedom brings respon-
sibilities and burdens and we have to face them in the spirit of free and
disciplined people” (1947). However, Truman’s description of Nehru as
a “loved and respected leader” of a “free people” did not refer to India’s
newly gained independence, but it articulated the Truman doctrine and
pre-figured the NSC-68 which followed suit. The US discourse referred
to India’s role within the free world and as a natural ally against the Soviet
Union (Muppidi 1999, 138). NSC-68’s aim was to defend “free institu-
tions” globally rather than any power centers: “[t]he assault on free insti-
tutions is world-wide now, and in the context of the present polarization
of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere”
(Truman 1950a). The discussion was cast as a fight of free nations versus
the Soviet communism’s tyranny (Truman 1951b). Accordingly, Truman
said in his 1951 State of the Union that the USA as a nation “has always
stood for the freedom for the peoples of Asia [...]. Our history shows this.
We have demonstrated it in the Philippines. We have demonstrated it in
our relations with Indonesia, India, and with China” (1951b). In fact, the
USA “helped to set up a group of new and independent nations, from

India to the Philippines” (Truman 1952a). The policy discourse char-
acterized the USA as a leader standing for “freedom” par excellence as
it guided others toward freedom, while India’s subject-position was not
articulated as “free” through India’s independence but as free from the
Soviet Union’s menace.
As mentioned above, however, the USA and India did not agree over
Kashmir and the Korean War in the US policy discourse. Soon India was
represented as pursuing non-alignment, another theme that is frequently
articulated throughout this book, which did not fit the US security poli-
cies (FRUS vol. V 1950a, 1469). The USA wanted to “expose the error”
of India’s foreign policy (FRUS vol. VI-2 1951c, 2173). In fact, Indian
policy was delegitimized by using quotations marks, for example, “India-
Policy of ‘non-alignment’” (FRUS vol. XI 1952–1954c, 1100). As US
Ambassador to India, Loy Henderson argued that the present foreign
policy of “so-called non-alignment” makes it difficult to cooperate (FRUS
vol. V 1950a, 1469–1470). Even stronger, Secretary of State Dulles
rejected in a public speech non-alignment as “obsolete” and “immoral” in
1956 (1956). India’s subject-position was thus constructed as an indepen-
dent country with unworkable and morally deprived ideas. Since India was
pursuing Five-Year plans to develop its economy, India was also sometimes
articulated as supporting communism through its opposition to US pol-
icy (FRUS vol. VIII 1955–1957d; McMahon 1994, 222). Nevertheless,
NSC 5409 acknowledged that the Indians were “independent, noncom-
munist, and basically friendly to the United States”, which was obscured
by “different traditions, institutions and current attitudes” (FRUS vol.
XI-2 1952–1954c). The Indians had unruly and impulsive attitudes since
all free nations should work together in determined opposition to com-
munist aggression (FRUS vol. V 1950b, 1473; Truman 1951b).
In comparison, Pakistan was presented as interested in discussing
the main security issues that affect “the whole free world”, as President
Eisenhower mentioned in a letter to Prime Minister Nehru about US mili-
tary aid to Pakistan (1954).44 For the setup of defense organizations, Dulles
said that the USA had “some real fighting men into the south of Asia”. He
added, “The only Asians who can really fight are the Pakistanis. That’s why
we need them in the alliance” (In Gould 1992, 37). This demonstrates that
there was a gendered aspect: Indian men such as Nehru were effeminized
within the Western representation by referring to their criticism as emotion-
alism and non-alignment as passivity. These meanings derived from India’s
British colonial past in which the Hindus were seen as weak in comparison
to Western men and Muslims (Rotter 2000, 192–195; 207–209). Indeed,
President Eisenhower presented the Indians as the strange and irrational
Other or the “funny people”, as he called them, who were led by Nehru,
a “personality of unusual contradiction” (In McMahon 1994, 81). When
the Truman administration discussed Nehru’s position on political issues,
he was seen as “rationalizing the negativism and passivism which found its
roots in Hindu emotion and philosophy” (FRUS vol. VI-2 1951d, 1691).
Nehru’s character seemed to be determined by Hinduism, which was pre-
sented as morally deprived compared to Christianity. In fact, Secretary of
State Dulles said in a public statement about the Portuguese claim of the
Goa, an island near India, that it was the “last outpost of Christian civiliza-
tion in South Asia” (In Gould 2008, 162). According to Rotter, Hinduism
was thus often seen by Americans to inspire “depravity, otherworldliness,
cowardice, submissiveness, and moral laxity – the result of an inability to
tell right from wrong or distinguish between the word of God and the [...]
Hindu deities” (Rotter 2000, 237).
The policy discourse articulated India as opposing “Western imperial-
ism”. With regard to the US peace negotiations with Japan, the US gov-
ernment said that
India’s attitude toward the United States position with respect to Japan is nei-
ther balanced nor objective. It appears motivated primarily by India’s oppo-
sition to colonialism, its antipathy for Western imperialism, its recognition
of the so-called facts of Far Eastern life, and its belief in the non-aggressive
character of international communism (FRUS vol. VI-2 1951b, 1676).
India’s alternative understandings of the world were said to mani-

fest themselves through associative chains of various meanings: anti-
Westernism, anti-colonialism, Eastern life, and pro-international
communism. As Muppidi writes, Eisenhower’s “three evils”, including
political subjugation, racial inequality, and economic difficulties, were
located in the Western domination over the colonized peoples within the
Indian discourse (1999, 135).45 These understandings were contested as
implausible, irrational, and unbalanced within the US policy discourse.
As the Truman administration said, “Virulent and widespread anti-West-
ernism is found in South Asia primarily in India and should be systemi-
cally attacked” (FRUS vol. VI-2 1951b, 1672). These ideas were seen
to be based on the “existence of a color problem in the United States”
and “an [e]nvy of Western accomplishments and resources” (FRUS vol.

VI-2 1951b, 1672). There were also alternative understandings within
the US administration. For example, Chester Bowles, who replaced
Henderson as US Ambassador to India in 1951, argued that India and
the USA shared an anti-colonial background.46 However, the adminis-
tration claimed that Bowles did not grasp the political reality of the US
fight against communism (Muppidi 1999, 140).
The development theme was also articulated in reference to India’s very
poor. According to President Truman, “It is hard for us to realize just how
bad economic conditions are for many peoples of the world. Famine, dis-
ease, and poverty are the scourge of vast areas of the globe” (1950c). This
was the “seedbed” for communism and something to be feared; the rem-
nants of free Asia could fall into communist hands because poverty makes
communism more attractive (Truman 1950c; Cullather 2010, 2). India
was articulated as being part of this world.47 As the NSC 5409 report said,
“[T]he economic problems of the countries of South Asia have reached
huge proportions” (FRUS vol. XI-2 1952–1954c). India was character-
ized as “underdeveloped” and “overpopulated” which echoed Thomas
Malthus’ vision that large population growth will lead to famines and
despair. India was also constructed as diseased since the Indian govern-
ment was attacking “disease, illiteracy, and poverty” (Truman 1952b).
Like poverty, sickness was something to be feared and seen as threaten-
ing as it embodied the loss of control. As Gilman argues, it is a “‘thing’
lying outside the self that enters to corrupt it” (In Rotter 2000, 6, 12).
Inferior countries are often seen as infected with disease within the binary
of healthy/pathological (Campbell 1998, 89). Other inferior meanings
were also attached to India. In fact, South Asia was constructed as an
unstable area because there were internal conflicts which were “created by
the impact of western ideas, religious beliefs, moral values, and productiv-
ity upon the folkways and mores of a society in which the masses are plod-
ding, illiterate, sub-marginal farmers” (FRUS vol. XI-2 1952–1954c).
As Campbell says in relation to the inferior Other, it was thus presented
as “infected with disease, lacking in industry, incapable of achievement,
prone to be unruly, inspired by emotion, given to passion, indebted to
tradition” (Campbell 1998, 89).
In this context, the US needed to help countries, such as India, which was
symbolized by the “undernourished child” in President Truman’s speech at
the 1952 Democratic National Convention (Truman 1952c). This demon-
strates a nurturing relationship in which the child should be taken care of in
order for it to become mature which invoked a “parent/child opposition and

justified practices of domination” (Doty 1996, 89). One of these practices
was to give economic assistance. In order to achieve this, Truman argued at a
Masonic breakfast in February 1951 that the “the moral forces of the world”,
the ones who believe in God, the “Sermon on the mount”, the welfare of the
individual rather than a “slave to Government” needed to be mobilized as part
of US traditional concern (1951c). These “traditional” assumptions derived
from exceptionalist ideas taken on by the first Puritan migrants in the USA
who were guided by a destiny, establishing a church and settlements that they
felt would be the example to the rest (Madsen 1998, 1). As Campbell writes,
“With the roots of its identity in Puritan experience, and with that experi-
ence being appropriated into an unyielding myth of the nations existence in
sacred time, the spiritual dimension has never been exorcised from American
practices” (1998, 133).48 One of these Puritans was John Winthrop, who
preached about poverty and charity in his sermon entitled Christian Charity.
The belief was to conduct one’s life with mercy; every man should help oth-
ers, such as giving to the poor and doing whatever is necessary even if at great
cost to yourself (Bremer 2003, 177). “Community of perils”, Winthrop said,
“calls for extraordinary liberality, and so does community in some special ser-
vice for the church” (In Bremer 2003, 177). However, some were born rich
and others poor as everyone was created differently by God. This meant that
“every man might have need of other” and need to bond together as brothers
(In Bremer 2003, 176). In other words, inequality was a reality created by
God, but the poor could still be given a helping hand. Indeed, the President
said that it is “your duty” and it is part of “your creed” to give “some sacrifice
for the welfare of the rest of the human race” (Truman 1951c).
What we thus have seen in the last two sections is that US security
policies were made possible by several constructions of India’s and US
subject-positions. As mentioned above, the US security policies were ini-
tially concerned with India’s unity due to tensions between the Muslim
League and the Congress Party. During the period 1947–1949, these
security issues were overshadowed by the original containment policy
with its emphasis on the Korean War and the security alliance with
Pakistan. Various meanings were attached to India’s and US subject-
positions: the USA was articulated as advanced and civilized which was
juxtaposed against the Soviet Union’s barbarism and backwardness. Like
the Soviet Union, India was presented as backward, but the language
of instability and chaos also emerged within the discourse. In fact, all
four themes, including democracy, non-alignment, development, and
instability, became important in various forms. Within the democracy

theme, India’s population was articulated as a “free people” while the
USA was helping others to achieve this freedom from outsiders, such as
communists. However, the Indians were also seen as difficult, anti-West-
ern, unruly, impulsive, irrational, and emotional people who think differ-
ently from Western people. The Indian leaders were delegitimized as wise
leaders as India’s policy of non-alignment was contested within the US
policy discourse. India also started to be articulated as underdeveloped,
overpopulated, and diseased, while it was the US exceptionalist duty to
care for India. The latter development theme would gain in prominence
in the next section.
INDIA’S GROWING IMPORTANCE: A TAKEOFF

The second Eisenhower administration (1957–1961) and the Kennedy
administration (1961–1963) saw India in a more positive light. Since
the US administrations argued that difficult economic conditions in
India would make communism more attractive, India received substan-
tial economic assistance from the USA (Merril 1990, 2–3; Nayar 1975,
140–141). This was reflected by the January 1957 NSC review on South
Asia, which stated that South Asian countries were “a significant segment
of the world’s newly-independent, ‘under-developed’, and vigorously anti-
colonial countries”, and India was “confronted with a colossal problem of
economic development” (FRUS vol. VIII 1955–1957b). This new hier-
archy of underdeveloped, developing, and developed nations reified old
patterns of domination. According to Hunt, it rested on American assump-
tions about racial differences and hierarchies as evident from its own soci-
ety and its racial discrimination in the 1950s (1987, 162). For instance,
President Eisenhower referred “in a humorous vein” in a meeting with
Prime Minister Nehru on September 26, 1960, to “the odors he encoun-
tered between the airport and the city of Karachi last December” (FRUS
vol. XV 1958–1960c). India was represented as a primitive country which
could not control its own unpleasant smells (Rotter 2000, 9). Nevertheless,
people were often no longer distinguished by cultural traits or skin color
but by their development and their place in the hierarchy of domination.49
The Americans were at the top as opposed to the “Third World”.50
Even though India was articulated as less-developed, it was now also
regarded as wanting to achieve economic progress, since India’s eco-
nomic plans were, according to NSC 5701, “the best vehicle for action
to promote US interest in an independent and stable India” (FRUS vol.

VIII 1955–1957b). A new kind of “development” theme thus emerged
within US policy discourse. As Hunt argues, the US “gospel of develop-
ment” argued that people’s traditional lives should be changed to one
with modern institutions and attitudes to achieve a stable society (1987,
160). This invoked modernization theory which argued that all countries
had to go through the same developmental stages, modeled on the USA
(Hunt 1987, 160). At the time, a group of economists and social scientists
led by Professors Walt Rostow and Max Millikan developed a theoretical
framework in their A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (1957),
which argued that foreign aid could allow countries such as India to “take
off” and create self-sustaining economic growth (Rostow and Millikan
1957). As the report stated, the “most pressing interest [of the United
States] is to help the societies of the world develop in ways that will not
menace our security—either as a result of their own internal dynamics or
because they are weak enough to be used as tools by others” (Rostow
and Millikan 1957, 39). The underdeveloped countries were described
as easily affected. Similarly, the NSC 5701 report on South Asia argued
that the Soviet Union was setting up a “vigorous and open diplomatic,
propaganda, and economic campaign to increase its influence in the
area” (FRUS vol. VIII 1955–1957b). However, India itself was seen as
non-aligned rather than under the influence of the Soviet Union. When
President Eisenhower discussed socialism in India and whether its Five-
Year plan deserved aid, he said that India’s large population had to pursue
a non-alignment policy in order to survive as many were living on “the
verge of starvation” (FRUS vol. VIII 1955–1957d).
For all its weaknesses, India was articulated as one of the main challeng-
ers of Communist China (FRUS vol. VIII 1955–1957b). As the NSC 5701
report argued, “The outcome of the competition between Communist
China and India as to which can best satisfy the aspirations of peoples for
economic improvement, will have a profound effect throughout Asia and
Africa” (FRUS vol. VIII 1955–1957b).51 Accordingly, in 1959, the State
Department said that “South Asia became a testing ground for the free
world”. It could now be determined whether Third World countries could
survive and grow without resorting to communism (In Rubinoff 1996,
504). India and Pakistan, while poor, were also vital to the free world.
With the Sino-Indian war in the 1962, India also continued to be articu-
lated as an important country by the Kennedy administration. In 1960,
presidential candidate Kennedy said in Fresno, California, “[I]f Communist
China should win her race with India for the political and economic leader-
ship of Asia – then the balance of power would move heavily against us – and
peace would be even more insecure” (1960a). The Kennedy administration
articulated India’s subject-position as a leader and an important power,
while the conflict was seen in balance of power terms. The Kennedy admin-
istration often emphasized that the balance of power was fragile. As Gaddis
argues, “Power, they believed, was as much a function of perceptions as of
hardware, position, or will: minute shifts in its distribution—or even the
appearance of such shifts—could cause chain reactions of panic to sweep
the world, with potentially devastating consequences” (2005, 200–201).
Events in one place could affect events in other places. Accordingly, after
the Chinese attack, Kennedy said that “we don’t want India to be helpless –
there’s a half billion people. Of course, if that country becomes fragmented
and defeated, of course would be a most destructive blow to the balance of
power” (Kennedy 1963a).
The USA was represented as a force for progress. When President
Eisenhower addressed the Indian parliament on December 10, 1959, he
stated, “Americans have participated, also, in triumphant works of world
progress, political, technical, material. We believe these works support
the concept of the dignity and freedom of man” (1959a). According
to William Appleman Williams, US policy was thus seemingly guided
by the concept of a humanitarian impulse to help others and to allow
them their self-determination. However, the American government was
also convinced that other people “cannot really solve their problems and
improve their lives unless they go about it in the same way as the United
States” (Williams 1988, 13–14). As presidential candidate Kennedy said,
the “United States could play a better role in the development of the
economy of the Indians” (1960b). The American public were thus inter-
pellated as a subject who accepted that the USA was a humanitarian coun-
try that should remake the world. As Doty argued, “Being democratic,
freedom-loving, and humanitarian have been important constitutive ele-
ments in the construction of the western ‘self’” (1996, 125).
Even though India and the USA were, in this sense, not seen as equals,
the USA and India were both seen as democracies, a recurrent theme
within the US policy discourse. In the literature on US security policies
toward India, it is often argued that India’s subject-position was continu-
ously (re)articulated as a democracy throughout the Cold War. Stephen
Cohen describes how in this period there was the “cliché” in official
documents that the USA and India were “the world’s oldest and largest
democracies”, respectively (2002, 290). Eisenhower was one of the first

presidents to mention that “[b]etween the first largest democracy on
earth, India, the second largest, America, lie ten thousand miles of land
and ocean. But in our fundamental ideas and convictions about democ-
racy we are close neighbours. We ought to be closer” (1959b). Also, the
US-India joint statement following Kennedy’s discussions with Indian
President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan stated, “The United States and India
are the two largest democracies in the world” (Kennedy 1963b). India
was now accepted and naturalized as a democracy within the discourse as
it was predicated to its subject-position. In fact, India was presented as a
“sister democracy” and “sister-Republic” by President Eisenhower in New
Delhi (Eisenhower 1959c; Eisenhower 1959b). According to Weldes,
these signifiers were also attached to countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean in order to represent the Western hemisphere as a close-knit
“family” (1999, 156). With regard to India, it made self-evident an even
larger democratic family, while it referred to the closeness of the US and
India’s values.
This particular trope was productive of commonalities between the
USA and India rather than differences. Eisenhower saw “[s]ome similari-
ties” between the countries. As he argued in his speech which was broad-
casted on December 13, 1959, to the Indian people,
India and America believe in the dignity of the individual, in each one’s right
to live his life in his own way. We both believe in equality of opportunity.
We both believe in the right of minorities to have their opinions respected
and protected. We both believe in the rule of law in world affairs, and in the
peaceful settlement of international disputes, be they great or small. These
are indeed fundamental bonds between us (1959d).
India was represented as sharing elements of the liberal US creed. These

values referred to liberal, individualist, democratic, egalitarian, and anti-
government ideals (Huntington 1981, 25). Eisenhower also articulated
other similarities during his earlier speech at the Indian parliament:
All humanity is in debt to this land, but we Americans have with you a spe-
cial community of interest. You and we from our first days have sought, by
national policy, the expansion of democracy. You and we, peopled by many
strains and races speaking many tongues, worshipping in many ways, have
each achieved national strength out of diversity. And you and we never boast
that ours is the only way [...] We both seek the improvement and betterment
of all our citizens by assuring that the state will serve, not master, its own
people or any other people (1959a).
Both India and the USA were represented as diverse democracies which
were open to new ideas and which would not allow their people to
become enslaved—as authoritarian states would attempt to do. The
meanings were thus organized in such a way that the USA and India
were being constituted as members of a “special community of interest”
against an absent Soviet Other in which the state’s aim was to “master”
its people and to see this as the “only way” (Muppidi 1999, 134). In
fact, the USA also sought to displace the idea that the USA was linked
to Europe as a colonizer. Instead, it showed that both the USA and
India were democracies and defender of democratic principles “from our
first days” and which would not try to impose themselves on others
(Muppidi 1999, 135–136).
The US policy discourse started to produce India as a peacefully
independent nation on its own terms rather than an unruly country. As
Eisenhower mentioned during his visit, “India won its freedom and its
independence through peaceful means. This in itself was a great accom-
plishment, and one that has challenged the admiration of the entire world”
(1959e). India’s independent subject-position was legitimized by the
peaceful means it used. In fact, the meaning of India’s independence was
in depth discussed.52 As President Eisenhower said, “Your Prime Minister
wrote a very great book about discovering India” which the President saw
as his own “personal discovery” (1959e). President Eisenhower referred
to The Discovery of India (1946), which had been written by Nehru during
his imprisonment for his participation in the Quit India Movement. In this
book Nehru gave more insight into India’s historical background as part
of the nationalist narrative of the struggle against the British. There was
a claim of a long history which, in turn, naturalized the claim to India’s
sovereignty (Singh 1996, 1). According to Jyotsna Singh, the trope of
“discovery” was often used by colonialists, nationalists, and postcolonial-
ist within the Indian policy discourse because it served several purposes;
it described, conquered, and liberated India (1996, 1). In Eisenhower’s
case, it helped to articulate the USA as an admirer of India’s peaceful
struggle rather than a colonizer.
India was also seen as a great civilization. As Eisenhower said, “I have
sensed the spirit of the new India, heir to a culture ages old, now pos-
sessed by a grand vision – advancing decisively, building a great modern
democracy on the foundation of an ancient civilization” (1959d). The

“grand vision” reproduced Indian nationalists’ claims to India’s greatness,
which was also based on its “civilizational identity”. As the construction
of “civilization” was predicated to India’s subject-position, the idea that
India could play a large role again was normalized (Muppidi 1999, 126).
Nevertheless, the USA was articulated differently as a “civilization” than
was India. Eisenhower said,
You are a very old civilization, with an ancient tradition and culture. We
are a young country. Our tradition is, as traditions go, young also. But in
another sense, in the sense of your independent nationhood, you too are
young. You are starting as we did 184 years ago on the path of the devel-
opment of a new nation. Your problems are different – your difficulties are
different – the resources with which you have to work are different. But
your purpose is the same as ours was – and still is: to develop your country
in which every man and woman may have the opportunity, in freedom, to
work out for himself in his own way a rich and satisfying life – a country in
which as Abraham Lincoln said, government is of the people, by the people,
and for the people (1959d).
The USA was characterized as a young country in comparison to India

even though they shared a liberal destiny. India was articulated as a “very
old civilization”, which mainly reflected its past glory days. India now had
to start over again. The past glory days were also echoed in other works
such as The Wonder That Was India (1954) by British historian Arthur
Basham, who gave a survey of India’s ancient history and culture.
The image of Gandhi was also deployed within the discourse. As
Eisenhower said, “Freedom must come first, we of India and of America
believe. One of the clearest voices of all time, proclaiming the priority and
supremacy of freedom, is your own sainted Mahatma Gandhi” (1959b).53
As Isaacs argues with regard to his interviews with 181 persons in the
1950s, the Gandhi’s image was “overwhelmingly triumphant” (1958,
291). He adds, “[Gandhi] is acknowledged as a man to be admired vir-
tually by all, whether friendly to India or hostile, attracted by Indians or
repelled by them.” As soon as Gandhi’s image was attached to India’s
subject-position, India was articulated as a country to be revered for its
freedom. Accordingly, President Kennedy said during Nehru’s visit that
Gandhi’s reputation spread “beyond the borders of your own country
and have been identified with the great aspirations of people all over the
world” (1961).
Another significant trope referred to India’s supposed spiritualism

and idealism. As Eisenhower said in a toast at a dinner during his visit in
December 1959, “[T]he strength of India’s spirit, which seems to me to
be compounded of faith, dedication, courage, and love of country, has
been borne in upon me in a most remarkable way. It is a spirit which
will not be denied – no one who has felt it could fail to be uplifted by it”
(1959f). According to Nehru, the “new spirit” indicated that Asia was no
longer “passive” under the yoke of a colonial regime or any other system
which told Asia what to do; it was a non-aligned country (In Muppidi
1999, 129). Within US policy discourse, however, different meanings
were fixed to India’s spirit, such as its faith and spirituality. Even when
India’s spirit was connected with non-alignment, it was articulated as ide-
alist and otherworldly. As Eisenhower had to admit, “I should say, too,
that this idealism that I felt is not merely one of academic theory; it is a
practical idealism. All around me I see evidences of India on the march”
(1959f). Within the policy discourse, India’s non-alignment, now less irra-
tional than previously conceived, was legitimized for its practical quali-
ties. The US policy discourse thus produced a simple binary of realism/
idealism even though Nehru articulated non-alignment as both a vision
for the future and a realist pursuit of national interest within the Indian
policy discourse (Muppidi 1999, 128). This binary reflected other bina-
ries as well; in comparison to India’s preoccupation with the spiritual, the
USA was constructed as being interested in the material (Heimsath 1998,
101). Meanings such as materialistic, scientific, and pragmatic could also
be attached to the US subject-position, while India was seen as spiritual
and impulsive (Rotter 2000, 191).
To conclude, during the second Eisenhower and the Kennedy admin-
istrations, the USA was more interested in India as it supported India
during the Sino-Indian conflict, and it wanted India to develop its econ-
omy since the poor economic conditions made communism attractive.
Within the US policy discourse, the development, non-alignment, and
democracy themes were rearticulated. India was presented as undeveloped
and at the bottom of the racial hierarchy but also as a country which
wanted to develop. It was an important example to others within the poor
free world and as a competitor to Communist China. The USA was pre-
sented as the epitome of human progress: it was guided by a humanitar-
ian impulse to help others. The Eisenhower administration “discovered”
India as an independent country and as a great civilization which was
spiritual, idealist, and practical. However, the USA and India were also
articulated as quite similar: they were both defenders of democracies in the

face of the Soviet Union.
UNRAVELING RELATIONS: VIOLENT PEOPLES

During the Nixon and Johnson administrations, there was a downturn
in US-Indian relations, which stood in sharp contrast with the optimism
when Kennedy became President. The Johnson administration stopped
pursuing some of its containment policies in South Asia by questioning
the Indo-Pakistan wars and India’s agricultural policies. The US policy
discourse produced the trope of wastefulness. President Johnson said in
1966 that the South Asian region was important, but with the 1965 con-
flicts and India’s interest in the development of nuclear arms, the USA
“will not allow our aid to subsidize an arms race between these two coun-
tries” (Johnson 1966a; Johnson 1966b). Secretary of State Rusk also
wrote that “we should not let the Indian Government take it for granted
that we can be a source for such food in advance of any decisions actually
made” (FRUS vol. XXV 1964–1968g).54 India was shown to be ungrate-
ful toward the USA, while the USA was seen as benign in helping South
Asia to achieve progress and feed the hungry even though the “ener-
gies and resources of the peoples of the subcontinent [...] were waste-
fully diverted from their efforts to meet their vitally important social and
economic problems” (Johnson 1965). South Asia’s subject-position was
depicted as poor, but they only had to blame themselves for this endur-
ing poverty as they continued to engage in an arms race. According to
Hugh Gusterson, this highlights the problem of “nuclear orientialism”
by which the Third World is ascribed within an orientalist discourse of
binaries between the “West” and the “East” (1999, 113–114). Within this
discourse, the Third World are constructed as countries which squander
their resources on weapons while they are confronted with poverty and
hunger.55 However, this presupposes that the USA does not waste money
on weapons and that there is not much poverty which needs to be dealt
with in the USA itself (Gusterson 1999, 11–6117). Also, the irony is that
the Indians, in fact, had warned the Americans about the prospects of an
arms race when the USA transferred arms to Pakistan for the US contain-
ment purposes (Cohen 2002, 273; Rotter 2000, 68).
As part of the development theme, the policy discourse often attached
notions of hunger and poverty to India’s subject-position. When ask-
ing for funding from Congress for India’s food emergency, Johnson
described India as a country affected by the “War on Hunger” (1967).

This was connected to President Johnson’s “War on Poverty” in the USA
as articulated in his 1964 State of the Union which proposed legislation
to reduce poverty (Johnson 1964). The main difference was that the
attribute of “hunger” was attached to India rather than to the USA even
though the plight of the American poor was compared with others. As
a memorandum said about Johnson’s stringent policies toward India’s
agricultural problems,
We were not interested in disciplining anyone, in becoming the masters of

anyone, or in dominating anyone. All we wanted was India’s friendship.
Nor were we cocky about our own economic successes, because 25% of our
people still had all sorts of needs. We had a poverty problem, a Negro prob-
lem, an urban problem, a health problem, etc. The President explained how
he was trying to do something about all of them. And our interest did not
stop at our boundary. We wanted to do something about health, education
and poverty all over the world (FRUS XXV 1964–1968e).
The USA was thus represented as a benign hegemon under whose leader-
ship it could solve both the US and India’s shared problems. Nevertheless,
the US administration’s foreign aid should be placed in the context of
power relations even though the Johnson administration denied it. As
Doty argues, “Foreign aid enables the administration of poverty, the sur-
veillance and management of the poor [...]. [It is] but one of the numer-
ous domains for the deployment of disciplinary techniques” (1996, 129).
The US subject-position can thus be articulated as an imperialist power
because foreign aid is not that different from colonialism with its own
disciplinary techniques (Doty 1996, 129).
The US policy discourse also constructed positive tropes. Whereas
India’s civilization was valued under the Eisenhower administration,
Johnson now referred to the “fascination that Indian culture holds for
Americans” such as Indian novelists, film producers, and painters of the
Ajanta Cave and the Akbar Court (1966c). After his short visit in July
1969 to India, Nixon also referred to India’s “diverse history, tradition,
culture, going back through the generations, the centuries” (1969a).
These elements again emphasized India’s subject-position as a civilization.
There were silences, however, with regard to India’s progress compared to
India’s ancient past and its great traditions. Nixon also said that the coun-
try had the “sublime combination of great tradition, deep philosophical
and religious insight, and enormous progressive spirit”, but the progres-
sive spirit referred to spiritual insights rather than practices (1969b). These
philosophies and religious attributes were now articulated as negative ele-
ments with regard to India’s subject-position. A lack of economic progress
could be attributed to indifference and passivity as part of India’s spiritual
and religious subject-position (Rotter 2000, 237). As Rotter writes about
American views on India, “Like the teeth of an old person, India’s eco-
nomic infrastructure was rotting or decayed; like an octogenarian’s joints
the bureaucracy was ossified. Hindu minds moved slowly [...] Old civiliza-
tions, like old people, had difficulty changing their minds” (2000, 83).
With the Nixon administration, however, the Cold War was brought
back to the Indian subcontinent with its concern about the India–Soviet
Union relationship during the South Asia crisis. India was mainly seen as
large due to its size and numbers rather than any other current achieve-
ments. The policy discourse articulated India as “the greatest democracy
in terms of numbers” (Nixon 1971b). The Nixon administration also said
that “India is four times the size of Pakistan and proportionally has even
greater potential as a modern nation. India has the population and the
resource base to become, at some distant time, one of the leading powers in
Asia, the Southern Hemisphere and perhaps even in the world” (FRUS vol.
E-7 1969–1972a). Even though Kissinger said that India was a “potential
power” within the world, India was mostly recognized for its large popula-
tion (FRUS vol. E-7 1969–1972d). South Asia’s largeness was also con-
structed as a negative development: the Indian crowds were constructed
as frightening to Westerners (Rotter 2000, 10). As Paul Ehrlich explained
in the bestseller The Population Bomb (1968), he “emotionally” came to
understand the world’s population explosion by visiting India “one stink-
ing hot night in Delhi a few years ago [...] The streets seemed alive with
people” (1968, 1).56 Like the Eisenhower administration, the meaning
of “stinking” and rotten odors were attached to India’s large population,
which was a manifestation of India’s deep problems. As the Nixon admin-
istration argued, the large population could either engage in “constructive
political and economic growth or [vent] its frustration in installing inef-
fective radical governments hostile to us” (FRUS vol. E-7 1969–1972a).
India was again seen as being poor and emotional. In fact, before his
Presidency, Nixon referred to Pakistan as “India’s more successful neigh-
bor” in his article in Foreign Affairs, while he called India “both challeng-
ing and frustrating: challenging because of its promise, frustrating because
of its performance” (1967). Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-IN) also
claimed during a testimony on political trends in India and Bangladesh: “I

don’t know that I have ever heard such a long list of difficulties, ills and
problems and so little hope [...] It is absolutely devastating” (1973, 18).
India and Pakistan were often connected through their conflicts. The
Nixon administration, for instance, said in the First Annual Report to
Congress that “[i]f their nation-building surmounts the centrifugal forces
that have historically divided the subcontinent, if their economic growth
keeps pace with popular demands, and if they can avert further costly
rivalry between themselves, India and Pakistan can contribute their vast
energies to the structure of a stable peace. But these are formidable ‘ifs’”
(Nixon 1970). Instability was thus predicated to South Asia’s subject-
position by the use of articulations such as “centrifugal forces”, “histori-
cally divided”, and “costly rivalry” (Nixon 1970). The conflict was seen
as enduring and not resolvable since it was constructed as “historically
divided”. This trope can also be traced in other discourses such as the
conflict in former Yugoslavia. According to Hansen, the Yugoslavian war
was said to go back hundreds of years while it was a relatively young con-
struction (2006, 212). Other meanings were also fixed such as the “strains
of continuing tension”, “old bitter dispute”, and “wasteful and dangerous
conflict” (Nixon 1970). South Asia’s subject-position lacked long-term
stability. As Nixon summarized it, “Neither country should be a country.
They are too poor, too bloodthirsty” (FRUS vol. E-7 1969–1972e). The
Indo-Pakistan conflicts were seen as deeply enmeshed into South Asia’s
societies, but it also alluded to India’s and Pakistan’s cultures and behav-
iors. In other words, their subject-positions were constructed as violent
and unstable within the policy discourse.
During the South Asia crisis, when Pakistan broke up into East and
West Pakistan, the same instability theme was reproduced. As Kissinger
said to Nixon, the Indians “are the most aggressive goddamn people
around here”. The Indians should “pipe down”, and Pakistan should be
kept “happy” (FRUS vol. E-7 1969–1972f). In 1972, Jack Anderson thus
published a front-page story in The Washington Post discussing a “tilt”
towards Pakistan within the administration’s Washington Special Actions
Group (Dallek 2007, 350).57 About Anderson’s article, President Nixon
said that he believed that “[a]s far as being anti-Indian is concerned, I can
only say I was antiwar. We did everything that we could to avoid the war,
as I pointed out” (1972). The US subject-position was articulated as “pro-
peace”. Nixon added that the subcontinent itself needs a “generation of
peace” since there had been so many casualties during the war of partition
and the “terrible agony” in 1965 Indo-Pakistan war (Nixon 1972). The
Indians should engage in more peaceful activities.
India was also seen as a Soviet stooge, which affected the power balance
within the region. During the South Asia crisis on December 5, 1971,
Kissinger said that “[t]he thing that concerns the President and me is
this; here we have Indian-Soviet collusion, raping a friend of ours” (FRUS
vol. E-7 1969–1972c). The “collusion” raised fears about aggression and
destabilization, which was represented in gender-laden terms. As Hayes
argues about the South Asian crisis, the metaphor “conveys the impres-
sion that innocent, vulnerable Pakistan was in danger of assault by the
aggressive, menacing nexus of the Soviet Union and India” (2013, 63).
The balance of power should thus be restored by redirecting the USS
Enterprise to the Indian Ocean; otherwise, there was the risk of “a com-
plete collapse of the world’s psychological balance of power” (FRUS vol.
E-7 1969–1972g). The USA should be the balancer who kept the “major
external powers” in check. This reflected Kissinger’s writings such as his
dissertation A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of
Peace, 1812–1822, in which he argued that only balance-of-power diplo-
macy could defend the interest of the nations to preserve the world order
(1957). Kissinger also writes that the central task of the administration
is to create a stable world order (1969). The USA needs to act in terms
of power and equilibrium instead of norms and principles. The USA was
articulated as the preserver of the world order through the balance-of-
power diplomacy (In Dallek 2007, 45–46). However, a new power bal-
ance in South Asia was still accepted by US administration after the South
Asia crisis. A few months after the 1974 nuclear test by India, Kissinger
told the Indian government that the USA “recognized India as a major
world power and as the dominant power in South Asia”. The USA had
no “interest in actions designed to achieve balance of power” (FRUS vol.
E-8 1973–1976d).
In conclusion, the Johnson administration displayed disinterest in the
Indo-Pakistan conflicts and heightened interest in India’s agriculture poli-
cies, while the Nixon administration was supportive of Pakistan during the
South Asia crisis. This was reflected by the various articulations of US and
Indian subject-positions within the US policy discourse: the instability,
development, and non-alignment themes were particularly predominant.
South Asia was represented as unstable since India was engaged in an
“ancient” struggle with Pakistan. India was also articulated as wasteful and
ungrateful as the USA was represented as benign in helping South Asia to
feed the poor, but it was spending its resources on the war with Pakistan.
Hunger and poverty were thus fixed to India’s subject-position. India was
also articulated as a civilization, but its indifference and passivity were
attributed to India’s spiritual and religious subject-position. It was merely
a great democracy in terms of numbers which lacked peaceful intentions
and who were falling under the influence of the Soviet Union.
NUCLEAR ISSUES AND AFGHANISTAN: INDIA’S MORALS

After this troublesome decade, US-India relations improved slightly under
the Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations. There were various
security issues, including India’s nuclear test in 1974, North–South rela-
tions, the Soviet Union’s invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, and Indo-
Pakistan tensions in 1989. Like several presidents before him, President
Carter used the language of “democracy”, referring to India as the “world’s
largest democracy” and “largest democracy on earth” (Carter 1977b,
1978b). However, after its democracy was suspended (1975–1977),
India’s status changed within US policy discourse. Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan (D-NY), former Ambassador to New Delhi, claimed in a 1977
interview by the Playboy: “When India ceased to be a democracy, our actual
interest there just plummeted. I mean, what does it export but communi-
cable diseases?” (In Kux 1992, 337). India was presented as a contagious
Other corrupted by illnesses who had abandoned the spread of democratic
values. As mentioned earlier, inferior countries were often constructed as
infected with disease within the binary of healthy/pathological.
Nevertheless, when India transitioned back to a democracy, the empha-
sis was again on commonalities between the USA and India rather than
differences. As President Carter said during his visit to India on January
1, 1978, both countries had the same “basic moral values; our common
belief in and the daily practice of democracy; [and] our mutual commit-
ment to world peace” (1978c). As part of the democracy theme, India’s
moral greatness was also articulated by referring to former Indian leaders
such as Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi. Carter said during his visit to India
that India is a “special place” because of them. He added, “There is a
sense in the world that moral leadership derives from the Indian people
in a direct and continuing fashion” (1978b). Reagan also said that he
found Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s idealism to be inspiring (1985b).
The Indian nationalists indeed also argued that India’s uniqueness could
be found in its “spirituality” and its “moral sensibility”. This was reflected
in Mahatma Gandhi’s behavior as a well-disciplined patriot (Rotter 2000,

25, 28). Within the US policy discourse, Gandhi and Nehru were also
compared to past American leaders. Carter said that “Gandhi and Nehru,
Washington and Jefferson, the thousands – and actually millions – who
worked with them, those whom they led, were all determined to present a
shining new example to the world” (1978d). Both countries were models
that exported political principles to the rest of world: the US as a “new
form of government” and India as a country “experimenting” with bring-
ing different people together in a “political unity” (Carter 1978d).
However, the trope of (mis)understanding also emerged with the Soviet
Union’s invasion in Afghanistan which was said to affect US containment
policies. Boundaries between outsiders/insiders were again drawn. Carter
said during his 1981 State of the Union that “Indian policies and percep-
tions at times differ from our own, [hence] we have established a candid
dialogue with this sister democracy which seeks to avoid the misunder-
standings which have sometimes complicated our ties” (1981). During
the state dinner with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv in June 1985, Reagan
agreed that “India and the United States; we are ultimately so similar. And
yet like family members, we often find it hard to communicate” (1985a).
India and the US were thus represented as family members. But although
India was seen as a “less-than-radical” Other and, in fact, quite similar,
there were still “differences” (Reagan 1985b). As Rotter argues, “It is
much more troubling when a counterpart seems completely unlike you, an
absolute other, while at the same time seeming to share some of you most
important characteristics. That was the case with Americans and Indians”
(2000, xxiv).
India also now started to be articulated as having both economic chal-
lenges and some successes under the Carter and Reagan administrations.
As President Carter remarked before the Indian parliament, India should
play a larger role due to its “unique position” as a “developing country
and also an industrial power” (1978a). Carter added that the seriousness
of the “economic challenges are no secret [...], [b]ut what is far less well
understood is the degree to which Indian social and economic policy has
been such a success” (1978a). India had undergone progress and had
been rising up the ladder, and it was now articulated as a “major industrial
power” among “the 10 largest in the whole world”. However, Carter
signaled that there were “differences” between the USA and India in the
degree to which public or private enterprises were the drivers of economic
growth (1978b). India had not followed within the footsteps of the USA
as a fully fledged capitalist country. Even though India slowly started to

encourage foreign direct investment, India was still represented as one
of the “less developed” countries which had “caught the spirit of free-
dom and enterprise”. It was taking baby steps toward a capitalist market
(Reagan 1986). When President Carter spoke about his visit to India, he
also discussed “the life of an Indian in a typical rural area which is very
poor” (1978e). The Carter administration added that it saw the impor-
tance of economic assistance programs in South Asia, “which include a
majority of the poor of the non-Communist world” (1981). The meaning
of poverty thus continued to be attached to India’s subject-position.
Under the Bush Sr. administration, the attribute of hegemony was
attached to India with regard to the instability theme. After the Cold War,
the Bush Sr. administration was looking for a new raison d’état as it had
been deprived of “an enemy” (Dumbrell 1997, 3). Bush referred to a
“new world order”, as introduced in his 1990 speech to Congress follow-
ing the invasion of Saddam Hussein’s army in Kuwait: “Today that new
world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we’ve
known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A
world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and
justice” (Bush 1990). However, the USA started to de-emphasize multi-
lateralism (Dumbrell 1997, 43–44). According to the Defense Planning
Guidance, the Bush Sr. administration had to build a new world order
“convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a great role
or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests”
(Department of Defense 1992). Germany and Japan were seen as the most
likely competitors for the global hegemon.
India’s role was also discussed. After the India–Pakistan crisis at the
end of the 1990s in which the USA urged restraint from both parties,
the Defense Planning Guidance said it was seeking to “discourage Indian
hegemonic aspirations over the other states in South Asia and on the
Indian Ocean” (Department of Defense 1992, 22). India was constructed
as a threat to the balance of power within the subcontinent. For this rea-
son, the Guidance argued that “a constructive US Pakistani military rela-
tionship will be an important element in our strategy to promote stable
security conditions in Southwest Asia and Central Asia” (Department
of Defense 1992, 22). The notion of India’s hegemony echoed George
Tanham’s Indian Strategic Thought (1992), which was widely read within
the presidential administration. India was seen as at “the center of a series
of concentric geographical circle or rings” and it sought to “[e]ncourage
the development to (1) deny Pakistan a meaningful potential to challenge

