Piotr Borowiec

The Politicization of Social Divisions in

Post-War Poland
Piotr Borowiec
Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Jagiellonian
University, Kraków, Poland

ISBN 978-3-031-26529-7 e-ISBN 978-3-031-26530-3

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26530-3

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To my daughter Alicja
Acknowledgements
Many people contributed to my writing of this book, including my
colleagues from the Institute of Political Science and International Relations
at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. I would like to thank all of them.
In particular, I would like to extend my gratitude to Piotr Obacz, Ph.D., for
the inspiration provided by his monograph entitled Podział “Polska
solidarna—Polska liberalna” w świetle wybranych koncepcji pluralizmu
politycznego. (2018). It helped me consider many issues related to
divisions. Even if I provide different answers to some of the questions he
asked, they would not have been formulated had it not been for his paper. I
would also like to thank the students of the Political Studies Faculty of the
Jagiellonian University, to whom I presented an approach to social divisions
and the theory of practices of repartition during political sociology lectures.
I am profoundly thankful to them for their critique, patience and
inquisitiveness.
Kraków, Poland
December 2022

Piotr Borowiec
Abbreviations
CBOS Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej—Centre for Public Opinion
Research
GUS Główny Urząd Statystyczny—Central Statistical Office
KPN Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej—The Confederation of
Independent Poland
PGR Państwowe Gospodarstwo Rolne—State Agricultural Farm
PKWN Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego—Polish Committee of
National Liberation
PPR Polska Partia Robotnicza—Polish Workers’ Party
PPS Polska Partia Socjalistyczna—Polish Socialist Party
PRL Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa—Polish People’s Republic
PZPR Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza—Polish United Workers’
Party
RP Rzeczpospolita Polska—The Republic of Poland
SLD Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej—The Democratic Left Alliance
UB Urząd Bezpieczeństwa—Security Office
UE Unia Europejska—European Union
ZMP Związek Młodzieży Polskiej—Union of Polish Youth
Contents
1 Introduction
2 The First Structural Experiment: Communist-Era Homogenisation
3 Consequences of the Experiment: The Division Between Society and
the nomenklatura
4 The Second Experiment: The Differentiation of the Social Structure
5 Consequences of the Second Experiment: The “Winners”–“Losers”
Division
6 The Formation of Social Divisions and the Theory of Practices of
Repartition
7 Conclusion
Index
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023
P. Borowiec, The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26530-3_1

1. Introduction
Piotr Borowiec1
(1) Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Jagiellonian
University, Kraków, Poland

Piotr Borowiec
Email: piotr.borowiec@uj.edu.pl

Keywords Introduction – Social divisions – Practice of repartition

Two observations formed the basis of my interest in the formation and

politicization of social divisions in Poland. Both are seemingly different and
perhaps exceptionally trivial but, in practice, they are related to each other,
inspire me and bring about scientific research.
The first consisted in me realising my growing irritation caused by
another passionate statement of a certain public opinion leader in the media,
claiming that Polish society was deeply “divided in half” and that this
caused negative consequences suffered, in particular, by the author of these
words and which were unbearable for him. He considered those divisions
and splits to be a burden weighing him down and leading to his permanent
discomfort of living. His additional words did not lead to anything sensible.
Often, he was not even able to define the sides of this division, its genesis
or the causes behind the formation of related distances, and yet he noticed it
and made it socially significant, seemingly considering himself a messenger
of some sort. In the later part of his argumentation, he warned against
further divisions and condemned those causing divisions and fuelling the
“Polish-Polish war”. As expected, he only counted politicians who did not
share his worldview among the dividers. It was them who he considered the
source of those divisions. He had no second thoughts about expressing his
negative opinion of them. Elated, he was convinced that he was the truth-
bearer, failing to notice that suddenly he joined the dividers (in reference to
the notion above). He divided politicians into those who reportedly cause
divisions due to employing dividing as a strategy and those who reportedly
abstain from doing it (at least in his opinion). In other words, into those
worthy and unworthy of trust, not equal to himself. Some he considered
superior, others inferior. The whole of his statement showed disdain for
politics, a wish for the need for unity and universal harmony, but built
solely based on his own vision of order and proper living—which is an
expectation that shocks with its totality and is partially a legacy of
communism and its doctrine of “moral and political unity” (Świda-Ziemba,
1998, p. 291).
The second observation is related to a statement by Adam Michnik—a
person symbolic of the Polish fight for freedom—from early 2015. It was a
statement anchored in politics and practically opened that [politically
important] year when presidential and parliamentary elections were held.
Michnik made a division “into an authoritarian Poland wanting to build a
police state, and a democratic Poland” (Adam, 2015). The above statement
is clearly significant because both Michnik and the circles centred around
him were reluctant to employ such polarisations. It cannot be interpreted
only as a mechanical attempt at supporting one of the parties to a political
dispute with his own authority and, therefore, as an instrumental and
demagogic strategy. It would constitute a simplification unfair to the source
of this concept, very likely untrue. Therefore, there must be something
more in those dichotomous, discursive juxtapositions—hereinafter referred
to as practices of repartition.
These observations and attempts at answering the question of what the
actual reasons for the appearance of social divisions and application of
repartitions—those that lie deeper than the ones suggested by common
sense, political discourse conditions and available scientific knowledge on
divisions, often referred to as the “classic knowledge on the matter”—are
constituted as the basis for the decision to begin research on the phenomena
mentioned above.
The main substantive assumption of this paper is a reflection on the role
of the ideas of justice and equality in Polish social order. The introduction
of the first version of these ideals in 1945, following the communist
distribution ideology, resulted in a permanent revolution of the social
structure and the destruction of existing divisions, differences and
inequalities. The consequences of those processes are still being felt today.
It is necessary to remember that the egalitarian perspective situates
inequalities mainly in the structure, within perspectives of
superiority−inferiority (Domański, 2002, p. 9). The introduction of their
second version, based on meritocracy and efficiency, led to the formation of
new inequalities, once again transforming the social structure and making it
more difficult to read. Therefore, in my paper, I focus on the economic,
ethnic and religious categories of social structuralisation, various
approaches to the structure and also subjective awareness aspects of the
lives of individuals (i.e., the meanings assigned to inequalities). It is in
these phenomena that is see the individual, psychological sources of
division. I believe that their premises lie mainly in endogenous factors,
inequalities and the attitudes of individuals towards them. I make central
the categories that constitute inequalities and eventually lead to divisions. It
is them that create the distances between individuals; therefore, they are
“signposts”, determinants for describing the structure of and changes in
inequalities, as well as for the formation of divisions. The analysis assumes
recognising social order as a “system” of active individuals socially,
economically and politically anchored and being in a state of constant
integration and transformation. Additionally, it may be recognised as an
order that is a collection of rules and institutions that determine the
framework of social existence (Marody, 1991, p. 7) and that are all
structured and co-dependent—and, therefore, also the relations between
them. Acting in this manner allows showing the ties between transforming
structures that result from their effect and, therefore, the formation of
divisions and politicization thereof.
In the analysis presented, social divisions and practices of repartition
constitute the main object of interest and bind all of the considerations
undertaken. Repartitions are important political matters—not only in
democracy—that form a basis for rooting and transforming politics. That is
why I attempt to present their model and capture their dynamics.
Repartitions are commonly considered mobilisation strategies that help
provide political support, while in reality, they are forms of questioning the
stability of the order by calling for a rejection of its dominant hierarchies.
They are also instrumental tools that groups use to anchor themselves in
politics and participate in them, or methods intended to ensure political
survival. They constitute a reflection of many conditions present within a
given society. This is why I consider them forms of diagnosis of social
statuses, the depth of inequalities and the changes expected. The foundation
of my consideration is the functionalist assumption that divisions and
practices of repartition are intrasystemic consequences that usually reflect
the condition of structures, the influence of dominating ideologies and the
accepted vision of social justice. To put it as simply as possible, practices of
repartition are attempts at revealing unjust relations and privileges and
political calls for abolishing them. In this manner, my paper reaches to the
very basis of structures (i.e., to the formation of social relations and
appearance of distances and connects them to political activities and
practices of repartition employed). I claim that the experiences of unjust
differences created the divisions in Poland and, therefore, repartitioning
practices (which includes politics). In the repartitioning theory proposed,
the objective is to explain one of the forms of politicization of social
divisions. The majority of inequalities and divisions arising are subject to
politicization that varies in form and intensity. However, not all of them are
politicized by means of repartitions.
In this paper, I demonstrate that the divisions are conditioned upon the
structure condition, inequalities, registers of wrongs and factors present at
an individual level, as well as subtle meanings that individuals assign to
them. At the same time, the analysis showed that repartitions are employed
in two cases: when there are significant and noticeable inequalities between
groups and when differences disappear, and homogenisation progresses. A
“homogeneous” society increases the likelihood of the application of
repartitions, usually through the “underlining” of hidden partitions aimed at
destroying that homogeneity. This applies to the democratic order in
particular. Political actors reach for such measures when the social structure
is characterised by profound differences, when it is nearly homogeneous
and, also, when a specific lifestyle model is imposed on minorities. The
existence of a homogeneous society does not exclude taking advantage of
these practices. On the contrary, it basically “invites” them to be included in
the discourse. That is why repartitions are also “instruments” used for
controlling social space and “healing” relations. They lead to a controlled
change while, at the same time, not being one, and that is one of the major
findings of this paper.
 In the analysis, I introduce notions that constitute theoretical
assumptions for the subject matter discussed, make it more understandable
and enable preparing the whole concept of divisions and practices. In this
paper, society is a social space that keeps becoming, that is, a network of
social relations. I consider the notions of society—relations identical, and
they appear interchangeably in this paper (Domański, 2004, p. 11;
Sztompka, 1989; Wasilewski, 2006, p. 47). I differentiate between the
occurrence of objective inequalities and the subjective reception of
objective condition of structures, as well as between the historically formed
social divisions and the practices of repartition recreating them. These
practices are discursive creations that depend on the condition of the
surroundings. They hold control and sustain or undermine existing
privileges, which makes them types of well-developed change
implementation projects.
In this paper, I omit the issue of the “translation” of divisions into the
party system and their impact on competition between parties—this is due
to the fact that, at present, there is still no evidence that the divisions (also
as presented in this paper) determine the form of the party system. It turns
out that “the political entrepreneurs organise only some of the social
divisions into political ‘sides’ and parties, expressed in programs in
activities, while others remain dormant” (Grabowska, 2004, p. 257).
Another reason is that it is a separate research question that goes beyond the
issues presented in this paper. I also do not involve myself in seeking the
lines of political division and do not answer the question of how individual
divisions impacted the role, successes or failures of individual parties. I am
searching for facts in the discourse that explain the mechanisms of the
formation of divisions and creation of practices. I am also looking for
confirmation of theoretical conclusions and, therefore, anchoring my
deliberations in post-1945 Polish politics. This work provides an empirical
basis for the repartition theory. However, as it lacks complete verification, I
am presenting it in the form of a dynamic interpretation scheme (Karwat,
2011, pp. 78–79).
The research question of this paper required returning to the processes
of Communist-era homogenisation, when totalitarian communist authorities
generated the “us”–“them” division, striving to build an “equal” society. I
take these processes into account and return to them because this paper
describes the continuity of change in Poland, taking place despite attempts
at applying discontinuous development that were made during different
periods. I remind them as the struggle against social divisions and the
formation of new ones had even started in Poland before the end of World
War II. They have been continued for decades up to the present day. One of
the features of changes experienced by society was the conviction that
striving to abolish inequalities would lead to the formation of relations
based on justice. This conviction seems persistent, but its strength was
changing over time.
Thanks to returning to the post-war period, the compilation of sources
employed was extensive. All of them, including compilations of political
and historical facts and the inductive method of theory building, formed the
source and methodological base for the research. It consists of scientific
literature regarding the social structure and transformation of Polish society
during the years 1945–2022. This literature is very abundant, although
some of it has ideological influences that refer to multiple theoretical and
empirical approaches, including Marxism. The literature on the subject,
irrespective of its ideological influences, allows the formation of the
fundamental inequalities and division to be recreated—both after World
War II and in later decades. It allows noticing “revolutionary interventions”
in the structure, aiming at liquidating one division and creating others. This
does not mean, however, that only the political interventions generated
social distances. I took advantage of the knowledge of structuralisation and
social classes—as well as of both Marx’s and Weber’s approach—according
to the historical period in which they were employed to analyse the social
structure. When discussing social structure, I employ notions from a given
historical period as they constitute a part of scientific temporal awareness. I
recognise their impact on politics and the repartitions employed.
This paper is based on the empirical and theoretical achievements of
scholars dealing with the structure and condition of Polish society. It is also
based on works of authors from outside of Poland that touch upon socio-
political divisions, including the reflections of Seymour M. Lipset and Stein
Rokkan (1967), reflections of Stein Rokkan (1970), concepts of Scott C.
Flanagan (1980), Ronald Inglehart (1984), Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair
(1990), Amory Gethin et al. (2021) and those of Oddbjørn Knutsen and
Elinor Scarbrough (1995). Some special inspiration was provided by the
works of Herbert Kitschelt (1989, 1992) and the theoretical solutions of
Ryszard Herbut (1997, 1999), Radosław Markowski (2000), Radosław
Markowski and Ben Stanley (2016), Mirosława Grabowska (2004, 2021),
Agnieszka Figiel (2009), Piotr Obacz (2018, 2021), Tomasz Zarycki (2000,
2007) and other scholars (Bejma, 2013; Borowiec, 2021; Cześnik &
Kotnarowski, 2011; Górka, 2009; Klepka, 2013; Kwiatkowska, 2010; Letki,
2013; Łukowski & Sadowski, 2013). All the works listed constituted the
basis for research, but I do not refer to them further on.
The analysis was built around the chronological line of events and a
comparison of temporally distant events. It focuses on a process approach
to recognising events taking place and striving for generalisation. What the
whole of this paper and its considerations have in common is the two great
social experiments—the first one starting in the 1940s, the second one in
the 1990s. In both cases, the intention was to “change the social life in line
with a more or less specified vision of a society” (Blok, 1994, p. 17), with
greater or lesser social acceptance—both instrumentally and politically—to
destroy the social division or recreate them in line with ideological
templates and selected concepts of justice.

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© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023
P. Borowiec, The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26530-3_2

2. The First Structural Experiment:

Communist-Era Homogenisation
Piotr Borowiec1
(1) Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Jagiellonian
University, Kraków, Poland

Piotr Borowiec
Email: piotr.borowiec@uj.edu.pl

Keywords Communism – Agrarian reform – Industry – Working class –

Totalitarianism

Ideological and Political Reasons for Interfering

with the Structure, and the Patterns of That
Interference
Had there been a necessity to describe the structure of the Polish society
directly after the end of World War II using a single word, the most fitting
one would have been “broken”. Its precise image was unobtainable at that
time given the lack of complete knowledge of the extent of wartime losses
and destruction. Besides, it was simply not necessary then as other
objectives—the recreation of social life, rebuilding of the country and
overcoming poverty and supply shortages—were far more important
(Jarosz, 2002). However, if anyone had accepted such a task, they would
have failed due to a lack of certain data. The five years of war brought the
society [at that time] a previously unknown degree of suffering and
population losses, as well as a biological (Roszkowski, 2010) and financial
disaster. War was a traumatic experience, and the social fabric was in a
critical biological condition (Kersten, 2018). For every thousand Polish
citizens as of 1939, 220 people died—murdered by Soviet and German
occupiers or due to other causes.
What was the society that had been destroyed in a structure like, then?
Clearly, it was rife with social divisions and enclosed within numerous
hierarchies and inequalities (Zagórski, 1978, pp. 37–54). It experienced
noticeable distances, generated conflicts and organised strikes and social
events. The war destroyed an order that was characterised by wrongs and
social injustice, one in which unjust relations were accepted, justified and
effectively sustained. It was a world where ethnic and religious inequalities
were present next to economic distances. However, demands for creating
just relations also appeared together with calls for rejecting social
pathologies.
The country, reborn in 1918, was taking intensive actions to introduce
social and economic changes. It initiated and conducted changes towards
industrialisation and urbanisation, performing limited but indispensable
social destructuralisation. The number of industrial workers employed was
growing systematically in the newly developed industrial centres. However,
the social structure was dominated by farmers and farmworkers employed
in large manors. Agriculture was the core of the contemporary economic
system (Wesołowski et al., 2017, p. 41). In 1939, 75% of the Polish
population lived in the countryside, with farmers and farmworkers
constituting 55% of the 35 million citizens of Poland. Industrial workers—
who later became the shapers of history—constituted 27.5% of the
population, bourgeoisie—11%, intelligentsia—over 5%, larger
entrepreneurs—1%, and landed classes—about 0.4% (Dziurok et al., 2014,
pp. 43–52). The above-mentioned groups were internally diverse, mainly in
economic terms. Social disproportions were running deep—an example of
which may be the distance between the majority of groups and the
entrepreneurs and landed classes or the economic and cultural rift between
the farmers and farmworkers and the intelligentsia. There were also certain
similarities between them—an example of which can be the similar living
standard of farmers, farmworkers and industrial workers (Turski et al.,
1978, p. 81). The society of that time had extreme faces—on the one hand,
small privileged groups; on the other, numerous and large handicapped
groups.
 When it comes to nationality, the situation resembled a multicultural
mosaic that is hard to create because of the ambiguous ethnic affiliation of
some of the inhabitants. In some of the people living in the territory of a
country that was being patched together after World War I, national
awareness was barely forming. Over 68% of the population declared Polish
identity. The subsequent most numerous groups were: Ukrainians—over
15%, Jews—8.5%, Belarusians—over 3% and Germans—over 2%. The
remaining ones were: Russians, Lithuanians, Czechs, Romani, a few
Slovaks and Karaites and certain ethnic groups linguistically similar to
Ukrainians (Boykos, Lemkos, Hutsuls), as well as Polonised Armenians
and Tatars. Social differentiation was the highest among Poles. It is
estimated that they constituted: 60% of all farmers and farmworkers, 75–
80% of industrial workers, about 80% of the intelligentsia, about 40% of
the bourgeoisie and 50% of entrepreneurs. Polish nationality was also
dominant among landed classes.
The majority of Poles were Catholic, and only a small part was
Protestant. Ukrainians, who usually worked in agriculture, were mostly
Greek Catholic. A similar religious structure was dominant among
Belarusians, who were either Eastern Orthodox or Catholic. The Belarusian
population was characterised by the highest percentage of the illiterate. The
majority of Jews, who constituted 21% of the urban population, were
followers of Judaism. They spoke Yiddish and Polish, engaged in various
professions and had a significant share of entrepreneurs, lawyers and
doctors. As much as 55% of doctors in Poland were Jewish (Dziurok et al.,
2014, pp. 43–52).
What remained of that society after the war and the forced resettlements
or migrations resulting from the international political arrangements?
(Kersten, 2018, p. 201). The consequences of these processes can be
noticed when discussing the social structure, but at the same time can only
be presented in approximation.
Since some Polish citizens remained outside the new borders at the
Eastern Borderlands, all the data is approximate. In 1946, the population of
the country was 23.9 million people, which means that it decreased by over
30%. Nowadays, the population losses of the Second Polish Republic are
estimated to be about 2.8 million casualties of Polish nationality and 2.7–
2.9 million of Jewish nationality, bringing the total losses of the Polish state
to about 5.5–5.7 million people (Roszkowski, 2010, pp. 84–85). Other
nationalities living in the pre-war territory of Poland also suffered losses. In
total, national minorities constituted about 2% of the population after the
war. Thus, the war and the post-war resettlements formed a nearly uniform
society in terms of ethnicity (Eberhardt, 2000, p. 79).
Among all the groups that composed the pre-war structure, the
intelligentsia suffered the greatest losses, which stemmed from the landed
classes and bourgeoisie. Similarly to the case of the Jewish population, it is
also possible to talk of planned extermination with regard to the
intelligentsia. The losses among this last group exceeded the average,
reaching up to 58% among lawyers, 38% among doctors and 28% of
professors and higher education facility employees (Palska, 1994, p. 39).
Population losses also translated into a transformation of the religious
structure, with the Roman Catholic denomination becoming dominant in the
territory of Poland after 1945.
While the war damaged the hierarchical organisation of Polish society,
the post-war political and economic changes constituted a ruthless
transformation of it. They often took the form of actual physical elimination
of whole social groups, and the decision regarding ideology and politics
became the main structure-building factor (Wnuk-Lipiński, 2008, p. 57).
Their objective was changing the unjust, pre-war structure and removing all
its distances, differing interests, conflicts and antagonisms. The tasks to be
carried out included a revolution of relations leading to the creation of new
socialist relations and building a social space based on equality—all in the
name of justice and dignity of the previously wronged. A social experiment
started to be implemented in which the structure became an indicator of the
effectiveness of changes. Thus, the concept of a flattened structure of a
classless society was promoted, aimed at finally ending exploitation among
people. When it comes to the everyday life of individuals, the new
authorities undertook meeting the material needs of everyone (Kolarska-
Bobińska & Rychard, 1990, p. 5) according to the social justice principle
of: “to everyone according to their needs” (Świda-Ziemba, 2010, p. 38).
The aims mentioned were ideologised and both ambitious and wishful,
which determined the practical measures employed for furthering them. The
new order was supposed to be built using the available models—Marxist
social theory, scientific socialism and Soviet experiences. It would be
impossible to achieve that without taking advantage of Leninist concepts,
including the practical actions described using the statement/method of:
“taking shortcuts without paying attention to costs”. In practice, all the
means to an end became acceptable, including physical violence against
opponents and a radical political and economic change to the social
structure (Mokrzycki, 1997, p. 34) achieved through industrialisation. A
radical reconstruction of awareness was also performed—a supervised and
purposeful indoctrination aimed at building an obedient society that would
take actions beneficial to those in power.
The power takeover was commenced on the go, without waiting for the
war to end, using nearly 300,000 Soviet soldiers (Jezierski & Leszczyńska,
1995, p. 166) present on the Polish territory. Their presence was decisive
for the effectiveness of the introduction of the new authorities. These
actions were anchored in the image of the “eternal” friendship with the
Soviet Union, which was hailed as the model of relations in every sphere of
social life (Fik, 1989, p. 158). However, designing the new order based on
the Soviet model—and according to the templates (Hirszowicz, 2001, p.
106) from beyond the eastern border—did not arouse too much enthusiasm
in Polish society. To most Poles, “the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) was a country of poverty and enslavement of the society” (Jarosz &
Pasztor, 1995, p. 111). Internal circumstances facilitated a power takeover.
The communists were supported by a part of society that previously
experienced discrimination and exclusion. However, those people expected
social advancement in exchange for providing political support. The
majority of society remained “beyond these changes” and had no impact on
their shape (Gawin, 2005, p. 108). It was also not inclined to support them.
Society was also “disciplined” by the local supporters, whose numbers were
growing systematically. In practice, they carried out military, political and
repressive actions per the guidelines received. In 1947, the security
agencies alone employed about 100,000 people. The number of supporters
of the new order was over 1.4 million people at the end of the following
year—this was the number of members of the Polish United Workers’ Party
(PZPR) (Grabowska, 2004, p. 101).
The road to the new order was built on repressions and elimination of
the anti-communist underground (Szpakowski, 1996, pp. 14–79) in prisons
of the Security Office (UB), which continued until mid-1950s (Paczkowski,
1996, p. 270). In 1950, there were about 35,000 people imprisoned due to
political reasons (Kostewicz, 1996, pp. 121–178). Additionally, those years
also saw the arrest of a few hundred thousand farmers and farmworkers for
delays in providing obligatory supplies, or for resistance against the
collectivisation enforced (Dudek & Zblewski, 2012, p. 82). All of these
repressions contributed to the experience of injustice being a part of the
abundant record of wrongs caused by communism.
The scale of persecution rose until the end of the Stalin era. Both
declared, and potential opponents were being eliminated ruthlessly (Jarosz
& Pasztor, 1995, p. 14). Those who refused to support the new regime and
did not accept it were intimidated. The authorities employed arrests and
mock trials, while those of “improper origin” and opponents of the new
order were denied and deprived of work. Anyone who could stand in the
way of the regime was supervised. Fear, also that for the safety of one’s
family, was employed to enforce conformity, finger-pointing and making
false accusations against fellow workers. Any positive “memories” of the
previous social system were considered a threat and, therefore, the
authorities attempted to oust them from the collective consciousness. Pre-
war pluralism and democracy were ridiculed, existing social ties were
destroyed (together with public confidence) and the intelligentsia and
artistic communities were put under supervision. In the countryside, the
farmer’s self-government institutions were being abolished (Styk, 1990, p.
151), medical chambers were dissolved and the so-called “landed class”
(i.e., owners of large manors) were wiped from history (Kuziński, 1955, p.
8). Any individualism was being extinguished (Świda-Ziemba, 2010),
replaced by organisational unity among youths (Dudek & Zblewski, 2012,
p. 90) and unity of thought and action.
The main part of the legitimisation of communists relied on the
ideological vision of a perfect future, which was presented as feasible and
devoid of alternatives (Duda, 2010, p. 28). It was referred to as the ideology
of historical necessity (Świda-Ziemba, 2010, p. 51). Without it, it would
have been impossible to carry out any activities on such a major scale. The
order being formed, which was supposed to reflect this vision, was confined
within a dichotomously simplified contraposition—a confrontation between
“good” and “evil”. With time, this dichotomy became dominant among the
definitions of reality (Świda-Ziemba, 1998, p. 289) and
evaluation/interpretations of the issues faced by the order. This
unidimensional form of evaluation was applied to individuals as well. The
vision of the change being implemented was legitimised through examples
of pathological relation from the times before the war: “One of the strengths
of the communist vision of the world was its radical opposition against
social inequalities and the irrationality of the capitalist economy”
(Hirszowicz, 2001, p. 9). Such a vision was an attractive choice for many
people and was considered a valuable alternative. Additionally, the
propaganda made false simplifications and reinterpretations by “imposing”
new, ideological evaluations on pre-war relations. All communication was
supplemented with images of the future filled with hope. They were used to
create ideological “frameworks” that were difficult to undermine and
convince a part of society. Using the images of injustice, pre-war relations
were “expropriated” from individuals and future, equality-based relations
were elevated instrumentally. The capitalist past was given worthless,
negative meanings and the status of evil—outside of a few examples of
positive activity such as the proletariat’s struggle against capitalism.
Egalitarian order was supported by selected resources of social memory
(i.e., examples from the past). However, the examples of wrongdoings and
poverty referred to were not a propagandist product or mystification—they
were scenes from the everyday life of many individuals during the interwar
period (Kochanowicz, 2010, pp. 153–180), experiences that were survived
and remembered, thus sustaining the need to abolish social injustice. The
wartime experiences only strengthened those demands. Therefore, the
relations from the period of the Second Polish Republic had few defenders,
although it was not a unidirectional process to which everyone submitted.
Many individuals were convinced that history favoured communism and
that the future would belong to it. Audacious declarations confirmed this
regarding the ability to shape the new order and its scope (Hirszowicz,
2001, p. 83), described in the form of a collective objective. However, there
was also a part of society that was anchored around positive memories and
evaluations of the past. That is why it is so difficult to determine the degree
of contemporary social approval for building non-antagonistic relations.
The pre-war wrongs were the fundamental source of legitimisation of
the actions that the communists carried out and kept exploiting it for
decades. The injustice was supposed to originate from capitalism and its
ownership structure, presented concerning the means of production. Its
segments (i.e., the capital owners and the supporters of exploitation)
survived the war and threatened the formation of the new order, allegedly.
Thus, eliminating those people who sustained ownership relations,
inequalities and divisions was a political task. That partially retained
hierarchy of actual divisions, identical to the pre-war structure, also became
a target of the change postulated by the communists. The decision to
transform the structure and abolish the hierarchies inherited was made “in
the name” of the majority of society by a minority controlled by
representatives of the Soviet Union. Thus, it was an imposed change (Leder,
2014, p. 7) that ignored all social costs as those were necessary to incur in
the struggle for a better future.
The reconstruction, in line with the ideological assumptions, brought
about tremendous social and economic costs. For many people, it meant
losing their livelihood, abandoning their values, standards and customs, and
also abandoning their religious beliefs under political pressure. It caused
many personal tragedies and led to people moving to the underground,
joining the armed struggle, emigrating or attempting to fit in. The changes
commenced also led to capitulation (i.e., acceptance of the enforced rules of
living by individuals). The negative consequences were particularly
noticeable in local communities. They were plagued by chaos, lawlessness,
dominance of the strong and previously unknown distrust. The changes
meant leaving the old relations behind and learning new ones. For a large
part of society, the communist revolution was a tragedy touching upon the
foundations of existential functioning. It was even so where the attitude
towards the change was positive—as in the case of those farmers and
farmworkers who acquiesced to the change. To many of them, the actions
carried out meant success, advancement in the professional structure,
privileges and, often, easier access to goods plagued by shortages.
Forming the state in line with the new model was taking place as a
result of radically quick actions. Accelerating the rate of change was a
strategy that fitted the Marxist concept of history, leading to complete
political control and enabling structural transformations (Wesołowski, 1989,
p. 6). Changes were introduced unexpectedly under the principle of
unconditional acceptance. This acceleration was also a part of the
propaganda messages offered to society. It had an intensive presence in the
language that described the actions performed. The slogans of “race with
time” and calls for taking advantage of a historical moment characterised
the strategy applied. The acceleration of political and social transformations
was confirmed through the language used in the discourse, which was
supposed to assure the recipients that the course of history was accelerated
and keep faith in the imminence of changes and effectiveness of the
authorities. The method of quickly imposed solutions limited opposition in
society. Time became considered as an invaluable revolutionary resource
that was useful for transforming and supervising society. The management
of social time was visible in the propaganda slogans, such as that about the
ceaseless “increase of the tempo of socialist construction” or the constant
struggle with time to benefit society.
Presenting changes as inevitable and impossible to avoid was combined
with references to the Enlightenment. A part of this was the integration of
the communist changes with the course of progress, improvement and
continuation of the march of reason through history. The ideologically
interpreted sense of history, the “historical necessity”, was where the sense
of changes and the hope for them coming true were perceived to be
confirmed. The holistic project introduced constituted a challenge but also
testified to the bravery of the authorities. It demonstrated their self-
confidence and that they had the indispensable knowledge required for
starting the mechanism of change at their disposal. The authorities claimed
that the “might of the human mind” was employed to abolish social
inequalities. The society development mechanisms additionally guaranteed
the certainty described by Marx, including the conviction of having
discovered the economic rights governing various orders. The project being
implemented was supposed to become a triumph of reason and the Marxist-
Leninist (Świda-Ziemba, 2010, p. 44) science over tradition, dogmas and all
kinds of superstitions and religions.
The activities previously carried out in Soviet Russia were the principal
model for the Polish revolution. They were employed in both internal and
external politics (Opulski, 2016, p. 11). Using them was considered an
obligation, which was aimed at ensuring that the right path that guarantees
success is followed, the same one that was trodden on by the builders of the
first worker state. This strategy led to Stalinism being implemented at first
and then being condemned and abandoned—similar to what happened in
the USSR. Copying was made a long-term method of rebuilding reality, and
the proper “reading of the template”—was considered a method for
enduring and participating in politics.
The remaining pre-war social structure was subjected to radical and
immediate change. It became the object of propaganda and an instrument of
control over society. The inherited structure was defined as a system of
constituents: capitalists, landed classes, workers, the internationally
stratified class of small-scale farmers and farmworkers, the internally non-
uniform and numerous bourgeoisie and the internally varied intelligentsia
(Szczepański, 1965, p. 10). The task was to eliminate the elements of the
structure that were not in line with Marxist ideology and remove the
antagonistic relations between classes, economic inequalities and the
dominance of all kinds of owners. It was visible most clearly in the
economic sphere—in the prepared plan of “takeover” of industry and
agriculture in order for them to become “owned by the nation” (Zaremba,
2001, p. 148). This was to be achieved by changing ownership relations and
socialising the means of production. The party-based system of
management introduced was supposed to ensure control over ownership on
the part of society. Controlling the development—that is, utilising the
existing resources rationally and the supervision of these resources carried
out by the central government—was described by the assumptions of the
new economic order. In practice, this meant not only the nationalisation of
privately owned establishments but also their destruction and wastage
(Leszczyński, 2013), as well as pushing the private property to the margin
of the state’s economic structure.
The radical liquidation of capitalist hierarchies was to be the beginning
of the social justice system. Socialist relations were supposed to be formed
due to “transformation” of individuals and their acceptance of new
standards and values. At first, the revolution took advantage of the
“communist human being” concept, the foundations of which had already
been presented in 1924 by Leon Trotsky (Baczko, 1994, p. 144). In general,
it focused on the elevation of egalitarianism and humanism and promised
the continuation of the Promethean myth (Mazur, 2009). At the same time,
it referred to the template prepared by the Marxist ideology. According to it,
the whole life of individuals and society was to be subordinated to
introducing new ideological solutions (Chojnacki, 2018, p. 149) and
implementing a previously designed plan. An individual was supposed to be
determined and ready to sacrifice their life for the cause, convinced of the
justness of the choices made and working intensely for the common good.
Additionally, they were supposed to be capable of finding “the (one and
only) right way” (Zwierzchowski, 2000, p. 13). An individual’s devotion to
the cause of socialism was supposed to manifest itself in motivations and
the actions taken, which was possible as a result of the increase in
revolutionary awareness and was useful in both political and ideological
struggle. This awareness was supposed to enable that individual to dispose
of the desirable convictions and attitudes (Mazur, 2009, p. 10). “The new
consciousness planned to be formed in the minds of Polish people was
actually supposed to take over the propaganda slogans. The propaganda was
to raise a new human being exhibiting characteristics of the ‘communist
morality’, such as internationalism and patriotism (as understood by the
communists, obviously), the primacy of public interest over private one,
being active and working efficiently” (Czyżniewski, 2006, p. 8). To form
this consciousness, all the instruments and methods available were
employed. For instance, the ideas of a nation, patriotism, sacrifice or
responsibility for the fate of the socialist community were used
instrumentally for elevating collective objectives over individual objectives
and interests. They all formed a catalogue of model activity and politically
desirable and useful behaviour.

