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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN
COMPARATIVE EAST-WEST PHILOSOPHY

Buddhist Feminism
Transforming Anger against Patriarchy

Sokthan Yeng
Palgrave Studies in Comparative
East-West Philosophy

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 Sokthan Yeng

Buddhist Feminism
Transforming Anger against Patriarchy
Sokthan Yeng
Adelphi
Garden City, NY, USA

ISSN 2662-2378     ISSN 2662-2386 (electronic)

Palgrave Studies in Comparative East-West Philosophy
ISBN 978-3-030-51161-6    ISBN 978-3-030-51162-3 (eBook)
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 To my female lineage with enduring love:
My mom, Chantha, and my nieces, Maya and Cassidy
 Preface

For many in small philosophy departments, it is not always a given that our
research programs match with our teaching schedules. Developing new
article or book manuscripts often requires that we add to or stray from our
original path of research. Many times, we are asked to teach courses that
have nothing to do with our evolving areas of specialization. Most profes-
sors do some tinkering with their introductory-level syllabi in order to
address student concerns or combat the boredom of going through the
exact same reading list over and over again. I had been experimenting with
adding some philosophers that would provide a different understand-
ing of the self and challenge Western canonical thinkers, such as Plato and
Descartes, that are found in “Introduction to Philosophy.” I worked to
integrate feminist and Buddhist philosophers but in different orders.
My students seemed to take to Buddhist philosophy quite well. My
course on “Eastern Philosophy” also usually filled, so this was not so sur-
prising. I was prepared for students to resist feminist thinkers, but they
seemed much more amenable to feminist philosophers if I taught them
after Buddhism. If I taught feminist thinkers before the unit on Buddhism,
some remained hostile to feminist philosophers even after I attempted to
explain similarities between Buddhism and feminism. They had seemingly
made up their mind about feminist philosophy and teaching Buddhism
afterward could not soften them.
This pattern held over multiple semesters, though I could never figure
out why. Was it because students could see, through Buddhism, that
Anglo-European males did not have a monopoly on knowledge? Was this

vii
viii PREFACE

message somehow less threatening because it was delivered by the plain-

spoken Thich Nhat Hanh? Even when students publicly expressed their
allegiance with Descartes over Buddhist thinkers, the exchange would
largely remain jovial. Buddhism was interesting, just not for them. I would
include different feminist philosophers, but nothing seemed to matter as
much as teaching Buddhism directly before introducing them to a feminist
thinker. I was so convinced that I never taught feminism before Buddhism
again in my lower-level classes.
Perhaps I was better at teaching Buddhist philosophy but my
“Philosophy of Sex and Gender” class filled too—even after students
realized it was a course on feminist theory. In an effort to further diversify
my feminism syllabus, I wanted to add a chapter on Buddhist feminism. I
checked to see if any anthologies would list a chapter on Buddhist feminist
philosophy alongside with liberal feminism, sexual difference feminism,
black feminism, and so on. None were to be found. It was difficult to find
any book of this kind that included the thought of Asian or Asian-American
women. My book grew, too, out of the desire to understand what Buddhist
feminism might look like in dialog with feminists of other traditions with
which I was familiar through my training in Western philosophy. It was a
hole in the literature of Buddhism and feminism that I, as an Asian-­
American woman, wanted to explore and be able to teach to my students.
This book came about, in short, through my efforts to incorporate my
research interests with my teaching schedule over the course of many years
at Adelphi University.

Garden City, NY Sokthan Yeng

 Acknowledgments

I could not have published this book without the love and encouragement
of my husband, Nathan. I also want to thank my brother, Youveak, and
my dad, Steve, for all their various support over the years. Thanks to Julia
and her parents, Betty and Jim Pitcherella, who genuinely seemed inter-
ested in my ongoing philosophical projects.
My academic successes are all the more rewarding for the wonderful
friends I have made. I would like to thank Cathy Leichter and Susan
Weisser. Both tirelessly cheered me on during the long process of writing
a book and even engaged in the drudgery of reading draft chapters. I
would like to thank Dana Murillo for helping me through challenges and
sharing in my joys. I thank all those who have helped me realize this proj-
ect by making connections between my philosophical work and struggles
against patriarchy on the ground. My crew of co-conspirators against
patriarchy will go unnamed but I trust you know who you are. Academia
tends toward isolation and solitude, especially before receiving tenure.
Thanks to everyone who has made my time in New York much less lonely
and much more fun.
It is difficult to know exactly when the idea of this book was formed but
my first presentation at the intersection of Buddhism and feminism
occurred when Elizabeth Hoppe invited me to talk about the work of
Irigaray and Descartes. For that and her friendship all these years, I thank
her. Parts of this book have been previously published in an article that
appeared in the Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy. Thanks to
Scott Davidson, the editor of this journal, and the anonymous reviewers

ix
x ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

for my article, “Irigaray’s Alternative Practices of the Self.” I have also

presented many parts of this book at the Comparative and Continental
Philosophy Circle and I am indebted to Jason Wirth and Leah Kalmanson
for their valuable feedback at these conferences and beyond. I would like
to thank Shannon Mariotti, who invited me to present my work on
Buddhism and feminism at the Western Political Science Association and
so graciously shared her ideas with me. I owe thanks to all those who
attended my conference papers and engaged my ideas as well. I would,
lastly, like to thank Adelphi University for granting me a year’s sabbatical
so that I could work on this manuscript.
 Contents

1 Introduction  1
References  12

2 The Western Suppression of Anger 15

Anger and the Divine  16
Anger and Greco-Roman Philosophy  17
Anger and Male Subjectivity  21
Anger and Contemporary Theories  23
The Turn to Buddhism  28
References  31

3 Vulnerability, Volatility, and the No-Self 33

Non-essentialist Feminism  34
Codependent Arising and Woman  35
Buddhist Women and Social Convention  38
Buddhism and the Potential for Change  40
Woman and Instability  42
Anger and the Precarious Self  44
The Transformation of Anger  47
Conclusion  49
References  51

4 Buddhism’s Essential Women 53

Women and the Proliferation of Buddhism  53

xi
xii Contents

Feminine Ethics of Care  56

Reason and Its Others  59
Mothers in Buddhism  61
Female Erasure and Resistance  63
The Practice of Mothers  68
References  70

5 Buddhism, Non-discrimination, and Inclusivity 73

The Theory of Non-discrimination in Buddhism  74
Moving Toward an Ethics of Non-discrimination  78
Black Buddhist Communities in the United States  81
Non-discrimination and Anger  84
Conclusion  88
References  90

6 Expressing Anger with Mindfulness 93

Buddhism and the Place of Politics  94
Postcolonial Selves  97
Unique Particularity 102
From Postcoloniality to the Present 106
Training Anger 108
Buddhist Feminist Possibilities 110
Supporting Anger with Mindfulness 113
References 115

7 The Legacy of Elder Buddhist Nuns117

The Arrival of Buddhism in the United States 118
Liberal Feminism 122
The Elder Buddhist Nuns and Sexuality 124
Anger: A Middle Path for Women 129
The Mad and the Possessed 133
Conclusion 138
References 139

8 Outlines of Buddhist Feminism and a Feminist Sangha143

References 147

Index149
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Buddhism has a history of adapting to cultures where it takes root and has
subsequently developed in diverse ways. It should not be surprising, there-
fore, that a version of Buddhism would arise in conjunction with feminist
philosophies. No articulation of a method or lens to ground Buddhist
feminism as an identifiable subset of feminist or Buddhist philosophy,
however, exists. Perhaps the constitution and tenets of both Buddhism
and feminism defy projects that search for conceptual unity or systematic
practices, which are hallmarks of Western philosophical thought. The
major schools of Buddhism, Theravada and Mahayana, reveal practical and
philosophical divides. Further splintering of Mahayana Buddhism into
Zen, Pure Land, and Tantric models adds to the multiplicity of Buddhism.
Feminism, too, is far from a monolithic discipline—though the critique
that white bourgeois women dominate feminist philosophy endures. Even
among the dominant cast of Anglo-European women, scholars can distin-
guish strategic and philosophical differences between liberal feminists,
radical feminists, and sexual difference feminists. By adding their voices,
black and Latina women have further diversified and enriched the field.
Though growing, the list of feminists who invoke Buddhist philosophy
and practices is relatively short.
Scholarship on Buddhism and feminism tends to fall into two camps.
Either scholars gauge the compatibility of the philosophies, which does
not always result in a match. Or they employ specific Buddhist ideas in
order to enhance particular feminist principles. Anthologies developed

© The Author(s) 2020 1

S. Yeng, Buddhist Feminism, Palgrave Studies in Comparative
East-West Philosophy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51162-3_1
2 S. YENG

through sociological and anthropological approaches are also on hand.

They tend, however, to compile life lessons that arise from the experience
of Buddhist women rather than work to create a philosophical foundation
for Buddhist feminism.
Despite the complexities of both Buddhism and feminism, efforts to
define a Buddhist feminist philosophy may not be an exercise in futility.
Scholars largely acknowledge the plurality within their discipline, but they
also seek out certain unifying features that allow for discussions about
Buddhist and feminist philosophies, respectively. The belief in the Four
Noble Truths (which will be discussed in a later chapter) and the commit-
ment to compassion, just to name a couple, can be found in all Buddhist
traditions. Feminists, for their part, may argue about causes and strategies
but they agree that the oppression and subjugation of women remains a
problem. Recognition of general features of each leave open, I believe, the
possibility of determining a foundation for the interdisciplinary philoso-
phy of Buddhist feminists by locating a common lens or tracking a recur-
ring theme that appears when Western feminists turn to Buddhism.
The identification of American Buddhism, for instance, serves as prece-
dence for the surfacing of particular traits from interactions between dif-
ferent schools of thought. Just as scholars have come to identify the
outlines of American Buddhism through patterns, one can also begin to
see patterns emerge in the ways Western feminist thinkers make use of
Buddhist ideas and practices. Indeed, there are connections between
American Buddhism and those who want to build a bridge between
Buddhist and feminist thought. Works by Sandy Boucher (1993),
Christopher Queen, and Duncan Ryuken Williams (1999) show that
political engagement, democratization, and an emphasis on meditation
practice are common features of American Buddhism. Because American
Buddhism allows for greater inclusion of women and seeks to apply
Buddhist philosophy toward political change, it shares some key goals
with feminist movements. It should not be surprising that there is overlap
between the groups. Rita Gross, who many consider a pre-eminent thinker
of Buddhist feminism, points out that women constitute a substantial seg-
ment of American Buddhist practitioners (Gross 1992, 219).
Although American Buddhist communities work to enact various polit-
ical changes, feminists within the sangha (Buddhist community) also seek
to employ Buddhist philosophy and practices in the struggle against patri-
archy in particular. Despite a turn toward greater political engagement by
Buddhists, many male gurus and leaders do not put great effort into the
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

