Bargaoanu Et Al 2023 Predictors of Illiberalism in Romania A Case Study During The Russian Invasion in Ukraine

Article
New Perspectives
2023, Vol. 31(4) 270–293
Predictors of illiberalism in Romania: © The Author(s) 2023
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A case study during the Russian sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/2336825X231206977
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invasion in Ukraine
Alina Bârgăoanu, Flavia Durach and Oana Ştefăniţă

National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania
Abstract
Illiberalism emphasizes traditional values and national sovereignty over liberal democratic ideals,
which can lead to the erosion of democratic norms and institutions. Against this background, the
paper investigates the relationship between illiberalism and various political and social factors in
Romania, taking into account a particular context (the Russian invasion in Ukraine). Romania has
experienced a rise in illiberal attitudes and the spread of populist and nationalist rhetoric, which is
particularly concerning given its strategic location as a member of the European Union and NATO,
and its proximity to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. This study aims to investigate the associations
between various attitudes, news consumption habits, and perceived exposure to misinformation,
and how these factors relate to levels of illiberalism in Romanian society. Given the increasing
prominence of illiberal and populist ideologies globally, a nuanced understanding of these rela-
tionships is critical. The study employs a quantitative approach, leveraging an online survey to
collect data from a sample of 1000 Romanian citizens. Soft quotas were used to ensure a diverse
representation across age, gender, and education levels. Data collection was carried out by Dynata,
a globally recognized market research firm, between March 1–9, 2022. Our analysis, informed by
multiple regression models, uncovers complex relationships between trust in institutions, attitudes
towards Russia and Ukraine, news consumption habits, perceived misinformation, and demographic
factors in shaping illiberal perspectives. By providing a comprehensive understanding of the
contributing factors, this study aims to inform public discourse and policy-making processes on how
to address illiberal tendencies in society.
Keywords
Disinformation, illiberalism, trust, war in Ukraine
Corresponding author:
Flavia Durach, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Expozitiei 30 A, Bucharest 012104,
Romania.
Email: flavia.durach@comunicare.ro
Bârgăoanu et al. 271
Introduction
The war in Ukraine has resulted in a complex interplay of political, economic, and social factors that
may have contributed to the rise of illiberal attitudes in many countries. Against this unique
background, the purpose of this study is to explore the associations between varying attitudes, news
consumption habits, and perceived exposure to misinformation with levels of illiberalism. We focus
our research on Romania, thus expanding on the discussion on the importance of domestic contexts
for understanding illiberalism. As a country bordering the war, we expect these events to be
perceived as highly relevant and shape the illiberal political discourse in the Romanian society in
particular ways. Romania has experienced a rise in illiberal tendencies and the spread of populist
and nationalist rhetoric, which is particularly concerning given its strategic location as a member of
the European Union and NATO, and its proximity to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Illiberalism
may also undermine Romania’s commitment to democratic values and institutions, potentially
affecting its relationship with its strategic partners.
The concept of illiberalism has varied scholarly interpretations (Kauth and King, 2020) and it is
beyond the scope of this article to contribute to in-depth conceptual clarifications; instead, we are
interested in analysing the various political and social factors that may contribute to the rise of
illiberal attitudes. We note that an illiberal democracy is one that engages in nondemocratic
practices, despite formally having democratic institutions and norms (Bonet and Zamorano, 2021).
In illiberal democracies, one can observe regular elections, as well as constraints on the powers of
the executive, and a challenged freedom of the press (Van der Brug et al., 2021). Past studies have
connected populist and radical-right parties and leaders to illiberalism (Blokker, 2022; Körösényi
and Patkós, 2017; Merkel and Scholl, 2018). Populism and illiberalism share similar goals, such as
the promise to protect regular citizens (the people), and anti-corruption and anti-immigration
orientations (Negrea-Busuioc et al., 2019). When populist parties take an illiberal turn, their
discourse for the electorate promotes isolationism, strongman-leadership, the rejection of glob-
alizations as an inherently threatening process, and a return to protectionism (Chambers, 2017;
Bernatt, 2019). Illiberalism emphasizes traditional values and national sovereignty over liberal
democratic ideals, which can lead to the erosion of democratic norms and institutions.
As an orientation of the public opinion, illiberal attitudes are characterized by “a rejection of
the legitimacy of institutions, such as constitutional courts, that impose constraints on the power
of the executive, and possibly limit the exercise of the <<will of the people>>” (Van der Brug
et al., 2021: 541), and can be observed in countries that meet the criteria of liberal democracies.
Indicators related to liberal/illiberal elements include public attitudes related to equality before
the law, checks and balances in the courts of justice, media reliability, press freedom, protection of
minority rights (Hernández, 2016: 46–48), as well as concerning socioeconomic changes after the
country’s regime change, perceptions of the systemic changes, democracy and capitalism (Bı́ró-
Nagy, 2017), support for radical right populist parties and politicians (Donovan, 2019;
Lewandowsky and Jankowski, 2023).
Background: Illiberal attitudes in Romania