National Unity as an Instrument for Integration

and Exclusion
It turned out very quickly that eliminating political opponents does not
guarantee political security and the full extent of power. The authorities
realised that administering legitimisation is indispensable even in an order
without any opposition. For these reasons, they very often took advantage
of various legitimisation strategies, including the propaganda that
underlined patriotic and national values and references. They strived to
obtain the full support of society and to be able to administer support for
change projects and methods of implementing them. However, despite
numerous actions, they still lacked social credibility and political support.
To gain control over society, a complete separation from the Western world
and limitation of contact with bourgeoisie culture was enforced. The
authorities limited discussion and exchange of ideas within the country and
even within their own political camp (Mazur, 2009, p. 195), which
eventually prevented the verification of information communicated to
society. In such an isolated order, manipulation, lies and all other useful
propaganda tools were employed in the fight for the “soul of Poles”. A part
of this process was increasing the control over the media and eliminating
competing sources of information, but that did not guarantee success either.
Manipulating information and creating messages favouring the authorities
during the Stalin era was made “one of the most important weapons in the
battle for gaining and maintaining power” (Czyżniewski, 2006, p. 258).
Using propaganda, the authorities tried to form a society that would be
more friendly towards them. Attempts were also made to “Polonise”
propaganda—a foreign word with many negative connotations—as akcja
zjednawcza (support-winning campaign), which perfectly demonstrated
what kind of hopes were placed in it. The propaganda aimed simply to win
over society—it was a fundamental weapon in the battle for support.
One of the primary tasks of monopolist communication was forming the
“conviction of persistence and stability of the authorities” (Czyżniewski,
2006, p. 9). In this message, it was underlined that the order being built is
based on values that are fundamental to the lives of individuals, assigning
only positive evaluations to the reality created and, at the same time,
elevating the activities contributing to building a just order. It presented sets
of ready-made answers to long-standing questions about the causes of
poverty, the fall of man and the sources of conflicts and inequalities,
including the question of where the causes of society’s misery lie. These
explanations met the need of the individuals to have a simple and
systematised vision of order, of what happens and of what the contemporary
struggle was about. In the public discourse, the message disseminated was
that the order being created is “on the common man’s side”. The individual
experience of wrongs was skilfully transformed into dreams of a better
world. Sometimes the tasks undertaken were extremely difficult and
required a great deal of belief in the new order. An example of that can be
the attempts to explain to society in 1952 that the fact that all of the election
candidates originate from a single political force is not only compatible
with democracy, but even an expression of its highest form (Czyżniewski,
2006, p. 11).
The control over information was a part of a mechanism of total control
over social life. The authorities considered some of the information a threat
to the order being formed, which is the reason for their selective treatment
of historical events and any accounts of the past—especially those
regarding the history of the Polish state. Manipulation also encompassed
relatively recent events that were a part of the history of the new order
being created. An example is hiding information about the Soviet army
helping with the power takeover (Czyżniewski, 2006, p. 9) or falsely
ascribing certain actions to political opponents. The authorities conveyed
false information not only to society, but even to their own party apparatus.
In the political structure, there was a rule that the higher a given individual
was in the party structure, the more information they were receiving: “The
people standing lower in the party and state hierarchy received information
‘more sparingly’. In most cases, they had to settle for half-truths, guesswork
and assumptions” (Jarosz & Pasztor, 1995, p. 14).
In their propaganda, the authorities used newspeak intensively
(Głowiński, 2009), and its meaning and characteristics evolved over time.
Trivialities, obvious facts and simple catchphrases describing the new ideals
and values received the status of revealed truths for which society
supposedly had waited for decades. They became signposts, motivators and
powerful justifications for the objectives pursued and the activity forms
employed. The messages of revolution reached everyone and, thanks to the
information monopoly, tore into the previously unavailable social spaces by
anchoring themselves effectively in science, politics and everyday
interactions. Their effectiveness stemmed partially from the fact that they
were presented as scientific knowledge resources, thus increasing their
strength. Another reason was the impossibility of verifying the information
that the messages included. Meanwhile, scientific knowledge, especially
historical, was being manipulated. Numerous examples of class struggle
were found in the past that were supposed to confirm that it is a force that
drives social changes. The Marxist concept, enriched with Lenin’s thought,
was made the model in research and for making comparisons. The Marxist
concept of social structure and the theory of social class became a sort of
theoretical “frameworks” and templates for analysing society.
The authorities obtained legitimisation through manipulation by
generating strong emotions, inciting fear, anxiety or pathos and controlling
everything impossible to previously control. They were apt at creating a
reality based on imaginations with new hierarchies of values, and strived to
form an atmosphere conducive to exercising their power, which was useful
from the point of view of their interests. At first, the authorities tried to
keep the appearance of post-war Poland as a democratic country, which is
why there was no radical opposition against the foundations of the society’s
identity. During the years 1944–1947, even contact with Christian
symbolism was maintained, Catholic church bishops were invited to
participate in state ceremonies (Świda-Ziemba, 2010, p. 68) and there was
no interference in the religious sphere of party activists. Memorial services
for the souls of communist militiamen fallen in battle were still allowed
(Osęka, 2007, p. 45). The authorities maintained an ideological relationship
between the Christian ideology and the fight of the exploited classes for
their rights, which was supposed to confirm the grass-roots origin of the
latter. Being close to the people, the local authorities and the central ones
were supposed to legitimise the communists. Its purpose was also to
undermine the spreading rumours of their external, anti-national origin.
To reinforce their legitimisation, the authorities referred to both
Christian and patriotic-national values. At first, the representatives of the
new government did not shy away from participating en masse (Osóbka-
Morawski, 1981). They referred to deeply rooted community symbols in the
form of the national colours, the national anthem or distinguished historical
figures: Mikołaj Kopernik, Adam Mickiewicz or Tadeusz Kościuszko
(Zaremba, 2001, p. 121). They also referred to selected events such as the
Battle of Grunwald or national insurrections and persons easy to affiliate
with communism, such as Jakub Szela, Rev. Piotr Ściegienny or Edward
Dembowski. However, they did not limit themselves to reminding them, but
carried out intensive manipulation. They described the course of many
events in a way contrary to the facts or claimed that Adam Mickiewicz
himself was fighting for socialism. What they were doing was a certain
“perfecting” of symbols by adjusting them to new times and challenges.
They transformed the national emblem, depriving the eagle of its crown, or
skilfully combined the communist movement with the symbolism of
Worker’s Day (1st May). They also reached out to values and resources that
were less rooted in the social consciousness and totally new ones. An
example of that is the celebration of the National Day of the Rebirth of
Poland (22nd July), Polish Armed Forces Day (12th October) and
anniversaries of events related to revolutionary Soviet leaders—Vladimir
Lenin or Joseph Stalin. Some historical facts and characters that were
inconvenient to the new ideology were “killed with silence” or aptly
depreciated by the authorities in line with the message: “What we do not
celebrate did not happen” (Osęka, 2007, p. 56). The new heroes of the
collective memory originated from the “working masses of cities and
countryside” and were often activists of the party apparatus, usually “people
and events of little significance, but ideologically catchy” (Czyżniewski,
2006, p. 176).
 The character of certain relations between the authorities and society is
perfectly shown by the course of the contemporary ceremonies and rituals
related to the new order (Miernik, 2007, p. 123). It was the leaders of the
Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) (in 1944) who had
already attached particular weight to symbols and rituals, noticing their
major significance for achieving the goals assumed, gaining the support of
masses and control over them and for enforcing subordination. Significant
events were not only celebrated, but also had specific scenarios of
ceremonies and rituals elaborated for them. Ceremonies were purposefully
prepared with properly assigned roles for the communist leader and the
population. The observers’ behaviour was divided into roles, and they were
assigned certain expected reactions to play. The scenarios envisaged
symptoms of “spontaneity” of participants and the occurrence of bottom-up
initiatives confirming the approval for the whole order (Osęka, 2007, pp.
12–37). All the ceremonies were under the constant supervision of the
security measures. The population’s participation in official celebrations
was supposed to indicate the rightfulness of the authorities, while in
practice, it was confirming the distance between the ruling apparatus and
the society [at that time]. During the ceremonies, some negative social
attitudes towards the authorities were expressed (Kamiński, 2000, p. 39)
and were not always accompanied by the enthusiasm expected. Therefore,
not all the forms of the authorities trying to bond with the nation ended in
success.
National traditions and patriotism were being used instrumentally for
legitimising the order (Zaremba, 2001, p. 7), even though the attitude of
communists towards these ideas was negative. To them, the only fatherland
was the “motherland of international proletariat” and, therefore, they found
any references to national independence hard to accept. Some of the
symbols of the national community were subjected to a particular
“reconstruction”—significant instrumental processing—by the authorities.
They were building new relations by combining even distant historical
periods, employing time compression and presenting the relations of
“people’s” authorities with selected elements of social remembrance, which
turned out to be exceptionally useful. In order to build the necessary
legitimisation, the authorities sought the roots of the communist order in the
times of the Piast dynasty’s rule in Poland in the tenth century (Gomułka,
1962, p. 131). This kind of binding of communism with the beginnings of
the Polish statehood was a way of forming a founding myth and providing
the idea of Polish communism with a feeling of stability. Additionally, it
formed a symbolic “liturgical year” that was indispensable to the authorities
(Miernik, 2007, p. 123).
In view of the aspiration to subordinate society to the Soviet state,
sustaining the concept of national unity was a form of political cynicism.
The actions taken and the propaganda instruments applied confirmed that
without referring to national identity and convincing those sharing that
identity that at least an apparent unity is being formed, it would be
impossible for the new authority structures to take root. The authorities’
decisions regarding using the idea of a nation also testified to the strength of
this idea and the significance of the symbols, myths, historical characters
and emotions forming it. The usefulness of the unity postulate that it was
also influenced by the pre-war experiences (i.e., the ethnic diversity of the
society). That is why the idea of a nation strengthened the current policy by
referring to the pre-war quarrelling and ethnic divisions presented as
“pathologies of democracy and capitalism”.
The instrumental use of the national unity category in a society
“formed” by the war was a safe strategy applied by the authorities
(Lewandowski, 1972, pp. 62–100). When it comes to ethnic composition,
Poland was nearly uniform and, therefore, “talking” about a nation seemed
credible. The ethnicity of other groups was not noticed—they were
deprived of it from the top-down. To this end, the concept of
internationalism was employed, which stated that the proletariat “has no
nationality”. “Coexistence with Polishness” itself was supposed to be
temporary as the anticipated successes of communism were expected to
lead to it eventually being abolished.
After 1945, communist groups fought a military struggle with the pro-
independence underground while simultaneously calling them to reach an
agreement and achieve national concord. They suggested the possibility of
leading to “creation of national solidarity” (Zaremba, 2001, p. 123). Such
an approach to national matters constituted a deliberate strategy by
communists, employed during the period of power struggle. The nationalist
character of this policy went beyond pompous reference to elements of
national tradition—it reached beyond the integrative dimension. The offer
of unity was, next to the mass terror employed, an offer that could not be
refused—it did not accept a lack of consent. It meant a situation without
alternatives, where its hidden strength lay. Any refusal to undertake
cooperation and a collective quest for unity meant being pushed outside of
the community and was unambiguously exclusive.
The concept of unity was employed during the creation of the
foundations of communist structures in the propaganda messages of the
Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) (Jóźwiak, 1952) or the self-proclaimed Polish
Committee of National Liberation (PKWN)—the task of which was to take
over the administrative authority in Poland under the umbrella of the Soviet
secret services and be an alternative to the Government of the Republic of
Poland in exile. The use of PKWN in propaganda manifested itself later in
the form of the decree on agricultural reform and the celebration of 22nd
July—“National Day of the Rebirth of Poland”—as the day of “Freedom of
the Polish Nation”. The continuation of the desire for unity was the creation
of the puppet Provisional Government of National Unity in June 1945
(Jezierski & Leszczyńska, 1995, pp. 173–174), uniting the communist
activists, some of the people’s and socialist politicians and people from
intelligentsia communities. The role of non-communist activists was being
limited, and they were effectively deprived of their influence and ultimately
forced to flee the country. Including “unity” in the name provided the
impact desired and enabled controlling the political situation by underlining
the openness towards agreement and concord. The noticeable movement
away from nationalistic legitimisation was gradual and became clear from
the moment of the referendum (1946) that was manipulated by the
communists (Zaremba, 2001, p. 175).
Organisational unity was an important value in Poland after 1945. It
turned out that it was also necessary for parties competing for the power
takeover. Without eliminating the organisational “double voice” of the
groups trying to build a “people’s state”, taking over the power would be
more difficult. This was confirmed by the rivalry between the Polish
Workers’ Party (PPR) and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), which was
noticeable to everyone. An example of it was the search for an answer to
the question: “Who is going to carry the banner of the national unity?”
(Osóbka-Morawski, 1946, p. 1). Thus, revolutionary efficiency requires the
unity of activists, although even the calls for unity themselves granted
certain credibility and was a part of this rivalry. The basic grounds for
agreement between these two left-wing parties—as argued by the
contemporary propaganda—was their previous actions that led to regaining
independence, the unification around the same ideas and the willingness to
lead to establishing dominance over the people (Syzdek, 1975, p. 27). The
actual form of organisational unity was achieved in December 1948 when
the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) was formed. Its formation meant
a completely new stage of changes introduced in Poland (Jezierski &
Leszczyńska, 1995, p. 210). The period from the formation of PKWN to the
unification assembly of PZPR was later named “the birth of the authority
system” (Kersten, 2018).
The authorities presented organisational unity as an example of
responsibility for Poland and as a confirmation of the democratic character
of the newly established party. In practice, the “fleshing out” of unity took
place over many years and was intensively controlled and stimulated behind
the scenes. The supervisory activities in this direction originating from the
Soviet representatives are described in detail by works of historians.
Organisational and programme unity within the scope of revolutionary
action and thinking were again instruments used for internal struggle with
political opponents and controlling different political communities of
activists competing for power within the party. It was exceptionally useful
and helped eliminate from the party structures those activists who had
divergent ideas that were not compliant with the binding line imposed and
threatening the majority. Whenever there were calls for “purifying the
structures”, the need for “ideological unity” within their own ranks was
suggested.
The new order based its legitimisation also on other actions. The post-
war reality required being active and resourceful. It was necessary to
mobilise the masses towards rebuilding the country. These very necessary
actions became a part of the process of the communists taking root in
society. The authorities made their struggle with physical destruction and
supervision of the post-war reconstruction one of the arguments for their
power. That is why they conducted actions aimed at ensuring stabilisation
and order—one of the fundamental objectives of their administration. The
need for safety and peace was a fundamental part of social expectations,
which is why the propaganda messages and information on successes
(either actual or fictional) became so frequent in any communication
directed to society.
A good example of the above-discussed legitimisation was the
rebuilding of Warsaw. The enthusiasm and spontaneity of the society that
strived to return to normality were used for political purposes. The
rebuilding of the capital city was made into a national political and
economic programme. Propaganda was convincing people that “the unity of
everyone’s actions is the slogan for the next year”, that “the whole nation is
building its capital city” or that “a united nation encounters no difficulties”.
The rebuilding was linked to patriotism, unity and the persistence of
community. Such an approach turned out to be effective in mobilising the
masses and encouraging participation in bringing the destroyed city back to
life. The buildings and streets were rebuilt and the commissioned tram lines
were declared symbols of efficiency—and, therefore, usefulness—of the
new order. Propaganda called for competing at work and suggested a need
for increased productivity and dedication to work. All efforts were geared
towards rebuilding the capital city. These efforts led to the activation of
society, created trust and generated loyalty towards the order of the political
groups in power.
The rebuilding initiatives sustained the dichotomous division into the
rebuilding party and the opposing party serving only the foreign centres,
which was imposed by the authorities. The authorities employed this
scheme of description of the contemporary reality for their own political
and sociotechnical purposes. Once it gained the nature of an ultimatum, it
was used for the intensive exclusion of opponents and building artificial
differences that were not based on actual inequalities. In most cases, the
authorities created them instrumentally, only for temporary political needs.
For the purposes of these activities, the authorities also took advantage of
the still-existing social differentiation, which was made a point of reference
for the policy conducted, anchored around the “government and nation” vs
“opponents and threatening enemies” relation. The authorities assigned
negative characteristics and condemnable moral meanings to the nation’s
opponents.
In the information communicated, the authorities dehumanised all
opponents—not only those understanding national unity differently, but also
those reacting negatively to the socio-political order being formed.
Propaganda was leaving people no choice—being an opponent of the nation
meant being deprived of the right to participate in social life. Such an
opponent was marginalised by the nation because the lack of involvement
in building the new order was unacceptable since it delayed the course of
history and the moment of appearance of a perfect world. In practice, the
authorities labelled all the defiant or inconvenient opponents as enemies.
And as historians demonstrate, there was no shortage of such opponents
during the period of the Polish People’s Republic (PRL). They were all
quickly deprived of their place in the community, physically eliminated by
the security measures in place or forced to emigrate. Pushing “problematic”
opponents beyond borders was used (by the authorities) for the whole
duration of the Polish People’s Republic period. It was a specific “form of
coordination of values” that employed force, violence and silencing of
opponents, representing a totalitarian approach to the idea of unity. All the
detected deviations from the template adopted became an object of attack.
And when some of them turned out impossible to overcome, the authorities
turned a blind eye to them, claiming that they simply did not exist.
Achieving national unity was not an easy task, especially in the light of
the thesis of “aggravation of class contradictions together with the progress
in building socialism” (Paczkowski, 2000, p. 283), which the propaganda
kept using. It presented a significant aspect of the order based on creating a
conflict convenient to the authorities and managing it, as well as forming
dichotomous oppositions useful to the authorities for political purposes. It
was generated not in order to solve or eliminate specific social issues, but
only to remain in power. This means that the divisions employed for
political purposes were often fictional and found no confirmation in actual
inequalities. All of them were anchored in dichotomy by the authorities. It
was the simplest one possible and, therefore, easy to understand: it meant
the presence of and struggle between good and evil. Constant tension was
created and maintained in the oppositions built. The category of the nation
turned out to be particularly useful and, therefore, was manipulated
intensively. An example of that can be identifying workers with the nation
and putting them in opposition to students. Such an opposition, asymmetric
in terms of numbers, led to the creation of a “force of attraction” on the
majority side, including being in the ultimate right. It was supposed to
attract and integrate the other with the majority group. It also enabled the
elimination of differences in the majority group itself. The aim of such
actions was to “force” people to accept the problems of everyday life and
support the authorities by accepting the interpretations that were of use to
them. This is evidenced by propaganda slogans such as: “Be wary towards
the enemy of the nation”, “The party and the nation fight together for a
better tomorrow” or “3 times YES – this is an expression of the unity of the
Polish nation” (Zaremba, 2001, p. 153).
History was made the main platform for seeking enemies of the order. It
was in relation to it that the communist authorities positioned themselves
and where they sought bases for useful dichotomies. That is why the pre-
war state and its elites were degraded symbolically. There was a clear
declaration of cutting off from the past and abandoning continuous
development. The dichotomy that constructed the fundamental
interpretations was the system of the “old” order and the “new” order,
which formed a line that was difficult to cross over. It was an opposition
that ensured the main drive of the revolution, the desire to differ from the
past and constantly seek evidence—whether true or fictional—that the
decision made by history was not a mistake. Similarly, society was being
reassured that the revolution was necessary and that the reality created was
better and, therefore, valued positively. The new order was exceptionally
flexible. To survive, it often accepted various deviations from the model set
and the ideology defining it but always took advantage of discrediting its
opponents. It made fighting enemies a fundamental part of actions
contributing to the achievement of political objectives. The existence of
enemies allowed the authorities to differentiate society according to their
political needs.
It was not only the past that constituted a source for political strategies.
Creating an available, understandable and relatively effective
communication required reference to contemporary problems. The
contemporary problems that were difficult to solve determined the
categories of new enemies. Among them were representatives of all the
social groups: penmen and writers who tried to negate the sense of the
notion of “nation and purposefulness of any sacrifices for it” itself (Fik,
1989), and then “landed lords”, “underground thugs”, “kulaks” or
“saboteurs”. All of these people were an obstacle to the economy of
socialism and took subversive actions, both in the countryside and in cities.
Spies were appearing everywhere and were being spotted by the authorities,
even in their own party. At first, it was claimed that they would sneak into
“the state apparatus for subversive and sabotage purposes”, and later this
was used, for example, to fight the supporters of the “right-wing nationalist
deviation” intensively (Zaremba, 2001, p. 190). Spies were said to be
present in all social groups, particularly among the clergy.
 Most of the dichotomies used were rooted in the contemporary, taking
advantage of the economic system pathologies and everyday problems and
ills of society, an example of which can be the phenomenon of speculation.
The demand for punishing the speculators also meant, in practice, a demand
for punishing the workers selling their benefits in kind that they were
receiving in addition to their monthly salary. At the same time, the calls for
fighting speculators issued by the authorities found significant support
among workers (Kenney, 1997, p. 220). The “majority” vs “speculators”
opposition that was created played a significant role in propaganda for a
certain time. According to Gomułka, a speculator was allegedly “the most
predatory, anti-national and anti-social as he only appears where he sees the
largest sources of income for himself. The interest and good of the national
are completely alien to him” (Gomułka, 1962, p. 389). The problems with
providing society with the most fundamental goods made this dichotomy
significant. However, an insight into the actual contemporary economic
situation confirms that speculators were a consequence of the shortcomings
of the centrally planned economy.
Taking advantage of dichotomies required attributing values and
assigning moral supremacy to the nation and groups included in it. Thus,
propaganda was assigning elevated and noble characteristics to groups
working towards the national interest (i.e., workers, farmers, working
intelligentsia and party apparatus). The opponents were refused any positive
characteristics—they were allegedly cruel and ruthless. The opposition
created employed vilifying, dehumanising and stigmatising. The authorities
were intensively using the existing social stereotypes, myths and prejudices.
For a long time, any defence against false information, lies or false
accusations was impossible. “Sometimes they were simply slighted, with
insults in almost gutter language thrown at them” (Czyżniewski, 2006, p.
190). Propaganda used all the statements of the government, also those that
were direct calls for the physical elimination of enemies standing in the way
of socialism.
The propaganda communication employed the category of “war”
intensively. The tragic consequences of war and the crimes committed by
the German occupants were presented extensively, fanning the flame of
anti-German sentiment (Lesiakowski, 2008, p. 30) and sustaining the
validity of threats. The war atmosphere was strengthened using notions and
expressions typical of military language. The fact that the Polish state was
anchored in the community of socialism-building states competing with
capitalism sustained the contemporary dichotomy of two opposing camps
and, additionally, made reality more understandable to society. The core of
the international dichotomy was the two sides implementing opposing
objectives: one seeking confrontation and war, and the other seeking the
end of confrontations and fighting for peace. There was an immutable
contrast present between the capitalist countries and the peace-loving camp:
the former were immersed in chaos, crisis and weakness, while the others
were characterised by social development, strength and courage
(Czyżniewski, 2006, p. 190). The backwardness and warmongering of the
imperialist camp was fiercely condemned and stigmatised (Fik, 1989, p.
143). The communist side, referring to itself as socialist, was the
embodiment of progress and peace, exhibited revolutionary consciousness
and had the knowledge of the rules of history at its disposal—so, it was
being ceaselessly elevated. Among the enemies were not only the “Anglo-
Saxon imperialists”, but also the “eternal enemy” in the form of the Federal
Republic of Germany (Zaremba, 2001, p. 157). In this never-ending rivalry,
it was a civic duty to join the forces of progress and development and
support their actions and objectives.
The use of the idea of a nation and making it the ideological core of the
new order, especially during the times of post-war crisis and ruthless
struggle for power and elimination of the opposition, is significant for the
repartition practices discussed in this work. The majority of these practices
employed the ideas of national and patriotism either directly or through
implication (Zaremba, 2001, p. 152). At the same time, these practices were
anchored in the inequalities and injustice experienced. However, they were
formulated intensively and sustained in the forms most beneficial to
contemporary authorities. All of them determined how individuals thought
about being together and participating in the national community for many
decades to come. It is also possible that such an intensive manifestation of
the need to be together was one of the reasons for sustaining national
identity in a part of society. It also constituted an important factor that led to
the fall of the order because society noticed the fiction in references to the
national interest made by the authorities. Their declarations of serving the
country and society were empty. On the other hand, it was noticed that their
actions hurt the interest of the community. Such actions strengthened the
conviction that the authorities had little to do with the national community
and that the nation consisted of people who the authorities kept forgetting.
The observations of this kind may have led to the appearance of the
imagination of the need for the existence of a true community, which
formed the basis for the “us” vs “them” social division.