emancipation of women. The current Dalai Lama, in response to this real-

ity, calls for more women to take positions as leaders. Having women in
leadership roles could help counteract male perspectives within Buddhist
culture and institutions. He seems also to imply that female leaders would
do more to address the oppression of women or, at the very least, current
leadership has not done enough to address patriarchy within Buddhism
(Cook 2017).
So, what have feminist leaders who also happen to be interested in
Buddhism done through their work? My search to identify patterns of
Buddhist feminism began with a curiosity about what Western feminists
found interesting and useful in Buddhism. Approaching the project in this
fashion reveals certain Western biases. For instance, many Western femi-
nists focus on the disappearance of the Buddhist nun lineage. Women in
Southeast Asia, in contrast, value “precept nuns” or mae chii. Mae chiis are
not the equivalent to a monk, as a nun would be, but they follow rules or
precepts that distinguish themselves from laywomen, such as refraining
from sexual activity. Theravada women believe this position and lifestyle
can also lead to enlightenment and are, generally, not as concerned with
obtaining an equivalent status to monks. A Buddhologist who picks up on
feminist themes in Buddhism may very well find different patterns of
thought that link Buddhism and feminism that has nothing to do with
official roles or status. Nevertheless, the use of patterns in developing
Buddhist feminism may be helpful precisely because there is not a need to
totalize such thought. Identifying patterns allows for nuance and differen-
tiation between thinkers and the acknowledgment that other paths for
creating Buddhist feminist philosophy may exist. Still, patterns can give
rise to distinguishable characteristics that would make the field more intel-
ligible to other scholars.
Patterns for Buddhist feminism, I suggest, include an emphasis on rela-
tionality, attention to the body, and the call to recognize anger. The first
two patterns can be seen in many works of feminist scholars, whether or
not they are interested in establishing a Buddhist feminist philosophy or
think such a discipline is even possible. Anne Klein (2008) and Erin
McCarthy (2010) work to explain and bolster the relational nature of the
self through feminist and Buddhist philosophy. In contrast to the autono-
mous subject that canonical Western philosophers promote, feminists
argue that the self should be thought in relation to others and the society
in which the subject develops.
4 S. YENG

The Buddhist concept of “no-self” has helped to reinforce the value of

understanding relationality in feminist thought. The privileging of rela-
tionality has allowed feminists to open a pathway to plurality as well. Many
feminists who identify as Buddhist also identify with another religious tra-
dition, allowing for a spirituality that connects cultures. Jan Willis (2008),
bell hooks (2016), and Luce Irigaray (2004, 187) feel no need to fully
embrace Buddhism or Christianity in a manner that excludes the other.
Feminists who engage with Buddhism also emphasize the practice and
meditation, rather than knowledge of sutras or scripture, as a means to
rethink the body.1 Sue Hamilton argues for a neutral understanding of the
body as a means to fight against the patriarchal strain in Theravada
Buddhism (Hamilton 2000). Often caught within a dualistic system that
inextricably links women and the body and codes them both negatively,
the move to explore Buddhist philosophy and meditation, therefore, is not
an attempt to ignore intellectual concerns but, rather, a way to provide a
more positive framing of the body.
The connection between feminists who turn to Buddhism in order to
understand anger and their attempt to address it is less visible than the
aforementioned patterns. It should go without saying, however, that the
relative silence on the part of Western philosophers surrounding anger has
not led to the extermination of anger in the world. If this strategy of dis-
counting and ignoring anger has not worked, a question remains. What is
the purpose of continuing on this path? I believe that analysis of Buddhism
and feminism together show that an avoidance of anger is an effective
means to protect the privileged subject of Western philosophy. Buddhist
dealings with anger provide an explanation for why Western philosophers
would want to circumvent such an analysis: a defense of the independent
self. A Buddhist feminist philosophy further reveals, I suggest, that the self
who gains the most cover through the refusal to discuss anger is the privi-
leged white male subject.
The second chapter is an investigation of the role of anger in the phi-
losophies of those who still have a great influence on the way contempo-
rary scholars think about anger: Aristotle and Seneca.2 Despite Aristotle’s
allowance for anger in response to injustice, his philosophy seems only to
address men as injured parties and subjects who can rightfully act with the
backing of anger. His philosophy reveals, therefore, the connection
between the discourse on anger and the privileged male subject of Western
philosophy. When a case is made for the recognition or erasure of anger, it
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

often coincides with the description of the canonical male philosopher—

rational and able to resist all ill effects of anger.
That Western philosophers focus heavily on the reactions of men in
response to anger and often gloss over women’s anger is a sign that the
female subject is of little concern to them. In other words, the erasure of
female subjectivity is implicit in gestures to vanquish anger. Accordingly,
one should take particular note of the ways that philosophers have tradi-
tionally excluded women and the anger women feel from their treatises on
the emotion. Denial of women’s anger and female subjectivity provide
feminists, of course, with only more reasons to feel aggrieved.
Feminist philosophers reveal a tension when we speak about the suffer-
ing of women under patriarchy while trying to play by the rules of philoso-
phy, which has largely unfavorable views of emotions in general and
women’s anger in particular. Because some Western philosophers may
now recognize that women have plenty about which to be angry, gestures
to deny or ignore women’s anger—rather than actual outbursts of anger
from feminists—may be the greater cause of linking feminism and anger
together. Despite clichés about angry feminists,3 it is not the case that
anger is a major theme in every feminist work or that all feminists openly
express feelings of anger. Female philosophers, who already find them-
selves at the margins of the discipline, may be reluctant to analyze and
explore anger. Because there is still a stigma attached to anger and the
recognition of it, feminists may fear that such a move will only reinforce
stereotypes about the irrational and emotional woman who is incapable of
theoretical work.
Because Western canonical philosophers often cast women in the role
of angry and overly emotional beings, there are few tools in their work to
recognize why women may justifiably be angry and few resources, for
anyone, to overcome or transform anger into something meaningful and
positive. Faced with these strictures of Western thought, there is little
wonder why feminists have looked for different treatments of anger else-
where. It is for these reasons that the treatment and transformation of
anger looms so large in this book. Indeed, many of the chapters will spe-
cifically address ways Western feminists turn to Buddhism as a means to
deal with and transmute anger.
Though the link between Buddhist feminism and anger has not received
its full due, this intersection can be found in the work of at least a few
prominent feminists who engage Buddhism in their work. Rita Gross
plainly states that she turned to Buddhism as a means to deal with the
6 S. YENG

anger she felt as a result of the struggle for women’s liberation (Gross
1992, 171). Luce Irigaray’s work, as another illustration, transforms her
work as she turns to Buddhist thought. Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell
commend her early work for its hostile and clever subversion of Western
philosophers (Cheah and Grosz 1998). In Between East and West, where
she most fully provides her interpretation of Buddhist thought, her tone
and philosophical insights are geared more toward calm. Cultural critic,
bell hooks, openly shares her thoughts and feelings about anger and has
notably credited Buddhist philosophy for revealing insights to her about
how to address anger.4
Although grouping these thinkers together may seem random because
they belong to different feminist traditions, their affiliation with varying
schools of feminism could help us to decipher a pattern that emerges when
looking at the broader landscape of Buddhist feminist thought. I believe
that the attempt to recognize and transform anger gains greater validity as
a foundation of Buddhist feminist philosophy precisely because feminists
with distinct perspectives take it up. Thinking through anger is not simply
an attempt to further a particular feminist philosophy. The connection
between feminists who turn to Buddhism as a means to address anger
spans multiple feminist traditions.
I further aim to provide context for how these feminists deal with anger
and how these interpretations fit with both feminist and Buddhist dis-
course. I explore possible exchanges between feminism and Buddhism
that disrupt male-centered analyses of anger. The privileging of men in
Western philosophy depends on women being seen as having a lesser intel-
lect and a mind with little connection to reason. When women express
anger, it serves as a sign that women are incapable of responding with
reason. Anger, therefore, is unreachable and wholly other to reason. A
Buddhist feminist approach would allow women’s anger to be seen as a
contribution to philosophical discourse. I, therefore, investigate ways that
Buddhism and feminism together show anger to hold insights about
metaphysical theory and political philosophy.
Is Buddhism more compatible with feminism simply because its phi-
losophy, in theory, denies male identity as well as female identity? In Chap.
3, I outline the Buddhist concept of the self or “no-self” and compare it
to the idealized Western autonomous male self found in the prior chapter.
I will investigate and question why critics believe that non-essentialist con-
cepts of self, sex, and gender present roadblocks for Buddhist feminism.
This charge, it is worth noting, does little to prevent figures like Judith
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

Butler from being part of the feminist tradition. I will further show the
ways that thinkers use Foucauldian philosophy to challenge patriarchal
narratives within and concerning Buddhism, precisely by undercutting a
stable sense of self.
I build upon the connection between feminist philosophies and
Buddhism through the theme of relationality. I further suggest that
Foucauldian feminists, Judith Butler and Ladelle McWhorter, conceptual-
ize vulnerability and volatility, respectively, in a manner that resonates with
Buddhist ideas about the interconnected and ever-changing self, which
can help to bridge—rather than widen—the distance between Buddhism
and feminism. A closer look at Butler’s conceptualization of anger further
reveals a similarity to a fundamental Buddhist precept of codependent aris-
ing. Thinking Buddhism with Butler allows for a fresh perspective on
anger and disrupts the Western notion of identity that privileges the self-­
contained male. Not only does anger play a role in Butler’s analysis of
subjectivity through her understanding of precarious life but it also pres-
ents a novel interpretation of the relational self in Buddhism. Despite
some valid concerns about patriarchal traditions within Buddhism, I show
that the philosophy of inter-being and no-self are resources that allow
both the self and anger to be a site of practice and change rather than a
fixed metaphysical category.
Even though the metaphysics of Buddhism does not judge women to
be essentially inferior to men, it remains to be seen if Buddhist philosophy
can do more than exist alongside feminist philosophy. Does Buddhism, in
other words, have resources to promote a positive view of women and
female qualities? In Chap. 4, I examine various ways thinkers draw out a
feminine and feminist reading of Buddhism. Many scholars looking at
Buddhist communities around the globe suggest that women are instru-
mental in the survival and growth of Buddhist cultures. Not only have
women joined Western Buddhist communities in substantial numbers but
also traditional Buddhist communities in Southeast Asia depend upon the
contribution of women to feed mendicant monks daily and villagers dur-
ing festivals. Some thinkers argue that Buddhism is feminine because com-
passion is just as important as wisdom, if not more so. Buddhist texts and
stories often laud the compassion and feeling of love and devotion a
mother has for her only son as an ideal but not without some tension.
What benefits and dangers arise for women, considering these female-­
centered readings of Buddhism? I examine how Buddhism reinforces fem-
inine stereotypes and essentialize women and which strategies feminists
8 S. YENG

