INDIA AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: BETWEEN DIPLOMATIC DEFENSIVENESS AND

INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION
Author(s): Joyeeta Gupta
Source: Energy & Environment , 2001, Vol. 12, No. 2/3, SPECIAL ISSUE: National Climate
Policies: Evolution, Drivers and Future Prospects (2001), pp. 217-236
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.

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 217

INDIA AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY:

BETWEEN DIPLOMATIC DEFENSIVENESS
AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION

Joyeeta Gupta
Senior Researcher,
Institute for Environmental Studies,
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
e-mail: joyeeta. gupta @ ivm. vu. ni

ABSTRACT:

This article focuses on the evolution of India's climate change policy over the la
decade and the key driving factors that have led to changes in the nature of th
policy. It argues that although India appears to be taking a defensive position in
relation to climate change in the international arena; in fact there have been a lar
number of measures that have been initiated since 1990 within India and these

measures collectively are likely to lead to a decoupling of greenhouse gas

emissions from energy development and possibly even economic growth.
Nevertheless, the government is likely to adopt a cautious position in international
negotiations in order to avoid taking on legally binding quantitative commitments
and because of their position that the onus lies on the developed countries to take
action. Thus although de facto India is taking a number of climate related no regret
measures, it will be unwilling to take on de jure commitments in the short-term.

1. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly there is new evidence of the seriousness of the climate change
While the key gross emitters include the large developed countries and Ch
India among others in the developing world, this article examines and anal
evolution of the policy of the Indian government in relation to climate ch
related policy and makes references where relevant to its energy policy.
India is an interesting case study to consider for several reasons. India is,
of its landmass, the seventh largest country in the world with a populatio
billion, growing at a rate of 1.7% per year. India has a huge market and is
process of liberalising and modernising its economy and the country may
brink of entering into an explosive growth path, which will inevitably be ac
by large-scale greenhouse gas emissions. The sheer size of the country
implications of the size are critical for global climate change policy. Second,

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218 Energy & Environment • Vol. 12, Nos. 2&3, 2001

a relatively stable democratic political system, a relatively wel

class, a free press, a well-established scientific communit
governmental organisations that should, in theory, be well-plac
and demand quality policies in relation to a wide range of
Finally, India has the ability, in theory and in practice, to influ
Group of 77 (the group of developing countries) and thereby to
the developing countries in the international climate chan
perceptions and politics of India are thus of critical interest to t
This article first examines the evolution of India's position on
last decade (see section 2). It then examines the underlying
analyses the characteristics of the negotiating position (see sec
inferences regarding the role of India in climate change policy
future (see section 4). In doing so, this article draws on an exte
interviews conducted in 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000 and 2
climate change and electricity stakeholders.1

2. EVOLUTION OF INDIA'S CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY

Prior to the 1990's, climate change was an unknown scientific and pol
India.2 At the 1989 Noordwijk Conference on Climate Change Mr. M
(1990) of the Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests stated: "The prob
Solutions must, therefore, be global ... It is our conviction that the goals
with the utmost care, taking full account of the technical and financia
individual countries, and their own economic needs and priorities. It ma
productive to lay down targets for countries which are still striving to
conditions of their masses. It may be equally counter-productive to reach
combat climate change, without devising mechanisms to ensure global p
The articulation of this principle has not changed much over the years.
With the establishment of the intergovernmental negotiating comm
Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1990 by the United Nati
Assembly, the issue reached the domestic agenda. Preparation for the U
Conference on Environment and Development coincided with those for
this enhanced the visibility of the subject for the negotiators, en
organisations and the media. During this period, the data on the emiss
impacts on India were very sketchy, speculative and varied from sour
(Nath3 1993: 37, ADB 1994: 76, Rao et al 1994, Gupta 1997 analysin
Mitra 1992a, WRI 1994, Mitra 1993, etc.).
Against this background, climate change was clearly, at best, only a p
item. It was on the agenda because of the international negotiations, b
limited social discussion of it or press coverage. The only consensus in
appeared to be that at a per capita level, the emissions of India w

1 Interviewees have been guaranteed anonymity and hence, are only referred to as
this article.

2 Within the international scientific community there has been awareness of the problem for
and in the 1980's there was increasing awareness in Europe and the US in scientific and p

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India and Climate Change Policy 219