Indian predominance on the subcontinent and (2) deter or defeat hostile
Pakistani actions” (Tanham 1992, vi–vii). India was thus constructed as a
predominant power which defensively tried to protect its neighborhood.
However, the Defense Planning Guidance was not accepted, which led to
new policy articulations during the Clinton administration.58
CONCLUSION
What this chapter demonstrates is that the US-India relations were
estranged and marked by fluctuations. The USA was more concerned
with its containment policies than with a regional policy toward South
Asia. Various reasons can be explored, such as the misunderstandings of
each other’s cultures, images and perceptions, and a lack of security inter-
ests. However, these factors are informed by changing underlying policy
discourses.
Within the US policy discourse, security issues and security policies were
often tied to the US containment policy—they were constructed as more
important—which limited other policy options toward India. For instance,
it was made common-sensible that India’s developing economy should
act as a bulwark against the Soviet Union during the second Eisenhower
administration. Accordingly, the USA wanted to develop India by pro-
viding aid. When US-India relations thus changed, this was reflected in
how the US interest in India was represented through its construction of
security issues within the US policy discourse. I discussed the construction
of various security issues: India’s independence and unity in 1947 during
pre-independent India; the Soviet containment, the Korean War in 1950,
and the Kashmir conflict under the Truman and first Eisenhower admin-
istrations; and India’s economic development and Sino-Indian conflict in
1962 under the second Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. From
the 1970s until 1990s, I referred to the South Asia crisis in 1971 and
India’s agricultural crises under the Johnson and Nixon administrations
while India’s nuclear test in 1974, the North–South relations, the Soviet
Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and Indo-Pakistan tensions in
1989 were constructed as security issues during the Ford, Carter, Reagan,
and Bush administrations.
When the relationship changed, this was also reflected in how India
and the USA were presented during each administration. The US security
policies and security issues were made possible by several constructions
of Indian and US subject-positions. Throughout this period, the devel-

opment, instability, non-alignment, and democracy themes were often
articulated although they were reproduced at different instances and in
different forms. The development theme was particularly salient. As the
US-India relationship was often estranged, most administrations pre-
sented India as poor or (under)developed with a few exceptions. When
the second Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations were interested in
strengthening India’s economy, India was presented as wanting to develop
itself. During the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations, India was also
represented as a country with a few economic successes and challenges.
Since the administrations were occupied with several security issues,
including nuclear issues and North–South issues, India was constructed as
a “developing country and also an industrial power”. However, India was
still articulated as poor.
India was also often presented as unstable during the 1945–1993
period. Since the Truman administration was interested in India’s unity
as a security issue but became preoccupied with its original containment
policy and the Korean War, India was presented as backward and cha-
otic. The Indians were seen as impulsive, irrational, and emotional Asian
people in comparison to Western people. During the second Eisenhower
and Kennedy administrations, India was seen as a peaceful country and a
competitor with China within the US containment policy. Nevertheless,
the Johnson administration’s disinterest in the Indo-Pakistan wars and
the Nixon administration’s pro-Pakistan policies during the South Asia
crisis were reflected by their representation of India as inherently violent
and wasteful. The Bush Sr. administration even constituted India as a
hegemon.
The non-aligned theme was also often referred to: India was presented
as anti-Western, easily impacted, difficult, a peacefully independent coun-
try, a Soviet ally, and misunderstood. Initially, India was constructed as
neutral, anti-Western, and difficult. The Nixon and Johnson administra-
tions also saw the Indians as troublemakers: India was a Soviet stooge
that was aligned with the Soviet Union. The second Eisenhower and
Kennedy administrations, however, articulated India as an independent
country, great civilization, and a pragmatic idealist rather than a difficult
non-aligned country. The Carter administration also articulated India as
different.
With regard to the democracy theme, India’s representation did not
change much. India was initially articulated as free. Under the second
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, India started to be represented

as a democracy, and its democratic values were juxtaposed with authoritar-
ian others within the US containment policy. Nixon constructed India as a
great nation in terms of numbers. Since the relations improved somewhat
under the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations as they were occupied
with nuclear issues, the North–South issues, and the Soviet Union’s inva-
sion in Afghanistan, India was again constructed as a democracy and as a
moral power.
During the Cold War, India was thus often articulated as poor, unsta-
ble, non-aligned, and democratic. The subsequent chapters discuss the
Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations. Unlike the 1945–1993
period, these administrations became continuously interested in India and
its security issues. The four themes will re-emerge, but some become more
salient than others, and they are articulated in different ways. For instance,
India was seen as a rising economy, while the instability theme became
less important in the long run. The democracy theme continued to be
articulated, while the non-alignment theme referred to India as a reticent
global power.
NOTES
1. Muppidi also lists authors who discuss Indo-US relations and who “char-
acterized the relationship between these two states as ‘troubled’ (Dutt
1984, 52), ‘estranged’ (Kux 1992, 447), ‘strained,’ ‘fragile,’ ‘discordant,’
‘oscillating’ (Limaye 1993, 5, 9), ‘stressful’ (Rose 1990, 57), and charac-
terized by ‘tension rather than cooperation’ (Brands 1990, ix)” (1999,
121).
2. US policy is argued to be a product of stereotypes that portrayed India “as
poverty-stricken and helpless” (Mellor 1979, 359). Referring to a State
Department analysis entitled United States-Indian Cultural Relations
(1982), Arthur Rubinoff also argues that Americans connected India much
more with disease, death, and illiteracy than any other country (1996,
501). Likewise, US foreign policy-maker drew their images from negative
depictions in the media and textbooks (Nayar and Paul 2003, 95).
3. Between 1920 and 1923, many detailed articles and several books on India
and Gandhi’s nationalist struggle were published.
4. According to Heimsath, during the first decade of India’s independence
(1947–1965), the images were indeed mostly negative (1998). Indians
were portrayed as “culturally exotic, psychologically unfathomable, lacking
in religious or philosophical exactitude, socially disunified, economically
inefficient, oppressive in physical environment, its people poor, non-

aggressive, oppressed, keen-minded but in large numbers uneducated,
morally sensitive but difficult to deal with personally” (Heimsath 1998,
101).
5. These ideas were widely held among the interviewees. In fact, 46 of the
interviewees mentioned Mayo as a source, while others referred to Rudyard
Kipling (Isaacs 1958 271). Andrew Rotter and Charles Heimsath list sev-
eral other books and movies which are sources of American impressions of
India, such as the movie Gunga Din (1939) and The Lives of a Bengal
Lancer (1936) (Rotter 2000, 3–4; Heimsath 1998, 101). Other authors
also analyze cultural artifacts. Dorothy Jones discusses representations of
Indians in American movies in The Portrayal of China and India on the
American Screen, 1885–1955 (1955), while Raj Gupta analyzes Indo-
American literary and cultural works, including music and movies,
throughout the last few centuries (1986).
6. Kux indeed argues, “India and the United States were not at odds because,
as some assert, there was too little dialogue, or a lack of mutual under-
standing, or were serious misperceptions, or because Indians and Americans
have trouble getting along with each other” (1992, xxi).
7. The national security interest is often coined even though there are quite a
few accounts concerning US security relations toward India that do not
make explicit how theories have informed them, as we discussed earlier.
Nevertheless, there are some (neo) realist accounts which focus on security
interests during the Cold War (Nayar 1975; Nayar and Paul 2003).
According to Baldav Nayar, relations between states should not be inter-
preted as a function of personal relations but as a grand design or a larger
global strategy toward the other superpower (1975, 134–135). The US
foreign policy is based on US national interests such as realpolitik and
balance-of-power considerations. As Nayar argues, “US foreign policy
toward India is merely the local application of a global strategy, which has
little to do with India specifically except insofar as India is seen as an avail-
able instrument or an unnecessary obstacle in the execution of that strat-
egy” (1975, 134). Usually, other countries’ interests are seen as “largely
expendable” within this framework. The USA found India’s policy of non-
alignment and India’s perception of its own potential in terms of great
power status to be obstacles to its own role. The USA did not want inde-
pendent centers of powers to rise; they resisted these new emerging powers
since they reduced their own power (Nayar 1975, 135–137; Nayar and
Paul 2003, 70). In fact, the USA employed the policy of regional contain-
ment of India through an alliance with Pakistan and its opposition against
India’s nuclear policies (Nayar and Paul 2003 2, 74–75).
8. Others, including Harold Gould and Arthur Rubinoff, also agree with the
observation of clashing policies although they give other explanations
(2008, 1996). Gould argues that “US South Asia Policy” failed because of
cultural ignorance, historical naivety, and obsessive preoccupations with
the Soviet Union as the USA incorporated South Asia into its own grand
strategy of containment (2008, 101). The relationship was affected by US–
Soviet competition and Indo-Pakistani rivalry (Rubinoff 1996, 499). The
Americans failed to comprehend India’s problems concerning Pakistan and
India’s non-alignment, while the Indians did not agree with the US policy
of containing communism (Rubinoff 1996, 503; 2008, 177). According
to Rubinoff, “The most compelling historical factor in Washington’s bilat-
eral relations with New Delhi is the perception that India was on the wrong
side of the two most important conflicts of the past century: World War II
and the Cold War” (1996, 503). In Second World War, the Indian national
leaders did not want to aid the war effort until they achieved their indepen-
dence. Although the US government supported India’s call for indepen-
dence, they were also interested in a more active role for India (Clymer
1995, 11, 15).
9. Also, he broadens the discussion beyond an analysis of India’s democratic
identity, as put forth by some constructivist scholars (Widmaier 2005;
Hayes 2009, 2012).
10. The Johnson mission took place in the spring of 1942, while the Philips
mission followed in December until mid-1943. An in-depth overview of
these US initiatives in order to gain an agreement between the Indian par-
ties and the British can be found in Clymer (1995).
11. There were already tensions between the Muslim League and the Indian
Congress Party before Second World War. For example, a few years earlier,
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, had announced
that December 22, 1939, was a “Day of Deliverance” for Muslim India.
The Muslim League celebrated that all the Indian Congress Party mem-
bers had resigned from their government posts in protest over not being
consulted by the British about the entry into the Second World War
(Wolpert 2006, 8).
12. After writing his secret diplomat document the Long Telegram on Soviet
affairs and expanding these ideas within the anonymous “The Sources of
Soviet Conduct” (1947) for Foreign Affairs, George Kennan went from a
career diplomat at the Embassy of Moscow to a lecturer to the newly estab-
lished National War College. In 1947 he was employed by Secretary of
State George Marshall as part of the policy planning staff who were respon-
sible for formulating US foreign policy objectives (Gaddis 1982, 25).
13. The Security Council could pass the resolution due to the Soviet Union’s
absence from the Security Council. They were boycotting it over the issue
of Chinese representation. After its retreat, China’s National Government

in Taiwan had a seat on the UN instead of the People’s Republic of China
on the mainland.
14. In a counterdiscursive articulation, Nehru suggested that in return for a
solution on Korea, there should be negotiations between different coun-
tries, including China and the USA, the Soviets should reoccupy their seat
at the Security Council, and the Chinese communists would take over the
Chinese nationalists’ seat in the UN. The US administration did not com-
promise on its stance as Acheson refused to participate (Kux 1992, 72–73).
15. Bowles’ supportiveness of India’s policies only mildly improved US-India
relations as McMahon argues (1994, 121–122). It did not fit with the
overall discursive understandings of the Truman administration.
16. Although Pakistan was also seen to be interested in building its military
arsenal against India, within the US policy discourse Pakistan was articu-
lated as more concerned with the threat of communism.
17. In fact, Nehru was slow in criticizing Russia’s crackdown on Hungary’s
anti-communist demonstrations in 1956. At the UN, India was the only
non-communist country voting against a resolution calling for the with-
drawal of Soviet troops (Kux 1992, 139–140).
18. In terms of goods, the value of India–Soviet Union trade more than tripled
from 1956 to 1959 (McGarr 2013, 63).
19. From this time period onward, I refer mostly to FRUS documents on
www.state.gov. This means that I merely refer to the webpage and I do not
include a page number.
20. With regard to Pakistan, Eisenhower said in the National Security Meeting
on January 3, 1957 that “our tendency to rush out and seek allies” was
“not very sensible” (FRUS vol. VIII 1955–1957b). Pakistan was articu-
lated as being too concerned with India rather than communism. But
Eisenhower confessed that “he did not quite know what to do about
Pakistan”. Cutting the military program “might have severe repercussions
on our relations with Pakistan, and might even destroy the Baghdad Pact”
(i.e. CENTO) (FRUS vol. VIII 1955–1957b; McMahon 1994, 207–208).
21. At the January 1957 UN Security Council debate on the issue of Kashmir,
Krishna Menon, India’s Ambassador to the UN, defended India’s point of
view in a round of two days. Eventually, the Soviet Union vetoed UN
troops to Kashmir (Kux 1992, 156).
22. According to the Telegram to the Department of State on May 17, 1958,
Prime Minister Nehru said there were several reasons, including the fact
that Pakistan was displaying anti-Indian attitudes, the recent threats of war
by Pakistan politicians, and the instable Pakistan government (FRUS vol.
XV 1958–1960b).
23. Some other problems were also articulated. For instance, the USA dis-
agreed vehemently with India over its stance on Goa when it annexed the
Portuguese colony in 1961, but the USA continued its relationship with
India as it was presented as a strong non-communist country (McGarr
2013, 137–139).
24. Initially, the Indian government made several requests for spare parts on
the basis of procurement in mid-October, but Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai
and Finance Minister Morarji Desai then informed American Ambassador
Galbraith that much more assistance would be requested when India could
remain out of an alliance (Chaudhuri 2014, 95–97).
25. Deputy Special Assistant for National security Affairs, Carl Kaysen, also
wrote to the President on November 3, 1962: “These developments strike
at the heart of India’s policy of nonalignment and have far-reaching inter-
nal consequences. India has turned to the West for assistance in meeting its
military requirements” (FRUS vol. XIX 1961–1963c).
26. The Pakistan government strongly objected to any military arms transfer to
India: Prime Minister Ayub Khan appealed several times to President
Kennedy and Secretary Rusk (Chaudhuri 2014, 124–125).
27. A mission was set up, headed by Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of
State, to arrive at a settlement for Kashmir. The British Minister for
Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, also arrived with his own
team. They managed to get Nehru and Ayub around the table, but with-
out much results after five rounds of talks. See for background informa-
tion, Chaudhuri (2014, 126–147) and McGarr (2013, 172–180).
28. In the first conflict Pakistan claimed a desolate and uninhabited marshland
called Rann of Kutch. During the next two weeks, the clashes escalated,
but the Indians had to withdraw as their troops would be cut off when the
Rann flooded during the monsoon. Although both parties settled for a
cease-fire, India suffered a blow by failing to repel Pakistan (Kux 1992,
233–236). These clashes were followed by a larger clash in August 1965
when the Pakistani government implemented Operation Gibraltar, allow-
ing 5000 Pakistani guerrillas to enter India to stir an uprising in Kashmir.
India quickly apprehended the intruders and then captured the main infil-
tration routes in Pakistan. In response, Pakistan launched a major attack
(Ganguly and Kapur 2010, 13).
29. In fact, the Nixon administration centralized its decision-making to leave
out “Ivy League liberals”, which left, for instance, the CIA but also the
Department of State out of the loop (Kissinger 1979, 11).
30. In his first cable “Selective genocide”, Blood wrote, “Here in Dacca we are
mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the pak military.”
Blood continued, “I, therefore, question continued advisability of present
USG [US government] posture of pretending to believe GOP [Government
of Pakistan] false assertions and denying, for understood reasons, that this
office is communicating detailed account of events in East Pakistan. We
should be expressing our shock, at least privately to GOP, at this wave of
terror directed against their own countrymen by pak military” (Blood
1971).
31. In fact, President Nixon visited India and Pakistan in 1969 in order to cre-
ate a secret diplomatic channel with China via Pakistan because he was
interested in opening relations with China. This led to the Kissinger trip to
China in July 1971 (Kux 1992, 280–282).
32. The fleet was not given a clear mission. In fact, there had not been a discus-
sion with the NSC, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or
the Navy. As commander-in-chief, the President usually discusses this with
other actors when no immediate threat is imminent (Garthoff 1994, 271).
In his memoirs White House Years, Kissinger said that they were seemingly
there to evacuate Americans from Pakistan, but the actual motive was to
warn against an attack on West Pakistan and to display US military strength
to China and the Soviet Union (1979, 905).
33. The Indian government also referred to the first nuclear test as “Smiling
Buddha”.
34. See Hayes 2013, 79–89 for an extensive discussion on the US response
concerning India’s 1974 nuclear test.
35. Kissinger added, “But it is a problem for us when the same restraint is not
shown on the Indian side, especially now that you have a censored press”
(FRUS vol. E-8 1973–1976c). The national emergency was the result of
Indira Gandhi’s lack of implementation of her domestic reform promises.
Weakened by higher oil prices, the Indian economy experienced a general
malaise in combination with strikes and unrest. In the meantime, the
courts ruled in a lawsuit by Raj Narain, her opponent in the 1971 elec-
tions, that Mrs. Gandhi’s election to the parliament was invalid due to
electoral irregularities. This was again followed by mass demonstrations
(Kux 1992, 335–336).
36. This was quite ironic because Homi Bhabha, an Indian nuclear physicist
and founder of the first private Indian nuclear research facility, had been
President at the Geneva Conference in 1955, which helped to move for-
ward the idea of the IAEA (Chaudhuri 2014, 219).
37. These members included the USA, the UK, the Soviet Union, Japan,
France, West Germany, and Canada. This group expanded to 15 members
in 1976–1977.
38. India’s response was different. Under the newly elected Indian administra-
tion of Indira Gandhi, the Soviet Union’s actions were defended during
the UN meeting. The USA took note of India’s initial pro-Soviet Union
line.
39. Declining to write off India, the Carter administration still transferred two
of the last long-pending nuclear shipments to Tarapur even though Indira
Gandhi did not guarantee its non-military purposes (Kux 1992, 371–373).
40. The essay “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” is also known as Article X
because it was signed by Mr. X.
41. In “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, Kennan also refers to freedom.
Kennan writes that “Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the
western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigi-
lant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geograph-
ical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of
Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence”
(1947).
42. Foley adds, “[Freedom] is at one and the same time a foundational ethic,
a cultural reference point, a defining ideal, a controlling precept, a depic-
tion of social reality, a medium of political exchange, a mobilizing source
of aspiration, and a device of historical and political explanation” (2007,
19).
43. Truman also referred to freedom with regard to India at other occasions.
Truman said how the Indian people turned to them for aid regarding their
famines and “[w]e should meet their appeal in the spirit which guides our
relations with all free nations” (1951a).
44. Pakistan became part of MEDO or “The Northern Tier”, as Dulles puts it.
This alluded to the notion of the “Northern Screen” coined by Sir Olaf
Caroe, the last foreign secretary of the British raj in India (1939–1945),
who toured the USA in promotion of The Wells of Power (1951). He
argued that the British Empire and its control of India had checked the
Russian ambitions toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan with regard to the
oil reserves in the Middle East (In Roberts 2003, 137–138). However,
after the decolonization India was articulated as a country which was no
“longer an obvious base for Middle East Defense. It stands on the fringe
of the defense periphery. Pakistan on the other hand lies well within the
grouping of southwestern Asia” (In Rudolph 2008, 40–41).
45. Indians often questioned America’s treatments of African Americans
(Rotter 2000, 151, 163–164).
46. The President was satisfied with Henderson’s performance in New Delhi,
and he now had to be moved to the Iran oil crisis which required a man of
stature (McMahon 1994 110).
47. Bowles recalled in an interview how President Truman responded when
Bowles asked whether he could be appointed as Ambassador to India:
“The President was appalled at the thought of anyone wanting to go to
India and he said: ‘Well, I thought India was pretty jammed with poor
people and cows wandering around the streets, witch doctors and people
sitting on hot coals and bathing in the Ganges, and so on, but I did not
realize that anyone thought it was important’” (In Rotter 2000, 15–16).
48. An example of this appropriation was theologian Reinhold Niebuhr’s
America’s Precarious Pre-eminence, who said that America was chosen by
God for a special mission which is only justified when it is done for the
greater good and the global community (1960, 17).
49. According to Rotter, American policy-makers seldom argued that their
policies were racially motivated since that was not acceptable after the
crimes committed during the Second World War (2000, 154).
50. The “Third World” was a term which gained currency during the 1950s
and 1960s. It achieved special relevance because it was located in relation
to the fight between the democratic First world and socialist Second World
(Hunt 1987, 162).
51. The administration also said that “Communist China’s tacit yet certain
rivalry with India is one of the basic facts of Asian politics” (FRUS vol. VIII
1955–1957e, 354).
52. Muppidi argues that within India’s policy discourse “independence” was
linked to India’s relations with other countries. The other powers should
treat India as an equal and show respect (1999, 130).
53. Gandhi did not just refer to political freedom as a right of a nation-state.
In fact, Gandhi argued that freedom or “swaraj” can be discussed in differ-
ent ways. It has “many branches” since it had many meanings (Dalton
1996, 97).
54. The Johnson administration also said that they “want a hard new look at
them before we spend a lot more money” and that they “want to keep the
Paks and Indians worried lest Uncle Sam become a lot less generous”
(FRUS vol. XXV 1964–1968d).
55. Gusterson refers to a Washington official who condemned India after its
peaceful nuclear test in May 1974 by saying, “I don’t see how this is going
to grow more rice” (1999, 116).
56. Ehrlich added, “People eating, people washing, people sleeping. People
visiting, arguing, and screaming. People thrusting their hands through the
taxi window, begging. People defecating and urinating. People clinging to
buses. People herding animals. People, people, people, people” (1968, 1).
57. According to the article, Kissinger said during a Washington Special Action
Group meeting, an interdepartmental committee for crises, on December
3, 1971, that “I’ve been catching unshirted hell every half-hour from the
President who says we’re not tough enough. He believes State is pressing
us to be tough and I’m resisting. He really doesn’t believe we are carrying
out his wishes. He wants to tilt toward Pakistan, and he believes that every
briefing or statement is going the other way” (FRUS vol. XI 1971d).
58. After it was leaked in The New York Times, it caused an outcry. The Bush
administration dropped the strategy document (Hyland 1999, 11).
CHAPTER 4
India, the Underappreciated: The Clinton

Administration
After India’s independence, India only gained full US attention during

moments of serious international crises, but from the late 1990s onward,
the USA showed a more sustained interest in India. Ashley Tellis argues
that any changes were down to “atmospherics” rather than any “structural
transformation”. He adds that the relationship “remained stuck in the
same non-proliferation straightjacket” ever since 1974 (Tellis 2005, 6).
Indeed, the first Clinton administration was initially not very interested in
India.1 During the second administration, however, the Clinton admin-
istration’s security policies changed. Never before had the USA backed
India’s position against Pakistan as it would during the Kargil crisis in
1999 when Pakistan sent troops into Kashmir (Cohen 2010, 13). Without
these changes, further US-India rapprochement would have been more
difficult to achieve during the Bush administration as the Clinton admin-
istration was able to “normalize” the relationship (Chaudhuri 2014, 221).
These changes in US security policies toward India immediately raise
the question: “Why?” Various explanatory variables could be introduced
such as the importance of the nuclear tests of both India and Pakistan in
1998 and the subsequent US-India dialogues. According to Hathaway,
the nuclear tests and dialogues unfroze relations between India and the
USA (2003, 7–8). Cohen agrees that the nuclear tests changed the rela-
tions: the Clinton administration may have been reluctant to give up on
its non-proliferation goals, but there was widespread agreement that the
continued imposition of sanctions on India as an emerging power

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54862-7_4
would not work (2002, 292). Similarly, the talks did not result in a lot of
decisions, yet they did provide an experience in how to deal with strategic
issues at top levels of government (Schaffer 2009, 75). This also reflected
the role of individual leadership (Kapur and Ganguly 2007; Hathaway
2003). S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly point at Clinton’s personal
actions during the Kargil crisis in 1999: Clinton did not cooperate with
Pakistan until it retreated all its forces from Kashmir (2007).
There are also other factors: changes in India’s policies affected US
security policies toward India (Mohan 2004, 2006, 2015a; Kapur and
Ganguly 2007). Mohan writes that India wanted to test its weapons and
engage the USA through its national confidence. In the early 1990s, India
did not want to take political risks, but the Rao government was ready to
test it as early as 1996 (Mohan 2004, 14–18). Kapur and Ganguly even
suggest that a convergence of structural and domestic factors in India in
combination with the earlier-mentioned role of individual leadership trans-
formed the relations (2007, 642).2 In the structural sense, India main-
tained a close relationship with the Soviet Union in spite of its non-aligned
status. Afterward, India faced new realities and the USA could, in turn,
no longer equate India’s policies with the Soviet Union’s policies (Kapur
and Ganguly 2007, 647–648). Domestically, India introduced market-ori-
ented reforms with initial help of IMF loans to replace its Five-Year plans
after it experienced a deep balance of payment crisis in 1991 (Kapur and
Ganguly 2007, 648–649; Widmaier 2005, 447). In addition, several other
scholars argue that changes were triggered by the retirement of prominent
US Congress members from 1997 onward, low-level diplomacy between
administrations,3 and the increasing role of American pressure groups such
as Indian Americans or business groups (Hathaway 2001, 23–24; Rubinoff
2008, 200–201; Malone 2011, 165–166; Chaudhuri 2014, 179–180).4
These are all valid inquiries delving into the role of explanatory variables
and the actors’ perceptions thereof, but I want to go beyond the politi-
cians and interest groups’ self-understandings and examine the meanings
which enabled the construction of an alternative lifeworld. This chapter
shows that India’s representation changed during the Clinton administra-
tion, which helped to reconstruct any attendant security issue. Especially
in 1997, changes became apparent within the policy discourse which made
possible future policy changes in US-India relations: India was presented
as holding back its economic potential due to the Indo-Pakistan conflict.
This means that these changes in India’s representation thus took place
prior to the 1998 nuclear test, which limited many US foreign policy-
makers’ options toward India. They also emerged before the retirement
INDIA, THE UNDERAPPRECIATED: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION 85
of members of Congress, and American pressure groups played a role at

the end of the 1990s. In addition, the changes did not occur immediately
after the Cold War when India implemented its economic reforms or both
the USA and India had to reorient its foreign policies, although the new
discursive articulations of the US role in the world did aid any transforma-
tions. In fact, in 1994, India was initially constructed as a growing econ-
omy, but this discursive articulation was not accepted as common sense.
The changing representations of India within the policy discourse are
indeed reflected by the annual Burton Amendments. Nearly every year, Dan
Burton (R-IN), a Conservative Republican and fierce critic of India, intro-
duced an Amendment to the foreign-aid bill to reduce US assistance to
India in order to improve India’s human rights stance. In 1992, the House
adopted the Burton Amendment, but it was not signed into law. By the mid-
1990s, however, it became more difficult to garner support. According to
Hathaway, “The turning point occurred in 1996, when the Burton amend-
ment lost by a resounding 169 votes. A year later, a comparable Burton
measure lost by 260 votes” (2001, 28). Congress became more “sensitive”
to issues regarding India within the policy discourse and the same could be
said for the rest of the administration (Rubinoff 2008, 200–201).
This chapter thus concentrates on the “how-possible” question as it dis-
cusses how the discursive changes in the US policy discourse made possible
changes in the US security policies. As noted in Chap. 3, four themes were
particularly important in the 1945–1993 period, including the democ-
racy, instability, development, and non-alignment themes. Indeed, India
was represented as a growing industrial power and less developed power,
as a moral power and democracy, but also as a hegemon. These themes
continued to be salient under the Clinton administration even though
they were articulated in different manners. In order to demonstrate this,
I first analyze the construction of security issues/problems and security
policies toward India, including India–Russia missile programs, Kashmir
and human rights, India’s neoliberal reforms, Indo-Pakistan tensions, the
nuclear test, and the Kargil crisis, and then I unpack the changing US and
Indian subject-positions in the policy discourse.
CONFLICTING US POLICIES
Like the Bush Sr. administration, the first Clinton administration imagined
a lifeworld, in which the Cold War framework was replaced with new US
global security concerns and security policies.5 The Defense Department’s
Bottom-up Review said that “the framework that guided our security
policy during the Cold War is inadequate for the future” (Department
of Defense 1993). Likewise, the 1994 National Security Strategy (NSS)
discussed changing security challenges: “A new era has begun. The Cold
War is over” (Clinton 1994a, 1). The Review presented four “new dan-
gers”, including weapons of mass destruction in the hands of former
Soviet countries and approximately 20 other interested countries, beyond
the declared 5 nuclear weapon states. Other security issues were regional
dangers, ranging from large-scale conflicts, drugs wars to insurgencies;
dangers to democracies and their reforms, particularly in former Soviet
countries; and economic dangers as the USA could not support its national
security efforts without a “strong, competitive and growing economy”
(Department of Defense 1993).6
As a policy solution, the 1994 NSS articulated a strategy of “engage-
ment” to tackle the new dangers based on a sound US economy: the USA
would “sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight”,
“promote democracy abroad”, and “bolster America’s economic revital-
ization” (Clinton 1994a, i).7 This strategy of engagement was selective as
it focused on “the challenges that are most relevant to our own interest”
through unilateral and multilateral initiatives (Clinton 1994a, 4). This
strategy was combined with enlargement.8 As National Security Adviser
Anthony Lake stated, “The successor to a doctrine of containment must
be a strategy of enlargement, [the] enlargement of the world’s free com-
munity of market democracies” (1993).9 The US main aim was to protect
market democracy and human rights globally based on its own security
interests, however (Ambrose and Brinkley 1997, 406). As Lake argued,
“[W]e must promote democracy and market economics in the world –
because it protects our interests and security” (1993). This enlargement
thus resembled the domino theory in which all communist countries
would fall after the first one went. Free markets would arise and spread
through trade with the USA (Ambrose and Brinkley 1997, 406).
Within this new lifeworld, nuclear non-proliferation was articulated as
a security issue. With regard to President Clinton’s agenda for the meet-
ing with the Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in 1994, White House
Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers said that “nonproliferation will be an issue,
a major security issue, between the two countries” (1994). The Clinton
administration’s security policy was to exert pressure on Delhi to sus-
pend its missile program. During the Bush Sr. administration, the USA
had urged Russia not to transfer missile technology after India had test
fired the Agni missile; President Boris Yeltsin canceled a large part of the
cryogenic rocket technology deal in January 1993 (Kant Jha 1994, 1040).
During the Clinton administration, these policies continued. In July
1993, Russia was allowed to sell the rockets, but without new technology
(LePoer 1995, 6).10 When Talbott visited India in April 1994, he pressed
India to sign the NPT (Rubinoff 1996, 510). The Clinton administration
said that the USA had been “[a]dvancing the discussions on fissile material
production, getting an acknowledgement both at the regional level and at
the global level of what the goals are. The Indians have kept their debate
on non-proliferation at a fairly abstract level, and we’re trying to maybe
perhaps make it more concrete” (1994b). The administration added that
“we intend to keep talking about it” (Clinton 1994b).11
There was also another problem, but it was not yet articulated as a secu-
rity issue. During the Clinton administration, the USA fixed particular
meanings to the Kashmir conflict, including human rights issues. Several
State Department reports referred to human rights abuse in Kashmir:
“Centrally controlled paramilitary forces are deployed throughout India
and have been responsible for significant human rights abuses in Jammu
and Kashmir” (Department of State 1994).12 While accepting Pakistan’s
new Ambassador, Maleeha Lodhi, President Clinton also commented
that the USA shared Pakistan’s “concerns on the abuse of human rights
in Kashmir” (Burns 1994). The Kashmir dispute was often raised in the
past, but during the Bush Sr. administration, the USA favored bilateral
negotiations to resolve the Kashmir problems under the framework of the
1972 Shimla agreement after the South Asia crisis. This agreement dis-
couraged raising the Kashmir issue at the UN (Kant Jha 1994, 1037). In
the fall of 1993, however, Assistant Secretary Robin Raphel told journal-
ists that “we view Kashmir as a disputed territory and that means that we
do not recognise that Instrument of Accession as meaning that Kashmir
is forever more an integral part of India” (In Wirsing 2003, 93).13 She
suggested that the USA had changed its position (Rubinoff 2008, 190).14
This was immediately denied by the Clinton administration.15 When the
Indian Prime Minister visited the USA in May 1994, Clinton endorsed
bilateralism and the Shimla agreement as a security policy to resolve the
Kashmir dispute as advocated by India (Kant Jha 1994, 1037). As the
President said, “We talked about security issues that affect India in the
post-cold-war era. […] [And] I told the Prime Minister that I hoped
that India and Pakistan would continue their constructive dialog on ways
to resolve their differences, including their differences over Kashmir”
(Clinton 1994c).
In fact, these issues, including nuclear non-proliferation and the

Kashmir conflict, were silenced in 1994: it started to be articulated as less
important within US policy discourse. A senior administration official said
the following about Prime Minister Rao’s visit to Washington in 1994:
We certainly touched on these subjects of human rights, Kashmir, and again

the two leaders talked about that privately, I’m quite sure. But, again, it
wasn’t the focus of the discussion. The major themes, really, were, how
can these two countries work together, form a new partnership to pursue
the goals and issues on which we’d agree and which are mutually beneficial
to us. And in that regard, clearly the economic side was one of the biggest
chunks of our agenda today (Clinton 1994d).
Creating a new narrative, the administration reconstructed US-India rela-

tions around economic relations and partnership. As mentioned above, in
the early 1990s, India went through a neoliberalization program by dereg-
ulating and reforming its economic sector. The policy discourse articu-
lated India’s economic reform program as “bring[ing] India’s economy
into the global marketplace” and “the engine of growth in our relation-
ships” (1994c). President Clinton also mentioned that “our Commerce
Department has identified India as one of the 10 biggest emerging mar-
kets around the world” (1994e). He added, “India is the world’s largest
democracy, by a long ways; and a very important partner for the United
States on many issues, with a very impressive rate of economic growth
now and the prospect of a real partnership with our country, spanning not
only economic, but many other issues” (1994f). There was a surge toward
economics. The Senior Official argued,
I think the President also tried to make the point in the press briefing that
both the nonproliferation issue and the human rights issue which, let’s all
agree, are the areas of disagreement between the United States and India,
or have been for quite a while. But he wants to put it in the larger context of
the overall thrust of the relationship. The dynamism in the US-Indian rela-
tionship is that Americans are more interested in India now as an economic
player, and therefore, that’s what’s driving – creating a larger constituency
in this country for a relationship with India (Clinton 1994d).
The administration’s rearticulation of the US-India economic relationship

and the construction of India as a growing economy was contested in the
media discourse, however. During White House briefings, critical questions
were asked by reporters, including, “By low-balling nonproliferation,

human rights, and high-balling the economic side with India, isn’t that a
terrific message you’re sending to Beijing that these are really your priori-
ties?” and are the “areas of agreement [between the US and India] […]
so large that you can afford to play down the areas of the disagreement or
leave them aside?” (Clinton 1994b, c). Presenting it as “India’s dirty little
war” in the House of Representatives, Dan Burton (R-IN) (1994) also
highlighted India’s human rights abuses in Kashmir in The New York Times.
Boundaries were drawn between inside/outside which excluded India as
an economic partner. India’s articulation as a growing economic player
was thus not successful, and the policy discourse soon produced more fre-
quently the meaning of conflict to India’s subject-position.
The Indo-Pakistan tensions started to be constructed as a security issue
in the latter part of Clinton’s first administration. About Hillary Clinton’s
trip to India, President Clinton said that the region had received insuf-
ficient attention. One of the reasons for these inattentions was these
“thorny problems between India and Pakistan which we have sought
to help resolve through several administrations and without success”
(1995a). During a meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
in April 1995, President Clinton also mentioned that he recognized the
various security issues in South Asia. He said he hoped that both would
“resolve the dispute in Kashmir”, and he urged both countries “to cap and
reduce and finally eliminate their nuclear and missile capabilities” as the
“weapons are a source of instability rather than a means to great security”
(Clinton 1995b).
In fact, the Clinton administration pursued three security policies
toward South Asia that conflicted with each other. Talbott argues that
the Clinton administration aimed at “keeping the lid on the proliferation
of nuclear and ballistic missile technology, nudging US-Indian relations
forward, and maintaining support for Pakistan as a quasi-democratic, rela-
tively pro-Western Islamic state” (2004, 28).16 About India and Pakistan,
Secretary of Defense William Perry indeed said in January 1995 that the
USA has a “strong interest in deepening the security and military ties”
with both countries. Perry argued,
I’ll start off by observing that India and Pakistan have longstanding ethnic,
religious and territorial differences dating back to their partition in 1947.
These differences have caused them to fight three wars since partition. Today,
each of them has the capability to build nuclear weapons. Because of this
nuclear capability, a fourth India-Pakistan war would be not just a tragedy – it

could be a catastrophe. So we care a lot about what happens there. But we
care about not just the stability of the region, we also have a strong interest
in each of these two countries (1995).
While both India and Pakistan were also constructed as important through
their shared values, their moderate or democratic systems, and growing
markets, Perry attached the meaning of “catastrophe” to a “fourth India-
Pakistan war” (1995). Accordingly, the USA was “sticking to our posi-
tion” on the NPT treaty as a security policy, and they wanted to continue
to pressure India and Pakistan on “the goal of capping, reducing and
eventually eliminating their nuclear weapons” as they were destabilizing
the region (Perry 1995). When the USA and 170 other countries made
the NPT permanent by extending it indefinitely in mid-1995, India and
Pakistan were excluded from the list of nuclear weapon states.17
Nevertheless, Pakistan was again articulated as the more valuable coun-
try. The Clinton administration wanted to pursue a strong relationship
with “a secure, more prosperous” Pakistan because Prime Minister Bhutto
“was elected to lead a nation that aims to combine the best of the tradi-
tions of Islam with modern democratic ideals” (1995b). The administra-
tion wanted to bolster her regime: she was in a fragile domestic position
due to violence in Karachi (Rubinoff 2008, 196). During the Bush Sr.
administration, Washington had suspended aid to Pakistan for making
nuclear weapons in violation of the Pressler Amendment, which said that
Pakistan had to cap its nuclear capabilities and accept American verifica-
tion before aid would be continued (Rubinoff 1996, 499).18 As a security
policy solution, the Clinton administration proposed a one-time waiver
because the Amendment was a “blunt instrument” (Perry 1995).19 In
April 1995, Prime Minister Bhutto visited Washington to get the back-
ing from congressional leaders and President Clinton for this waiver
(Rubinoff 1996, 512). In fact, Hank Brown (R-CO), Chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, held hearings in which representatives of
the business community argued for expanded commercial US-India rela-
tions while he also held a series of hearings in March 1995 where State and
Department officials urged a one-time waiver of the Pressler Amendment
because India presented “the greatest source of instability in South Asia”
(Rubinoff 1996, 513–514). As a follow-up to these hearings, these asser-
tions were reiterated on the Senate floor by supporters in September 1995,
such as Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), who said that “strong relations with
Pakistan are crucial to improving our security” in South Asia as the USA
should show support for Prime Minister Bhutto to conduct ties with the
USA and is a “valuable” ally (1995).20 These discussions caused outrage
in India from government parties and parties on the left. Nevertheless, the
Brown Amendment with its one-time waiver passed 55–45 in the Senate
and 348–69 in the House; the legislation was signed on January 27, 1996
(Rubinoff 1996, 515–516).21
The US military policies were also slowly emerging regarding India
although Perry stressed that “arms sales were simply not on the agenda”
(1995). There had been an initiative in 1991 by General Claude
Kicklighter, the General commanding the army in the US-Pacific, to set
up a military-to-military cooperation plan with India. Joint naval exercises
such as the intensive Malabar series were established in 1992 (Banerjee
2006, 68–70). This cooperation continued under the Clinton adminis-
tration: the focus was on consultation mechanisms, trainings, and other
exchanges. This was taken forward in January 1995 by an Agreed Minute
on defense cooperation signed by Perry and the Indian Minister of State
for Defense (Schaffer 2009, 74). An institutional framework emerged: a
bilateral Defense Policy Group of senior-level officials was established; an
air force pilot exchange program and cooperative military training was
set up; and the US International Military Education and Training fund-
ing was doubled (Hagerty 2006, 19; Malik 2006, 85). Nevertheless, this
remained a relatively slow-moving diplomacy initiative due to differences
in bureaucracies’ structures and policy barriers (Schaffer 2009, 74–75).
US-India relations only improved greatly from 1997 onward, as the next
section shows.
INDIA AND THE NUCLEAR TEST

During Clinton’s second presidential term, the administration pursued a
closer US-India relationship even though nuclear issues were constructed
as a major security issue. In late 1997, Madeleine Albright was the first US
Secretary of State in 14 years to visit India (Hathaway 2003, 7). As the
President said, “I will pursue our security strategy with old allies in Asia
and Europe and new partners from Africa to India and Pakistan, from
South America to China” (Clinton 1998a).
Plans for a subsequent presidential visit to India were thwarted by India’s
general elections resulting in a coalition led by the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and India’s decision to
conduct five underground nuclear tests on May 11 and 13 after a hiatus

of 24 years (Hathaway 2003, 7).22 President Clinton stressed, “I want to
make it very, very clear that I am deeply disturbed by the nuclear tests which
India has conducted, and I do not believe it contributes to building a safer
21st Century. The United States strongly opposes any new nuclear testing”
(1998b). Meanings were organized in such a way that the nuclear tests
were constructed as threatening. Global safety was affected by the nuclear
tests since the tests threaten to spark a “dangerous arms race” in Asia
(Clinton 1998b).23 The US Congress was also critical of India, including a
few far-reaching statements. Dan Burton in the House of Representatives,
for example, spoke in mid-June about the region becoming “the epicentre
of a World War-III type nuclear conflict” (1998). Senator Jesse Helms,
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, even argued that
India “clearly constitute[d] an emerging nuclear threat to the territory of
the United States” (1998, 5). While global security was affected, however, a
breach of US security was not accepted as common sense within the bound-
aries of the discourse. Clinton thus said during his visit to Germany that
“[t]hey clearly create a dangerous new instability in their region. And as
a result, in accordance with United States law, I have decided to impose
economic sanctions against India” (1998c). As a policy solution, President
Clinton signed an order on May 13, 1998, following the provision of the
Glenn’s Nuclear Proliferation Act of 1994, which called for measures against
countries that test nuclear weapons (Rubinoff 2006, 50). This act imposed
financial and arms control sanctions, such as the termination of $21 mil-
lion in economic development assistance, the postponement of $1.7 billion
which was lent by International Financial Institutions, the cancelation of
loans and credits by US banks, and the annulment of arms sales (LePoer
2001, 6–7). Many other institutions were subjected to strict licensing, such
as companies involved in the strategic sector (Tellis 2006, 124–125).
In the meantime, the USA conducted private discussions with
Pakistan to stop them from conducting nuclear tests; however, on May
28, Pakistan exploded five nuclear devices and detonated a sixth device
on May 31, 1998.24 The same restrictions were imposed on Pakistan.
The US administration also encouraged other countries to constitute
the India–Pakistan conflict as a security problem, including the Group
of Eight, or G-8, and the UN (Talbott 2004, 53, 74–75). As both
India–Pakistan nuclear relations with South Asia and US–China rela-
tions were on the US agenda, in June President Clinton referred to the
tests as “defeating, wasteful and dangerous”, and he applauded China’s
chairmanship of the UN Security Council as “China’s constructive

leadership […] will be essential to the long-term resolution of issues
involving South Asia” (1998d). As a policy solution, the foreign minis-
ters of the five declared nuclear weapon states, the permanent members
of the UN Security Council, condemned the tests on June 6, 1998, as
“proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to
international peace and security”, and it called on India and Pakistan to
reduce the danger of a war, to sign the CTBT, to join talks to ban fis-
sile material production, and to strengthen nuclear export controls and
cease missile testing (UNSC 1998).
Nuclear issues remained at the center of the US security policy toward
India, but soon there was less pressure on India because the security
issue was constructed as under negotiation. The security issue was de-
emphasized.25 In discussing the nuclear tests in the Senate on June 23,
Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) stated that the administration should
start thinking about gradually lifting the sanctions:
The month of May 1998 will be remembered as a time of nuclear anxiety.