There is a growing trend towards illiberalism in the European Union. In Eastern and Central Europe,
democracy and the rule of law are under attack by elected majorities in countries such as Hungary,
Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Anders and Lorenz, 2021; Bustikova and Guasti, 2017).
In Western Europe, scholars note the emergence and persistence of right-wing populist parties with
illiberal tendencies, concluding that “right-wing populist parties can already be considered a
272 New Perspectives 31(4)
permanent and institutionalized, and in some Eastern European countries even dominant, feature of
party systems in advanced democracies” (Merkel and Scholl, 2018: 41).
In what Romania is concerned, scholars note that the country followed the political post-
accession patterns of other EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe: country reform
and fight against corruption, while maintaining questionable practices, such as the persistence of
informal networks and a tendency towards democratic backsliding (Negrea-Busuioc et al. 2019).
Notable moments cited as examples of illiberal tendencies include the 2012 attempt to impeach
the then President Traian Băsescu and curb the independence of the Constitutional Court, the
2014 elections, when the Romanian government was accused of infringement of civil rights of
the Romanian citizens living abroad, and the justice law changes in 2017 (Bretter, 2022; Iusmen,
2015; Negrea-Busuioc et al. 2019). The COVID-19 pandemic and the 2020 local and parlia-
mentary elections worked as a backdrop for illiberal discourse spread by politicians in main-
stream media and social media. The most common themes were “anti-Roma racism, intolerant
speech against Romanian citizens working abroad or the “diaspora”, attacks on fundamental
rights such as the freedom to expression and the right to information, and anti-justice discourses
[…], anti-feminist, anti-LGBTQ and xenophobic sentiments, which sought to minimize and
downplay violence against women, children and minorities, […] anti-Hungarian sentiment,
religious discourse against anti-Covid-19 protection measures” (Holdiş and Rus, 2021: 3). More
recently, the rise of the political party Alliance for the Union of Romanians (Alianța pentru
Unirea României, AUR) adds to the normalisation of political illiberal discourse in Romania
(Dragolea, 2022).
Negrea-Busuioc et al. (2019) emphasize that the academic literature makes limited references to
the illiberal tendencies in Romania, usually in comparison with other states in Central and Eastern
Europe. Through these comparisons, certain domestic conditions that are specific to Romania
emerge. The majority of authors comment on the fact that Romania experiences a form of limited (or
failed) illiberalism, held in check by EU institutions and the pressure of the public opinion (Bretter,
2022; Iusmen, 2015; Nonhoff and Rappold, 2022; Spendzharova and Vachudova, 2012). For
example, while Romania is characterized by “wide-spread nationalism”, its use is rather limited as
compared to Hungary, and the memory of the country’s communist dictator, Nicolae Ceauşescu
makes the public more reluctant towards open populist authoritarianism (Bretter, 2022, 203). While
populist parties play an important role in politics in Romania, “functioning checks and balances
have so far prevented autocratic tendencies.” (Nonhoff and Rappold, 2022, 4). Romania is also
responsive to EU pressure. By studying the aforementioned 2012 impeachment crisis, Iusmen
(2015) concludes that political miscalculations, political disagreements, political opportunism and
public pressure stemming from reasonable levels of EU support allowed for the EU-level leverage
(CVM monitoring and the withholding of the Schengen area membership) to curb anti-democratic
actions in Romania. However, other domestic factors contribute to the erosion of democracy in
Romania. One such factor, relevant for this article, stems from the media and information eco-
system. The contemporary Romanian media system suffers from ownership concentration and high
degrees of political polarization (Negrea-Busuioc et al., 2019). The growing concentration of media
ownership in Romania limits editorial autonomy, as different media channels become vehicles for
the particular political interests of the owners.
Research discussing illiberal populist politics in the specific context of the Russian invasion in
Ukraine is scarce, and provides indirect evidence on the extent to which illiberal attitudes are
embraced by the political leadership and the general public. In a study looking at the public
discourse concerning the Russian invasion in Ukraine in five countries, Romania is described as
country where “democratic transformations are hindered by entrenched political interests pushing
back against civic and institutional anti-corruption efforts, discrimination against minorities and
control over media” (Pipchenko, 2023: 43). On what the orientations of the public opinion are
concerned, data from a recent public opinion survey conducted a month before the Russian invasion
in Ukraine indicated that 65.7% of Romanians would vote for a nationalist party that promotes
religious values and supports the traditional family. Of the 65.7% who say they would vote for a
nationalist party, 39.7% would keep their option if such a party proposed measures and policies that
could determine Romania’s exit from the European Union (which represents approximately 26% of
all survey participants) (Strategic Thinking Group, 2022). However, the Russian invasion in
Ukraine had an impact on right-wing populism in Romania, where the radical right populist party
(AUR) lost some of its appeal to the electorate due a strong alignment with the Kremlin rhetoric.
After the initial backlash, the party managed to reverse this trend by exploiting increased anxiety
regarding the economic effects of the war (Soare, 2023).
The present study contributes to the literature on illiberal attitudes and the democratic back-
sliding in Central and Eastern Europe by providing empirical data collected during a particular
context: the Russian invasion in Ukraine. In Romania, a country bordering the war, these events are
perceived as highly relevant and shape the illiberal political discourse. Taking advantage of this
context, populist leaders urge the public to reconsider issues that are at the forefront of illiberalism,
such as Romania’s alliances, geopolitical interests, and a return to nationalism and protectionism.
Furthermore, we expand on the discussion on the importance of domestic contexts for under-
standing illiberalism. To this end, we explore the associations between varying attitudes, news
consumption habits, and perceived exposure to misinformation with levels of illiberalism. Lastly,
this study introduces the distinction between active and passive illiberalism, and argues in favour of
integrating this distinction in future studies on the topic. Illiberal dispositions can be considered
based on two dimensions - attitudinal and behavioural - that reinforce each other (Hawkins et al.,
2012); thus, we are able to find differences between passive illiberalism (i.e. a traditional value
orientation) and active illiberalism (i.e. a preference for actions considered classic-illiberal).
Factors that impact illiberal attitudes

Illiberalism and trust in institutions
Past research suggests that illiberal ideologies are often characterized by a distrust in democratic
institutions and a preference for more authoritative power structures (Norris and Inglehart, 2019).
Declining trust in democratic institutions is listed among the “symptoms” of illiberal turns in Central
and Eastern Europe (Bustikova and Guasti, 2017). International institutions, such as the European
Union, are also targeted by illiberalism. For instance, in CEE countries, illiberal tendencies work
towards undermining the EU’s foundational principles or towards taking strong anti-Brussels stances
on a number of issues, including immigration (Anders and Lorenz, 2021; Bı́ró-Nagy, 2017). Illiberal
views are negatively and significantly correlated with trust in European institutions (Voeten, 2022).
To the extent of our knowledge, there are no studies exploring the correlation between illiberal
attitudes and trust in national and international institutions during the war in Ukraine. Discussing the
relationship between trust and illiberal attitudes in this context can bring novel contributions to the
body of knowledge, due to the particular implications of the war in neighbouring countries. In
the last 10 years, non-mainstream European parties have cultivated views and relations aligned with
the interests of the Kremlin. Pro-Russia stances echoed the feelings of those who were distrustful of
Western institutions and viewed Russia as an alternative to the current global order (Everett, 2023;
Tsygankov, 2012). However, the bigger threat represented by having a war unfolding at the borders
of Romania could make people look more positively to some institutions that can offer a greater
sense of security. Through its serious political, security and defence implications for EU member
states, the Russian invasion in Ukraine impacts citizens’ trust in key institutions, such as NATO
(Economou and Kollias, 2023).
Consequently, we find it relevant to investigate the relationship between trust and illiberalism, in
this novel context. Based on previous findings on the relation between trust and illiberalism, we
posit that:
H1: A higher level of trust in institutions is associated with lower levels of illiberalism.
Attitudes towards Russia, Ukraine, and NATO

In Europe, fringe political parties have cultivated friendly relationships with the Russian
leadership. This closeness is motivated by ideological affinities (nationalism, conservatism, tra-
ditionalism), and pragmatic calculations related to networking, financial support and political know-
how (Braghiroli, 2023). A concrete manifestation of these parties’ affinities with Russia can be
found in the “illiberal turn and shared opposition of the supranational liberal EU order”, a per-
spective “increasingly shared by Moscow’s friendly forces both on the left and on the right”
(Braghiroli, 2023: 30). At the same time, pro-Russian parties rely on anti-EU, anti-Western, anti-
NATO discourse and their views tend to be aligned with the Kremlin rhetoric (Krekó and Enyedi,
2018; Soare, 2023).
We expect similar attitudinal orientations in the general population holding illiberal views. There
is a line of research showing that citizens support illiberal politicians especially because they share
similar populist and authoritarian attitudes (Lewandowsky and Jankowski, 2023). For instance,
people holding more illiberal democratic attitudes also tend to be more Eurosceptic than supporters
of liberal views (Van der Brug et al., 2021), In the context of the war in Ukraine, it is a plausible
assumption that people with illiberal tendencies will have a more positive attitude towards Russia,
and a more negative attitude to the other party involved, namely Ukraine:
H2a: Positive attitudes towards Russia are positively associated with illiberalism.
H2b: Anti-Ukraine attitudes are positively associated with illiberalism.
Furthermore, it is also a reasonable expectation that illiberal views will be associated with less
support for NATO, especially since Russian narratives build on the idea that NATO is ultimately
responsible for the war, by acting as an existential threat to Russia. Previous studies indicate that
citizens’ pro-NATO attitudes are influenced by among others by personal values and individual
characteristics (Kostadinova, 2000), leading us to believe that having illiberal values might influence
attitudes towards NATO. Although the war in Ukraine managed to reduce political polarization to
some extent, echo chambers holding an anti-NATO stance persist irrespective of the changed security
landscape (Xia et al., 2023). We assume this to be the case of illiberal echo chambers:
H2c: Anti-NATO attitudes are positively associated with illiberalism.
Nationalism and illiberalism