A Revolutionary Attack on Existing Social

Divisions
The main task of the authorities was to transform the remains of the
capitalist structure permeated by unacceptable inequalities in line with the
plan accepted and the ideology adopted. Ultimately, the aim was to finish
with threatening distances and structural elements from the Second Polish
Republic, causing feelings of a lack of security and, therefore, retaining
social divisions. The structure inherited was to be changed radically and
adjusted to Soviet models functioning in line with the concept of full
employment, production supervision, state interference in society and a
project consistent with humanist and progressive values. The authorities
were quick to commence it without even waiting for a full takeover of
power.
In the first post-war years, the scale and dynamics of social and
economic transformations were astonishing. A part of them was the state
taking over the accumulated possessions of “exploiters and petty
capitalists”, which was considered abandoned. After the Red Army entered
Poland, the accelerated plundering of private property was started through
the nationalisation of medium and large industries. The property and real
estate in territories regained from Germany were treated similarly. The
process of property takeover proceeded as follows: a “liberated” plant was
entered by a representative of the “people’s” state, a plenipotentiary of the
Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland and an officer of the Red
Army, and they declared “requisitioning” of that plant for the purposes of
the people’s authority being formed. The pre-war owners had nothing to
return to. During the years 1944–1946, 10,662 industrial enterprises and
2,252 commercial enterprises were nationalised (Anasz & Wesołowski,
1976, p. 33). This is how bourgeois Poland was eliminated—and in the
propaganda messages, this was described as an act of historical justice. In
view of the Soviet army controlling every aspect of life, it was impossible
to oppose these actions.
 The nationalisation of industry and implementation of the Soviet model
of management (Jezierski & Leszczyńska, 1995, s. 190) were not supported
universally by society, but only by the groups encompassed by the so-called
“social advancement” (Marody, 1991a, p. 53), which were the most
susceptible to the impact of the ideology of equality in the form imposed.
The contemporary descriptions also feature statements that the
nationalisation of industry was expected and desired by society and that the
pre-war experience of private factories made the workers support the new
forms of managing them (Kenney, 1997, p. 33). The processes of taking
over the industry and organising new forms of management in it determined
the main points on the line of deep social structuring processes. Every
workplace was defined as the main centre of the “formation of new,
socialist relations and the main centre of the implementation of ideas of
socialist humanism”, and the strength of the system was supposed to
depend on how the social relations within workplaces looked (Wacławek,
1965, pp. 4–5). Any obstacles on the way to implementing new economic
solutions were removed instrumentally together with gaining the material
base for political actions of the party apparatus. The actions mentioned
above were just the beginning, complemented by the “conscious,
revolutionary transformation of the structure during the years 1944–1945”
(Wesołowski, 1978a, p. 26).
However, the most important role in the initial phase of the structural
change was given to the most numerous group—the rural population, which
the authorities saw as the future loyal supporters of the order, a “pillar of the
new system” (Zagórski, 1978, p. 21).
The agricultural reconstruction was to be radical, thus confirming the
ideal of the revolution and its concept of justice. At the same time, it was
supposed to confirm the possibilities of communists concerning rebuilding
the world, as well as their capability of implementing large-scale projects
(Wesołowski, 1978a, p. 26). A radical change in the structure of land
acreage in the countryside was intended to be the answer to the
manifestations of inequality, feeling of injustice and actual poverty among
farmers and farmworkers, which were unacceptable there. According to the
population census of 1931, “60.6% of the population of pre-war Poland
worked in agriculture, and the remaining 39.4% in non-agricultural jobs”
(Wesołowski, 1969, p. 12). In 1944, farmers and farmworkers constituted
nearly 70% of the society. After 1945, the situation of farmers and
farmworkers was described using the Marxist concept of social class
(Widerszpil, 1965, p. 30)—instrumental and politically useful analyses of
social structure. It was claimed that a class differentiation of the farmer
population took place in the countryside before the war, based on their
attitude towards the means of production. The numbers of the rural semi-
proletariat class increased. The economically weak farmer class took shape,
while the inexpensive employed labour was exploited by the class of small
agricultural capitalists (Turski et al., 1978, p. 48). The presence of large
farms in the agricultural structure was criticised. Such farms were later
subdivided (Wesołowski, 1969, p. 10).
The agricultural reform was carried out according to the decree of the
Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN), which signalled social
and economic reforms (Szczepański, 1965, p. 19)—a document devoid of
references to the communist ideology and therefore acceptable to a large
part of political groups (Zaremba, 2001, p. 139). It included universal and
politically useful slogans underling, for example, the necessity to ensure
universal employment (Mrówczyńska, 1977), which later changed into
guaranteed employment. The agricultural reform included state-owned,
post-German, abandoned properties, as well as large acreages owned by
individuals and legal entities. The land was distributed equally among
farmers who held little or no land and was seized by the state.
During the years 1944–1948, 9,707 land estates encompassing about
3.49 million hectares were taken over for the agricultural reform. In the end,
1.2 million hectares were distributed among 387,000 farmer families
(Chwalba, 1999, pp. 718–719). Of the land distributed, the overwhelming
majority was assigned to new farms and about 500,000 ha was dedicated to
the enlargement of the already existing ones. From among the farms
existing in 1949 on the so-called “old land”, every fourth one benefited
from the agricultural reform. The changes introduced by the agricultural
reform into the agrarian structure of the farmer class were of great
significance. The number of farms with less than 2 ha of land or more than
20 ha of land (i.e., the extreme groups) decreased, while the number of
farms with small (2–5 ha) and medium areas increased. The farms with 5–
20 ha of land constituted 41.5% of the whole farms in 1950 and accounted
for 68.2% of the land of farmers (Turski et al., 1978, pp. 48–49). On the
land recovered from Germany, a single distribution of land amounted to 7–
15 ha (Kołomejczyk & Syzdek, 1971; Słabek, 1972). In total, 6,070.1 ha of
land was transferred to farmers there during the years 1944–1949, and
814,000 farms were created (Góra, 1969, p. 7). The subdivided land was
distributed among farmers who had either no land or had small and medium
farms, which is why the structure of farms became fragmented. In 1950,
there were over 1.5 million farms smaller than 5 ha (Turski et al., 1978, p.
49).
The agricultural reform was a flagship project of communism, simple in
terms of its nature. It consisted in depriving landowners of their land and
distributing it among landless farmers. Despite that, it still caused social
feuds and disputes. For landowners, it was the time to emigrate as they had
no instruments at their disposal that would let them oppose the subdivision
of their land. The reform caused conflicts both on the part of its
beneficiaries and on the part of families deprived of land. The method of
distributing the land caused conflicts due to the limited supply and major
demand. Misunderstandings were less frequent when settling farms on land
recovered from Germany. The assignment of small acreages stemmed not
only from the equality idea promoted, but also from reasons of political and
planning nature. It turned out quickly that, in the near future,
collectivisation of the countryside was planned (i.e., complete control over
food production being taken over by the party apparatus [Leszczyński,
2013, p. 334]). The rumours that the distribution was temporary and that the
land would be handed over to state farms formed on the basis of the Soviet
model were confirmed. The declarations trying to reassure people were to
no avail: “Remember, however, that it is only our rule that can guarantee
your perpetual control over the land owned and protection against the
nightmare of ‘kolkhozes’” (Witek, 1946, p. 3). The collectivisation was
confirmed by the limitations within the scope of individual building
construction—introduced for some of the agricultural land—necessary to
transform these areas into large farms in the future. The information and
rumours regarding collectivisation in Soviet Russia horrified the farmers
(Kamiński, 2011).
The reforms’ purpose was to destroy the landowner class and large
multi-generational specialised farms (Lewandowski, 2008, p. 208), which
were the foundation of the pre-war agricultural economy. To the
farmworkers (previously living from occasional work and not having any
land of their own) who received the land, the reform meant social and
financial advancement, an actual benefit (Kersten, 2018, p. 209) and
allowed them to feel like an owner. In terms of the economy, the small size
of the land assigned did not guarantee adequate income or standard of
living. In spite of that, conducting that reform was the part of a revolution
that spoke to the imagination of the disadvantaged.
However, the change in agriculture temporarily satisfied the aspirations
and expectations of farmers. They became an instrument of influence on the
countryside and of pursuing political and ideological objectives—a
significant political resource in the hands of those in power. The
distribution of land was presented as an act of social justice, carried out
according to the rule of “an equal share to each”. The authorities were using
the message regarding solving social problems and the willingness to end
farmers’ poverty. In the reforms made, the economic calculations were not
taken into account—only the social and political ones. The authorities did
not consider the efficiency of farming, nor did they take into account that
the property allocated could not be taken away in practice. The sole purpose
of the reform was to obtain short-term political support, and its purpose was
to provide the farmers with a sense of rapid improvement in their financial
situation. It led to the elimination of not only large manors, but also many
medium-scale farms that could have formed the foundation for efficient
agriculture.
Based on the decree of PKWN, those gifted were obligated to pay for
the land with the equivalent of the average annual harvest within twenty
years, mainly in the form of crops. The burden of this payment was
extended for many years, partially ensuring, at the same time, the supply of
products. The reform ensured sufficient basic agricultural production, which
meant achieving self-sufficiency in terms of food during the post-war years.
Conducting it also brought measurable positive consequences for the whole
management system. It helped eliminate the traditional debt incurred by
farmers (that was known for years), as well as the actual famine and
poverty in some of the farmer families (Turski et al., 1978, p. 73). However,
not all of its consequences turned out to be functional for the order. In many
regions of the country, conducting it led to conflicts and divisions among
local communities. One of the consequences was the aggravation of
conflicts between poor farmers and the rich ones, also referred to as kulaks.
The reform also determined [for the economic system] the model of
relations in the countryside and the scheme of relations with the other
classes as it determined the maximum level of management capability for
farmers through instruments such as the upper limit of the surface area of an
individual farm. It introduced the “dwarf” farms and low production
efficiency into the agricultural structure, but retained private ownership.
The owners soon realised that when they were forced to look for income in
other sectors of the economy. A situation of hidden migration appeared,
where small-scale farmers systematically travelled to work in nearby
industrial centres that were intensely looking for labour. In practice, a
significant group of farmers was forced to earn their income outside of
farming.
The rumours of collectivisation turned out to be the greatest threat to
obtaining the support of farmers for the new order. They nullified some of
the positive political consequences of the reform and introduced a lack of
trust in the relations between farmers and authorities. However, all the
rumours had their confirmation in reality. Most attempts at introducing
collectivisation over the years failed. The greatest intensity of subordinating
the countryside to the authorities by means of repressions and
administrative actions took place in the years 1952–1953. The
collectivisation policy implemented thus far turned out to be an economic
and social failure, leading “the countryside to economic ruin. Its bankruptcy
became obvious in 1956” (Jarosz & Pasztor, 1995, pp. 29–44). Imposing of
collectivisation, failure of new forms of farm management and reluctance
and enmity of farmers towards collectivisation forced the authorities to
accept the existence of residual capitalist relations (Turski et al., 1978, pp.
50–51) in the countryside. The distribution of land alone “kept a large
number of farmers in the system of thinking about profit”, revolving around
resourcefulness and responsibility for one’s own fate, which made it more
difficult to make a change in countryside relations that the authorities
planned. The structure of farms made many farmers stay with the traditional
farmer economy. They made products for their own needs and sold
surpluses privately or delivered them to socialised buying points.
The appearance of farmers–workers was not the only noticeable feature
of the structure of the farmer class. When analysing this class, some
scholars actually talked about two different classes of farmers—individual
farmers and collective farmers. In this manner, the farmers were
differentiated in terms of control over means of production—in the case of
individual farmers, this control was complete (Turski et al., 1978, pp. 39–
47). Although the cooperatives referred to pre-war traditions, they had little
to do with them. In reality, they were state-owned enterprises completely
subordinated to central planning, used for spreading control over
agricultural workers and preparing and “training” the planned
collectivisation of the countryside. The proclaimed voluntary character of
associating within these cooperatives was mostly fiction. In practice, the
poorest among farmers were forced to work there. The inefficient forms of
management, the lack of responsibility of the managers and workers for the
common property and the shortcomings in farming culture made it
impossible to achieve sufficient management efficiency within
cooperatives, which had an impact on their further existence. In September
1956, there were over 10,000 cooperatives operating that farmed 13% of the
total land acreage, while on the 31st of December of that year, less than
2,000 such cooperatives remained (Cena, 2002). However, the ideas for
state administration were not abandoned and, later on, a process of the older
farmers handing over their farms to the state in exchange for retirement
pensions was implemented.
As a result of the reforms carried out, farmers gained more prestige, and
educational opportunities and many barriers to mobility were abolished.
This is confirmed by sociological analyses devoted to his class that were
carried out during the first twenty years of the “people’s” state. They show
how the share of farmers in the employment structure changed. According
to population censuses, in 1931, farming was the source of income for
60.6% of the population, while in 1960, only for 38.4% (Wesołowski, 1969,
p. 12). It also stemmed from the fact that the young inhabitants of the
countryside moved to industry, receiving professional training. However,
the image of the situation of farmers was not only positive. They
experienced mass terror, were forced to form cooperatives and kolkhozes
and provided food quotas for the state. The obligatory quotas were
abolished only in 1972. Some of the farmers were presented in propaganda
as kulaks, enemies, hiding and selling privately the goods they should have
handed over to the socialised buying points (Cena, 2002). Years later, it is
easier to notice that although the countryside’s situation definitely
improved, it was still underinvested and backwards in terms of economic,
cultural and educational aspects.
The next part of structural changes turned out to be industrialisation
processes aimed at transforming the country’s character from agricultural to
industrial. From the very beginning of the revolution, it was underlined that
its objective was “creating a socialist, industrial society in Poland”
(Wesołowski, 1969, p. 11). This meant that it was necessary to form a large
working class consisting of blue-collar workers (Domański, 1998, p. 373).
The authorities considered the rate of growth of numbers of this class
another indicator of the revolution’s success.
The industrialisation process was referred to as socialist, which meant
that it “was organised and shaped according to a plan by the state and
Marxist-Leninist party of the working class” (Mrówczyńska, 1977, p. 30).
In 1945, the group of workers, which was exceptionally uniform, was
estimated to be over one million people. A major step in the direction of
industrial society was the implementation of the six-year plan (1949–1955),
also referred to as the plan of “building the foundations of socialism”
(Jezierski, 1987, pp. 152–197). In terms of economy and ideology, this plan
imitated Soviet solutions and envisaged achieving accelerated growth in the
form of intensive industrialisation. It assumed increasing production, new
investments and growth of the heavy industry. Basing the plan on the
existing free labour force and focusing the whole of changes on simple
development of the heavy industry was supposed to lead to faster
achievement of political goals. The detailed assumptions of the six-year
plan were often revised and modified under the influence of current events
or problems that were difficult to solve. The plan, which was implemented
to a large extent, had certain negative consequences next to positive ones. It
led to stagnation in other fields of the economy and a crisis in agriculture, a
certain reflection of which was the social breakdown of 1956, as well as
irreversible, destructive changes in the natural environment. According to
what the scholars claim, after all those years, the partial success of the plan
was a consequence of the overexploiting forms of economic activity,
“drainage of private property, low wages, shortages on the market and
ubiquitous impoverishment” (Leszczyński, 2013, p. 335).
The working class was defined as a large collection of people
encompassing workers who do not own the means of production, but are
their co-owners as members of society employed in the sphere of
production and exchange. They perform subordinated works within the
system of an enterprise and their main source of income is the remuneration
for work. The additional features indispensable for characterising the
working class and its constituents are the lifestyle and the culture specific to
it (Widerszpil, 1965, p. 182). The working class was formed around major
investment ideas. The best example is the construction of the Nowa Huta
combine, which was an ideologically and politically motivated action aimed
at “breaking” the intellectual and pro-independence community in Kraków.
The elaborations regarding this class mentioned the significance of the
quantitative dimensions and the increase in numbers of the working class
(Wesołowski, 1969, p. 12). In 1931, there were 2,786,349 blue-collar
workers in Poland (81.2% of employees), and in 1973—6,904,855 (65.4%).
The number of people employed directly in the industry was, accordingly:
1,545,719 (45%) and 3,652,359 (34.6%) (Jarosińska & Kulpińska, 1978, p.
109).
The creation of a working class was perceived as a condition for the
success of the new order, a stage on the path towards a classless society.
The workers were assigned the status of a hegemon, beneficiary and the
main party interested in the formation of relations based on justice
(Wesołowski, 1969, pp. 4–5). However, in view of the constantly noticeable
imperfections and presence of destabilising elements among the workers,
this class was subjected to ceaseless ideological shaping. The ideologists
were relentless in efforts to have a working class characterised by similar
aims, common values and views, identical functioning patterns and bonds
testifying to internal coherence. It was claimed that the process of such
integration takes place based on the common economic situation and
common social position, under the influence of a specific set of institutions
and forms of formal organisation, through acceptance of common
ideological vision of social order and one’s own role in the implementation
of that vision, whereas its course is determined by a complex system of
factors (Szczepański, 1961, p. 12). Whenever obstacles appeared on the
path to the appearance of such consciousness, the ideological and
propaganda pressure was increased. There were appeals for further
integrations, “elimination of divergent and conflicting aims and elimination
of antagonisms” (Szczepański, 1961, p. 10), as well as for eliminating the
causes leading to disagreements among workers. Class consciousness was
to mobilise for a political struggle ensuring the domination of the working
party.
The evaluation of the working class in the middle of the 1970s was not
clear. In the sociological and demographic approach, the working class was
young in three ways—demographically, sociologically and technically. It
was young demographically as people aged up to 39 constituted about 61%
of all workers; sociologically because a lot of workers came from farmer
families and technically because the majority of them had professional
preparation, not just vocational training. The description showed the
undisputed potential of that class as well as the hazards and threats to the
authorities coming from the workers, stemming mainly from their
constantly growing aspirations. Meeting them constituted a major
bargaining chip in relations between the authorities and the workers. The
workers were noticing more often that the actions taken did not yield the
expected results. While it did not mean that there was no success at all, the
new order was incapable of handling many problems, including work
efficiency and effective administration (Wesołowski, 1978b, pp. 229–230).
The educational backwardness of society, the need to educate
ideological and party personnel and the growing needs of the developing
industry necessitated the development of education on all levels. After
1945, there was only a small number of surviving engineers, teachers,
doctors, economists and lawyers left in the country after the war. There
were also problems with primary education, which is why it was the first
one that was made universal (Makarczyk & Błuszkowski, 1978, p. 178),
which led to the elimination of illiteracy within five years. An educational
programme aimed at the countryside population was introduced, and
vocational and secondary education were developed as well. The actions
mentioned above made education universal and accessible and provided
possible educational advancement. Next to these actions, the authorities
were also making intensive attempts at “persuading” the pre-war
intelligence to join their side. At the same time, they exhibited a disdainful
attitude to it and ran a simultaneous expansion of white-collar personnel
(Palska, 1994, p. 20). The new intelligentsia originated from the popular
masses and was supposed to have class consciousness and be an effective
conveyor belt for the ideology imposed. At the same time, the new
intelligentsia was relieved by the authorities from fulfilling the mission of
creating higher culture while, at the same time, being assigned new tasks
that were subordinated to the objectives of the communist revolution.
The composition of the intelligentsia was changing quickly and was
increasingly diverse in terms of social background. The authorities achieved
that also by manipulating the criteria characterising this stratum. Within the
scope of administration, they included the new professions among the
intelligentsia, which is why the cross-section of the contemporary society
reflected the contemporary values (Widerszpil, 1965, p. 46). In 1966, the
intelligentsia was formed by people originating from the former bourgeoisie
and landed classes (0.4%), the petite bourgeoisie (12.9%), farmers (20.3%),
workers (25.8%) and other social groups (Nowak, 1966, p. 23). However, it
is necessary to remember the specific character of those times, which also
included concealing one’s actual background to avoid various forms of
harassment. Once this is done, it turns out that the data quoted understated
affiliation with groups of former “exploiters” and overstated the number of
intelligentsia with the farmer and worker backgrounds.
The universalisation of the education system and increasing access to
education for groups previously excluded from it was an achievement of the
revolution, but there was also a different side to these processes. Certain
pathological phenomena appeared, such as awarding diplomas to people
who were not educated—to the party and military apparatus (Bar, 2009, p.
44). The awoken and understandable educational ambitions were achieved
using half-measures and feigned actions, subordinated to political criteria. It
quickly turned out that the authorities’ main objective was to create a
personnel supply for the state bodies and the party. The higher education
programme assumed creating their own intelligentsia, one that accepted the
order, was available for duty and recognised and disseminated the
ideological values. One example of this is the formation of “believers in the
communist ideology coming from the Union of Polish Youth (ZMP)”
(Świda-Ziemba, 2010, p. 90). For example, the instruments used to form a
new consciousness included political trainings for higher education system
employees in 1950s. Education became a form of gratification, awarded to
those most obedient and complying with the political instructions—which
does not mean, however, that all the people who became educated then did
that by submitting to the authorities. However, this often imposed certain
gratitude-based dependencies on them, which persisted for many years.
After 1945, the higher education system was transforming rapidly, as
confirmed by changes in the educational structure of the population. Within
thirty years, higher education was completed by 753,200 graduates. Thus,
the number of intelligentsia representatives nearly doubled. In the mid-
1970s, the number of white-collar workers in the wide sense of the notion
was nearly two million people (Makarczyk & Błuszkowski, 1978, pp. 179–
180). However, the structure of intelligentsia was internally diverse, which
was often mentioned by scholars (Szczepański, 1959). White-collar workers
were divided into two “socio-professional categories”—the intelligentsia in
the narrower sense (encompassing creators of culture and specialists
educated in higher education facilities) and the medium- and lower-level
office workers (Wesołowski, 1974, p. 15). Such a wide approach to the
intelligentsia was a significant modification of defining it and an opening
towards the expectations of this stratum’s members. Additionally, it was a
purposeful, ideological and political “manipulation” of its structure. It was
argued that being included among the intelligentsia should stem from the
work performed, which was supposed to determine all the other features
(Wesołowski, 1966, p. 175). Such an approach was supposed to reduce the
grudges of the authorities towards the intelligentsia, being a consequence of
the reluctant approach of the pre-war intelligentsia towards communism.
The pre-war intelligentsia, affiliated with the landed classes and the gentry
culture, turned out to be a major disappointment (Chałasiński, 1958, p.
113), which is why it was systematically criticised and persecuted (Wiatr,
1965, p. 446).
Order was maintained using the systematically expanded party
bureaucracy, the party apparatus at workplaces, the militia and a network of
security service collaborators. From the very beginning, there was assumed
“a division into avant-garde and the unenlightened masses, into teachers
and students – often headstrong or lazy, those in privy and those outside of
the circle of special knowledge; the division that, with time, simply adopted
the character of division into the authorities and society” (Marody, 1991b,
p. 132). A part of the party apparatus was also included among the
intelligentsia. The guiding political force of the revolution was first the
Polish Workers’ Party (PPR), and later, after 1948, the Polish United
Workers’ Party (PZPR). In 1946, the Polish Workers’ Party had 400,000
members, the Polish Socialist Party—650,000 members (Paczkowski, 1993,
p. 79) and the Polish United Workers’ Party—after it was established—had
nearly 1.5 million members (Kersten, 2018, p. 405). In the following years,
the number of its members increased. At the apex of its functioning, in
1980, PZPR had over 3.5 million members (that is, about 10% of the
society) (Magierska, 2005, p. 29). The party became the guide and the tutor,
maintaining a tight-knit bond with the working class and considering its
aspirations. All the actions taken by the party were aimed at ensuring its
undisputed hegemony.
 The course of the revolution confirmed that it is possible to have partial
control over the development and performance of transformations using the
state’s existing resources and top-down actions.