employ to play with maternity and motherhood. In what ways can a femi-
nist reading of Buddhism challenge Buddhist communities to move
beyond patriarchy and become more inclusive of women and mothers?
Although it may seem counterproductive to arrive at a feminist reading of
Buddhism by emphasizing motherhood, maternal images and storylines
are not foreign to Buddhist philosophy. The question is whether mother-
hood in Buddhism can break from patriarchal narratives that often portray
mothers as overtaken by grief or consumed with other emotions that make
them incapable of Buddhist practice and enlightenment.
In order to challenge negative depictions of mothers and motherhood,
some contemporary thinkers have turned their attention to practice.
Irigaray combines her readings of Buddhism and the feminine, which echo
a feminist ethics of care and a focus on embodiment. Carol Gilligan
famously suggested that women and girls approach ethics in a manner
distinct from men and boys. Gilligan further argues that understanding
the different process of decision-making between girls and boys requires
the recognition of what girls are taught to value through their connection
with their mothers (Gilligan 1982). In addition to the lineage of girls and
women through a feminine ethics of care, Irigaray interprets Buddhism
through meditative breathing techniques that highlight relationality and
mimics the breath of the mother (Irigaray 2002).
Dipa Ma suggests that mothers are particularly well suited to put
Buddhist philosophy to use. As traditional caretakers of children, mothers
come to understand the impermanence of the moods of children and
approach them with loving kindness. Nhat Hanh, for his part, uses mater-
nal imagery to create a space for anger and mindfulness to coexist. He
offers an innovative approach to anger and sees the arising of anger as an
opportunity for us to practice the loving kindness a mother has toward a
crying child. Despite the prevalence of maternal figures in Buddhist leg-
end and philosophy, cultural and physical spaces for women to practice
and meditate remain limited. I will, therefore, also explore ways that
Buddhist theory can be put into practice and help women integrate more
fully into the community. How can Buddhist leaders and institutions do
more to listen to the concerns of women? What can Buddhist leaders do
to help women and mothers, specifically, practice and meditate?
In Chaps. 3 and 4, I discussed, respectively, ways that Buddhism recog-
nizes a self without fixed attributes such as femaleness and ways that
women and femininity serve as models for Buddhist philosophy, perhaps
at the expense of essentializing women and reducing women to the role of
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

mothers. How can these contradictory statements operate together in

Buddhism? In Chap. 5, I analyze the Buddhist logic of non-discrimination
in order to address this philosophical conflict. I explore, in particular, con-
ventional and ultimate wisdom in relation to the place of women in
Buddhist history. I suggest that this concept is flexible enough to accom-
modate the philosophical idea that women are a site of volatility and the
cultural belief that women are different from men.
If Buddhist theory provides room for vulnerable selves and promotes
an attitude that sees connections between self and other, why is it that
Buddhist communities are not more inclusive of women from minority
groups? Why does the theory of non-discrimination not lead to greater
inclusivity in Buddhist communities? I explore these questions in relation
to bell hooks, a self-proclaimed Buddhist. Her experience and insights
about black communities in the United States help push Buddhist leaders
to confront the place of women of color in Buddhist communities. Despite
her critiques of white and black Buddhist communities, she shows that
Buddhism has tools to help disenfranchised groups. The move from the-
ory to practice, however, continues to be a problem for Buddhism. In
theory, Buddhism does not discriminate against women, people of color,
or women of color. In practice, Buddhist leaders and institutions continue
to marginalize these groups. Thus, the space for practice remains difficult
for many to access. I suggest, therefore, that Buddhists could apply the
theory of non-discrimination to issues of gender and race to become more
sensitive to concerns of minority groups.
I argue, in addition, that thinking Buddhism together with black femi-
nism allows us to build a connection between the theory of non-­
discrimination and non-domination. Although many feminists frown
upon the domination of the gendered other, the desire to extinguish and
conquer anger remains acceptable. Conventional Western and Buddhist
wisdom tells us that we should, indeed, discriminate against anger. It has
no place in our world and should be eradicated. Anger, in other words, is
the ultimate other that should be dominated no matter what. Such com-
mon attitudes lead us to dismiss feelings of anger from others or to treat
anger within ourselves as the other to be eliminated. By taking seriously
the suffering of minority and oppressed groups, there is an antidote to
discriminating against the anger of the other as meaningless. In other
words, we can develop an attitude of compassion and non-domination
toward anger.
10 S. YENG

Attempts to dominate and dismiss women of color often coincide with

attempts to dominate and dismiss anger as other to reason. Men and dom-
inant groups often oppress women and women of color, in particular, as
too quick to anger and incapable of having their anger addressed through
reason. In Chap. 6, I examine ways that postcolonial feminists have done
much to advance readings of anger that relay a different understanding of
the self and reason so as to disrupt concepts of agency. Because women are
portrayed as incapable of balancing their anger with thoughtfulness or
mindfulness, postcolonial feminists have developed different interpreta-
tions of reason as a means to build bridges between anger, knowledge, and
political action.
What, though, can Buddhism do to alleviate the suffering of the
oppressed, if Buddhists do not distinguish between the suffering of the
oppressed and the oppressors? Because Buddhism is often charged with
political quietism, I examine ways that Buddhists can engage politically
through the philosophy of non-discrimination. How can anger be freed
from the dualisms that pit personal emotions against collective liberation
and reason against unreason? I explore ways that contemporary Buddhist
understandings of anger fit within positive readings of anger and echo the
thoughts of postcolonial feminists.
I explore, too, how a Buddhist understanding of anger differs from
postcolonial feminist readings. Thich Nhat Hanh’s writings, which sug-
gest that one can envelop anger in a zone of mindfulness through medita-
tive practices, have brought to light a kindlier Buddhist interpretation of
anger. His work serves as an interesting counterbalance to postcolonial
feminists who have done more to claim their anger than other feminists
but also recognize the need to train their anger, which Buddhism offers.
Buddhist philosophy allows for a refreshing attitude toward anger but, I
suggest, the Buddhist approach to anger would benefit from greater
engagement with feminist philosophies. Postcolonial feminists point to a
lacuna in Nhat Hanh’s work. Their philosophies allow for the open expres-
sion of anger, which Nhat Hanh advises against. Joining together postco-
lonial feminist thinkers who have approached anger openly with Buddhist
meditation skills is a step forward in the process of transforming anger that
breaks from dualistic thinking that completely separates anger and
mindfulness.
Despite connections to various feminist groups and theories, a glaring
absence in this discussion remains. Indeed, many Western feminists have
argued that Buddhist feminism cannot exist if Asian women continue to
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

be silenced and if Asian Buddhist women can have no role in shaping

Buddhism. Many scholars point to the fact that the Buddhist nun lineage
had died out and argue that Buddhist feminism is an oxymoron if it is not
re-established. Other critics argue, conversely, that the elder Buddhist
nuns are no model for feminists because they demean the body and the
female form in particular. I suggest that these arguments, while important,
overlook an important message that the elder Buddhist nuns conveyed. I
turn to the Therigatha (poems of the elder Buddhist nuns), in Chap. 7, to
trace a different feminist interpretation of these Buddhist nuns. Through
their poetry, they showed that they could balance the anger they felt for
the plight of women with Buddhist practice. Nhat Hanh, in contrast, does
not explicitly articulate a connection between his reading of anger and
feminism.
I suggest that scholars are apt to miss the contribution of these early
Buddhist women due to the widespread aversion to dealing with anger. I
further suggest that the elder Buddhist nuns show that freely expressing
their anger did not prohibit them from following the path to enlighten-
ment. Although I give Nhat Hanh credit for pointing to a Buddhist treat-
ment of analysis, I argue that these women, in their own ways, also showed
that anger is not antithetical to Buddhism and enlightenment. Greater
analysis of feminist writings can also make Nhat Hanh’s reading of anger
more robust. By analyzing the ways that feminists and female imagery help
Buddhists to articulate their nuanced position on anger, I believe women
can come to have a more prominent role in Buddhist thought.
Unfortunately, the elder Buddhist nuns are not seen as part of Buddhist
philosophy and it would be anachronistic to classify them as postcolonial
feminists. Indeed, they do not fit neatly within any existing feminist tradi-
tion. Recognizing the contribution of these women to philosophical and
feminist discourses will show that they are feminist models who spoke to
the anger of women and also add to the foundation of Buddhist feminism.
A closer look at various Buddhist cultures provides many more examples
of women who have strategically used anger in their struggle against patri-
archy. Asian Buddhist women have left many traces in history and contem-
porary culture. It is the resistance to recognizing anger that obfuscates the
ways Asian Buddhist women have fought against patriarchy and worked to
transform their communities. In order to realize a more inclusive com-
munity of Buddhist feminists, we must transform our understanding of
and approach to anger.
12 S. YENG

Notes
1. This feminist method of meditation differs from the famed Cartesian model
of the West. In contrast to Descartes who used meditation to elevate the
mind over the body, feminists who turn to Buddhist meditation challenge
not only mind-body dualism but also the degradation of the body.
2. I will discuss in most detail Seneca’s work because Stoicism has an enduring
legacy as the philosophy that most repudiates anger.
3. See Gross, Buddhism After Patriarchy, 131, and Robert Thurman, Anger:
The Seven Deadly Sins (New York: Oxford University Press: 2004), 17.
4. Spread throughout her works are references to Thich Nhat Hanh and other
Buddhist thinkers. She perhaps most directly proclaims her thanks to Nhat
Hanh in thinking through anger. See bell hooks, “bell hooks, the Beats, and
Loving Blackness,” New York Times, December 10, 2015, accessed January
19, 2017, https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/
bell-hooks-buddhism-the-beats-and-loving-blackness/?smid=tw-
share&_r=0

References
bell hooks, the Beats, and Loving Blackness. 2015. New York Times, December
10. https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/bell-hooks-bud-
dhism-the-beats-and-loving-blackness/?smid=tw-share&_r=0. Accessed 19
January 2017.
Boucher, Sandy. 1993. Turning the Wheel: American Women Creating the New
Buddhism. New York: Beacon Press.
Cheah, Pheng, and Elizabeth Grosz. 1998. The Future of Sexual Difference: An
Interview with Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell. Diacritics 28 (1): 19–42.
Cook, Jane. World Peace Through Compassionate Leadership: Dalai Lama to
Women. http://www.thetibetpost.com/en/news/international/5417-world-
peace-through-compassionate-leadership-dalai-lama-to-women. Last modified
23 February 2017.
Gilligan, Carol. 1982. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory on Women’s
Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Gross, Rita. 1992. Buddhism After Patriarchy: A Feminist History, Analysis, and
Reconstruction of Buddhism. Albany: SUNY Press.
Hamilton, Sue. 2000. Early Buddhism: A New Approach: The I of the Beholder.
New York: Routledge.
hooks, bell. Toward a Worldwide Culture of Love. http://www.lionsroar.com/
toward-a-worldwide-culture-of-love/. Last modified 22 March 2016.
Irigaray, Luce. 2002. The Way of Breath. In Between East and West, trans. Stephen
Pluhacek. New York: Columbia University Press.
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