Scholars find that illiberalism in politics is defined, among others, by nationalism, be it ethnic or
economic (Dostal et al., 2018; Makarychev, 2019). In other words, identity becomes the basis of
illiberal politics (Berezin, 2022). In practical terms, scholars find a relationship between the
construction of the nationalistic discourse and the illiberal turn in countries like Hungary (Toomey,
2018). In Romania, nationalism embraces illiberal rather than liberal forms, for reasons that can be
can be traced back to the nation-building project adopted by the communist regime in Romania
(Chen, 2003).
Given this background, we expect that:
H2d: Nationalist attitudes are positively associated with illiberalism.
Illiberalism and news consumption habits

News consumption habits are important for shaping political attitudes. There is evidence that
traditional news sources tend to promote liberal democratic values (Norris, 2000), whereas social
networking services can spread of misinformation and illiberal ideas (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017;
Lee et al., 2023). Other studies suggest that, in illiberal democracies, public service media and the
digital media can both contribute to negative attitudes towards liberal causes (Mihelj et al., 2023).
Additionally, the nature of the consumed news content plays a crucial role in shaping political
attitudes. On one hand, higher consumption of tabloid media rather than quality media is associated
with stronger populist attitudes (Pajnik et al., 2023). On the other hand, media bias can increase
polarisation in matters of politics (Bennett and Iyengar, 2008). In particular, social networking
services have been linked to increased polarization (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Pariser, 2011), as
they can act as echo chambers that amplify illiberal viewpoints, Against this background, we expect
that:
H3a: Consuming mainstream media news is negatively associated with illiberalism.

H3b: Consuming news from social networking services (SNS) is positively associated with
illiberalism.
Perceptions of misinformation exposure

In the literature on the fake news and online misinformation, the role of social media platforms in the
spread of misinformation and illiberal ideas is thoroughly exposed and discussed (Allcott and
Gentzkow, 2017; Lee et al., 2023). Furthermore, the social media users themselves are growing
more aware that, in extraordinary circumstances at least, social networking services become the
perfect medium for the spread of misinformation (Hadlington et al., 2023).
Misinformation is seen as a significant contributor to illiberal and extremist attitudes (Vosoughi
et al., 2018). Political leaders with illiberal or populist tendencies rely, as a strategy, on flooding the
information ecosystem with a wave of misinformation that ultimately makes it extremely difficult
for regular audiences to discern fact from fake (Dunwoody et al., 2022). In the particular context
studied in this paper, specific pro-Russian narratives present in social media (Geissler et al., 2023;
Hanley et al., 2023) might a lead to more open manifestation of illiberal attitudes in the target
population.
To the extent of our knowledge, there are no studies to explore the relationship between per-
ceived exposure to misinformation and illiberalism. However, there is evidence that people who
perceive themselves as being surrounded by misinformation trust the news less (Wasserman and
Madrid-Morales, 2019), which, in turn, could make them less vulnerable to the effects of biased,
misleading information. We assume that citizens who are more aware of being exposed to
misinformation will assess content more critically and will be less prone to be nudged towards
illiberal views through falsehoods.
H4: Perceived exposure to misinformation is negatively associated with illiberalism.
Illiberal attitudes and individual characteristics