The Promise of Non-antagonistic Relationships

Between Structural Segments
In the planned processes, the individual had a specific role to play in
reconstructing the social structure, but their agency or innovativeness was
limited to the minimum. The dominance of authorities encompassed the
individual as a whole. There was no place for them to exhibit any creativity
deviating from the models imposed. They were fully subordinated to the
ideological vision and were supposed only to accept the motivations and
patterns of behaviour that were provided top-down. Their thinking and
acting were fully subordinated to the objective of the change. The
authorities strived to eliminate any unpredictability, spontaneity and
independence in individuals using the state apparatus. Ubiquitous
supervision and control over all actions of the individual was employed.
The majority of society was quickly convinced that any resistance against
the order is punished and that it is not worth taking any actions that are not
consistent with the expected ones.
The domination and supervision of communists over the everyday life
of individuals were bringing the results expected. Some people did change
their approach towards the communist authorities. Friendly attitudes
appeared more frequently, the authorities were trusted, and more people
signed up for the communist party. With every subsequent year, society’s
faith in the return of the democratic order was weakening, and people were
getting used to the idea that the scenarios of the political situation turning
around would not come true. The behaviour that was becoming increasingly
frequent was conformism and trying to come to terms with the existing
order. Finding a place for oneself and arranging an existence in harmony
with the totality became a challenge to many individuals. Such decisions
also stemmed from observing the state of reality created by the regime. The
order was legitimised through the partial elimination of uncertainty and
chaos from it, as well as the limitation of the feeling of lack of security
resulting from the past wars—World War II and the so-called “domestic
war”. The pacification of the situation within the country (i.e., elimination
of the armed underground) was also considered an achievement by a part of
society. Some people also considered the implemented redistribution of
property in the form of agricultural reform or nationalisation of the industry
a manifestation of security. Both processes were marked with the
symbolism of equality and justice and could be used to persuade many
people to support the new order effectively. All the symptoms of
stabilisation raised hope and encouraged positive opinions, which translated
to the attitude towards the government. The authorities limited numerous
spheres of uncertainty but also created new ones that became grounds for
the appearance of new anxieties.
The social structure reconstruction processes commenced—intended to
introduce a feeling of social justice—required time, even when performed
with the use of a “quick path” of implementation. The passing of time
started to play a central role in the processes inspired. As in every other
revolution, it became an object of the action of the government and
legitimised or delegitimised its actions. It was also skilfully saved as all the
actions and reforms were based on indisputable acceptance and total
subordination without considering any opposing voices and standings. In
this manner, the communist revolution supervised the administration of
time.
When evaluating the condition of structural transformation after a few
years, the government noticed that the actions that were supposed to lead to
social homogeneity were only partially successful at achieving the
objectives set. As a result of the mistakes made, limitations, political
obstacles and internal obstacles, the scenarios for execution were extended
in time. Long-term objectives were replaced by short-term objectives,
which were assigned the most important role in the legitimisation of the
order. At the same time, it was argued that the revolution, including
industrialisation, contributed to the disappearance of many differences and
distances. Firstly, this was in the economic aspect, when the unnecessary
segment of semi-feudal order was eliminated (such as the connection with
private ownership and capital). The social space was cleansed of objectively
pathological elements such as unemployment and poverty, which
contributed to a persistence of differences. It was also argued that the
obstructions to consciousness and culture were eliminated, including the
stereotypes that divided communities. In their place, relation networks
devoid of hierarchy and domination were supposed to appear. This last
conviction was being disseminated by the authorities at the end of the
1960s, when they were defining the structure and argued that, by that time,
it consisted of non-antagonistic elements only. The core of the new
structure made the working class a hegemon, in line with the ideological
assumptions. The strata of small-scale farmers and intelligentsia were
mentioned next to it. At the same time, the stratum of private craftsmen,
low in numbers and manufacturing small items and providing services to
the population, was noticed (Wesołowski, 1969, p. 3). Such descriptions
and methods of presenting the structure were dominant in its definitions
appearing in sociological studies.
The above representation of the structure was the adjustment to the
expectations of the authorities. It was done knowing that the authorities
expect success in reconstructing the social structure, with certain
ideological categories imposed. Descriptions of the structure that presented
it in a different way, less satisfactory to the authorities, also appeared
(Wiatr, 1962). In most cases, the existing classes were described as
internally coherent, devoid of any discrepancies and conflicts. Their internal
diversity was often ignored, for example, in terms of income. Thanks to
eliminating “non-confirmatory elements” from the structure, the belief in
the effectiveness of the change implemented was maintained. That is why in
the postulate and research aspect, the structure presented gained the
character of a political and ideological “framework”. Almost all the social
analyses were compared to it. Additionally, a great deal of effort and time
was spent demonstrating that the differences present, always free of conflict
and antagonism, considered only a sort of folklore, elements of little
significance (Szawiel, 2003, p. 267) for the functioning of the order.
The propaganda underlined that workers and formers are the
fundamental forces of the change being carried out (Wesołowski, 1969, p.
10), a political slogan legitimising the order and supporting the structural
transformations. It was being underlined that the industrialisation process
led to these classes coming closer to each other through common work in
the industry and that this closeness was “exceptionally strong and
profound” (Nowakowski, 1976, p. 340). Reminding of the elimination of
the former hierarchies served to underline equality. Such claims sounded
good in propaganda, but in reality, they were an exaggeration as some of the
old hierarchies were not eliminated despite great effort. The authorities also
failed to build fully non-antagonistic relations within specific social classes.
Messages like that only presented the hierarchy desired that was supposed
to be strived for. Another challenge was achieving proper relations between
the ideologically “elevated” parts of the structure and its other elements.
The issues of introducing equality in society turned out to be extremely
complicated, more than had been expected at the beginning of the
revolution. The inequalities that the communist ideologists were unable to
handle “were found” in the division of labour. The fact of the continued
existence of the division of labour in a centralised economic system was
driving the engineers of communism to despair. It was blamed for the
homogenisation of society not proceeding at the rate expected and for the
classes remaining internally diverse. However, in spite of these problems, it
was underlined that the structure is characterised by a lack of significant
conflicts within the classes (Wesołowski, 1978b, p. 34).
The authorities strived for organisational and institutional reinforcement
of their power and expansion of social support. By distributing land to
farmers, they partially gained support for the revolution implemented, even
though numerous steps were taken later on to deprive them of that property.
The farmers were not completely “torn out from the clutches” of capitalist
relations, defined by means of private property. They still had property at
their disposal, and the dominant conviction among them was that individual
effort and diligence decide the standard of living. The small profits they
managed to make took a very special meaning, impacted their
consciousness and sustained the market rules. This meant that the cult of
individual industriousness and responsibility remained strong among people
who had only skills in physical agricultural labour. It manifested when they
provided products for private sale for rates higher than at the state-owned
buying point. It was the form in which capitalist relations remained present
in the countryside. They also had an impact on relations between farmers
and other social groups. However, the significance of land ownership to
farms had been reduced. The authorities made sure that it was very hard for
farmers to achieve any sort of affluence as their small farms did not allow
them to accumulate capital. What was then left was an existence at an
elementary level, which allowed the authorities to claim that the
exploitation of farmers in the countryside had ended. Farmers had the most
valuable goods at their disposal—food products. This fact created
dependencies and antagonisms between them and the rest of society. Both
sides became dependent on each other and a new type of relations appeared,
which was significant in view of the lack of existential security in most of
the population. The above conditions generated tensions as farmers were
blamed for food supply shortages (Nowakowski, 1957).
The journey to the just structure that would do away with social
insecurity was continued, but its final destination was nowhere in sight.
Further obstacles appeared on the way, stemming not only from the need to
maintain the division of labour. According to the ideological assumptions,
the classes created were a temporary solution—as confirmed by the
changing attitude towards the existing classes and strata (Kenney, 1997). At
the same time, the members of these classes had different experiences in
terms of work. The pre-war experience of capitalism among workers
significantly impacted the relations they formed and their functioning in the
industry. This historical anchor also provided an important differentiation.
Large new groups of workers had different experiences as they were
anchored mainly in the farmer culture. It comes as no surprise then that the
internal homogenisation of workers encountered numerous obstacles on its
path (Szczepański, 1961, p. 10). At the same time, the majority of the
working class functioned in the socialised economy sector (Wesołowski,
1969, p. 13) and was subordinated to central planning and state
administration and subjected to supervision and state discipline. It is no
surprise then that the experiences of workers with communism differed
from those of farmers. Workers noticed the actual mechanisms of
organising and maintaining order more readily. They also experienced
massive disillusionment with the new order. Very often, it turned out that
the declarations on taking their needs into account in social and economic
decisions made by the state did not translate into specific actions.
According to the propaganda communications retained, the processes of
building the structure desired ended in success. However, analyses by
sociologists often did not confirm those successes. Propaganda presented
the structure as a system of friendly classes (Widerszpil, 1974, p. 77), while,
in reality, it was far from the plans set for it. At the same time, it was argued
that the formation of a fully homogeneous society takes a longer time, even
though there were also opinions that it is “almost within arm’s reach”
(Wesołowski, 1965, p. 117). According to the propaganda, the sole and
basic task of the authorities was to eliminate those differences. These issues
were systematically repeated in the discourse as if explaining the authorities
for the existing, imperfect situation. New tasks were designated for the
party and state apparatus in order to make equality a reality. However, the
postulates listed and the demands for introducing equality were not
converging with social expectations. Society wanted goods, not equality in
poverty.
In scientific analyses, the systematically decreasing income differences
between classes and strata were underlined (Wesołowski, 1965, pp. 118–
127). Simultaneously, it was omitted that the general living standard of a
large part of society was no longer improving and that it was, in fact, even
deteriorating. The everyday experience of individuals confirmed that
inequalities were still present. This was confirmed mainly by comparing
one’s own economic situation with the living standard of others.
Observations confirmed that others had more and more goods at their
disposal—and that was not only the comparison with party apparatus.
People’s own findings confirmed that those with private initiatives had a
better living standard, which effectively undermined the messages about
striving to reach equality and implement collectivist values. A conviction
that the majority of society participates in poverty distribution was
becoming more widespread. In order to weaken these social doubts,
examples of egalitarianism were included in propaganda communications.
Equal rights in terms of culture and just access to education and cultural
assets were mentioned, next to the existence of moral and political unity in
society (Widerszpil, 1974, p. 77). The improvement in accommodation
conditions in the countryside and the financial situation of its inhabitants
were underlined, as well as the fact that they were encompassed by free
health care and agricultural insurance. It was said that the financial situation
of farmers and workers had become equalised to a significant extent. The
statistical data showed that, in comparison to 1945, the income per capita in
an average farmer family had been averaged. However, it still was lower
than in an average worker’s family in the socialised sector (Turski et al.,
1978, pp. 82–83). The fact that a major part of small-scale farmers started
working in the industry significantly impacted these classes becoming
closer. In 1960 there were 824,00 farmers-workers, who legally held nearly
17% of individual farms (Szczepański, 1965, p. 62). A significant distance
in the sphere of income remained between the group of farmers and
workers and that of white-collar workers. An example of the elimination of
social barriers was supposed to be the phenomenon of marriage
homogenisation, which meant breaking the social and community block
regarding the selection of spouses, which was typical of the interwar period.
The more frequent acceptance of a person from another class as a spouse
after 1945 was said to confirm the decreasing role of class affiliation.
With every decade, it was increasingly difficult for the authorities to
justify the existence of differences in income with the capitalist past. The
power of propaganda messages regarding the continuation of the
revolutionary trend was also waning—and, therefore, this kind of
justification of the government’s leadership was losing significance. Further
assurances about eliminating divisions or reducing the existing differences
were not receiving too much interest from society. The authorities were also
losing interest in further equalisation of the structure. That is why some of
the differences present were “covered up with silence” or their significance
was underrated. The authorities effectively used the categories of
objectivity and subjectivity of perceiving differences for these actions.
There was no shortage of problems to overcome on the way to
homogeneity. They became more visible once the class representatives
turned out not to meet the authorities’ expectations towards them. They did
not appreciate the advancement achieved or demanded a greater share in the
distribution of goods. They also did not share the admiration for the
socialism-building carried out thus far and refused to confirm the opinion
that an egalitarian society had already been formed. It was irritating to the
authorities that the farmers were unwilling to subordinate themselves to
collectivisation ideas and refused to submit to it in spite of encouragement
and pressure. The lack of understanding of the idea of revolution by the
farmers results in the actions of authorities directed against them. They
were less dedicated to supporting the Polish countryside, and the support
promised to farmers usually did not come to fruition. In practice, the
authorities guaranteed the farmers protection against the former owners of
their land—and that promise had been kept. Only those farmers who were
obedient and loyal to the order were appreciated. Meanwhile, others
continued to be an object of distrust. Attempts were made to subordinate
them completely by means of collectivisation, which was slowed down and
extended in time, but never abandoned. The strategies of the takeover of
land by the state were being changed systematically. Private property kept
irritating doctrinarians and ideologists, which is why alternative forms of
farming such as production cooperatives were suggested. The change
projects did not take any economic arguments into account and only the
ideological and political criteria mattered, which fully confirms the mode of
conducting the agricultural reform. Nevertheless, it often turned out that
political needs dominated even over ideological ones. Remaining in power
was clearly the authorities’ sole objective, and everything else was
subordinated to it. That is why the ideas of complete social reconstruction
of the countryside and “rooting out” traditional religiousness and rituals
from it were abandoned.
In spite of devoted efforts, by the 1970s, the authorities still had not
managed to form a social structure compliant with ideological assumptions.
The structure formed was still considered temporary and a testimony to
failures experienced and compromises, concessions and silencing made. It
was an image of both strengths and weaknesses of the authorities and
reminded of the class structure with the officially decreed leading role of
workers. The structure created was disappointing to communist ideologists,
sociologists and representatives of existing strata and classes alike. Even the
privileged nomenklatura expressed their dissatisfaction with the range of
their privileges. The new hierarchies in individual classes were built by
“elevating” certain professional and industry branches both politically and
instrumentally. For strategic reasons, the industries that received privileges
were mining, arms and metalworking (Zaremba, 2001, p. 91), thus
differentiating the workers in terms of salary and improving their access to
rarer goods. The workers who were less useful to the order were subjected
to full economic exploitation.
Such compromises and actions deprived the order of its ideological
character, providing it with a conciliatory, political and instrumental one
instead. An example of that can be the services sector, which was
continuously maintained and tolerated despite being in conflict with the
principles of orthodox Marxism. The attempts at a scientific explanation of
the contemporary social structure led to the conclusion that the social
structure of the 1970s did not correspond to the expectations of communist
ideologists.

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© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023
P. Borowiec, The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26530-3_3

3. Consequences of the Experiment: The

Division Between Society and the
nomenklatura
Piotr Borowiec1
(1) Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Jagiellonian
University, Kraków, Poland

Piotr Borowiec
Email: piotr.borowiec@uj.edu.pl

Mechanisms of the Formation and Removal of

Social Distances
The previous analysis of how the totalitarian order employed the values of
equality and justice has demonstrated that they conditioned the revolution
and its sets of political objectives. It was according to these ideas and
imaginations that the transformation of the social structure was carried out.
Because of that, it has been retold how it was instrumentally and
unscrupulously modified until the 1970s and then “played out” for the
following two decades. There have been some of the consequences of this
supervised and controlled change presented, supported by intensive
propaganda and an information monopoly that took advantage of the
authority of science and the idea of progress and rationalism, and carried
out with the use of three-way actions—starting with the elimination of
political opponents and then proceeding to destroy capitalism (its structure)
and perform actions aimed at changing society through education and
indoctrination.
 The promoted concept of justice provided a political advantage during
the initial phase of changes as that concept was attractive and credible to
many people. The ideological and political “elevation” of workers and
farmers, often facing discrimination before, made them feel that historical
justice had been served and more important. Seeking to solidify their rule,
the authorities sought the support of these groups by making more promises
and filling the discourse with images of a better future. It is hardly
surprising that the designated beneficiaries of the revolution waited so
intensely and impatiently for the order to fulfil these promises. When
managing the revolution, the authorities pointed to further factors testifying
to the effectiveness of the change. The achievements of the order were
confirmed by leading to the formation of socialist relations and bringing
back to individuals the dignity taken away by capitalism. They meant a
change in the whole of living, in aspects crucial to human existence, and
were supposed not to be another mirage (i.e., “masks” applied onto
relations to obscure and falsify their actual form). Implementing such
changes required time, social approval, indispensable economic resources
and political determination.
C,ommunist ideologists were thoroughly analysing all the fears,
humiliations and injustices that had been suffered by the Polish society
(Hirszowicz, 2001, p. 17). They made the pre-war social divisions, having
the mostly economic background, an object of their interest. Additionally,
they skillfully linked these divisions to the condition of the pre-war social
structure. They recognised the wrongs and the exploitation of one people by
another as dependent on economic formation (i.e., also on structural
inequalities), and defined the future as the elimination of these pathologies
(i.e., of the divisions). They confirmed that in Polish conditions, the
distances also stemmed from inequalities present in capitalist relations.
They presented interpretations of these inequalities (i.e., places of their
formation and occurrence), as well as mechanisms used to sustain them.
Turning attention to the significance of relations to the order stemmed from
analyses made by Karl Marx. According to him, relations were identical to
structured inequalities that eventually generated social conflict. The
capitalist social relations were characterised by economic determinations,
were overflowing with conflicting interests and antagonisms.
The communists based the formation of non-antagonistic relations on
manipulating “the mechanism of suppressing and generating aspirations”
(Touraine, 2010, p. 18). They set “manually” the principles decisive for the
functioning of that mechanism. The first was the principle that the
authorities controlled the distribution of goods in society. Thus, they
abandoned the individual aspirations of individuals, imposing [on society]
certain different, official and ideological models of aspirations. They were
characterised by universal supervision and top-down satisfaction of needs
by the state, which led to the individuals becoming subordinated to those
who disposed of goods. The authorities created catalogues of valued goods
and aspirations, which sometimes took the form of general ideological
promises that were certain utopian imaginations difficult to meet. They
created sets of rules and standards admitting and limiting aspirations and
made the solutions adopted the final instance in settling what a good life
was, which interests had a chance of being expressed in the order and which
were blocked. They decided on forming and sustaining new hierarchies;
every single of them was a functional structure that determined the chances
of development of social groups.
The arrangement of such a mechanism always determines and
stimulates the stability of orders and their capability for transformation,
specifies the range of possible changes and indicates the initiators and
inhibitors of change. It also decides on delaying or accelerating the rate of
changes, thus forming orders and relations typical of them. It imposes
contradictions and leads to social problems, conflicts and political disputes
within society. They especially occur when this mechanism is set from the
very basics, according to completely new rules incompatible with the
previous ones. It is worth adding that it is impossible to “deactivate” the old
rules of that mechanism for the duration of reconstruction and use only the
new ones—they may exist next to each other for a long time. It is similarly
unrealistic to immediately and ultimately eliminate the old forms of
aspirations in individuals.
These conclusions show that the mechanism always plays a significant
role in society, which is confirmed by the fact that communists often
referred to material ambitions and aspirations. An example of that can be
the use of the idea of competition at work—it was allowed, but only
concerning the execution of planned tasks (Narojek, 1996, p. 12). The lack
of clear and intelligible rules of functioning of this mechanism creates
chaos in individuals, undermining the functioning of the order and forming
a basis for its change. Eventually, this leads to the later changes in the order
being radical. “Manipulating” the mechanism discussed means instrumental
control over change. From a long-term perspective, however, the adopted
models of communist aspirations generated negative consequences for the
authorities. Thoughtless “driving” of mass aspirations, imposing ideological
visions of such aspirations and linking them to the then-current policy
turned out to be dysfunctional to the authorities. There were multiple
instances of them experiencing negative consequences of increasing the
aspirations of many groups and failing to satisfy most of them.
The “aspiration arrangement” mechanism discussed is of importance to
any order. A radical change to its rules always demands quick changes,
rejecting the whole previous order and negating sets of existing hierarchies
and privileges. The mechanism confirms the significance of ideology for
increasing the precision of its functioning, consisting of preparing useful
justifications for increasing or limiting aspirations. It shows the role of
ideology in supervision and control over society. Usually, it is the economic
aspect of aspirations—bearing all its limitations in mind—that seems the
most important for forming orders, and the optimal adjustment of economic
aspiration rules leads to ordering political objectives. Thus, any suggestions
of changes in the redistribution of riches gain not only ideological but also
political dimensions.
A general adjustment of this mechanism that was introduced by
communists and had an impact on everyone was the abolishment of the free
market and the introduction of central planning, state property and full
political supervision and control (Mokrzycki, 1997). A part of it was the
creation of standards and the administrative apparatus handling the
distribution of goods. The extensive system of distribution was tasked with
performing “just” allocation of goods on a group and individual level (i.e.,
implementing the fundamental communist dream of equality). And it was
doing that as long as it had enough goods—mainly plundered ones
(agricultural reform). Once there was a shortage of goods, it took even more
pathological forms, for example, by creating the corrupt and primitive
clientelist system (Tarkowski, 1994).
In terms of the adjustment of aspirations, the communist authorities
were both radical and conservative. They destroyed what was before and
imposed changes without leaving much choice to anyone. Or at least it
seemed so, especially when they referred to experiences of the Soviet order.
They focused on subordinating the whole society and taking complete
control over the realisation of aspirations, set admissible forms of aspiration
realisation (in line with assumptions of the communist economy) and took
full responsibility for improving the lives of all individuals. They set
aspirations for all groups, extending them radically for some and declining
others not only the right to aspirations, but even to existence. They set the
maximum achievement ceilings and ensured they were not exceeded by
punishing them for realising aspirations in any way other than the imposed
ones. They occupied themselves with setting places for all groups within
hierarchies, controlling the objectives and the methods of achieving them.
Such actions [of the government] in a situation of universal deficiency
of goods led to people considering “ripping out” any goods plagued by
shortages from its hands a success. Despite their devoted efforts, the
authorities were unable to extinguish all aspirations. They remained
smouldering in people, appearing in scattered or hidden forms, breaking
into consciousness and waiting for a chance to be realised. Certain actions
[of the government] were in line with society’s aspirations, for example, the
industrialisation programme: “It did enable social advancement and
fostered realisation of personal aspirations of various groups and strata,
thanks to which it could count on their approval” (Rychard, 1995, p. 18).
The authorities did not encompass everyone with the equal distribution of
goods and created an exception for themselves by way of alternative access
to goods that constituted a certain bypass of the official distribution system
(Koralewicz, 2008) and was intended for the avant-garde of the proletariat.
Its existence led to the appearance of the nomenklatura.
The authorities controlled society by playing a “game of aspirations and
ambitions” of individuals. This did not apply solely to the administrative
structures of running the state. The authorities reached for all aspirations,
“took them over” and used them to control individuals in a manner
beneficial to their own political interests. They built a universal system of
satisfying aspirations and then failed to comply with it, and also employed
partiality, bias and interest of the party apparatus. Although the original
aspirations of certain groups were realised, like in the case of farmers, they
were not fully satisfied. The distribution of land made farmers its owners,
but their financial standing was not improved significantly, and the value of
agricultural land in the Polish People’s Republic was low. All groups, not
only those towards which the government had a positive attitude,
experienced having their aspirations managed. Many groups were
persuaded that they were experiencing some advancement, with some
individuals becoming its shareholders: “The degree of deprivation of basic
needs resulted in the feeling of advancement already being experienced as a
result of moving to a city from the countryside, even if such a transition was
not readily accompanied by any noticeable improvement of the material
standard of living” (Marody, 1991, p. 232). Initially, advancement was
experienced by workers who systematically improved their qualifications,
similarly to their children who had access to educational advancement.
However, these actions were, to a great degree, a part of the authorities’
instrumental manipulation of the aspirations of various groups. Whole
groups were shifted in the queue for goods. This was achieved not only by
manipulating aspirations of measures of success, but also through specific
actions such as the so-called “extra points” for the background of children
of farmers and workers for admission to higher education. Any
advancement without the participation of the authorities was excluded, and
all others were presented by the propaganda “as a gift – a present from the
people’s authority” (Palska, 1994, p. 9).
Blocking the activity of individuals in many spheres of life was a
significant limitation of the existing paths of aspiration realisation. The
substitute spheres of activity imposed, beneficial to the state apparatus and
the nomenklatura, were losing their mobilising potential. In fact, some of
them had never played such a role at all. The fact that individuals accepted
them often stemmed from other motivations and instrumental calculations
rather than from being convinced of the validity of the existing solutions
and objectives. Another weakness of the paths suggested was the
undermining of the faith in the possibility of realisation of those aspirations.
This resulted in a collapse of mutual dependency between labour and effort
and the reward for them. The social experience gained indicated that
working more efficiently did not result in a higher salary. The ideological
propaganda forms of mobilisation, such as slogans like “good and honest
work contributes to building the socialist Fatherland”, were not fulfilling
their role. The mechanism of incitement of collective aspirations was also
blocked by the “serious” interpretation of the equality idea promoted. This
was evident in view of the messages on the necessity of equal remuneration
paid to all people working in the same position, irrespective of their
involvement at work. The labour system formed turned out to be
dysfunctional—the individuals with “blocked material aspirations” were not
driving efficiency and effectiveness. What became entrenched in the
consciousness of many workers was the conviction that salary was not an
economic category, but “only plays a social role and is remuneration for the
lone fact of remaining in an employment relation” (Marody, 1986, p. 15).
On the other hand, the hopes vested in the concept of common good and
sacrifice for the nation or the realisation of collective interest” turned out
empty and impossible to make real.
Officially, the state and party apparatus was responsible for satisfying
the aspirations. Making good on all the promises made and management
over advancements and distribution of goods—all of that was in its hands
(Zagórski, 1978, p. 21). The majority of individuals were deprived of
responsibility for the conditions of their existence and the possibility to
control their own lives. In practice, such a limitation turned out to be more
dysfunctional than useful to the authorities. It was beneficial to them only to
a very limited extent, and its political usefulness varied as well. An example
of that can be the situation and behaviour of small-scale farmers and former
manor workers who were incapable of making a living off the land they
were assigned. Thus, what had been perceived as advancement and a path
towards equality was eventually considered an “illusory moment of peace”.
Because of that, political support for the authorities expressed by such
farmers changed over time and waned when the government failed to meet
their subsequent aspirations. Such a situation was experienced by social
groups, especially in the early 1970s (Koralewicz, 2008, pp. 21–22), when
the disappointment of society with how its needs were satisfied was
revealed. Further promises of the authorities were taken less and less
seriously and only angered the people. In view of the “constantly growing
needs of the working class, working farmers and the intelligentsia”, these
promises “created one of the most significant ‘legitimisation pitfalls’ for the
existing social order” (Pańków, 2010a, p. 208). It turned out that providing
further advancement to workers and farmers was difficult. In view of the
lack of goods for distribution, such a strategy was no longer possible to
repeat. This led to ceaseless competition for resources between the
authorities and the social groups. A side effect of this competition was
further awakening of aspirations with simultaneous failure to satisfy them,
resulting in recurring social conflicts. After the period of “little
stabilisation” (Świda-Ziemba, 2010, p. 313), further consumer aspirations
were awakened. In the decades to follow, the range of unsatisfied needs
experienced particularly strong expansion, and the scale of unrealised
consumer aspirations increased. One of the symptoms of the deepening
crisis—market breakdown and growing inflation, as well as a direct
consequence of a rapid decrease of actual income in 1982 that impacted all
the social groups—was the increase in discrepancies between the achieved
income and that declared as desired (Sikorska, 1999, p. 115).
The fields of materialism, consciousness, privilege distribution and
access to and shortage of goods were where the fate of the social justice
concept and its version implemented in practice was decided. The order
could not provide the welfare promised, even to the ideologically selected
groups. The “mechanism of suppression and generation of aspirations” that
had been introduced turned out to be a pitfall that led to tragic economic
consequences for society. The above statements are confirmed by the
fluctuating level of society’s support for the order (Zaremba, 2001), as well
as the level of its acceptance and legitimisation. An increase in support for
the Polish People’s Republic’s authorities was always related to an
improvement in the economic situation, which is confirmed by the periods
of Gomułka’s “little stabilisation” and Gierek’s industrialisation.