(interviews, Dasgupta4 1994: 133). At the ti

publishing inaccurate estimates. It was taken
emission levels of India (WRI 1990), but when
the WRI report, the government went from d
talking in terms of a methane conspiracy and
for countries (Agarwal and Narain 1995: All).
developed countries needed to take action to
pay the 'agreed fixed incremental costs' of me
reduce the rate of growth of greenhouse gases
prepare a draft negotiating text in 1991, but
developed countries (Agarwal et al. 1999). The
the Convention should include technology tran
to "cleaning" technologies, and these should b
acceptable". "The mere availability does not me
backed by adequate financial resources, accessi
mere accessibility does not mean automat
technology must be transferred free of strin
conditionalities" (Nath 1993: 71; cf. Rao5 1992
such technology always came with strings att
dumping. There was also consensus on the ne
technologies via an independent multilateral fu
by a 0.1% contribution of the GNP by all cou
idea was suggested initially by then prime m
Meeting in 1989 and repeated at the Noorwijk
reason that the Government of India initially r
in the Global Environment Facility (GEF - wh
UNEP and UNDP).6
In 1992, the United Nations Framework Con
was adopted. It called on developed countri
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. It in
per capita emissions of developing countr
differentiated responsibilities of countries and
provide the agreed fixed incremental costs of
and to provide technologies to the South; and t
entity of the financial mechanism established un
concept 'joint implementation' which was how
the concept intended that it should imply that i
to invest in a developing country and if as a r
gas emissions in the developing country would
usual base line, then the reductions could be cr

3 The then environment minister of India.

4 The then ambassador of India negotiating the climate c

5 The former Prime Minister of India.

6 For details regarding the initial resistance to the GEF,

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220 Energy & Environment • Vol. 12, Nos. 2&3, 2001

Interviews revealed that government officials appeared to be

with the Convention. There were some irritations regarding the
quantitative commitments in relation to emission stabilisa
countries, the lack of specific commitments in relation to tec
inclusion of joint implementation and the adoption of the GEF a
entity of the financial mechanism (see Gupta 1997: 74-98).
ratified the Convention.
At the same time, Indian environmental groups became increasingly involved in the
climate change issue. The Centre for Science and Environment took a radical stand
and focused inter alia, on issues relating to equity (cf. Agarwal and Narain 1998). They
have since published papers regularly on the climate change issue that focus on the
international aspects. The Tata Energy Research Institute took a more pragmatic stand
and focused on the energy aspects of the climate change issue and researchers
published extensively not just in Institute publications but also in journals like Energy
Policy. Development Alternatives also examined the issue from the perspectives of
development trajectories for India and published regular articles in its journal
Development Alternatives. Research scholars became gradually more involved and
more papers on individual issues began to emerge.
In the meanwhile, NGOs and some developing country governments wished to
press for binding quantitative commitments for the developed countries. The
Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) came out with a draft protocol demanding
the reduction of emissions by 20% in 2005 in relation to 1990 levels. A former Chair
of the G-77 for the climate negotiations, Prof. Mwandosya (1999) of Tanzania,
records that at the first Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention (COP -1 )
in 1995, AOSIS presented its draft Protocol. The G-77 was at this time divided on the
issue, because the oil exporting countries did not wish to support this argument and
many of the larger and more developed countries were also afraid that such a demand
would immediately lead to renewed pressure from the North to take action in the
South. At this point, the Indian Ambassador drafted a text and lobbied for support
within the G-77. Within a couple of days 100 countries had decided to support the
Government of India's position. The oil exporting countries, that had opposed the
AOSIS position, were afraid of isolation by the so-called 'green G-77', and they
supported the call of the G-77 on this issue. This common front from the G-77
provided support to the European Union's position and led to the adoption of the
Berlin Mandate at COP-1 calling for a process to identify quantified goals within
specified timeframes for the developed countries.
The ambiguous intrusion of the concept of 'joint implementation' (JI) in the FCCC
had caught the government by surprise. There was a diversity of opinion among the
social actors interviewed. Most were sceptical about it in the early days of the
discussion seeing JI as a way for the developed world to continue with their lifestyles
and of exporting their responsibilities to the developing countries (see for details
Gupta 1997: 116-131). However, although there were heated negotiations on the
issue, a compromise decision was accepted at COP-1 in 1995 which would allow the
start of a pilot phase of JI referred to as Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ).
Two years later, an international conference was organised in New Delhi in 1997