Tensions were high as the world watched India and Pakistan play nuclear
roulette. June has brought some respite; India and Pakistan have declared
a moratorium on further nuclear testing, and they are discussing bilateral
talks this month […] What has happened in South Asia is in many ways
an indictment of the administration’s failed foreign and non-proliferation
policies (1998).
The 1999 NSS also stated, “We seek, as part of our dialogue with
India and Pakistan, to encourage both countries to take steps to pre-
vent proliferation, reduce the risk of conflict, and exercise restraint
in their nuclear and missile programs” (Clinton 1999a, 44). These
initiatives were part of the overall strategy of engagement which had
not radically changed since 1994 (Clinton 1994a, i; 1997a; 1999a,
iii). The Clinton administration did not abandon its non-proliferation
goals, but it “engaged” India rather than isolated it (Cohen 2002,
292; Hathaway 2003, 7). A series of high-level discussions about the
FMCT and CTBT were held between Singh and Talbott (Hathaway
2003, 7).26 Within a few months, there were also other initiatives: the
US Senate already voted in July 1998 to remove the heaviest sanctions,
namely agricultural sanctions on India and Pakistan, and in November
less stringent rules were imposed with regard to financial and military
training programs (Hayes 2009, 987). Also, the Amendment of 1998

to the Arms Export Control Act, sponsored by Senator Brownback
of Kansas, was enacted which gave the President the authority to
waive many sanctions against India and Pakistan, such as the Glenn
Amendment, the Pressler Amendment, and others (Rubinoff 2006,
51). In October 1999, Congress allowed the President to make the
waiver permanent under Brownback II (Rubinoff 2006, 51).
As part of the nuclear issues, the US policy discourse also constructed
the CTBT, in particular, as a security issue. The Clinton administration
started to discuss these plans more frequently as the global agreement
needed to be universally signed and ratified or it would not be accepted.
Press spokesman Joe Lockhart said that India and Pakistan engaged pos-
itively with the USA concerning the CTBT (1999a). Nevertheless, the
Singh–Talbott talks remained inconclusive with regard to US objectives:
India did not sign the NPT or the CTBT (Banerjee 2006, 72). This meant
that India and Pakistan prevented the CTBT’s enforcement when the
Indian delegates merely promised that they would not undertake nuclear
tests in the future (Talbott 2004, 36, 40; Banerjee 2006, 72). The failure
of the BJP government to ratify the CTBT would become irrelevant, how-
ever, when the Republican-controlled US Senate also did not sign it by a
vote of 51–48 (Rubinoff 2006, 51).
KARGIL AND THE CLINTON VISIT

In the latter part of Clinton’s second administration, a new security issue
was articulated as dangerous. The Kargil crisis took place in 1999 when
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate sent troops over the Line
of Control into Kashmir near Kargil. According to a statement by the US
Press Secretary, “As part of the President’s on-going efforts regarding the
current conflict in Kashmir, the President spoke again today with both Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of
India. All agreed the situation is dangerous and could escalate if not resolved
quickly” (Clinton 1999b). As a policy solution, many private phone calls and
letters were thus exchanged by the White House, Pakistan, and India at the
start of July 1999 (Talbott 2004, 159–160). When Prime Minister Sharif
visited President Clinton soon after, a joint statement was distributed:27
President Clinton and Prime Minister Sharif share the view that the cur-
rent fighting in the Kargil region of Kashmir is dangerous and contains
the seeds of a wider conflict […] It was agreed between the President and
the Prime Minister that concrete steps will be taken for the restoration of
the line of control in accordance with the Simla Agreement. The President
urged an immediate cessation of the hostilities once these steps are taken
(Clinton 1999c).
A US administration official emphasized that it was strictly a US–Pakistan

meeting and that “the forces that are across the line of control need to be
returned to the Pakistani side” (Clinton 1999c).28 This demonstrated a
change in US foreign policy. The USA put pressure on Pakistan and came
out publically in support for India for the first time.
Clinton visited India in March 2000, followed six months later by a
visit to Washington by Prime Minister Vajpayee (Hathaway 2003, 8).
Press spokesman David Leavy said that the USA has a “very important
strategic interest with India” (2000). Also, he added, “[T]he President
views strong Indian relations as essential to our own interests, to the inter-
ests of the American people […]. They have an important role to play
in the future not only in terms of strategic interests, but also the envi-
ronment, health, improved trade and investment” (Leavy 2000). In fact,
Clinton was the first President in 22 years to visit India (Cohen 2002,
268; Rubinoff 2006, 51). The newly gained importance of India was also
evident since the President stayed for five days in India and merely five
hours in Pakistan (Cohen 2002, 26, 291–292). Clinton gave a speech at
the Indian parliament and signed the “Vision for the 21st Century” docu-
ment in which the USA and India promised to cooperate regarding trade,
information technology, energy and environment, health, democracy pro-
motion, terrorism, and non-proliferation. For instance, the administra-
tion established the Joint Working group on Counterterrorism. Also, an
economic dialogue was set up with a Financial and Economic Forum, a
Commercial Dialogue, and a Working Group on Trade (Clinton 2000a).
Non-proliferation remained an important security issue as a “nuclear
future is not a more secure future”, but there were also other security
areas where they could cooperate (Clinton 2000b).
During the second administration, the USA thus pursued closer rela-
tions with India than during the first administration. From 1997 onward,
the Clinton administration remained continuously interested and wanted
to engage India through the Talbott–Singh talks and its support for India
during the Kargil crisis. In the following section, I discuss the changing
policy discourses that made possible these changing US security policies.
What we find is that the articulation of US security policies toward India

fell within the discursive boundaries of two competing understandings of
India: India as an unstable power and as an emerging economy; in other
words, there was a clash between the development and instability themes.
Concretely, this means that various representations were deployed during
the first administration: India was initially connected with Russia and then
represented as a promising market. The latter trope was overshadowed
by India as a developing country and a contributor to the Indo-Pakistan
conflict. The year 1997 marked a watershed when the two themes were
combined. India started to be constructed differently: it was a country
with economic potential being held back by Indo-Pakistan conflict. The
trope of economic potential became increasingly more important.
CONFLICTING US POLICIES: INDIA AS AN IMPORTANT

MARKET
As shown earlier, the first Clinton administration pursued many security
policies toward India with blocking Russia’s technology transfer to India,
talks about India’s and Pakistan’s non-proliferation, non-involvement in
Kashmir and human rights, discussions about US-India trade relations,
military transfers to Pakistan, and initial steps toward US-India defense
relations. In 1993, the Clinton administration initially understood India
within a Cold War framework.29 When the Clinton administration entered
office, the breakup of the Soviet Union was not a distant memory: India
was not often articulated on its own terms because Russia was attached to
its subject-position. During briefings, Secretary of Treasury Lloyd Bentsen
and President Clinton were asked whether they were “concerned” that
the “IndiaRussia rocket deal [sic] regarding rocket technology and fuel
would impact trade and aid with Russia” and whether Clinton was able to
“persuade Mr. Yeltsin to cancel the sale of Russian missile technology to
India and Libya?” (Bentsen 1993; Clinton 1993)
This Cold War framework was soon replaced by Clinton’s policy of
engagement and enlargement which included new security issues while
continuing to construct a large role for the USA. As the 1994 NSS argued,
Never had American leadership been more essential – to navigate the shoals
of the world’s new dangers and to capitalize on its opportunities. American
assets are unique: our military strength, our dynamic economy, our power-
ful ideals and, above all, our people. We can and must make the difference
through our engagement; but our involvement must be carefully tailored to

serve our interests and priorities (Clinton 1994a, i).
The USA was thus constructed as a powerful leader. Like in the Cold War,
the USA was articulated as having a great responsibility since it “can and
must make a difference through our engagement” (Clinton 1994a, i). The
USA should continue to be a global leader to the rest of the world. As
Clinton stated in the State of the Union,
Now, there are some in our country who argue that with the Cold War,
America should turn its back on the rest of the world […] I took this office
on a pledge that had no partisan tinge to keep our nation secure by remain-
ing engaged in the rest of the world. And this year, because of our work
together – enacting NAFTA, keeping our military strong and prepared,
supporting democracy abroad – we have reaffirmed America’s leadership,
America’s engagement. And as a result, the American people are more
secure than they were before (Clinton 1994g).
One of these responsibilities was the support of liberal democracy abroad

to create the rest of the world in its own self-image. As mentioned in
Chap. 3, the idea that the spread of liberal and democratic values abroad
advanced America’s interests had a long pedigree and continued to be
prominent during the Clinton presidency. As one of the main points, the
NSS argued that the USA should “promote democracy abroad” since
“democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely
to cooperate with the US” (Clinton 1994a, i–ii). These ideas were partly
based on the democratic peace theory which was debated in the aca-
demic discourse a few years earlier with the seminal article by Michael
W. Doyle “Liberalism and World Politics” (1986), claiming that “Liberal
states are different. They are indeed peaceful […] Liberal states have cre-
ated a separate peace, as Kant argued they would” (Doyle 1986, 1151).
This theory holds that (liberal) democracies do not go to war with each
other. During the Clinton administration, these ideas were rearticulated
by Fukuyama’s End of History and the Last Man (1992). Fukuyama saw
the spread of democracies over authoritarian and totalitarian forms of gov-
ernment in the 1990s as progress and as a reason for optimism (1992,
11–12). There is a “Universal History of Mankind in the direction of
democracy”; if we cannot imagine a different world order, a world without
democracies, then history itself is at its end (Fukuyama 1992, 47, 50). The
support of liberal democracy was combined with the support of markets as
the USA also wanted to remake the world’s economies in its own image.
The Defense Department’s bottom-up review said, “Today there is prom-
ise that we can replace the East-West confrontation of the Cold War with
an era in which the community of nations, guided by a common commit-
ment to democratic principles, free-market economics, and the rule of the
law, can be significantly enlarged” (Department of Defense 1993). The
discourse assumed that everyone wanted to be free and prosperous similar
to this US model.
Like in the Cold War, the liberal identity trope often emerged when
US identity was discussed. In the State of the Union of 1995, Clinton
said that the Founders created a nation based on a “single powerful idea”
which said that “men are created equal […] endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, and among these are Life, Liberty and
the pursuit of Happiness” (1995d). Clinton added that “[i]t has fallen to
every generation since then to preserve that idea, the American idea, and
to deepened and expand its meaning”. It was made self-evident that the
USA was an exemplary nation because of its ideals and US citizens, a spe-
cial people with a unique destiny. “America” exists through people com-
ing from different places whose US identity is based on the flag and the
Pledge (Campbell 1998, 91). The “powerful ideals” which the Clinton
administration mentioned were the values of the American creed: free-
dom, individualism, democracy, egalitarianism, rights, and the rule of law
(Foley 2007, 3).30 According to Samuel Huntington, it is this identifica-
tion of nationality with values that makes the USA particularly unique; the
USA is founded upon a creed of liberty (1981, 25). He argues that you
cannot speak of Frenchism or Britishism, but there is an American ideol-
ogy (1981, 2). The driving ideology of US foreign policy is thus liberalism
or “American democratic liberalism”, which stands for commitments to
“the interdependence of democracy and capitalism; to individual liberty
and the protection of private property; to limited government, the rule
of law, natural rights, the perfectibility of human institutions, and to the
possibility of human progress” (Dumbrell 1997, 4).31 This gives a strong
sense of mission as its own democratic history serves as a model (Dumbrell
1997, 4).
Several constructions were articulated with regard to India in light of
this US representation of itself. India’s status as a democracy was often
invoked. As mentioned earlier, the democracy theme derived from the
Cold War when India’s subject-position was articulated as such (Cohen
2002, 290). The 1994 NSS, for instance, noted that South Asia had
“seen the spread of democracy” (Clinton 1994a, 26). When Indian Prime
Minister Rao visited Clinton in Washington in May 1994, the President
also emphasized and reiterated that India was the “world’s largest democ-
racy, a nation of almost 900 million people” (Clinton 1994c). This repre-
sentation continued through the Clinton’s presidency; Clinton referred,
for instance, to India as “the largest democracy on the face of the earth”
(McCurry 1997a).
Within the development theme, India was also constructed as changing
from a developing country into “one of [the US’] most important emerg-
ing markets” (Clinton 1994a, 26). In a background briefing on Indian
Prime Minister’s visit to Washington, the US administration referred to
the market-oriented reforms in India while India’s subject-position was
articulated as a “major area for American investment” (Clinton 1994b).
What made India’s economy so important was that it had “a large middle
class, upwards of 200 million people, which is a very good trade opportu-
nity for the United States” (Clinton 1994b). India was thus marching up
the development ladder because of its size. In fact, Clinton also went a step
further during his press conference with Prime Minister Rao, saying that
India was a “major world economic power”, asserting that under Rao’s
leadership “India is taking its rightful place as a major world economic
power and as a partner in world affairs” (1994c). By shedding its own eco-
nomic plans, India was only now constructed as “taking its rightful place”
in the world economy. India’s economic reforms “dovetailed nicely” with
the Clinton administration’s national security plans and created a space for
closer relations with the USA as a trading partner (Hagerty 2006, 18). As
the 1994 NSS argued, secure nations have democratic structures and they
are growing economies (Clinton 1994a, i–ii).
Since India was represented as a democracy with a growing econ-
omy, the USA and India were constructed as sharing the same values.
As the 1994 NSS argued, “Nations with growing economies and strong
trade ties are more likely to feel secure and to work toward freedom”
(Clinton 1994a, i–ii). During the press conference of Clinton and Rao,
the President thus said, “Along with the United States, India is one of
the world’s great experiments in multicultural democracy. Its people share
our love for freedom, entrepreneurship and self-expression.” The USA
and India were represented as similar even in terms of their “entrepre-
neurship” (Clinton 1994c). These statements alluded to neoliberal ideas.
As David Harvey writes, “Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory
of political practices that proposed that human well-being can best be
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills

within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property
rights, free markets and free trade” (2005, 2). India was disciplined into
accepting American ideas of economic progress and becoming a neolib-
eral state. As Foley argues, neoliberalism “rationalized the increasing scale
of globalizing conformity by reference to ‘Washington consensus’ upon
the axiomatic requirements of progress” (2007, 5). All of these values,
for example, entrepreneurship, self-expression, and freedom, are deeply
entrenched in US society as they are connected to democracy, liberalism,
and capitalism. According to John Dumbrell, “American democratic lib-
eralism” embodied the interdependence between democracy and capital-
ism (1997, 4). Capitalism in the USA refers to a way of life since it taps
into various American values and ideals (Foley 2007, 213). India was thus
being remade into the US likeness.
However, India’s articulation as a growing economic player was not suc-
cessful. Even though President Clinton presented India as having the “big-
gest middle class in the world”, India was soon depicted as a poor country
engaged in conflicts (1995a). When Hillary Clinton toured South Asia in
March 1995, visiting representatives of the government and NGOs, focusing
on aid policies and women’s empowerment, her office said, “Providing sup-
port, rebuilding community and protecting the future for children and fami-
lies is vital to the national interests of developing and developed countries
alike” (1995a). The aid dimension was discussed rather than India’s growing
economic role. Also, India was represented as developing. When President
Clinton discussed Hillary Clinton’s 1995 trip to South Asia, he said, “[O]
ne of the biggest obstacles to the modernization of those countries and to
the vitality and preservation of democracy are the challenges faced by women
and children there” (1995e). Like in the Cold War, the region was depicted
as having to modernize. In fact, the Clinton administration made jokes about
toilets in India. During a press briefing, press spokesman Mike McCurry
asked a journalist who went to India to report on Hillary Clinton’s trip:
Did you, while you were there in New Delhi, by any chance happen to visit
the International Museum of Toilets, out of curiosity? According to the
Reuter wire here, when you go to the International Museum of Toilets, visi-
tors are greeted with ferns sprouting from a toilet bowl at its main entrance.
(Laughter). They take the business of bathrooms very seriously it reports
here. The museum chronicles the rise of the toilet from 2500 B.C. to 1980
when the first auto-control toilet was installed – a very important advance in
technology (McCurry 1995).
India was thus ridiculed for having a toilet museum as “[t]hey take the
business of bathroom very seriously”. India was articulated as poor and
developing by showing that the auto-control toilet was for them an
“important advance in technology”. It referred to American’s views of
India’s as chaotic, dirty, and lacking development (Rotter 2000, 17–19).
The instability theme re-emerged which overshadowed India’s rep-
resentation as a growing economy. When India tested a Prithvi missile
in 1996, the USA called upon India and Pakistan to restrain them-
selves since “the deployment or acquisition of ballistic missiles by
India or Pakistan would be destabilizing, and that the deployment
of ballistic missiles would undermine the security of both India and
Pakistan” (Burns 1996). Deterrence was thus seen as problematic in
South Asia. One of the main arguments against nuclear deterrence in
South Asia was the geographical proximity between Pakistan and India.
Nevertheless, Gusterson notes that the decision-making times concern-
ing nuclear missiles for India and Pakistan were not very different from
the USA and Soviet Union: they were both too short (1999, 118–119).
Even though ballistic missiles were argued to keep the USA safe, the
US government presupposed that other countries could not deal with
nuclear arms and would make dangerous decisions. In other words,
Gusterson argues that “an argument that appears on the surface to be
about numbers and configurations of weapons, is really, when one looks
more closely, about the psychology and culture of people” (1999, 121).
Leaders from India and Pakistan were presented as emotional: they
made irresponsible calculations and took risks. The region was articu-
lated as a zero-sum game which was not easy to disentangle, especially
since both countries have “longstanding ethnic, religious and territo-
rial differences” (Perry 1995). The countries were depicted as lacking
political maturity because they were more vulnerable to ancient hatreds
(Gusterson 1999, 123; 126).32 This reflected an orientalist discourse as
was already encountered during the Cold War: the West was rational
and disciplined, while the Third World was irrational and undisciplined
(Gusterson 1999, 123–124).
India was represented as having internal conflicts. Hillary Clinton
stressed that the South Asian countries were “working very hard to try to
build their own democracies and create more prosperous economies for
their people” but were also riven “by ethnic and religious and racial con-
flicts” (Clinton 1995b). Again, Indians were presented as lacking political
maturity. Hillary Clinton painted a bleak picture:
[What] I am impressed by as I shook the hands of men and women who’ve

had brothers and sons and husbands and mothers and fathers assassinated for
democracy’s sake, who themselves had been imprisoned or exiled or tortured,
is how these people were doing what they did in large measure because of what
America means to the rest of the world. How devoted they were to democracy
and a better life for their people was in direct relationship to what they expected
to be able to realize because they looked at the model we are (1995b).
This statement reflected American overconfidence or hubris; the USA lectured

the rest of the world about the value of democracy. The USA was presented
as an inspiration to the others: people looked up to the USA as a model and
moral example for a “better life”. In other words, the USA was a City upon
a Hill to India. These assumptions derived from exceptionalist ideas taken on
by the first Puritan migrants who established a church and settlements that
they felt should be an example (Madsen 1998, 1). In fact, one of the Puritans,
John Winthrop, preached to his own tiny settlement in New England that it
was a City upon a Hill allotted by providence, a beacon in the dark and a place
of rectitude, where “the eyes of all people are upon us” (Baritz 1998, 26).
The Clinton administration’s security policies were thus made possible
by various constructions of India and the USA. The USA pursued conflict-
ing security policies toward India, such as the cancelation of Russia’s tech-
nology transfer to India, discussions about non-proliferation, interest in
India’s growing economy, and a defense agreement. Accordingly, the USA
was represented as a unique country, a leader with great responsibilities,
and an inspiration to others. The development, instability, and democracy
themes were also articulated. India was initially connected with Russia and
its non-proliferation. In 1994, India was represented as a growing world
market and a democracy which shared neoliberal values, but this trope was
soon replaced by others: India as democratic country which needed to be
developed and which was unstable because it was part of an enduring and
irresponsible conflict between Pakistan and India. In the next section, its
instability and economic strength started to be linked with each other.
INDIA AND THE NUCLEAR TEST: INDIA AS AN OVERLOOKED

COUNTRY
During the start of Clinton’s second administration, the USA responded
strongly to India’s nuclear tests by employing sanctions followed by rounds
of US-India talks on NPT and CTBT. Under the first administration,
India was naturalized as a conflict area but also as an area of economic

potential. In the NSSs, India and Pakistan had been mentioned as “one
of its most important emerging markets” every year since 1994 while in
the last few years the tensions and conflicts were more often highlighted
(Clinton 1994a, 25; 1995f, 31; 1996).
During the second Clinton administration, however, an important
change occurred: the instability and development themes were linked with
each other, which made possible different foreign policy options to the US
policy-makers. Prior and after the nuclear tests in India on May 11 and 13,
1998, President Clinton started to remark at a news conference that the
USA should keep a foot in South Asia because of the “enormous poten-
tial of South Asia for good, if things go well, and for ill if things don’t”
(1997b). Clinton also asked, “Why are they fighting over the line of control
in Kashmir? […] Why is that such a big problem that they keep spending
money preparing to go to war with one another instead of educating their
children and alleviating the abject poverty that is holding them down and
keeping them from their full potential?” (1999d). Conflicts were holding
South Asia’s potential back. India was seen as wasting money on conflicts
rather than tackling its poverty and expanding its economy. Like in the
Cold War period, Third World countries were constructed as irresponsible
and irrational because they were depicted as being too poor for nuclear
weapons, while Western countries were allowed to spend their money on
these weapons rather than on their own country’s poor. In fact, in the
USA nuclear weapons were presented as a cheaper option in keeping peo-
ple secure in comparison to other weapons. There was thus a double stan-
dard (Gusterson 1999, 117). Nevertheless, President Clinton added that
the Indians and Pakistanis should sort out their differences because “I am
convinced that they could quickly begin to enjoy economic growth rates
at the level of the highest East Asian communities and be our best partner
for the future” (1997b). Pakistan and India were presented as potentially
being able to follow in the footsteps of the successful economies in East
Asia such as Japan and the so-called Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore,
South Korea, and Taiwan) prior to the economic crisis in 1997. India
should strive to become like them and climb the development ladder. As
President Clinton said on May 9, 1998, a few days prior to the test, “[I]
f somehow the Indians and the Pakistanis could unravel their differences,
their future potential as an economic market for us and as a force for peace
in Asia, bearing responsibilities that otherwise we might have to bear, is
absolutely staggering” (1998e). India’s enormous potential in terms of
security and economy could emerge if the conflicts were resolved.33 Only
then, could India handle the responsibilities which the USA usually bore.
The US mission thus served as an example for India in the future.
India’s growing economic importance also made it common-sensible
to connect India’s and China’s economies even prior to the nuclear tests.
Both India and China were, for instance, connected through the Kyoto
conference on climate change in December 1997. The 1998 NSS stated
that the success of the Kyoto agreement “depends on meaningful partici-
pation by key developing nations as well as the industrialized nations of
the world. Rapid economic growth in China and India make their partici-
pation essential to the global effort to control greenhouse gases” (Clinton
1998f, 45). China and India were the key developing nations, and they
were also seen as rapidly growing. The meanings were welded in such a
manner that both India and China were constructed as large polluters and
as growing economies which could not be left out of the treaty. Press offi-
cer McCurry also said that “those robust economies that are developing
well – India being one, China being another – could easily overtake some
industrialized nations [and their pollution output] halfway through the
next century” (1997b). India was thus represented as an economy which
will grow more extensively than some developed nations.
During the Indian nuclear tests, there were also other tropes. India was
constructed as a “vibrant democracy” within the democracy theme. The
President stated on May 16, 1998:
This [nuclear test] is especially disappointing to me because I have long

supported stronger ties between the United States and India. After all, India
will soon be the world’s most populous country. Already it has the world’s
largest middle class and 50 years of vibrant democracy to its credit. And
America has been immeasurably enriched by the contributions of Indian
Americans who work hard, believe in education, and have really been good
citizens (Clinton 1998g).
The gravity of and the disappointment about the nuclear tests was thus
juxtaposed with India’s subject-position as a “democracy”, which presup-
posed that it was a responsible power. India’s actions were also contrasted
with the Indian Americans who were articulated as successful American
citizens because they had enriched the USA—a melting pot to which
migrants could bring their talents. Indian Americans were represented as
self-made citizens and high achievers who went to riches through hard
work following the myth of Asian Americans as the model minority. The
US media often portrayed Asian Americans as smart ethnic groups of
which many attended college (Hing 1993, 11).34
However, India was also represented as a “vibrant” and “great” coun-
try, wanting to show its large role to the world through its nuclear test
because it had been ignored (Clinton 1998c). Clinton said during his visit
to Germany on May 13, 1998:
[India] may think that their security requires this, but I think it’s more
likely, if you just listen to the rhetoric of the party in power, that they believe
that they have been under-appreciated in the world as a great power. And
they think one reason may be that they’re not an out-front, out-of-the-
closet, open nuclear power. Well, I think they’ve been under-appreciated
in the world and in the United States, myself. They’re a very great country
(1998c).
India was thus constituted as “under-appreciated” in the global arena even

though Clinton claimed that “[t]hey’re going to have a very large say in
the 21st century” (1998h). Within the Indian security discourse, India’s
greatness was indeed debated. According to Muppidi, the Nehruvian
vision of India represented India as a “great” power, which was based
on ideas of “civilizational identity” and “destiny” rather than capability
(1999, 126). As Nehru said, “Destiny has cast a certain role on this coun-
try. […] [W]e also have to act as men and women of destiny […] never
forgetting the great responsibility that freedom, that this great destiny of
our country, has cast upon us” (In Muppidi 1999, 126). Within the BJP
government, however, these visions of India’s civilizational identity were
seen as too idealistic: India should face geopolitical realities and show mili-
tary strength (Chacko 2012, 168).
Reflecting the instability theme, the US policy discourse presented
India as a country on its way to greatness, but not there yet. President
Clinton said in Germany, “I hope the Indian government soon will real-
ize that it can be a very great country in the 21st century without doing
things like this […] It simply is not necessary for a nation […] – a per-
fectly wonderful country; it is not necessary for them to manifest national
greatness by doing this” (1998c). Clinton also remarked that he did not
think that the “best way to guarantee India’s security or its greatness [is]
to basically call up the darker elements of the 20th century” (1998h). The
USA thus showed its appreciation of India, but there was also the claim
that India was manifesting its greatness in the wrong way. The nuclear test
was confronted by the administration as a “terrible mistake” that India’s
security did not require. Clinton argued, “[T]o think that you have to
manifest your greatness by behavior that recalls the very worst events of
the 20th century on the edge of the 21st century, when everybody else
is trying to leave the nuclear age behind, is just wrong. It is just wrong”
(1998c). The USA and “everybody else” were presented as having a moral
compass while India and Pakistan were behaving irresponsibly. India and
Pakistan should be told off. These statements were in many ways ironic
since the US administration naturalized the idea that it had the power to
decide which country was great even though the USA had been occupied
with its own search of national greatness during the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, which it denied now to India (Hunt 1987, 21). Sunil
Khilnani also claimed that “India felt treated like an amiable if slightly
retarded child – a condescension that resonated in the schoolmasterly
piety of President Clinton’s admonition after the nuclear tests” (1999, xi).
In other words, the USA demanded that India should demonstrate good
behavior. This parent–child relationship again recalled the colonial dis-
course in which “developing” countries were seen as immature, backward,
and as lacking control over their emotions. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright had indeed called India and Pakistan to “cool it – take a deep
breath and begin to climb out of the hole they have dug themselves into”
(Clinton 1998d).
India was also depicted as having conducted its tests “out of a nar-
cissistic desire for self-aggrandizement rather than for legitimate national
security reasons” (Gusterson 1999, 125). For instance, Defense Secretary
William Cohen represented India and Pakistan as “engaging in chauvin-
istic chest-pounding about their nuclear manhood” (In Gusterson 1999,
124).35 In the Western discourse, female passionate behavior is contrasted
by male rationality. The Western representation of India conferred effemi-
nacy by alluding to emotions and passions that must be controlled; India
had something to prove by overdoing these acts of manhood (Gusterson
1999, 130). India’s nuclear ambitions were thus questioned through
hierarchies of domination by attaching feminine or child-like qualities to
its subject-position. For example, Representative in the House, Edward
Markey (D-MA), denounced the tests as “reckless, shameful and irrespon-
sible” (Rubinoff 2008, 196). By depicting India either as a woman or a
child, the US policy discourse presented the boundaries of the inside and
outside: India had broken the rules with their immature behavior which
delegitimized India’s actions. As Clinton said, India “directly challenges

the firm international consensus to stop the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction” (Clinton 1998b). Also, US Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright remarked it was “clear that what the Indians and Pakistanis did
was unacceptable and that they were now not members of the nuclear
club” (1998). India was acting outside the norm which reflected the non-
alignment theme.
While India was represented as a great but overlooked nation which
pursued this in an unacceptable and irresponsible manner, US leadership in
the nuclear club was seen to be undermined by the Senate’s refusal to sign
the CTBT. Responding to the question of what was going to happen with
India and Pakistan, press spokesman Joe Lockhart made clear that both
countries had made “positive” statements about the CTBT. However,
Lockhart added, “[T]he world is watching. The world looks to the United
States for leadership. They want to know that we’re going to stand up and
take a stand against testing. And I think it’s hard to expect or to condition
our decisions based on what others would do. That’s not how the United
States leads in the world. We lead, we don’t follow” (1999b). The USA
was represented as a model to other countries. This representation was
guided by another concept of US national greatness and leadership: the
idea of Manifest Destiny in which the USA defines its own fates as differ-
ent from other people. This gave it a special mission to spread ideas and
institutions, thereby remaking the world in the image of the USA (Bell
1975, 199). However, US duties over India and Pakistan were on the line.
When Press Officer McCurry was asked what it says about “the President’s
clout in international affairs” as both India and now Pakistan have “sum-
marily rejected his advice?”, McCurry responded,
It says that the United States of America, despite all of its wealth and its might,
cannot control every event every place in the world, particularly in a place
where, for five decades now, governments have fought wars and peoples have
lived with incredible tension. And it just means it makes it all the more impor-
tant and all the more incumbent upon the United States, given our unique
role in the world, to work hard at doing the kinds of things we do (1998).
The USA was thus represented as having a unique role. Even if the USA
could not control everything, it had a duty to fulfill because it was a wealthy
and powerful country. It was its Manifest Destiny to do “the kind of things
we do”. Accordingly, the 1997 Defense Department’s Quadrennial Review
stated, “In between […] competing visions of isolationism and world

policeman lies a security strategy that is consistent with our global inter-
ests – a national security strategy of engagement” (Department of Defense
1997). Instead of being a world policeman or an isolationist, the USA
was represented as a benign hegemon under whose leadership the inter-
national community should be influenced for the sake of US and global
security. The fact that the terms “isolationism” and “world policemen”
were used, was particularly telling since the labels have become a term of
abuse (Dumbrell 1997, 9). There is an American hubris that the USA has
a large and positive role to play in the world. However, the USA has nearly
always pursued some sort of engagement; the isolationism-world police-
man dichotomy is a construction. The USA has been at least supportive of
regional hegemony in Latin America since the Monroe Doctrine in 1832
(Dumbrell 1997, 9). After the CTBT debacle, the USA thus continued to
engage other states, including India, as there was need for US leadership.
To conclude, the administration employed sanctions followed by rounds
of US-India negotiations, including discussions about the CTBT, after
India’s nuclear tests, as mentioned earlier. Accordingly, the USA was con-
structed as a leader who could not take care of everything but should stay
engaged since it was not an isolationist power. With regard to India, the
instability, development, non-alignment, and development themes were all
articulated. Prior to the 1998 nuclear tests, the instability and development
themes started to be linked with each other: India was presented as a coun-
try whose great economic potential was being held back by instability in
the region. India’s rapidly growing economy was connected with China’s
through the Kyoto Protocol. After the nuclear tests, India was constructed
as a vibrant democracy whose emotional and irresponsible actions did not
make it part of the nuclear club and for which it should be told off, but also
as an underappreciated great power. India’s potential became increasingly
important from 1999 onward, as the next section demonstrates.
KARGIL AND THE CLINTON VISIT: CHALLENGES