Experience of Discrimination in Workplaces

The communist authorities experienced a persistent lack of legitimisation,
which is why they employed all sorts of means to increase their anchorage
in society. To this end, they participated actively in all kinds of ceremonies,
commemorations, anniversaries and official celebrations of state holidays.
The participation of state leaders in those events was often transformed into
a presentation of their skills or merits in liberating the country. The parties
organising ceremonies built “an image of state leaders that assigned to them
nearly divine characteristics” (Osęka, 2007, p. 150). The leaders were
presented as rejuvenated, smiled and established direct contact with society.
They received flowers from people dressed in folk attire symbolising the
support of working people and the national tradition. Any visit from leaders
was presented as a distinction and always constituted the central point of
the event, around which the most important parts of the ceremony were
structured. During the Stalin period, they were separated from society,
standing on a tall, distant platform from which they saluted the marching
crowds. In this manner, the hierarchy of the authorities and their distrust
towards people invited to the ceremony was underlined. The whole event
and the ceremonial space were planned in detail. The ceremonies organised
were supposed to hide the distance present between the government and
those governed (Osęka, 2007, p. 150). This distance was reduced later on,
but the purpose of a ceremony was always to demonstrate the harmony that
existed between the authorities and society.
However, it was not ceremonies that reflected the form of relations
between those groups. It started with the brutal elimination of the pro-
independence opposition and was complemented by the places where the
socialist relations were born and where the true face of the order was “being
displayed”—namely, the workplaces where workers met the plant
management apparatus. The form of these relations was supposed to
confirm the spread of the ideas as a new model of labour and plant
management involving workers was to appear. In practice, it was the
organisational apparatus—and later the party apparatus taking over the
control over production—that was made responsible for realising this
objective. In propaganda, the new authorities were inviting workers to joint
management of factories and convincing them that the long-awaited
moment of making the labour movement’s dreams of creating the
anticipated alternative work relations come true had finally arrived. A
special role in those planned relations was to be played by the managing
apparatus. Its recruitment was initially difficult due to a lack of staff
experienced in recreating the production process. An obstacle to forming a
complete apparatus was a peculiar “social vacuum” (Zaremba, 2001, p.
137) in which the new authorities were functioning. As time passed, the
number of those interested in joining the managing apparatus grew
(Grabowska 2004, p. 119).
The arrangement of these relations and the creation of working
conditions, including the practical transformation of the “mechanism of
suppression and generation of aspirations”—during the first years of
communism—was presented in the following work: Rebuilding Poland:
Workers and Communists (Kenney 1997b), Strajki robotnicze w Łodzi
1945–1976 (Lesiakowski, 2008) and in other studies (Kamiński, 2000, pp.
64–149; Miernik & Piątkowski, 2005; Chumiński, 2015; Zawisza, 2019).
Padraic Kenney was right to claim that to examine the issue of opposition
and resistance against the order imposed, it was necessary to go to the
factories (Kenney, 1997a, p. 32). At the same time, it was possible to notice
in the factories the framework for the formation of the “us” vs “them”
social division, where the ideals of the ideology and revolution had a brutal
clash with practical implementation thereof.
Those taking over control of the work establishments strived to
commence production, which was presented by propaganda as the
successes of the new order. This required concluding the necessary
compromises (i.e., making deals, especially with workers who had pre-war
experience in production). The launching of factories was accompanied by
enthusiasm and hope, also due to the lack of basic goods. The noticeable
powerlessness in terms of provisioning was being handled using slogans
about the improvement of the situation in the nearest future and requests for
understanding. The post-war enthusiasm encompassed the workers, which
is why the discontent stemming from product shortage was initially possible
to explain. Thus, effective explanations for errors in production and
shortages of goods were provided using sets of convincing arguments.
Those in control of the order underlined that the shortage situation was a
consequence of the war, which was true. Later on, the shortages were
allegedly a side effect and consequence of the capitalist heritage and the
initial shortcomings of the system, which, however, did not encumber the
system itself but specific people only. It was claimed that the perspective of
an “increasingly better, fuller, more prosperous and happy life seemed to be
within arm’s reach” (Mazur, 2009, p. 356). The persistent promise to
eliminate supply shortages started losing its impact because of the lack of
confirmation of it.
The workers’ desire to improve their biological existence led them to
formulate demands for increased salaries, the introduction of fair standards
and social and provisioning solutions. Despite growing penalties, strikes
were still being organised. The authorities euphemistically referred to them
as “work breaks” (Lesiakowski, 2008, p. 11). An excellent example was the
situation in factories in Łódź, where the expectations of higher
gratifications, caused by the growing food prices and the availability of
products in private trade (Lesiakowski, 2008), led to frequent conflicts. In
order to increase the interest of workers in more efficient work, additional
remunerations in kind were introduced, also referred to as allowances and
material additions, which the workers often sold on the black market. Such
attempts at linking productivity with aspirations and remunerations did not
provide the expected effects and the workers’ despondency was becoming
ubiquitous. Positive consequences of the worker’s labour existed in
propaganda communications only. Meanwhile, factories were plagued by
disorganisation and chaos. The dominating feeling was that their effort was
being wasted and that the system of remunerations supplemented with
allowances not only did not lead to the elimination of production problems,
but also created more inequalities among the workers. Additionally, it kept
workers convinced that the state is indeed responsible for the whole life of
workers.
Workers’ demands included egalitarianism, just distribution of goods,
equal salaries and participating in decisions regarding their workplace—
none of which were excessive. They noticed any inequalities present
regarding remunerations and considered them unjust. What incited doubts
in them was not only the salary differences present in factories between
blue- and white-collar workers, but also those between workers in different
factories. The workers were following the salary increases in other factories
and demanded similar ones (Kenney, 1997b, p. 100). In this manner, the
revolutionary ideas crashed against the reality of everyday life and the
authorities’ problem was that the workers’ slogans they had been spreading
were taken seriously.
The official takeover of control over work establishments by workers
and making the industry common property did not eliminate aspirations for
fair remuneration. From whom could the workers expect decent work and
pay if not from the “just” communist order? The authorities had to face this
problem and convince the working class that although it had become the
owner of the factories, it now had to work there more intensely. The
inadequacy of the spread of ideas was apparent in such situations as there
was a lack of effective tools for increasing production. The attempts at
combining material aspirations with efficiency entailed questioning the
equality and justice ideas promoted. It was of no significance what kinds of
“justifications” were used to support the calls for more efficient work. The
authorities created strategies to motivate the workers, but some quickly lost
their attractiveness and were ineffective. At the same time, the initial
dedication of the workers—stemming from the idea of rebuilding the
country, which they accepted—was gone, replaced by weariness and
bitterness (Lesiakowski, 2008, p. 38). The authorities were noticing the
spread of behaviour typical of “layabout workers”, practically unknown
during the interwar period (Malinowski, 1962, p. 94). The belief in the
creation of the front of national unity was waning, especially when the
reaction of authorities to poor production results was increasing the
production efficiency standards, stricter supervision over production and
growing the system of labour controllers and inspectors to an unimaginable
size. The actions mentioned above confirmed that workers “were not
allowed to decide on anything within their workplaces” (Świda-Ziemba,
1998, p. 212)—they were not the actual owners of these places, and they
found it impossible to feel as if they were. Instead of developing
employees’ aspirations and supporting creative solutions at work, the work
establishments—especially the staff managing them—blocked the creation
of new ideas as they saw them as a threat to their existence. They only
promoted actions consistent with the propaganda communication and
supported workers loyal to the order.
From a long-term perspective, the work establishments took over the
responsibilities outside of production and received tasks consisting in
eliminating alienation and forming relations with workers to implement
forms of paternalistic hierarchies. Their main task was to “socialise” the
workers—according to Jan Poleszczuk, they were supposed to be “little
societies” and worker collectives. Additionally, they were expected to take
over all the welfare-providing functions of the state—helping supply people
with both basic and luxury goods, supporting people in crisis situations,
solving accommodation issues, organising health care and recreation and
providing care for employees’ children. The whole life of workers was
supposed to orbit their workplaces. However, fulfilling these functions
turned out to be extremely difficult in practice. In reality, it was all about
gaining more control over workers. Such numerous functions of work
establishments turned out to be a part of concealed supervisory actions of
the apparatus aimed against the workers (Poleszczuk, 1991).
The work relations formed were not conducive to appropriate attitudes
towards the workplace and the work itself or building the labour ethos.
Unsatisfactory salaries, disappointment with the provision of goods
(Miernik, 2005, p. 27), observation of factory management pathologies and
realisation that the factories do not constitute common property all
encouraged the workers to neglect and ignore their obligations at work.
This led the workers to start illegal activities such as stealing from their
workplaces (Madej, 2005, p. 135). They were irritated by unrealistic
standards, low salaries and thorough searches at the workplace entrance.
Their decision to commit theft often stemmed from the will to survive,
insufficient salary or lack of basic goods (Lesiakowski, 2008, p. 14).
Because of universal poverty, expecting the workers to work efficiently
without that being reflected in the amount of their salary lacked grounds—
especially in the worsening economic situation. In response to the
transgressions of workers, the authorities introduced an extensive system of
penalties: “The June 1950 law on socialist work discipline marks the
official beginning of the open battle with worker crime and the dawn of
Stalinism in the factories” (Kenney, 1997b, p. 206). It is worth adding that
in 1950 it only took seven months to punish 42,443 workers under these
regulations (Kenney, 1997b, p. 206). However, no penalties could stop
alcohol consumption at work, which became a part of the worker culture,
testifying to the feeling of pointlessness of work and the dissolution of work
relations. The above actions confirmed that the working class experienced
realising its place in the new order quite painfully. The workers quickly
understood that the messages referring to a community of labour, equality
and the party representing the workers were just another mystification
employed in propaganda. In the order being formed, the workers were given
the position of “slave labour” (Świda-Ziemba, 1998, p. 209).
On the other side of the growing conflict among factory management,
the false imagination of workers as the leading force of history was falling
as well. The progressing disappointment resulted from the workers not
being involved enough in the production process, lacking ideological
compatibility or ignoring the motivation tools proposed. The workers
turned out to be the biggest disappointment on the ideological and political
front as they not only failed to exhibit spontaneous desire to join the party,
but were also devoid of a high level of political activity and did not
participate in propaganda events (Miernik, 2005, p. 10). Complaining about
their political slowness, passiveness and lack of political activity became a
regular element of the discourse of the party apparatus. The said apparatus
was more and more often disdainful towards its structural background. The
workers were characterised as insufficiently seasoned, useless for the
revolutionary tasks assigned to them and lacking the proper consciousness
expected of them. The indifference of workers towards the order formed
was becoming a problem, although one that remained hidden by the
propaganda for many years.
 Disciplining the workers created enmity spaces in relations as it was not
only the strike organisers who were deprived of employment—sometimes
even whole work establishments were closed (Lesiakowski, 2008, p. 115).
The workers were being made aware that because of the order built and
them being owners of the workplaces, work was their fundamental
obligation. The workers started to realise that the factory managers took
over the role of pre-war factory owners. The management apparatus in
factories did not shy away from actions aimed at disciplining the workers,
but the primary role within that scope was played by Security Office (UB)
officers employed full-time at the factories (Paczkowski, 1996, pp. 23–26).
The presence of this apparatus, receiving generous salaries, deepened the
workers’ disappointment with the new order and their reluctance towards it.
A part of the relations built was introducing party organisations, often
identical to the management apparatus, into work establishments. The party
staff were taking over new tasks in work establishments, becoming
responsible for educating the workers and increasing their ideological
awareness. At the same time, they were not incurring liability for numerous
instances of negligence (Lesiakowski, 2008, p. 56) or consequences of
errors in factory management. Additionally, the party apparatus took control
over labour unions, which made the workers aware of how they were
completely alone before the authority structures. The unions, which were
supposed to be a channel for communicating worker discontent, were
subordinated to a party organisation (Miernik, 2007, p. 77), thus alienating
the workers from the unions created.
The worker’s dissatisfaction with the functioning of their work
establishments, including numerous idle periods caused by shortages of
resources or semi-finished products, was growing systematically.
Production was universally handicapped due to a lack of timely deliveries
and the collapse of the work ethos. In workers’ eyes, social property was
becoming fiction, and the sense of common ownership was alien to them.
The place previously occupied by the capitalist factory owner had been
taken over by the factory director, and the management was chosen
according to political needs. It turned out that the method of managing and
using property did not differ much from the pre-war one. The salaries were
not improving, while the production chaos was getting worse. The striking
workers were characterised as enemies working to the detriment of society
and destroying common property The image of a discontent and striking
worker was becoming established among the authorities, requiring further
education and awareness-raising. Despite that, in propaganda, the workers
were always satisfied with their work conditions and salary. It was
underlined that dissatisfaction is expressed only by a handful of bums and
reactionaries (i.e., workers sympathising with the capitalist order)
(Lesiakowski, 2008).
New methods of activity stimulation and the application of extensive
forms were supposed to increase work efficiency and productivity and
improve responsibility (Miernik, 2007). One of the main ones was the
competition at work (Wilk, 2005, pp. 43–68), the aim of which was to
repair the disturbed relationship between work and remuneration. Attempts
were made to increase work efficiency using ideological messages and new
rhetoric about taking advantage of unreachable stocks of materials and
symbolic goods. To the working class, the competition would provide an
opportunity for higher salary, promotion, advancement and becoming a
local workplace hero. In view of ubiquitous problems with production, the
authorities reached individual resources of material aspirations. Campaigns
like these were used to provide more goods for the economy and increase
support and acceptance towards the authorities. At the same time, it was
aimed at reducing the disappointment of workers caused by the condition of
the economy, persuading them to accept the order and convincing them that
the living standard may depend partially on their work efficiency (Miernik,
2005).
The competition at work was implemented in line with the Soviet
experiences (Wilk, 2011, p. 19)—it was a form of instrumental, continuous
motivation, a form of rescuing the system and increasing production
through encouraging to work by means of rewarding with goods that were
difficult to access by most of society. It referred to individual aspirations,
being appreciated and having one’s significance in the workplace
recognised. The work for the socialist fatherland was combined with the
aspirations of individuals. The offer of competition was directed to worker
communities and intended to elicit new behaviour from them. However, this
strategy created additional forms of inequality and further division at work
establishments. It led to the destruction of group coherence. The model
workers were not favoured by their co-workers and were becoming objects
of ridicule, jealousy and antipathy, and sometimes even of aggression or
boycotting (Świda-Ziemba, 1998, p. 147). Competition was perceived as
conflicting with equality as the rewards and gratifications were envisaged
for the best only. Such opinions appeared mainly among older workers, who
noticed in this programme a form of humiliation and deprivation of dignity.
Younger workers were usually supportive of competing. Over time, the
interest in competing was waning, and a significant hit suffered by this
programme was the disappointment of model workers with the forms of
rewards applied. Competing was systematically linked with increased
requirements towards the workers and changes in the adjustment of salaries
(Kenney, 1997b, pp. 237–286).
The competition was a political and propaganda strategy used to
influence society. The system of non-salary benefits was aimed at releasing
the enthusiasm of the working classes, devoted to achieving new economic
objectives and reducing the inertia of planning mechanisms (Poleszczuk,
1991, p. 127). The myth of the model workers was aimed at demonstrating
that exhausting labour results from the collective enthusiasm of workers
(Świda-Ziemba, 1998, p. 207). The exceptional and effective role of the
workers’ party, able to motivate workers to work hard, was presented (Wilk,
2011, p. 77). On the wave of this enthusiasm, declarations of additional
employee obligations, working on more holidays or working longer hours
were born. A work race was being created, which—from the authorities’
point of view—was particularly necessary as a form of education of
workers, mainly on the basis of sustaining the sense of uniqueness of the
moment and continuation of the revolution. Although no major economic
successes were achieved, competing was a “hole torn” in the communist
arrangement of the “mechanism of suppressing and generating aspirations”,
a primitive response to the ideological blocks of the order imposed by the
authorities. An undisputed achievement of this motivation strategy was
temporarily drawing a part of society away from their everyday problems
and shortages of goods, reducing social conflicts and tensions and
undermining the question about chances for having one’s needs satisfied
(Kenney, 1997b, pp. 232–286).
When the decisive majority of ownership means ended up in the hands
of the state, it required supervision and professional management. The
management structure formed at work establishments “imposed” previously
unknown forms of new hierarchies. The need to have this property managed
forced the introduction of position variation solutions, which confirmed that
the working people of the countryside and cities were the owner of the
factories. However, these solutions’ practical forms of influence on the
economy turned out to be a failure, and the control of workers over the
property was particularly illusory. It also turned out that functioning of
work establishments and all state institutions was impossible without
hierarchical, bureaucratic structures ensuring minimum functionality.
Without the hated idea of hierarchy, no management of state-owned means
of production was possible (Morawski, 1982, pp. 14–15).
In the management forms adopted, the possibility of promotion within
formal structures was not eliminated, but it became dependent on
subordination and obedience, or actually on the degree of presented activity
and participation in solidification of the “people’s authority”. What became
an evaluation criterion was the activity in socio-political structures
maintaining the existing order. At the same time, the level of salary was
disconnected from work efficiency and, therefore, the labour distribution
retained stopped forming the basis for demanding respect (Giza-Poleszczuk,
1991, p. 80). Having a higher position in the work establishment structure
did not entail respect, but actually became grounds for being denied it. Such
an instrumentalisation of participation in the order deprived it of legitimacy.
In this manner, the party apparatus was placed at the top of the hierarchies
formed. Hanna Świda-Ziemba wrote that “members of the Polish United
Workers’ Party were the aliens, those to whom false signals are sent, those
with whom any non-formal contact is usually avoided. Thus, the members
of the party were threatened with a certain banishment, and they were
condemned to their own ghetto” (1998, p. 146). This is how the
bureaucratic structure that also handled “ideological supervision” was being
formed and solidified. Its task was to transmit the messages from the
authorities to society and explain the government’s actions. It also
confirmed politics as becoming the same as economics, as well as the
dominance of politics over economics.
The political affiliation defined qualifications and skills. Incompetence,
arrogance or wrong management of work establishments was not noticed,
thus depriving the party and state elites of any right to introduce changes.
The authorities shaped the system of selecting and recruiting members
tasked with governing based on conformism. With time, that system
expanded its range and was growing, especially during the periods of the
improving economic situation in the country. Meanwhile, it was working
well in times of crisis. It sanctioned the distribution of privileges, which
was why it expanded its influence and recruited new members—always
using the message that becoming privileged is available, and the first step
towards it is choosing the side of the order. The distribution of privileges
built did not introduce any rules of responsibility for wrong decisions. It did
not allow for reckoning of those loyal and obedient (Poleszczuk, 1991, p.
119) unless the situation demanded designating a “scapegoat”. The
authorities made decisions secretly, usually during meetings and councils,
where they approved the decisions sent “from above”, which also made
determining those responsible difficult. The costs of many errors were
hidden by the factory managers.
The vocational diversity of workers and the fact that they were assigned
to different branches of the industry (Domański, 1987, p. 71) led to the
appearance of industry privileges and work classifications. A mechanism of
constant, elevated evaluation of work performed by workers employed in
spheres of importance to the state was formed. Thus, the workers’ dreams
of equality and the ideologists’ dreams of uniform social classes were being
shattered. Under the influence of interest groups and ambitions to develop
arms, new hierarchies of professional groups appeared. They were not
aimed at restoring social justice, but only saving the remains of the
production organisation. They were forms of managing the chaos that
appeared in work establishments. The work classifications were aimed at
introducing order to the economic system. Instead, they turned out to be a
fundamental obstacle to building an order based on equality. Certain
professional groups, considered more important to the state, received higher
salaries and special bonuses. That is why the idea of equality “turned out to
be an ideological banner masking the rise of a new class order” (Heymann,
1998, p. 140). In the end, actions that were supposed to rescue the economic
system took the order away from the officially adopted ideology with every
passing year. From the very beginning, the order strived to blur and
eliminate differences. Meanwhile, the classification system confirmed that
they existed and that it was impossible to function without them.
Those studying the social structures noticed the significance of the
distribution of labour for the formation of the new relations. They were
confirming that the dreams of building a uniform structure and non-
antagonistic relations were verified negatively by life itself. The analysis
noticed the decreasing role of class factors—a consequence of the attitude
towards the means of production, with a simultaneous increase in factors
related to the place of an individual in the existing distribution of labour. It
was claimed that it was the “distribution of labour that became a factor
determining the distribution of all attributes of social standing in the
socialist society” (Wesołowski & Słomczyński, 1978, p. 32). In practice,
this meant that striving to introduce a limited distribution of labour in
factories failed and that instead of fostering the uniformity desired, work
establishments were becoming forms of new diversification. The division
forming led to the appearance of new hierarchies—formed around income,
prestige, respect and participation in authority.
The problems with the formation of claims for respect are presented
perfectly in the analyses of Anna Giza-Poleszczuk. According to her, the
sources of disturbance of respect were present in two spheres: political
discourse regarding the distribution of labour and popular recognition of the
legitimacy of social divisions. In the political discourse regarding social
diversification—including the distribution of labour—respect had an
ideological, not technological, character. Because of this situation, the
discourse regarding claims took a specific character. It had been permeated
by the ideological dimension, weakening or eliminating meritocratic
matters typical of modern production organisations from the existing
distribution of respect (1991, p. 83).
The salary matters at work establishments were linked to being a party’s
management apparatus member. What pictures this situation perfectly is the
following statement from a worker (a letter regarding the socio-political
situation from a worker from Łódź to the Security Office [UB]), confirming
the existence of distances: “Here, in Poland, it keeps getting worse instead
of better. The government is supposed to support workers and equal
opportunities. Still, those with access to money claiming that all is good in
the country earn forty thousand or more per month, while an ordinary
worker earns five thousand or less and, if he has a large family, they need to
eat black bread and potatoes with borscht (beetroot soup)” (Kenney, 1997b,
p. 233). Similar tendencies are pictured in the statement from a post office
worker in 1945: “After a year of work at the post office, I’m a beggar, my
clothes are torn, I sold everything else, I have no coal, no potatoes and my
children want something to eat” (quoted after: Górecki, 1997, p. 102). It is
not surprising that opinions such as “what a nice democracy with nothing to
eat”, “the parasites keep eating while the worker is starving” or “easy for
him to say when he ate his fill” were present among workers (Kamiński,
2000, p. 7). That is why the workers considered the country’s government
responsible for the economic situation. It was not guided by the “good of
society”, but the binding will adopted by the political bodies of the ruling
party (Świda-Ziemba, 1998, p. 27).
It was the work establishments where the paths of the authorities and
society diverged most turbulently. It happened when the workers with the
most friendly attitude towards the order experienced the discrepancy
between official ideological messages and everyday work, as well as “the
consequences of the policy of the authorities, glaringly inconsistent with the
public declarations” (Jarosz & Pasztor, 1995, p. 22). It was the unfulfilled
promises of ensuring a decent standard of living that were the most
effective at delegitimising the order. When the promises to satisfy the needs
were not made or fulfilled and supply problems were coming back, even
those who were the most supportive and friendly to the order were
becoming dispirited towards it. Only those who had access to goods
maintained their support.
The order being created assumed the existence of unity between the
party apparatus and the workers, but this never happened (Kenney, 1997b,
p. 336). According to the internal ideological communication, the workers
had not developed the so-called “class consciousness” (Świda-Ziemba,
1998, p. 207). However, according to the propaganda, they supported the
party and its actions. In reality, it was different. The systematic socio-
political crises and suppression of worker demonstrations confirmed that
the relation between the working class and the party is fiction. The workers
very quickly became a symbol of uncouthness and primitivism to the party
apparatus and were treated like obstacles on the path towards communism.
The workers “looked good” in journalistic programmes in the media—when
they were walking out together from a factory or a mine wearing identical
clothes and with safety helmets on their heads, they constituted an example
of a significant force. That is why they were kept at a distance, distrusted
and subjected to more intensive surveillance. The cyclic outbursts of social
discontent inspired by the workers were confirming that they were totally
“lost” to the order.