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India and Climate Change Policy 221

by Development Alternatives. The then min

projects looked promising the pilot phas
economic sectors and in different regions so
experience (Venugopalachari 1997). The Con
must provide measurable benefits, both
perspective of developing countries, povert
needs are among the top national priorit
therefore, yield positive economic, environm
as environmental benefits globally" (Confer
In the meanwhile negotiations had begun o
for the developed countries. The US pres
which included some binding commitments
European Union had come up with a propos
international pressure was gradually bui
introduced and passed in the US senate that
binding commitments without 'meaningf
countries (IHT 1997). This also led to pres
'voluntary commitments' by developing cou
of the Clean Development Fund that was to b
non-compliance.
At COP-3, the Kyoto Protocol to the Unit
Climate Change (1997) was adopted. The Pro
calls on the developed countries to reduce th
5.2% in the budget period 2008-2012 in relat
in 1995). This common target is divided amo
some having to reduce their emissions by 8%
emissions by 1%, 8% and 10% respective
domestic action and via a range of internat
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Join
Under pressure from the developing countri
was dropped. The Kyoto Protocol was not ex
by Indian officials and some environmenta
negotiations were mostly between the Europ
world, and only after were the developi
countries were also dismayed by the inclusio
grandfathered property entitlements to the
time, the developing countries had to ag
Development Fund into the Clean Developm
new name for Joint Implementation that ha
the pilot phase. As interviewees put it: "But
CDM was expected to be a non compliance fi
different". Beyond that the insistence of th
Kyoto Protocol without 'meaningful par
annoyed the government of India. "We will
unwarranted linkages to meaningful pa

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222 Energy & Environment • Vol. 12, Nos. 2&3, 2001

contingency on domestic actions. What was the need for su

annoyed foreign affairs official. Another official explains: "Th
agreement has been deformed by the 1997 agreement; in Kyot
appears to have been compromised, the first world appears to
expend any sweat, lets make money and sell technology.
differentiated approach seems to have lost meaning and unsus
living seem to be the dominating approach."
This meant further, that when the issue of 'voluntary commi
countries came up again at COP-4 in 1998 in Buenos Aires, Ind
of the G-77 refused to accept it as an agenda item. At Buenos A
was adopted that focused on strengthening the financial mecha
and transfer of technologies and maintaining the momentum
Buenos Aires, Argentina and Kazakhstan announced suddenl
willing to consider voluntary commitments.
What can the Kyoto Protocol mean for India in a positive se
fear that the Kyoto Protocol and related discussions may lead to
for India, there is potential for the country to capitalise on t
become available through the Clean Development Mechanism. Fu
step towards emission reduction, the Kyoto Protocol may
towards emission reduction that may check the impacts of clim
term, which may have serious effects on a country like India.
Although the scepticism of the pre- 1997 years in rela
Implemented Jointly continue to linger, many of the critical s
level have decided to take on a relatively pragmatic positio
This Mechanism allows for entities from the developed cou
invest in sustainable development projects in developing c
access to the emission reductions that may be achieved a
investment. While some NGOs are actively exploring the optio
the Swiss, Canadian and Dutch governments have initiated som
the issue, the discussion reached the highest political level
political delegates from the U.S.
On October 26th, 1999 the Governments of India and the Un
Joint Statement on Cooperation in Energy and Related Enviro
than a year later, in March 2000, the Prime Minister of India, A
U.S. President Bill Clinton prepared a "Joint Statement on Coop
Environment Between India and the United States". The two c
they "intend to work together and with other countries in approp
toward early agreement on the elements of the Kyoto mechanis
Development Mechanism, which could offer opportunity for
partnership between developed and developing countries.
particular, that the Clean Development Mechanism could
opportunities for economic growth and environmental protecti
decided to set up a Joint Consultative Group on Clean Energy
This Group is responsible for identifying, initiating, monitor
collaborative projects in research, development, transfer

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India and Climate Change Policy 223