AND PROSPECTS
After 1998, the USA asked Pakistan to withdraw its troops during the
Kargil crisis, and President Clinton visited India. Another trope emerged:
India began to be represented as an important economy. The US Trade
Representative Charlene Barshefsky said that the USA had an interest
in “areas of high technology trade where India has long been a leader”
such as software development, telecom, e-commerce, and other emerg-

ing technologies (Lockhart 1999c). India was articulated as a “leader”
in high-technology trade, which was one of the new opportunities in the
globalizing world.36 About the Clinton administration’s visit to India in
March 2000, Leavy thus said, “I think the President views strong Indian
relations as essential to our own interests, to the interests of the American
people […] They have an important role to play in the future not only in
terms of strategic interests, but also the environment, health, improved
trade and investment” (2000).
India and Pakistan were now less connected as their subject-positions
became disentangled and “dehyphenated” (See e.g. Inderfurth 2000). In
fact, the administration claimed, “We do have a relationship that stands
alone […] we’ve never put our relationship with India based on relation-
ships with other countries. It stands alone. It’s an important country. We
need to engage them” (Leavy 2000).37 India was represented as an impor-
tant country; Pakistan should not get into the equation. As Leavy argued
at a press conference, “We have important issues with both sides. Having
strong bilateral relations with both India and Pakistan are in our inter-
ests. They’re not mutually exclusive. The relationship with India stands
on its own […] it’s not a zero sum game with any other country” (2000).
Kashmir, of course, was still constructed as a region of concern. In 2000,
President Clinton said, for instance, that Kashmir is “[t]he most danger-
ous place in the world today” (2000c).38 As during the earlier Clinton
years, India continued to be seen as a site of danger.
Overall, India was constructed as facing diverse challenges and even
greater prospects. In his speech to the Indian joint session of parliament
in 2000, Clinton (2000b) continued to tie India’s security and economic
growth together: “Only India knows if it can afford a sustained invest-
ment in both conventional and nuclear forces while meeting its goals for
human development.” But there was much more to India. He described
it as an exemplary nation, saying that “the greatest of India’s many
gifts to the world is the example its people have set ‘from Midnight to
Millennium’” since every challenge and “every solution to every chal-
lenge” can be found in India (2000b). Clinton was referring to Shashi
Tharoor’s book From Midnight to Millennium which Clinton was “rav-
ing” about, according to Talbott, when it was published (Tharoor 1997;
Talbott 2004, 43). Tharoor discusses that there are various issues and not
one solution since India can only be discussed in the “plural”. As Tharoor
argues, “There are, in the hackneyed phrase, many Indias” when you look
at the diversity of groups, faiths, and ideologies (1997, 7–8).39 During his
speech, Clinton said,
From a distance, India often appears as a kaleidoscope of competing, per-

haps superficial, images. Is it atomic weapons, or ahimsa? A land struggling
against poverty and inequality, or the world’s largest middle-class society?
Is it still simmering with communal tensions, or history’s most successful
melting pot? Is it Bollywood or Satyajit Ray? Swetta Chetty or Alla Rakha?
Is it the handloom or the hyperlink? (2000b)
India was thus a study of contrasts: its subjection position was articulated
as a complex mix of different images although they were set up as binaries,
for example, India as a country affected by communal tensions or as a suc-
cessful melting pot. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger also argued,
There may be no place in the world where so many issues of importance to

our future come together so dramatically – from conflict resolution to the
information revolution, from political reform to nuclear restraint, from the
environment to the gap between rich and poor. What happens in South Asia
will have a strong impact on the security and prosperity of the American
people for many years (2000).
In other words, South Asia and India, in particular, were represented as

a place where various very important issues, such as poverty and wealth,
came together. Cohen argues that American policy-makers have a ten-
dency to view India in dichotomies: India was constituted “in terms of a
blur of favorable and unfavorable stereotypes” because Americans contrast
India’s own constructions of India’s “greatness” and its extensive poverty
(Cohen 2002, 5; Heimsath 1998, 101). This also echoed colonial phan-
tasies. Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal find that the subcontinent was often
depicted by “two contrary images” within Western popular culture. India
was “lauded as an ancient land of mystery and romance, extraordinary
wealth and profound spirituality”, while it was also “denounced for its
irrationality and inhumanity and derided for its destitution and squalor”
(1998, 1). This trope was also articulated during the Clinton adminis-
tration although Clinton allowed for a plurality of images rather than a
binary. Clinton said at the joint session of the Indian parliament that the
“competing images” were somewhat “superficial”, and therefore, he con-
cluded, “The truth is, no single image can possibly do justice” to India
(2000b).
The US discourse began to assert that India should be better under-

stood. During his trip to India, Clinton said he wanted “[t]he American
people to see the new India and to understand you better. And I hope
that the visit will help India to understand America better. And that by
listening to each other we can build a true partnership of mutual respect
and common endeavor” (2000b). Both countries were represented as
having uninformed views of each other. The “new” India needed to be
listened to. As Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal argue, images of stark pov-
erty, chaos, religious strife, India’s grandeur or meditation, which were
either “optimistically fanciful or pejoratively stereotypical”, often derive
“from an inability to understand or comprehend, far less explain, the enor-
mous complexities of South Asia” (Bose and Jalal 1998, 1–2). Ironically,
the US aim for greater understandings also continued to constitute India
as a complex country, in other words, “another world, incredibly, fabu-
lous, and the concerns of its people escaped the understanding or even
the imagination of Americans” (Heimsath 1998, 101). At the same time,
the USA and India were also constructed as similar. In his speech to the
Indian joint session of parliament in 2000, Clinton referred to Prime
Minister Vajpayee’s idea that India and America were “natural allies”,
which Clinton construed as “two nations conceived in liberty, each find-
ing strength in its diversity, each seeing in the other a reflection of its own
aspiration for a more humane and just world” (Clinton 2000b). Both
countries thus had the same aspirations based on notions of liberty and
diversity. In fact, the USA is also a pluralist society as everything exists in
many variants although there is one truth as the US Great Seal’s motto “e
pluribus unum” (out of many one) elucidates (Foley 2007, 238). Similar
to 1993, the USA and India were thus again represented as sharing many
values, but now they were also seen as “allies” that could work together.
Nevertheless, they were not quite the same: India remained complex coun-
try with many challenges and even more prospects.
CONCLUSION
With all the different policy decisions during the Kargil crisis and after
India’s nuclear tests, it was clear that US security policies toward India
were changing during the Clinton administration. Unlike the Cold War
period, US-India relations have become closer, and there has been a con-
tinuous US interest in India from 1997 onward. As shown, several expla-
nations could be provided, including Clinton’s leadership role, nuclear
tests in 1998, Talbott–Singh dialogues in 1998–1999, changes in Indian

politics in 1991–1993, congressional changes, or the growing clout of
American pressure groups.
Instead, this chapter focuses on how changing policy discourses enabled
change in US security policies in 1997: India was constructed as a great
economic potential which was being held back by dangerous conflict and
as an economy which was comparable to China’s robust growing economy.
During the first Clinton administration, India was already represented as
a promising market in 1994. However, this was contested in the media
discourse as the articulation was not successful. It was overshadowed by
other tropes: India as a democracy that needed to be developed and as
an unstable country which was part of the India–Pakistan conflict. The
year 1997 marked a turning point: India’s large economic growth started
to become more salient as made evident by the discussions of the Kyoto
Protocol and high technology. In fact, the US policy discourse did not
merely construct India as a dangerous and unstable liability one year after
its 1998 nuclear test. Instead, the US policy discourse had limited the for-
eign policy options as the development and instability themes were linked:
India was also articulated as a growing economy held back by conflict, an
underappreciated great power, a vibrant democracy, and a natural ally.
During the Clinton administration, the development theme thus
became gradually more important than the instability theme, and it con-
tinued to be significant in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 5 discusses
the security policies, security issues, and US and India’s subject-positions
during the Bush administration in order to demonstrate which tropes
continued and which ones discontinued. It demonstrates that the Bush
administration rearticulated many representations of the Clinton admin-
istration, including India as a growing economy with its effects on the
environment, as a democracy, and a vibrant country.
NOTES
1. The disinterest became evident through the diplomatic vacuum that
emerged. The administration had not appointed a US Ambassador to
India for 14 months since the departure of Thomas Pickering in March
1993. Stephen Solarz, one of the few India supporters in Congress, was
initially chosen by the Clinton administration (Rubinoff 1996, 509). In
fact, in the early 1990s, the Bureau of South Asian Affairs was created
through Solarz’s bill since he wanted to give more attention to South Asia
(Kux 2001, 321). Unfortunately, Solarz became wrapped up in the House

bank scandal. Like many other members of Congress, he had overdrawn
his checking account. This meant that no hearings could be conducted for
the ambassadorship. Eventually, career diplomat Frank Wisner took up his
post in July 1994 (Rubinoff 1996, 509; 2006, 50).
2. Kapur and Ganguly also argue that at the individual level, both Indian and
American leaders took the initiative to conduct closer relations. For
instance, they point at Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and Minister of
Finance Manmohan Singh’s decision to move toward market reforms
(Kapur and Ganguly 2007, 649–650).
3. The groundwork of the low-level diplomats did not always play a large
role because the State Department was often overruled by the President.
Presidents and their staff often adopted global perspectives and tended to
care less about regional relations in South Asia than foreign policy profes-
sionals (Rudolph 2008, 12–13). For instance, in 1993 when Robin Raphel
said that the USA never accepted the accession of Kashmir in India, the
Clinton administration backtracked and endorsed the Shimla agreement,
saying that Pakistan and India have to resolve it by themselves (Kux 2001,
327–328; Kant Jha 1994, 1037). This also relates to another plausible
explanation for US policy changes toward India: this could have been
caused by large changes in personnel between the first and the second
Clinton administrations. According to US Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott, “The second term saw some turnover in the ranks of offi-
cials working on relations with India” (2004, 41). In the first term, Robin
Raphel, the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, was the only official
interested in South Asia. According to Talbott, Raphel had a “rough tour”
in New Delhi because she was skeptical about India-US relations, while
she considered Pakistan a useful ally (Talbott 2004, 41–42; Kux 2001,
328). The rest of the State Department, led by Secretary of State
Christopher Warren, however, had limited interest in South Asia beyond
non-proliferation (Kux 2001, 328). During the second Clinton adminis-
tration, Raphel was replaced by Rick Inderfurth, one of the Secretary of
State Madeline Albright’s deputies at the UN (Talbott 2004, 42). These
changes could have affected US-India relations. However, the literature
on US-India relations does not refer much to the importance of staff
changes within the Clinton administration. As mentioned earlier, there
have been pro-Indian officials (e.g. Ambassador to India Chester Bowles)
within the government in the past, but they were not always listened to
since their ideas did not fit the overarching US security policy.
4. For instance, changes in Congress took place because of the defeat and
retirement of non-proliferators such as Larry Pressler in 1997 and John
Glenn in 1999. Also, there was a loss of appetite for economic sanctions
after the nuclear test in 1998 as the Republicans had close ties with the
American business community who had become interested in India
(Rubinoff 2008, 200–201). Lastly, there was the growing influence of the
Indian-American community, but their impact was not as large because it
did not affect substantive legislation (Rubinoff 2008, 202). To illustrate,
in 1980, the Indian-American community numbered around 387,000,
but by 1997, this figure had grown to 1,215,000, and they were a very
affluent group as their per capita income exceeded all but that of the
Japanese Americans (Hathaway 2001, 23–24). However, their impact was
not as large as the changes in Congress. Even though in 1993 the US
House of Representatives caucus on India and Indian Americans was
formed and it became one of the largest caucus on the Hill in the mid-
2000s, Rubinoff claims that the strengths are often exaggerated as it does
not affect substantive legislation (2008, 202).
5. According to Dumbrell, there was not much difference between Bush’s
New World Order and Clinton’s expansive internationalist policies (2012,
94). However, the Bush administration had failed to produce a clear strat-
egy (Hyland 1999, 11). The 1992 Defense Planning Guide’s demand,
written by the Defense Department and leaked to the press in April 1992,
asking for a larger role for the USA, was not accepted. Its replacement
strategy was contradictory as it outlined that the USA might fight two
regional wars at the same time, but the armed forces were also reduced
(Hyland 1999, 11; Dumbrell 2012, 84).
6. The USA had the largest federal deficit in US history: $290 billion by
1992 (Ambrose and Brinkley 1997, 399).
7. According to Dumbrell, the Clinton administration was indeed searching
for the right conceptual “theory” or “bumper sticker”, as Clinton referred
to it, for the new overarching strategy. These were “engagement” and
“enlargement” (2009, 41).
8. The Clinton administration’s policies were being referred to by various
terms: “engagement and enlargement”, “selective engagement”, “asser-
tive multilateralism”, and “assertive humanitarianism” (Dumbrell 2012,
94).
9. According to Lake, the aims were to (1) “strengthen the community of
major market democracies”; (2) “foster and consolidate new democracies
and market economies where possible”; (3) “counter the aggression and -
support the liberalization - of states hostile to democracy”; and (4) “help
democracy and economies take root in regions of greatest humanitarian
concern” (1993).
10. There were also other nuclear issues. Washington was concerned about
expiring of the IAEA safeguards on the Tarapur plant in India in October
1993 because India could use the uranium fuel for military purposes. In
February 1994, India agreed to keep the Tarapur plant under IAEA safe-
guards (LePoer 1995, 6–7).
11. India still tested its Prithvi missile after Prime Minister Rao’s return from
Washington in May (Kant Jha 1994, 1041). Also, India started its Surya
project, which was known as the Agni IV missile.
12. See also State Department report (1995).
13. The Instrument of Accession is a document produced by Maharajah Hari
Singh, ruler of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, in 1947, in which
he agreed to accede to India.
14. Since no Ambassador to India had been appointed, Robin Raphel started
to play a more important role in the articulation of US foreign relations
with India (Rubinoff 2008, 190).
15. Department of State’s spokesman Mike McCurry said, “I can’t confirm a
comment made by an individual person in a briefing that occurred on
background. […] There’s nothing that’s been said by any senior adminis-
tration official in recent days that represents a change in our policy towards
Kashmir, nor any change in our view of India’s territorial integrity. […]
[T]he United States believes the entire geographic area of the former
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir is disputed territory” (1993).
16. In April 1993, CIA director James Woolsey said that there were US plans
to list Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism since it both supported
Muslim militants in Kashmir and Sikh separatists in Punjab. But a few
months later, US officials announced that Pakistan would not be listed;
the Pakistan government had promised it would confront Kashmir mili-
tants. Pakistan cooperated with the USA to apprehend and extradite ter-
rorists who had attacked Americans (Nayak 2006, 136).
17. As President Clinton said, “Indefinite extension of the NPT has been a
central priority of my Administration” (1995c).
18. In February 1992, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan admitted
that Pakistan had the knowledge and material to assemble a nuclear device.
As a result, President Bush could no longer certify Pakistan. Pakistan
received sanctions under the Pressler Amendment (Thakur 1993, 840;
Talbott 2004, 21).
19. The Amendment prohibited the delivery of 71 aircraft for which Pakistan
had already paid $658 million of a $1.4 billion arms package. Also,
Pakistan had to pay $50,000 a year to maintain and store the planes in the
USA (Rubinoff 1996, 511).
20. The critics, including Joseph Biden (D-DL), John Kerry (D-MA), and
Larry Pressler (R-SD), condemned the concessions rewarded to Pakistan
(Rubinoff 2008, 194).
21. However, with the nuclear tests in 1998 and after the government of
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was overturned in a coup led by Chief of
Army Staff Pervez Musharraf in 1999, new sanctions were imposed on

Pakistan.
22. The administration was taken by surprise by the 1998 test. Earlier in 1996,
US Ambassador to India, Frank Wisner, learned that suspicious activity
was found at the Pokhran test site in India. He spoke with A.N. Varma in
India, Prime Minister Rao’s principal secretary, while President Clinton
called Prime Minister Rao, who assured him that India would not act irre-
sponsibly. The Indian plans for a nuclear test were halted (Talbott 2004,
37–38). According to Mohan, these tests were, in fact, originally due
within 72 hours (2004, 5–6). By contrast, the Clinton administration only
heard from the 1998 test through the media instead of its own intelligence
community (Rubinoff 2006, 50; Talbott 2004, 50). Prior to India’s
nuclear test, Bill Richardson, US Ambassador to the UN, also visited New
Delhi, where he recalled to have received assurances that the Indians
would not respond to Pakistan’s Ghauri missile test of April 1998 (Talbott
2004, 46–47; Rubinoff 2006, 50).
23. A letter from Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Clinton was leaked
saying that China had been India’s principal security concern.
24. President Clinton called with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to invite him for
a special visit to Washington and to offer relief for earlier military and eco-
nomic sanctions. According to Talbott, Sharif did not accept this. Talbott
and a team also went to visit Sharif and other Pakistan officials in order to
ask for “restraint and maturity”, but the Pakistan government was not open
for suggestions. In this manner, India would get away with testing and the
ruling government would possibly be ousted (Talbott 2004, 57–66).
25. In Congress, there were also already voices after India’s test that the USA
was partly culpable as it had not seriously engaged India prior to its test.
See Rubinoff for a short overview of Senators’ statements, including
Richard Lugar (R-IN), prominent Republican Senator on foreign affairs,
and Joseph Biden (D-DL) (2008, 196–197).
26. According to Talbott, Jaswant Singh informed the US administration
through various channels that he was willing to discuss the CTBT if no pres-
sure would be put onto India (2004, 76–82). Since Madeline Albright was
abroad, Acting Secretary Talbott accepted Jaswant Singh’s visit in
Washington, which led to several rounds of discussions. See an insider’s
viewpoint on the Talbott–Singh talks, for example, Talbott’s Engaging
India (2004, 81 until 155 and 182–185). Talbott claims that there was
seemingly progress in January 1999 as the Indians wanted to sign the CTBT
at the end of May; however, the negotiations were “discouraging” as the
Indians put up extra conditions and did not want to discuss their long-term
plans (2004, 145–148). At the end of 1999, however, the Indian govern-
ment was more willing to possibly sign the CTBT (Talbott 2004, 183–185).
27. Prime Minister Sharif met with Clinton. According to Talbott, Clinton
and Sharif had a tough conversation which amounted into the statement
while keeping the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee informed (2004,
160–169).
28. Soon after the Kargil War, Nawaz Sharif was removed by Pervez Musharraf
through a military coup. In turn, less US sanctions on Pakistan were
removed.
29. Since Clinton was focused on budgetary reforms and health issues, Clinton
made only four foreign policy speeches during his first eight months as
President, in which he emphasized continuity with his predecessor
(Ambrose and Brinkley 1997, 400).
30. Seymour Martin Lipset also defines the American Creed by referring to
five terms: liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire
(1996, 19).
31. Tony Smith defines liberalism as “(1) cooperation among democratic gov-
ernments; (2) linked in economic openness; (3) through well-structured
multilateral institutions; and (4) under a United States that willingly
assumed the responsibilities of leadership” (2012, 14).
32. Gusterson argues that US media and Congress members articulated the
importance of ancient strifes by arguing that India’s and Pakistan’s missiles
were named after ancient warriors and deities. In fact, the USA often
named nuclear weapons after ancient gods and dead warriors, such as
Jupiter, Poseidon, and Atlas (1999, 126).
33. Clinton also asserted this at other instances. As mentioned earlier, the
President said in June, “India and Pakistan are great nations with bound-
less potential, but developing weapons of mass destruction is self-defeat-
ing, wasteful, and dangerous. It will make their people poorer and less
secure” (1998d).
34. The myth neglects the fact that there are quite a few less successful Indian
Americans even though Americans came into contact with successful ones
since the Indian Americans were often physicians, colleagues, and consul-
tants (Hing 1993, 11). In fact, the 1990 median annual income for Asian-
American households ($42,250) exceeded that of the white population
($36,920) although there were also more poor Indian Americans in com-
parison to poor white people (Hing 1993, 11). At the end of the 1990s,
the Indian-American’s average median income rose to over $50,000
(Cohen 2002, 288).
35. According to Chacko, the BJP and the Indian strategic elite were indeed
impacted by “anxious masculinity” as they wanted to show their hyper-
masculine approach to power by testing a nuclear weapon rather than
Gandhi’s feminine non-violence approach (2012, 28–29, 178–180).
36. In fact, one journalist paraphrased presidential candidate George W. Bush,

saying that “[i]t’s time for the US to move towards India – because India
is now going to be, in the 21st century, one of the most important coun-
tries as far as economy and trade and all that” (Lockhart 1999d).
37. In the 1999 NSS, the administration also proclaimed that “[w]e seek to
establish relationships with India and Pakistan that are defined in terms of
their own individual merits” (Clinton 1999a).
38. Visiting India, Clinton reiterated that he thought it was a “difficult situa-
tion, to say the least” (2000d).
39. Sunil Khilnani also writes in The Idea of India that India has many self-
understandings, and it is not one homogenous country as the Indian
nationalists claim (1999, viii).
CHAPTER 5
India as a Strategic Partner: The Bush

Administration
During the Clinton administration, US-India relations slowly improved,

and this relationship became more intense during the Bush Jr. adminis-
tration. This improvement was not merely the result of 9/11. Already
one month into the Bush administration, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld met with National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra and
two months into the administration in early April 2001, External and
Defense Minister Jaswant Singh convened with National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice. President Bush joined this meeting, which led to a
cordial 40-minute talk in the Oval Office (Hathaway 2003, 6; Kux 2001,
94). The USA and India soon started to discuss missile defense systems
and expanded their defense cooperation even though the USA also had
close relations with Pakistan in the War on Terror. Especially during the
second Bush administration, the USA made the unprecedented move to
set up a US-India nuclear deal agreement allowing India to receive nuclear
material and technology for its civilian nuclear reactors upon the condition
that these civilian reactors were monitored by the IAEA.1 This deal was
a very significant development, especially since India refused to sign the
1968 NPT and tested a nuclear device in 1974. As Harsh V. Pant writes,
“The Indo–US nuclear pact has virtually rewritten the rules of the global
nuclear regime […] The nuclear agreement creates a major exception to
the US prohibition of nuclear assistance to any country that does not
accept international monitoring of all its nuclear facilities” (2011, 2–3).2

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54862-7_5
This chapter discusses the improvements in the relationship. Reflecting

over “why” the relationship took off, one could argue that the relationship
improved because of explanatory variables such as Bush’s and his advis-
ers’ interest in India. Bush was seemingly impressed by India’s genuine
democratic values, shared with the USA, and his advisers also regarded
India as a potential balancer to China (Kux 2001, 94–95; Hagerty 2006,
21; Rubinoff 2008, 204; Tellis 2013, 5). In fact, South Asia was one of
the few regions for which the administration had personnel in place very
soon after assuming office (Rubinoff 2008, 204). Before he took office,
Bush had gathered a group of foreign policy advisors called the Vulcans.
This nickname was coined by Rice during the 2000 presidential campaign
after a large statue in her hometown (Mann 2004, x). The group included
Richard Armitage, Robert Zoellick, Robert Blackwill, Stephen Hadley, Dov
Zakheim, Richard Perle, Condoleezza Rice, and Paul Wolfowitz (Daalder
and Lindsay 2003, 22).Of these Vulcans, Robert Blackwill, a China expert,
had close ties with the President, and he had been very interested in setting
up India as a balancer to China (Hathaway 2003, 10; Rubinoff 2008, 204;
Chaudhuri 2014, 188). Especially, Condoleezza Rice emerged as one of
the principal actors: she convinced President Bush to push forward after
she insisted in the 2000 campaign that the USA should engage India more
closely because of India’s growing role in the region (Chaudhuri 2014,
187; Rice 2000, 56). Closely cooperating with the Vulcans, Rumsfeld was
also an important supportive actor as he met around 40 times with the
Indians in order to discuss proposals concerning Iraq (Chaudhuri 2014,
188, 223). Armitage became Deputy Secretary of State, assuming the role
played by Strobe Talbott on South Asian affairs during the Clinton admin-
istration (Rubinoff 2008, 204). Others outside of the Vulcans, including
Secretary of State Colin Powell and the rest of the State Department, were
a bit more hesitant and suspicious of the group and its policies toward
India. However, State Department opposition was not taken into account
(Talbott 2004, 210; Chaudhuri 2014, 187, 196–197, 224).
The civilian nuclear deal was also said to be the result of Bush’s personal
leadership (Kapur and Ganguly 2007, 651–652). Critics of the nuclear
deal, such as George Perkovich, argue that the agreement undermined the
NPT framework as it was not subjected to interagency formulation but
established by a handful of officials in the Bush administration, includ-
ing National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Undersecretary of State
Nicholas Burns, Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary Ashley Tellis,
Counselor Philip Zelikow, and President Bush himself (Perkovich 2005,
INDIA AS A STRATEGIC PARTNER: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 121
1; Andersen 2008, 87; Pant 2011, 60; Chaudhuri 2014, 222).3 Since the
plan had gone through minimal interagency and congressional reviews or
consultations, President Bush’s and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s
announcements during Singh’s visit to the USA in July 2005 came as
a surprise. Congress faced a fait accompli (Perkovich 2005, 1; Rubinoff
2008, 209–210; Kapur and Ganguly 2007, 652).4 Kapur and Ganguly,
therefore, argue that presidential leadership was “crucial” in formulating
the agreement. In fact, they say that “[i]t is questionable that a different
administration – with a president less committed to a thorough trans-
formation of Indo-US relations – would ever have offered such a deal”
(Kapur and Ganguly 2007, 652).5
Indian leadership also needed to be open to closer relations.6 As Kux
argues, Bush “revealed his interest in continuing, and indeed intensifying,
the rapprochement, and the Indians eagerly reciprocated” (2001, 94).
The BJP had entered the government as the main coalition partner in the
1990s, and it has continued to be an important party within Indian poli-
tics. Prime Minister Vajpayee of the BJP described the USA and India as
“natural allies”, and the BJP saw close relations with the USA as in India’s
national interest (Kux 2001, 94). Accordingly, the BJP actively pursued
better US-India relations. After 9/11 India not only shared intelligence
with Washington but also volunteered its military bases for the US mili-
tary’s attack on Afghanistan (Hathaway 2003, 7). During the US war in
Afghanistan, the Indian Navy escorted and protected high-value shipping
through the Straits of Malacca (Malik 2006, 90). According to Hathaway,
this offer would have been “unthinkable” in the 1990s (2003, 7). In fact,
during the first Gulf War, India withdrew its permission for American war-
planes to refuel at Indian airports (Hathaway 2003, 7).
By focusing on the “how-possible” question, however, this chap-
ter shows that US security policies made possible earlier changes in the
policy discourse. India’s subject-position had already been transformed
during the Clinton administration. In fact, Rubinoff writes, “South Asia
was virtually the only place where the Clinton administrations’ policies
were not abandoned. The normalization of relations with India continued
unabated, and there was talk of partnership and a natural alliance with New
Delhi by Secretary of State Colin Powell” (2008, 204). The discursive
subject-positions continued to underlie the Bush administration’s policies.
President Bush’s and his advisors’ actions were informed by discursive
changes, which had occurred already during the Clinton administration.
As this chapter below shows, many tropes of the Clinton administration
continued to be articulated, such as India’s economic growth, its increas-

ing impact on the environment, and its vibrant democracy. With the Bush
administration, India was also increasingly presented as an economic com-
petitor and as a rising world power.
This chapter thus offers an overview of the Bush Jr. administration’s
security policies toward India and how they were enabled by US policy dis-
courses with the construction of security issues/problems and security pol-
icies toward India, which is followed by an interrogation of how the Indian
and US subject-positions were presented within the US policy discourse.
PRIOR TO 9/11: MULTILATERAL TREATIES AND CHINA

When the Bush administration came into office, it did not pursue President
Clinton’s “engagement” strategy to face its security issues because the
administration opposed multilateral treaties (Gurtov 2006, 288).7 As
Phyllis Bennis argues, unilateralist tendencies under the Clinton adminis-
tration continued more forcefully during the Bush administration (2003,
1–3). In fact, the Republican Party Platform said, “Republicans do not
believe multilateral agreements and international institutions are ends in
themselves” (2000). Accordingly, the Bush administration wanted to cre-
ate a new security framework: the Missile Defense Treaty was a limited
missile defense system of ground-based interceptor missiles which had
to replace the Cold War System of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).
MAD stood for a military strategy in which the opposing sides would
deter each other’s weapons of mass destruction. A nuclear war could be
best prevented if neither side expected to survive a nuclear exchange.
President Bush said about the new Missile Defense Treaty in May:
The Iron Curtain no longer exists […] Yet, this is still a dangerous world; a
less certain, a less predictable one. More nations have nuclear weapons and
still more have nuclear aspirations […] Most troubling of all, the list of these
countries includes some of the world’s least-responsible states. Unlike the
Cold War, today’s most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic
missiles in the Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands
of these states – states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life (2001a).
The Soviet Union was not constructed as the main threat anymore, but
the proliferation of other countries was problematized. The US policy
discourse constructed, for instance, China as more threatening and hence
a security issue to be addressed. About China, the Republican Party

Platform said, “The [Clinton] administration’s failure to guard America’s
nuclear secrets is allowing China to modernize its ballistic missile force,
thereby increasing the threat to our country and to our allies. The theft
of vital nuclear secrets by China represents one of the greatest security
defeats in the history of the United States” (2000).
In this context, the Bush administration became interested in turning
India into a potential balancer of China: India was linked to “China’s suc-
cess in controlling the balance of power” (Rice 2000, 56). As Rice said in
her 2000 article in Foreign Affairs, “[the US] should pay closer attention
to India’s role in the regional balance. There is a strong tendency con-
ceptually to connect India with Pakistan and to think only of Kashmir or
the nuclear competition between the two states. But India is an element
in China’s calculation, and it should be in America’s, too. India is not a
great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one” (2000, 56).
Accordingly, Armitage visited Tokyo, Seoul, and New Delhi, to discuss
its ballistic missile defense as a counterweight against the invisible Other
(Ganguly 2003, 178).8
The increasingly close US-India security relations were thus reflected
in US-India discussions about the Missile Defense Treaty. In April 2001,
Singh visited Washington, where he met Rice and Bush. Following this
meeting, the Indians were informed in advance of Bush’s speech on the
Missile Defense Treaty: it was for the first time in many years that India
had been short-listed (Tellis 2006, 128; Hathaway 2003, 7). When in May
2011 the Bush administration proposed its new initiative, the Indian gov-
ernment was one of the few governments that welcomed this statement
(Tellis 2006, 115). While the plans were not endorsed by major European
and Asian partners, Singh depicted it as a new framework for “seek[ing] to
transform the strategic parameters on which the Cold War security archi-
tecture was built” (In Tellis 2006, 116). Although most of its praise was
reserved for the US plans for unilateral reductions in the US nuclear arse-
nal and the move away from MAD, Schaffer argues that the US-India
relationship seemed to grow stronger (2009, 65).9 Visiting both Japan,
South Korea, and India, Armitage thus went to India a week after India’s
declaration of support to brief the Indian government about the new stra-
tegic framework, and the USA and India decided to cooperate (Pant 2011,
50–51).10 In December 2001, the US-Indo Defense Policy Group issued
a statement, which asserted that the missile defenses could contribute to
“enhance strategic stability and discourage the proliferation of ballistic

missiles with weapons of mass destruction” (In Hagerty 2006, 23).
The Bush administration’s policy discourse also constructed other secu-
rity issues related to India. President Bush argued in June that “[t]he issue
of climate change respects no border. Its effects cannot be reined in by
an army nor advanced by any ideology. Climate change, with its potential
to impact every corner of the world, is an issue that must be addressed
by the world” (2001b). However, the administration opposed the Kyoto
Protocol as it said in its letter to members of the US Senate because it
“exempts 80 percent of the world, including major population centers
such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm
to the US economy” (Bush 2001c). Emission reductions were presented
as important, but Kyoto’s multilateralist treaty was claimed to protect
countries such as India rather than the US economy. The Bush adminis-
tration did not want to implement it.
The Bush administration’s policy discourse thus constructed several
problems as security issues related to India prior to 9/11: nuclear prolif-
erators, China, and climate change. This changed greatly after 9/11, as
the following section shows.
9/11 AND TERRORISM

After 9/11 the USA reformulated its security policies and crafted a new
narrative in which India was articulated: the War on Terror rose to the top
of the Bush administration’s global agenda of US security policies toward
South Asia. As President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee said in their
joint statement during the latter’s visit on November 9, 2001, “[t]errorism
threatens not only the security of the United States and India, but also our
efforts to build freedom, democracy and international security and stability
around the world” (2001d). In fact, on November 1, 2001, Pakistani-based
militants attacked the Kashmir Legislative Assembly, killing 38 people, after
which a 5-man suicide mission connected with the Jaish-e-Mohammad, a
Pakistan-based movement, attacked the Indian parliament in New Delhi
on December 13, resulting in 22 deaths (Kampani 2005, 180).11 President
Bush said after the second onslaught in New Delhi, “Yesterday’s attack
was […] aimed at destroying opportunities to build a future that is more
stable, more peaceful, and more prosperous. We will not allow terrorists to
succeed in this larger mission” (Bush 2002a). The US policy discourse thus
constructed these events as worldwide destabilizing terrorist acts.
The standoff between Pakistan and India was also constructed as a

security issue of concern to the USA. In 2002 a war between India and
Pakistan seemed imminent, especially after the May suicide attack on a
military camp in Jammu and Kashmir in India, in which around 30 people,
mostly families of the soldiers, were killed.12 Press Secretary Ari Fleisher
said,
[T]he situation between India and Pakistan has long been a concern of this
President. It’s something that he has worked on very hard and will consider
to do so [sic]. […] We call on India and Pakistan to work to resolve the
current crisis peacefully and through dialogue that can eventually result in a
permanent solution. The President thinks it’s very important that India and
Pakistan take all steps they can to reduce tensions and to avoid a war that
would destabilize the region and distract in the war against terrorism (2002).
The Indo-Pakistan conflict was articulated as a possible distraction for

the War on Terror. As a policy solution, the USA became involved with
diplomatic efforts between Pakistan and India. The USA put pressure on
President Pervez Musharraf to end cross-border terrorism while cautioning
Indian counterparts against any military moves. Armitage and Rumsfeld
were dispatched in early June 2002. Armitage received a promise from
Musharraf that he would halt cross-border terrorist movement permanently
although he retracted these statements after a few weeks. Nevertheless,
India started to redeploy troops on October 16, completing the stand-
down over a course of two months (Andersen 2008, 91). After the infiltra-
tion was reduced, the USA called on both countries to resume negotiations
(Andersen 2008, 92). In the meantime, the USA also added two militant
Pakistani Islamic groups, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT), to its list of foreign terrorists (Hathaway 2003, 18).13
Nevertheless, it was treated as unproblematic that Pakistan was a
“major non-NATO ally” within the War on Terror (Powell in Rohde
2004). India offered its military bases for the operation in Afghanistan,
but the USA opted for Pakistan’s (Chellaney 2001, 99–100).14 The USA
started to cooperate with the Pakistani army after Pakistan was asked to
abandon its support for the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda. In the spring of
2002, the US military force assisted Pakistani forces in tracking Al-Qaeda
fugitives (Rudolph 2008, 45; Kronstadt 2006a, 5). In exchange for his
cooperation, President Musharraf was the first South Asian leader to be
hosted by the President at Camp David (Andersen 2008, 93). By March
2003 all remaining sanctions imposed against Islamabad were waived by

executive order. Congress approved a $390 million assistance package
for 2003–2004 and a further $701 million for 2004–2005. India was to
receive $85 million out of a total assistance package of $1.9 billion for
South Asia (Rubinoff 2008, 206). To strengthen Musharraf’s position
and to express gratitude, they also announced the sale of sixteen F-16
aircraft to Pakistan in 2003 (Andersen 2008, 93).
In 2003 the USA courted with India regarding another major secu-
rity issue. As President Bush said in his 2002 address, “The threat comes
from Iraq. It arises directly from the Iraqi regime’s own actions, its history
of aggression and its drive toward an arsenal of terror […]It has given
shelter and support to terrorism and practices terror against its own peo-
ple” (2002b). Accordingly, President Bush asked three times for assis-
tance from Prime Minister Vajpayee between February and March 2003
(Chaudhuri 2014, 190). At the start of April 2003, Blackwill also made a
“[c]ase for war” in one of his opinion pieces in Indian newspapers (2003).
However, India was not supportive of the Iraq war.15 In a counterdiscur-
sive formulation, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs constructed the
war in Iraq as “unjustified” and “avoidable” in March 2003, stating that
it only considered sending troops when there was a UN mandate available
(Kronstadt 2003, 5).16 Hence, the passing of UNSC Resolution 1483 in
May regarding the “contribution to stability and security in Iraq” opened
up new discussions among the USA and India (Malhotra 2003).17 The
problem was that India’s troops did not want to act under US authority
(Chaudhuri 2014, 203–204). Nevertheless, the fact that India even con-
sidered the proposal was evidence of how much relations had improved
(Rubinoff 2008, 205). Richard Boucher, US State Department spokes-
man, said that the administration “hoped the [Indian] troops would have
been able to go [to Iraq]” since “it is in our interests and what we perceive
as their interests as well” (2003). In any case, India “remains an important
strategic partner” (Boucher 2003).
Unlike in Pakistan’s case, the USA initiated high-tech cooperation with
India as part of the War on Terror (Mohan 2006). On September 22,
2001, the USA lifted many remaining technology sanctions, which had
been imposed on India after its nuclear test in 1998, and it reduced the
Entity List, which prohibited American companies from cooperating with
Indian ones from 150 to 20 (Guihong 2005, 278; Hagerty 2006, 21).18
As President Bush said when he met with Prime Minister Vajpayee in
November 2001, “We lifted sanctions on India so that our relationship can
prosper. We will fight terrorism together. Our initial discussions focused

on the battle against terror, and the Prime Minister understands that we
have no option but to win.” He added, “My administration is committed
to developing a fundamentally different relationship with India” (Bush
2001e). Bush and Vajpayee agreed to expand relations in counterterrorism
and defense (Bush 2001d).
While counterterrorism cooperation advanced slowly in the Joint
Working Group on Counterterrorism by exchanging training materials
and methods and cooperating in narcoterrorism, cooperation was most
extensive in military-to-military relations (Nayak 2006).19 In December
2001, the Indo-US Defense Policy Group resumed its meetings for the
first time since 1998. In these meetings they decided, for instance, on
joint military exercises, including personnel exchanges, naval cooperation
through the Malabar exercises, and military education. The objective was
to create interoperability between the two forces on the basis of familiar-
ity (Hagerty 2006, 21–23). In fact, in the wake of the tsunami in the
Indian Ocean in 2004, India and the USA were able to respond quickly
in gearing up for military cooperation in the Indian Ocean (Malik 2006,
93). The Indo-US Defense Policy Group also decided on defense sales
(Tellis 2006, 137). India received systems for early warning and missile
defense, but the cooperation was not extended to sales of major combat
systems (Tellis 2005, 37–39). At the end of June 2005, the Indian and
US Defense Ministers Pranab Mukerjee and Rumsfeld signed the Defense
Framework Agreement for the next ten years calling for more security
cooperation and arms sales (Rudolph 2008, 48). This cooperation would
be extended to other areas, as the following section discusses.
THE NSSP AND NUCLEAR DEAL

The policy discourse soon began to construct India as important for
regional and global security. President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee
announced an agreement in 2004: the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership
(NSSP). The deputy spokesman from the State Department, Adam Ereli,
said about this: “Implementation of the NSSP will lead to significant
economic benefits for both countries and improve regional and global
security.” Cooperation extended to three areas: civilian nuclear activities,
civilian space programs, and high-technology trade. Also, the discussions
would focus on missile defense (Ereli 2004). Changes were made in US
export licensing policies which strengthened “cooperation in commercial
space programs and permit certain export to power plants at safeguarded

nuclear facilities” (Ereli 2004).20 The Bush administration thus made
India an exception to US policies concerning non-proliferation, an excep-
tion denied to Pakistan (Andersen 2008, 87).21
In 2005 more security issues were articulated within the strategic part-
nership. After the newly appointed Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice,
visited New Delhi on March 15–16, 2005, State Department officials
announced on March 25 that the USA initiated a “new strategy for South
Asia”, arguing that the NSSP should be broadened and setting a goal “to
help India become a major world power in the 21st century”. The officials
added, “We understand fully the implications, including military implica-
tions, of that statement” (Kronstadt 2005, 2; Department of State 2005).
This could create greater involvement in the region, especially with regard
to China. Anonymous Pentagon officials said that as a result of the deal,
India could buy military equipment worth $5 billion, “including anti-
submarine patrol aircraft that could spot Chinese submarines in the Indian
Ocean and Aegis radar for Indian destroyers operating in the strategic
Straits of Malacca, as useful for monitoring the Chinese military” (Linzer
2005). Accordingly, the Bush administration wanted to discuss “global
issues” and “regional security issues” within its strategic dialog. In fact, it
was suggested the USA might sell F-18s rather than F-16s (Department
of State 2005).22 On July 19, 2005, a joint statement by President Bush
and Prime Minister Singh was signed to establish a “global partnership”,
which aimed at “stability, democracy, prosperity and peace through-
out the world” regarding counterterrorism and democracy promotion.
It focused on several US-India initiatives with regard to the economy,
energy and environment, democracy and development, non-proliferation
and security, and high technology and space (Bush 2005b). Indeed, when
President Bush visited India at the start of March 2006 the joint statement
“expressed satisfaction with the great progress the United States and India
have made in advancing our strategic partnership to meet the global chal-
lenges of the 21st century” (Bush 2006a).
Nevertheless, the civilian nuclear deal was articulated as the major
security initiative within the US policy discourse, which took several years
to establish.23 In July 2005, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh
wanted “to achieve full civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India
as it realizes its goals of promoting nuclear power and achieving energy
security” (2005b). Also, Rice stated, “[A] key to unlocking the promise
of this partnership is the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative” (2006a).
Initially, the Bush administration made common-sensible the importance

of energy security: “Recognizing the significance of civilian nuclear energy
for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more effi-
cient manner, the two leaders discussed India’s plans to develop its civilian
nuclear energy program” (2005b). However, other security issues were
also attached to the deal. Rice said that the civilian nuclear deal will “ele-
vate our partnership to a new strategic level”, and it will also enhance
India’s energy security, benefit the environment, create job opportunities
for Americans, and bring stability and security for the non-proliferation
regime (2006a).
At the same time, India’s future nuclear tests were constructed as a
security issue. The State Department told Congress in a confidential cor-
respondence that “[t]he fuel supply assurances are not […] meant to
insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear explosive test or a
violation of nonproliferation commitments” (Lantos 2007).24 In other
words, the USA would terminate the cooperation as required under exist-
ing US laws; the Hyde Act did not cover future tests. The letter also said
that the “US government will not assist India in the design, construction
or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies” (Lantos 2007). In order
to implement the deal, Prime Minister Singh had promised the USA that
India would separate its military and civilian nuclear facilities and place the
civilian plants under IAEA control (Bush 2005b). This meant that India
would place 13 of its 22 thermal power reactors under international safe-
guards (Rudolph 2008, 209). However, India was less willing to accept
the moratorium on nuclear testing: there was Indian parliamentary oppo-
sition against this.25
With regard to the civilian nuclear deal, Iran also constituted a security
issue. The USA urged India to change its relations with Iran (Fair 2007,
261).26 As Rice stated at an April 2006 hearing of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee to discuss the proposed US-India civilian nuclear
deal, “The United States has made very clear to India that we have con-
cerns about their relationship with Iran” (In Kronstadt 2006b, 2). This
civilian nuclear deal could potentially weaken the non-proliferation regime
while the Bush government wanted to counter Iran on nuclear issues (Fair
2007, 261).27 Also, Wikileaks cables emerged in which Indian Foreign
Secretary Shivshankar Menon informed US Ambassador David Mulford
in May 2008 about India–Iran visits concerning gas pipelines. Menon
said that “there is nothing in this visit that should upset you”. Menon
also cautioned the USA: “This government has to be seen following an
independent foreign policy, not responding to dictation from the US”