———, ed. 2004. Luce Irigaray: Key Writings. New York: Bloomsbury.
Klein, Anne. 2008. Meeting the Great Bliss Queen: Buddhists, Feminists, and the Art
of the Self. Ithaca: Snow Lion.
McCarthy, Erin. 2010. Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood Through Continental,
Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Queen, Christopher, and Duncan Ryuken Williams, eds. 1999. American
Buddhism: Methods and Findings in Recent Scholarship. New York: Routledge.
Willis, Janice. 2008. Dreaming Me: Black, Baptist, and Buddhist—One Woman’s
Spiritual Journey. Somerville: Wisdom Publications.
 CHAPTER 2

The Western Suppression of Anger

Western analyses of anger usually begin with Greek and Roman writings.
Thinkers often use these texts to show that concerns of modern life, unlike
that of the Homeric epic, make the praise of anger incomprehensible. The
literary device that praises the Greek hero through his ability to conjure
divine wrath on the battlefield would seem quaint and out of place today.
Philosophers note, instead, that Greco-Roman thought operates as a
bridge to modern morality and away from the valorization of anger. The
rise of both Christianity and secularism, as divergent roots from Stoicism,
makes the link to a divine anger seem like something that belongs in
the past.
The ideal subject of the Greco-Romans, which endures, taps into divine
logos rather than wrath. While this thematic may seem less male-centered
than those that pivot on the warrior, some feminists argue that such a
framing does little to dislodge the privileged male subject that is at the
center of Western thought. Dignity and recognition still depend on van-
quishing the enemy, but, now, the enemy is emotional sentiment in gen-
eral and anger in particular. Philosophers, who cast women as the
passionate and irrational sex, can use this schema to exclude women from
both the divine and human realm. Men become more akin to the divine
and women, animals—as the latter both lack reason.
Just as philosophers elevate the prestige of men by connecting male
subjectivity to divine logos, they work similarly to link women to anger as
a means to diminish the status of women. What claims could a woman

© The Author(s) 2020 15

S. Yeng, Buddhist Feminism, Palgrave Studies in Comparative
East-West Philosophy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51162-3_2
16 S. YENG

have to subjectivity or recognition if philosophers tend to portray her as

inherently inscrutable? Structuring the nature of Woman in this manner
renders it difficult for women’s resistance or objections to register as any-
thing more than sound and fury. She seems, like particular religious senti-
ment that venerates anger, to be without place.
In an attempt to change the calculus of this narrative, some feminists
have sought to show the philosophical value of emotions and passions. A
few feminists have even challenged traditional readings of anger as a means
to show the importance of women. Given the link between Stoic interpre-
tations of anger and Christian morality, feminists have found it more help-
ful to couple their rendition of anger with a different religious tradition in
order to undo the knot of female subjectivity found in the West. This
chapter culminates with an exploration of reasons feminists may turn to
Buddhist thought as an alternative. Because there are some commonalities
between Buddhist and Stoic philosophy, I seek to explain how Buddhism
diverges in its reading of anger and identity formation.

Anger and the Divine

Peter Sloterdijk (2012) and Leonard Muellner (2004) argue that Ancient
Greeks did not always disparage anger. The turn from Homer’s renderings
of anger to Greco-Roman conceptions of anger marks a reversal of sorts in
the place of anger. In the Iliad and Odyssey, heroes had a special connec-
tion to divine figures through anger. Conjuring anger was not a source of
shame but, rather, a sign of distinction that the hero had a certain kinship
with the gods.
Despite changes in religious sentiment and order from pagan life to
Christianity, the appeal of anger did not vanish immediately. Constantine
and his advisors, quite to the contrary, held fast to the image of an angry
God precisely because it allowed for continuity between Greco-Roman
and Christian life. Religious belief, therefore, did little to determine
whether one would declare anger to have some benefits or none at all.
Emperors such as Constantine emphasized instances where God used
anger to punish and correct humans. Even though portrayals overwhelm-
ingly depict Jesus as kind and gentle, the Bible also records times when he
lashed out in anger.
Robert Thurman notes, “In the Jewish Bible, the angriest person
around seems to be God himself” (Thurman 2006, 32). Indeed, the Old
Testament relays stories of a wrathful and vengeful God. Because Adam
 2 THE WESTERN SUPPRESSION OF ANGER 17

and Eve disobey Him, He curses them both. Adam will not have everlast-
ing life and men, in general, will only garner food from the earth after
great toil. Eve, and all women, will suffer pain during childbirth. Noah’s
ark, too, tells of God’s exasperation with human beings and His desire to
wipe them off the face of the earth (Thurman 2006, 32–33). These
accounts of God hardly portray a measured or temperate use of anger. Not
only is God angry but God’s anger also seems quite unrestrained.
Although Christians often describe Jesus as compassionate and kind,
there are events when even Jesus becomes angry. On one side, there are
directives from Jesus to turn the other cheek and not to be angry with
those who bring harm or injury. “They know not what they do.” Yet there
are circumstances that incur the righteousness of anger. Jesus’ anger at
those who turned God’s house into a marketplace seemed justified as an
example of spiritual anger. Jesus became angry with men who would sully
a sacred place. In other words, Jesus’ anger represents a spontaneous reac-
tion emanating from an upright heart (Pinckaers 2015, 86–87).

Anger and Greco-Roman Philosophy

Shifts in Western conceptions of anger reflect the influence of Greco-­
Roman philosophy. Instances where Jesus becomes angry recede into the
background, while common conceptions of him relay a kind and forgiving
archetype of man. Though there is some tolerance for becoming or feeling
angry in Aristotle, the ideal person still seems to be the one who does not
feel anger. The rise of Stoicism and Seneca’s philosophy, in particular,
remains a cornerstone for contemporary arguments against the show or
use of anger.
Aristotle’s examination of anger via its relation to reason continues to
be an important factor for judging the acceptability of anger. Aristotle,
considered to be a thinker who is more tolerant of anger, believes that
anger and reason can coexist. Seneca, on the other hand, suggests that
each works to conquer and stamp out the other. Contemporary thinkers
also tend to fall into these two camps. In the first, there are those who
believe that anger can be a dangerous but valid emotion. There is justifica-
tion, in other words, to be angry. In the second, there are those who argue
for the elimination of anger because they believe it is always a destructive
emotion. While I will touch upon issues of justice, I will emphasize the
ways philosophers conceive of the relationship—or lack thereof—between
anger and reason. I will also show that analyses of anger, unlike other
18 S. YENG

emotions, often give rise to a system of classifications that mimic ontologi-

cal hierarchies of Greco-Roman philosophers that place logic above feel-
ing or lived experience.
Aristotle’s analysis of the relationship between anger and reason goes
beyond pointing to the faults of the slavish. It is an extension of his exposi-
tion on reason and his temperate philosophy. Because anger can be in
touch with reason, reason can also instruct anger (Aristotle 1991,
11261a1–3). Reason not only moderates the intensity and duration of
anger, but it also works to make anger a less frequent occurrence. While
there are instances where anger is appropriate, Aristotle also makes clear
that many are too quick to anger because they do not heed the rational
part of the soul.
In accordance with his doctrine of the mean, Aristotle believes that
anger is only acceptable when it has the proper target, occurs in the right
measure, and lasts an appropriate amount of time. These caveats show that
Aristotle believes that anger and reason are not mutually exclusive. Unlike
philosophers to follow, Aristotle conceded that there are sometimes good
reasons to be angry. Those who never become angry, even in the face of
injustice or as a result of damages, could also be lacking in virtue. They are
not slaves to emotions but slaves in their cowardice to act against those
who have wronged them.
In a time of warring city-states, the slavish person is more difficult to
locate than those who exhibit unreasonable anger. He who does not
defend himself or his loved ones, however, is no more admirable than a
hotheaded person. Such a person does not understand the connection
between anger and the integrity of one’s beliefs. Through beliefs, we
understand what one understands to be important and holds to be valu-
able—whether it is a possession or person. The absence of anger in these
situations reveals either that the person did not truly value that which was
harmed or is lacking in conviction about what is important to him. Perhaps
even worse, the lack of anger can be a reflection of a certain type of stupid-
ity that does not allow the person to recognize when harm has been pur-
posefully and voluntarily done (Nussbaum 2016, 17). Despite this
unfavorable portrait of the slavish person, even Aristotle believed that
anger usually led to destruction. He believed that anger is necessarily
directed at another person, often ending in the desire for vengeance,
which would give the injured person pleasure.
Seneca built on Aristotle’s work and developed more fully his ideas on
the connection between anger and reason to dispense with anger. Seneca,
 2 THE WESTERN SUPPRESSION OF ANGER 19

too, defined anger as a movement from impulse to affirmation toward the

goal of vengeance (Seneca 2010, 40). In other words, Seneca believed
that anger was volitional in nature. Anger was not simply a mere eruption
of negative emotion. In order for anger to emerge, the aggrieved party
needed to follow his emotions and identify his target for vengeance. Since
the desire for revenge is integral in anger, it shows that a certain amount
of reason is inherent within anger. Humans intend, if not strategize, to
return harm for harm. The human male is different from animals, which
are incapable of anger precisely because they are not reasonable creatures.
Perhaps they will lash out at other animals or beings that may harm them,
but this is more a result of instinct. A man, in contrast, will often plan an
attack and aim at destroying someone who has caused injury. Only the
cool hand of reason can disrupt the desire for vengeance.
Seneca famously relays the story of the reasonable counselor who tries
to persuade an inebriated king to stop drinking to establish a dichotomy
between anger and reason. In response to the counselor’s advice, the king
chose his aide’s son as a target because he was dear to him. He aimed to
kill him as a punishment for the counselor’s gall in reproaching a superior.
Instead of further berating the sovereign or seeking revenge for such a
cruel act, he compliments the king on the shot that killed his son. The
counselor, according to an Aristotelian analysis, may seem slavish because
he does not seek to defend a loved one from harm. This behavior shows
not just a lack of anger but could also hint at a slave’s wish to appease his
lord at whatever cost. Seneca, in contrast, applauds his ability to respond
in a calm manner. The soberness of the counselor is what helps him to
resist the influence of anger. Seneca uses this story to show that anger can
be overcome even in the most difficult situations. If someone forced to
watch the death of his son at the hands of a terrible tyrant could respond
with composure, then those of us who become angry at much less can
work to control feelings of anger too.
Of course, the person who does not act in defense could also suffer
from cowardice. Bravery, as a practical virtue, cannot be taught through
intellectual means. Therefore, the need to induce bravery or overcome
cowardice may not be a matter for reason. When reason cannot do the job,
then the ruler of emotions can perhaps take on a positive role. Maybe as a
signal that he is a product of his times, Aristotle suggests that anger can be
useful as it helps to vanquish fear. If the paralysis of fear is wholly unac-
ceptable for the Greek male, anger may not only be the preferable emo-
tion but also a positive antidote to fear (Thurman 2006, 32).
20 S. YENG