Inequalities in Advanced Socialist Society

Despite certain undisputed “successes”, the long-term, extensive actions
aiming at changing the unaccepted elements of the pre-war structure did not
lead to the appearance of a homogeneous society. They did not generate the
anticipated equality and justice. The arrangement of the main classes and
strata showed a certain coherence despite numerous examples confirming
that this coherence was illusory. The authorities themselves evaluated the
long-term revolutionary effort positively, often underlining that their
“actions were unprecedented”. However, on the part of society, the
evaluation of the order and relation showed the growth of initial doubts
with every passing year. The partial “levelling” of the structure led to the
elimination of glaring financial disproportions, but this was not the equality
that some people were expecting when they expressed their trust towards
the order, even if that trust was conditional.
It was not about the lack of similarity of the existing relations to the
models promoted as they had never been defined in detail. It was about the
disappointment with daily life that a growing number of people felt. Not
everyone, however. A part of society functioned within relations defined by
belonging to the nomenklatura and sustained those relations, considering
them important from the point of view of its own interest. Others accepted
the pathological relations and suited some people perfectly—mainly those
who made a living out of that pathology. They noticed the crisis of shortage
economy and pathologies of the economic relations and effectively took
advantage of them. An example of that can be the problems with the supply
of rare products, which some of the more “resourceful” people could solve
by creating methods for obtaining them that were alternative to those
offered by the order. This is how a certain pathological “resourcefulness”
was born in the form of corruption and bribery. “The informal
arrangements, even if someone did not take advantage of them, created a
sense of lawlessness, unequal opportunities and existence of secret and, in
consequence, unjust criteria of distribution” (Kolarska-Bobińska &
Rychard, 1990, p. 28). The imitation of relations became visible in the
residential system, manifesting in many years of waiting for one’s
apartment and experiencing the existence of a system for the privileged,
who obtained apartments outside of the queue. Everyday relations became
filled with pathological forms. The necessity to enter such relations usually
made people embarrassed. In fact, it was a form of daily humiliation. There
was no escape from such humiliation, and it was present everywhere—even
in waiting for the basic construction materials and household appliances
according to the generally applicable rules. The situation looked similar
within the scope of work and production relations, formed on capital
absorption, labour absorption, delays, elimination of innovativeness and
waste of resources and materials (Roszkowski, 2010, pp. 91–92), making
appearances of working and noticeable helplessness in solving the problems
of the workforce. The omnipresent inefficiency, initially irritating, was
eventually accepted and recognised as a trademark of the order.
In the formation of a new order, the temporary improvement of the
situation of farmers and workers was ceaselessly presented as a success.
The conviction that industrialisation is a “leap into modernity” and a
consequence of ideological assumptions was reinforced (Sokół, 1997, p.
160). Conducting it was supposed to serve to demonstrate the superiority of
the ideology imposed. In fact, every year of “coexistence” of the authorities
and the working class confirmed that the workers would never become a
force leading towards communism as it turned out to be impossible to
harness them to serve the ruling order, which meant that the authorities had
failed (Zaremba, 2001, p. 18). The discontent of the workers confirmed that
the working class would never become the foundation for stabilising the
order. At first, it was elevated and appreciated, but it was eventually
removed to the margin of the order and considered a threat. The authorities
felt that the actual bond between the workers and the “workers’ party”
never existed. It comes as no surprise, then, that the low-level party
apparatus observing this process increasingly experienced uncertainty and
anxiety concerning the future. The lack of visible, expected consequences
of the grandly announced reforms and having to observe erroneous and
irrational decisions worsened these moods.
With every passing year, the achievement of the authorities that formed
the basis of their legitimisation were losing significance. The ideology itself
lost its impact on society even earlier, and the majority of people perceived
it as a hodgepodge of incompatible solutions which also provided grounds
for delegitimising the authorities. Only a small part of society accepted the
thesis of “aggravating class struggle”, which was another propagandist
invention of ideologists intended to be an ideological drive for social
processes. The arguments of this type were losing their propagandist
impact. In practice, the authorities started lacking stimuli and goods
necessary to motivate all the groups, and the existing once were directed to
the violence apparatus that was “keeping society under control”. The
motivation strategies that had been used for years had run dry and become
ineffective. Society was no longer afraid and realised that protests were the
only effective form of fighting, one that ensured a larger assignment of
goods and temporary improvement of the financial situation. This
experience transformed the attitude to the existing order into one based on
demands and contestation, thus questioning it and providing grounds for
changing it.
The 1970s were supposed to be a confirmation of the solutions
implemented and the superiority of relations, as well as a presentation of the
advantages of the structure formed. It was intended to be a time of showing
a better world, so highly praised during the destruction of the capitalist
order and a demonstration of the successes of the civilising mission. In
practice, that decade turned out to be the end of intensive changes in
structure and only a time during which the authorities kept sustaining their
position (Mokrzycki, 1997, p. 33). It started with turbulent protests,
conflicts and clear manifestations of social discontent. That is why the first
thing that was done was to take control over the revolt of workers.
Afterwards, the authorities attempted modernising the order. It turned out
fruitless and, at the end of that decade, an even greater structural crisis
appeared instead of success examples—which meant a complete rejection
of the existing economic solutions and relations by a large part of society.
However, despite clear signs of failure and the social antipathy towards the
project sustained, the construction of a centralised order was not
abandoned. In fact, while the official objectives were officially followed,
the authorities minded their privileges only. To continue the efforts and
neutralise some of the problems, the authorities adopted the idea of Leonid
Brezhnev regarding the existence of a transitional stage between the
socialism already achieved and the communism to come. That stage was
referred to as “the stage of developed socialist society” (Baczko, 1994, p.
147). Such a solution not only included Brezhnev on the list of thinkers and
creators of communism, but also solved the issue of the timeliness of the
creation of communism. From that moment on, there was no time limit for
waiting for communism to come true.
From the 1970s, changes in social structure were taking place, as if
automatically, as the authorities had neither resources nor capabilities for
the purposeful transformation of the structure (i.e., shifting the position of
further groups in the hierarchy). They lost interest [in the structure] due to
having no more tools that would allow strong interference with its shape.
The reason behind this powerlessness was a major crisis of the order. The
state and party apparatus solved the current conflicts and fought the
opposition, focusing on remaining in power and minding its own economic
interests. At the same time, the crisis increased the number of handicapped
groups and led to the pauperisation of the majority of social groups. In
December 1981, the majority of society considered themselves poor
(Beskid, 1996, p. 35). Numerous studies confirmed the presence of poverty
and material deprivation. In 1982, it was found that 38.2% of Poles lived in
material deprivation, 47.2% had average living conditions, only 9.7% had
good ones and very good were experienced by 4.9% (Beskid, 1985, pp. 68–
69). This and other data confirm that society was not as egalitarian as it
would seem from the ideological and propaganda communications. Poverty
was experienced most by farmers and unqualified workers and least by the
intelligentsia, management apparatus, administration and private owners
(Wnuk-Lipiński, 2014, p. 147).
The institutional and ideological pressure of the authorities to
subordinate all the structural analyses to the Marxist concept was
weakening. Additionally, “starting from the times of the government of the
team of Gierek and Jaroszewicz, the rough form of socialism became a
thing of the past. In its place, an ideological consent to an increase in
income differences appeared” (Heymann, 1998, p. 142). Alternative
theoretical orientations and forms of organising social life started to break
through. The analyses of social structures were torn out of the political
clutches and stopped being an object of systematic manipulation. An
example of that can be the application of the category of a stratum, bolder
references to stratification among scholars and turning away from class
concepts. It was becoming rarer that quasi-functional analyses of structures
(Kolarska-Bobińska & Rychard, 1990, p. 31) had Marxist tones and were
becoming equivalent, alternative explanations of the social structure. The
political changes observed invited the researchers to carry out bolder
studies and used the previously dominant categories to a lesser degree.
The existing structure did not confirm the working class’ dominance
and its significant privileged status. There was not enough evidence that the
workers transformed from an exploited, discriminated and stratified group
into co-owners of means of production and content co-administrators of the
country. Despite reminding them of successes and presenting the
effectiveness of the qualification-raising process, or even public celebration
of new relations, the workers did not see their exceptional position. As
Hanna Świda-Ziemba rightly argued, it was already at the level of
assumption of the communist ideology that the workers were objectified
and incapacitated rather than elevated (1998, p. 207). The conditions of the
working class observed in the 1980s confirmed those ideological
consequences. However, the propaganda communications, as well as some
scientific communication, kept sustaining the thesis of the unique
significance of the workers to the order (Jarosińska & Kulpińska, 1978, p.
160). The workers were presented in a system of two social classes existing
in a friendly relationship: the working class and cooperative farming class,
as well as the stratum of working intelligentsia (Widerszpil, 1974, p. 77). In
propaganda communication, it was still maintained that the societies should
be characterised by unity of interests and that any conflicts and
contradictions are symptoms of pathology (Rychard 1995, p. 69).
A substantial matter for the structure created was its openness (i.e., the
lack of permanent barriers making it difficult for the individuals to move
between the structure’s constituents). The structure was, to a great extent, a
result of the “mobility” forced by the authorities. An example of that can be
the passage of men originating from the blue-collar workers’ group to the
white-collar workers’ group during the years 1950–1954. During this
period, in the beginnings of socialist industrialisation, this mobility was at
its most intense. The processes were characterised well by the outflow of
people from the countryside to other socio-professional groups (Zagórski,
1978, p. 121). During the years 1946–1960, it encompassed over 2.5
million people (Gałęcki, 1965, p. 268). The social revolution started with
“unlocking” the mobility of the farmer population (Zagórski, 1978, p. 16).
Andrzej Paczkowski states that only in the years 1950–1953, over 115,000
people experienced promotion to a management position (1996, p. 231).
That is why “mass promotion” was mentioned in reference to workers, the
said promotion consisting in changing their “position and role without
changing their social affiliation” (Sarapata, 1965: 44). Later, from the
1970s, the promotion channels started to be blocked, and it was getting
harder to notice examples of promotion itself. Władysław Adamski wrote
that: “it was no longer ‘openness’, but ‘blockades’ and closures that
characterised the social structure” (2014a, p. 300). In the 1980s, these
blockades of advancement became one of the factors of erosion of the
ideological order in real socialism (Wesołowski & Mach, 1986). The
privileges stemming from one’s background came back in a new
configuration. Arrested industrial development translated to the inhibition
of horizontal and vertical mobility, which meant that society had nothing
left to expect from the authorities.
The structure formed consisted of the working class, farmer class,
intelligentsia, bourgeoisie and little bourgeoisie (Marek, 1990, p. 273). The
most numerous group in 1970 were workers. Blue-collar workers and their
families constituted nearly half of the country’s population. In 1973,
6,905,000 blue-collar workers were employed in the socialised economy, of
which the largest share was employed in industry—3,656,000, in
construction—879,000 and in transport—680,000 (Anasz & Wesołowski,
1976, p. 48). The workers seemed to be a uniform class. Still, internal
differences were significant, especially to the advantage of those employed
in heavy industry. It is difficult to determine clearly whether the situation of
workers in the “people’s” state had been improved. In reference to the so-
called “old working class” originating from before the war, everything
seemed to indicate that it was not so, while workers from the countryside
had a sense of advancement.
The disappointment towards the forms and amounts of remuneration did
not decrease in the last two decades of the Polish People’s Republic. During
that period, the negative attitude of the party apparatus towards workers
kept growing. They were completely objectified, and the apparatus acted
towards them with disdain, forgetting that it stems from the working class.
The relations between the workers and the party apparatus were
characterised by mutual distrust. Solving social conflicts by force and
throwing armed groups against workers created a gap that was difficult to
bridge. The working class not only turned its back on its creators, but also
threatened them—thus, undermining the whole long-term effort of the
communist revolution. At first, it refused to respect the authorities.
Therefore, the workers directed the denial of the right to exist, previously
regarding the pre-war capitalists and owners and strongly promoted by the
propaganda, against those who “created” them. The workers put an
equation mark between the authorities and the exploiting class: “Since
‘they’ do not respect us, we also have no obligation to adhere to that
principle” (Giza-Poleszczuk 1991, p. 85). The workers did not confirm the
“revolutionary miracle” with their behaviour and actions and did not want
to carry the communist values “on banners”. The split between these groups
was evidenced by the disdain of the nomenklatura towards the workers, and
the final confirmation of it was the formation of “Solidarity” Independent
Self-Governing Trade Union (Polish: Niezależny Samorządny Związek
Zawodowy “Solidarność”) (Pańków, 2010b, p. 62).
Despite actions that continued for many years, the authorities failed to
eliminate private property, which was still present next to the state in many
spheres of the economy, saving the economic order against total
discreditation. Because of that, the demands for immediate elimination of
prywaciarze (private operators) coming from a part of the party and
ideological apparatus sounded even more grotesque. It was them who the
ideologists of the collapsing order fingered as responsible for all kinds of
shortcomings, shortages and the dysfunctional condition of the economy.
They kept upholding the “purity” of the order’s assumptions. The return to
the original ideas was supposed to solve all the problems of the order
(Jarosińska & Kulpińska, 1978, p. 160).
It does not mean that there were no supporters of equality anymore—the
majority of society was still interested in it. That is why the supplies of
goods remaining in the hands of the nomenklatura and private initiatives
generated a sense of injustice. The concept of distributional justice was
accepted. Axiologically, “socialism had been validated” (Rychard, 1995, p.
177). The results of studies regarding the acceptance of the idea of justice
show the changes that took place in a single year—between 1980 and 1981.
It turns out that during that period, socio-political events did not remain
without an impact on the acceptance of egalitarian and efficiency-based
principles. The changes noticed included a decrease in the popularity of
egalitarian principles, lower support for the concept of full employment and
increased support for efficiency-based justice principles—by several
percentage points on average. The downward tendency of the popularity of
egalitarian justice principles was also noticed (Kolarska and Rychard, 1996,
pp. 171–172). In the middle of the 1980s, there was still low acceptance of
social differences, and fighting for the implementation of socially accepted
principles of distributional justice and “market balance” was a fundamental
objective of workers’ activities in 1980 (Kolarska-Bobińska & Rychard,
1990, p. 21). It seems that the ideas of egalitarian equality of income
distribution had become accepted elements of the rejected official ideology
among society. Such anchorages helped the authorities continue
manipulating the fields of conflicts and “moving the main line of conflict
from the authorities-society axis to within society itself” (Kolarska-
Bobińska and Rychard 1990, p. 23). Results of further studies confirmed
that in 1981 an “anti-farmer thinking syndrome” was present due to food
shortages and contemporary propaganda. The natural access of farmers to
the food produced incited anti-farmer attitudes in some of the urban
inhabitants (Jasiewicz & Mokrzyszewski, 1996, p. 80). Those attitudes were
sustained instrumentally, and the disdain towards the countryside
population was intensified.
The situation of farmers in the last two decades of the Polish People’s
Republic had not changed significantly, although the economic changes of
the 1970s led to about 2 million people moving away from the countryside
(Łapińska-Tyszka, 1995, p. 92). The share of the rural population in the
social structure was decreasing systematically until 1990—down to about
38%, where it remained until the end of the next decade. At the beginning
of the 1990s, the countryside was dominated by farmers (46.4%), workers
and service employees (41.1%) and rural intelligentsia (about 12%)
(Halamska, 2016, p. 22). The structure of farm sizes did not undergo any
major changes during that time, similarly to the material situation of
farmers. Farmers’ income was relatively stable due to anchorage in private
property, on the one hand, and unsatisfied demand for agricultural products,
on the other. When it comes to the size of property owned, small private
farms were still the majority and large ones were rare. The fact that farmers
considered land an autotelic value, working on one’s own property and
linking one’s industriousness to the direct standard of living constituted
destructive factors within the order created. They were drawn together by
the aversion towards collectivisation and the idea of taking land away from
them that had been recurring for many years. The issue of collectivisation
was raised until the end of the 1980s (Jarosz & Pasztor, 1995, pp. 29–40).
Some farmers were also making a living out of working in the industry.
Through that, they participated in the dilemmas and problems of workers.
They learned what kind of problem they had but, at the same time, were not
significantly involved in solving them. Working at both farms and factories
significantly limited their activity, such as participation in protests. After
leaving the factory, they went directly to their other job on the small farms
they owned. Such a situation had significant consequences for forming
relations between these two groups. Farmers often took over certain
elements of worker culture and lifestyle, thus leading to decreased distance
between them in practice. With time, both groups had become similar
(Zagórski, 1978, p. 20) in terms of material issues and culture. Workers
from the countryside sustained tradition and emotional relationship with
religion, as well as exhibited patriotism—at the same time having a
negative opinion on the anti-religious and anti-church bearing communist
elite (Styk, 1990, p. 151).
The actions aimed towards eliminating private craftsmanship and
commerce that had been conducted for many years caused tremendous
devastation in this sphere of economy, but did not lead to the complete
elimination of the little bourgeoisie (Szczepański, 1965, p. 37). The
observations and studies carried out in the 1970s and devoted to the
situation of this social stratum confirmed that private initiative still existed
and was of use to the economy. It meant that some entrepreneurs survived
the hardest period of persecution and ideological pressure. Self-employed
people such as craftsmen, traders, small entrepreneurs and “freelancers”
were included among the little bourgeoisie. A characteristic feature of this
stratum was a specific kind of mentality, which was hard to reconcile with
the fundamental assumptions of the order created. Working for one’s own
account and functioning in a system of shortages led to new opportunities
for craftsmen, providing them with incomes higher than those of the
working class, farmers and the intelligentsia. It was reportedly a group with
“very high income, high living standards and aspirations that regarded
material value almost exclusively” (Marek, 1990, p. 271). Undoubtedly, it
was precisely so to a large extent, especially with the other groups having
been subjected to pauperisation. Noticing the advantage of this group in
terms of the material situation meant being aware of one’s own failure and
the efforts made to build social equality. Such incoherence of the order’s
identity reduced its ideological credibility, which is where the demands for
eliminating the little bourgeoisie stratum came from.
In the case of the intelligentsia, what uniformisation of the social
structure meant in practice was building this stratum with a new
composition. It is necessary to remember that since the very beginning of
the formation of the “people’s” state, this stratum had been an object of
interest of communist social engineers. This happened due to pressure and
actions, including a preference for individuals originating from popular
classes in the creation of the intelligentsia. The idea implemented was to
create a stratum having a revolutionary consciousness that was supportive
and obedient towards the authorities and useful to them. The composition of
this stratum was systematically and instrumentally expanded. At first,
people finishing accelerated courses were included in it, and later also
included white-collar workers in management positions at work
establishments. Such actions enabled a controlled expansion of the
composition of the intelligentsia, considering that being granted a position
at a work establishment required acceptance of the bodies of the “workers’
party” (Wasilewski, 1989). It turned out that belonging to the intelligentsia
depended primarily on a decision of the party apparatus. The authorities
underlined its sacrifice and dedication to the new Poland: “In the light of
total degradation of the group’s cultural function, it was argued that in the
existing situation, it had a chance that it had never been given before. For it
was blessed with building the only system in the world that ensures
progress, equality and justice” (Palska, 1994, p. 67). Although the stratum
formed was supposed to be free of any “destructive factors”, its relations
with the authorities were far from harmonious and changed depending on
the crises taking place within the country. It was similar in this aspect to the
creative intelligentsia, which—after a period of fascination with the new
order—exhibited mostly distrust and aversion, especially in the 1980s. It
was when a large part of the intelligentsia avowed itself against the order,
actively supporting the demands and actions of workers.
The statistical data from the early 1970s indicated that over 90% of the
Polish intelligentsia obtained education and vocation in the People’s Poland
(Widerszpil, 1973, pp. 256–257). In 1973, 3,768,000 people declared
themselves as white-collar workers, of whom about 45.8% had secondary
and vocational education, and 16.8%—higher education (Anasz &
Wesołowski, 1976, pp. 50–51). However, the unquestionable social
advancement and increase in numbers of the intelligentsia did not translate
to the improvement of its material situation—it was not a beneficiary of the
changes taking place. The lack of proper remuneration, a sense of injustice,
and having been wronged accompanied the intelligentsia until the last days
of the order. In terms of income, the intelligentsia was actually levelled with
workers and farmers. The statements apparently elevating the intelligentsia,
such as “the intelligentsia and the working people of cities and villages”,
only underlined its proletarianisation. This was confirmed by economic data
(Adamski 2014a, p. 298; Mokrzycki, 1997, p. 41).
Reminding of the condition of fundamental structural elements and
relations between them allows noticing the “successes” of the authorities in
the struggle with inequalities. What also attracts attention is the blurring of
the economic border between workers and other social groups and the
formation of a new income structuralisation. Still, these tendencies also
appeared as a result of the reaction of the authorities to the salary demands
of workers. The order was incapable of introducing new solutions and only
reacted to current events. Meanwhile, the authorities were interested only in
remaining in power. It was the purpose to which they subordinated all their
actions.
The formation of a large community of workers limited their relations
with other groups. They had almost no contact with the intelligentsia
(Babiuch-Luxmoore, 1989), outside of a part of the intelligentsia becoming
involved on the side of the workers fighting for their rights. The workers
built relations with each other at work establishments—it was where they
formed basic bonds, especially in large enterprises (Pańków, 2010b, p. 62).
Their relations focused on production tasks and existential problems. The
contact with apparatus, often low level, was infrequent, limited and official
and stemmed from the performance of employee obligations. Meanwhile,
contact with farmers employed in factories became a part of workers’
relations. An additional plane for contact between workers and farmers was
being formed based on the inflow of food products unavailable in state
distribution from the countryside. Relations based on simple trading were
coming back, but often did not lead to mutual closeness, but even aversion
and lack of understanding. Workers were reluctant to accept product prices
higher than in state-owned stores. Accusations of greed and avarice
appeared, which confirmed that even such an ersatz of the market was an
alien experience to the workers. There were no conflicts between the
structural segments, excluding the nomenklatura since the majority of
society existed at a similar standard of living. These conditions were
reinforced by cultural and religious similarities and the strong integrating
role of the Catholic Church.
Socio-economic problems were growing every decade due to economic
failure of the order. The frequently repeated attempts at overcoming these
difficulties led to even larger crises. Since they wanted to remain in contact
with society, the authorities informed of drawing conclusions for the future
and even admitted making mistakes and indicated those responsible for the
crisis situations. Any suggestions of repairs were kept in the spirit of
maintaining order (i.e., in line with the ideology) and were adjusted for
temporary needs. The authorities kept employing it for all the tasks carried
out, although less orthodoxly. The ideology still remained the justification
for all the reforms implemented, at least in propaganda. Thus, the order
being created resulted from caring for the authorities’ interest, which was
not consistent with any ideological assumptions, but rather relied on forced
compromises, concessions, half-truths and instrumental interpretations and
evaluations.
The actions aiming at liberalising the order, which were a consequence
of the ceaselessly returning crises, did not lead to the changes expected. The
demand for carrying them out was so universal and strong—especially in
the 1980s—that the authorities decided to make the reform of the order, a
part of their official programme, a new ideology. It was reminded that it
would be hard to find anyone standing against the reforms as everyone
officially defined themselves as reformers (Morawski, 1990, p. 90). In the
light of the order being rejected by society, the ideology of reform became a
time-buying strategy of the authorities—which was confirmed, for example,
by it being continued in the form of the so-called “second stage” of the
reform. The economic situation confirmed that no justifications were
required to change the economic system. Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński estimated
that the economic crisis in the late 1980s was experienced by about 60% of
society, while a sense of crisis was foreign to about 12–15% of those
surveyed. The material situation of the latter group was reportedly even
improving (2003, p. 34). That majority was formed by nearly all social
groups, while the one beyond the crisis was the nomenklatura—especially
the high-level apparatus and some of the small entrepreneurs.

The Main Division of the Communist Era:

“Us”–“Them”
Next to economic transformations, the core for uniformising structure and
appearance of non-antagonistic relations was creating a fully open
aspiration realisation path. Limitation or closure of other paths made the
ideologically elevated one the more probable choice. It claimed that
“individual success was achieved within the party-structured collective”
(Kenney, 1997b, p. 291). Without negating ideological motivations (as these
were present too), the main motivations for starting a career within the
political-party apparatus were political pressures, pragmatism and material
and cool-headed calculations. The sources of acceptance for the order were
described using three words: “stupidity, fear, interest” (Hirszowicz, 2001, p.
31). Work establishments and state management bodies were presenting the
benefits for activists supporting the order (Lesiakowski, 2008, p. 74). In this
manner, the structures of the state and the party, including the whole
economic sphere, were filled with individuals “with revolutionary
aspirations”, which were possible to realise together with the “worker’s
party”. Only the official aspirations were considered worthy of realisation.
Although the propaganda described this path as the only right one, the
authorities could not supervise the spheres of family or spiritual life. In
practice, it was possible to conduct social activity, but only on the condition
of staying away from the spheres reserved for the authorities.
With every year, a distance was forming within the structure—a space
of inequality between the party apparatus and the rest of society. Its
formation is presented most clearly by the course of relations between the
workers and the factory management. However, it is not only these relations
that shaped and constituted it, and the factory apparatus was not the only
beneficiary of the order. Many groups supported the order, often simply
being passive in exchange for promotions, stable employment or a sense of
security. According to Hanna Świda-Ziemba, the individuals most devoted
to the order had a farmer background (1990, p. 231), and they appreciated
the advancement received the most. It is estimated that in 1950 there were
almost 150,000 vacant positions in the party apparatus, state apparatus,
social organisations and elected institutions (Paczkowski, 2000, p. 15).
Often, it was an advancement “through shortcuts”, consisting in “assigning”
education to further people in exchange for supporting the order. Another
example can be entering the order-supervising services, ensuring numerous
forms or privileges throughout life, effectively sustaining the loyalty of
whole families. The order was eager to employ people without
qualifications. For example, about 20% of the Security Office employees
did not even have primary education (Paczkowski, 2000, p. 15).
The revolution distributed the goods encompassed by shortages to many
previously excluded groups. Its strength lay not only in values, but also in
its resources for distribution. What turned out to be an important factor was
creating a monopoly for the distribution of these goods—it was
implemented everywhere and then used to gain control (Pańków, 2010b, p.
61). Pluralism was replaced by monopoly, and justice and decency were
replaced by cynicism and support for one’s own group. This regards party
activists, who had guaranteed promotion (i.e., they were transferred from
one position to another despite a lack of competencies). Being related to the
order enabled secure existence, although the sense of security was changing
together with subsequent economic crises of the country.
The privileges had an extensive character. Next to the examples listed
above, the actions directed towards the intelligentsia with pre-war
background during the first post-war years are worth reminding. Their
impact consisted of enabling access to goods, usually food, that were
difficult to obtain. The authorities provided referrals to recreational
locations, assigned flats and provided support in obtaining passports
(Zaremba, 2001, p. 88), as well as helped in satisfying other real-life needs.
Until 1956, the party, military and union apparatuses had been receiving
flats outside of the official distribution, as well as furniture and household
appliances for them, which were used at the expense of the state, and it was
also possible to receive domestic assistance services free of charge. The
apparatus was also assigned free foreign vacations, cars and other rare
goods (Zaremba, 2001, p. 89). Thus, the original distribution of privileges
to the apparatus implementing the new order (i.e., mainly employees of the
ministries of power, militia, state secret services and the military) was later
limited by Władysław Gomułka to a large extent, but was never eliminated
completely. The access to valued positions kept being controlled, and the
privileges were defined instrumentally (Świda-Ziemba, 1998, p. 296).
The top-down distribution of income and goods regulated by the state
was used for managing society. When it was employed for the first time, it
was for the purposes of recruiting the original member resources. During
different periods of the “people’s” state, the strategy of “collective
corruption of the nation” was used, which consisted in “bribing (or rather
neutralising) the social and professional groups potentially dangerous to the
political system using higher salaries and various kinds of privileges”
(Dzwończyk, 2000, p. 37). The intensively reported demands of groups
important to the order modified the goods distribution rules systematically.
Solving conflicts through increased access of certain groups to goods
provided only a temporary moderation of social tensions. It turned out that
it did not eliminate all the tensions and potential conflict areas, but only
postponed their resolution. In the long run, it was only a temporary
improvement in living conditions that brought about even greater crises.
The systems of reward were supplemented with a set of potential
penalties. The privileges assigned could always be taken away, and an
employee could always be dismissed from their assigned job. Deprivation
of privileges constituted a real and frequently employed threat. After 1945,
the people organising strikes in industrial plants were brutally deprived of
their jobs. The possibility of losing employment created a great deal of
uncertainty and anxiety, which made it easier to manage society more
effectively (Domański & Rychard, 1997, p. 14) and keep it obedient. In
view of the expanded and tightened control of the party over the social life,
this often meant tremendous problems—not only in finding work, but also
in the functioning of the family. Employment blockades were applied even
to blue-collar positions. Those particularly defiant, rebellious, insubordinate
and resistant were being deprived of goods, rights, property and freedom
(Karpiński, 2003, p. 42). Any manifestation of glaring disobedience
entailed the application of direct coercion means or even physical
elimination. In order to survive, the order took advantage of criminal
activities during the last two decades of its existence.
The origins of the “us” vs “them” division should be sought in
recruitment to the power apparatus, namely, in the campaigns to this end
that were conducted by the Polish Worker’s Party at work establishments
and among activists involved in installing the order with the use of
violence. The “against us”—“with us” system constituted the beginning of
the division of fundamental hierarchy subordinating and weakening other
hierarchies, which led to the creation of the presence of a new hierarchy in
consciousness, and it was characterised by further inequalities (Styk, 1990,
p. 141). However, this does not mean that it was already possible to talk
about the appearance of the distance between the forming power apparatus
and society. However, this first bond—choosing the side of the order
imposed by force and rejecting democracy—was later difficult to overcome
and “branded” people for their entire life. Few people managed to break
away from this “branding”. Choosing the side of the “people’s” authority
forced defending it further on; the same as defending the point of one’s
involvement or choices made in life. Participation in the elimination of the
pro-independence underground bound to the order more than any ideology
—after committing such deeds, it was impossible to abandon the camp of
the authorities. However, it did not mean unconditional support for the
government in all matters.
The “us” vs “them” division was born at work establishments, where
the relations between the apparatus and the workers were formed and where
both sides’ spheres of hope were rising and falling. At first, both these
groups were united in their desire to launch the factories, and there were no
worldview-related differences between them—so there was “space” for new
relations. In terms of appearances, those taking over the power in the
country did not pay any major attention to matters of religion. Later on, the
differences in beliefs and lack of involvement of the workers in the
ideological activity created distance between these two groups. There was a
vast number of causes of this phenomenon. The workers noticed the lack of
competence among the management, the lack of liability for the property
entrusted, the subordination of staff to the party apparatus and the better
salaries provided by the order. Undoubtedly, other factors influenced the
progressing process of the workers walling themselves off from the party
apparatus at work and the appearance of a gap between them. There is no
shortage of examples confirming the growing distance related to economic
and dignity-related matters.
The order was alienating itself, and its dysfunctional character was
confirmed by further pathologies. This was exemplified by the
incompetence and negligence of the authorities. It was not only the workers
who felt that the state property was being wasted: “The mood at work was
exhausting people horribly - it was sad, neurotic and unproductive” (Świda-
Ziemba 1998, p. 214). The condition of the economy generated a feeling of
pointlessness and absurdity, and “it was not only individual behaviour that
people considered pointless, but their whole lives were also becoming
pointless” (Marody, 1991, p. 221). People noticed that the noble
assumptions and the practice were diverging, that ideology was constantly
put above economic calculation and that propaganda was full of hypocrisy
and falseness. The workers on strike in Łódź (in July 1946) noticed [in the
newspapers] that the contemporary press was describing their actions in a
manner completely inconsistent with the facts. The experiences of this kind
became shared by a large part of society, which noticed the use of lies and
manipulation. The experience of the inconsistency of individual experiences
with the official course of events presented in the propaganda was a
fundamental factor in delegitimising the order and its ideology.
The appearance of the “us” vs “them” dichotomy was facilitated by
actions aimed at eliminating the pre-war divisions. They led to the
disappearance of many inequalities that were previously quite significant,
also through the eradication of capital-holding classes, as well as to
significant levelling of income (Wesołowski, 1965, pp. 118–127;
Wesołowski, 1978, p. 45). The material buying power of the majority of
society became similar, except for people included among the
nomenklatura. The deficiencies of goods made distributing them a
controversial experience, and the total lack thereof in a part of society made
this matter a basis for social conflicts. This led to the appearance of a
persistent discrepancy between the needs and the unsatisfied aspirations.
The authorities made themselves the supervisor over human life through
central management of the economy and access to employment,
gratifications and privileges. By controlling the means of production, they
cared for the realisation of their own needs. The economy became a tool of
the authorities, and they treated it as if it was their property.
The nomenklatura consisted of state officials, members of central
bodies of the communist party and the lower-level party apparatus obedient
to them and completely dependent on them, as well as any people that were
considered useful and enjoying the trust of the party. The staff in structures
of security and diplomacy and in high positions in the economy, military
and public administration “were also included among the nomenklatura”.
A characteristic part was the so-called “keys”, according to which people
were designated for a few hundred thousand positions at the central,
provincial, urban, district and communal levels, or in different spheres of
functioning of the state and its institutions (Gilejko and Jędrzejko, 2008, pp.
18–19). According to the participants of the strikes of the 1980s, the
nomenklatura included people in medium- and high-level positions, starting
with the department manager in large enterprises and institutions, through
officers of the field apparatus of the political and administrative authorities,
and ending with central bureaucracy, including its entities, subject to the
formal procedure of more or less democratic elections (Adamski, 2014b, p.
26). They all became a party distributing the goods, forming a structure
with quasi-class features in the “us” vs “them” social hierarchy. In the
1970s, the domination of the nomenklatura became politically formalised
through the introduction of the order to vote on a single-party list
(Staniszkis, 1983, p. 332).
Social inequalities were evolving in the direction of two poles.
According to the terminology later, almost all the segments of the structure
—except the nomenklatura—were marginalised. Included among many
confirmations of the occurrence of this division is the finding that the
composition of the structure that was presented for many years did not
reflect its true form and did not take into account its two levels—referred to
using the “us” and “them” categories. They created a vertical hierarchy
identical to the fundamental differences. In turn, the horizontal differences
on both sides did not translate significantly to the everyday life of
individuals. However, some of them were purposefully underlined in order
to hide the position of the nomenklatura. The actual inequalities were
hierarchical (Wnuk-Lipiński, 2008, p. 60). The antagonisms within the
contemporary classes were limited, and it was not them that caused
recurring crises. The crises resulted from the subordination of social classes
and strata to the nomenklatura class (Adamski, 2014a, p. 297), and it was
exactly this inequality that “reflected” the fundamental “fracture” in the
social structure (i.e., the dichotomous opposition).
What led to opposition to the nomenklatura was the long-lasting
experience of exclusion, entering into unequal social relations with that
class and observing its actions or methods for solving crises. What also
contributed to it was observing how the official ideology was implemented
because the equality and justice in line with the principle of “to each
according to their contributed effort” was non-existent. The one actually
applied was “to each according to their usefulness and helpfulness to the
authority” (Giza-Poleszczuk, 1991, p. 87). In a situation of a lack of goods,
the mode of distributing them became symbolic. Had there been more
goods, the privileges of the authorities would have incited weaker emotions:
“The system provided material profits and symbolic recognition to its
officers, activists and supporters, while bringing losses, the threat of
repression and actual repressions to its opponents and enemies”
(Grabowska, 2004, p. 120).
A consequence of the existing blocks was the segmentation of the
labour market into two dimensions: political and economic, thus confirming
the existence of fundamental social dominations. The distribution of goods
“to each in equal share” was supposed to be an instrument for righting the
wrongs. Instead, it became a confirmation of power and domination. The
existing blocks led, in the 1980s, “to the near-complete vanishing of
professional competencies as a criterion for appointment to positions
important from the point of view of the whole society’s interest” (Gilejko &
Jędrzejko, 2008, pp. 18–19). Maintaining the mechanism of recruitment to
the nomenklatura was a way of sustaining the inequalities. Having a
position in the structure of the party and the totalitarian state constituted a
confirmation and certificate of having the right awareness, intellectual
superiority and competitive advantage and having chosen the path of social
progress. The propaganda assigned positive characteristics to the
nomenklatura, which was supposed to consist of responsible people ready
to make sacrifices, the elite of society. These opinions were consistent with
how the nomenklatura imagined itself. The results of studies from the years
1984–1985 also showed that, in comparison to people who were not party
members, the Polish United Workers’ Party members had a better opinion
about their own financial situation, evaluated the achievements of the Polish
People’s Republic positively and considered it a democratic state, allowed
the possibility of the authorities limiting civil liberties “for higher purposes”
and believed that the Catholic Church was not entitled to speak about
political matters (Grabowska, 2003, p. 172).
The post-war studies on the transformation of the social structure
focused mainly on the working class, the farmer class and the intelligentsia.
For a long time, they included neither the private initiative nor the arising
nomenklatura. The studies did not consider elements testifying to the
privileges of the latter. This was confirmed by Jacek Wasilewski when, in
1981, he underlined that the “edge” categories—less numerous but present
at the “extreme” or “intermediate” structural locations—received very little
attention. His studies of the social and professional careers of 282 high-
level directors in Warsaw, aged 30–40, confirmed the impact of politics on
the positions held. About 75% of the directors studied began their
professional activity while working in the party (PZPR) organisations or
youth wings of the party. As many as 40% of the directors came from
intelligentsia families, 20% from farmer families and the rest from families
that could be considered worker families (1981). The study results listed
may constitute an attempt at describing a part of the party-state, low-level
apparatus forming the foundations of the “bureaucratic nomenklatura”
(Pańków, 2010a, p. 209).
 In 1979, Stefan Nowak noticed a conflict between the world of
communist institutions, alienated and unfriendly (“them”), and the
individuals participating in the life of these institutions (“us”) (1979, pp.
155–173). The existence of the nomenklatura was confirmed by further
studies regarding the significance of socio-political divisions and
evaluations of social conflicts. In the Polacy ‘84 studies, as much as 56.7%
of respondents stated that they noticed the presence of conflict within
society. The imaginations of that conflict were placed in the following
relations by the people surveyed: a) government—society (43.8%); b) city
—countryside (12.1%); c) government—opposition (9.2%); d) party
members—non-members (5.8%); e) government—workers (5.5%). Thus,
the majority of the people surveyed placed the conflict within the scope of
society’s relation with the authorities (Markowski, 1990, pp. 23–24). It was
defined in the form of a conflict between the authorities, understood as the
governing party-state apparatus, and society, perceived as the whole of
those who, willingly or not, were subordinated to these authorities (Szawiel,
2003, p. 267). The above examples confirmed the existence of the “us” vs
“them” division, which became fixed in the social consciousness at the end
of the 1970s (Jarosz, & Kozak, 2008, p. 289). In the 1980s, that division
was more visible because the party-political apparatus was fighting to
maintain its privileged place in the order. In 1984, the majority of the
people surveyed also had a sense of the existence of the conflict between
“us” and “them” and defined it in the categories of conflicting interests
between the authorities and the rest of society (Jasiewicz & Adamski, 2014,
p. 173).
The division discussed existed already in previous years, but there was
silence about it—and it was not defined using the “us” vs “them”
categories. The strict control of the regime over all the spheres of life was
an obstacle to the “us/society” vs “them/authorities” categories appearing in
the discourse, but they were present in the consciousness (Świda-Ziemba,
2010, p. 7). It can be traced back to the first feelings of individuals that the
authority imposed after 1945 is foreign and does not represent the interests
of society. Informing of it would mean admitting the lack of legitimacy of
the authorities. It was hidden that the majority of society refused to
legitimise the authorities and expressed a lack of consent to their further
privileges. An example of such “useful” interpretations of the situation may
be the statement that the dispute in Poland was actually taking place
between the bureaucrats and technocrats and the rest of society
(Markowski, 1990, p. 15), thus casting the blame on a part of the
nomenklatura without defining those guilty specifically.
The greatest confirmation of the division was the protests and behaviour
of workers. They were not exhibiting appropriate ideological dedication,
not appreciating the long-standing efforts of the authorities and refusing to
be the basis for the authorities. “To the contrary, the workers, organised
against this apparatus despite having been created in a sense by the
communist state, first became its dangerous opponents and then, in the long
run, the diggers of its grave” (Pańków, 2010b, p. 62). The workers and
students initiated protests, strikes and rebellions. In the 1980s, the
authorities considered them “an obstacle”—the removal of which from the
road was a condition for implementing the reforms that meant staying in
power. A consequence of the fear and sense of danger was the authorities’
choice to focus on the policy of force and increased supervision, which took
the form of martial law in 1981. Its imposition dispelled any remaining
illusions regarding the party, humiliated the central management of the
economy and society and led to the completion of the mutual split. Both
sides “subscribed” to the division of the communist times.
With the passage of time, all the veils concealing the actual relations
were falling, and the true image of the role of the nomenklatura was
becoming clear. It was exactly the “way the apparatus of a state – calling
itself a ‘worker’s’ and ‘socialist’ state – handled the popular, authentically
worker-based movement and labour union left no one with any doubts (…)”
(Pańków, 2010b, p. 64). Only two actors remained on the stage of events:
the authorities and society (Morawski 1990, p. 78). “Solidarity” became a
mighty, institutionalised and fully alternative channel of articulation of
society’s demands—especially during the first stage of the movement’s
existence. It took large swathes of public space away from the authorities
which controlled them before, and it was a significant part in view of it
being intended for everyone (Gilejko & Jędrzejko, 2008, p. 18). The
movement organised protests against the order but, to many individuals, it
became a generational form of participating in the public sphere (Wnuk-
Lipiński, 2003, p. 50). Thanks to its rise, society was becoming the main
actor of change, a mass and collectivist entity experiencing national unity
and confirming the formation of a uniform society. The nation was elevated,
and “us” meant the community united around common values, demanding a
change of the order and capable of opposing the totalitarian authorities
together (Gilejko & Jędrzejko, 2008, pp. 18–19).
It was not the “us” vs “them” division that led to the growth of social
conflicts and the appearance of protests and strikes. The intensity of these
phenomena resulted primarily from increasing inequalities between society
and the authorities, the experience of continuous decline of the economic
situation, the unfair, arbitrary distribution of goods in a situation of constant
shortage thereof, and discrimination of and transferring the costs of the
crises to classes that had already been deprived of privileges. The loss of
hope, the experience of the inefficiency of the “command” economy, the
lack of goods and the refusal to give freedom to society generated recurring
conflicts. It was the deepening distance and the lack of security that marked
the intensity of subsequent conflicts. This was related to the decline of
consumption during the years 1980–1982 (Marody, 1991, p. 234) and the
fact that acute economic deprivation became commonplace (Wnuk-
Lipiński, 2003, p. 18). On the other hand, with social security being at the
lowest level and full employment being fiction, both these things were
losing their significance.
The long-lasting social conflict took the form of the “us” vs “them”
opposition, which included all the wrongs and injustices of the Polish
People’s Republic period (Wnuk-Lipiński, 2003, p. 17). Other inequalities
between classes or strata, including the existing socio-professional
hierarchies, did not generate any major conflicts. The main inequality arose
around conflicting interests, access to power and goods, participation in
order-sustaining mechanisms and denial of respect. The division was
complemented by the egoism of the authorities and their disdain towards
the working class, farmer class and everyone who demanded freedom and
personal dignity. Disdain towards those who demanded truth, honesty and
morality. What can serve as confirmation of these asymmetric relations is
the social evaluation of the social coexistence sphere present in the second
half of the 1980s. Contemporary social relations were characterised using
the evaluation of “ailments of everyday life”, among which the dominant
one was “mutual unfriendliness among people”. A part of them was the
evaluation of relations with the better-situated groups. The attitude of the
administration towards the citizens was evaluated negatively by 72.7% of
the people surveyed, and the attitude of the superiors towards their
subordinates—by 68.5% (Giza-Poleszczuk, 1991, pp. 74–75). In other
studies conducted in the middle of the 1980s, 70% of the people surveyed
believed that the officials and representatives of the authorities were
insensitive to the people’s suffering (Borowski et al., 1985, pp. 94–108). At
the same time, those surveyed were noticing that some groups—the
intelligentsia and people holding major positions—“looked down” on other
social groups and exhibited “arrogance” (Narojek, 1980). In the 1970s, the
scholars friendly towards the authorities underlined that “elimination of
antagonistic classes from the social life does not mean eliminating the
hazard of social inequalities arising” (Malanowski, 1976, p. 374)—and that
was exactly what happened, although in an arrangement different from the
one they anticipated.
The members of the party apparatus were also losing hope, as
confirmed by a huge number of members leaving the Polish United
Workers’ Party at the beginning of the 1980s. Fear, frustration and terror
were growing among the nomenklatura people, and they started associating
the contemporary crisis with a “total threat to everything – careers,
privileges, values cherished and, according to some of them, even their own
lives and the lives of their family members” (Tarkowski, 1994, s. 89). Such
despair arose even before the martial law (Rakowski 1991, p. 49), but had
its climax in the second half of the 1980s. The nomenklatura started
questioning the profits they were receiving, noticing at the same time the
growing cost of their long-standing support for the order.
A confirmation of the objective interests of the nomenklatura were the
decisions of Prime Minister Mieczysław F. Rakowski, enabling the creation
of new companies and “self-enfranchisement” of the party apparatus by
taking advantage of the state property in the 1980s. During that decade,
social support for private ownership was growing rapidly (Kolarska-
Bobińska, 1989). The objective of the political actions of Rakowski’s
government was maintaining the privileged position and reducing the
discontent among some of the party activists. The Act on Certain
Conditions of Consolidation of the National Economy of 24 February 1989
enabled the taking over the state property and the banking sector property
by private individuals by way of rent or lease, or contribution of state
property to a company. “This meant that the local party elites could create
for themselves the conditions allowing them to survive the great change in a
decent financial situation and with prospects for the future. Thus, a ‘side
effect’ of this reform was the enfranchisement of the nomenklatura, who
committed themselves to the private sector, creating arrangements that were
often informal” (Materska-Sosnowska, 2009, p. 119). The said act enabled
“nomenklatura-based privatisation”, (i.e., establishing “nomenklatura
companies”) where the state property served private individuals, usually
heads of enterprises (Karpiński, 2001, p. 53). Examples of privatised
companies appeared already in 1987. The propaganda presented the
privatisation of this kind as a purposeful economic strategy. In practice, it
was about transforming “a part of the political capital held into economic
resources” (Tomescu-Dubrow, 2017, p. 294).
Therefore, society was dominated by the conviction that limiting the
impact of the nomenklatura and the people managing the enterprises on the
common property will be a fundamental part of the economic changes. The
management of the economy was supposed to be taken over by a new
stratum of people characterised by high competencies (Jasiecki, 2010, p.
89). People believed that meritocratic principles would become the basis of
the new order and that the political anchorages would become a thing of the
past. It was supposed to be different than after 1945, when equality had also
been promised but what was created in practice was a bureaucratic class
that was inconsistent with “socialist democracy with the participation of the
masses” (Pańków, 2010a, p. 209). The postulates listed were fitting the final
overcoming of the “us” vs “them” division and were also supposed to be a
confirmation of the values of the democratic order and free market.
However, the resources and “advantages” formed during the Polish People’s
Republic period were kept and sustained and made the basis for forming a
democratic order. Some of the nomenklatura quickly found a “soft landing”
in the neoliberal order and transformed their political capital into economic
one (Wnuk-Lipiński 2003, p. 100), taking advantage of resources
accumulated: (Grabowska 2004, p. 60). Since a great deal of these
resources was transferred to the new order, it also led to transferring of the
“us” vs “them” division.

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© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023
P. Borowiec, The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26530-3_4

4. The Second Experiment: The

Differentiation of the Social Structure
Piotr Borowiec1
(1) Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Jagiellonian
University, Kraków, Poland

Piotr Borowiec
Email: piotr.borowiec@uj.edu.pl

Ideological and Economic Reasons for Interfering

with the Structure, and the Patterns of That
Interference
The change that began in 1989, usually referred to as the transformation,
has been discussed in numerous publications. Thus, there is no need to
retell the whole course or character thereof. Presented below are only
selected aspects regarding ideological, economic or structural changes
significant for explaining the social divisions.
What kind of society was inherited after 45 years of the communist
experiment, then? In the class-based approach, it had the privileged
nomenklatura, which meant it consisted of two classes. According to the
results of scientific studies available, it was economically poor, statist,
relatively homogeneous in terms of the set of dominating values and filled
with pride in the “collectivist victory” achieved. The collective community
coming out of communism was evaluated negatively for many years. It
constituted an object of disappointment, particularly to the neoliberal social
engineers, ideologists and some scientists, blaming that inherited mentality
for the failure of reforms.
 At the same time, it was a society united mainly around patriotic,
national, religious and family ideas, ready for further sacrifices. It remained
pro-egalitarian while accepting at the same time the appearance of
differences in income and consenting to the appearance of inequalities
(Dzwończyk, 2000, p. 64), albeit within a limited range. In 1988, study
results showed that 80% of the people surveyed approved the introduction
of market mechanisms and 30% were even willing to accept unemployment
(Kolarska-Bobińska, 2014, p. 196). The consent to inequalities stemmed
from the fact that they were supposed to result from the competencies,
efforts and skills of individuals. The majority of society was open towards
building a new order although, at the same time, it had little idea what
economic differentiation meant and what all of its consequences would be.
Claiming that society was entirely homogeneous after 1989 has no
grounds, but it is true that it had gone far on the path to such a condition. It
experienced homogenisation in many aspects of life, functioning for many
years in line with the models forced upon it that led to identicalness or
similarity. Such an opinion was also strongly influenced by observation of
everyday life, the formulas used to describe it, the ubiquitous greyness, the
common model of population behaviour, the ways of spending free time
and the availability of the same kinds of entertainment. Homogeneity
manifested in “relative similarity of consumption patterns, low quality of
accommodation, poor household equipment and shabby appearance of
stores and restaurants” (Hamilton & Hirszowicz, 1995, p. 195). The cultural
and social unification was dominant, although differences in many of the
spheres of life mentioned above were also noticeable.
The differences present resulted from the unequal access to power that
had existed for many years, control over the distribution of certain goods
and supervision over the distribution of prestige sources. Indeed, society
deprived the nomenklatura of the last of the above, assigned it to private
initiative and looked with jealousy at the business people. After 1989, no
major economic differences were visible, although the ownership structure
was not uniform and wholly state-owned. The majority of society
experienced poverty. Increases in possession of material goods were
incidental and usually took place after social protests, which additionally
exposed the existing subordination. This social condition was presented by
Malcolm Hamilton and Maria Hirszowicz, who wrote that society had been
nearly completely proletarianised (Hamilton & Hirszowicz, 1995).
Uniformity was dominant in terms of race, ethnicity and religion. There
were nearly no ethnic minorities or immigrants. Such a structure resulted
from many years of uniformisation and the conviction that social uniformity
was conducive to remaining in power, in line with the assumptions of the
Marxist-Leninist ideology.
It was precisely this kind of society that experienced another social,
economic and political experiment, another change of revolutionary nature
and dominance of another ideology over various spheres of life (Janicka &
Wesołowski, 1997, p. 96). It experienced a long-lasting transition from
communism to pluralism and formation of a democratic political system
(Sadowski, 2010, p. 33) that was supposed to ensure participation in the
order to all the parties interested according to their choices and individual
capabilities. Once again, it participated in simultaneous dehierarchisation
and hierarchisation of the social structure.
The fact that the consciousness of a large part of society involved
positioning itself in opposition to communism defined the attractiveness of
alternative, liberal visions of the order. The “kneeling” before liberalism
would not be so severe if it were not for the conviction that the fall of
communism had finally resolved centuries-old historical dilemmas. The
circulated thesis of the end of history strengthened the faith in the history of
“having made a choice” and there being no alternative to liberalism. What
was manifested was the feeling of historical triumph and having the support
of the aforementioned history’s decisions. Additionally, geopolitical
arrangements and conditions advantageous to liberalism arose in this part of
the world. The situation in which liberalism found itself is described
perfectly by the later words of Zygmunt Bauman: “The absence of a real
enemy personifying a real alternative is the true Achilles’ heel of the
victorious, triumphant and unrestrained capitalism” (2005, pp. 112–113).
Choosing the free market was so obvious that the changes were also
referred to metaphorically as “the return to normalcy”. The idealistic vision
of the West that had been created over the years turned out to have no
alternatives and was additionally intensively sustained by the neoliberals.
No internal contradictions, fields of conflict or possibilities of new
inequalities were noticed within it. In practice, the decision to return to
capitalism was made by society even earlier, after it experienced decades of
failure of the order of the “people’s” state.
 The victory of capitalism over communism captured the imagination. It
was a powerful force of ideological and political influence that made
neoliberal solutions more obvious because it was also assigned a moral
dimension—the triumph of good over evil. Meanwhile, neoliberalism
received nearly the status of another perfect ideology leading to the
“modernisation” of life and to social progress. The moral advantage was
highlighted, and it was ceaselessly reminded that it was the order of
freedom that became victorious. The moral elements were employed
intensively to impose solutions stabilising the economic system (Pyszczek,
1995, p. 20). Such an approach provided some elites with political
advantage at the beginning of reforms and the peace necessary for
implementing them. It was also a part of social engineering used to avoid
discussions regarding the shape of reforms, among others. In a controlled
debate, criticism was nearly impossible. The domination of ideology was
imposed—firstly at the level of economic solutions, but later attempts were
also made to do this at the cultural level. The infatuation with the new
ideology significantly limited the influx of reliable knowledge, including
alternative visions of economic solutions.
The first economic solutions implemented were free from criticism,
confirmed by the analysis of scientific papers, political programmes and
political discourse of the early 1990s. No one listened to the few
representatives of the former ruling party’s high-level apparatus who
rejected the free market. Radical transformations were wrapped in the
metaphor of “shock therapy”, suggesting quick emergence of the target
condition and limitation of duration of painful consequences. However,
both the economic programme of the “Solidarity” Independent Self-
Governing Trade Union and the economic arrangements of the Round Table
(Główczyk, 2002, pp. 54–58) were left out. It was recognised that creating
“capitalism without capitalists and without private capital” (Jasiecki, 2002,
p. 287) was possible but required a lot of time, social sacrifices and
extensive transformations on the part of the state. The few differing
concepts were silenced or pushed outside of the public discourse. For these
reasons, there was “no sensible alternative” (Oblicki, 1989, p. 13) to the
programme implemented as other economic solutions were excluded. For
example, the interventionism of Keynesian economics was associated with
the command economy of the previous system. This process was
summarised excellently by Witold Morawski, who wrote in 1992 that an
ideologisation of social life took place, and the “neoliberal orthodoxy
prevailed” (1993, p. 5).
The economic changes took place in two ways—first, the economic
system was stabilised and then solutions from capitalist countries started to
be copied. The general objective was to recreate the market economy.
Copying was made a method of achieving a free market—it was supposed
to be enough to transfer the templates to increase the chances of success. It
was standard practice to refer to existing templates—this process was
referred to as the implementation of liberal institutions (Bukraba-Rylska,
2004, p. 159). The “copying machine” was operated by a neoliberal
convert, which is why private ownership was introduced everywhere,
irrespective of the public interest or economic balance. Prior to that, some
of the work establishments were driven to collapse even though it would
have been possible to keep developing them by employing the previously
applied form of ownership combined with subsidising or restructuring. A
similar rapture was caused by the foreign capital, which resulted in its
dominance in the banking, commercial and media sectors. Many years were
required to notice that advanced democracies often willingly limit the
access of foreign entities or private capital to many sectors of their market
such as the banking or media sector. The thoughtless copying was justified
by the intent to catch up with the West, ensure quick modernisation and
become similar to progressive societies, which is why references were made
to dreams typical of lagging peripheral regions (Krasnodębski, 2005, p. 19).
Thus, the domination of neoliberalism was sustained for over three
decades and a part of it stemmed from the conviction that private property
is the best choice and the non-personal mechanism of the market (even
while the market was being formed) was an oracle. Such views were
referred to on any occasion by nearly all the groups in power. “Soulless”
measures, such as the rate of growth per citizen, were employed as the
bases for evaluations, and not only economic ones (Bugaj, 2010, p. 28).
They were used for measuring the effectiveness of management and social
transformations. Strengthening these measures meant subordination to
neoliberalism, which was reinforced using “neospeak” language, new
clichés such as “market”, “competition”, “economic growth”, “GDP
increase”, “middle class”, etc.). The new “spells” found their place in the
language of ethics, science and politics.
 When presenting the reform as an alternative to communism, a
reference to justice was made again. This time the message spread was that
the differences and hierarchies present were just, and the inequalities were
justified as they came from differences in talent, effort and competencies,
making the reform almost an embodiment of perfect equality. The
neoliberal market was considered “the only measure of the value of labour,
production, consumption and ways of spending free time” (Turowski, 2009,
p. 135), while the accelerated “production” of inequalities was dressed in
the robes of justice. What was introduced was one of the catchy liberal
“fairy tales” about everyone having equal opportunities. It did not matter
that a part of society already had certain social capital, many security
measures and a privileged position at its disposal. The resources were not
equal at the starting point, even though some people did believe that the
starting conditions were equal for everyone (Polska, 2011, p. 13).
After two decades of transformation, when writing about economic
actions, it was claimed that the Balcerowicz Plan did not have any
particularly original features. It actually constituted a certain variety of the
traditional “adjustment programme” that the International Monetary Fund
applied in the countries whose economies found themselves in a state of
macroeconomic destabilisation. However, an important difference consisted
of the fact that, in that instance, it was used with regard to an economy that
was rebuilding its political system rules at the same time (Bugaj, 2010, p.
22). It was noticed that next to the initial social approval, the economic
changes also received the support of international institutions and the
backing of Western advisers, the “capitalism consultants” (Jarosz, 2004, p.
48). They were carried out with the approval of international organisations
and under the pressure of domestic and foreign economic experts (Pańków,
2010, pp. 67–68), as well as with the support of governments of the Western
countries.
After launching the stabilisation programme, the suppressed demand led
to a sudden decrease in production and a shocking surge in prices, the
control over which was relinquished in January 1990. The actual income
and living standards of a large part of society kept decreasing. The
liberalising actions aimed at opening the economy to the world led to the
collapse of many enterprises. While it brought about an improvement in
supply, leading to the store shelves being filled with goods and thus
enabling access to basic articles, these products were not available to the
majority of society because of their high prices. The bankrupting companies
did not pay taxes, which led to the worsening of the national budget
problems and a deepening of the deficit. The crises in public services—
education, science and health care—were growing bigger (Sadowski, 1994,
pp. 12–13). In 1990, Poland experienced hyperinflation (the annual
inflation rate achieved +639.6% in 1989), while the foreign debt was 42.3
billion USD (which constituted 64.8% of GDP, according to the Central
Statistical Office). Major market deficiencies were present, and the
economy was under threat of collapse. Within three years, the
unemployment rate reached 20%, which meant from 1.5 to 2 million people
in absolute numbers (Pańków, 2010, p. 68).
The fast top-down actions were supposed to increase the effectiveness
of changes and were also supposed to lead to quick “catching up with the
West” (Leszczyński, 2013). In Western countries, the market system had
been formed for many years, spontaneously and in a bottom-up manner. In
the Polish case, the state created the market using top-down actions.
Through the application of statism and strong interventionism, the state was
depriving itself of ownership, control and supervision over the economy
(Pańków, 1990, p. 6). Its supervision over the changes was significant. In
particular, when a major part of society was withdrawing its approval for
the continuation of changes, the government continued the reforms in the
direction taken. The political elites decided in detail who was to receive the
tremendous capital accumulated during the Polish People’s Republic period.
The politicians were deciding who would be invited to form the economy,
also through the privatisation of work establishments. They, therefore,
indirectly formed the structure of not only ownership, but also privileges
(Heymann, 1998, p. 141).
The state, which was practically supervising the building of the market,
was given the task of self-limitation, supporting pluralism and neutrality,
guarding the rule of fair competition and remaining outside of the ongoing
ideological and political disputes. The state was supposed to become the
guardian of the rights of individuals and enable self-realisation for
everyone, irrespective of their views. It was underlined that the limitation of
the state’s tasks should have no impact on the realisation of the fundamental
tasks reserved for it exclusively. The tasks important to society were to be
realised in spite of the liquidation of a part of state structures and lesser
entitlements of the authorities, in line with the principle of the liberal
doctrine. At least those were the elements and tasks of the state that were
referred to in the discourse.
The new dominant ideology perceived society in a way other than the
communist one did. It recognised it as a sum of individuals, rejected the
collectivist approach and failed to recognise any group values or egalitarian
distribution of goods. It looked with aversion at the majority groups and
rejected the previously implemented collectivist and centralist form of
living. It believed in the unlimited capabilities of individuals to change the
world, trusted individuals and clearly focused on them. It enabled
individuals to realise their personal objectives and focus on individual
ambitions (Smolar, 2008, p. 63), introducing a new hero into the arena of
Polish history—homo oeconomicus, having a wide array of rights at their
disposal, ready to make rational choices, searching for their own originality
and ready to establish and realise new identities. The neoliberal ideology
promoted the concept of an autonomous hero, existing beyond any social
and historical context and treating society only as a tool for satisfying their
own needs (Szacki, 1999, p. 15). A hero who was not attaching themselves
long to any territory, fixed value or community, who practised individual
freedom—according to Isaiah Berlin—in both a “negative” and “positive”
sense thereof. This attitude became the basic guideline for the individual
(Berlin, 2000, pp. 183–239). Anything expanding their capabilities was
considered good, while any obstacles on their path were to be eliminated.
The good and happiness of the individual formed the main part of the
ideological framework. Property disposal was intended to be a common,
egalitarian experience. The faith in the capability of human beings to have
control over their own fate and to shape the conditions in which they live
their life was sustained intensively.
Abandoning the previously questioned model of work and effort
towards the common good was supposed to “extract” the individualism that
had been suppressed for many years. The individual was only offered to
focus on their own interest, egoism and particularism and take advantage of
their surroundings for their own gain to the widest extent possible. At the
same time, success became the measure of the individual’s value, impacting
what was good and just. The individual was assigned exclusive
responsibility for their life (Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, 1998, p. 221), and they
were supposed to “pave” their own path towards privileged positions, where
privileges resulted from their merits. This is how the foundations of justice
were defined anew. The neoliberal consciousness dominated the perception
of common good. Public matters were forced into oblivion, especially in the
light of continuous demands to limit the tasks of the state. It needs
reminding that such an affirmation of unrestrained individualism entailing a
lack of interest in any common good was far removed from the ideas
preferred by Solidarity, which fought for subjectivity in public life in the
collective dimension (Magoska, 2005, p. 64).
The limitation of the significance of communality after 1989 was
challenging in view of the elevation of the idea of the nation during the
communist period and the existence of strong communities—national,
religious and familial, strengthened with a sense of victory over
totalitarianism. These conditions were what decisively determined the issue
of communality and separation after 1989. They automatically found
themselves—not due to fault of their own—“on the path” of the expanding
neoliberal ideology. It turned out exceptionally quickly that the post-
communist, homogeneous society did not resemble the diverse and
colourful creation that neoliberalism had expected. The communities that
denied the nomenklatura its privileged place within the structure found
themselves in a similar predicament. Due to ideological reasons, they
became a threat to the realisation of the above-listed objectives of the new
order. The assumption that every vision of community life adopted by
individuals was equal increased the criticism towards models suggesting
subordination to national, religious or family values. Dominating identities
and forms of living typical for them started to be undermined as they stood
in the way leading to the maximisation of individual objectives. More and
more often, collectivist communities were placed in opposition to
individualism, freedom and democracy, even at the expense of “shaking”
the social cohesion sustained by majority values.
A conviction was promoted that the inherited “collective” mentality
(Mokrzycki, 1991), traditionalism or egalitarianism constituted a hazard to
the reforms implemented. The attachment to communities allegedly blocked
undertaking business activity, and strong anchorage in family or nation
stood in the way of practising individualism and taking responsibility for
one’s own fate. Thus, it was said to block the social processes of
differentiation. For these reasons, the individual was supposedly forced to
re-evaluate their attitude towards religion, national or family bonds. It was
claimed that individuals “need to make choices between life strategies that
did not exist during communist rule” (Domański, 1994, pp. 256–257). It is
impossible to understand why entrepreneurship would be in conflict with
seeking support in family or neighbourhood. Even the simple observations
of how small private companies arise show the role of family, friends and a
certain social capital in their formation and functioning. Focusing solely on
careers and the realisation of individual objectives weakens communal
bonds, but they are not an obstacle to entrepreneurship. On the contrary,
they strengthen it—as confirmed by the whole sector of family companies
formed before and after 1989.
The new dominant ideology rejected the decisive part of communist
values (Morawski, 2001, p. 9) while remaining in preference of some other,
but defining them differently. The distribution of goods stopped being
subject to social control and no longer meant “to each equally”. Justice was
seen in equality of rights and chances—everyone was to receive the same
chance of obtaining social standing, development and gratification. It was
combined with the rule that remuneration for work should be related to
personal qualifications and efforts. Everyone was offered the rules of
meritocratic justice (Skarżyńska, 2005, p. 95). It was reminded that the true
equality of chances did not exclude major inequalities in terms of income
(Domański, 2000, p. 160). Hierarchies were to be created according to
merits, and top positions were intended for those more capable, industrious
and educated. When promoting these principles and values, the costs of
reforms were also mentioned. It was argued that justice would be the rule
for distributing these costs throughout the whole society, which constituted
one of the symbolic protective shields of the reforms. It was even claimed
that the market would contribute to the increase in the welfare of the whole
society. Unfortunately, it was never mentioned that economic growth would
generate growing inequalities (Domański, 2000, pp. 23, 89).
With every passing year, the evaluation of the actions of those creating
the free market was subjected to growing criticism. The fairness of
conditions that contributed to the founding basis of the free market was
questioned. In 1995, Jacek Kurczewski defined this beginning as the
“distribution of ownership titles among the participants of the social game”
and evaluated this period as follows: “it is true that everyone participates in
the war for power, ownership and property, but the chances were not equal
at the start and that inequality keeps reminding of itself every once in a
while – with a sense of injustice on one side and arrogance on the other”
(1995). Claiming that the basis for new ownership structures was a
“distribution of ownership” is justified to a large extent, just as much as
reminding that every revolution is based distribution and rewards the hosts
of its activists and supporters. For years, there were not enough arguments
to consider privatisation fair, and it was not justified by the forms of
socialisation of ownership, privatisation carried out among employees or
the sale of property to foreign capital with a transfer of the funds received
to the state budget for social purposes. The privatisation among employees
helped those employees in the short-term but, in the long term, it worsened
their difficult situation as it meant separating them permanently from access
to capital.