(US Embassy 2008). Even though Menon presented Iran as a “global
problem”, the USA and India had to pursue different strategies because
of India’s close proximity to Iran and Afghanistan (US Embassy 2008).28
During the Bush administration, the USA thus pursued closer relations
with India, which were reflected by various US security policies, including
the Missile Defense Treaty, the NSSP, the defense agreement, the civilian
nuclear deal, and discussions over the Iran and Iraq wars. In the following
section, I argue that the Bush administration’s security policies toward
India were enabled by representations of the USA and India within US
policy discourse. Many representations of the Clinton administration were
rearticulated during the Bush administration, such as India as a growing
economy and the effects on the environment, and India as a democracy
and as a vibrant country. The four themes—democracy, economic, non-
alignment, and instability—were particularly prominent.
MULTILATERAL TREATIES AND CHINA: INDIA

AS A STRONGHOLD
As noted above, the Bush administration conducted several security policies

toward India before 9/11: the support of its own Missile Defense Treaty,
its opposition against the Kyoto Protocol, and the suggestion that India
became a balancer against China. As part of the development theme, the
Bush administration reproduced the Clinton administration’s representa-
tion of India as a growing, developing country which affected the global
environment. “The world’s second largest emitter of greenhouse gases is
China,” President Bush said. “Yet China was entirely exempted from the
requirements of the Kyoto protocol. India and Germany are among the
top emitters. Yet India was also exempt from Kyoto” (Bush 2001b). This
echoed the notion of a “free rider”, in which other countries had benefitted
from the situation by not getting involved in global affairs and creating a
collective action problem (Mearsheimer 2001, 159; Brooks and Wohlforth
2008, 37). The USA, on the other hand, recognized its “responsibility to
reduce our emissions” (Bush 2001b). The USA was represented as a benign
hegemon and a responsible power which wanted to share the environmen-
tal burden. The Kyoto Treaty was depicted as unfair to the US economy. As
the Bush administration argued, “This is a challenge that requires a 100 per-
cent effort, ours and the rests of the world’s […] yet India was also exempt
from Kyoto. These and other developing countries that are experiencing
rapid growth face challenges in reducing their emissions without harming

their economies” (Bush 2001b). India had thus a growing economy in part
because it did not put enough effort into its emissions reductions.
The policy discourse also constructed India as a rising power, which
had an important role to play. Blackwill said in September 6, 2001, that
the administration sought to “intensify collaboration with India on the
whole range of issues that currently confront the international commu-
nity writ large”. In other words, “President Bush has a global approach
to US-India relations, consistent with the rise of India as a world power”
(Blackwill 2001). Cooperation with India was thus presented as beneficial
to various US security policies, such as the new Missile Defense Treaty and
US concerns about China. India was not only naturalized as an emerging
market within the US policy discourse, as the Clinton administration had
articulated, but also naturalized as a rising political force. Accordingly, Rice
claimed during the 2000 presidential campaign that the USA “should pay
closer attention to India’s role in the regional balance” and that “India is
not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one” (2000).
Governor Bush also said in his speech entitled “A Distinctly American
Internationalism” on November 19, 1999:
This coming century will see democratic India’s arrival as a force in the
world. A vast population, before long the world’s most populous nation.
A changing economy, in which 3 of its 5 wealthiest citizens are software
entrepreneurs. India is now debating its future and its strategic path, and the
United States must pay it more attention. We should establish more trade
and investment with India as it opens to the world. And we should work
with the Indian government, ensuring it is a force for stability and secu-
rity in Asia. This should not undermine our longstanding relationship with
Pakistan, which remains crucial to the peace of the region (1999).
India was naturalized as a rising economic force, and a force “for stability
and security”, particularly in Asia.29 Within the academic discourse, India
was also articulated as a rising power. Ganguly indeed argued that India
has some features that “undergird its strategic significance in the region
and beyond”’ such as its substantial military, its democratic institutions,
and a growing economy with a few high-ranking sectors (2003, 1). Cohen
agreed that India was “becoming a major power” and will become increas-
ingly important to the USA in at least two critical areas: its high-technology
revolution and nuclear evolution. He added, “An India that does well in
these areas could be an important partner” (Cohen 2002, 1, 3).30
As part of the democracy theme, India and the USA were depicted as
sharing the same values. Like in the Clinton administration, India was
represented as a “vibrant democracy” and “natural ally”. As Powell said
in his remarks with Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh on October
17, 2001, “We are natural allies. Two great democracies who believe in a
common set of values that have served both of our nations well” (2001).
Blackwill also claimed that “[m]y President’s big idea is that by working
together more intensely than ever before, the United States and India,
two vibrant democracies, can transform fundamentally the very essence of
our bilateral relationship and thereby make the world freer, more peaceful,
and more prosperous” (2001). These ideas were again based on demo-
cratic peace theory as the Bush administration echoed the Clinton admin-
istration in arguing that “democratic nations are less likely to go to war
with one another” (Blackwill 2001). As Jarrod Hayes argues, the continu-
ous articulation of India as a democratic identity enables and constrains
security threats for the USA as it “shapes the range of possibilities politi-
cal actors have in terms of presenting external states as threats by making
some claims – those involving other democracies – implausible” (2013, x).
The US policy discourse also presented India as a large democracy of
heterogeneous people. According to Blackwill in Mumbai on September
6, 2001, President Bush said,
When I asked then Governor Bush in Austin, Texas, in early 1999 about the
reasons for his obvious and special interest in India, he immediately responded,
“a billion people in a functioning democracy. Isn’t that something? Isn’t that
something?” The concept of democratic India, a billion-strong, heteroge-
neous, multilingual, secular, and – in the words of Sunil Khilnani – a “bridge-
head of effervescent liberty on the Asian continent” – with its vibrant press
and respect for the rule of law, has powerful attraction for every American,
and a very particular appeal for this President (Blackwill 2001).
In The Idea of India, Khilnani argues that there was not “one idea” of
India based on a nationalist history of a unified people (1999, 2–3). He
adds that “the idea of India is not becoming more homogenous and uni-
vocal, as Hindu nationalists claim and hope. In fact, no single idea can pos-
sibly hope to capture the many energies, angers, and hopes of one billion
Indians; nor can any more narrow idea – based on a single trait – fulfil their
desires” (1999, viii). India has many self-understandings of itself. As noted
in Chap. 4, the claim that India was made up of “many Indias” was also
invoked by the Clinton administration in its reference to Tharoor’s From

Midnight to Millennium (Clinton 2000b; Tharoor 1997, 7–8). Vibrant
and energetic India was juxtaposed through its “effervescent liberty” with
other less democratic countries in Asia. As Khilnani argues, the American
and French revolutions were great examples of democratic experiments,
and India is the third example. Even though the Indian experiment was
“still in its early stages”, it was significant in that “Asia is today the most
economically dynamic region in the world, but it is also one where vast
numbers of people remain politically subjugated. Its leaders have confi-
dently asserted that the idea and practice of democracy is somehow radi-
cally inappropriate and intrusive to the more sober cultural manners of
their people” (Khilnani 1999, 3–4). This indirectly reflected the Bush
administration’s viewpoints on the invisible Other within the administra-
tion’s articulations: the “sober” and “undemocratic” China. “Vibrant”
India had to offset China by spreading its democratic values in the region
based on democratic peace theory; a democratic China would be less of a
threat. This was also articulated by others. Senator John Kerry (D-MASS.)
indeed also constructed “vibrant” India as a “potentially important part-
ner in our efforts to promote regional stability, economic growth and
more open political systems in surrounding countries […] It is a player in
a region dominated by China” (2001).
Unlike some other Asian states, India was represented as a stable coun-
try through its democratic values. Blackwill proclaimed in Kolkata in
November 2002:
[P]eace within Asia – a peace that helps perpetuate Asian prosperity – remains
an objective that a transformed US-India relationship will help advance.
Within a fellowship of democratic nations, the United States and India
would benefit from an Asian environment free from inter-state conflict –
including among the region’s great powers – open to trade and commerce,
and respectful of human rights and personal freedoms […] Achieving this
objective requires the United States to particularly strengthen political, eco-
nomic, and military-to-military relations with those Asian states that share
our democratic values and national interests. That spells India (2002).
Asia was constructed as a continent with many conflicts. By contrast, the

USA and India were represented as democratic strongholds who needed
to supervise and discipline other Asian subjects. This alluded both to colo-
nial tropes and made common-sensible the claim that other undemocratic
powers, such as China, were unstable and affected the balance of power
within Asia. As the Republican Platform said, “China is a strategic com-
petitor of the United States, not a strategic partner. We will deal with
China without ill will – but also without illusions. A new Republican gov-
ernment will understand the importance of China but not place China at
the center of its Asia policy” (2000).31
The policy discourse thus limited and enabled US security policies and
attendant identity constructions prior to 9/11. As mentioned above, the
USA conducted various security policies toward India, including its oppo-
sition to the Kyoto Protocol, its Missile Defense Treaty initiative, and the
suggestion that India could join the USA against China. Accordingly, the
democracy, economy, and non-alignment themes came to the fore. India
was presented as a developing country and free rider, a growing and sta-
ble world power, and natural ally and vibrant democracy as opposed to
other Asian countries. The USA was articulated as a responsible power
who wanted to work together with democratic nations. These tropes
made intelligible US security policies toward India, but 9/11 provided a
moment for establishing several other initiatives, as the next section shows.
9/11 AND TERRORISM: INDIA AND PAKISTAN

After 9/11 the USA pursued various security policies toward India, includ-
ing the dispatch of Armitage and Rumsfeld during the India–Pakistan
standoff, the request for India’s involvement during the Iraq war, and the
first steps toward high-technology cooperation. Initially, the USA was pre-
occupied with 9/11. The US policy discourse constructed it as something
that was “beyond experience, outside of history” (Der Derian 2009,
230).32 As President Bush said in his address on September 20, 2001,
Americans have known wars, but for the past 136 years they have been wars
on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the
casualties of war, but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning.
Americans have known surprise attacks, but never before on thousands of
civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a
different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack (2001f).
There was a moment of dislocation where the “subject’s mode of being

is experienced and disrupted” (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 110). The
Americans and their social relations were made much more visible: the
subjects were confronted by this dislocation and the social relations

needed to be fixed again to various meanings.33 In other words, there was
initially a “void” of meaning, a discursive vacuum where the event was
incomprehensible to the American public and where there was a lack of
meaning (Holland 2013, 77; Jackson 2005, 29). As Jack Holland argues,
there was “the notion that 9/11 was a date on which everything changed,
and second, the notion that 9/11 was a date on which nothing changed
at all” (2009, 275). The American public was stunned; they were inter-
pellated into accepting the meanings generated by the politicians and the
media (Nabers 2009, 202; Der Derian 2009, 229). A new discourse was
produced—the “War on Terror”—which President Bush introduced in
his address on September 20, saying, “Our war on terror begins with
Al Qaeda” (Bush 2001f). It meant that policies were outlined and US
identity and other countries’ identities were articulated within this policy
discourse, which justified a war-based response.
The “War-on-Terror” discourse made visible the USA as one of the
prominent Western civilizations. During his address on September 20,
President Bush said that the questions that were asked was “why?” and
“why do they hate us?” (2001f). Bush responded, “They hate what they
see right here in this chamber: a democratically elected government. Their
leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms: our freedom of reli-
gion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and dis-
agree with each other.” It was a fight between a civilization and “a fringe
movement”, a small band of terrorists (Bush 2001f). The 9/11 attacks
were articulated as an attack on the US political creed, its institutions and
ideals, rather than any cultural or ethnic alignments. The superiority of
these values was seen as self-evident and universal (Pei 2003, 34). Also,
it made invisible that the 9/11 attack was a response against Americans’
actions abroad. Instead, it became a war on what America stood for (Krebs
and Lobasz 2007, 422). As the Bush administration said, “This is the
world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe
in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom” (2001f). The terrorists
were delegitimized in their actions as the USA was represented as tak-
ing the moral high ground in promoting its American/universal values.34
During his trip to China in October 2001, Bush added,
This conflict is a fight to save the civilized world, and values common to the
West, to Asia, to Islam. Throughout the world, people of strong faith, of all
faiths, condemn the murder of the innocent. Throughout the world, people
value their families – and nowhere do civilized people rejoice in the murder
of children or the creation of orphans. By their cruelty, the terrorists have
chosen to live on the hunted margin of mankind. By their hatred, they have
divorced themselves from the values that define civilization, itself (2001g).
The terrorists were depicted as barbarians and savages who live on the
“hunted margin of mankind” since they were primitive and culturally
inferior human beings. This civilized/barbarian dichotomy is a familiar
trope. During the Cold War, the US government claimed that the US
civilization was at stake and it thus needed to fight the Soviet barbarians,
as we discussed earlier (Campbell 1998, 138–139). The binary of good
versus evil was also introduced, which helped to delegitimize the “ter-
rorists” even further. Two days after the attacks, President Bush said,
“Civilized people around the world denounce the evildoers who devised
and executed these terrible attacks. Justice demands that those who
helped and harbored the terrorists be punished – and punished severely.
The enormity of their evil demands it” (Bush 2001h). With regard to
the attacks in South Asia a few months later, Bush also said in the 2001
joint statement with Prime Minister Vajpayee that “both countries are
targets of terrorism, as seen in the barbaric attacks on September 11 in
the United States and on October 1 in Kashmir” (2001d). The USA and
India were represented as civilized countries attacked by terrorists. When
President Bush was asked after the first assault whether other laws apply
to America and India when they were hit by a terrorism, he replied, “I
think there is one universal law, and that’s: Terrorism is evil, and all of
us must work to reject evil. Murder is evil, and we must reject murder”
(2001e).
The USA was also presented as a liberal country which had “unparal-
leled responsibilities”, as suggested by the 2002 NSS (Bush 2002c, 1).
This document was also known as the “Bush doctrine”, which was con-
nected with neoconservatism.35 As Charles Krauthammer argues, “[T]he
Bush doctrine is, essentially a synonym for neoconservative foreign policy”
(2005).36 The NSS claimed,
The United States possesses unprecedented – and unequalled – strength and

influence in the world. Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and the
value of a free society, this position comes with unparalleled responsibilities,
obligations, and opportunity. The great strength of this nation must be used
to promote a balance of power that favors freedom (2002c, 1).
The USA was represented as liberal and powerful; US global primacy was
made common-sensible. The Bush doctrine said that its aim was to “help
to make the world not just safer but better” (Bush 2002c, 1). It added,
“[W]e must build and maintain our defences beyond challenge” (Bush
2002c, 29). Mearsheimer argues therefore that “[n]eoconservative-the-
ory – the Bush doctrine – is essentially Wilsonianism with teeth. The
theory has an idealist strand and a power strand. Wilsonianism provides
the idealism, an emphasis on military power provides the teeth” (2005,
1).37 Pre-emption was a major element within this strategy.38 Unlike other
strands within US foreign policy, including realism and liberal interna-
tionalism, the Bush doctrine offered a unilateral assertion of American
power and a willingness to pre-empt threats while the spread of democ-
racies remained the pinnacle of American foreign policy (Krauthammer
2005).39 It rested on four elements: US hegemony, pre-emptive use of
force, unilateralism, and democracy promotion (Schmidt and Williams
2008, 195–199).40 During his West Point speech, President Bush said on
June 1, 2002,
We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace – a peace that favors human
liberty. We will defend the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants.
We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great pow-
ers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies
on every continent. Building this just peace is America’s opportunity, and
America’s duty (2002d).
The USA was represented as omnipotent and its leadership important for a
peaceful world. The USA was thus articulated as a defender of democratic
peace and liberalism, which it would defend with all its might. Terrorists
were not merely presented as a danger anymore; specific states, including
Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, were constituted as the “axis of evil” (Bush
2002e).
As a leader, the USA would still cooperate with “great powers” (Bush
2002c, 26). The Bush administration said during the 2002 State of the
Union: “In this moment of opportunity, a common danger is erasing old
rivalries. America is working with Russia and China and India, in ways we
have never before, to achieve peace and prosperity” (2002e). In fact, John
Gaddis argues that in this sense the Bush NSS came across as even more
multilateral than its predecessor, since the Clinton administration merely
refers to “promoting” democracy and human rights “abroad” (2002, 36).
Nevertheless, the Bush doctrine added, “[O]ur forces will be strong

enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-
up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States”
(2002c, 30).41 In other words, it was made self-evident that great pow-
er’s ambitions should suit the global leadership of the USA. Mearsheimer
argues that the USA pursued a “bandwagoning” logic rather than a bal-
ance of power: weaker states should join forces with the stronger power
(2005, 2).
Within the War-on-Terror discourse, India was represented as a democ-
racy and a global power with which the USA should intensify its rela-
tionship. In the 2002 NSS’s section on “Other Main Centers of Global
Power”, the Bush administration asserted,
The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral relation-

ship with India based on a conviction that US interests require a strong
relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies committed to
political freedom protected by representative government. […] Differences
remain, including over the development of India’s nuclear and missile pro-
grams, and the pace of India’s economic reforms. But while in the past these
concerns may have dominated our thinking about India, today we start a
view of India as a growing world power with which we have common strate-
gies interests (2002c, 27).
The USA and India were represented as similar because of their politi-
cal freedom, although India had to increase its economic freedoms. They
shared some of the same interests, and India was recognized as a “grow-
ing world power”. Even though Pakistan was articulated as the “front-line
state in the global campaign against terrorism” in President Bush’s joint
statement with President Musharraf, India was still presented as important
to US security policies (Bush 2001h). As the Bush administration said in
the NSS, US–Pakistan relations improved because of “Pakistan’s choice
to join the war against terror”, while the USA accepted “India’s potential
to become one of the great democratic powers of the twenty-first century
and has worked hard to transform our relationship accordingly” (Bush
2002c, 10).
However, India was also again articulated as a country that was linked
to Pakistan and to terrorism and instability in South Asia. On September
19, President Bush told reporters, “We will work and consult closely with
Pakistan and India to make sure that that part of the world is as stable as
can possibly be stable” [sic] (2001i). Echoing the instability theme, the
USA thus needed to help secure the volatile region. As the Bush adminis-
tration said, “[t]he President and the Secretary made it very clear to both
President Musharraf and to Prime Minister Vajpayee about the impor-
tance of promoting stability in the region. And both nations understand
the importance of winning this war against terrorism” (Fleisher 2001).42
The US security policies, including its War on Terror, the Iraq war, and
its diplomatic response toward the India–Pakistan standoff, were made
possible by various constructions of India’s and US subject-positions.
Within the War-on-Terror discourse, the democracy and instability theme
were particularly dominant. The US subject-position was made visible as a
prominent Western civilization and a liberal and omnipotent leader which
pursued just aims with other willing “great powers”. India was presented
as a global power and democracy with which the USA wanted to build
a relationship as it had the same interests, but it was not as important as
“front-line state” Pakistan. However, India and Pakistan were also both
articulated as being part of an unstable region.
THE NSSP AND NUCLEAR DEAL: INDIA AS A PARTNER

After 2004, the Bush administration established the NSSP and agreed
on the nuclear deal. When the civilian nuclear deal was being discussed,
dehyphenation became more prominent, because India and Pakistan were
articulated as disconnected. As Burns said, “[w]e’ve made clear all along
that this is a unique deal to India only. This is an exemption […] We’re
making an exception for India only, and an exemption to the law for India
only. India is a unique state” (2006a). In an op-ed in The Washington Post
in March 2006, Rice agreed, “Our agreement with India is unique because
India is unique” (2006b). India’s uniqueness was produced again through
well-known arguments, such as its plurality of ethnicities and faiths, its
democratic values and accountability, its fight against terrorism, but also
its 30-year record of low proliferation, and its high energy needs due to
its growing economy (Burns 2006a; Rice 2006b). Pakistan was also said
to have the same energy problems because of its growing economy, but
with regard to the civilian nuclear program, President Bush represented
Pakistan and India as “different countries with different needs and differ-
ent histories. So, as we proceed forward, our strategy will take in effect
those well-known differences” (Bush 2006b). The administration pre-
sented Pakistan as a proliferator “of quite [a] serious nature” to whom they
could not offer the same civilian nuclear deal (Burns 2006b). The admin-
istration referred to the Pakistani Abdul Khan, who had diffused nuclear
technology to other countries such as Libya, Iran, and North Korea in the
1980s and 1990s (Albright and Hinderstein 2005, 111). In other words,
Pakistan did not get the same “special treatment”. As Rice argued,
Pakistan is not in the same place as India. I think everybody understands

that. And one of the important contributions, or one of the important
achievements I think of the administration is that we’ve been able to take
Pakistan on its own terms and India on its own terms. We have programs
and relationships with Pakistan that would not be appropriate with India,
and vice versa. And I think that being able, in a sense, to de-link these two,
and to have good relations with both, on their own terms (2006c).
Unlike India, Pakistan was still valued as a partner in the War on Terror
and its programs.43 Rice said en route to India on March 15, 2005, “One
of the things that we’ve been able to do is, in a sense, is to continue to de-
hyphenate the relationship with Pakistan because at the same time that our
relations with India have been moving forward we have the best relations
with Pakistan that perhaps we’ve ever had as well” (2005). Both countries
were thus valued on their own merit and were constructed as unique in
different ways. As Burns argues, “[w]e have this unique relationship with
Pakistan, which is vital to our country and the war on terrorism. We have
another unique and vital relationship with India” (US Embassy 2005a).
In discussing the nuclear deal, India was also represented as an iso-
lated country as part of the non-alignment theme, which should turn into
a partner of the USA. Indeed, India had developed its civilian nuclear
energy on its own over the last few decades. India did not sign the NPT
in 1968 because it constructed the treaty as discriminatory. It claimed
that the NPT did not reduce the stockpiles of main nuclear states. By
remaining a non-signatory country, India could not be inspected by the
IAEA for its safeguards on nuclear material (Squassoni 2006, 1–2). Burns
therefore asked, “Is it better to maintain India in isolation, or is it bet-
ter to try to bring it into the international mainstream?” Its compliance
with the norms showed that India was a “uniquely responsible” power
(Burns 2006b). Its so-called responsibility legitimized India’s nuclear sta-
tus. Comparisons and links were made between India and Iran, but unlike
India, Iran was presented as one of the “[a]spiring proliferators” which
was sponsoring terrorism and was defying the international community
through its own nuclear ambitions (Rice 2006b). In fact, according to

Burns, the comparison between India and Iran was “just ludicrous” since
India was depicted as a “highly democratic, peaceful, stable” state (In
Weisman 2006). The USA and India should thus become partners. Rice
argues that the NSSP and the subsequent civilian nuclear agreement had
been important in their “goal of transforming America’s partnership with
India” (2006b).
The language of a democratic identity was again repeated. About the
nuclear relations, Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) said at the Senate on December
8, 2006, that it has “become cliché to speak of the US-India relationship
as a bond between the world’s oldest democracy and the world’s largest
democracy – but this cliché is also a fact” (2006). Accordingly, the US
policy discourse no longer constituted the USA and India as estranged.
Rice said,
For too long during the past century, differences over domestic policies and
international purposes kept India and the United States estranged. But with
the end of the Cold War, the rise of the global economy and changing demo-
graphics in both of our countries, new opportunities have arisen for a part-
nership between our two great democracies. As President Bush said in New
Delhi this month, “India in the 21st century is a natural partner of the United
States because we are brothers in the cause of human liberty” (2006b).
This echoed Kux’s book, India and the US: Estranged Democracies
(1992), in which the Cold War relations between the USA and India
were discussed. The term “estrangement” had been very influential and
continued to be important. President Clinton and officials in his admin-
istration referred to it, and during the Obama administration, Secretary
of State Clinton mentioned this notion. Burns also discussed it when he
talked about the strengthening of US-India ties as he wanted to “elimi-
nate any possibility that our two nations might overlook their natural
affinities and enter into another period of unproductive estrangement,
as was so often the case in the past half century” (US Embassy 2005b).44
US-India relations were thus juxtaposed with the past: they should remain
aware of their so-called natural bond since they were “natural partner[s]”
with “natural affinities” (US Embassy 2005b; Rice 2006b). This intertex-
tually referred to Prime Minister Vajpayee’s statement in 1998 that the
USA and India were “natural allies” to underline the seriousness of the
relationship.
In discussing the civilian nuclear deal, India also continued to be

depicted as a consumer of a lot of energy. President Bush said that it was
in the “interests of the United States […] that India develop a nuclear
power industry because that will help alleviate demand for fossil fuels”
(2006c). President Bush also said, “India is consuming a lot of fossil fuel.
That is driving up the price of – a part of the reasons why the price is
rising. America uses a lot of fossil fuels. China is using more fossil fuels.
India is using more fossil fuels, and it’s affecting the price of energy in the
United States and in India and in Pakistan” (2006d). A globalized world
was depicted where the US economy was affected by other large coun-
tries’ consumptions. It was undercutting the US prosperity, but it was also
affecting its “energy security” (Rice 2006b).
The War-on-Terror discourse thus became increasingly less salient dur-
ing the second Bush administration. In fact, Martin Halliwell and Catherine
Morley ask the question whether 9/11 really represented a rupture? They
argue, “The ‘turning point’ theory of history is one that is seductively
neat,” but there are also other currents and events that were important
rather than dramatic temporal occasions, such as Thomas Friedman’s
analysis of global competition (2008, 3, 5). My research indeed argues
that the 9/11 rupture was temporary; in the second Bush administration,
other articulations became more dominant with regard to India, such
as India’s rising power. The US policy discourse constructed India as a
“rising global power and partner”, and the USA “anticipates that India
will play an increasingly important leadership role in Asia in the 21st cen-
tury” (Department of State 2006). An “emerging world power” was also
attached to India’s subject-position (Bush 2005c). Accordingly, during
President Bush’s visit in March 2006, the joint statement also referred to
a “global partnership” (Bush 2006a).
Reflecting the development theme, the policy discourse started to men-
tion India’s growing economy again. As Bush argued following a meeting
with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on November 25, 2008, “[t]here
is a vibrancy and energy, and there’s a entrepreneurial spirit that’s very
strong” (2008). In 2006, President Bush also stated that both Pakistan
and India were undergoing large changes. He added, “More than five
centuries ago, Christopher Columbus set out for India and proved the
world was round. Now look at India’s growing economy and say that
proves the world is flat” (Bush 2006e). This echoed Thomas Friedman’s
book The World is Flat, in which Friedman writes that India resembled
the USA because of the American names and American companies that
settled there (2005, 5).45 India was no longer a distant country some-
where in the “West” that still needed to be explored by Columbus. The
US policy discourse represented India as approaching the top of the
development ladder as a former colony and low-ranking underdeveloped
country, changing the patterns of domination. The world was perceived
as becoming increasingly flat and connected because of technological and
economic advances. Friedman described Bangalore as “India’s Silicon
Valley”, where large American companies were building new depart-
ments and were outsourcing their work to (2005, 4). However, India
also did not entirely resemble the USA. Friedman asserted, “[T]his defi-
nitely wasn’t Kansas. It didn’t even seem like India” (2005, 4). Like in
the Clinton administration, the USA and India were very similar, but not
quite alike.
India’s growing economy and the outsourcing practices were also
mentioned in the US media and popular culture. In the American movie
Outsourced (2006), salesman Todd Anderson works as a fulfillment super-
visor at Western Novelty in Seattle until his entire department is shifted to
India, where he needs to train his replacement at the local call center. One
of his Indian colleagues and love interest, Asha, asks Todd why the Indians
need to pose as Americans when they are selling China-made products?
Why pretend the call center is in Chicago when the things are made some-
where else? The world is thus constructed as a globalized one in which the
USA is just one player. Also, on a Time Magazine cover, a young Indian
woman was wearing both traditional clothing and a headphone. From an
ancient civilization, India had turned into a “superpower”, as Time maga-
zine suggested (2006).
The language of competition between the US economy and other
countries increasingly manifested itself within the US policy discourse. In
the 2006 State of the Union, President Bush said that the economy was
“healthy and vigorous” and its economic performance was “the envy of
the world” (2006f). But, although the USA was looked up to as the City
upon the Hill, the Bush administration warned for complacency:
The American economy is preeminent, but we cannot afford to be com-

placent. In a dynamic world economy, we are seeing new competitors like
China and India, and this creates uncertainty, which makes it easier to feed
people’s fears. So we’re seeing some old temptations return. Protectionists
want to escape competition, pretending that we can keep our high standard
of living while walling off our economy (2006f).
Shifting the relations of power, the policy discourse constructed the USA
as an insecure place now that it had “new competitors” such as China
and India. Kishore Mahbubani argues in The New Asian Hemisphere that
the West is negative about the future with the rising Asian powers (2008,
3–4). According to Mahbubani, it reflects “a new Western zeitgeist: the
belief that the world is becoming more dangerous” (2008, 6). Americans
wanted to wall off competitors: they got tired from the competition as
they saw their jobs go overseas through offshoring and outsourcing (Bush
2006f). However, Friedman argues that Americans should roll up their
sleeves rather than go shopping, as the Bush administration advocated
after 9/11; otherwise, there would be a lack of innovation (2005, 252).
Competition was also constructed as one of the main American values.
As Zakaria argues in The Post-American World, “American firmly believe
in the virtues of competition” and “individuals, groups and corporations
perform better when they are in a competitive environment” (2011,
243–244). Accordingly, the Bush administration claimed in the 2006 State
of the Union that the road to isolationism “ends in danger and decline”
which can only be resolved by US “leadership” (2006f). The USA should
put its shoulder to the wheel and compete against others because it cannot
afford complacency.
CONCLUSION
The Bush Jr. administration conducted various security policies toward
India. This chapter focused on providing a deeper understanding rather
than any explanatory variables such as Bush’s and his adviser’s interests.
Under the Clinton administration, the US-India relations became closer
as there was more interest in India, but during the Bush administration,
this relationship continued even more intensely. The USA and India dis-
cussed the Kyoto Protocol, the Missile Defense Treaty, and China. They
also expanded their defense cooperation, and they established high-tech-
nology and civilian nuclear cooperation.
These US security policies toward India were made possible by discur-
sive changes which took place during the Clinton administration. Many
tropes from the end of the Clinton administration continued to be articu-
lated into the Bush administration, including India as a growing economy
and the effects on the environment, and India as a vibrant democracy
and natural ally. There was also one new trope: India as a rising power
in Asia and beyond. After the War-on-Terror discourse, there were a few
changes. The USA was articulated as a liberal power with the military
strength to boot. India was linked with Pakistan and terrorism in South
Asia. Nevertheless, India continued to be represented as a democracy and
growing world power which the USA should intensify its relationship
with. When the War-on-Terror discourse was increasingly less articulated,
India was constituted as unique and different from Pakistan. Also, it was
constructed as isolated and estranged for too long. In the meantime, there
was an emphasis on its growing world power and rising economic force.
The latter was connected with a growing sense of US insecurity arising
from its competition with India and China.
In terms of the four dominant themes, all of them were articulated
again in different forms. With regard to the democracy theme, India was
represented as a vibrant democracy and natural ally. The development
theme was quite salient: India was represented as a rising economy and
growing world power. The instability theme was articulated after 9/11
when India was connected with the volatile South Asia, but it became less
important in mid-2005. Lastly, the non-alignment theme came to the fore
when India was articulated as wrongfully isolated and estranged. India
should be turned into a partner as part of the civilian nuclear deal.
India was thus constructed as a rising economy, growing world power,
natural ally, and vibrant democracy. Chap. 6 demonstrates that many of
these tropes were articulated during the Obama administration. Again
India’s economic growth and the environmental problems continued to
be articulated.
NOTES
1. Cooperation was extended to the Tarapur nuclear facility, as reneged by
President Carter in the 1970s, but also other civilian nuclear reactors.
2. Indeed, the 1978 NPT halted civilian nuclear trade with countries who
had not signed the NPT and placed the nuclear facilities under regular
scrutiny, after which this rule was accepted by the NSP in 1992.
3. Zelikow played a larger role during the earlier stages of the US-India civil-
ian nuclear negotiations after Blackwill, Tellis and Kissinger as principal
guest, persuaded him to become interested in the matter during a meeting
organized by the US think tank, the Aspen Institute, in India in 2002
(Chaudhuri 2014, 226). In mid-2005, Burns, assisted by Tellis, led the
subsequent negotiations (Chaudhuri 2014, 222). A day prior to the
US-India joint statement on July 18, Rice received a message, according to
her memoires, that the Indian Prime Minister was not willing to endorse
it, holding on to non-alignment, but on the day itself she met with the
Prime Minister early in the morning and was able to persuade him (Rice
2011, 437–439).
4. In fact, President Bush did not take any members of Congress with him on
his 2006 visit to India even though Joe Wilson (R-SC), the former cochair
of the India Caucus in the House and John Cornyn, who had set up the
Senate Caucus, had asked to join him (Rubinoff 2008, 209).
5. Some scholars also try to combine various determinants or highlight other
factors. Jason Kirk writes that Indian Americans and their US India Political
Action Committee were vital in energetically pressing members of Congress
to support the civilian nuclear deal by distributing briefs, sponsoring recep-
tions, using electronic communications, personal appeals, and other strate-
gies (2008, 292–297). Rubinoff also refers to the Caucus of India and
Indian Americans with 173 House members (105 Democrats and 68
Republicans ) in the 109th Congress (2005–2007) and the establishment
of the “Friends of India” in the Senate (35 members) in 2004, but their
impact has not been large on foreign policy (2008, 201–202). Dinshaw
Mistry analyzes the two-level game, in which the bargaining of the nuclear
deal took place among the international actors and the national govern-
ments, and the national governments and their domestic audiences (2014,
12). By contrast, Harsh Pant focuses on three levels of analyses: structural,
domestic, and individual determinants (2011). In the structural sense, the
changing international system after the Cold War liberated “Indian and
American attitudes toward each other from the structural confines of Cold
War realities”. Both countries had to reorient their security policies. During
the Bush administration, the USA became particularly interested in India
vis-à-vis China as a rising power (Pant 2011, 21–23). Domestically, there
were changes in the US administration’s non-proliferation policies, the
decline in anti-Americanism of Indian political parties, the rise of the BJP
with a different foreign policy agenda, the growing US-India economic
ties, India’s need for energy security, the expansion of defense ties, the
impact of Indian diaspora in the USA, and less anti-American public opin-
ion (Pant 2011, 38–56). At the individual level, President Bush, supported
by a few advisors, led the way and cooperated with interested Indian
politicians.
6. On the Indian side, many leading politicians were involved: Sonia Gandhi,
head of India’s ruling Congress Party; Pranab Mukherjee, former External
Affairs Minister; M.K. Narayanan, former Security Advisor; and Shyam
Saran, the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy (Pant 2008, 60). Saran
approached Rice and Zelikow in November 2004 to set up an energy dia-
log in order to solve the problem of the Tarapur installation which
President Carter had cut off fuel to at the end of the 1970s (Chaudhuri
2014, 226).
7. During the Clinton administration, US foreign policy already had unilater-
alist tendencies. According to Dumbrell, the administration’s unilateralism
became more salient when the Republicans took over Congress in 1995
and when the USA emerged as a prominent actor after the Cold War, as
was evidenced by the lack of support for the International Criminal Court.
However, the Bush administration had been more vocal about its unilater-
alist policies (Dumbrell 2002, 282).
8. Nevertheless, Jaswant Singh said in 2003, “We categorically reject such
notions based on outmoded concepts like balance of power. We do not
seek to develop relations with one country to ‘counterbalance’ another”
(In Kronstadt 2005, 3). India also showed interest in joining the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization at which it gained an observer status, and China
and India had strong economic ties. In 2007, China–India trade stood at
$17.2 billion (Hayes 2009, 978).
9. India usually supported the decrease in nuclear stockpiles, but it had not
been supportive of earlier missile defenses (Tellis 2006, 130–136).
Nevertheless, in mid-2000s, Jaswant Singh said that the Indian govern-
ment did not support ballistic missile defense systems because it under-
mined international strategic stability, it could create a space race through
militarization, and it affected nuclear disarmament (Pant 2011, 50).
10. There were also other initiatives. In May 2001, Assistant Secretary of State
for South Asia, Christina Rocca, confirmed that there would be a review of
sanctions, which had been imposed on India after its nuclear test in 1998,
while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton,
visited India in July to restart the Defense Policy Group (Ganguly 2003,
178).
11. This movement was led by Maulana Masood Azhar, whom Jaswant had
traded for the passengers on the hijacked Indian Airbus two years earlier.
Another hostage was Omar Sheikh, who was involved in murdering Wall
Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in February 2002 (Talbott 2004,
215).
12. In the meantime, large-scale violence broke out between Hindu national-
ists and Muslim residents in Ahmedabad, the largest city in Gujarat. A train
with Hindu pilgrims caught fire of whom around 60 people died, which
was then followed by attacks on Muslims (Andersen 2008, 91; Talbott
2004, 215).
13. At the end of 2003, both countries announced a cease-fire, and in mid-
February 2004, they agreed to a six-month “roadmap to peace” in which
they would discuss all standing issues even though this was slow to realize
(Talbott 2004, 219).
14. For India, it had been an important step to open up its military bases, air-
fields, and intelligence for the US War on Terror, especially since India
denied the Soviet forces access during the Cold War years despite their
close relationship (Chellaney 2001, 99). In fact, India was one of the top
five aid donors to Afghanistan from 2002 until 2010 (Pant 2011, 22).
15. During discussions in Indian parliament on April 7–8, an unanimous reso-
lution was passed that military action and reconstruction should be done
under UN command.
16. The UNSC Resolution 1441 in November 2002 did not authorize the use
of force but discussed the need for Saddam Hussein to comply with UN
disarmament regulations (UNSC 2002).
17. In June, President Bush dropped in for a 30-minute talk during Rice’s
discussion with Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani while Assistant
Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman was sent to conduct a round of talks
with Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal and National Security Advisor Brajesh
Mishra (Chaudhuri 2014, 200–203).
18. The Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Department of Commerce
compiles an Entity List which contains names of businesses, research insti-
tutions, governments, private organizations, or individuals. They are sub-
jected to license requirements for the transfer of specific items.
19. The Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism was established in 2000.
20. In the meantime, the Indian government passed a bill about the preven-
tion of proliferation on May 13, 2005, and signed an US-India agreement
about limiting the risk of nuclear exports to a third party. In response, the
State Department removed again 13 organizations from the Entity List.
21. These actions were accompanied by conversations between Burns, Zelikow,
Rice, and their Indian counterparts, such as Saran, until Prime Minister
Singh’s visit to Washington in mid-July 2005 (Chaudhuri 2014, 229–233).
There were various issues of contention, including the fact that there
should be “full” civilian nuclear energy cooperation instead of “limited”
and India should “voluntarily” separate the civilian from the military
facilities.
22. In the meantime, the Bush administration also proposed a visit to India in
2006.
23. The civilian nuclear deal took a long time to implement as a result of the
lack of consultation by the Bush administration (Rubinoff 2008, 201).
Following the 2005 joint statement, the International Relations Committee
in the House of Representatives passed the India Nuclear Cooperation
Promotion Act of 2006 by a 16-2 vote, after which the full House endorsed
it by 359 to 68 members. About 219 Republicans and 149 Democrats
supported it, while 9 Republicans and 58 Democrats voted against it. The
Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee endorsed it by 16-2, but it did not
pass before the congressional election recess. Afterward, the House passed
the Henry J. Hyde United States and India Cooperation Act of 2006 by a
vote of 359 to 68, and the Senate followed the next day on December 9.
President Bush signed it into law on December 18, 2006 (Rubinoff 2008,
210). The US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act or Hyde
Act of 2006 amended provisions of the United States Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, which had prohibited civil nuclear cooperation with India. This
domestic law enabled the USA to negotiate the 123 agreement between
the USA and India to operationalize the 2005 joint statement. In the
meantime, the USA and India finalized their negotiations in 2007, in
which they decided that India reserved the right to separate the nuclear
facilities into civilian and military ones, India would not sign the FMCT on
fissile material production, and the wording about cessation of cooperation
after India’s nuclear testing would be left ambiguous (Chaudhuri 2014,
243–247). The 123 agreement now needed to be ratified by US Congress
and the Indian parliament. The 123 agreement was only signed by both
countries in 2008. In the meantime, it also needed to put forth it to the
IAEA and the NSG, which both approved of the arrangement (See: Mistry
2014, 176, 183).
24. The letter referred to 45 technical questions that members of Congress
posed about the deal. It remained secret for nine months because discus-
sion over the agreement in India could have ousted the government of
Prime Minister Singh (Kessler 2008).
25. Also, negotiations were stalled because the leftist parties within the
Congress Party’s coalition disagreed with close US-India relations as it
could affect its strategically autonomous foreign policy, and BJP Party
leaders became ambiguous about the deal because it could interfere with
India’s nuclear program (Rudolph 2008, 49; Chaudhuri 2014, 238–242;
Mistry, 2014, 152). Nevertheless, the Indian government survived the
vote of no confidence.
26. In 2001, Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Tehran, which culminated in the
Tehran Declaration (Fair, 2007, 260). This declaration focused upon com-
mercial and energy concerns, such as a new gas pipeline and an agreement
that Iran would provide natural gas to India (Fair 2007, 273).
27. According to the longer version of the Wikileaks cables, Indian Foreign
Secretary Shivshankar Menon informed US Ambassador David Mulford
on May 1, 2008, about the visits: “‘[T]here is nothing in this visit that
should upset you’. He emphasized that the Indian government had little
choice to say yes when the Iranian government requested a stop in transit.
Moreover, Menon explained, India and Iran need to talk about Afghanistan
and energy issues. ‘We can talk with him without affecting our other rela-
tionships’, Menon contended, and cited the strong India-Israel relation-
ship that withstood India’s flirtation with Iran. Menon also cautioned the
US against telling India what to do, especially in public. ‘This government
has to be seen following an independent foreign policy, not responding to
dictation from the US,’ he stated. He recognized that Iran presents a
global problem, and the US and India differ in how to fix the situation
because of geography. For instance, Menon pressed, India must work with
Iran to deal with Afghanistan” (US Embassy 2008).
28. Notwithstanding US objections, the Foreign Minister Natwar Singh said
in October 2005 that India would not support America’s proposal at the
IAEA to refer Iran to the Security Council for possible sanctions (Fair,
2007, 262). However, on other occasions India did support the US: India
voted for the resolution finding Iran to be non-compliant at the IAEA in
September 2005. Also, India referred Iran to the UN Security Council in
February 2006 (Fair 2007, 262).
29. In fact, the USA was India’s largest trading and investment partner during
the Bush administration (Pant 2011, 22).
30. According to Andrew Wyatt, the Indian economy is also reimagined in the
Indian discourse as a world power with an international economy rather
than a national one (2005, 170).
31. These ideas were reproduced more often. At the National Committee of
US–China relations, one of the Vulcans, Zoellick, said, “There is a caul-
dron of anxiety about China […] Uncertainties about how China will use
its power will lead the United States – and others as well – to hedge their
relations with China” (In Kessler 2008)
32. In fact, Jack Holland writes how 9/11 is often taken as a starting point
within official, media, and academic texts (2009, 275).
33. Subject-positions are unstable and contestable, however, according to
Jason Glynos and David Howarth, “[D]islocations are these occasions
when a subject is called upon to confront the contingency of social rela-
tions more directly than at other times” (2007, 162–163).
34. In fact, during the presidential campaign Rice wrote that “American values
are universal. People want to say what they think, worship as they wish,
and elect those who govern them; the triumph of these values is most
assuredly easier when the international balance of power favors those who
believe in them” (2000).
35. Many critics and supporters of the Bush administration assert that its for-
eign policy was under a neoconservative influence or that the Bush admin-
istration pursued a primacist foreign policy and democracy promotion
characteristically associated with neoconservatism. For a quick overview of
the scholars involved, see Hurst (2005, 42).
36. There were a quite a few neoconservatives in the Bush govern-
ment, such as Wolfowitz and John Bolton, US Ambassador to the
UN. However, there were also non-neoconservatives, such as

offensive realists (e.g. Rumsfeld and Cheney) and defensive realists
(for instance, Powell) (Owens and Dumbrell 2006, 241). For a
trajectory of the changes within the neoconservatives during the
Cold War and afterward, see Dumbrell (2008).
37. This is what neoconservative commentators, Robert Kagan and William
Kristol, call a “benevolent global hegemony” (2000, 6). According to
many neoconservatives, in fact, they were the “true heirs of the liberal
tradition in America” as they had the best means to achieve liberal goals
such as peace (Drolet 2011, 3, 5). The liberals had abandoned their uni-
versalist commitments in favor of multiculturalism and individual self-real-
ization since the 1960s (Drolet 2011, 5).
38. For instance, the NSS argued that “we must be prepared to stop rogue
states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use
weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and
friends”. It also said, “We must deter and defend against the threat before
it is unleashed” (Bush 2002c, 24).
39. As John Gaddis said, the Clinton administration wanted to engage and
enlarge the world, but the Bush administration’s policies were more “pro-
active” (2005, 37).
40. Halper and Clarke write that neoconservatives analyze global affairs in
moral terms, black-and-white categories. They also support US unipolar
power and its use of military power while they have a disdain for conven-
tional diplomacy embodied by the State Department and realist analysis.
Lastly, they look to the Reagan administration as the leading example as
they create their own version of his legacy (Halper and Clarke 2004, 11).
41. The Bush doctrine was intertextually connected with the secret 1992
Defense Planning Guidance paper that was leaked to the press. Outlining
a strategy of primacy, the Guidance also said that it aimed to “prevent the
emergence of a new rival” (Defense Planning Guidance 1992; Schmidt
and Williams 2008, 195).
42. Already during the Clinton administration, a few House representatives
framed India as a terrorist state because of alleged actions against Christians,
but this representation was not accepted as the dominant narrative nor
repeated by many other politicians during the Bush administration. See
Edolphus Towns (D-NY) (2000; 2001) and Dan Burton (2002).
43. In one Wikileaks document, the USA said it wanted to be an “equal part-
ner” with India on counterterrorism, but India was not as forthcoming. It
noted, “India’s lingering zero-sum suspicion of US policies towards
Pakistan, its fiercely independent foreign policy stance, its traditional go-it-
alone strategy toward its security, and its domestic political sensitivities
over the sentiments of its large Muslim population, have all contributed to
India’s caution in working with us on a joint counter-terrorism strategy”