Though he would agree with Aristotle that courage is a virtue, Seneca

argues that the development of courage need not involve the use of anger.
In the case of the story above, any angry words or actions on the part of
the counselor would be more a sign of stupidity than courage. On the one
hand, Aristotle may rightly believe that the counselor behaved slavishly if
he complimented the king just to protect his own life. On the other hand,
Seneca suggests that the counselor understands that others were also in
danger. Taking an aggressive approach and showing hostility toward the
king may well have led to the deaths of countless others who were in
attendance. The counselor may have used reason to craft the only response
that could have calmed the situation and reduced the chance of greater
carnage.
When faced with fear on the battlefield or in life, courage can suffi-
ciently take the lead as the main actor (Seneca 2010, 40). The unenlight-
ened may believe that anger evokes a greater sense of courage. The
reasonable, on the other hand, know that the fortification of courage can
be done without indulging in angry sentiment. More focus on instilling
courage, as something separate from anger, will also lead to greater cour-
age. If anger becomes a means to induce courage, courage may be difficult
to summon in situations off the battlefield.
While war and conquest were still a part of Roman life, Seneca’s phi-
losophy regarding courage and anger points to another insuperable target
that transcends all eras: death. The more pressing matter for Stoic philoso-
phy, in continuity with Ancient Greek thought, was a meditation on the
end of life for the common individual. Because the ability to face death
with courage was of paramount concern for Romans, displays of violence
and violent deaths worked to help citizens confront their own mortality.
Many will not encounter death at the hands of a combatant. Instead, death
will likely meet us after a slow decline in life. In this context, the idea that
anger and courage could be thought together in order to achieve a victory
against the opposing warrior misses the point. Anger at death is futile, for
no amount of anger will result in the vanquishing of death. The only dig-
nified response is to face death with courage and without anger. Coupling
anger and courage would be of no use against death. If anything, anger
could diminish the human capacity to confront the end of life with cour-
age. Preparing to face death with courage, for Seneca, also required get-
ting rid of the device that many used to evoke courage: anger.
Seneca’s turn to the individual, likewise, employs reason against those
who are self-centered. Contrary to the idea that anger bolsters positive
 2 THE WESTERN SUPPRESSION OF ANGER 21

qualities such as courage, Seneca focuses on the negative repercussions for

the individual who harbors feelings of anger and not only the harm for the
socio-political group. The angry person suffers from physical and mental
distress. He who is angry could burst blood vessels and cause a fair face to
turn foul (Seneca 2010, 60–61). The mind too undergoes turmoil as a
result of anger (Seneca 2010, 68). Still, Seneca suggests that developing a
calm demeanor through reason is possible for all of us. He, perhaps even
more than Aristotle, thought anger was susceptible to the powers of rea-
son. Because reason plays a role in anger, reason could also diminish and
negate anger altogether. Eradicating anger within us requires thoughtful-
ness about our behavior and emotions. To this end, Seneca suggests daily
exercises to help us analyze our progression toward greater calmness.
Asking which of our ills we healed today (Seneca 2010, 91) not only
allows us to reflect on our trigger points but also allows us to recognize
that progress against anger and other negative emotions can occur.

Anger and Male Subjectivity

Greater concern over the interior dimensions of the individual rather than
developing attributes that would be praised by society in battle or litera-
ture reveals an enduring message within analyses of anger. In the works of
Aristotle and Seneca, anger still has a distinctive status because it begins to
turn into the combatant of the divine. The privileged male of the ancien
regime continues to be the standard for subjectivity but in a different fash-
ion. He connects with the divine through logic rather than through divine
wrath. His battles are within himself and not an opposing warrior.
The Stoic subject, therefore, must not only fight against anger when
confronted by another but also work on the self. According to Michel
Foucault, “[t]he practice of the self is conceived as a permanent battle. It
is not simply a matter of sharpening a man of valor for the future. The
individual must be given the weapons and the courage that will enable him
to fight all his life” (Foucault 1997, 97). The path toward the betterment
of the self does not only arise for warriors on the battlefield. Everyday life,
for common people, presents a challenge and an opportunity for growth.
Stoics couch the practice of the self as an ongoing struggle to respond to
injustices, slights, and temptations. Seneca may have focused on anger,
but the Stoic program sets out to defuse emotion in general.
In order to fully understand these enduring Greco-Roman interpreta-
tions of anger, it is first necessary to examine briefly the philosophical view
22 S. YENG

of emotions in general and then contextualize the place of anger among

emotions. Philosophers, as is widely known, pit emotion against reason. If
reason is a divine quality, emotion is that which not only belongs to
humans but also something humans share with animals. Humans, there-
fore, need to make greater use of reason in order to be closer to the divine
and control their emotions, lest they become animals. Most ancient phi-
losophers describe human life as a struggle between emotion and reason.
The only way to guard against imprudent action is to use reason to quell
one’s emotions.
If emotions, in general, are dangerous, then anger is all the more dan-
gerous because it is the master of all passions. Emotions like love and
greed are no match for anger. When anger takes hold, the love for family
and friends dissipates and leads to harsh words or even violence. Anger can
cause the greedy to scatter his wealth and destroy prized possessions
(Seneca 2010, 62). As king of all emotions, anger is in touch with all other
subjects of the emotional realm. It, furthermore, has a stealthy power that
allows it to mix with other passions and intensify them. Because anger
often spurs action in the hopes of obtaining revenge, any emotional cock-
tail that involves anger can be deadly. On its own, jealousy may not lead to
any particular hostile action. Jealousy combined with anger, however, can
induce a scorned lover to kill his beloved. Although the dismissal of anger
can be part of the larger philosophical project to do away with emotion,
philosophers often highlight ways anger—unlike other emotions—con-
nect to subjectivity and socio-political concerns. Anger, therefore, seems
to have a special status among emotions in that it has intensity enough to
conquer other interests and even reason.
More to the point, he who can control his emotions (and anger in par-
ticular) through reason gains greater recognition as a subject—regardless
of his experience on the warfront. Judith Butler explains that “assujetisse-
ment denotes both the becoming of the subject and the process of subjec-
tion—one inhabits the figure of autonomy only by becoming subjected to
a power” (Butler 1997, 83). In other words, a person gains subjectivity by
proving that he can subject himself to authority and power. By showing
that one can respect certain rules and norms, a person gains recognition as
a subject. If becoming a subject depends upon the ability to wield and
yield to power appropriately, the case of anger lends itself nicely for testing
this dynamic. The ability to repress anger or respond calmly to someone
else’s anger often works as a sign that the subject recognizes the prohibi-
tions in place against acting in anger. By repressing one’s anger, a person
 2 THE WESTERN SUPPRESSION OF ANGER 23

shows that he can practice self-regulation in a manner that mimics the

dictates of social order. Controlling one’s anger is simultaneously a means
of exercising power over oneself and following the norms set by authority
figures that expect reason to overrule emotion.
Despite the rise of the common man that Nietzsche sees in Greco-­
Roman philosophy, inclusion of subjects stops short of women (among
other out-groups). Subjectivity could be granted to men who did not
belong to the aristocracy or warrior class if they could martial their skills
against anger and other emotions. Women, in contrast, could not over-
come emotion and anger. By dismissing anger in women, Seneca’s phi-
losophy does not attempt to find a way for women to overcome it. There
is not, in a sense, a possible path that allows for women to claim subjectiv-
ity through the same process of repressing anger because Seneca never
fully deals with female anger. It perhaps should not be a surprise that
attention to female anger coincides with greater tolerance for anger—but
still not necessarily from philosophers of the canonical tradition.

Anger and Contemporary Theories

Unlike Stoics and Christian theologians, some psychologists suggest that
the internalization of anger can create psychological and physical harm
(Kemp and Strongman 1995, 414). This attitude represents one of the
few changes in contemporary analyses of anger. Because most of us will
not find ourselves in the few extreme instances where anger is allowed,1
anger is still largely looked down upon. Yet more recent psychological
perspectives on anger show that repressing anger, whatever the cause, can
be harmful to health. Their treatise on anger, while not necessarily dimin-
ishing negative ideas about anger, does challenge the idea that the best
way to handle anger is to contain it.
More modern analyses of anger are also now taking into account the
role of gender—which was largely ignored by scholars before. Although
Seneca did make reference to women in a few passages, he aimed his trea-
tise on anger for a male audience. Unlike the lengthy examples and analy-
ses he gives in trying to explain male anger, he does not have much to say
about an angry woman. He writes, “the anger of… women is more sharp
than grievous, and rather trivial at its onset” (Seneca 2010, 47). The feel-
ing of anger as it arises in women is not to be taken seriously.
That Seneca’s discussion about anger ignores women is ever clearer
when we consider the recurring theme of violence couched in the analyses
24 S. YENG