Political orientations can be a relevant variable for understanding illiberal attitudes (Jost et al.,
2003). Parties that challenge liberal models usually endorse cultural conservatism and ethnic
nationalism (Keskinen et al. 2016; Vachudova, 2021). Some scholars root the illiberal phenomenon
in CEE states in conservative, nationalist, and religious ideas (Buzogány and Varga, 2021; Szelényi
and Csillag, 2015).
In what age is concerned, research indicates that political attitudes are remarkably stable
overtime, albeit it is more likely for liberals to turn more conservative with age, than the other way
around (Peterson et al., 2020). In general, attitudes are formed during adolescence and grow in-
creasingly stable with age (Niemi and Klingler, 2012; Reed, 2006; Rekker et al., 2015). In what
authoritarianism, as a marker of illiberal views, is concerned, a recent found no association with the
participants’ age (Fasce and Avendaño, 2020).
While there is a long line of research showing that gender matters in terms of political attitudes
(Bittner and Goodyear-Grant, 2017; Pratto et al., 1997), there is limited evidence of gender dif-
ference specifically for illiberalism, which speaks of the universal potential illiberal views across
genders. Findings point out that both genders can show predispositions towards illiberal values,
depending on the context (Donovan, 2019; Kalmijn and Kraaykamp, 2007).
Education also emerges as a significant factor, as it often promotes democratic values and
attitudes (Niemi and Junn, 2005; Weil, 1985). The differentiation due to class and education is
generally larger than the differentiation due to generation and gender (Kalmijn and Kraaykamp,
2007). However, the role of education in driving support for some liberal issues can depend on the
nonliberal political agendas in some countries (Zhang and Brym, 2019), a finding that justifies the
need for context-based research in this regard.
The economic conditions of a person may also contribute to illiberal attitudes. Socioeconomic
status has a proven effect on a variety of attitudes and preferences explored in the literature (Stanley
and Cześnik, 2022; Trošt and Marinšek, 2022), and there is evidence that economic disadvantage
can foster illiberal tendencies (Gidron and Hall, 2017).
Lastly, regarding the place of residence, studies highlight the impact of local social and economic
conditions on political attitudes (Enos, 2017).
In conclusion, political ideology, age, gender, education, income, and residence may also affect
the levels of illiberalism, but are considered control variables in this model.
Methodology
The purpose of this study is to explore the associations between varying attitudes, news con-
sumption habits, and perceived exposure to misinformation with levels of illiberalism. Given the
rising tides of populist and illiberal ideologies in many democratic societies, understanding these
relationships is critical (Repucci and Slipowitz, 2022). We aim to elucidate the role of trust in
institutions, political attitudes, news consumption sources, and demographic factors in shaping
illiberal perspectives. Embracing a quantitative research approach, this investigation leverages a
survey design to assemble comprehensive data from Romanian citizens. We conducted our study
using an online panel of 1000 participants, specifically designed with soft quotas to ensure diverse
representation across age, gender, and education levels. The data collection was executed by
Dynata, a globally recognized market research firm, during the period of March 1-9, 2022. The
sample exhibited a mean age of 43.19 years with a standard deviation of 13.16, and was gender-
balanced, consisting of 52.3% women and 47.7% men. Regarding the educational background, the
sample was divided into 55.2% individuals with low education and 44.8% with high education.
Notably, the sample was heavily skewed towards urban residents, who accounted for 86.7% of the
total participants.
Measures
Illiberal attitudes were measured using an original scale with seven items, measured on a 7-point
Likert scale (see Appendix A). Items grouped in two factors, using CFA with a varimax rotation:
passive (factor loadings from 0.859 to 0.716) and active illiberalism (with loadings from 0.834 to
0.766). A 4-item scale, reflecting more of a traditionalist tendency of the citizens, who feel
threatened by the freedoms and changes brought about by the democratic system and European
membership, represented the “passive illiberalism”. A 3-item scale, reflecting a preference for
actions considered classic-illiberal: a restriction of press freedom, violation of the laws of justice
under certain conditions, influence of elections, represented the “active illiberalism”. Both scales of
illiberalism were reliable (α = 0.811, M = 4.29, SD = 1.63 for active illiberalism and α = 0.799, M =
3.01, SD = 1.79 for passive illiberalism)
Understanding the unique socio-political landscape of Romania lends significant weight to our
decision to employ an original scale for measuring illiberal attitudes. Existing scales, often de-
veloped with a Western or global perspective in mind, may not sufficiently capture the intricacies
and unique attitudes shaped by Romania’s historical legacy and current geopolitical issues (see, for
example, research on the limitations of cross-cultural scales: Smith and Bond 2022; Schwartz,
2014). For instance, attitudes toward the European Union, press freedom, and the legal system in
Romania may differ significantly from those in other democratic societies due to its unique post-
communist context and ongoing struggles with corruption and governance (Hess, 2016; Manolache,
2013). Our scale’s “active” and “passive” dimensions offer a nuanced understanding that is par-
ticularly well-suited for the Romanian populace. The “passive” dimension captures the traditionalist
values that have been accentuated by Romania’s specific cultural and historical experiences,
particularly its transition from a communist to a democratic system and subsequent EU membership
(Bădulescu, 2023; Stan, 2013; Tismăneanu, 1997; Whitefield, 2002). Similarly, the “active” il-
liberalism dimension addresses concerns particularly relevant to Romania, such as public attitudes
towards institutional transparency, media independence, and electoral fairness—issues that have
been hotly debated in the country (Dragomir, 2018; Freedom House, 2022). Both dimensions were
validated through factor analysis and internal consistency testing (see above), ensuring their re-
liability and effectiveness in capturing the complex phenomena we aimed to study. Therefore, while
acknowledging the merit of scales used in comparative studies, we assert that our original scale
provides a more contextually grounded and thus potentially more accurate measure of illiberal
attitudes within Romania.
Given that our scale naturally grouped into two factors, we chose to employ “active illiberalism”
and “passive illiberalism” as separate dependent variables instead of a single measure of general
illiberalism. This decision allowed us to capture the nuanced dimensions of illiberal attitudes. In line
with this approach, the independent variables included trust in institutions, pro-Russia attitudes,
anti-Ukraine attitudes, anti-NATO attitudes, and nationalist attitudes. We also considered news
consumption habits, focusing on mainstream media and social networking services (SNS), along
with perceived exposure to misinformation. To account for potential confounding effects, control
variables such as political ideology, age, gender, education, income, and geographic residence were
included in the model.
In the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, we assessed respondents’ trust in key
Romanian institutions using a composite scale. Participants rated their level of trust on a 7-point
Likert scale, ranging from ‘No Trust’ to ‘Complete Trust’ for each of seven institutions: The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Government of Romania, the President of
Romania, the Romanian Army, the Romanian Press, and the Church.
Principal Component Analysis was employed to assess the dimensionality of the trust items,
which grouped into a single factor with loadings ranging from 0.737 to 0.878 (α = 0.874, M = 3.54,
SD = 1.39). The unidimensional structure of the scale suggests that these institutions are collectively
perceived through a common lens of trust or mistrust, which allows us to use this composite score as
a robust measure of institutional trust in the current geopolitical scenario.
To assess public attitudes toward various geopolitical entities and conflicts, participants were
asked to respond to a series of statements on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Strongly Disagree’
(1) to ‘Strongly Agree’ (7). The items were organized into four separate blocks, each corresponding
to attitudes toward Russia, Ukraine, NATO/USA, and Romania, in the context of the Russia-