(US Embassy 2007).
44. Burns also referred to Bush’s conversation with Indian Ambassador Lalit
Mansingh in 2001. President Bush had said to Mansingh that “[a]fter
years of estrangement, India and the United States together surrendered
to reality” and pursued a better relationship (US Embassy 2005b).
45. In the first chapter of his book Friedman explores India at length through
his own experiences and stories. Friedman then argues that there are ten
factors—or flatteners—which spurred global competition, such as the col-
lapse of the Berlin Wall and communism, Netscape and the web, outsourc-
ing and offshoring (2005).
CHAPTER 6
India Has Already Risen: The Obama

Administration
During the Bush administration, US-India relations became ever closer, as

was evident from the civilian nuclear deal and the discussions surround-
ing the Missile Defense Treaty. With the Obama administration, one
of the main questions which arose was whether the Obama administra-
tion’s interest in India was comparable to the Bush administration’s. The
US-India relationship was increasingly close after the Cold War, but did
the partnership weaken under the Obama administration? Was there “less
to it than met the eye?” (Schaffer and Schaffer 2012).1 According to Pant,
the USA and India were “struggling to give substance to a relationship
that seems to be losing traction in the absence of a single defining idea”
(2009). Under the Bush administration, the relationship had blossomed,
but at the start of the Obama administration many issues were separating
them, including terrorism, Afghanistan and Pakistan, nuclear cooperation,
and India’s role in the Asia-Pacific region (Pant 2009). India wanted to
play a larger role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, while the Americans
were reluctant to allow this involvement because of Pakistan’s concerns.
Patrick Christy notes that initiatives even remained stalled (2011). For
instance, after the nuclear deal of 2008, there was an impasse over repro-
cessing US nuclear material. The range of subjects discussed between the
USA and India remained “symbolic” rather than vital interests, including
Afghanistan and Pakistan, to India and the USA.

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54862-7_6
Nevertheless, the various summits between President Obama and Prime

Minster Narendra Modi from the BJP, elected in office in 2014, seemed
to have “arrested the drift in the bilateral relationship”, extending, for
instance, to environment cooperation and concerns about China (Mohan
2015b). As mentioned earlier, Prime Minister Modi invited Obama to
India’s annual Republic Day in January 2015, for which President Obama
postponed his annual State of the Union address. In the joint statement,
they said they recognized “the important role that both countries play in
promoting peace, prosperity, stability and security in the Asia-Pacific and
Indian Ocean Region” (Obama 2015a).
More importantly, if there had been a slowdown in US-India relations
during the Obama administration, the question remains unchallenged
that there has been a large change in US policies toward India in the last
few decades. Stephen Cohen and Constantino Xavier argue that “[b]oth
countries have a come a long way since the end of the Cold War, and
given China’s rise, the United States is surely posited to become one of
India’s main strategic partners” (2011). Likewise, Pant stresses that “[i]
t was indeed a tall order for Obama to match Bush’s achievements vis-à-
vis India”, but the relationship has been changed for a long time to come
(2011, 62–63). Teresita Schaffer also argues,
The biggest success stories in the past decade entail accomplishments the
United States and India achieved on their own, without third parties. The
most dramatic change has been the creation of a security relationship. In
2000, there was practically none; in 2010, US officials assert that the United
States conducts more military exercises with India than with any other coun-
try. Major strategic interests bring the two countries together in the Indian
Ocean. India’s exports to the US have doubled in that same period, and its
imports from the US have grown fivefold. These are the essential building
blocks for a broader relationship (2010a).2
The US-India relationship was maturing. As Ashley Tellis argues, it was

now consolidating because there was a “dominance of ordinariness”, which
worked to the relations’ strengths (2009, 11). There were less “sweeping,
big-ticket” issues, such as civilian nuclear cooperation, but there were still
large initiatives: the USA supported India’s bid for a UN Security Council
seat and established a US-India strategic dialogue which was taking place
yearly (Sharma 2011). As part of the confirmation hearing to become
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton thus announced that she would commit
INDIA HAS ALREADY RISEN: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 155
to President Obama’s plans to “establish a true strategic partnership with

India, increase our military cooperation, trade, and support democracies
around the world” (Kronstadt et al. 2011). During President Obama’s
three-day visit to India in 2010, he also said that the US-India relationship
would be one of the “defining partnerships” of the twenty-first century
(2010a).
This chapter demonstrates that the discursive changes which occurred
during the Clinton administration continued to enable specific policy
options under the Bush and Obama administrations. As my findings below
show, many representations of the Bush administration continued to be
articulated, such as India’s economic growth and the environmental prob-
lems. On the other hand, a few new tropes emerged, such as India as a
reticent global power. In the following sections, I discuss what issues were
constructed as security problems and give an overview of the attributes
which were discursively attached to India’s and US subject-positions,
which made these US security policies possible.
SINGH’S VISIT AND THE FIVE PILLARS

Unlike the Bush administration, US security issues toward India were
constructed very broadly within the policy discourse one year into the
Obama administration. As Tellis argues, the maturing of the relation-
ship meant that it would move to “an expanding web of interactions in
numerous issue areas where both agreement and disagreement persist to
varying degrees” (2009, 11). When on November 24, 2009, Obama wel-
comed Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for the first state visit of
the Obama administration’s term, President Obama said, “[T]oday, our
nations are two global leaders, driven not to dominate other nations, but
to build a future of security and prosperity for all nations […] [A]s we
work to build that future, India is indispensable” (2009a). To achieve
“security and prosperity”, Hillary Clinton told Indian business leaders
during her five-day visit to India in July 2009 that India and the USA
planned to take their cooperation to a new high by launching a bilateral
dialogue: “We see the dialogue that we are embarking upon as extremely
important and [it] is based on the five pillars which are areas of strategic
importance, agriculture, healthcare, science and technology and educa-
tion” (2009).3 The notion of security was thus stretched to include other
areas rather than issues which fell under the NSSP in 2004 and subsequent
joint statements, including civilian nuclear energy, environment, high-

technology trade, development, and missile defense.
The US policy discourse continued to produce some problems as secu-
rity issues as they had been in the Bush administration. In December
2009, the Copenhagen climate change negotiations took place where
India and China, together with Brazil and South Africa, a group called
BASIC, watered down the language about “monitoring” countries’ com-
pliance in their discussions with the USA. Nevertheless, it was agreed that
developing countries had to hold the increase of temperature below 2
degrees Celsius. About the environmental issues, President Obama said
during a press conference in London, “[I]f China and India, with their
populations, had the same energy use as the average American, then we
would have all melted by now” (2009b). Obama added in Strasbourg in
France, “[W]e all know that time is running out.” The climate issues were
naturalized as an important problem with a potential for disaster (2009c).
Since environmental threats were produced as security issues, they could
harm the USA in various ways. Obama said, “I don’t think people fully
appreciate the potential damage – economic damage, as well as environ-
mental damage – that could be done if we are not serious in dealing with
this problem” (2009d). Jobs and energy security were attached to envi-
ronmental issues as associative chains: it was argued that the public wanted
to hear about these issues rather than a melting glacier. In other words,
the American public was interpellated into this narrative (Guber and Bosso
2012, 444).
President Obama was more committed to strengthening global non-
proliferation than the Bush administration. The Obama administration
articulated the non-proliferation system as a high priority (Department
of Defense 2010, iii).4 As President Obama said, the USA was commit-
ted to “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”
(Obama 2009e). However, the administration also wanted to implement
the US-India nuclear deal. These understandings seem to contradict each
other. Nevertheless, the Undersecretary for Politics Affairs William Burns
said, “The signing of the civil nuclear deal turned a source of friction
between our two countries into opportunities for cooperation in trade and
job creation, helping India to meet its growing energy needs, and open-
ing up possibilities to work together to strengthen the global nonprolif-
eration regime” (2009). The USA supported India’s full membership in
four export control regimes, including the NSG, the Missile Technology
Control Regime, the Australia group for chemical weapons material, and
the Wassenaar Arrangement for the armaments trade. In the meantime, the
USA and India started to put new measures in place. They agreed in 2010
on reprocessing US nuclear material in India’s own reprocessing plants
under IAEA safeguards (Pant 2011, 7–8). The US and Indian leaders
also announced that three of India’s military and space organizations were
removed from the US Entities List even though the material could not be
transported yet due to India’s nuclear liability laws (Schaffer 2010b). The
Indian government had passed the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages
Bill in 2010, having to include many recommendations of the opposition.
Unlike the international norm, the law made both the operator and the
supplier potentially liable, which could potentially affect American compa-
nies’ engagement (Pant 2011, 8–10).5
The US policy discourse also continued to construct the Afghanistan
war and Kashmir as important security issues. When President Obama
presented his Afghanistan–Pakistan (Af–Pak) plans at the White House
in March 2009, he said that the situation was “increasingly perilious”
and “[t]he future of Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the future of its
neighbor Pakistan” (Obama 2009f). Pakistan and Afghanistan were both
presented as a problem, while India was again connected to Pakistan. As
Obama said, “To lessen tensions between two nuclear-armed nations that
too often teeter on the edge of escalation and confrontation, we must
pursue constructive diplomacy with both India and Pakistan” (2009f). In
light of these security issues, the Obama administration appointed a spe-
cial US representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke,
to coordinate US actions. Accordingly, the USA wanted to play a part in
resolving the Kashmir conflict. The Obama administration asked India to
join other international actors in managing the region (Pant 2011, 63;
Chaudhuri 2014, 261). After 2009, however, there were silences in the
US policy discourse: the Af–Pak plans were not tied to any security issues
in India (Department of State 2010a). When the USA presented its plans
in 2009, India had lobbied the USA to remove India and Kashmir from
the US Af–Pak strategy (Rozen 2009). India’s argumentation was made
acceptable within the US policy discourse: India’s and Pakistan’s subject-
positions were dehyphenated as they were before.
The Obama administration thus constructed climate change, global
non-proliferation, the Afghanistan war, and Kashmir as security issues, but
they also discussed agriculture, healthcare, science and technology, and
education as part of strategic cooperation. In the following section, the
security issues even expanded.
CENTERS OF INFLUENCE AND DIALOGUES

In 2010, the Obama administration articulated various dangers facing the
USA: “The dark side of this globalized world came to the forefront for
the American people on September 11, 2001. […] More broadly, though,
we have wrestled with how to advance American interests in a world that
has changed – a world in which the international architecture of the 20th
century is buckling under the weight of new threats, the global econ-
omy has accelerated the competition facing our people and businesses”
(Obama 2010b, 1). As a policy solution, the USA had to aim at “renew-
ing American leadership” in building its country’s economy and shaping
the international system, but it also asked for more “engagement” with
other countries (Obama 2010b, 2–3). The 2010 NSS said about India:
“The United States is part of a dynamic international environment, in
which different nations are exerting greater influence, and advancing our
interests will require expanding spheres of cooperation around the word.
Certain bilateral relationships—such as US relations with China, India,
and Russia—will be critical to building broader cooperation on areas of
mutual interest.” While asserting themselves, the “emerging powers” gave
rise to opportunities for partnership (Obama 2010b, 43). In fact, this
reflected an “Obama doctrine” (Drezner 2011). Even though the policy
does “not fit easy on a bumper sticker” (Sanger 2012, xvi). As David
Sanger argues, when a security issue is articulated as a grave threat to US
security, as evidenced by the 2011 Osama Bin Laden raid, the USA was
willing to act unilaterally without any lengthy ground wars, but if the secu-
rity issue is articulated as a threat to global politics, the administration was
far more reluctant (Sanger 2012, xvi–xvii).
The US “engagement” with other countries was translated in several
ways; first of all, the US-India strategic dialogue became institutionalized.
President Obama said at the reception of the dialogue: “A fundamental
pillar of America’s comprehensive engagement with the world involves
deepening our cooperation with 21st-century centers of influence, and
that includes India” (Obama 2010c). As part of the dialogues, security
issues continued to be articulated in very broad terms for “the promotion
of global peace, stability, economic growth and prosperity” (Department
of State 2010b). During President Obama’s three-day trip to India in
November 2010, non-proliferation and export controls were constructed
as important security issues, among many other security issues, such
as food security, economic and financial partnerships, and education
(Department of State 2010b).6 When India’s Minister of External Affairs

Shri S.M. Krishna and Secretary Clinton met in New Delhi on July 19,
2011, for the second annual meeting, they also discussed several secu-
rity issues within their own working groups.7 There were many groups,
including the newly established Homeland Security Dialogue and the
Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism (Department of State 2011).
According to Schaffer, agreements were made “in important but un-sexy
areas” such as cybersecurity, aviation safety, women’s empowerment, sci-
entific cooperation and clean energy, expansion of student exchanges and
information sharing (2011a).8 In fact, in 2012, there were a total of 23
meetings among senior civil servants, and they all focused on different secu-
rity issues (Schaffer and Schaffer 2012). Assistant Secretary for South and
Central Asian Affairs, Robert Blake, summed up the strategic agenda: the
innovation agenda, which included the collaboration on energy security,
civil nuclear cooperation, agriculture, space, climate, and other scientific
developments; the security agenda, which included military-to-military
relations, arms sales, and non-proliferation; the people-to people agenda,
which focused on civic engagement, open governance, and democracy;
and lastly, the growth agenda, which concentrated on increasing bilateral
trade and investment (Blake 2011a; Kronstadt et al. 2011, 3).
About the latter growth agenda, one of the security problems was the
job creation for American workers. During the 2010 State of the Union,
President Obama spoke of the need for increase in US exports and jobs
which was “consistent with national security” by seeking “new markets
aggressively, just as our competitors are” (Obama 2010d). One of these
markets was India. As Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke said during
his trade mission to India in 2011, accompanied by representatives of
24 US companies, he wanted India to open up its economy even fur-
ther by tackling trade barriers and intellectual property right protection:
“Ultimately, what America seeks is a level playing field for its companies,
where the cost and quality of their products determines whether or not
they win business” (In Kronstadt et al. 2011). However, this was juxta-
posed against another issue. In the State of the Union speech, Obama
also addressed the problem of US-based companies that “ship our jobs
overseas” (Obama 2010d). This was closely connected to the H-1B visa
application by US-based companies for foreign workers. Especially, Indian
firms in the USA, including Infosys Technologies and Tata Consultancy
Services, applied for these visas. On August 13, 2010, President Obama
signed into law border protection legislation, which demanded an increase
in fees of around $2000 for each visa application. There were thus tensions
between the advancement of US-India relations and the protection of the
“American worker” (Lacey 2010).
As part of US engagement, security issues also deepened because not
just the state but also “global security” needed to be secured (Obama
2010b, 1). Hillary Clinton argued in her Foreign Policy article, entitled,
“America’s Pacific Century”, that the Asia-Pacific has become a “key driver
of global politics” (2011a). She added that “much of the history of the
21st century will be written in Asia, and much of the future of Asia” will
be shaped by India (Clinton 2011b). Accordingly, President Obama said
during his visit to India in November 2010: “India and the United States,
as global leaders, will partner for global security” (2010e). This fitted
with the US administration’s language of the deepening and widening of
US-India relations. In the Joint Statement of 2011, Clinton and Krishna
discussed their desire to “further broaden and deepen the US-India global
strategic partnership” (Department of State 2011). President Obama reit-
erated that a strategic partnership of global proportions was in the making
through “expanding security cooperation”, and they therefore continued
with the defense framework, as signed by Defense Minister Rumsfeld and
Mukherjee in 2005 (Obama 2013a, b). Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
also said that “for this relationship to truly provide security for this region
and for the world, we will need to deepen our defense and security coop-
eration” (2012). As the military forces were “rebalancing” toward the
Asia-Pacific area, India should thus become a “linchpin” in the US strat-
egy (Panetta 2012).
These articulations were made in light of an invisible Other in the
“East”: China. In the first year of the Obama administration saw short-
term improvements in its relations with China, but relations fluctuated.
Accordingly, Hillary Clinton outlined a “Vision for the 20th Century”,
a lifeworld in which the USA was supportive of India’s “leadership” in
the Asia-Pacific. She stated, “[W]e encourage India not just to look east
[sic], but to engage East and act East as well, because after all, India, like
the United States, where we look to the Atlantic and to the Pacific, India
also looks both east and west” (Clinton 2011b). In fact, the Look East
Policy was formulated under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1992 to
engage in closer economic and security relations with the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). India became a “dialogue member”
with ASEAN in order to avoid one country dominating the region (Cohen
2002, 252). Nevertheless, in her last foreign policy speech as Secretary of
State, Clinton reiterated her encouragement of the “‘Look East’ Policy as

a way to weave another big democracy into the fabric of the Asia-Pacific”
(Clinton 2013).
The US policy discourse thus rendered intelligible security issues within
the Asia-Pacific. The Obama administration rearticulated the meaning of
India’s neighborhood by emphasizing that the US-India security relations
were tied to the wider Asian and global context. Indeed, in 2010, the two
governments discussed their “shared vision for peace, stability and pros-
perity in Asia, the Indian Ocean region and the Pacific region and [their
commitment] to work together, and with others in the region, for the
evolution of an open, balanced and inclusive architecture in the region”
(Obama 2010e). The 2012 joint statement reiterated that the 2010 aim
for an “open, balanced, and inclusive architecture” for Asia (Department
of State 2012). “Translation: neither side contemplates a quasi-alliance to
‘contain’ Beijing,” Teresita and Howard Schaffer argue, “but both will
remain engaged together throughout the Asia Pacific region” (2012). In
fact, in the Wikileaks documents, the US government noted, “We follow
closely India’s ‘complex relationship’—as Indian officials have called it—
with China, the dynamics of which will significantly affect not only Asia as
a power center of the 21st century, but directly impact US interests from
the Pacific to the Cape of Good Hope” (US Embassy 2009).
Accordingly, the USA showed support for regional forums that include
India, China, Southeast Asia, and the USA, such as the East Asia sum-
mit, and a trilateral dialogue between the USA, India, and Japan which
took place to discuss regional issues and strengthen cooperation (Obama
2010e; Christy 2011). Another initiative was to create a greater presence
in the Indian Ocean region through maritime cooperation, by continuing
naval exercises and keeping the sea-lanes safe from piracy and terrorism
for commerce to continue unimpeded (Department of Defense 2011, 2).
Indeed, the US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2010 mentioned
that as India’s military capacity grows, “India will contribute to Asia as a
net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond” (Department
of Defense 2010, 60). Finally, the meaning of “Asia-Pacific security”
and “global security” also referred to India’s permanent membership
within the UN Security Council. As India was elected to the UN Security
Council for a two-year term in 2010, President Obama announced during
his trip to India in November 2010 that the USA looked forward to “a
reformed UN Security Council that includes India as a permanent mem-
ber” (Obama 2010e).
The US-India consultations on Central and West Asia and collabora-

tions on Afghanistan were also held. Unlike the first year of the Bush
administration, the USA and India now discussed more extensively devel-
opmental projects and India’s support for the Afghan National Security
Forces’ capabilities, which made common-sensible a security role for
India when the USA withdraws its troops from Afghanistan (Schaffer and
Schaffer 2012; Christy 2011). Also, the Silk Road initiative was estab-
lished, which aimed at creating more trade routes within the region and
thus economic integration (Clinton 2011c). As Clinton said, “Let’s work
together to create a new Silk Road. Not a single thoroughfare like its
namesake, but an international web and network of economic and transit
connections. That means building more rail lines, highways, energy infra-
structure, like the proposed pipeline to run from Turkmenistan, through
Afghanistan, through Pakistan into India” (2011c).
The USA thus faced a globalized world in which it needed to build
up its own economy and engage itself with other countries. The secu-
rity issues were broadened through the US-India security dialogues, such
as food security, environmental security, education and economic issues,
while India was increasingly articulated as part of various US security strat-
egies toward Asia and in particular against an invisible China. “Global
security” and security in the Asia-Pacific were articulated as concerns,
which would become substantive in the following section.
MODI AND REBALANCING TO ASIA

The Obama administration articulated a new NSS in February 2015,
which articulated that “America must lead”, but “our resources will never
be limitless” (Obama 2015b, x, 2). As President Obama shortly outlined
in the first part of the strategy, the “core interests” were affected by secu-
rity challenges, including “aggression, terrorism and disease”, as mani-
fested by the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa and the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Others were also mentioned, including attacks on
important infrastructure, US citizens, or allies; global economic crisis; use
of weapons of mass destruction; climate change; major energy disruptions;
and security issues related to failed states. Nevertheless, “historic opportu-
nities” were also presented. As President Obama wrote,
Our rebalance to Asia and the Pacific is yielding deeper ties with a more
diverse set of allies and partners. When complete, the Trans-Pacific
Partnership will generate trade and investment opportunities – and create

high-quality jobs at home – across a region that represents more than 40
percent of global trade. We are primed to unlock the potential of our rela-
tionship with India (2015b, x).
The deepening of ties with India became important within the frame-
work of “[r]ebalance to Asia and the Pacific”, in which the USA also
wanted to strengthen alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the
Philippines and to continue to strengthen regional institutions against a
non-articulated security liability: China (Obama 2015b, 24). Indeed, the
administration said it “welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and pros-
perous China”, which could be juxtaposed against meanings that were left
unsaid: China’s subject-position as instable, aggressive, and poor (Obama
2015b, 24). For India, this meant:
We support India’s role as a regional provider of security and its expanded

participation in critical regional institutions. We see a strategic convergence
with India’s Act East policy and our continued implementation of the rebal-
ance to Asia and the Pacific. At the same time, we will continue to work
with both India and Pakistan to promote strategic stability, combat terror-
ism, and advance regional economic integration in South and Central Asia
(Obama 2015b, 25).
The two security issues were thus China and Pakistan, of which Pakistan
was articulated as less important. India was presented as the provider of
stability, which was not made dependent on India–Pakistan relations, as
it remained dehyphenated. Even though terror attacks were constructed
as important within the NSS 2015, the emphasis was put on the larger
Asia-Pacific region and global terror (Obama 2015b, x).9 The Act East
Policy referred to an action-oriented strategy, which India’s new Prime
Minister Narendra Modi had unveiled during the ASEAN-India summit
on November 12, 2014, in contrast with the Look East Policy against
ASEAN. The meaning of “acting east” was intertextually related to
speeches by Clinton on India’s foreign policy during Obama’s first admin-
istration, which signaled a shared security concern. Consequently, one ini-
tiative was to conduct a multilateral Malabar naval exercise between the
USA, India, and Japan in 2015, for the first time since 2007, when India
put a halt on multilateral exercises following China’s concern.
In the meantime, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Obama
met several times to discuss the deepening of the relationship in light
of the Asia-Pacific security issue. Following speculations over denials of

Modi’s visa by the Department of State in 2005, President Obama imme-
diately invited Prime Minister Modi to Washington, D.C., in September
2014.10 The joint statement on September 30, 2014, said that they con-
tinued with “the broad strategic and global partnership” in terms of secu-
rity and prosperity. They also endorsed the first “Vision Statement for
the Strategic Partnership”, a vision on Asia-Pacific security and beyond,
earlier formulated by Clinton in 2011, to “strengthen and deepen coop-
eration” (Obama 2014a). With President Obama’s second visit to India
in January 2015, President Obama reiterated that “[w]e agreed to deepen
our defense and security cooperation […] We’ve also agreed to a new
vision for the Asia-Pacific so that we’re doing more together to advance
our shared security and prosperity in this critical region” (Obama 2015c).
Indeed, Obama and Prime Minister Modi renewed the 2005 Defense
Framework Agreement for the next ten years. The USA had become
India’s largest arms supplier during the second Obama administration.
As one of the world’s largest purchaser of weapons, India spent $5 billion
in equipment from the USA, with Russia closely behind, with $4 billion
(Lakshmi 2014).
Closely related to this security issue was the continuation of the US-India
strategic dialogue, which incorporated an even wider range of issues, from
“strategic cooperation in global issues”, economic issues, defense, and
security cooperation to energy and environment (Department of State
2015). In fact, the meetings in September 2015 were renamed US-India
strategic and commercial dialog led by Secretary of State John Kerry and
Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker as they were “committed to con-
fronting the political and economic challenges together” in light of their
relationship as the “central component of America’s rebalance to Asia”
(Earnest et al. 2015). The commercial dialogue aimed at creating more
trade and investment opportunities and concentrate “on our shared pri-
orities of growing our economies, creating good jobs, and strengthening
our middle class” (Earnest et al. 2015). With regard to India’s concern
about the H-1B visa procedure for Indian workers in the USA, Deputy
National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes said it was part of other US secu-
rity concerns, including immigration reform and border control, which
affected the US economy and the creation of jobs. Nevertheless, President
Obama’s executive actions did not affect the Indian workers as much: the
US government decided to “fix” its own immigration system by restricting
the exploitation of undocumented workers and making it easier for highly
skilled workers to stay (Earnest et al. 2015; Obama 2014b). Outside the
Obama administration, however, there remained some discursive ten-
sions between the two articulated aims: improved US-India relations in
order to enhance “global security” and the challenges faced by migration.
In response to the Obama administration’s policies, a Senate Judiciary
Committee hearing on March 17, 2015, was convened to examine the
“abuse” of the H-1B visa applications (Moore 2015).
The commercial dialogue also encompassed other major issues. In the
2010 NSS, the Obama administration said that it would support “global
health, food security, and cooperative responses to humanitarian responses”
as part of Top National Security Priorities (2010b, 5). In 2015, food security
remained a main focus even though it was articulated as a little less impor-
tant (Obama 2015b, 18). Nevertheless, the issue brought the two countries
together through discussions in the Trade Policy Forum as established in
2005 (US Embassy 2014). India wanted assurances that its own food secu-
rity program to ensure the poor’s nutrition through stockpiling food would
not be detrimentally affected by the World Trade Organization’s rules on
farm subsidies. The issue nearly broke down the Doha round of trade nego-
tiations in the World Trade Organization in 2001. However, in 2014, the
USA and India struck an agreement with an open-ended “peace clause”
which allowed India to change the subsidies for food security programs
and protect it against any challenges until a permanent solution was found.
The issues of energy and environmental security did not advance quickly,
but some changes have been made. Similarly to the first Obama adminis-
tration, environmental security continued to be articulated as an important
issue as the Obama administration spoke of confronting “climate change”
(2015b). Accordingly, President Obama and Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh constructed it as “a defining challenge of our time” (2013a). In the
2014 joint statement, the USA and India also said,
Climate change threatens both our countries, and we will join together to
mitigate its impact and adapt to our changing environment. We will address
the consequences of unchecked pollution through cooperation by our gov-
ernments, science and academic communities. We will partner to ensure that
both countries have affordable, clean, reliable, and diverse sources of energy,
including through our efforts to bring American-origin nuclear power tech-
nologies to India (2014a).
As a result, the Joint Working Group on Climate Change was established

as part of the US-India dialogues (Kronstadt 2014, 1). The aim was to
make advancements at the UN Climate Change conference in November–

December in Paris (Mohan 2015b).11 This was a change from the 2009
Copenhagen climate discussions where large “developing” countries, such
as India, China, Brazil, and South Africa, were presented as a bloc. It had
been a large initiative for both India and China, but this major India–
China cooperation was discontinued. In the meantime, there was gridlock
with regard to civilian nuclear assistance after India’s nuclear liability laws
in 2010. Some of these problems were tackled with the September summit
in Washington in 2014. In January 2015, the administrations announced
that they achieved a “breakthrough” on civil nuclear cooperation by estab-
lishing a state-backed insurance scheme, which would limit the nuclear
supplier companies’ liability after a possible power plant accident (Obama
2015c). It was proposed that a pool of around $250 million would be
advanced (Ministry of External Affairs 2015). There were still other prob-
lems: progress had been slow with regard to India’s membership of the
NSG, the Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia group, and the
Wassenaar Arrangement.
In order to deepen the relationship to advance “Asia-Pacific security”,
the Obama administration thus continued with the strategic dialogue and
renewed the joint defense statement while it also advanced cooperation on
energy security, food security, and environmental security. The next sec-
tion highlights how the US and India’s identities were constituted within
the US policy discourse. As my findings below show, many representations
of the Bush administration continue to underlie the Obama administra-
tion. New tropes, such as India as a global power with increased responsi-
bilities, also appeared.
SINGH’S VISIT AND THE FIVE PILLARS: INDIA

AS A COMPETITOR
As noted above, during its first year, there were talks about the Afghan
war, nuclear policies, and a discussion on environmental politics at
Copenhagen. With regard to the latter, India’s representation of a growing
economy impacting the environment was articulated by both the Clinton
and the Bush administrations. Within the Obama administration, India
was constructed as one of the developing nations which was “eradicating
poverty” but also “catching up” with the USA as an “emerging” coun-
try with “enormous economic growth and industrialization” (Stern 2009;
Obama 2009g, h). India was thus constructed as not yet at the end point
of development although it was rising in an economic sense.
At the same time, the Obama discourse did differ in some ways from
the Bush administration. Prior to the Copenhagen climate change sum-
mit, President Obama said at a news conference that he saw
how important it is for the United States to lead by example in reducing our
carbon footprint so that we can help to forge agreements with countries like
China and India that, on a per capita basis, have a much smaller footprint
and so justifiably chafe at the idea that they should have to sacrifice their
development for our efforts to control climate change (2009i).
In contrast to the Bush administrations’ articulations, India and China were

not constructed as free riders but as countries with legitimate and justified
complaints; at the same time, the USA shared even more responsibilities.
As President Obama said, “It’s critical for us to lead by example by becom-
ing more energy efficient, and we also have to harness technology and
shared scientific breakthroughs in order to find more sustainable energy
patterns” (2009c). This echoed Friedman’s book Hot, Flat, Crowded: Why
We Need a Green Revolution (2008) in which he writes, “[T]he best way
for America to get its ‘groove’ back—is for us to take the lead in solving
the world’s big problem. In a world that is getting hot, flat, and crowded,
the task of creating the tools, systems, energy sources and ethics […] is
going to be the biggest challenge of our lifetime” (2008, 5–6). The USA
should save the world through its leadership, innovation, and collaboration
“or everybody is going to lose – big” (Friedman 2008, 6). A narrative was
thus crafted which reflected the traditional US rhetoric of US “burdens of
responsibility” (Weldes 1999, 201). The US global leadership was con-
structed as altruistic; it was not for its own gain since it could come at great
costs and was voluntarily assumed. The American people needed to volun-
tarily resolve this environmental security issue by becoming more efficient.
As with the Bush administration, India and China continued to be
articulated as competitors. Speaking at a town hall meeting in Mumbai on
November 7, 2010, President Obama reflected on the changing subject-
position of the USA in relation to other states:
The fact of the matter is that for most of my lifetime and I’ll turn 50 next
year – the US was such an enormously dominant economic power, we were
such a large market, our industry, our technology, our manufacturing was
so significant that we always met the rest of the world economically on our
terms. And now because of the incredible rise of India and China and Brazil
and other countries, the US remains the largest economy and the largest
market, but there is real competition (2010f).
In the past, the USA had been the economic leader and at the top of the
development ladder, but now the USA had to deal with more competi-
tion. The Obama administration warned at a Q&A session in Missouri:
“Nations like China and India are starting to turn out more engineers,
more scientists. If we aren’t able to compete technologically, we’re not
going to be able to compete, because this is a knowledge-based economy”
(2009j). China and India were presented as fierce competitors as they were
becoming more similar to the USA in many fields. Indeed, Representative
Frank Wolf (VA-20) introduced “The Bring Jobs Back to America Act”
in 2010 as he stated that the “Chinese, Indians and other international
competitors are actively monitoring new technologies” which was a prob-
lem because if the USA did not start to invest in research and educa-
tion, “the 21st century will belong to China and India” (2010). These
utterances made sense within the “liberal globalisation discourse” (Weldes
2001, 650). According to Weldes, this discourse includes several elements,
such as “a well-worn Enlightenment narrative of progress; the central and
wholesome role of global markets; a utopian narrative of technological
advance; the trope of the ‘global village’; and the interrelated narratives
of an increasingly global culture and a progressive and pacific politics”
(2001, 650). Within this discourse, the USA was now represented as lack-
ing progress. Nevertheless, the NSS of 2010 said that the Americans will
work on America’s leadership in order to “secure a more resilient nation”
in a world where economic opportunities were more dispersed (Obama
2010b).
A new trope of renewal began to be articulated within the US policy
discourse. In 2007, presidential candidate Obama wrote an opinion piece
in Foreign Affairs, entitled “Renewing American Leadership”, in which he
asked for “visionary leadership” similar to deeds done by Roosevelt, Harry
Truman, and Kennedy in the past. Obama added, “The American moment
is not over, but it must be seized anew. To see American power in terminal
decline is to ignore America’s great promise and historic purpose in the
world. If elected president, I will start renewing that promise and purpose
the day I take office” (2007). One of the subheadings of the NSS of 2010
was also entitled: “Renewing American Leadership – Building at Home,
Shaping Abroad” (Obama 2010b).12 There should be growth, innovation,

and renewal; the USA should recover its strength and energy in a volatile
world. The American public was interpellated into accepting that the US
only role in this world is to be a leader. Within the US media discourse,
Friedman’s 2005 book also captures this by asking in the subtitle how
a green revolution “can renew America?” Unlike Samuel Huntington’s
Clash of Civilizations (1993), Halliwell and Morley therefore argue that
all these statements export the vision of hope which fits with the “more
optimistic American currents of resourcefulness and renewal” (2008, 5).
Presidential candidate Obama also articulated the notion of optimism and
hope during his presidential campaign based on his keynote address at
the 2004 Democratic Convention, entitled, “The Audacity of Hope” in
which he said, “In the end, that’s what this election is about. Do we par-
ticipate in a politics of cynicism or a politics of hope? […] Hope in the
face of difficulty. Hope in the face of uncertainty. The audacity of hope!”
(2004). This can be tied to the US liberal identity of progress. According
to Foley, “In America, progress continues to constitute the main basis for
American optimism and for the nation’s self-belief as the vanguard of the
West” (2007, 181–182).
While the language of competition was attached to both India’s and
China’s subject-positions, India and Pakistan were also connected. On
November 26, 2008, 10 Pakistan-based gunmen from Lashkar-e-Taiba
attacked several spots, including a railway station, hotels, the cinema,
and a hospital, in Mumbai that left 166 people dead, including the Taj
Mahal Hotel, which became quite salient within the US policy discourse.
President Obama visited several sites in 2010, such as the Taj Mahal Hotel
and St. Xavier College. During his visit, President Obama said at a Q&A
session in Mumbai:
I am absolutely convinced that the country that has the biggest stake in
Pakistan’s success is India. I think that if Pakistan is unstable, that’s bad
for India. If Pakistan is stable and prosperous, that’s good, because India is
on the move. And it is absolutely in your interests, at a time when you’re
starting to succeed in incredible ways on the global economic stage, that
you don’t want the distraction of security instability in your region (2010f).
Like in the Clinton administration, India’s fortunes were tied to the vola-
tile region and in particular to Pakistan. The countries were not com-
pletely seen on their own merit. As Obama said about the Af–Pak strategy,
India and Pakistan were “two nuclear-armed nations that too often teeter
on the edge of escalation” (2009k). However, the Obama administra-
tion also articulated Pakistan as the most irrational and impulsive country,
which alluded to the instability theme during the Cold War. As Obama
said, Pakistan’s “obsession with India as the mortal threat to Pakistan has
been misguided, and that their biggest threat right now comes internally”
(2009l). Also, in 2011, President Obama said at a news conference that
Pakistan should understand that India was not their “mortal enemy” and
that “a peaceful approach towards India would be in everybody’s interests
and would help Pakistan actually develop” (2011b). Pakistan was repre-
sented as unstable, while India was articulated as the innocent bystander
that was the object of Pakistan’s wrath.
India was still represented as an important partner to the USA. In one
Wikileaks document, the US Embassy briefs Richard Holbrooke, Obama’s
special representative, for his trip to South Asia. The Embassy noted, “The
encouraging news for US interests is that whereas India, over the previous
40-odd years, had tended to quickly and suspiciously dismiss US intentions
in the region, our recent improvement in relations have made Delhi much
more amenable to co-operating” (US Embassy 2009). As part of the non-
alignment theme, in which India cherished its autonomy especially during
the Cold War, India had now become more malleable and less susceptible
rather than unruly or anti-Western. India and the USA were constructed
as sharing similar values and aims. In the Wikileaks documents, India was
thus described as a “raucous democracy” but also as a “true partner” and
“more committed than ever to building a durable and wide ranging rela-
tionship” (US Embassy 2010). Likewise, during Prime Minister Singh’s
visit to the USA in 2009, Obama described the relationship as “one of
the defining partnerships of the 21st century”. Obama added, “For while
our two nations have taken different paths to reach this moment, ours is a
common story. It’s the story of two proud people who struggled to break
free from an empire and declare their independence. Two bold experi-
ments with—in democracy with Constitutions that begin with the same
simple words: We the people. Two great republics dedicated to the ideals
of liberty, justice, equality, and the never-ending work of perfecting their
union” (2009a). India’s and the US past could be narrated as a story with
a happy ending as the shared liberal values had to bring these countries
together even though they had taken different paths. Their past and their
future would be the same. India could not be put aside; India was “indis-
pensable” (Obama 2009a). The administration added, “It’s the story of
two economic marvels fuelled by an ethic of hard work and innovation”

(Obama 2009a). Constructing both countries as growing economic inno-
vators, the administration thus constituted the countries as exemplary
heroes. As Secretary Blake said at a town hall meeting, “[t]he rise of India
is one of the great stories of the 21st Century” (2011b).
The language of “natural allies” was attached to the US-India rela-
tionship during the Bush administration and the later Clinton years. This
continued to be the case during the Obama administration. According to
Secretary Blake, the “US and India increasingly are natural allies” (2009).
President Obama also said at a news conference with Singh:
Well, first of all, I think that the United States and India are natural allies
not just around counterterrorism issues, but on a whole host of issues. As we
discussed earlier, we’re the world’s two largest democracies. We have a range
of shared values and ideals. We’re both entrepreneurial societies. We’re both
multiethnic societies. We are societies that believe in human rights and core
freedoms that are enshrined in our founding documents (2009m).
The strength of the relationship was thus located in shared values.