of anger. According to many contemporary thinkers, it is much more

likely that a man responds violently due to anger. Violence, even in
Seneca’s reading, is not a tool that women take up with the same fre-
quency as men. This is not to say that thinkers believe that women should
be given license to express their anger. The difference is one of image.
Portrayals of angry women often have them bursting into tears. Women,
too, should restrain anger lest she be branded hysterical. Men, in contrast,
are thought to express anger through violence. Therefore, treatises like
those of Seneca warning against the violence resulting from anger seem
only to address male anger (Olberding 2008, 409).
The specter of the angry, and therefore hysterical, woman still seems to
haunt Western philosophy. Although feminists have challenged philoso-
phy’s dismissal of emotion, few feminist philosophers have sought to study
anger. Feminists have enriched philosophy through discussions on melan-
choly, desire, and jouissance but analyses of anger remain problematic for
being, if not simply taboo, unproductive. Martha Nussbaum, one of the
few contemporary feminist philosophers who have provided a prolonged
analysis of anger, comes to more or less the same conclusion as Seneca.
She believes that anger is irrational and futile (Nussbaum 2016, 249).
Women, who do dare to draw different conclusions about anger—per-
haps unsurprisingly—belong to another discipline or seem on the out-
skirts of philosophy. Although philosophers would not necessarily deny
the insights found in the literature of Virginia Woolf, no one identifies
Woolf as a philosopher. Even outside the realm of philosophy, Woolf’s
treatment of anger has created controversy. She seems, on the one hand,
to capture the intensity and power of anger that threatens to overwhelm
others from writing or expressing themselves. On the other hand, she,
too, warns that anger can drive a person insane. More than a few portray-
als of Woolf depict her as a brilliant but mad woman who may not have
been able to tame her many demons, including anger. Should Woolf have
heeded Seneca’s warning not to allow anger to arise even in instances of
injustices? Or is the figure of Woolf used as part of a long-standing project
to silence women who are angry?
Perhaps the need women feel to repress feelings of anger may be a rem-
nant of the ancient project that places women, emotion, and anger as
opposing forces to truth and reason. Male philosophers have repeatedly
cast women as incapable or deficient in regard to reason. Anger, even in
men, works as an impediment to understanding the situation clearly or
seeing the truth. Women’s anger, therefore, is a double dose of
 2 THE WESTERN SUPPRESSION OF ANGER 25

anti-reason. “Woolf’s anxious response to anger is caused by a culture

that … constructs ‘truths’ that aim to make both ‘women’s anger’ and
feminist critique deviant: reigning discourses in our century, whether
political, critical, or psychological, have constructed truths that con-
demned anger, at least women’s anger, and with it feminist critique as
destructive of truth” (Helal 2005, 78).
Although it is no longer acceptable or commonplace for thinkers to
baldly cast an angry woman as hysterical, the outlet—or lack thereof—for
women’s anger has largely remained the same. Whereas Seneca asserted
that anger has all the impact of a thoughtless woman, contemporary think-
ers cannot openly equate the futility of anger with woman’s lot. However,
the belief that women do have a great deal of anger and that anger amounts
to a trifling is still quite common. Recognizing that his contemporaries
not only believed that women lacked reason but also thought women to
be worth little, Seneca likened anger to women as a means to devalue
both. Anger, a sign of the empty-headed and slow-witted, is a particularly
womanish quality (Seneca 2010, 32). Despite some sympathy for the suf-
fering of women, many thinkers still believe that the show of anger is
unseemly and for naught. Robert Thurman acknowledges the difficulty
for women whose anger is still frowned upon as shrewish and hysterical.
He even adds that modern liberated women have cause to feel anger due
to male chauvinist intimidation, domination, and oppression (Thurman
2006, 17–18). Still, the trajectory of his work on anger is clear. It is
destructive for everyone involved and it is interesting that he points to
women as a particular sub-group who feel it necessary to use anger
as a tool.
As such, the angry woman is a paradoxical figure. She exists in relation
to nothingness. She has nothing for which to be angry, so women should
be careful never to express anger. Yet despite the insistence that she is to
be dismissed, she engenders a great deal of fear—and even anger—amongst
others. “Though feminist anger conjures up fear and consequently draws
attention, it has all but disappeared in feminist discourse … because it is
commonly ‘evoked as a spectacle or the spectacular eruption of an illegiti-
mate and dismissible anger’” (Helal 2005, 79). The idea that a woman’s
anger arises from petty matters, of course, is not a new one and raises the
possibility that even feminism has not been able to break with the tradi-
tional philosophical view on anger.
The idea that anger is unfruitful, however, is reminiscent of Seneca’s
critique of anger. Anger expressed by the powerless is considered an
26 S. YENG

ineffectual gesture toward victimization. Therefore, should be suppressed.

When it arises, it is seen as a loss of control (Kemp and Strongman 1995,
410). Unlike the cool aide to the drunken king in Seneca’s story, women
do not recognize that they are not in positions of power and, therefore,
should not protest. Seneca, even in his time, recognized that there would
be just reason to become angry but that following such urges would be
aggravating and foolish. Because injustice and idiocy are in such great sup-
ply, the reasonable man may have plenty occasions to become angry.
Seneca adds, however, that the rational person would spend his entire life
in a state of rage if he were to become angry at all that is wrong with the
world. Since this would lead to a disagreeable life, it is better not to
become angry.
Of course, feminists have argued that such a critique of anger is a shabby
attempt to maintain the status quo. Cultural critic and thinker, bell hooks,
states, “One of the things that happens when you decolonize your mind is
that it becomes hard to function in the society, because you’re no longer
behaving in ways people feel comfortable with” (hooks 1999, 85). Seneca
seems to suggest that the person who would become angry benefits the
most from remaining calm. Although hooks would agree that the person
who resists showing anger fits better within society, she argues that the
break with social norms is necessary and beneficial for oppressed people. If
this rupture with codes of conduct leads to anger, so be it. It may also be
the case that others who do not approve of a woman’s resistance to norms
may mark her as angry. In other words, not conforming to social regula-
tions may be enough to earn her the label of “angry woman,” whether or
not she actually is angry.
Butler’s philosophy, like that of hooks, allows for using the prejudice
against women as a means to challenge power dynamics. She asserts, “The
self-colonizing trajectory of certain forms of identity politics are symp-
tomatic of this paradoxical embrace of the injurious term. As a further
paradox, then, only by occupying—being occupied by—that injurious
term can I resist and oppose it, recasting the power that constitutes me as
the power I oppose” (Butler 1997, 104). By accepting the conventional
reading of anger and the stereotype that women are quick to anger and
that female anger, therefore, is unworthy of philosophical analysis, femi-
nists can expose weaknesses and faults in the staid analyses of anger.
The connection between anger and violence or retribution, for instance,
reveals a male bias in at least two ways. On the one hand, psychologists
have suggested that the line of thinking that argues for the repression of
 2 THE WESTERN SUPPRESSION OF ANGER 27

anger in an attempt to stave off violence seems largely to be addressing

male responses. The conventional view is that tears, rather than violence,
are the sign of women’s anger (Olberding 2008, 409). If women are
unlikely to express anger through violent acts, then what Western philoso-
phers say about anger does not apply to women. On the other hand, bell
hooks argues that the tendency to deny women violent impulses is also
problematic. She writes, “I was also frightened by the kind of ‘construc-
tion of difference’ that makes it appear that there is some space of rage and
anger that men inhabit, that is alien to us women… it’s easy to slip into
imagining that those are ‘male’ spaces, rather than ask the question, ‘What
do we as women do with our rage?’” (hooks 1999, 80). Is it really the case
that an angry woman does not have thoughts of and desire for violence?
Through telling her own story, hooks suggests that women not only can
become angry but also have violent impulses as a result of anger. If women,
too, can link anger to revenge, then there is no reason that prevailing
Western analyses of anger should exclude women. Yet, they do.
Seneca describes many situations where anger arises and leads to vio-
lence, but women are never the agents of violence in these scenarios. It is
possible that such narratives about anger have worked to make it known
that women are to be denied not only anger but also violent impulses. The
erasure of women from discourse about anger is what drives women to
find other outlets for anger. Thus, it may not be the case that women are
so different from men in that they do not want to respond to anger with
violence, but that violence is thought to be completely of the male domain.
Just as Western philosophy has sought to suppress anger, the discipline
has also worked to push thinkers who discuss anger far from its center.
Rita Gross laments her inability to find a home in a university philosophy
department despite her philosophical training. Luce Irigaray’s “talking
back” (Oliver 2017) to the Western cannon and theoreticians led to loss
of her post at a prestigious French institution, which perhaps pushed her
closer to the margins of the philosophical world. Irigaray did not express
her personal outrage over this excommunication, but many feminist phi-
losophers believe her anger with the Western philosophical tradition is
evident in her work. As a cultural critic, bell hooks is taught in certain
philosophy courses but would not necessarily be claimed by the discipline
as one of their own. Although bell hooks does not want to be labeled as
an angry woman, she has contributed a great deal to the discourse of anger
in diverse fields to challenge the white supremacist capitalist patriarchy.
28 S. YENG

I would not reduce any of these thinkers to their ideas about anger nor
would I suggest that anger predominantly colors their views. I offer,
instead, that they each find anger and examinations of anger to be philo-
sophically valuable. Considering the largely dismissive and negative atti-
tude toward anger, it is not surprising that they would look elsewhere for
resources to think more seriously about anger. That they all turn to
Buddhism, however, is telling. In what follows, I will explore why
Buddhist treatments of anger can be helpful for feminist thinkers and how
such analyses tie into other possible resources in Buddhism for feminist
thought.

The Turn to Buddhism

Considering that there are some commonalities between Stoic and
Buddhist philosophies, why would some feminists be more drawn to the
latter? No one in either tradition would advocate for the cultivation of
anger. This shows that the root of anger is not the injury but self-­
centeredness. The current Dalai Lama, drawing from Shantideva’s scrip-
tures, suggests that anger is not only unreasonable but so toxic that
“anger…, even for a single instant, has the capacity to destroy virtues col-
lected over a thousand eons” (Gyatso 1997, 6). Only recently has Thich
Nhat Hanh, Buddhist monk and scholar, suggested that anger should be
treated as something other than a poison. Stoics, in a move that resembles
the well-worn image of Buddhists, also advocate meditation as a means for
addressing anger. The difference, however, is that Stoic meditation turns
on inculcation of ideals rather than an attempt to understand why feelings
of anger have arisen, as recommended by Buddhists. Foucault explains
that Seneca’s philosophy requires “the absorption of a truth imparted by
a teaching, a reading, or a piece of advice; and one assimilates it so thor-
oughly that it becomes a part of oneself… In a practice such as this, one
does not rediscover a truth hidden deep within oneself through an impulse
of recollection; one internalizes accepted texts through a more and more
thorough appropriation” (Foucault 1997, 101). Buddhists, in contrast,
believe that we should acknowledge the existence of anger rather than
treating it like a combatant to be vanquished. Meditation on anger in the
Buddhist tradition allows for the recognition of hurt and suffering. Instead
of trying to internalize the Stoic code of reason that dictates the futility of
anger, Buddhists hope to defuse anger by caring for the pain that has
caused it rather than trying to push it aside by way of cold reason.
 2 THE WESTERN SUPPRESSION OF ANGER 29