Ukraine conflict. Items within each block were randomized to minimize order effects. Factor
analysis was used to group these statements into unidimensional scales, and their internal con-
sistency was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha.
Public attitudes toward Russia were measured with a scale that exhibited strong reliability, as
evidenced by a Cronbach’s Alpha score of 0.900. The scale ranged from 1, signifying an anti-Russia
stance, to 7, representing a pro-Russia viewpoint. The data revealed a mean score of 2.59 with a
standard deviation of 1.67, suggesting that the general sentiment leaned toward being skeptical or
critical of Russia. The questions that contributed to this scale had factor loadings ranging from
0.697 to 0.865 and included statements such as “Russia is defending its legitimate interests and is
not responsible for the conflict,” and “Due to NATO’s aggressive expansion, Russia is now
‘surrounded by enemies’ and must defend itself.”
When it comes to Ukraine, the survey also displayed strong reliability with a Cronbach’s Alpha
of 0.879. Respondents evaluated their attitudes on a scale from 1, which represented a pro-Ukraine
and anti-Russia position, to 7, which indicated an anti-Ukraine and pro-Russia stance. The average
score was 2.81, with a standard deviation of 1.88, indicating that the respondents are leaning slightly
more toward a pro-Ukraine perspective. The factor loadings for these questions ranged from
0.888 to 0.914 and included statements like “Ukraine is a puppet of NATO and the USA,” and
“Ukraine has taken territories from us; therefore, we should not get involved in the current conflict.”
Regarding attitudes toward NATO and the USA, the Cronbach’s Alpha was 0.870, showing a
high level of internal consistency. The scale ranged from 1, indicating a pro-NATO/USA stance, to
7, implying an anti-NATO/USA view. The average score of 3.15 with a standard deviation of
1.90 indicates a position more favorable toward NATO and the USA. Factor loadings for this scale
ranged from 0.857 to 0.916 and featured items like “NATO/USA have conspired against Russia
since the end of the Cold War,” and “NATO/USA have come too close to Russia’s borders.”
Lastly, attitudes toward Romania were gauged using a scale that demonstrated high reliability,
boasting a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.926. The scale ranged from 1, meaning trust in Romania in the
context of the conflict, to 7, implying mistrust. The mean score was 4.14 with a standard deviation of
1.77, showing that there is a moderate level of mistrust or skepticism about Romania in this context.
The factor loadings for these items varied from 0.694 to 0.886 and included statements like
“Romania should not interfere in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia,” and “In the context of
the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Romania is expendable.”
To measure news consumption habits, respondents were asked about the frequency with which
they accessed political or public interest news through various platforms. Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) with Varimax rotation was employed to examine the underlying components. The
rotation converged in three iterations, revealing two distinct components. The first component was
related to social media usage (6 items), with factor loadings ranging from 0.589 (Facebook) to 0.815
(Instagram). This scale displayed strong internal consistency with a Cronbach’s Alpha of .853. For
news consumption via social networking sites, the sample size (N) was also 1000, with scores
ranging from 0 to 7. The mean was 2.55, and the standard deviation was 1.95. The second
component focused on traditional and other non-social media platforms (4 items), with factor
loadings ranging from 0.622 (Radio) to 0.779 (Television). This scale also showed good reliability
with a Cronbach”s Alpha of 0.718(N = 1000, M = 4.12, SD 1.77).
To assess the frequency of participants’ exposure to misinformation, we asked them to indicate
how often they typically encounter such news or information. The options ranged from 1 (‘rarely or
never’) to 5 (‘several times per day’). The mean was 3.38 (SD = 1.16), suggesting that the re-
spondents generally perceive a moderate to high level of misinformation. This measurement al-
lowed us to gauge the regularity with which participants come across what they perceive to be
misinformation. In the survey, respondents were not forced to provide a definitive answer regarding
perceived misinformation; 53 individuals opted for the “unable to estimate” option, coded as 99,
indicating the freedom to abstain from making a judgment. However, it is important to note a
limitation regarding this scale: self-reported measures of exposure to misinformation may not be
entirely reliable, especially in populations that are not accustomed to critically evaluating news
sources. Therefore, the data should be interpreted with this potential bias in mind, and future
research may aim to employ more robust measurement techniques.
Political orientation of the participants was assessed through a self-placement method using the
traditional left-right scale. Respondents were prompted to locate their political preferences on a
scale from 0 to 10, where 0 represents the left end of the political spectrum, 10 the right end. In our
sample of 798 valid responses, the mean score for political ideology was 6.80, with a standard
deviation of 2.398. This suggests a moderate-to-conservative skew in the sample. Additionally,
29.9% of respondents identified at the midpoint of the scale (score of 5), while smaller percentages
identified at the extreme left (4%) or extreme right (7.6%).
Demographic characteristics of the participants were collected through the survey using a
range of questions. The sample consisted of 1000 respondents, with ages ranging from 18 to 66
(Mean = 43.19, SD = 13.16). Respondents were asked to provide their birth year, which allowed
us to calculate their age at the time of the survey. The participants’ gender was self-reported,
with 52.3% identifying as female and 47.7% as male. The highest level of education attained by
each respondent was recorded, participants being divided in two groups, individuals with lower
and higher education (bachelor degree and above). Education levels varied, using a scale from
one to eight where one represents ‘No Schooling’ and eight represents ‘Postgraduate Studies.’
The majority (37.2%) of respondents had completed high school (scored as five on the scale),
and 34% had attained a level of higher education including bachelor’s degree or above (scored
as seven or eight on the scale). The mean educational level was 6.02, with a standard deviation
of 1.254, indicating that most respondents had some form of higher education but the sample
was fairly diverse in educational attainment. The categories also included those with primary ed-
ucation (0.5%), vocational training (5.4%), and post-high school but non-university education (11.0%). In
terms of income, respondents were asked to evaluate their family income level on a scale from one to five.
In this scale, one indicated ‘We do not have enough even for basic needs,’ and five represented ‘We can
afford everything we need without making sacrifices.’ The majority of respondents (40.5%) scored
themselves at 3, which means they perceived themselves as having enough for a ‘decent life’ but could not
afford more expensive goods. The mean income perception level was 3.16, with a standard deviation of
0.96, showing a moderate variation in income perceptions across the sample. Other significant categories
included those who felt they only had enough for basic needs (5.4% scored as 1) and those who could
afford some luxuries but with limitations in other areas (30.3% scored as 4). Lastly, residence was gauged
on a 1-to-6 scale: ‘In Bucharest’ (1), ‘In a large city’ (2), ‘In suburbs of a large city’ (3), ‘In a small city’ (4),
‘In a village’ (5), and ‘Isolated house’ (6). Notably, 40% lived in large cities (scored 2), 26% in small cities
(scored 4), and 17.2% in Bucharest (scored 1). The mean residence score was 2.78 with a standard
deviation of 1.36, indicating a moderate geographical diversity.
Results
In this section, we discuss the findings of our study, focusing on each of our hypotheses. The
analyses were conducted using multiple regression models to understand the underlying rela-
tionships. Two forms of illiberalism were considered as dependent variables: passive (Model A) and
active illiberalism (Model B). Due to the high degree of correlation among key variables—namely
pro-Russia attitudes, anti-Ukraine attitudes, anti-NATO attitudes, and nationalist attitudes—
multiple regression models were constructed to more accurately isolate and interpret the indi-
vidual contributions of these factors to both passive and active illiberal views, while controlling for
other variables (see Table 1).
Hypothesis 1: Trust in Institutions