deployment of appropriate technologies

energy, renewable energy, energy efficien
expanding opportunities for commercial de
and enhancing cooperation on the climate c
Climate Convention.
On June 28th, 2000, there was a summit between India and the EU (2000), and this
summit concluded: "We are deeply concerned about growing environmental
degradation... we shall address the global environmental issues of mutual concern,
including climate change in accordance with the principle of common and
differentiated responsibility. We shall institute a joint working group on environment
to promote common initiatives in the environmental field to explore the potential for
joint collaborative projects, facilitate transfer of technologies, develop opportunities
for investments in the public and private sectors, launch an environmental awareness
programme and facilitate co-ordination on multilateral environmental issues".
On September 15th, 2000, a Protocol of Intent was adopted between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of
India which states that the US Agency for International Development and the United
States Department of Energy will support the Indian Ministry of Power and the
National Thermal Power Corporation to develop advanced power generation
technologies in India, including testing the feasibility of integrated gasification
combined cycle (IGCC) demonstration power plants to establish the most suitable
IGCC technology for Indian coal, the possible financial structures and to develop a
time bound implementation plan.
The COP-6 meeting in The Hague was suspended in relation to the definition of the
modalities for the different flexible mechanisms and the definition of sinks. On his return
from the Conference, the Indian negotiator stated as a private comment in a newspaper:
"The South was strident about the emission trading and transnational 'carbon offset'
projects. It feared that the rules for 'buying' and 'selling' greenhouse gas (GHG)
allowances could very well gift rights to entitlements, freezing North-South disparities".
He continues: "But the North's current occupation of environmental space must not lead
to property rights. . . The Seattle and Hague conferences show how utilitarian rationalism
is thin ice for sustaining North-South dialogue" (Sharma 2001).
While the climate change issue seems to have become somewhat more main stream
via the high level bilateral meetings, it remains not a priority issue of the ministry of
environment which focuses much more on biodiversity and natural resources, forests,
hazardous substances and river conservation.

3 EXPLAINING THE EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL POSITION

It would be perhaps of some interest to explore the reasons underlying th
taken by the government of India in the international negotiations. The f
section first discusses some of the driving factors of the domestic policy
process, some of the de facto implementation measures being taken
government of India and then returns to an analysis of how this translates
foreign policy position.

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224 Energy & Environment • Vol. 12, Nos. 2&3, 2001

3.1 THE DOMESTIC POLICY

The climate policy process and driving forces (or lack of it)
There are some structural features that affect the way domestic policy has b
in the last decade. India has a socialist, democratic, secular, parliamentary f
government. It has a federal political structure, with 29 states and 6 union te
Being a federal state, the central government makes policies only on those
which it has authority. Thus, while foreign policy is clearly an issue for t
government, the authority over relevant domestic policy may be split up be
centre and the states. This in itself complicates the process of making foreig
as well as complicates the issue of implementing commitments taken
international context at domestic level. Another critical issue is that by virtue o
India has a large number of federal ministries; at last count there wer
ministries. Thus making and implementing joint policies is a very critical cha
the policymakers.
Although, the political structure is fairly stable, the last decade has wit
number of unstable coalition governments. In 1989, the National Front Go
came to power and collapsed in 1990; followed by a breakaway Natio
Government with the support of Congress which collapsed in 1991 . This wa
by a Congress Government which stayed in power for five years. In
Bharatiya Janata Party came to power for a period of 13 days, and since they
prove a majority, a United Front (coalition) Government came to power for t
after which the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led coalition came to power.
they fell in 1999. A new BJP led National Democratic Alliance then re-emerg
next government and this party has since been in power. With a fresh scanda
2001 and the resignation of some cabinet ministers it is uncertain how sta
current government is. The constantly changing governments has l
preoccupation more with the politics of staying in power than the politics o
decisions in relation to key issues that concern the country, and has
postponement of policy decisions.
Apart from the more political and structural issues, environment has y
integrated in a satisfactory manner in the decision-making process. The thi
the government of India is the Planning Commission chaired by the Prime M
India. However, only two of the officials work on all environment and fore
issues, and hence environment does not get the degree of priority at the
integrated policymaking as it deserves. There is a ministry of Environment a
which has limited clout in relation to actual determination of policy
implementation in areas that fall under the jurisdiction of other ministries.
biodiversity protection has priority in the ministry, climate change has les
However, in recent years the ministry has been getting considerable support
judiciary that has actively taken on the cause of environmental issues, and
environmental non-governmental organisations.
At the domestic political level, the climate change issue has been m
discussed, although the level and depth of the discussions has increased over
There has been an implicit agreement that the government can represent th
South issues, but should avoid discussions on energy, transport and ag

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India and Climate Change Policy 225