However, the Obama administration also produced another meaning: the
power of the people. What made the countries even stronger allies was
the (re)articulations of “strong people-to-people ties” and through the
“incredible contributions that Indian Americans have made to the growth
of our country and the degree to which they are woven into the very fabric
of our society” (Blake 2009; Obama 2009m). It signified that the rela-
tionship was not an abstract relationship but a personal one. The meanings
of “friendship and partnership” were thus also fixed to the US and India’s
subject-positions (Obama 2010f).
As shown, US security policies were thus made possible by various con-
structions of Indian and US subject-positions one year into the Obama
administration. The USA conducted various security policies, including
discussions about the Afghan war, nuclear cooperation, and environmen-
tal politics. Within the policy discourse, the development, democracy, and
instability themes were articulated. India was constructed as unstable due
to its connection with Pakistan, but also an indispensable, a liberal country,
an innovative competitor, and as a friend. The USA had to renew itself as a
leader but also share responsibilities with regard to the environment. These
tropes made intelligible US security policies toward India. They opened up
a space for establishing several other initiatives, as the next section shows.
CENTERS OF INFLUENCE AND DIALOGUES: INDIA HAS

RISEN
After Obama’s first year in office, the US policy discourse enabled the
rebuilding of the US economy and its engagement with others in an
increasingly integrated world through the institutionalization of the
US-India strategic dialogue on a broad range of issues and a deepened col-
laboration on global security, in particular the Asia-Pacific. Various tropes
continued to be articulated and new ones emerged. One rearticulated
trope was the language of competition. Referring to the gridlock between
the Democrats and Republicans in Congress, President Obama said in his
State of the Union:
How long should we wait? How long should America put its future on
hold? You see, Washington has been telling us to wait for decades, even as
the problems have grown worse. Meanwhile, China’s not waiting to revamp
its economy. Germany’s not waiting. India’s not waiting. These nations
aren’t standing still. These nations aren’t playing for second place. They’re
putting more emphasis on math and science. They’re rebuilding their infra-
structure. They are making serious investments in clean energy because they
want those jobs. Well I do not accept second-place for the United States of
America (2010d).
The USA was represented as needing to maintain its first-place position;

the time for action was now. The competition with other actors resembled
a sporting match where each country strived at becoming number one. As
Obama said, “[w]e can win this competition” (2010g). This sports anal-
ogy was also used in other instances. In Friedman’s 2005 book on global
competition, which the Bush administration intertextually referred to, an
analogy was drawn between the unexpected US Basketball Team’s loss
in the 2004 Olympic Games and the US global position. The USA was
articulated as complacent and lacking any ambition as the rest of the world
was learning and catching up in fields the USA was used to dominating
(Friedman 2005, 250–251).
The language of the USA as “number one” was often invoked. The USA
had an exceptional status that now seemed to fade.13 President Obama
stressed at a town hall meeting that “I don’t want to cede our future to
China and India and European countries. I’m not willing to settle for
second place, not for the United States of America” (2010h).14 President
Obama also said at the college in North Carolina, “[I]n the race for the
future, America is in danger of falling behind […] In a generation, we have

fallen from 1st place to 9th place in the proportion of young people with
college degrees. When it comes to high school graduation rates, we’re
ranked 18th out of 24 industrialized nations—18th […] We lag behind
other nations in the quality of our math and science education” (2010g).15
This was also rearticulated by others within the US media discourse. Under
the headline of “We’re No. 11!” Michael Hirsh asks in Newsweek, “[H]
as the United States lost its oomph as a superpower?” since it was not in
the top 10 of 100 best countries to live in (2010). In “We’re No. 1(1)!”
Friedman also discusses the problems of school performances. He wrote
that this is part of a larger issue: a problem of values where nobody takes
responsibility and everybody blames each other (2010).16
The USA was also represented as lacking in innovation. President
Obama said that the “world has changed” as billions of people in India
and China were “suddenly plugged into the world economy” through the
revolutions in communications, technology, and commerce, which cre-
ated fierce competition (2010g). In That Used To Be Us: How America
Fell Behind in the World It Invented and How We Can Come Back, Thomas
Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum write that after the fall of the Berlin
Wall, the USA misunderstood the global environment (2011, 14). The
USA underinvested while India and China were the new competitors in
a globalized world due to their work ethic, cheap labor, and new tech-
nology. Embracing the Western market model, the competitors became
more like the USA. In the meantime, the USA was represented as com-
placent and cocky (Friedman and Mandelbaum 2011, 17–19). President
Obama also said, “Now, in the last century, America was that place where
innovation happened and jobs and industry always took root. The busi-
ness of America was business. Our economic leadership in the world
went unmatched. Now it’s up to us to make sure that we maintain that
leadership in this century” (2010g). The USA had thus been a front-
runner of modernity and progress in the past, but it now needed again to
“outinnovate, outeducate, and outbuild the rest of the world” since “to
get there, we can’t just stand still” (Obama 2011a).
The language of decline also emerged. In Congress the discussion was
about the decline of jobs, the decline in neighborhoods through fore-
closures, and the economic turndown. Accordingly, President Obama
argued that the US administration had to act following this economic
meltdown because “[w]e couldn’t accept a future that was marked by
decline” (2010j). President Obama also said that “it’s become fashionable
in some quarters to question whether the rise of these nations will accom-
pany the decline of American and European influence around the world.
Perhaps, the argument goes, these nations represent the future, and the
time for our leadership is passed. That argument is wrong. The time for
our leadership is now” (2011c). Within the US media and academic dis-
courses, authors such as Friedman and Mandelbaum indeed claim that
there was an urgency because the USA was in a “slow decline” which had
not been very obvious to the casual observer and therefore, could be easily
refuted (2011, 8). They add, “Our problem is not China, and our solution
is not China. Our problem is us—what we are doing and not doing, how
our political system is functioning and not functioning, which values we
are and are not living by” (2011, 13). The language of decline was thus
connected to the USA as an increasingly weak nation, lacking the proper
morals and engagement. It was also linked to the rise of others. As men-
tioned earlier, Hillary Clinton claimed that the Asia-Pacific had become a
“key driver of global politics” (2011a). One scholar who was particularly
associated with this viewpoint was Fareed Zakaria. In fact, Bruce Jones,
a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, commented, “[T]he debate
says either Fareed Zakaria, yes, we’re in decline or, no, we’re still num-
ber one” (2011, 6). In his book The Post-American World, Zakaria writes
that it is “about the rise of everyone else” rather than US decline, but he
presents the USA as a power which will not dominate the globe in the
twenty-first century (2011, 1). There is a shift of power to other countries,
in other words, a “post-American world, one defined and directed from
many places and by many people” (Zakaria 2011, 4).17
At the same time, the Americans were also presented as disappointed.
In the 2010 and 2011 State of the Unions, President Obama said that
many Americans were “angry” and were harboring “frustrations” about
the lack of jobs as change had not come quickly enough (2010d, 2011a).
Various members of Congress, including Representative Rob Wittman
(VA-1), also discussed people’s actual frustration with the government.
As he stated, “People out there are anxious. They are concerned. They
are frustrated. They are telling me, as well as the rest of the Congress,
get to work, start creating jobs and start turning this economy around”
(Wittman 2009). However, Obama said in the 2011 State of the Union
that it should not “discourage” the Americans: “Remember, for all the
hits we’ve taken these last few years, for all the naysayers predicting our
decline, America still has the largest, most prosperous economy in the
world” (2011a). The world had thus changed, but the US economy
remained exceptional. President Obama said,
We are the home of the world’s best universities, the best research facilities,
the most brilliant scientists, the brightest minds, some of the hardest work-
ing, most entrepreneurial people on Earth, right here in America. It’s in our
DNA. Think about it. People came from all over the world to live here in
the United States. That’s been our history. And those were the go-getters,
the risk takers who came here. The folks who didn’t want to take risks, they
stayed back home (2010g).
It was made self-evident that the USA could bounce back since it was
inherent to its liberal identity, its DNA, to be the best and to take risks as
a settler society built on immigrants from all over the world. As Obama
added at the State of the Union, “Sustaining the American Dream has
never been about standing pat. It has required each generation to sacrifice
and struggle and meet the demands of a new age. And now it’s our turn”
(2011a). To achieve the American dream of upward mobility, Americans
should thus continue to compete. The USA was constructed as a unique
and successful society because it was “distinguished by the openness of
its economy, society and politics. Its engines of renewal are competition,
mobility and immigration” (Huntington 1988, 89). Indeed, President
Barack Obama started referring to Robert Kagan’s book The World
America Made, which argued that America’s military and economic power
remains large and China will not soon overtake it, although eventually the
USA will face decline similar to the Roman Empire (2012a). Based on
Kagan’s article “Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of American Decline”,
President Obama stated in his 2012 State of the Union address, “Anyone
who tells you that America is in decline or that our influence has waned,
doesn’t know what they’re talking about” (Kagan 2012b; Obama 2012a).
Two competing narratives, isolationist and liberal, emerged in dealing
with the rising powers or “centers of influence”.18 As part of the isolation-
ist standpoint, Obama remarked at the Democratic National Committee
Fundraiser in New York City, “[W]e now live in a world where America is
facing stiff competition for good jobs. There are rapidly growing nations
like China and India; they’re hungry; they’re on the move” (2011d).
Also, they are subsidizing “much more aggressively” (Obama 2011b). On
the stump, President Obama also claimed during election time that Mitt
Romney’s firms were “‘pioneers’ in the outsourcing of American jobs to
places like China and India” (2012b). Outsourcing was constructed as an
unpatriotic act as former “poor” countries were suddenly able to advance.
Accordingly, the Democratic Party platform advocated insourcing by
giving tax breaks and “betting on American workers who are making
American products we sell to the world that are stamped with three proud
words: Made in America” (2012). In fact, in a jobs speech at a manufac-
turing plant in New Hampshire in 2012, Vice President Joe Biden made
use of an Indian accent: “Even call centres which rushed overseas in the
hundreds of thousands. How many times you get to go: ‘I like to talk to
you about your credit card?’” (Lavender 2012). Biden made fun of the
Indians by infantilizing the workers.
These narratives were also produced in Congress. During the 2010
congressional elections, there were many ads about China and a few on
India, including one in which Senator Barbara Boxer (D-NY) accused her
competitor, Carly Fiorina, former Chief Executive at Hewlett-Packard, of
outsourcing jobs to “Shanghai instead of San Jose, Bangalore instead of
Burbank”, as they are “proudly stamping her products ‘Made in China’”
(Chen 2010). The Indian migrant also slowly started to be portrayed as
the scapegoat: the undeserving but competitive Other. In discussing the
immigration bill and the increase in visa fees, Senator Charles Schumer
(D-NY) called large Indian IT company Infosys Technologies, based in
the USA, a “chop shop”, which referred to a company that dismantled
stolen cars and then resold it (Sharma 2010). During congressional dis-
cussions, he retracted this comment, but he then referred to particular IT
companies as “body shops”, in contrast to Microsoft, IBM, and Intel, in
which expensive workers are replaced by low-cost engineers. According
to Schumer, the visa program allowed companies to recruit foreign work-
ers and compete for the H-1B visas with a cap at 65,000 per year, but
they brought in cheaper foreign engineers (Schumer 2010).19 The H-1B
visa holders were reduced to bodies, while the quintessential “American
worker” was affected by this.
Nevertheless, protectionism was also juxtaposed against the US lib-
eral subject-position. As President Obama said at the Indian parliament
in New Delhi, “[w]e can resist the protectionism that stifles growth and
innovation. The United States remains – and will continue to remain –
one of the most open economies in the world” (2010a). Competition was
“potentially healthy” as it will “keep America on its toes” (Obama 2010f).
Obama referred to Adam Smith by saying in London that “[t]here is no
greater generator of wealth and innovation than a system of free enterprise
[…] That’s why countries like China, India, and Brazil are growing so
rapidly, because in fits and starts, they are moving toward market-based
principles that the United States and the United Kingdom have always
embraced” (Obama 2011c). The USA and the UK were represented as
the front-runners of capitalism, while the others were following in their

footsteps.
As one of the “rising powers”, India’s subject-position was also pre-
sented as an honest broker aside from a cutthroat competitor for jobs.
President Obama said at the US-India Business and Entrepreneurship
summit in Mumbai, “[T]here still exists a caricature of India as a land of
call centers and back offices that cost American jobs” (2010k). Obama
also said that he did not see outsourcing as a “bogeyman” although “both
countries are operating on some stereotypes that have outlived their use-
fulness” (2010l). President Obama added, “[T]hese old stereotypes, these
old concerns ignore today’s reality: In 2010, trade between our countries
is not just a one-way street of American jobs and companies moving to
India. It is a dynamic, two-way relationship that is creating jobs, growth,
and higher living standards in both our countries” (2010k). In other
words, the narrative of progress was central within the liberal globaliza-
tion discourse as free trade was said to create a better life for all (Weldes
2001, 651). The world could only be prosperous when it was a liberal
one which was conducive to free trade. There was a “win-win situation”
as there was reciprocity in prosperity since India was the “fastest growing
region in the world” (Obama 2010f). As Mahbubani writes in The New
Asian Hemisphere, “The number of people in the world who are seek-
ing the western dreams of a comfortable middle-class existence has never
been higher. For centuries, the Chinese and Indians could not aspire to it.
Now more and more believe that it is within their reach. Their ideal is to
achieve what America and Europe achieved. They want to replicate, not
dominate, the West” (2008, 5). The USA had thus remade the world in its
own image. The audience was interpellated into the liberal globalization
discourse while the alternative of isolationism was rejected.
The US policy discourse also represented India as innovative. In fact,
this could be observed in American advertisements and popular culture.
A 2009 Intel ad shows the Indian-American computer architect and co-
inventor of the USB, Ajay Bhatt, walking into a laboratory and being
cheered and celebrated by other workers. The ad ends with this catch
phrase, “Our rock stars aren’t like your rock stars”. In American TV series,
including The Big Bang Theory (2007–) and Heroes (2006–2010), Indians
are portrayed as researchers, doctors, or people in other high positions.
Not surprisingly then, President Obama said about India and the USA at
the business and entrepreneurship summit in Mumbai: “What gives me
the most confidence about our future is our greatest resource, the drive
and ingenuity of our people: workers and entrepreneurs, students and

innovators, Indians and Americans” (2010k). Indians were represented
as an imaginative people. As President Obama said at the Indian parlia-
ment, India was “[a]n ancient civilization of science and innovation, a
fundamental faith in human progress […] And despite the skeptics who
said this country was simply too poor, or too vast, or too diverse to suc-
ceed, you surmounted overwhelming odds and became a model to the
world” (2010a). Unlike in the Cold War, India’s subject-position was
no longer rearticulated as an underdeveloped and large state resting on
the foundations of an old civilization (Rotter 2000, 82). Rather, it was
a model through the innovativeness and the “demographic dividend” of
its young people (Blake 2009). Assistant Secretary for South and Central
Asian Affairs, Robert Blake, referred to a book by Infosys founder Nandan
Nilekani entitled Imagining India—The Idea of a Renewed Nation (2010)
in which he writes that India can continue to grow in the future due to
its people’s power and its “demographic dividend”. The large popula-
tion should not be constituted as a problem but as an opportunity since
the working-age population will grow (Blake 2009; Nilekani 2010, 28,
35–36). As President Obama remarked at the Indian parliament,
Instead of slipping into starvation, you launched a Green Revolution that fed
millions. Instead of becoming dependent on commodities and exports, you
invested in science and technology and in your greatest resource, the Indian
people. And the world sees the results, from the supercomputers you build
to the Indian flag that you put on the Moon. Instead of resisting the global
economy, you became one of its engines, reforming the “Licensing Raj” and
unleashing an economic marvel that has lifted tens of millions of people from
poverty and created one of the world’s largest middle classes (2010a).
Unlike in the Cold War, India was no longer presented as a crowded

Malthusian time bomb (Nilekani 2010, 36). The Cold War construction
of vast Asian countries with hordes of hungry peasants morphed into the
idea that the Asian countries were integrated into the world economy
(Cullather 2010, 2–3). The green revolution was produced as a suc-
cess even though there was a counterdiscourse which was critical of the
achievements.20
A new lifeworld was thus articulated: India was constructed as a strong
economy through its people’s potential while India’s large poverty fig-
ures were de-emphasized. Unlike the notion of a growing middle class,
the meaning of poverty was not that easily attached anymore to India’s
subject-position. As India was constructed as innovative, Director of the
National Economic Council, Lawrence Summers, indeed argued that a
“Mumbai Consensus” could become more salient than a Washington or
Beijing Consensus. The former would be based on “the idea of a dem-
ocratic developmental state, driven not by a mercantilist emphasis on
exports, but a people-centered emphasis on growing levels of consump-
tions and a widening middle class” (2010).
Reflecting the democracy theme, the US policy discourse articulated
that it was the “people” who create a bond between the nations and cement
the relationship. President Obama said at the Indian parliament that the
relationship was “unique” because “we are two strong democracies whose
Constitutions begin with the same revolutionary words: ‘We the people’.
We are two great republics dedicated to the liberty and justice and equal-
ity of all people” (2010a). The USA and India were constructed as virtu-
ous through their people and their institutions. In fact, Secretary Clinton
referred to people-to-people relations as the core of “smart power” (Blake
2012). This is a concept coined by Nye, which entails a mixture of hard
power (for instance, coercion) and soft power (e.g. attraction and lead-
ership) (Nye 2008, x). Soft power was also attached to India’s subject-
position. Blake said that the Obama administration supported a greater
role for India in the “Asian architecture”, especially since “[i]t is natural for
India to ‘look East,’ where its soft power—long visible everywhere from
the temples of Angkor Wat and Bali to the global reach of Bollywood—is
increasingly complemented by its economic power” (Blake 2011c). Nye’s
concept of soft power was invoked to show the impact India can have on
the world. India was a model and inspiration though its emergence and
many were looking to India for leadership in the region because of every-
thing that India “contributes to – and represents to – the world” (Clinton
2010).
As part of the development theme, India was no longer merely articu-
lated as a rising power within the US policy discourse. As President Obama
said in Mumbai, “[t]he United States does not just believe, as some people
say, that India is a rising power, we believe that India has already risen. India
is taking its rightful place in Asia and on the global stage. And we see India’s
emergence as good for the United States and good for the world” (2010f).
India’s role was thus legitimized as it was “indispensable to the future that
we seek, a future of security and prosperity for all nations”; in other words,
it pursued the same universal/American aims (Obama 2010c). What was
silenced here was that India was only now constructed as a mature country;
it was disciplined into taking on Western rules while India had been an
important non-aligned country during the Cold War. In fact, it was made
self-evident that the USA helped to transform India. As the Obama admin-
istration said at the Indian parliament, “The United States not only wel-
comes India as a rising global power, we fervently support it, and we have
worked to help make it a reality” (2010a). It was the USA who decided
when a country became developed and modeled on the US image, as put
forth by the hierarchical modernization theory of the 1950s.
Similar to the Bush administration, the meaning of stability was also
predicated to India’s subject-position and its rise. The 2010 QDR sug-
gested, “[T]he United States faces a complex and uncertain security land-
scape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate. The distribution
of global political, economic, and military power is becoming more dif-
fuse. The rise of China, the world’s most populous country, and India, the
world’s largest democracy, will continue to shape an international system
that is no longer easily defined” (Department of Defense 2010). India
was thus represented as one of the forces of change; however, Deputy
Secretary of State James Steinberg also said,
In the past, the emergence of new powers placed enormous stress on the
international system. Because power was seen as a zero sum game, the rise
of new powers was viewed as inherent threat to the status quo. But in the
twenty-first century, the emergence of India as strong, stable, democratic
and outwardly looking global player with global interests has the potential
to enhance the effectiveness of the international system and the security and
well-being of all, in a positive sum game (2009).
Juxtaposing India against the other militant rising powers, the Obama
administration constructed Asia as volatile while India was represented
as stable and as an “important cornerstone” for the whole Indian Ocean
region (Rhodes 2010). Geoffrey Pyatt, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary at the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, also said that
“amid the democratic transformation of Egypt and the continuing unrest
in Bahrain, Libya and Yemen, India’s value as an anchor of democratic sta-
bility in the Indian Ocean region has only increased” (2011). “[A]nchor”
and “cornerstone” were thus metaphors for India’s stability. Pyatt stressed
India’s vital role by referring to Robert Kaplan’s book In Monsoon: the
Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. Kaplan contends that the
Greater Indian Ocean “may comprise a map as iconic to the new century
as Europe was to the last one” since the Indian Ocean was surrounded by
37 countries and a lot of energy and container traffic traverses the seaways
(Kaplan 2011, xi; xiii; Pyatt 2011).
Even though India was a new force, the US policy discourse continued
to articulate the USA as an important power in Asia. When the US admin-
istration wanted to visit several countries in Asia, Deputy National Security
Advisor for Strategic Communication, Ben Rhodes, said at a press gaggle,
“We’re sending a very clear message [that] the United States sees itself as
an Asian power, see ourselves as a Pacific power, and intend to significantly
increase and deepen our engagement in the region. And, again, India is
fundamental to that effort” (2010). The USA was playing a “leadership
role in Asia” (Obama 2010a). This role was legitimized since the USA was
constructed as a “Pacific power”, but its role was also naturalized in other
ways. In Clinton’s article “America’s Pacific Century”, she said, “At a time
when the region is building a more mature security and economic archi-
tecture to promote stability and prosperity, US commitment there is essen-
tial. It will help build that architecture and pay dividends for continued
American leadership well into this century, just as our post-World War II
commitment” (2011a). The article’s title alluded to founder of Time and
Life magazine, Henry Luce, and his phrase, “the American Century” who
argued in 1941 that the USA should assume global leadership (Halliwell
and Morley 2008, 9). The USA had thus lost a bit of its influence, but it
still should spread its liberal institutions and remake Asia’s regional order.21
In fact, President Obama spoke again at the Ohio State University about
an “American Century” in 2012 because no country could play the same
role in global affairs (2012c).22 Even though more countries were taking
on “responsibilities of leadership”, the USA was “at the hub of it, making
it happen” as it was “indispensable” and “exceptional” (Obama 2012d).
India and the USA started to be normalized as leaders within the US
policy discourse. President Obama argued in the news conference with
Prime Minister Singh, “[O]urs is no ordinary relationship. As the world’s
two largest democracies, as large and growing free market economies, as
diverse, multiethnic societies with strong traditions of pluralism and toler-
ance, we have not only an opportunity, but also a responsibility to lead”
(Obama 2010l). Since they were both constituted as exceptional leading
powers, the USA wanted to share its responsibilities with India. When
the Obama administration announced that India should become a perma-
nent member in the United Nations Security Council, President Obama
indeed said that “with increased power comes increased responsibility”,

paraphrasing Roosevelt’s famous claim that “great power involves great
responsibility” (Obama 2010a; Roosevelt 1945). The USA and India
were represented as countries whose duty was to work toward “global
public goods” which were liberal Democratic goods, as supported by the
USA as a benign hegemon (Steinberg 2009).
Following the non-alignment theme, however, there were also other
understandings of India, such as the articulation of India as avoiding
responsibilities on the global scene. The Obama administration said at
the Indian parliament, for instance, “Faced with such gross violations of
human rights [in Burma], it is the responsibility of the international com-
munity–especially leaders like the United States and India –to condemn it.
And if I can be frank, in international fora, India has often shied away from
some of these issues” (2010a). Juxtaposing India against the US respon-
sible leadership, India lacked the courage to stand up for “its ideals”. It
was made common-sensible that the USA did shoulder its responsibilities,
and this was what great powers should do: India did not behave as a great
power. India was constructed as not being ambitious enough and hanging
too much back when important decisions needed to be taken in global
politics. Underlying these statements is the assumption that power politics
is the natural mode of foreign policy-making for states. India was interpel-
lated into a US policy discourse of power politics.23 India should, thus,
not hide anymore behind its non-alignment or strategic autonomy. In
fact, a 2012 strategy document on Indian foreign policy, entitled “Non-
alignment 2.0”, was published, which had little to say about the USA
(Khilnani et al. 2012). Burns therefore said,
Some Americans, for their part, worry that it is India which “self-hyphenates”
[…] that India sometimes has a hard time realizing how far its influence
and its interests have taken it beyond its immediate neighborhood […] that
India doesn’t always see as clearly as others do how vital its own role in Asia
is becoming. Some Americans worry that India is ambivalent about its own
rise in the world, still torn between its G-77 and G-20 identities. And some
Americans wonder if India has the drive to overcome obstacles to its own
ambitious development efforts (2010a).
India was not merely being held back by reticence but also by its bureau-
cratic way of governing and the “license raj” with its various trade barriers
(Burns 2010a). As Burns said, “[i]ts very ambitious development pro-
grams, are going to hinge to a large extent on cutting through some very
bad habits of bureaucratic red tape and bureaucratism over a number of
years. It’s going to take time to cut through that” (Burns 2010b). India
was thus articulated as a slow-moving country.
India’s leadership was still important for the world’s future as a vibrant
democracy. As Clinton said,
There are still obstacles to overcome and questions to answer on both sides,
but the United States is making a strategic bet on India’s future – that
India’s greater role on the world stage will enhance peace and security, that
opening India’s markets to the world will pave the way to greater regional
and global prosperity, that Indian advances in science and technology will
improve lives and advance human knowledge everywhere, and that India’s
vibrant, pluralistic democracy will produce measurable results and improve-
ments for its citizens and inspire others to follow a similar path of openness
and tolerance (2011a).
India was a place to bet on. The US administration asked the audience to
imagine the possibilities of a US-India global strategic partnership which
was “founded on a shared values and exceptional people-to-people ties”
but was also a “long-term project” which cannot be taken for granted
(Hormats 2011).
From 2010 until 2012, the Obama administration thus rebuilt itself
and engaged others through the US-India strategic dialogue, through
the discussions in Asia-Pacific forums, and through its support of India’s
claim to the UN Security Council seat. Within the policy discourse, the
USA was either represented as a liberal leader who would bounce back
or a declining power which was losing its number-one position to China
and India, in other words, a clash between liberalism and protectionism.
As part of the development theme, India was constructed as an innovative
country which had already risen and no longer the crowded Malthusian
time bomb. These understandings clashed with counterdiscursive articu-
lations: India as a cutthroat competitor with its underpaid and unpatriotic
H-1B visa claimants. Even if India was articulated as a competitor, the
instability theme hardly emerged as India was represented as a stable and
important within a volatile Asia-Pacific region. The non-alignment theme
did return concerning India’s lack of global leadership, but this would
also change within the second Obama administration, as the next section
discusses.
MODI AND REBALANCING TO ASIA: RESPONSIBLE POWERS

During the second Obama administration, the USA initially focused on
the strategic and commercial dialogue. With Prime Minister Modi’s elec-
tion in 2013, the USA and India also discussed other initiatives, includ-
ing the rebalancing program as part of the US security framework. The
language of “American leadership” became more salient within the policy
discourse as the language of decline disappeared. The USA was continu-
ously articulated as the power that should lead. The 2015 NSS boldly
asserted that the USA will “lead” others “with purpose”, “with strength”,
and “by example” but also “with all the instruments of US power” and
“with a long-term perspective” (Obama 2015b, 2–4). Referring to the
US role in the past with the Industrial Revolution and the Second World
War, the document saw an opportunity to shape global politics: “As we
did after World War II, we must pursue a rules-based international system
that can advance our own interests by serving mutual interests” (Obama
2015b, 9). This was not a neutral order, but it displayed an “American
world order”, in which the rules were laid down by the USA. This was
also reflected in the discussion about global trade. In his weekly address
in February 2015, President Obama emphasized that American workers
and businesses should be either protected or promoted: “We should seize
those opportunities. We should make sure the future is written by us.
And if we do, we won’t just keep creating good new jobs for decades
to come—we’ll make sure that this century is another all-American cen-
tury” (Obama 2015d). Juxtaposed against Clinton’s 2011 statement that
“much of the history of the 21st century will be written in Asia”, the
Obama administration aimed for an era of new possibilities. If not, “China
is trying to write the rules for trade in the 21st century” (Obama 2015d).
The USA also continued to be articulated as a “Pacific power” in the
2015 NSS (Obama 2015b, 24). Unlike the Asian countries, the USA was
presented as most concerned with stability and peacefulness in Asia simi-
larly to the Bush administration. There was lots of economic growth in
Asia but also “security dynamics in the region” which needed American
guidance. The NSS noted, “American leadership will remain essential to
shaping the region’s long-term trajectory to enhance stability and security,
facilitate trade and commerce through an open and transparent system,
and ensure respect for universal rights and freedoms” (Obama 2015b,
24). What was silenced was that the Asian countries were also concerned
with the common good; they were again merely seen to have passionate
territorial and often undemocratic pursuits. Asian countries needed to be

nurtured and disciplined into good behavior. The USA was represented
as the responsible, independent judge with good intentions rather than an
imperialist. In fact, Hillary Clinton already claimed in 2011 that “[t]he
region is eager for our leadership and our business—perhaps more so than
at any time in modern history. We are the only power with a network of
strong alliances in the region, no territorial ambitions, and a long record
of providing for the common good” (2011a). This obscured past events:
the USA did create unrest and had territorial ambitions in Asia, as the
prolonged Vietnam Wars in the 1950s until 1970s and the US colonial
possession of the Philippines attested to.
As part of the instability theme, India was also one of the “respon-
sible rising powers” among the Asian nations as it remained the corner-
stone for stability (Obama 2015b, 1). It was rendered intelligible that
there were not merely threatening and revisionist powers in this world.
Unlike revisionist powers, India would also uphold the international order
together with the USA. Earlier, India was articulated as a country which
avoided responsibilities, but this was destined to change. India’s “respon-
sible advancement serves as a positive example for developing nations, and
provides an opportunity for increased economic, scientific, environmental,
and security partnership” (Obama 2015b, 43). In the joint statement,
President Obama and Prime Minister Modi also said on September 29,
2014, “We will support an open and inclusive rules-based global order,
in which India assumes greater multilateral responsibility, including in a
reformed United Nations Security Council. At the United Nations and
beyond, our close coordination will lead to a more secure and just world”
(Obama 2014a). India was envisioned to be an active rising power, and it
had become one within an American “rule-based global order”.
Like the first Obama administration, the administration also claimed
that the “people-to-people ties” were even more important than the
government-to-government relations. After a meeting with Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh in September 2013, President Obama men-
tioned again “people-to-people ties” by discussing the contributions made
by Indian Americans, such as businessmen, academics, and scientists, but
also the 2014 Miss America of Indian-American origins (Obama 2013c).
Nevertheless, the administration did not interpellate all audiences into this
understanding as the liberal subject-position clashed with the protection-
ist one. The problem construction of the H-1B visa procedure and its
“abuse” by foreign nationals continued to gain salience due to counterdis-
cursive understandings. As mentioned earlier, the hearings by the Senate

Judiciary Committee juxtaposed the “skilled American workers” against
its foreign counterpart (Grassley 2015). Referring to underpaid Indian
nationals at the IT company Electronics for Imaging, Chairman Senator
Chuck Grassley (R-IO) argued that the focus should be “on our country’s
immigration policies and the need for reforms to better protect American
workers” (Grassley 2015, 1; Moore 2015). Within the media discourse,
these articulations were also voiced. Quintessential “American companies”
and their “American workers” were said to be affected by Indian replace-
ments, including Walt Disney World, Toys “R” Us, Southern California
Edison, and New York Life Insurance Company (Preston 2015). Even
though President Obama argued that “high-skilled immigrants, gradu-
ates, and entrepreneurs […] [should] stay and contribute to our economy,
as so many business leaders have proposed”, these tensions would remain
difficult to resolve (2014c).
CONCLUSION
The Clinton and Bush administrations had made new inroads due to
their increased interest in India. Under the Obama administration, the
close relations continued. In fact, one could ask whether the Obama
administration was as interested in India as its predecessors. Nevertheless,
President Obama referred to India as a partner “for global security”
(2010b).
Various security policies toward India were enacted during the Obama
administration. While there were many official visits in both countries, the
USA and India also conducted talks on environmental politics, renewed
their defense framework, and established a strategic dialogue which
focused on broad strategic and commercial issues. In addition, the USA
pursued Asian-wide and global initiatives through, for instance, its sup-
port for India’s seat in the UN Security Council. Accordingly, the US
policy discourse stretched the concept of security. Some issues contin-
ued to be articulated as security issues, such as environmental problems.
However, new security issues also emerged, such as food security and edu-
cation. The “security issues” also deepened as the referent object was not
merely the state but “global security” as a thing that needed to be secured.
The US-India security relations were articulated within a wider Asian and
global context.
These security policies were made possible by various representations.