Trust in institutions demonstrated a significant negative correlation with passive illiberalism
(β = 0.143, p < .01). In contrast, it showed an insignificant relationship with active illiberalism (β =
0.011, p > .05). This suggests that higher levels of trust in institutions are indeed associated with
lower levels of passive illiberalism, supporting Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2: Attitudes
H2a: Pro-Russia Attitudes
Pro-Russia attitudes were significantly positively associated with both passive and active il-
liberalism (β = 0.435 and β = 0.339, respectively; both p < .01). This validates Hypothesis H2a.
H2b: Anti-Ukraine Attitudes

Similarly, anti-Ukraine attitudes showed a significant positive relationship with both passive and
active illiberalism (β = 0.494 and β = 0.341, both p < .01). Thus, Hypothesis H2b is supported.
H2c: Anti-NATO Attitudes

A significant positive association was found between anti-NATO attitudes and both passive and
active illiberalism (β = 0.551 and β = 0.389, both p < .01), supporting Hypothesis H2c.
H2d: Nationalist Attitudes

Similarly, nationalist attitudes were strongly positively associated with both passive and active
illiberalism (β = 0.690 and β = 0.419, both p < .01), thus confirming Hypothesis H2d.
Table 1. Regression coefficients for active and passive illiberalism across key variables.
Passive illiberalism Active illiberalism Passive illiberalism Active illiberalism Passive illiberalism Active illiberalism Passive illiberalism Active illiberalism
(beta) (beta) (beta) (beta) (beta) (beta) (beta) (beta)
Bârgăoanu et al.
(Constant)
Trust in 0.143 (0.039)** 0.011 (0.043) 0.061 (0.040) 0.072 (0.045)* -0.024 (0.039) 0.080 (0.045)* 0.077 (0.036)* 0.137 (0.046)**
institutions
Pro-Russia 0.435 (0.032)** 0.339 (0.035)**
attitudes
Anti-Ukraine 0.494 (0.029)** 0.341 (0.033)**
attitudes
Anti-NATO 0.551 (0.028)** 0.389 (0.033)**
attitudes
Nationalist 0.690 (0.028)** 0.419 (0.036)**
attitudes
News 0.009 (0.035) 0.050 (0.039) 0.008 (0.035) 0.050 (0.039) 0.012 (0.034) 0.042 (0.039) 0.030 (0.030) 0.068 (0.038)
consumption
mainstream
media
News 0.090 (0.032)* 0.183 (0.035)** 0.087 (0.031)* 0.184 (0.035)** 0.097 (0.030)* 0.198 (0.035)** 0.105 (0.027)** 0.211 (0.034)**
consumption
SNS
Perceived 0.065 (0.046)* 0.080 (0.051)* 0.059 (0.045) 0.073 (0.051)* 0.075 (0.044)* 0.092 (0.051)** 0.067 (0.039)** 0.078 (0.050)*
exposure to
misinformation
Right-leaning 0.084 (0.023)** 0.040 (0.025) 0.086 (0.022)* 0.046 (0.025) 0.083 (0.022)* 0.041 (0.025) 0.035 (0.019) 0.068 (0.025)*
political
ideology
age 0.109 (0.004)** 0.065 (0.005) 0.076 (0.004)* 0.096 (0.005)* 0.097 (0.004)** 0.082 (0.005)* 0.065 (0.004)* 0.092 (0.005)**
Gender 0.024 (0.107) 0.075 (0.118)* 0.013 (0.105) 0.071 (0.119)* 0.018 (0.102) 0.078 (0.118)* -0.048 (0.090) 0.053 (0.115)
Education 0.099 (0.044)** 0.166 (0.049)** 0.104 (.043)** 0.178 (0.049)** 0.100 (0.042)** 0.165 (.048)** 0.088 (.037)** 0.165 (.048)**
Income 0.037 (0.058) 0.022 (0.064) 0.037 (0.057) 0.021 (0.064) 0.006 (0.056) 0.005 (0.064) 0.007 (0.049) 0.013 (0.063)
Residence 0.037 (0.040) 0.090 (0.044)* 0.023 (0.039) 0.082 (0.044)* 0.013 (0.038) 0.064 (0.044)* 0.003 (0.034) 0.064 (0.043)*
Adj. R2 0.275 0.249 0.314 0.248 0.357 0.273 0.478 0.283
N 749 749 738 738 726 726 749 749
281
For both models of illiberalism this variable consistently shows positive and significant results.
Hypothesis 3: News Consumption

H3a: Mainstream Media
Consuming mainstream media news showed an insignificant relationship with both passive and
active illiberalism (β = 0.009 and β = 0.050, both p > .05), failing to support Hypothesis H3a.
This means that whether someone often watches, reads, or listens to mainstream news or not does
not significantly influence the likelihood of them holding illiberal views.
H3b: Social Networking Services (SNS)

Consumption of news from SNS was significantly positively correlated with both passive and
active illiberalism (β = 0.090 and β = 0.183, both p < .05), thus supporting Hypothesis H3b.
Hypothesis 4: Perceived Misinformation

Perceived exposure to misinformation exhibited a significant negative correlation with both
passive and active illiberalism (β = 0.065 and β = 0.080, both p < .05), thereby supporting
Hypothesis 4.
Control Variables: Political Ideology and Socio-Demographic Controls

Political ideology, age, gender, education, income, and residence were also considered. Right-
leaning political ideology is found to have a significant negative association with passive illib-
eralism, while the association with active illiberalism is not significant. In most models, the variable
“age” has a positive effect on passive illiberalism (beta coefficients range from 0.065 to 0.109),
meaning older people tend to exhibit higher levels of passive illiberalism. In all cases, these
coefficients are statistically significant. Conversely, “age” has a negative effect on active illiberalism
(beta coefficients range from 0.065 to 0.096), meaning older people are less likely to exhibit
active illiberal attitudes.
Gender is positively associated with active illiberalism, indicating that women are slightly more
predisposed to active illiberalism. However, the relationship is not significant in terms of passive
illiberalism. Education shows a significant negative association with both forms of illiberalism,
indicating that higher levels of education are associated with lower levels of illiberalism. The
income is not significant in any model, while the “residence” variable shows varying effects across
different models. In some models, residence has a positive effect on active illiberalism (beta
coefficients range from 0.064 to 0.090), suggesting that those living in rural areas may be more
predisposed to active illiberalism, while in most models, the residence is not statistically significant
for passive illiberalism.
Summary of model fit
The adjusted R-squared values indicated that the models accounted for approximately 27.5% to
47.8% of the variance in passive and active illiberalism. The sample size for all models ranged from
726 to 749. The VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) scores are mostly below 2, which suggests that
multicollinearity is likely not a significant issue in these models.
Discussion
The study presented here aimed to understand the underlying mechanisms that contribute to
passive and active forms of illiberalism. Utilizing multiple regression models, we examined the
relationship between key factors such as trust in institutions, pro-Russia attitudes, anti-Ukraine
attitudes, anti-NATO attitudes, nationalist attitudes, news consumption from mainstream media
and social networking services (SNS), and perceived exposure to misinformation. Additionally,
control variables like political ideology and socio-demographic variables were considered.
Trust in institutions
One of our salient findings was the significant negative correlation between trust in institutions and
passive illiberalism, supporting Hypothesis 1. This is consistent with prior literature, which has
shown that trust in institutions can act as a safeguard against illiberal attitudes, presumably because
faith in the system diminishes the attraction of authoritarian alternatives (Hetherington and
Rudolph, 2015). However, the relationship was insignificant for active illiberalism. It could be
interpreted that trust in institutions might prevent passive acceptance of illiberal ideas but may not
be potent enough to inhibit those who are already active proponents of such views (Inglehart and
Welzel, 2005). To the extent of our knowledge, the present study is the first to explore the rela-
tionship between trust in institutions and illiberalism in the particular context of the war in Ukraine.
We can confirm through our data that the negative correlation between trust in institutions and
illiberalism – as identified in the literature (Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Voeten, 2022) – remains
valid in times of crisis and instability. Although the threat represented by the war in Ukraine could
reinforce trust in institutions through the “rally around the flag effect” (Schraff, 2021), this does
affect the negative correlation between trust and illiberalism.
Attitudes toward Russia, Ukraine, NATO and Romania

Our study supported Hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c, indicating that pro-Russia, anti-Ukraine, and
anti-NATO attitudes were significantly positively associated with both passive and active illib-
eralism. These findings are congruent with studies like Mummendey et al. (1999), which suggest
that negative attitudes towards ‘out-groups’ and alliances with ‘in-groups’ can often be predictors of
illiberal views. The findings contribute to the line of research showing that citizens who support
illiberal politicians share similar attitudes with them (Lewandowsky and Jankowski, 2023). In our
case (i.e. the war in Ukraine), citizens with illiberal tendencies share the pro-Russia, anti-Ukraine
and anti-NATO stance of illiberal parties (Braghiroli, 2023; Krekó and Enyedi, 2018; Soare, 2023).
The strong association between nationalist attitudes and both forms of illiberalism also confirms
prior research that has highlighted the link between nationalist fervor and illiberal attitudes
(Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). Also, authors such as Haidt (2012) and Sidanius et al. (2001), link
nationalist attitudes with authoritarian tendencies and rejection of democratic norms. The robustness
of this relationship in our models highlights the importance of nationalist attitudes as perhaps one of
the most potent predictors of illiberalism (Dostal et al., 2018; Makarychev, 2019), emphasizing the
need for targeted interventions to address this form of political ideology.
Media consumption and information environment