Government policy documents do not, in ge

The domestic science on the issue continu
are being discussed at the international neg
global news in relation to climate change. I
scientific controversies. These included those between the Centre for Science and
Environment (1991) and the World Resources Institute, Parikh's (1992) criticism of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Houghton et al. 1990)
scenarios, irritation regarding EPA, IPCC and WRI research on methane emissions
from cows and rice cultivation and deforestation (Agarwal and Narain 1991, Mitra
1992a and b), and the lack of distinction between survival and luxury emissions.
However, the research in the West has multiplied while that in India has increased (cf.
Shukla 1995, Shreshta et al 1998, Pachauri 1998) but not adequately to keep in touch
with all the issues in the climate negotiations and to be of immediate relevance to the
work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Kandlikar and Sagar 1999).
The Government of India has not yet submitted its national communications under
Article 12 of the Convention and this is partly because the data on the emissions and
sinks is not yet of quality that the government is confident about it. Not being as
familiar with the issues and data in relation to emissions and sinks, it seemed much
more safe to define the issue in terms of words that the Government of India did
understand and could sell to the Indian public. Furthermore, the climate change issue
was an imported policy item, and there was and is not much domestic support or
attention paid to the issue barring the interest of a handful of organisations.
Another key problem in India is the problem of ideological vacillation and the
dilemma as an interviewee put it: "How to develop and at what cost". Although in the
process of liberalising the economy, there remain serious doubts within the country
about the ideological starting point for the negotiations and for the manner in which
the development trajectory for India is to be defined (Gupta 2000a). A critical
challenge is the lack of institutional ability and, as another former ambassador of India
put it, "we can't implement most of the environmental agreements and so we should
be careful about taking on commitments. We need to have a hawkish rather than a
dovish posture. We know that we have to clean up our coal and we have to try and get
action in the country. But we cannot guarantee that it will happen and we cannot make
it happen".
One can also distinguish between the quality of the position the government has
taken in relation to various elements of the climate change discussion. On cross-
cutting issues relevant also to other negotiations (e.g. technology transfer, equity,
financial mechanism) the government tends to have clear-cut positions, sometimes
even bordering on the proactive. On climate change specific issues, the response of the
government is essentially defensive. This is because of the wide and complex array of
issues on the table, the speed at which the permutations and combinations of these
issues change, and the lack of a dedicated team with a critical mass that can work on
the different issues. This is not to say that there are not enough experts in and outside
India who can define clear negotiating positions for and with the negotiators.
However, government officials state that although they do not exclude the input; they
do not have the time, resources and staff to be able to include it by coordinating,

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226 Energy & Environment • Vol. 12, Nos. 2&3, 2001

collecting, collating and analysing the views of stakeholders. T

national climate change committee are too short and formal to b
analyse the diverse issues and to make clear policy recommenda
negotiators only have some guidelines on the basis of which the
leaves some stakeholders dissatisfied arguing that "The governm
know the interests of the people of India. They represent elite int
society". "The notion of interrogating the government on clima
The government will have an immediate political response: the
are trying to stop us from developing". At the most, the nation
in abstract, diplomatic terms based on "precedent" and "persona
not "assessed by public debate" or the result of "fine-tuned pr
bottom line is that economically it should not hurt India and
sellable to the people". The position is of course cleared by the
a superficial level. Unlike negotiations on the Comprehensive T
other defence issues, accountability to the Parliament is ex po
"They don't know what their baselines are and what to oppose
without understanding the issues". While some interviewees arg
the impression created because the government did not wish to
argued that this was a cover-up since the officials negotiating d
to expose! Whatever it is, the negotiators do not appear to see
detailed negotiating positions that they can lobby in advance wi
minded interests. This is not to belittle the efforts made by the n
decade in pursuing certain ideas and in lobbying support for th
And this is hardly surprising since the domestic policy docum
able to provide the government the support it needs for such n
Five Year Plan (1992-1997) did not mention climate change, pr
developed prior to the Convention. The Conservation Strategy
coping mechanisms to deal with climate change and a Coas
Notification was passed in 1991 requiring states to prepare nat
policies. The Ninth Five Year Plan (1997-2002) does integr
emissions in its discussions on energy policy but does no
recommendations except on the need to improve the efficienc
supply side of energy and to promote renewable energy and n
current annual report of the Ministry of Environment and For
reference to the climate change issue.

Other relevant policies

While it would appear that the government of India is taking m
policy decisions, this is, of course, an incomplete picture. India
initiatives in relation to the energy and forestry sector and th
large extent compatible with the requirements of climate chan
Although India has had a high C02 emission level in relation t
because the energy intensive sectors have been growing fast (iro
etc) (Skutsch et al 1993; Srivastava 1997: 942), this trend is bein
growth of the service and communication sector. At the same