The development theme became even more salient: the meaning of pov-
erty was rarely attached to India’s subject-position. During the Bush Jr.
administration, India was already constructed as an unfair competitor, but
it was now also articulated as a country which had already risen. India was
also presented as a stable and liberal country in a volatile region among
China and Pakistan. In fact, it was a model to other countries through its
innovation, responsibility, and its people’s power. The USA was seen to
compete with India and China to stay number one; otherwise, it risked
decline. The USA was also constructed as a strong country which could
face competition and renew itself as part of its liberal identity. It carved
out a large role for itself in Asia as a leading Pacific power and it wanted
to share some responsibilities with India. All in all, the USA envisioned a
different lifeworld which enabled the USA to place a bet on India.
NOTES
1. This was not necessarily reflected by the Obama administration’s choice in
advisers: many of them were active during the Clinton administration,
including former National Security adviser Anthony Lake, but also other
advisors such as Strobe Talbott and Assistant Secretary for South Asian
Affairs Karl Inderfurth and Vice-President Joe Biden as a past Senator.
They all had spoken for or against non-proliferation and Indo-Pakistan
conflicts (In Gould 2010, 112). On the other hand, President Obama also
appointed for the first time an Indian American, Nisha Desai Biswal, as
head of the South Asia Bureau in the State Department in 2013.
2. The US-India trade have continued to expand from 2000 to 2014: India’s
import from the USA has grown sixfold, while its export to the USA has
quadrupled. In 2000, US export to India was $3667.3 and US import
equaled $10,686.6, while in 2014, they amounted to $21,607.5 and
$45,244.0, respectively (US Census 2014).
3. Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Robert
O. Blake Jr. also listed these five pillars, namely strategic cooperation; sci-
ence, technology, health, and innovation; energy and climate change; edu-
cation and development; economics, trade, and agriculture (Blake 2009).
4. Pant summarizes several of the Obama administration’s initiatives on non-
proliferation: the G8 statement at the L’Aquila summit in 2009 about
strengthening controls on enrichment and reprocessing items and technol-
ogy as part of the NSG discussions; the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit
where the Obama administration discussed the securing of vulnerable fis-
sile materials by keeping it away from terrorist groups; and the new
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed by the USA and Russia (2011,
3–6).
5. Initially, there was no provision in the 1962 Indian Atomic Energy Act
about nuclear liability in case of a nuclear incident, which meant that it was
unclear who was liable.
6. During the 2010 US-India dialogue, various security issues were discussed,
such as non-proliferation, export controls, food security, counterterrorism
cooperation, civil space cooperation, clean energy and climate change,
cybersecurity, defense cooperation, education, economic and financial
partnerships, CEO forum and entrepreneurs round tables, export and
investment initiatives, nuclear security, development collaboration in
Afghanistan, and safeguarding sea, air, and space (Department of State
2010b).
7. In the 2011 US-India strategic dialogue they discussed defense, security,
and counterterrorism (e.g. homeland security, cybersecurity, counterter-
rorism, and maritime bilateral exchanges); civil nuclear cooperation; mem-
bership of export control regimes (e.g. the NSG); export control
cooperation; nuclear security; strategic security dialog; prosperity (for
instance, trade, aviation, and agriculture); women’s empowerment; educa-
tion, innovation, science and technology; and space (Department of State
2011).
8. Some security issues also partly moved to the realm of private enterprises.
In 2012, a memorandum was drawn between the Nuclear Power
Corporation of India, Ltd. and Westinghouse which said it wanted to work
toward an agreement such as site developments in India. The aim was
eventually to create a nuclear power plant in Gujarat even though India’s
nuclear liability regime remained a problem for US companies (Schaffer
and Schaffer 2012). Also, the Indian Air Force announced on April 27,
2011, that it was short listing two European companies for a very large
military aircraft deal excluding four other candidates including two US
companies: Boeing with the F-18 and Lockheed-Martin with the F-16.
The US administration was surprised by this announcement (Schaffer
2011b).
9. The Indians did find terrorism equally important. During Obama’s visit to
India on January 25, Modi said that terrorism was the “global threat”
which needed a “global strategy” to tackle it as “[t]here should be no dis-
tinction between terrorist groups” (Obama 2015c). For the Indians, there
was no difference between Pakistan-based terror groups, including
Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the US interest in Al-Qaeda and now the Islamic
State (Mohan 2015b).
10. As a long-time member of the militant Hindu wing of the BJP, the
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Chief Minister Modi had been
accused of a possible role in the communal riots in Gujarat in 2002 because

it raised the question whether he could have stopped or slowed down the
killings. A train with Hindu pilgrims had caught fire of whom around 60
people died, which was then followed by attacks on Muslims. The riot left
2000 people dead, mostly Muslims. In 2005, the USA imposed a visa ban
until 2014. As a regional and therefore unimportant politician and a politi-
cian and a person against whom a part of the US-based Indian community
lobbied against, he was denied a visa. The State Department made use of
an obscure law passed in 1998 which made visas unavailable to foreign
officials engaged in “severe violations of religious freedom” (Mann 2014).
In the meantime, the Indian Supreme Court reopened 2000 cases in 2004,
and it found over 30 people guilty in 2011, but it refused to prosecute
Modi several times due to insufficient evidence. In September 2014, the
US court issued summons on behalf of two Indian plaintiffs, but Modi
enjoyed immunity as a head of the state.
11. Mohan notes that Prime Minister Modi’s standpoint on environmental
issues is a change in Indian policy—India did not want to participate in
environmental forums earlier (2015b).
12. Referring to renewal, the Obama administration also proclaimed in the
2011 State of the Union that “our success in this new and changing world
will require reform, responsibility, and innovation […] And because we’ve
begun this work, tonight we can say that American leadership has been
renewed and America’s standing has been restored” (Obama 2011a).
13. In fact, when asked at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit about
his views on US exceptionalism, Obama answered, “I believe in American
exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exception-
alism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism” (2009n).
14. This is an old trope. There has been a public debate about US declining
status in the past (See Rachman 2011).
15. Obama referred to more of these rankings: “The other thing that was hap-
pening was that we were becoming less competitive internationally, so
manufacturing jobs were moving overseas. You saw countries like China
and India and Brazil investing heavily in their education systems and in
infrastructure. And where we used to be ranked number one, for example,
in the proportion of college graduates, we now rank number 12” (2010i).
16. The language of number one was also invoked during other administra-
tions but in different contexts. On the 2007 cover of The Economist, it
read, “Still No. 1”, next to a drawing of Uncle Sam ready to punch any
contender. Even though problems of Iraq affected the USA, it was still
reproduced as the “dominant superpower” (The Economist 2007).
17. About the power shift, Zakaria argues that the world has experienced three
“tectonic power shifts” in politics, economics, and culture during the last
500 years: there was a shift of power to the West during the Renaissance
accompanied by changes in science, commerce, and industrial revolutions;
a shift to power toward the USA, which turned it into a superpower, domi-
nating global economics, politics, science, and culture; and currently, a
shift of power toward other countries, which creates a world where all
countries can play a role (2011, 1–5).
18. In fact, President Obama said, “[T]here’s going to be a tug of war within
the USA between those who see globalization as a threat and want to
retrench and those who accept that we live in an open, integrated world”
(2010f).
19. There had been an incident in December 2013, in which Indian diplomat
Devyani Khobragade had been arrested and strip-searched. She was
accused of providing false documents in order to get a work visa for her
housekeeper who received much less than the minimum legal wage. This
caused outrage within the Indian government as it was “shocked and
appalled” (Harris 2013). Soon after the US Ambassador to India, Nancy
Powell, resigned, the Department of State gave her diplomatic immunity
and the opportunity to return to India.
20. The technology behind the green revolution was developed by scientists
from the Rockefeller Foundation, the US Department of Agriculture, and
the Mexican government to maximize crop production through plant
breeding, pesticides, and chemical fertilizers. Early critics argue that there
had been a large increase in food production, but it did not produce an
improvement in the well-being of the poor peasants. More recent research
shows mixed results (Hazell and Ramasamy 1991; David and Otsuka
1994).
21. The Asian order can be shaped in various ways. Focusing on the USA and
China as the main powers, David Shambaugh argues that there are seven
potential models with regard to the Asian order. Since the end of the
Vietnam War, the USA was mainly pursuing a “hubs and spokes” model,
creating alliances with various countries in the region (2005, 12–17).
22. Presidential candidate Mitt Romney also called for an “American Century”,
demanding the expansion of naval and missile defense systems and a closer
relationship with Israel in November 2011 (Rucker 2011).
23. According to Chacko, these assumptions can also be found in the Indian
foreign policy literature; quite a few authors, such as Mohan and Pant,
argue that India should have a more realist foreign policy (2012, 2–3).
CHAPTER 7
Conclusion
The USA and India have moved relations forward at a pace which would
have been unimaginable a few decades ago. As President Obama stated
during his visit to India in January 2015, “I realize that the sight of an
American President as your chief guest on [India’s] Republic Day would
have once seemed unimaginable. But my visit reflects the possibilities of
a new moment” (2015e). This book discusses how this “moment” came
about through shifts in the policy discourse: new meanings were fixed to
India’s subject-position which made possible policy change. Surprisingly
then, not as much has been written about US foreign policy toward India in
comparison to, for example, China or Japan. There is a tendency to focus on
other Asian countries even though large changes took place with regard to
US-India relations. About the 2005 civilian nuclear agreement, for instance,
one commentator said it was not the “Treaty of Versailles, or even the Camp
David Accord”, but it was a “transformative development” (Adam 2015).
Throughout the chapters, this book uncovers how the relations intensi-
fied under the Clinton, Bush Jr., and Obama administrations. During the
Cold War, US-India relations were often marked by oscillations as India
mostly received attention during grave international crises, but the USA
showed a more sustained interest in India from the late 1990s onward.
The changing security policies were reflected by several initiatives, includ-
ing President Obama’s support for India’s permanent seat in the Security
Council in 2010 and a broad strategic dialogue which was institutional-
ized in the same year. Before him, President Clinton became personally

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54862-7_7
involved during the Kargil crisis in 1999, backing India against Pakistan
for the first time, and President Bush informed India in advance about his
Missile Defense Treaty, a privilege reserved for close allies. There were thus
many “firsts” in the US-India relationship. Some areas developed more
slowly, including the transfer of civilian nuclear material to India following
the civilian nuclear deal (2005–2008). Other policies were more successful,
such as the 2005 Defense Framework Agreement, which helped to advance
many joint naval exercises and growing arms sales. There were even Asian-
wide initiatives, including the Malabar exercises, which often acted as a
counterweight against China. Schaffer therefore argues that the “most dra-
matic change has been the creation of a security relationship” (2010a). Of
course, there will be setbacks between the USA and India, but there was
the potential for a “lively security relationship” (Schaffer 2010c, 5).
The general conclusion is that these changes were enabled by changing
policy discourses during the three presidencies after the Cold War, most
prominently the Clinton administration. Grounded in poststructuralism,
this book makes use of a critical constructivist approach in which phenom-
ena are seen as socially constructed. This is different from realist theories
which argue that there are so-called ideational and material factors, and
they are not intersubjectively shared. Even though conventional construc-
tivism does emphasize intersubjectively shared identities and discourse,
there are also differences between this approach and critical constructivism
as the theoretical chapter discusses. In fact, these arguments fall within
the positivist or postpositivist camps in their concern over objectivity and
causality, which is arguably one of the largest debates in the IR discipline
(Kurki 2006, 189–191).
As part of poststructuralism, critical constructivism does not merely
analyze how discourses construct social phenomena, such as actor’s iden-
tities, but also how discourse permeate power relations between actors.
Discourse naturalizes power relations by establishing the boundaries
between good/bad and inside/outside. In other words, knowledge can
produce some countries as “democratic” and “one-of-us” as opposed
to “dangerous” and “authoritarian”. The aim of the critical constructiv-
ist researcher is to “make strange” these knowledge that are taken for
granted. For example, it shows that terms, such as “United States” and
“unipolar power” or “India” and “democracy”, which both appear to be
naturally connected, are actually socially constructed. The constructions
are deconstructed or denaturalized. Within the US policy discourse, the
social construction of US and Indian subject-positions, but also security
CONCLUSION 193
issues and security policies, are thus analyzed. In policy discourses, security
policies are not merely solutions to security issues: policy discourses help to
construct how a security issue and actor’s identities should be understood
and how the security issue should be solved. This is not to say that this
research makes “objective” and “neutral” statements about these social
constructions. Observers cannot step outside the discourse and analyze
the world from an external perspective, devoid of any meaning: all subjects
and objects are constituted by it. The aim is thus not replication but to
question our presuppositions in order to obtain different knowledge than
we already were aware of in our own world of meaning. In other words,
the book questions our assumptions, or social constructions, so that we
can have a different understanding of US-India relations.
Concretely, what this book demonstrates is that the Indian subject-
position was constructed differently from 1945 to 1993 in comparison
with the post-Cold War administrations: India changed from a poor, neu-
tral, and unruly country during the Truman administration into a com-
petitive, reticent but stable world power under the Obama administration.
With regard to the 1945–1993 period, the US subject-position remained
largely the same: the USA was presented as a leader and a liberal democ-
racy, which wanted to help other countries, even though it sometimes
faced difficulties. Concerning India’s subject-positions, however, the book
traces four themes: democracy, non-alignment, development, and instabil-
ity. They re-emerged at different instances and in different forms through-
out the 1945–1993 period. The instability theme included, for instance,
emotionalism and chaos, followed by a peaceful country, and a bitter and
ancient conflict, and India as a hegemon. With regard to non-alignment,
India was presented as neutral, anti-Western, difficult, a peacefully inde-
pendent country, a Soviet ally, and different. The democracy theme
referred to India as free, a great nation in terms of numbers, and a moral
power. Lastly, the development theme presented India as poor, underde-
veloped, in development, a growing industrial country, and a country with
a few economic successes and challenges.
The four themes continued to be articulated during the Clinton, Bush,
and Obama administrations: 1997 marked a watershed since there were
large changes in the development theme. Instead of a poor or developing
country with some economic successes, India was articulated as a country
with growing economic potential which was held back by conflicts. Also,
its robustly growing economy was linked to China’s economy as part of
the Kyoto Treaty. India’s economic potential and environmental issues
continued to be articulated throughout the Bush Jr. and Obama admin-

istrations. In fact, India was presented as a competitor of the USA, espe-
cially since the US subject-position was constructed as a leader in relative
decline during the Obama administration. As part of the non-alignment
theme, India also started to be articulated as a growing world power and,
in some cases, a reticent leader. The democracy theme also changed: India
was articulated as a vibrant democracy and natural ally throughout the
three administrations. India’s instability was less emphasized. During the
Bush administration, India was connected with Pakistan after 9/11, but
it was also constructed as a democratic stronghold vis-à-vis China. India
became the stable and indispensable democracy.
By showing these changes, the chapters demonstrate how policy dis-
courses enable and limit foreign policy-makers in imagining different
lifeworlds and any foreign policy options associated with it. Especially,
the development theme highlighted the boundaries to India’s construc-
tion in the policy discourse. In 1997, India started to be constructed as a
country with great economic potential which enabled a closer relationship
between the USA and India after the nuclear tests. In fact, the Clinton
administration had already presented India as such in 1994, but the US
media was not interpellated into this understanding; the meanings were
not yet common-sensible within the policy discourse. At the end of the
Bush and start of the Obama administrations, however, India had turned
into a “competitor” and an economic power which had already risen: its
large poverty problems were less articulated.
What is also striking about these changes is that the USA and India were
represented as increasingly similar throughout the decades. The US policy
discourse had remade India into its own self-image: both were produced
as stable liberal democracies with strong economies even though India may
not have such a global outlook. Nevertheless, the US policy discourse con-
tinued to draw boundaries between the Self and the Other or the USA and
India. Indian H-1B visa claimants were, for instance, constructed as unfair
competitors. Moreover, even if India is presented as an emerging economy
and competitor, it is still disciplined into becoming a developed country.
As mentioned in Chap. 2, the “colonial phantasy” often draws binaries
between the inside and outside or developed and developing. Homi Bhabha
indeed argues that the colonizers engaged in mimicry, which represents
“the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference
that is almost the same, but not quite” [Italics removed]. In other words,
India is shown to be increasingly similar, but it does not yet measure up.
CONCLUSION 195
There is the counterargument that policy change was not informed by

changing policy discourses. Alternatively, the Clinton administration tried
to adapt to a difficult situation after India’s 1998 nuclear test as the regu-
lar sanctions did not seem to work and merely tried to make the best of it.
In the long run, this led to closer US-India relations. This book only ana-
lyzes the security issues, identities, and the available policy options which
were already transformed by the discourse and not the policy-maker’s
intentions or post hoc justifications for their policies. These are ques-
tions that should be answered through the “why-question”, whereas this
research focuses on the underlying meaning structures. Nevertheless, the
President’s post hoc justification of the 1998 nuclear test could only make
sense and become accepted within a changing discourse. The President’s
articulation of India’s emergence and a US-India partnership made less
sense in 1994 than it did in 1997.
Overall, this research thus contributes to the literature on US security
policies toward India by focusing on the “how-possible” question rather
than the conventional “why-question”. Much has been said within the
literature on US security policy toward India about changing US-India
relations, but it discusses mainly explanatory variables, such as Clinton’s
and Bush’s personal initiatives or the nuclear tests and subsequent Singh–
Talbott talks. These are perfectly valid inquiries into historical events
and developments when one is interested in the agent’s perceptions.
Researchers can take social facts for granted in order to analyze a foreign
policy-maker’s viewpoint. However, this book’s contribution is that it
wants to move beyond social facts and analyze the structures of meanings
underlying the foreign policy-maker’s viewpoints. This is also the book’s
limitation because it does not provide explanations or a comprehensive,
factual overview of all the US security policies toward India. Nevertheless,
there are quite a few interesting works which discuss these issues, as men-
tioned throughout this book.
It is then surprising that the literature on US Cold War security poli-
cies toward India has shown more interest in the “how-possible” question
than the works on post-Cold War US-India relations. I discuss how the
importance of asking a “how-possible” question is shown by Muppidi.
As mentioned earlier, Muppidi’s work on India-US relations during the
Cold War demonstrates that asking “why-questions” is not sufficient for
understanding insecure India-US relations. Close US ties with Pakistan is
often brought up as an explanation, but according to Muppidi, we should
reconstruct the underlying discourses, that is, how meanings are produced
and attached to subjects, such as India. Like Muppidi, I argue that policy
discourses allowed for estranged US-India relations, but the relations con-
tinued to fluctuate during the Cold War. With the second Eisenhower and
Kennedy administrations relations improved somewhat, which became
apparent by the construction of security issues and the meanings attached
to India’s identity within the US policy discourse.
Nevertheless, the literature on US Cold War security policies toward
India shows more interest in these different constructions of India than
works on post-Cold War US security policies. As previously mentioned,
various authors discuss explanatory variables, including India’s depictions
during the Cold War. For instance, Cohen writes, “For many decades, the
image of Indians in the United States has been bimodal. At one extreme,
there were pictures of hungry children, wandering cows, naked sadhus,
ranging from the revered Mahatma Gandhi […] to Mother Teresa, and an
assortment of transient Indian gurus. American policymakers and elected
officials shared these images” (2002, 287). Kux also finds that “bejewelled
maharajahs and British colonial sahibs, impoverished beggars and fakirs,
massive demonstrations of Indian nationalists, and the complex problems
of untouchability, caste and Hindu-Muslim communalism all made for a
bewildering mélange” (1992, 4). Since “India has acquired a new ‘face’”
in the last few decades, as Cohen puts it, there was a need to further
explore the post-Cold War meanings attached to India’s identity by mak-
ing use of the “how-possible” question (2002, 287).
There are also other avenues for further research. There is, for instance,
the declinist debate within the US policy, academic and media discourse
about US decline and other countries’ emergence. Like the literature on
US security policies toward India, the “why-question” is often posed
with regard to changes in Indian and the US global positions. These
global positions and the changes thereof are taken as unproblematic. In
fact, there has been a recurrent narrative of declinism. Gideon Rachman
observes that “America has been through cycles of declinism in the past”
(2011). Josef Joffe also contends, “Every ten years, it is decline time in
the United States” (2009). In the latest declinist cycle, several authors
find that the USA was going through a slow decline as other countries
started to play a more important role in the twenty-first century (See, for
instance, Zakaria 2011 and Kupchan 2013). India came to be understood
as one of these rising powers. As Priya Chacko argues, “‘Emerging’, ‘ris-
ing’, ‘surging’, ‘blossoming’ – these are just a few of the epithets that
have become commonplace in discussions about contemporary India”
CONCLUSION 197
(2012, 1). In fact, in 2008 Cohen explained before the Subcommittee

on the Middle East and South Asia that in 1978 he and Richard Park
had written a book called India: Emergent Power? (1978) but that the
question mark has since vanished in Cohen’s new book India: Emerging
Power (2002).
By making use of the “how-possible” question, this book shows how
India indeed came to be understood as a rising power rather than a devel-
oping country, especially in relationship to US decline during the Obama
administration. It highlights that these constructions were enabled by
underlying discourses rather than any explanatory theories, such as real-
ism, liberal institutionalism, or a mixed framework. With his use of a
mixed framework, Barry Buzan’s observations are especially of interest.
In 2004, Barry Buzan was somewhat more skeptical about India’s rise,
arguing that “[m]odern India has so far failed to transcend its region”
and despite its nuclear test in 1998, “it is not talked about or treated as a
potential superpower” (2004, 71, 73). In fact, “rising powers” were often
formulated as a challenge to the superpower, in other words, a rising-as-
a-revisionist power. However, a few years later, Buzan writes that “India’s
claim for great power status is now plausible” since the global system will
become more multipolar with the increase of coalitions (2011, 1). This
shows that changing underlying discourses affect politicians and scholars
alike, which, in turn, opens up new possibilities for the USA and India. A
full-blown analysis could demonstrate how these changing insights were
made possible in relation to the declinist debate.
There are also other research areas that can be explored. This book
analyzes state-to-state relations rather than society-to-society connections,
but there are also changing representations within US society. As men-
tioned earlier, this research makes use of a somewhat traditional approach
by prioritizing the state through its policies. However, security is not
merely about the state, and it is also not merely articulated by the govern-
ment: other voices also count. Although this book refers to other sources
outside of government documents, security issues in the US media or in
popular culture could be more fully explored. There is also room for the
analysis of India’s depictions in the US media or popular culture to find
out what different meanings are attached to India’s subject-position and
how India’s subject-position has changed. Both government sources and
popular culture are worth evaluating as they help to produce and repre-
sent common-sense understandings which have been normalized within
the discourse.
Lastly, the representation of Indian Americans is another field of inter-

est. Indian Americans are often referred to as the minority model in the
US (policy) discourse, but further research could demonstrate how the
Indian Americans came to be presented as such. The Indian technology
workers and the managerial employees have become prominent in US
society (Rajan and Sharma 2006, 9). According to Rajan and Sharma,
“Silicon Valley is the most visible location of both the actual labor and
the tangible wealth of this new tech-driven immigration.” However, they
add that there are also other “equally important but less visible varieties of
South Asian labor”, such as shopkeepers, taxi drivers, priests, and students
(Rajan and Sharma 2006, 6). Especially since there are also negative repre-
sentations of Indian Americans, the representation of Indians as a minority
model should not be taken as a common-sensible understanding.
The book thus shows how discourses can enable and constrain options
available. The main aim of this research was to gain a better understanding
of how changes in US security policies toward India were made possible
during each presidency, analyzing how meanings are produced and attached
to objects such as the USA and India within policy discourse. While this
book concentrates on US security policies toward India, this analysis can
also be adopted in other researches, either foreign policy researches or
other inquiries. In fact, it can also be of interest to policy-makers. Even
though observers, including academics and policy-makers, cannot step
outside the discourse, this book wants us to ask the “how-possible” ques-
tion and to start questioning that which we take for granted, that is, our
assumptions about institutions, people, and practices. Deconstruction can
help to envision the “possibilities of a new moment”, as I mentioned at
the start of this chapter (Obama 2015e). By questioning our presupposi-
tions, this may lead to new insights, ideas, or solutions, which were not
obvious to us before.
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INDEX1
NUMBERS AND SYMBOLS 115n14, 132, 133, 142, 160,

123 agreement, 149n23 167, 182, 183, 186, 195
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), 160, 163
A Attlee, Clement, 34
Acheson, Dean, 33, 52, 78n14 Awami League, 44
Advani, L.K., 148n17
Afghanistan, 8n2, 32, 46–50, 70–3,
75, 81n44, 121, 125, 130, B
148n14, 149–50n27, 153, 157, Baghdad Pact, 78n20
162, 188n6 Bandung gathering, 38
Af–Pak plans, 157 Bangladesh, 44, 68
Agni missile, 86 Barshefsky, Charlene, 108
Albright, Madeleine, 91, 106, 107, Basham, Arthur, 63
113n3, 116n26, 140 Bhabha, Homi J., 22, 23, 80n36, 194
Althusser, Louis, 24 Bhabha, Homi K. See theory chapter
American Century, 181, 184, 190n22 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 91, 94,
American creed, 98, 117n30 105, 117n35, 121, 146n5,
Armitage, Richard, 120, 123, 125, 149n25, 154, 188n10
134 Bhutto, Benazir, 89–91
articulation, 4, 6, 11, 12, 18, 22–5, Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 46
31, 36, 37, 44, 68, 69, 73, Biden, Joseph, 115n20, 116n25
78n14, 85, 88, 89, 96, 100, 112, Binaries, 22, 64, 65, 110, 194
1
Note: Page number followed by “n” refer notes.

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54862-7
238 INDEX
Biswal, Nisha Desai, 187n1 78n13, 80n31, 80n32, 91, 93,

Blackwill, Robert, 120, 126, 131–3, 104, 108, 112, 116n23, 120,
145n3 122–4, 128, 130–5, 137, 142–5,
Blake, Robert, 159, 171, 178, 179 146n5, 147n8, 150n31, 154,
Blood, Archer, 44, 79n30 156, 158, 160–3, 166–9, 172–6,
boundaries (of the discourse), 51, 92 180, 183, 184, 187, 189n15,
Bowles, Chester, 37, 56, 78n15, 190n21, 191–4
81n47, 113n3 Civilian nuclear deal (2008), 120,
Boxer, Barbara, 176 128–30, 139, 140, 142, 145,
Brezhnev, Leonid, 45 146n5, 148n23, 153, 192
British Cabinet Mission Plan, 33, 34 Clark, Clifford, 48, 151n40
Brown, Hank, 90 Clinton, Bill, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9n6, 75, 84,
Brown amendment, 91 86–111, 114n5, 114n7, 115n17,
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 48 116n22–4, 117n27, 117n29,
Burns, Nicholas, 87, 101, 120, 117n33, 118n37, 118n38, 122,
139–41, 145n3, 148n21, 141, 159–64, 166, 171, 179,
152n44 181, 183, 184, 191, 193, 195
Burns, Williams, 156, 182, 183 Clinton, Hillary, 101, 154, 155, 160,
Burton, Dan, 85, 89, 92, 151n42 174, 185
Bush, George H.W., 45, 46, 49, 72, Clinton administration, vi, 1–3, 6–, 7,
74, 85–7, 90 9n6, 73, 83–123, 130–3, 137,
Bush, George W., 1–6, 9n6, 118n36, 143, 144, 147n7, 151n39,
119, 122–4, 126–32, 134–9, 151n42, 155, 169, 187n1, 192,
141–4, 146n4, 146n5, 148n17, 194, 195
149n23, 152n44, 187, 191–5 colonial discourse, 22, 106
Bush administration, 4, 32, 46, 49, colonialism, 22, 29, 55, 66
50, 70, 73, 82n58, 83, 112, colonial phantasies, 110, 194
114n5, 119–53, 155, 156, 162, common sense. See theory chapter
166, 167, 171, 172, 180, 184, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
186, 194 Treaty (CTBT), 3, 93, 94, 102,
Bush doctrine, 136–8, 151n41 107, 108 116n26
concept of security. See theory chapter
Congress Party/Indian Congress
C Party, 33, 52, 57, 77n11, 146n6,
Caroe, Olaf, 81n44 149n25
Carter, Jimmy, 32, 46–8, 50, 70–5, containment policy, 30, 31, 34, 36,
81n39, 145n1, 147n6 38–41, 44, 45, 49, 50, 52, 57, 73–5
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), conventional constructivism, 15, 26n3,
35, 79n29, 115n16 192
Central Treaty Organization Copenhagen climate change summit,
(CENTO), 37, 78n20 156, 167
China, 1, 13, 21, 33, 37, 40–2, 44, critical constructivism, 6, 9n7, 11, 12,
45, 52, 53, 59, 60, 64, 74, 14–18, 25, 192
INDEX 239
D foreign policy analysis, 2, 11, 12, 17,

decline/US decline, 42, 49, 144, 146, 19
168, 173–5, 184, 187, 194, 196, Foucault, Michel, 9n7, 15, 26n5
197 Friedman, Thomas, 142–4, 152n45,
Defense Framework Agreement 167, 169, 172–4
(2005), 127, 164, 192 Friends of India, 146n5
Defense Planning Guidance (1992), Fukuyama, Francis, 97
49, 72, 73, 114n5, 151n41
democracy theme, 7, 53, 58, 64, 70,
74, 75, 98, 102, 104, 132, 145, G
179, 193, 194 Gaddis, John, 8n6, 60, 137, 151n39
denaturalizing/making strange, 17 Galbraith, John, 41, 79n24
Desai, M.J., 79n24 Gandhi, Indira/Mrs. Gandhi, 43, 44,
Desai, Morarji, 47 46, 48, 80n35, 80n38, 81n39
development theme, 7, 56, 58, 59, 65, Gandhi, Mohandas/Mahatma Gandhi,
74, 99, 103, 108, 112, 130, 142, 30, 32, 49, 63, 70, 71, 75n3,
145, 179, 183, 187, 193, 194 82n53, 117n35, 196
diaspora, 8n3, 146n5 Gandhi, Rajiv, 49, 70
discourse. See theory chapter Gandhi, Sonia, 146n6
discourse analysis, 8n5, 12, 16, 31 Gates, Robert, 49
Doyle, Michael, 97 Glenn, John, 92, 113n4
Dulles, John, 40, 54, 55, 81n44 Glenn amendment, 94
Goa, 55, 79n23
Grassley, Chuck, 186
E Great Britain/United Kingdom,
East Pakistan, 44, 45, 80n30 33, 34, 176
economic reform India (1991), 43,
85, 88, 99, 138
Ehrlich, Paul, 67, 82n56 H
Eisenhower, Dwight, 31, 37, 38, 40, Hadley, Stephen, 120
50, 54, 55, 58–64, 66, 67, 73–5, Hall, Stuart, 23
78n20, 196 Hamilton, Lee, 67
estrangement/estranged, 29, 31, 73, Harriman, Averell, 79n27
74, 75n1, 141, 145, 152n44, 196 H-1B visa, 159, 164, 165, 176, 183,
185, 194
Helms, Jesse, 92
F Henderson, Loy, 54, 56, 81n46
Fiorina, Carly, 176 Holbrooke, Richard, 157, 170
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty “how-possible” question, 2–5, 8n4,
(FMCT), 3, 93, 149n23 17, 31, 85, 121, 195–8
Five Year Plan, 40, 54, 59, 84 Huntington, Samuel, 98, 169
Ford, Gerald, 32, 46, 47, 50, 70, 73–5 Hyde Act (2006), 129, 149n23
240 INDEX
I Jinnah, Muhammad Ali, 33, 77n11

identity construction. See theory Johnson, Louis, 32
chapter Johnson, Lyndon, 30, 32, 41–3, 46, 50,
Inderfurth, Karl, 187n1 65, 66, 69, 73, 74, 77n10, 82n54
Indian Ocean, 21, 69, 72, 127, 128,
154, 161, 180, 181
India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion K
Act (2006), 148n23 Kagan, Robert, 151n37, 175
India-Pakistan crisis 1989, 49, 50, 70, 73 Kargil crisis, 1, 83–5, 94, 95, 108,
India's nuclear test 1974, 45, 46, 50, 111, 192
69, 70, 73, 80n34 Kashmir, 1, 21, 35, 39–42, 49, 50, 54,
India's nuclear test 1998, 1–3, 13, 83, 73, 78n21, 79n27, 79n28, 83–5,
84, 108, 112, 115n21, 126, 87–9, 94, 96, 103, 109, 113n3,
147n10, 195, 197 115n13, 115n15, 115n16,
Indo-Pakistan wars 1965, 42, 69 123–5, 136, 157
Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship Kennan, George, 34, 36, 50–3,
(1971), 45 77n12, 81n41
instability theme, 7, 52, 68, 72, 75, Kennedy, Edward, 45
96, 101, 105, 112, 139, 145, Kennedy, John F., 31, 40, 41, 50,
170, 171, 183, 185, 193 58–61, 63–5, 73–5, 79n26, 168,
International Atomic Energy Agency 196
(IAEA), 2, 46, 47, 80n36, Kerry, John, 115n20, 133, 164
114–15n10, 119, 129, 140, Khan, Ayub, 79n26
149n23, 150n28, 157 Khan, Shahryar, 115n18
International Military Education and Kharge, Mallikarjun, 91
Training (IMET), 91 Khilnani, Sunil, 106, 118n39, 132, 133
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Khobragade, Devyani, 190n19
43, 84 Kicklighter, Claude, 91
interpellation, 6, 12, 18, 23–5 Kissinger, Henry, 44, 46, 67–9,
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, 80n31, 80n32, 80n35, 82n57,
1, 94 145n3
intertextuality, 9n8 Korean War 1951, 36
Iran, 21, 37, 81n44, 81n46, 129, 130, Kyoto conference, 104
137, 140, 141, 149–50n27,
149n26, 150n28
Iraq war 2003, 126 L
Isaacs, Harold, 30, 63 Lake, Anthony, 86, 114n9, 187n1
isolationism, 108, 144, 177 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), 125, 169,
188n9
liberal globalization discourse, 177
J liberal institutionalism, 12, 197
Jaish-e-Mohammad, 124, 125 Locke, Gary, 159
Japan, 34, 43, 55, 72, 80n37, 103, Long Telegram, 51, 52, 77n12
123, 161, 163, 191 Look East policy, 160, 161, 163
INDEX 241
M non-alignment theme, 69, 75, 85,

Malabar series, 91 134, 140, 145, 182, 183, 194
Mansingh, Lalit, 152n44 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 1,
Markey, Edward, 106 46, 87, 90, 94, 102, 115n17,
Mayo, Katherine, 30, 76n5 119, 120, 140, 145n2
Menon, Krishna, 78n21 NSC-68, 36, 53
Menon, Shivshankar, 129–30, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 46,
149–50n27 149n23, 156, 166, 187n4, 188n7
Middle East Defense Organization
(MEDO), 37, 81n44
Mikulski, Barbara, 90 O
Mishra, Brajesh, 119, 148n17 Obama, Barack, 2, 5, 6, 75, 141,
Missile Defense Treaty, 3, 122, 123, 145, 154–9, 167–79, 181, 184,
130, 131, 134, 144, 153, 192 186, 187n1, 188n9, 189n13,
Modernization Theory, 59, 180 189n15, 190n18, 191, 193,
Modi, Narendra, 154, 162–6, 184–6, 194, 197, 198
188–9n10, 188n9, 189n11 Obama administration, 2, 5, 6, 75,
Moynihan, Daniel, 70 141, 145, 153–91, 193, 194, 197
Mukherjee, Pranab, 146n6, 160 Obama doctrine, 158
Mulford, David, 129, 149n27 Orient, 22
multilateralism, 9n6, 72, 114n8 outsourcing, 143, 144, 152n45, 175–7
Musharraf, Pervez, 116n21, 117n28,
125, 126, 138, 139
Muslim League, 33, 34, 52, 57, P
77n11 Pakistan, 1, 3, 4, 7, 12–14, 16n22, 30,
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), 31, 34–7, 39, 41–6, 48, 49, 54, 57,
122, 123 59, 65, 67–70, 72, 73, 76n7, 77n8,
78n16, 78n20, 78n22, 79n26,
79n28, 80n30–3, 81n44, 82n57,
N 83, 84, 87, 89–96, 101–3, 106–9,
Narayanan, M.K., 146n6 113n3, 115n16, 115n18–20,
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 116n21, 116n24, 117n28,
40, 41, 53–5, 58, 62–4, 70, 71, 117n32, 117n33, 118n37, 119,
78n14, 78n17, 78n22, 79n27, 105 123–6, 128, 131, 134–40, 142,
neoconservatism, 136, 150n35 145, 151n43, 153, 157, 162, 163,
neoliberalism, 99, 100 169–71, 187, 192, 194, 195
Next Steps in Strategic Partnership Panetta, Leon, 160
(NSSP), 127–30, 139–44, 155 Partition (1947), 35, 89
Nilekani, Nandan, 178 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE), 45
Nixon, Richard, 30, 32, 43–6, 50, Perle, Richard, 120
65–9, 73–5, 79n29, 80n31 Perry, William, 89–91
non-alignment, 25, 29, 38, 41, 50, 54, Pickering, Thomas, 112n1
57, 59, 64, 74, 76n7, 77n8, 108, PL 480 food programme, 42
146n3, 182, 193 policy-as-discourse approaches, 18, 19
242 INDEX
policy discourse. See introduction and Saran, Shyam, 146n6, 148n21

theory chapter Schumer, Charles, 176
poststructuralism, 6, 11, 12, 14–18, security imaginary, 4, 31
25, 192 security issue. See theory chapter
Powell, Colin, 120, 121, 132, 190n19 Self and Other, 6, 12, 18, 22, 23, 25,
power relations, 16, 17, 66, 192 27n13
Pressler, Larry, 113n4, 115n20 Sharif, Nawaz, 94, 115n21, 116n24,
Pressler amendment, 90, 94, 115n18 117n27, 117n28
Prithvi missile, 101, 115n11 Shelton, Henry, 147n10
problem representation, 19 Shimla agreement, 87, 113n3
protectionism, 176, 183 Sibal, Kanwal, 148n17
Pyatt, Geoffrey, 180 Singapore, 32, 103
Singh, Hari, 115n13
Singh, Jaswant, 3, 116n26, 119, 132,
R 147n8, 147n9
Rann of Kutch, 79n28 Singh, Manmohan, 4, 113n2, 121, 123,
Rao, P.V. Narasimha, 84, 86, 88, 99, 128, 129, 142, 148n21, 149n24,
113n2, 115n11, 116n22, 160 155–7, 165–71, 181, 185, 195
Raphel, Robin, 87, 113n3, 115n14 Singh, Natwar, 150n28
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Sino-Indian conflict/war, 40, 50, 59,
188n10 64, 73
Reagan, Ronald, 32, 46, 48–50, 70–5, social construction. See theory chapter
151n40 Solarz, Stephen, 112–13n1
Realism, 12, 15, 26n3, 64, 137, 197 South Asia crisis 1971, 44, 45, 50,
Rhodes, Ben, 164, 181 67–9, 73, 74, 87
Rice, Condoleezza, 119, 120, 123, Soviet Union, 1, 4, 5, 8n1, 8n2, 27n13,
128, 129, 131, 139–41, 145n3, 30, 31, 34–40, 42–5, 47–54, 57,
146n6, 148n17, 148n21, 150n34 59, 65, 67, 69–71, 73–5, 77n8,
Richardson, Bill, 116n22 77n13, 78n21, 80n32, 80n37,
rising power, 7, 24, 131, 142, 144, 80n38, 84, 96, 101, 122
146n5, 175, 177, 179, 180, 185, Steinberg, James, 180, 182
196, 197 Straits of Malacca, 121, 128
Rocca, Christina, 147n10 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Roosevelt, Franklin, 32–3, 50, 53, (SALT), 47, 188n4
168, 182 subject-positions. See theory chapter
Rumsfeld, Donald, 119, 120, 125,
127, 134, 160
Rusk, Dean, 41, 42, 65, 79n26 T
Talbott, Strobe, 3, 87, 89, 93, 109,
113n3, 116n24, 116n26,
S 117n27, 120, 187n1
Said, Edward, 22 Talbott-Singh talks/dialogue, 95, 112,
Sandys, Duncan, 79n27 116n26
INDEX 243
Tanham, George, 72, 73 Vietnam, 41, 43, 185, 190n21

Tarapur, 47, 81n39, 114–15n10, Vulcans, 120, 150n31
145n1, 146n6
Tashkent, 42
Tellis, Ashley, 83, 120, 145n3, 154, 155 W
Tharoor, Shashi, 109, 133 War on Terror, 119, 124–6, 135,
Towns, Edolphus, 151n42 138–40, 142, 144, 145,
Truman, Harry, 33–6, 50, 52, 53, 148n14
55–7, 73, 74, 78n15, 81n43, Warren, Christopher, 48, 113n3
81n47, 168, 193 Washington Special Action Group
Truman doctrine, 52, 53 (WSAG), 68, 82n57
Wendt, Alexander, 14, 15
Western imperialism, 55
U West Pakistan, 44, 45, 68, 80n32
unilateralism, 9n6, 137, 147n7 why-question, 2, 4, 5, 8n4, 17, 195,
unipolar power, 24, 151n40, 192 196
United Nations Mission for India and Wikileaks, 7, 129, 149n27, 151n43,
Pakistan (UNCIP), 35 161, 170
United Nations Security Council seat, 21 Winthrop, John, 57, 102
US Entities List, 157 Wisner, Frank, 113n1, 116n22
US India Political Action Committee Wittman, Rob, 174
(USINPAC), 146n5 Wolf, Frank, 168
US-India strategic and commercial Wolfowitz, Paul, 120, 151n36
dialogue, 164 Woolsey, James, 115n16
US-India strategic dialogue, 154, 158, World Bank, 43
164, 172, 183, 188n7
US-Indo Defense Policy Group, 123
US Nuclear Regulatory Committee Y
(NRC), 47 Yeltsin, Boris, 86, 96
US–Pakistan bilateral security
agreement (1959), 39
USS Enterprise, 45, 69 Z
Zakaria, Fareed, 144, 174, 189n17,
196
V Zakheim, Dov, 120
Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 91, 94, 95, 111, Zelikow, Philip, 120, 145n3, 146n6,
116n23, 117n27, 121, 124, 126, 148n21
127, 136, 139, 141, 149n26 Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammad, 48

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CHANGING

CARINA VAN DE WETERING

ISBN 978-1-137-54861-0 ISBN 978-1-137-54862-7 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016956910

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Cover illustration: © NurPhoto.com / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

interviewees, including Stephen Cohen, Teresita Schaffer, Dennis Kux,

2 Analyzing Policy Discourse 11

3 Developing US Relations with India: 1945–1993 29

4 India, the Underappreciated: The Clinton

5 India as a Strategic Partner: The Bush

6 India Has Already Risen: The Obama

PNE Peaceful Nuclear Explosion

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 1

as India promised that nuclear material and technology would be used

based on ground-based interceptor missiles (Tellis 2006). Teresita Schaffer

PLAN OF THE BOOK

countries’ subject-positions, within policy discourses. In order to analyze

administration, India’s representation went through large changes and

during each administration (Gaddis 1982, ix). Nevertheless, the codes

Analyzing Policy Discourse

Although various authors discuss the state of US security policies toward

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 11

fit anywhere within the framework of the contemporary debates going on

However, there have been growing examinations of post-Cold War US

CRITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND POSTSTRUCTURALISM

capabilities, than “ideational” considerations, including ideas, norms, and

to focus on the content of norms and their role-defining qualities which

the behavioural aspects of social practice” should be collapsed (2001,

By making use of poststructuralist and critical constructivist viewpoints,

are attempts to deal with a pre-given, objective “problem” (Bacchi 1999,

THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY

SELF AND OTHER

regarded as lacking progress and being backward (Hansen 2006, 36).13

ARTICULATION AND INTERPELLATION

Thus, a theory of articulation is both a way of understanding how ideologi-

Hall demonstrates, for instance, how Thatcherite discourse articulated

(Weldes 1996, 285). Meaning is produced “and temporarily fixed by

Interpellation is thus “a dual process whereby identities or subject-

relations and interests entailed in them are naturalized. As a result, the

3. Conventional constructivism and realism are both based on positivist

Developing US Relations with India:

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 29

which was seen as procommunist. This was exacerbated by the suspicion

knowledgeable of South Asia (Rudolph 2008, 12; In Wetering 2011).

(1957–1963), the unraveling of relations under the Johnson and Nixon

the Roosevelt administration was no longer actively involved with India

ESTABLISHING COLD WAR POLICY

articulated as a security issue as it was often not on the US administration’s

INDIA’S GROWING IMPORTANCE

December 1956, in which the US President articulated the Soviet Union’s

a plebiscite while India was not (Kux 1992, 156–157). President

China announced a unilateral cease-fire on 22 November and pulled back

subcontinent. The military postures of both India and Pakistan prior to

Army has engaged in indiscriminate slaughter” (1971). Congress was also

NUCLEAR ISSUES AND AFGHANISTAN

trade (Schaffer 2009, 91).37 However, “[W]hen India poses a threat,

As this section shows, various US security issues and security policies

PRE-INDEPENDENT INDIA (1945–1946):

Central to US policy discourse was also produced the instability theme.

ESTABLISHING COLD WAR POLICY: FREE INDIA