Greater contrasts between Buddhist and Stoic approaches can be found

in the voices in leadership and the conception of the self that challenges
the privilege of the autonomous male subject. Though the idea of an
angry Buddhist would strike many as an oxymoron, contemporary
Buddhist leaders admit that they, too, become angry from time to time.
This is quite a departure from Western philosophers who seem to discuss
anger at a distance. The honesty of Buddhist leaders reflects their human-
ist values, which resists the idea that only divine beings or a select few who
have risen above human nature. Theravada Buddhists feel no need to raise
the status of the Buddha from man to deity. He, like the rest of us, was
human. As a result of this philosophy, they conclude that we, humans, also
can achieve enlightenment. Mahayana Buddhists, despite attributing
divine qualities to the Buddha, concur that Buddha nature is within us all.
Because there is less pressure to live up to divine ideals, there can be
greater candor about human qualities and emotions such as anger. Unlike
in Western philosophy, anger does not disqualify people from being lead-
ers or thinkers. Buddhism, at least in principle, is more gender-inclusive
because it does not shun what is common to humanity and worldly life.
Because Western philosophers have long portrayed women as too bound
to the earth and nature, it is perhaps not surprising that feminists would
gravitate to a tradition that pays respect to human life and attention to
lived experiences.
How can feminists, then, turn the transformation of anger into the
foundation of ethics rather than what needs to be pushed aside for ethics
to emerge? That Buddhist leaders not only admit feelings of anger but also
believe in the possibility of transforming anger casts it in a more positive
light. On the one hand, the transformation of anger is consistent with
Buddhist ideology concerning the impermanent and codependent nature
of all things. Anger, like everything else, is not a stable state of being. With
the movement of life and existence, anger, too, will change. Thus,
Buddhists such as Nhat Hanh do not conceive of anger as wholly negative.
The transformation of anger alludes to the ability for us all to change the
way we think about the false dichotomies we erect in order to create
intractable identities. In this way, anger and the transformation of anger,
especially, are not useless feelings to be thrown away at the first avail-
able chance.
On the other hand, the Buddhist allowance for transformation can pro-
vide hope for feminists who see patriarchal structures at play within
Buddhism too. If Buddhists believe that change is inevitable and part of
30 S. YENG

the structure of life, then perhaps there is a greater likelihood for change
in the institutional practice of Buddhism than in Western philosophy. This
would allow for greater access for women and a movement toward a post-­
patriarchal Buddhism for which Rita Gross hopes. In this way, the trans-
formation of anger points to the possibility of change even in the most
entrenched ideals and persistent institutions.
I suggest that Buddhist literature on anger may be attractive for femi-
nists in large part because it does not seem written exclusively for men.
Buddhists do not believe that anger belongs to men but is lacking in
women because they resist philosophical dualism. That Buddhists do not
buy into the idea of the “eternal feminine” or the “eternal male” may
contribute to a message that applies to both genders. Buddhist discussions
about anger, at least in the abstract, can address women’s responses and
concerns. Where Westerners draw strong connections between anger and
violence, Buddhists do not immediately make this jump. As such, perhaps
feminists find that there is a greater opening or recognition of other
options that are not coded in male terms.
Most Buddhists believe that anger stems from the delusion of the inde-
pendent self (Thurman 2006, 51–52). When the will of the autonomous
self seems to fail, a person becomes angry as he recognizes that the uni-
verse does not revolve around him. In an interpretation of Shantideva, the
Dalai Lama further connects anger to egotism. He suggests that many
become angry when harm befalls them or those close to them. However,
they feel nothing when the same injury afflicts a stranger or enemy (Gyatso
1997, 22).
In the next chapter, I will discuss further the implications of genderless
and sexless philosophical views that engenders a different approach to
anger. Because Buddhists intertwine discourse on anger with their meta-
physical belief in “no-self,” Buddhist analyses of anger seem to be less
male-oriented than that of the West. Buddhist scholars often couch their
discussions about anger in relation to the defense of the self. Their anti-
dote to anger, in part, entails letting go of egotism. They, like Western
philosophers, contend that anger arises mostly in response to injury to the
self. However, they place an emphasis on the attachment to the self rather
than on injury.
 2 THE WESTERN SUPPRESSION OF ANGER 31

Note
1. Even when injustices seem so great as to warrant anger, thinkers such as
Nussbaum praise Mandela, Gandhi, and King for responding without anger
(Nussbaum 2016, 212).

References
Aristotle. 1991. On Rhetoric. Trans. George A. Kennedy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Butler, Judith. 1997. The Psychic Life of Power. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Foucault, Michel. 1997. The Hermeneutic of the Subject. In Ethics: Subjectivity
and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: The New Press.
Gyatso, Tenzin. 1997. His Holiness the XIVth Dalai Lama. Healing Anger: The
Power of Patience from a Buddhist Perspective. Trans. Thupten Jinpa.
New York: Penguin.
Helal, Kathleen M. 2005. Anger, Anxiety, Abstraction: Virginia Woolf’s
‘Submerged Truth’. South Central Review 22 (2): 78–94.
hooks, bell. 1999. bell hooks. In Angry Women, ed. Andrea Juno and V. Vale,
78–97. New York: Juno Books.
Kemp, Simon, and K.T. Strongman. 1995. Anger Theory and Management: A
Historical Analysis. American Journal of Psychology 108 (3): 397–417.
Muellner, Leonard. 2004. The Anger of Achilles: Menis in Greek Epic. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2016. Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Forgiveness,
Justice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Olberding, Amy. 2008. ‘A Little Throat Cutting in the Meantime:’ Seneca’s
Violent Imagery. Philosophy and Literature 32 (1): 130–144.
Oliver, Kelly. 2017. Reading Nietzsche with Irigaray: Not Your Garden-Variety
Philosophy. http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/nietzsche1313/files/2017/03/
Oliver-Nietzsche-13-13-1.pdf. Accessed 15 April 2017.
Pinckaers, Servais. 2015. Passions in Virtue. Trans. Benedict M. Guevin.
Washington, DC: Catholic University Press.
Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. 2010. Anger, Mercy, Revenge. Trans. Robert A. Kaster
and Martha C. Nussbaum. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sloterdijk, Peter. 2012. Rage and Time: A Psychopolitical Investigation. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Thurman, Robert. 2006. Anger: The Seven Deadly Sins. New York: Oxford
University Press.
 CHAPTER 3

Vulnerability, Volatility, and the No-Self

Because canonical Western philosophy often paints a negative portrait of

women, it is not surprising that feminists would search elsewhere for posi-
tive frameworks for thinking Woman and the female subject. Buddhist
philosophy, at first glance, may appear to be an odd choice. One of its
fundamental principles, that of “no-self,” seemingly indicates that
Buddhists would seek to undo the self rather than provide resources for
understanding the female self. Yet feminists who propose a non-essentialist
concept of women echo many of the same ideas contained in no-self. In
return, scholars who want to challenge the notion that the Buddhist tradi-
tion is inherently patriarchal also make use of non-essentialist feminist phi-
losophy in their endeavors.
Non-essentialist feminists and Buddhist scholars, alike, point the way to
playing with values and the creativity in the unstable self. The instability of
identity has led contemporary thinkers to show the positive aspects of
objects and beings that philosophers have traditionally read as dangerous
or unimportant. In the case of women and other undesirable bodies, they
become contested sites or places where resourcefulness and imagination
emerge. Although contemporary Western thinkers such as Judith Butler
have shown that that which has traditionally been coded as negative (i.e.
women) can be seen in a positive light, there is still a resistance to applying
this theoretical framework to anger. I argue that this productive under-
standing of volatility can be applied to anger by using feminist and
Buddhist philosophy together.

© The Author(s) 2020 33

S. Yeng, Buddhist Feminism, Palgrave Studies in Comparative
East-West Philosophy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51162-3_3
34 S. YENG

Non-essentialist Feminism
Because feminists recognize that Western philosophers have often defined
humans in ways that exclude or ignore female experience, many believe
that feminists should also avoid using this universalizing strategy when
theorizing about women. Iris Marion Young explains, “A major strategy
for feminist critiques of Western philosophy has been to expose how its
concepts of the human harbor categorical and normative biases derived
from male experience and from the experience of patriarchal privilege”
(Young 1990, 898). Alison Stone adds that universal claims about women
are false and are part of normalizing strategies (Stone 2004, 135). Just as
the experiences of men differ from that of women, the experiences of cer-
tain women—particularly those who are white and middle class—diverge
from women who are of different races and/or class backgrounds. If femi-
nists mean to unify womanness, they risk repeating the same mistake that
canonical Western philosophers made. Thus, some feminists fear that
beginning from an explicit or tacit form of universal woman will elide
important differences in the attempt to claim solidarity.
Elizabeth Spelman argues against grouping all women under one meta-
physical category and, thereby, assuming a common quality joins all
women. Spelman, instead, suggests that there is no real foundation that
connects women across race, class, and cultural lines. She, and feminists
who are critical of gender realism, believe instead that womanness is insep-
arable from categories such as race, class, and culture. What it means to be
a woman, in other words, cannot be thought or understood as a stand-­
alone category. To think that a white woman can understand the experi-
ence of a black or Latina woman is to assume that white women have
access to a universal perspective (Spelman 1990).
Many feminists of color point to the differences in political struggles as
a means to protest the tendency to take the white, middle-classed woman
as standard. While white feminist movements focused on the ability for
women to work outside the home, for example, many women of color
were already expected to do so (Spillers 1987). This struggle for employ-
ment, therefore, mainly addressed the grievances and concerns of white
women of privileged backgrounds.
Spelman also argues that womanness is constructed within culture.
What it means to be a woman cannot be divorced from cultural standards,
norms, and expectations. Although there may be a temptation to assume
 3 VULNERABILITY, VOLATILITY, AND THE NO-SELF 35

that there is a baseline for what constitutes women in all cultures, those
arguing against essentialism in any shape or form believe that cultures
bring their own nuances and contours to such norms. That women are
generally taken to be heterosexual may seem to function as a minimum
requirement of womanness. However, what it means to be heterosexual in
particular cultures differs and, therefore, cannot be used as a constant vari-
able (Stone 2004, 145). Here, philosophy causes fractures to appear in the
illusory metaphysical thinking about women as a unified group.
Essentialism cannot adequately address how each woman and women are
constituted within a vast matrix of identities that are constantly undergo-
ing reinterpretation (Stone 2004, 148).