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India and Climate Change Policy 227

government has invested in the liberalisatio

include the amendment to the Indian Electricit
in 1991. In 1992, a separate Ministry for
established and since then plans for imp
surpassed at least in the Eighth Five Yea
projects are in particular doing well althou
(Rajsekhar et al 1999). The Electricity Re
promulgated in 1998 to establish independen
the state to promote rationality and indepen
structure. A power sector reform bill has bee
State Electricity Boards into generation, trans
to enable the process of corporatisation and if
there is new evidence to show that theft of e
states, which affects the financial viability
Policies to deal with these have been adopte
price, licensing and import restrictions in
introducing competition to the sector. Court
commercial vehicles to switch to Compressed
higher efficiency standards in New Delhi. Th
If all goes well, the combined impact of t
the financial situation of the generation, tr
will enable these utilities to be able to inves
and modernisation. This, in itself, should im
and lead to a reduction of the inefficiencie
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in rela
With the liberalisation of the banking sector,
may also support investments in modern te
government will be able to create the condit
investors are keen to invest in the market and take on the normal market risks
associated with such investments and will be able to bring in new resources to give the
modernisation of the sector a major boost. This will also mean that all consumers of
electricity will probably feel the pinch of the rising electricity prices and this will be
an added incentive for them to invest in technologies and appliances to improve the
efficiency of their productive processes and reduce their energy bills. If all goes well . . .
A recently completed report (Gupta et al 2000b) shows that since 1990, the energy
consumption per tonne of product in the end use sectors has reduced significantly
indicating that there is a decoupling between growth and emissions. Although in a
business-as-usual scenario it is expected that by 2020 the population will have increased
by 50% and the GDP by 5.8 times, the electricity production by 5 times, the greenhouse
gases will only increase by 4 times in relation to 1990 levels. There are huge savings in
energy possible in the end use sectors and in distribution and this could lead to reduced
demand for electricity leading to a 45% reduction in emissions in relation to the
business-as-usual scenario. This year the Indian Parliament is to consider three relevant
bills - the Electricity Bill 2001, the Energy Conservation Bill and the Renewable Energy
Bill. If these Bills are passed, it is likely that much of the technical potential may in fact

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228 Energy & Environment • Vol. 12, Nos. 2&3, 2001

be achieved despite the interim implementation problems (Meh

investment in India; Gadgil and Sastry 1994 on energy efficient
A side-impact of the liberalisation process is the increasing in
the private sector to capitalise on all available opportuniti
production processes and to compete internationally. As a result,
industry has been increasingly interested in the concept of th
Mechanism, and there is now even a regular journal called Glo
Emerging Green Opportunities, which is published by the Con
Industry. Visits to a number of energy intensive sectors (like th
steel and cement sectors), sectors that see potential in CDM (li
relation to cogeneration) and a number of other ministries re
increasing knowledge on the CDM and growing enthusiasm
views of these stakeholders as stating that:

• the large-scale, globally competitive sector, would be able to

of the art technologies commercially, although the cost of
• the large-scale power generation sector would need financial a
best of modern technologies that is also appropriate for the ra
in India, especially given that the purchasing power of the con
• the large scale domestically focused sector would have an inc
if the price of electricity and the billing system forced them
mind and if competition with foreign competitors for the dom
them to innovate; however, the bottleneck would remain th
and institutional inertia,
• the small-scale locally oriented sectors needed tailor made te
specific context and these could be domestically available;
financial resources and information,
• the small-project sector (light bulbs, water pumps, etc.) w
of financial support but not necessarily additional technolog

Many interviewees stated that they would support CDM projec

offer are good, i.e. the technology is available at considerably
political long-term implications are dealt with and if the long-
are not curtailed, (i.e. if there is clarity that as long as India's
below a certain level, no caps on emissions would be applied); i
are clear; and if there is a thorough understanding of how th
drawn. Suggestions included that the base line should be drawn
technology available in India in relation to specific sectors
should be the average technology used in a sector in relation to r
Those opposing CDM felt that CDM was used to make In
technologies, the participation of India would somehow compr
lead to a situation in which the long-term growth of India w
was a quick fix solution that would involve India in contract ba
that instead of CDM, there should be emission allowances f
equity and emission trading.