Contrary to Hypothesis H3a, we found no significant relationship between consumption of
mainstream media and illiberal views. This contradicts some studies that have implicated main-
stream media in perpetuating bias and misinformation (Norris, 2000; Sunstein, 2017) or studies
suggesting that mainstream media can function as a moderating influence (Gentzkow and Shapiro,
2006; Ladd, 2012). However, consistent with Hypothesis H3b, our results demonstrated a sig-
nificant positive correlation between news consumption from SNS and both forms of illiberalism.
This observation aligns with existing literature pointing to the polarizing effects of social media
platforms (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Pariser, 2011), indicating that social media platforms can be
echo chambers that amplify illiberal viewpoints (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017).
Furthermore, our results support Hypothesis 4, revealing that perceived exposure to misin-
formation was negatively correlated with both passive and active illiberalism. This finding sheds a
new light on the growing body of research that has identified misinformation as a significant
contributor to illiberal and extremist attitudes (Vosoughi et al., 2018), and with the ongoing debates
regarding the role of social media platforms in the spread of misinformation and illiberal ideas
(Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Lee et al., 2023). The result suggests that people who are more aware
they are subjected to unreliable, biased information are less prone to be nudged towards illiberal
views by the media content they consume. One possible explanation is that people who feel
surrounded by disinformation refrain from accepting information uncritically and trust the news less
(Wasserman and Madrid-Morales, 2019), which, in turn, makes less vulnerable to the effects of
biased, misleading information. This finding creates a new avenue for research on the factors that
mitigate vulnerability to misinformation and can inform media literacy initiatives aiming to reduce
societal polarization.
Political ideology and socio-demographic factors

While political ideology was consistently significant, the direction varied depending on the model,
which underscores the complexity of ideological influences on illiberalism. For instance, right-
leaning political ideology showed varying relationships with passive and active illiberalism,
confirming previous research that demonstrated complex interactions between political ideology
and anti-democratic attitudes (Federico and Malka, 2018; Jost et al., 2003).
The influence of age, gender, and education also provided nuanced insights. Our results showed
that higher levels of education were negatively associated with both passive and active illiberalism.
This finding aligns with previous research that indicates educated individuals are more likely to hold
liberal attitudes and are generally more supportive of democratic institutions (Galston, 2004; Niemi
and Junn, 2005). Higher education appears to serve as a protective factor against illiberal tendencies,
possibly due to the critical thinking skills and broader exposure to diverse viewpoints that come with
advanced education. However, the strength of this association was more pronounced for passive
illiberalism than for active illiberalism, suggesting that education is not a panacea and that other
factors also play a crucial role.
While our study found that urban residents were generally less prone to passive and active
illiberal views compared to their rural counterparts, the distinction was more pronounced for active
illiberalism. This complements existing literature that highlights the urban-rural divide as a critical
variable in understanding political attitudes, such as Putnam’s “Bowling Alone” (2000) and the
works of Cramer (2016), who examines rural consciousness and its impact on political behavior.
The differential impact on passive and active illiberalism may reflect the broader cultural and
informational ecosystems of urban and rural areas. Interestingly, income did not show a strong
correlation with either passive or active illiberalism. This contradicts some theories that suggest
economic stability may lead to more moderate political views (Lipset, 1959). The lack of a strong
correlation could be indicative of the complexities involved in the relationship between income and
illiberalism, potentially moderated by other variables like social identity and geopolitical attitudes.
As for age, our study found that older individuals were more likely to exhibit passive illiberal
attitudes but were less prone to active illiberalism. This finding could be understood within the
framework of Inglehart’s generational replacement theory (Inglehart and Norris, 2003), which
posits that older generations, socialized under different historical and societal conditions, may hold
more traditional values. However, the fact that this association reverses when considering active
illiberalism suggests that older individuals may not be as engaged in translating these traditional
attitudes into active forms of illiberalism. This is a complex relationship that warrants further
research.
Gender also played a role, although its impact was not as significant as other factors. Previous
research has shown that men are generally more likely to hold illiberal views than women (Pratto
et al., 1997; Sidanius et al., 2001), which was not significant in our study. Interestingly, our analysis
uncovered a nuanced distinction; women manifested a higher propensity for active illiberalism. This
adds another layer of complexity, possibly indicating different socialization processes for men and
women that make them more or less receptive to different forms of illiberalism, in line with findings
pointing out that both genders can engage in active illiberal actions depending on the context
(Kalmijn and Kraaykamp, 2007).
Overall, control variables like education, residence, income, age, and gender all play roles in
shaping illiberal attitudes, but their effects are nuanced and sometimes paradoxical. This suggests
that future research should employ more complex models, possibly incorporating interaction terms
or using machine learning algorithms to identify more nuanced relationships among these variables.
Moreover, the findings shed new light on the complex interplay of institutional trust, geopolitical
attitudes, news consumption habits and perceived misinformation in shaping illiberal attitudes. As
societies grapple with the erosion of democratic norms, understanding these nuanced relationships
becomes increasingly vital.
Limits and future research