Codependent Arising and Woman

Buddhists espouse similar theories as non-essentialist feminists, even if
Woman is not the focal point of Buddhist philosophy. The theory of code-
pendent arising works to undo the privileging of one thing or being over
another. Instead of pondering which being is primordial or which is the
most important part of the self, codependent arising begins from the
standpoint that everything is interconnected and interdependent. This
philosophy begets the concept of “no-self,” which means that the self is
neither a unified nor stable subject.
Contrary to the autonomous self that Westerners tend to favor,
Buddhists believe that the self is woven from the intermingling of five
aggregates. Walpola Rahula, Theravadin Buddhist monk and scholar,
explains that these aggregates are matter, sense, perception, volition for-
mations, and consciousness. Matter refers to the physical and bodily
aspects of the self. Senses include touch, sight, taste, and so on. Perceptions
are registered senses. Mental formations such as desire and aversion are
emotions that come about through habitual tendencies. Many associate
consciousness with mind. Although Buddhists may not altogether resist
this correlation, they are quick to note that mind is not separate or more
important than the other aggregates. Consciousness or mind does not
exist on its own. It must be conscious of something. Consistent with this
logic, these interdependent or codependent aggregates shape what we call
the “self.” The self, therefore, is not an independent mind but, rather, an
amalgamation of ever-changing parts. Belief in a separate self or fixed
identity is a sign of craving that leads to suffering and delusion because
Another random document with
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of Silmästä
silmään
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
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Title: Silmästä silmään

Runoja

Author: Uuno Kailas

Release date: September 19, 2023 [eBook #71684]

Language: Finnish

Original publication: Helsinki: Holger Schildtin kust.Oy, 1926

Credits: Jari Koivisto

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SILMÄSTÄ

SILMÄÄN ***
SILMÄSTÄ SILMÄÄN

Runoja

Kirj.

UUNO KAILAS

Helsingissä, Holger Schildtin Kustannusosakeyhtiö, 1926.

"Kun hän näkee, kuinka maailmassa kaikki oliot hävittäen

sotivat toisiansa vastaan, kuinka kaikki nuoruus kuihtuu,
kaikki voima katoaa ja kaikki kirous sammuu, kun hän
silmästä silmään katsoo sitä tuntematonta tahtoa, joka on
säätänyt kaikki nämä synkät lait, niin iloitsee hän enemmän
kuin koskaan tietämisen onnesta ja totuuden ravitsemana hän
on kauhistavan onnellinen."

Auguste Rodin.
SISÄLLYS;

Vaeltajan oodi.

Vaeltajan oodi.

Peitetyt kasvot.

Ilta.
Peitetyt kasvot.
Uni.
Spleen.
Enkeli.
Ahnas portti.
Olit poissa —
Jumalan tyttäret.
Kohtalon lyhty.
Syntyminen.

Trubaduuri.

Kesää.
Ruusumajassa.
Trubaduuri.
Kuuma syli.
Pieni syntinen laulu.
Pienessä maassa.
Hiiret.
Rotta.
Noli me tangere!
Veljelleni.
Pieniä hautoja.
 Luominen.

Luominen.
Korvenhaltian kuolema.
Valo ja ihminen.
Vainajain kevätnäky.
Karavaani.

De profundis.

Näky kadulta.
Onnellinen.
Paennut lintu.
Hämähäkki.
Runoilija.
Nälkä.
Autio pelto.
De profundis.
Eräs in memoriam.

Pronssia.

Salto mortale.
Pitkäperjantai.
Pronssia.
Yksinäinen ratsastaja.
Totuus.

Ihmisen määrä.

Ihmisen määrä.

Purressa.
 Runoilijan laulu.
Purressa.
Vaimon valitus.
Jos oisin tuli —
Ritari Olavi.
Säkeitä tuntemattomasta.
Hymni kauneudelle.
Viinihoure.
Kohoaminen.
Albatross.
Isä ja poika.
Vanha talo.
Sataa.
Kummittelijat.
Angelika.
Rakkaus.
Dooneyn soittaja.

VAELTAJAN OODI
VAELTAJAN OODI

Kahtahalla on kotipaikka sulla:

toinen kehto on sekä hauta toinen.
Vierahissa kuljet sa kaiken matkaa
toisesta toiseen.

Mutta sentään on jano sulla lentoon

Sallimuksen, äitisi, kämmeneltä
pilviteille, miss' oman siipes isku
tietäsi aukoo.

Sillä tiedät: on omas matka yksin,

kaikki muu on äitisi kämmenellä.
Tahdot, kaiken-nälkäinen, lentos piirin
ohjata loitos.

Kaukaisuuden tuon, mikä silmään siintää,

maiden ääret, myös arot valtamerten,
taivaan tähti-tunturit — kaiken mielit
luonasi nähdä.

Siivet pilven kylkihin arveluitta:

taipaleella saat tuta kaikki tunnot!
Ties on vaaksa, mutta se vaaksa kulkee
outoa suuntaa.

Kuullen maanituksia Paanin huilun

pilviteiltä jos kevätlehtoon suostut,
joutsenkaulaa kietonet lähteen luona
nauravan neidon —

mut et kauan malta: on kiire sulla.

Kun soi ukkosrumpu ja nuolet sinkoo,
lähdet jälleen: saa veres liekehtimään
taistelun vaisto.

Vastavoimat nyt syvin, huimin pyörtein

tielles kiertää. Saat tuta tuskan nielut,
päivänpaiste-tuokion pienet riemut,
tappion rauhan.

Siellä täällä näät monen miehen luita.

Niistä kaiken on lihan nakerrellut
ahnas paahde tai pedot. Käärme ryömii
silmästä jonkun.

Katsot ympärillesi: aavikoita.

Hiljaisuutta kuuntelet, yksinäinen.
Itses silloin näät sinä ensi kerran
silmästä silmään:

aavikoita sielläkin, hiljaisuutta;

askelista on veriläikät jääneet;
kaiken yllä on syvä iltarusko:
Kuoleman silmä.
 Siivet pilven kylkihin arveluitta:
kohta saavut äitisi kämmenelle!
Ties on vaaksa, mutta se vaaksa kulkee
outoa maata.

PEITETYT KASVOT
ILTA

Nään purren purjeitansa riisuvan.

Taa ratavallin käärmekiemuran
jo päättyi pakomatka auringon.
Sen kintereillä ahnas pilvi on.

Se linnun lailla lentää yli maan

ojossa kaula, kita ammollaan
kuin auringon, yön tulikärpäsen,
se mielis pyydystää ja niellä sen.

Ja rannan kaislat ovat niitetyt.

Rutaisen veden kyräilevän nyt
kuin oudon, ripsettömän silmän nään
maan iltaan autioon ja hämärään.

Ja tuuli viimeisillään lepattaa

ja pian siiviltänsä putoaa
kuin ajatus, mi hämyretkellään
saa liian kauas — säikkyy itseään.
PEITETYT KASVOT

Minä usein unessa miehen nään, joka kasvonsa peittää —

hän ääneti seisoo, ja kädellään hän kasvonsa peittää.

— Mitä pelkää hän, mitä kaihtaa hän

miks kasvonsa peittää?
Näyn jonkin nähneekö hirveän
ja kasvonsa peittää —

vai säikkyykö omaa sieluaan, siks kasvonsa peittää —?

Hän on kalpea, ei puhu milloinkaan, mut kasvonsa peittää.
UNI

Kuin kädet kuolleen ihmisen ovat puiden oksat kuivat, kuin

paariliinoja vainajain lumipilvet on, ylhäällä uivat.

On laakso autio, hiljainen

ja paljon luita siellä.
On musta orhi ja kalvas mies
ja pitkä varjo tiellä.

Mies kasvoilta on kuin hauta ja yö.

Ja nyt — jumala armahtakoon —
hän tapaa tiellä poikasen,
joka säikkyy ja lähtee pakoon.

Mut nää: käden nostaa kalvas mies, ja varjo lankee

kuuhun. Myös poikasen se saavuttaa, ja hän hirttäytyy
puuhun —
SPLEEN

Ja päivät syttyvät ja päivät sammuvat, mut niiden sisällyksen

aina toukka syö. Puust' elämän, kuin madonsyömät omenat,
ne kaikki vuorotellen varisuttaa yö.

Ja himos kukkii joka kevät uudelleen,

ain' uuden katseen eessä syttyy hymyilys.
Mut tuska viiltää verinaarmun sydämeen,
ja suontas iskee aina sama pettymys.

On oma kieles mykkä, rujo elämäs,

kaleeriorja oot ja tapaa tottelet,
ja joka päivä kiellät sisint' itseäs,
ja koskaan, koskaan kahleitasi murra et.

Ja arka sielus on kuin myyrä kolossaan, ei uskalla se purra

tietä aurinkoon, vain janoo, omista ei kauneutta maan, jos
kuinka päivät syttyköön ja sammukoon.
ENKELI

Tuli kaunein kaikista enkeleistä minun lohduttajakseni päälle

maan Nyt vast' olen ihminen: mulle hänen kauttaan kaikki
annetaan.

Hänen ruumiinsa on kuin sielu

ja sielunsa taivaan kaltainen.
Hänen luokseen lentävät laulut
kuin pienet linnut riemuiten.

Minä rakastan. Ja nyt herään kuin mullan alta elämään.

Hänen hentoa olkaansa vasten minä nyyhkien painan pään.
AHNAS PORTTI

Olet sulkenut portin juuri,

sen taakse jättänyt mun.
Se on julma, se portti, ja suuri.
Se portti on niellyt sun.

Menit pois, veit kaiken valon.

Ja nyt olen onneton.
Syyspimeys pihassa talon
kuin musta koira on.
OLIT POISSA —

Olit poissa. Ja poiss' oli syleilyt. Olin kauan kaikkea paitsi,

kävin niinkuin paimen säikkynyt, joka varjojen katraita kaitsi.

Sinä palasit sydämeeni taas kuin häkkihin, linnun lailla.

Sydän havahtui sinun laulantaas kuin taivas ääriä vailla.
JUMALAN TYTTÄRET

Nyt ovat tulleet ne päivät, jolloin jumalan tyttäret kulkevat

ihmisten parissa. Jumalan tyttärillä on ihmisen tomu, mutta
heidän sielunsa ei ole tomuun sidottu. Jumalan tyttäret
solmivat lankoja, lankoja taivaasta tomuun. Jumalan tyttäret
pesevät sieluja puhtain käsin.

Kaikki silmät eivät eroita, kaikki korvat eivät kuule, kaikki

sydämet eivät tajua jumalan tyttäriä.

Jumalan tyttäret peittävät kasvonsa vierailta, jumalan

tyttäret puhuvat hiljaa, jumalan tyttäret tekevät vain yhtä:
rakastavat.
KOHTALON LYHTY

Oli kalpea, sairas, hento, ei kasvoilta kaunis, ei. Mut kuitenkin

tähdenlento: valokaarensa ihmeen vei

yli aution, pitkän tieni, jota kuljin mä yötä päin, hän,

kohtalon lyhty pieni, avotaivaat ylläni näin.

Oli jostakin toisesta maasta

tähän eksynyt maailmaan
hän, Puhtaus. Teiden saasta
ei tarttunut anturaan.

Mikä, mistä? Ja minne hän lähti,

"Phantasia", retkellään?
— Yli tieni on kulkenut tähti:
valon sen yhä ylläni nään.

SYNTYMlNEN