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India and Climate Change Policy 229

Interviewees and the literature suggest tha

support: Supercritical boilers, coal gasifi
attention to the small-scale sectors and the s
(which however will need simple monitoring
technologies but financial and institutional
Institute (2000) recently concluded that pr
projects include integrated gasification com
tonne C02), pressurised fluidised bed com
renovation and modernisation projects in t
per tonne C02); grid connected wind (31 US$
projects (at 168 US $ per tonne C02), wind
C02), continuous digestors for the pulp and
dry quenching technologies for the iron an
and the replacement of industrial motors (1
of Indian Industry (2000: 6) advocates CD
cogeneration, biomass based power plants, e
the paper industry, conversion of soderber
technologies in the aluminium industry, etc
Thus industry is getting more engaged in
made with Clinton's government and the E
reached the highest political agenda, although
national priorities and the fallout from the

3.2 The foreign policy aspects

Given that in the early days there was very
issue, why did India participate in the neg
1997), this was because of a political recogni
developing countries, and because the artic
with the government position at the time.
measures (such as energy efficiency) it did
developing countries. At the same time, the
global inequity (Chengappa 1992: 31).
Partly, because of a lack of knowledge of
climate change problem is not seen so much
as a problem of production, consumption a
(1991: 37) concluded: "We have seen that un
available, the present consumption pattern
government has thus never really focused o
enhancement. Instead it has focused on the
inequity. "When it comes to trade, our nat
economic issues. But on ecological issues, w
like that but it is a matter of negotiation!
government would have chosen to do so".
There is a broadly shared view that the p
relations; and there is a fear that the perceiv

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230 Energy & Environment • Vol. 12, Nos. 2&3, 2001

its falling prices for raw materials, tariffs in the developed coun
financial system etc.) will somehow be complemented
environmental order (Rao 1993, 1994). This is not just extrapola
economic sphere (cf. Nath 1997) to the environmental sphe
evidence in relation to a range of other environmental regimes
Sharma 2000). Thus there is perceived unfairness in the ozone
the CITES regime (Bajaj 1996), in the waste regime (Bhutani 19
regime (Shiva 1993), in the UNCED regime (Chatterjee and
relation to the GEF (Agarwal et al 1992:25-26; and Gupta
increasing fear that the climate change regime too will be cas
prevent India from developing while allowing the powerful co
life-style. This fear has been enhanced by the fall of the Berlin
as having weakened the position of the developing countries a
competitor in the former East Bloc, rather than a source of su
83-85). An Indian ex-prime minister claims that efforts are "b
countries to create a two-track world, in which a handful of af
monopolise access to technology and sophisticated weaponry, w
world is hemmed in by all manner of restrictive regimes and
1994: 399). "We are not fighting for equity because it is morally
want stability". The ideological argument of course is closely li
economic growth argument.
There is also a strong perception that the international negotiatio
and that getting into substantive discussions may only weaken the
"It is not conceivable to think of an architecture that is fair. The
have is to embarrass other governments - it makes for good copy
just the role of economic, scientific and political power that is c
in the negotiations, but also the way the negotiations are conduc
developing countries have in actually continuously monito
representing their views during a range of formal and inform
negotiations. The whole notion of annual meetings of the Conf
several preparatory meetings while essential to deal with internat
enormous strain on the resources of developing countries that h
alert on a number of issues in relation to a number of differen
meetings tend to go on long after the closing time, and sometimes
small delegations just cannot cope with these circumstances. At
the international process is seen as unfair interviewees did not wis
negotiations. "But India cannot opt out; it has tied itself to to
treaties". 'There is an imbalance in the negotiations. . . If you opt
on - and tomorrow the agreement will affect us."
At the same time, while there may be potential for develop
their assets, and while there are some efforts made by th
Caribbean Group, the African group, the oil exporters (OPEC)
to meet and make regional positions, the Asians have not yet
resources to be able to develop a South and South-East Asian p
This may be because of the perceived diversity of interests and

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India and Climate Change Policy 23 1

with neighbouring countries from a security

distrust of the knowledge base, experience an
distrust of the larger neighbours. (However,
diverse countries with diverging interests, bu
together to strengthen their negotiating pos
resources are not pooled and Asia has no real
nor does it have a strategy to try to improve
to, could take the initiative to develop such a
so; as one official put it: 'we are Indocentric'.
70's the government no longer really wis
developing countries in the context of the G
has long championed the leadership cause with
out a niche for itself'. Most interviewees from
only a few from outside felt that India had
function efficiently in the process. Of course t
meetings, do try and take on a coordinating r
mostly ad hoc and limited efforts, limited al
prior to the G77 meetings.

4. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS: NOT SEEING OPPORTUNITIES

FOR RISKS?
To a large extent India shares the challenges and problems that other developin
face in the context of international negotiations. But there are researchers
industry involved in the issues and being a democratic country there is som
transparency and debate at the domestic level. However, the government h
able to collate and analyse these views into a coherent and detailed negotiatin
A review of the information provided in this article leads to the f
inferences. Climate change is not seen as a critical priority in India, which
facing a broad range of problems ranging from poverty alleviation to health
also national disasters (cyclones in Orissa; earthquakes in Gujarat, etc.) and
scandals (e.g. Tehelka.com). Although considerable research work is done in
research in India is not adequate to help the government determine well s
negotiating strategies based on a thorough understanding on national emi
sinks and scenarios for future growth. This implies that the government is o
negotiate in terms of an ideological standpoint and to use the climate chang
discuss North-South issues and to attempt at damage control in the clima
regime. In doing so, diplomats have in general had constructive positions
to cross-cutting international issues (such as aid, technology transfer), but t
defensive in relation to climate change specific issues. This is the only wa
government to guarantee some degree of legitimacy for its position, since t
is based on precedent. It is also fairly isolated in its negotiating strategy bec
not have (or commit) the resources to collect and collate domestic inf
coordinate or cooperate with the neighbouring countries, initiate and
regional position, nor does it aim for a leadership position with respect t
countries. Thus, until the government has an accurate quantitative picture

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232 Energy & Environment • Vol. 12, Nos. 2&3, 2001

emissions and sinks, it is unlikely to even wish to discuss quan

for the future. This is because the government cannot promise
and what it probably cannot enforce for a country - the size of
analysis in this article has shown that India is clearly in a state of
desperately to gradually superimpose the mantras of liberalisa
protected market, but it is difficult to predict whether after so
process will be a smooth one. I would thus argue that a society
no way of predicting what its business as usual scenario is lik
then take on quantitative commitments in relation to busines
does not exist would be political suicide.
Having said that, I would also argue that India has, in eff
number of measures that should if the economic pundits and
have it right, lead to an entire rationalisation of the electricity ge
and distribution sector. This would lead to price competition,
and in general to a more healthy and responsive generation sect
use coal as a major source of electricity would be able to
technologies. The renewable electricity sector and cogeneration
boost. All this could lead to a reduction in the rate of grow
emissions. At the same time, the iron and steel, cement and alu
been liberalised and as they all wish to compete in the interna
market there are enough incentives for them to invest in state
There is also considerable potential in cogeneration, the water
and drives and lighting. Here there may be some financial assis
support needed. In the meanwhile, there is already a visible dec
emissions in the end use sectors and this trend is likely to cont
of the service sector in India. Thus, I would argue that althou
willing to take on quantitative obligations in relation to climate
is seriously engaged in searching for ways to achieve sustainabl
the context of democratic decision making.
However, the government is unlikely to present this upheaval
a contribution to the climate change problem, because, in princi
that it is its turn to take action, and because it is not entirely sure
change will lead to. Although ratification of the Kyoto Protocol
in itself any immediate challenges to the Government of India, lik
unlikely to ratify prior to large scale ratification of key deve
countries and only if no links are made with the concept of mean
the mean while de facto implementation in the energy, forestry an
probably continue. The interest of the social actors and indus
increase and they are waiting for government approval, rules and
of potential sectors have been identified as likely candidates for
On the other hand, the developing countries face a major prob
going to wait for them. If they are constantly going to be defens
strategy, they will always be at the losing end of international
put it: "How many rounds of loops can you get behind? Develop
get their act together. Are governments going to govern or a

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India and Climate Change Policy 233

responding?" I would plead for the need for

mass to research, read, delegate, collate and
of different conventions; and to try to cap
constructive and proactive positions ba
documentation and public support. Such a g
resources for international lobbying with li
India cannot afford to use rhetorical and id
substantive progress in international negotia
Finally, I believe that international pressur
institutional structure and the statistical d
political and social transformations to take
to productive negotiations or effective
increasing cases of non-compliance, which is
countries in international environmental tre
would be more likely to have success in en
policies out of a menu of policies and meas
At present, there are considerable tensions
Bush will go in withdrawing his support fo
time, pressure on the developing countries
negotiations get tough for the developing c
why developing country governments are af
precisely why I would argue in favour o
developing countries. I would like to end b
comment (Sharma 2000): "Next summer,
rapprochement and compromise among s
require environmental statesmanship with th
strove, and much repented, And whisperin

Acknowledgements:
This article is based on research underta
Modernising the Electricity Sector in Ch
Economic Growth and the Concern for
supported by the Netherlands Research
Change. Many thanks to my colleagues in t
Carolien Kroeze, Jaklien Vlasblom and to th
the editors for their comments.

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