Several potential limitations could be considered for this study. The study is based on self-reported
data, specific to a cultural context which can be subject to various biases. For example, social
desirability bias could lead respondents to answer in a way they believe is more socially acceptable
rather than reflecting their true beliefs. The data is cross-sectional, it was collected at a single point in
time and it may not accurately reflect changes in attitudes or beliefs over time. Therefore, lon-
gitudinal studies would be needed to examine trends and changes in illiberal attitudes over time.
While our models accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in illiberal attitudes, they
were not exhaustive. Future research should consider other psychological, social, and economic
variables that could further explain this phenomenon. Additionally, there could be other scales that
can help having a better grasp over the phenomena or that could rely more on objective data instead
on self-assessment. Overall, while quantitative data offer valuable insights by establishing robust
predictive models, they often fall short in capturing the underlying motivations and context-specific
nuances that shape these views. Qualitative research can fill this gap by providing deeper, more
textured insights into why individuals hold illiberal beliefs and how these beliefs influence their
behavior. Future research could employ a mixed-methods approach that leverages the strengths of
both quantitative and qualitative designs.
The study’s limitations, including the unexamined role of cultural factors and limited geo-
graphical scope, suggest avenues for future research. For example, future research could focus on
media literacy and its potential role in shaping these attitudes. As the study shows that consumption
of political news via various social media platforms is significant for both passive and active il-
liberalism, a more detailed analysis of the algorithms used by these platforms and the specific type of
content that trends on each platform would be useful. The political context in which individuals
form their attitudes is also important. Further research could explore the effect of specific political
events, policies, or public figures on the development of illiberal attitudes. Furthermore, future
studies could explore the varying conceptions of ‘fake news’ or ‘misinformation’ across different
ideological spectrums, examining how these perceptions are shaped by an individual’s capacity for
critical thinking. Such an investigation could shed light on the cognitive mechanisms behind the
selective interpretation and dissemination of information, which, in turn, could offer nuanced
strategies for combating the spread of misinformation.” For example, the impact of media literacy
has been explored in the works of scholars like (Hobbs, 2010), who emphasize its role in promoting
critical thinking and democratic participation. Also, the demographic factors or the political af-
filiation could be furtherly explored in qualitative studies to find out how the socio-economic factors
contribute to illiberal attitudes and develop more effective interventions.
Future studies should aim to explore these dynamics in more diverse populations to build a more
comprehensive understanding of the factors driving the rise of illiberalism. The impact of these
variables in shaping both passive and active forms of illiberalism cannot be overstated, especially in
the context of a rapidly evolving global political environment. These findings echo the urgency
expressed in existing literature to understand the root causes of democratic backsliding and rising
illiberal tendencies, as studied by scholars like Diamond (2015) in “Facing Up to the Democratic
Recession” and Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) in “How Democracies Die.” Moreover, the strong role
of nationalist attitudes in predicting illiberal views, emphasized in this study, points to a crucial area
that requires immediate scholarly and policy attention.
While further research is needed, the findings are significant in the context of rising illiberal
trends and can serve as a basis for targeted interventions designed to promote liberal democratic
values. The uniqueness of our research lies in its comprehensive examination of various forms of
illiberalism, namely passive and active, in relation to multiple attitudinal, media consumption, and
demographic variables. Some of these variables have not been explored in the literature in direct
connection to illiberalism (i.e. perceived exposure to misinformation; anti-Ukraine attitudes), while
others have not been investigated in contexts of crisis, such as the war in Ukraine.
Our study particularly stands out for its detailed look into the impacts of pro-Russia attitudes,
anti-Ukraine attitudes, anti-NATO attitudes, and nationalist sentiments within the context of our
sampled population. Furthermore, we expand on the discussion on the importance of domestic
contexts for understanding illiberalism. More specifically, the distinction that we introduce between
active and passive illiberalism proves to be fruitful for the understanding of the particularities of
Romanian illiberalism. As such, we contribute to the scarce literature on illiberalism in Romania.
Importantly, our results not only contribute to the understanding of illiberal tendencies in this
specific cultural and geopolitical context, but they also provide a framework that could be adapted
for similar studies globally. The strong statistical associations we identified between certain attitudes
and illiberal views could be indicative of broader, transnational trends. Thus, these findings could be
significant for policymakers, sociologists, and political scientists who are trying to understand the
factors that contribute to illiberal ideologies in different parts of the world.
Conclusions
Overall, this study contributes to the ongoing academic discussion on the rise of illiberalism by
dissecting its multidimensional nature. It underscores the need for a nuanced approach in policy-
making to address the various predictors contributing to passive and active illiberalism. The ad-
justed R2 values suggest a moderate to strong explanatory power of our models, indicating the
relevance of these predictors in understanding illiberalism. Our results signal a significant need for a
nuanced approach in policy formulation aimed at mitigating the factors contributing to both passive
and active illiberalism. The strong associations between nationalist attitudes, anti-NATO/Ukraine/
Russia attitudes, and illiberal tendencies, for example, necessitate policies that engage citizens in
more inclusive narratives and dialogues. Given the strong influence of nationalist attitudes and anti-
institutional sentiments, for instance, policymakers need to adopt multifaceted strategies that go
beyond mere counter-propaganda or civic education.
Furthermore, understanding the link between news consumption on social media, and illiberal
tendencies can be critical for media organizations and policymakers. If news consumption on certain
platforms is seen to foster illiberalism, it may necessitate actions such as media literacy campaigns
or regulations to ensure balanced and accurate news reporting to counter misinformation and
propagate democratic values.
In summary, our study offers a multidimensional perspective on illiberalism and its predictors,
serving as a timely contribution to both academic research and public policy formulation. It calls for
targeted interventions, integrating various socio-political and media factors, to mitigate the rise of
illiberal attitudes in society.
Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Supplemental Material
Supplemental material for this article is available online.
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Author biographies
Alina Bârgăoanu, professor PhD, dean of the College of Communication and Public Relations,
National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (Bucharest); member of the
Advisory Board of European Digital Media Observatory ( EDMO ) and of EDMO’s task force on
the war in Ukraine; Marcin Król Fellow at Visegrad Insight; visiting fellow at Minda de Gunzburg
Center for European Studies at Harvard University; member of the High-Level Expert Group on
Fake News and Online Disinformation, EC (2018); founder and editor-in-chief of the fact-checking
portal Antifake.ro; media commentator and columnist on topics related to disinformation, tech-
nology and democracy.
Flavia Durach, PhD, is Associate Professor at the College of Communication and Public Relations,
National University for Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, and the coordinator
of the MA Digital Communication and Innovation. Her research interests include the study of media
effects, with an emphasis on online disinformation, strategic communication, the role of the digital
platforms, and EU attitudes. In recent years, she was involved in a number of national and in-
ternational projects dedicated to media literacy and countering fake news.
Oana Ştefăniță, PhD, is an associate professor, vice-dean at the Faculty of Communication and
Public Relations, National University of Political Sciences and Public Administration. She was the
beneficiary of a Fulbright grant at the Center for International Mass Communication Research,
University of Georgia, USA. She is involved in research projects on education, communication and
public policies. Her research interests regard media effects and education.

Bargaoanu Et Al 2023 Predictors of Illiberalism in Romania A Case Study During The Russian Invasion in Ukraine

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Bargaoanu Et Al 2023 Predictors of Illiberalism in Romania A Case Study During The Russian Invasion in Ukraine

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Alina Bârgăoanu, Flavia Durach and Oana Ştefăniţă

Background: Illiberal attitudes in Romania

Factors that impact illiberal attitudes

Attitudes towards Russia, Ukraine, and NATO

H2c: Anti-NATO attitudes are positively associated with illiberalism.

Nationalism and illiberalism

H2d: Nationalist attitudes are positively associated with illiberalism.

Illiberalism and news consumption habits

H3a: Consuming mainstream media news is negatively associated with illiberalism.

Perceptions of misinformation exposure

H4: Perceived exposure to misinformation is negatively associated with illiberalism.

Illiberal attitudes and individual characteristics

Hypothesis 1: Trust in Institutions

H2b: Anti-Ukraine Attitudes

H2c: Anti-NATO Attitudes

H2d: Nationalist Attitudes

Hypothesis 3: News Consumption

H3b: Social Networking Services (SNS)

Hypothesis 4: Perceived Misinformation

Control Variables: Political Ideology and Socio-Demographic Controls

Attitudes toward Russia, Ukraine, NATO and Romania

Media consumption and information environment

Political ideology and socio-demographic factors

Limits and future research

Declaration of conﬂicting interests

Potenţialul electoral al partidelor cu orientare naţionalistă. Strategic Thinking Group. https://www.

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