Problems with Structure, Waiting for the

Formation of the Middle Class
Despite the provision of existential safety at the basic level, the uncertainty
that appeared prior to 1989 was a traumatic experience for many people.
However, the reality conditions caused by the reforms decisively exceeded
the previous sense of temporariness, danger, anxiety and fear. It was only
then that a part of society learned what the lack of a sense of security really
meant, especially in legal or economic aspects. The disintegrating and
inefficient state confirmed the sense of temporariness. Such tendencies were
deepened by a noticeable lack of projects or ideas for building new
institutions, a lack of effective programmes of the continuation of changes
and the realisation that the people governing the country and introducing
the reforms had no control over them. They failed those who trusted them
and did not know the purpose of change and when it would be achieved. In
view of the growing political aggression and undermining of the authority
of the post-Solidarity leaders, often exposing their pettiness and hypocrisy,
the feeling of helplessness and loneliness among a part of society was
growing dramatically. Additionally, the lack of distinct boundary between
the two orders led to the appearance of an atmosphere of un-obviousness
and unreality (Staniszkis, 1990, p. 10). There were “two orders” existing
next to each other, both having their values and objectives. Transitional
social conditions were arising that satisfied no one. Different forms of
behaviour were becoming emphasised—on the one hand, the heroism in the
daily fight for survival; on the other, aggression, economic and cultural
violence and ruthless actions that ignored the good of others. Greed and
rapacity of some people incited terror and fear in others, and the
“resourcefulness at any cost” and previously unnoticeable greed became an
element of the new order’s relations.
In the Polish People’s Republic, many social groups became pauperised
(Wnuk-Lipiński, 2003, p. 35). Still, it was the 1990s that made a part of the
social security measures crumble and undermined the foundations of the
life of many social groups (Heymann, 1998, p. 152). They sped up the
income diversification processes and bottom-up recreation of the middle
class, as well as the formation of bases for new hierarchies (Leleń, 2005, p.
46), which was impacted first and foremost by the phenomenon of
unemployment. The income hierarchy was transforming and being formed
internally, often surprising with the results. During the years 1991–1993,
under the influence of the release of salaries in the private sector, the
remunerations of entrepreneurs, enterprise directors and management staff
were rising, while those of workers, mainly qualified workers, were falling
(Domański, 1994, p. 150). The changes observed were the aftermath of a
partial abolishment of state control over remunerations and stemmed from
the new rules of the economic game. One of these rules, and at the same
time a supervisory remainder of the state, was the tax on above-standard
increases in remunerations—which forced, in practice, a decrease in
remunerations of state enterprise and public enterprise workers and limited
the competition possibilities of work establishments, thus encouraging
privatisation. According to Ryszard Bugaj, this action led to the liquidation
of state enterprises first of all (2010, p. 23). In 1993, the sectors that were
privileged in the Polish People’s Republic were still dominating in the
economy that was moving towards the market, but it was ‘other factors’ that
became the driving force of the distribution mechanisms” (Domański, 1994,
pp. 153–154). The reforms condemned not only workers but all the people
employed in the public sector to have their remunerations reduced. The
results of sociological studies show unambiguously that in the 1990s, the
differences in financial and living conditions increased (Sikorska, 1998).
However, the success of the appearing free market and navigating it
depended on factors other than those highlighted by the liberal ideology.
The observation of the changing reality confirmed that what was growing in
significance was a specific social capital in the form or relations and
arrangements from the previous system, the ability to trade and take
advantage of legal loopholes, family capital and access to information.
What turned out to be of exceptional value was employment in state
administration, where salaries were paid regularly, and layoffs were limited.
A job in state administration became a dream of a large part of society.
After the first ten years of changes, a higher professional position combined
with education ensured higher income than in the 1980s (Domański, 2000,
p. 160).
Restructuring, market orientation, privatisation of the economy and
liquidation of unprofitable work establishments led to turbulent changes in
the job market and contributed to mass layoffs, closure of work
establishments and increase in unemployment. There was a rapid increase
in unemployment. From the minimum level in 1989 to 12–13% in 1992
among the general professionally active population and up to 15.8% (2.9
million people) in the first half of 1994 (Domański, 1994, p. 156).
Unemployment hit women first and foremost (Gramlewicz, 2016, pp. 142–
152). Households where a woman was the head of the family were
becoming impoverished more frequently than others (Szelenyi, 2003, p. 9).
Unqualified workers experienced the same. Long-lasting unemployment
was suffered particularly by certain social groups. An example of that can
be about 370,000 employees in the areas of the former state agricultural
farms (Leopold, 1995, p. 20) who had no possibility of employment in other
sectors of the economy. The number of long-term unemployed, not entitled
to unemployment benefits, was growing. It included many young people
and women. Unemployment of this kind was becoming a huge social threat
(Reszke, 1995) and undermining the foundations of the new order. In
practice, unemployment threatened many families’ functioning, especially
when the sole provider lost their job. A state of privation appeared,
translating to a reduced sense of self-worth, pessimism and depression
(Sowińska, 2000).
The changes were accompanied by axiological and normative chaos
(Kurczewska, 1995, p. 39), and the basis for it was provided by the “life
according to double rules and moral standards” during the socialist times—
the application of different principles and values depending on the situation.
The new values imposed, the chaotically formed hierarchies and the
diversity of income quickly turned out to be destructive to some of the old
relations—mainly the family ones. They brought about many unexpected
and undesirable consequences (Pańków, 1994, pp. 133–145). They also
preserved pathologies such as ethical relativism, opportunism and
clientelism, permissivism, mobbing and corruption (Miszalska, 2002, p.
165). The disappointment that reforms resulted only in a worsening of the
financial situation made a part of society develop an “unfulfilled
expectations” syndrome. The notions of “orphans of communism” or
“social costs of the transformation” appeared, trivialising this phenomenon
(Szumlewicz, 2006, p. 257). The people included among losers were those
who had trouble adjusting, but not to the rules of the free market—as it was
not present then. The problem was the conditions of the transition phase.
The category of “losers” was also employed by some people employed in
public services, higher education or administration (i.e., those who “were
almost unaffected by the market being formed”). In this manner, the
neoliberal ideology was showing its effectiveness—it solved the problem of
groups that were not doing well in the transformation by stigmatising them.
The phenomena mentioned above impacted a major part of society,
which considered them new forms of injustice. Neoliberalism was not
taking advantage of physical violence in order to rebuild the social
structure, but rather “persuaded” those resisting the ruthless rules of capital
creation—which had nothing to do with competition or market. It was a
pathological, vigorous creation but also a controlled form of formation of
the economy by active individuals. Everyone else was stigmatised by
neoliberalism, which assessed that they could not adjust to the reality
conditions that it created and called “the market”. It left many victims, who
often chose suicide, in its merciless path.
The above comments confirm that no one postulated retaining the
communist social structure, and few wondered about its future. Abandoning
it was the main focus of political actions and thinking. Considering the
previous economy as anachronistic was equivalent to having an opinion on
the social structure. However, taking into account that the appearance of a
middle class in the social structure would also mean a rapid increase in
inequality was rare in the political discourse (Domański & Rychard, 1997,
p. 21).
The answer given to the question of what the future social structure
would be was as follows: it was to be dominated by the middle class. This
class had been anticipated since the end of the 1980s, and its existence was
supposed to mean that the free market had taken root. The intelligentsia and
the business groups originating from the informal economy of the Polish
People’s Republic became considered the middle class due to these
demands. The middle class was supposed to emerge nearly automatically
through the use of the “bulldozer strategy” (i.e., eliminating everything that
was not in line with the neoliberal ideology). That is why everything
resembling the middle class and any actions aimed at its formation received
a positive evaluation. All other elements of the former order were included
in the “bankruptcy estate” intended for rapid “recycling”. No one was
interested in them, and their fate was to be decided by the free market.
Through the renewal of social and economic life, a better order was
supposed to appear in the post-communist structure.
However, the “bulldozer strategy” was implemented selectively on the
structural level, and no attempt was made to level the fundamental division
inherited after communism, stemming from the previous unequal access to
goods and power. The foundations of inequalities between the
nomenklatura and society were not removed, and the privileged position of
the former in disposing of valuable resources was also not eliminated.
Changes did not bring unemployment to those in management positions,
administration or education, including higher education. The majority of
people in these groups remained outside of the sphere of common anxiety
and consequences of the formation of the free market, which does not mean
that they did not experience any of the other negative consequences of
changes such as low salaries in the public services sector.
The rise of the middle class was interpreted as a factor indispensable for
promoting economic growth (Easterly, 1999). The middle class was also
characterised by optimism, activity, frugality, creativity, capital
accumulation and taking advantage of social advancement opportunities
(Wyżnikiewicz, 2015). The ideologists of the market believed that the
middle class would ensure the secure persistence of democracy and be its
most important stabilising element, the core of society and a conscious
voter base (Leleń, 2005, p. 52), also thanks to not being dependent of the
state’s redistribution actions and programmes.
According to Henryk Domański, the notion of the middle class made a
brilliant career, not only scientific, but also ideological and political. There
were even texts written about building a middle-class society (1994, p. 11).
Creating it through privatisation, reprivatisation and enfranchisement
became one of the objectives of subsequent governments—there was a
broad consensus on this matter (Jasiecki, 2002, p. 88). Because of that,
private capital was favoured at the expense of any other form of ownership.
The creation of the middle class was made into a task and an argument for
the supporters of the new order, an ideological call that was often not
available for discussion. In the discourse, the middle class took the place of
the working class, and some of the arguments employed in its favour were
previously used concerning workers. Its existence was a condition for the
functioning and survival of the order. Its representatives were supposed to
be “the economic and political factor stabilising the new socio-economic
order” (Domański, 1991, p. 63).
The search for the middle class started with appreciating the role of the
little bourgeoisie at the end of the 1980s. From that moment on, attempts
and defining what the middle class was and presenting its composition
began. However, the claim that this class may consist of the small business
had problems entering the social consciousness, and few scholars supported
it. Such an approach resulted from negative communist propaganda that had
been targeted against this social group for many years. Despite these
obstacles, the increase in the number of businesspeople was a fact. The
dynamics of the expansion of this category were continued. At the end of
June 1993, there were 1,689,063 private businesses operating, mostly
dealing in commercial (661,000), service (372,000) and industrial activity
(341,000) (Domański, 1994, p. 180). During the years 1998–1999, the
number of private entrepreneurs increased over four times, reaching a level
of 6.6% (Domański, 2000, p. 16). The internal structure of businesspeople
was transforming and experiencing rapid stratification. Already in the first
years of the transformation, 20% of the wealthiest Poles were obtaining
nearly 40% of the national income (Jasiecki, 2002, p. 106).
Attempts were made to define the middle class using higher education.
In the early 1990s, this meant believing that the new order would appear
within the intelligentsia—a group that was pauperised entirely at that time
(Kurczewski, 1993; Mokrzycki, 1994). In spite of the intelligentsia’s
impoverishment, its exceptional level of awareness, appreciation of the
values of free market and democracy and understanding of the interest of
the transformation were all recognised (Dzwończyk, 2000, pp. 66–77).
What spoke in favour of intelligentsia was the personal capital, education,
specific mentality, state of awareness, pro-market attitude and, additionally,
patience towards the degradation experienced. It was appreciated that it
even accepted the worsening of its position in the labour market. It was
underlined that such a situation would change with time and that knowledge
and qualifications would be appreciated in the economy. Its ideological
elevation was also justified by referring to its approval of principles of
competition and individualism and its aversion towards collectivism and
traditional values. The intelligentsia turned out to be a very useful stratum
and had all the characteristics required, but it was hard to believe that it
could become the middle class, dominating and stabilising society. Its
dependence on budget remunerations spoke against giving it the status of
the avant-garde of the change. And it was so indeed as, after 1989, the
intelligentsia was experiencing financial degradation (Dzwończyk, 2000,
pp. 129–130) rather than appreciation.
Most politicians were spreading the conviction of its indispensability
and claimed without a shadow of a doubt that the lack thereof is an obstacle
to reaching prosperity, even though some researchers provided examples of
countries where the wealthiness of society was achieved without this class
(Domański, 1994, p. 271). The scientific deliberations over the condition of
the structure were dominated by searching for groups with similar
characteristics or resources of goods. The middle class (Kurczewski, 1982)
was supposed to be characterised by identical location on the stratification
ladders (Domański, 2000, p. 27). Therefore, researchers were looking for
the indicators characterising it—a good car, own home, stable income,
higher education, specific social capital and other important resources. They
were looking for individuals who “taken together, will constitute a centre of
a specific lifestyle, mentality and views” (Domański, 1994, p. 268) by
exerting influence on others. That is why the politicians were increasingly
eager to include the business communities among the middle class and
“glancing” hopefully at high-level management staff with a high level of
education and capital. These tendencies were confirmed by the financial
advancement experienced by people in high-level management positions
(Domański, 2000, p. 16).
During the first years of the transformation, the economy was ruled by
ubiquitous chaos and uncontrolled processes, often deliberate bankruptcies,
property takeovers and employee layoffs. The consequences of the
Balcerowicz Plan were radically different from the first plans and
expectations (Bugaj, 2010, p. 22). The only thing not waning was the faith
of the liberals that privatisation, reprivatisation and quick accumulation of
capital would speed up the formation of the middle class, with effect on
economic growth. However, the need for further waiting was underlined:
“In short, the market rules need to operate for a certain time in order to
generate a new social structure, and especially the middle class” (Wnuk-
Lipiński, 2003, p. 54). In this aspect, the faith held by the neoliberals in this
class was similar to that held by the People’s Poland ideologists in workers.
A group that significantly contributed to the formation of the middle
class was the part of the nomenklatura that “converted its political authority
position into wealth resources” (Wesołowski, 1994). It adapted to the new
rules of functioning exceptionally quickly and took advantage of the
previously formed capital resources and exhibited business activity. These
processes were confirmed by the management staff composition, which
often originated from the Polish People’s Republic state apparatus. Some
members of the nomenklatura strengthened their position by becoming
owners, shareholders or businessmen (Pańków, 2010, p. 75). The actions
taken by that part of nomenklatura had nothing in common with the
passiveness or withdrawal characteristic of a major part of society. It
exhibited resourcefulness and knowledge of the economic system and took
advantage of the previously acquired skills, information and experience. It
does not come as a surprise then that, at the end of the 1990s, the high-level
members of the party-state apparatus were considered the main beneficiary
of the changes (Domański, 2000, p. 110).
The neoliberal revolution had no scruples in dealing with the workers,
the main creators of the political change (Pańków, 2009) that had allowed it
to come into existence. It reduced, to a minimum, the demand for labour
stemming from the centralist administration model. It also rejected top-
down control over work establishments, undermined the respect towards
manual labour and led to worker layoffs. It did not envisage high standing
for them in the hierarchies created, as they had no capital at their disposal
and did not exhibit mobility or entrepreneurship. Such heroes of the fight
against communism were not useful as they were not driving changes, and
the majority of them did not represent middle-class values. In practice, what
commenced was its liquidation, which spread over time. Some worker
groups from certain industries were taking up the fight, which led to strikes
and protests that postponed their own downfall. During the first four years
of the change, the actual income of employed workers decreased by as
much as 38% (Główczyk, 2002, p. 137)—although during the years 1998–
1999, qualified workers alone still had a significant share in the
professional structure, constituting 24.8% of the people employed
(Domański, 2000, p. 17).
With the passage of years, the workers’ acceptance of the changes
introduced was decreasing. At first, they believed in the creation of a
“friendly market economy” regulated by the market and capitalist
institutions and also in the continued growth of the industry (Gardawski,
1996, p. 206). None of these expectations were met. The decrease in the
importance of workers was also influenced by consciousness-related and
structural factors. The new order was promoting individual survival
strategies which tore their way into the consciousness of individuals. The
elevation of individualism led to undermining group solidarity and
weakening its influence. Additionally, the workers turned out to be a non-
uniform, internally divided group incapable of group solidarity
encompassing the whole class. They were exceptionally diversified in terms
of financial standing and divided by trade interests. These features
accelerated their total decline. The strikes started regarded individual work
establishments’ interests, and few resulted from class solidarity. Thinking
only of one’s own situation was becoming increasingly dominant. The
workers were learning at an accelerated pace the new forms of behaviour
and strategies of “everyone saves himself” or “you care only for yourself”.
With every decade, the workers kept losing their political importance. The
myth of their capability to oppose the government in any social order was
dispelled.
Applying the free market principles to the economy first impacted the
income of farmers. They were expecting an improvement in their financial
standing as they had private property at their disposal (Szafraniec, 1998, p.
304) and had exhibited individual initiative for many years. Meanwhile,
after the reforms were started, the demand for their products collapsed. The
internal economic breakdown translated to reduced demand for food
products while opening the economy to foreign food products led to the
appearance of less expensive food from Western countries. The competition
of the local products with subsidised ones caused problems with selling the
produce and, thus, a drastic decrease in the income of farmers. This started
a long-lasting process of transferring a large portion of the costs of the
changes introduced to the countryside inhabitants. This situation was
confirmed by two waves of protests, road blocks and farmers’ strikes. The
first one occurred directly after 1989—a consequence of the release of
prices. The second took place in the years 1998–1999 as a result of a
decrease in agricultural product prices caused by import and inhibition of
export to Eastern markets, including to Russia (Gorlach, 2001, p. 166).
The competition between farmers working on small acreages with
developed and subsidised Western agriculture was particularly difficult,
especially since the food price mattered the most and the fashion for eco-
friendly products was yet to come. Small-scale farmers were unable to
adjust to the administration rules imposed, which had nothing to do with the
free market in view of competing with subsidised food. The growing
unemployment also impacted the worsening situation of the countryside
among farmers/workers and the high inflation rate that translated to the
increased cost of the repayment of farmer loans. Any support for the
indebted provided by the state would have been incompatible with the
neoliberal direction of the contemporary government. Most farms were left
without any help whatsoever, and their situation did not arouse the interest
of the authorities (Wnuk-Lipiński, 2003, p. 177). In 1994, nearly 40% of
rural families had at least one unemployed person in the household, and the
number of “redundant labour force” at the countryside was estimated to be
450,000 people (Podedworna, 2001, pp. 176–178). What happened
threatened the existence of many rural families. One of the consequences of
these processes was the establishment of the “Self-Defence” (Polish:
Samoobrona) radical social movement.
The actions forced small-scale farmers to join the groups losing the
transformation. This also happened as a result of wrongly conducted
liberalisation of food product prices and too liberal opening of the Polish
market to foreign goods. All these actions fitted the long-lasting enthusiasm
regarding less expensive agricultural products only and the conviction that
Western products of this type are of better quality. The focus on mass and
inexpensive production shook the foundations of many family farms and
began the process of extensive differentiation in both internal and regional
dimensions (Kaczor-Pańków, 1995, pp. 41–66). Financial differences were
getting noticeably quicker in the countryside, stemming from the lack of
competition capabilities of small farms compared to large private farming
enterprises. The economic policy focused on reinforcing “the big ones”
manifested itself in such entities being clearly privileged in terms of access
to investment funds, loans and, later on, EU funds (Pańków, 2010, p. 74).
 The preserved records of political and scientific discourse confirm that
farmers were stigmatised in the new order. Among other things, they were
referred to as “the last peasants of Europe”, “post-traditional farmers” or
“the problem class”. There were even statements that the structure of the
countryside was “unique in the scale of Western and Eastern Europe”
(Podedworna, 2001, pp. 172–174) and allegedly anachronic (Fedyszak-
Radziejowska, 1995, p. 176). Such opinions were expressed as a result of
comparing Polish farming with the agricultural structures of Western
countries. It turned out that the reality of the countryside also did not fit the
models the liberal government intended to pursue. In the middle of the
1990s, the structure of farmers was divided into three categories: (a) the
“marginalised”, having a strong sense of powerlessness; (b) the “owners”,
focused on taking over the land of their fathers; (c) the “businessmen”,
perceiving the changes as a chance for growth (Gorlach, 1995). The
agricultural policy of leaving agriculture to the free market led to a decrease
in the number of people working on farms, small farms were going
bankrupt and land was becoming accumulated in the hands of agricultural
businesses.
Processes of deagrarisation started in the countryside and a phenomenon
of “bourgeoisie-ing” appeared, consisting of a growing share of the middle
class in agriculture. The transformations made it harder to present the social
structure of the countryside, which led to the appearance of forced
simplifications of its description. It was noticed that farmers still dominated
the countryside, but their share in the whole structure was becoming
smaller. The analysis of sources of income of the countryside inhabitants in
the years 1991–2013 presented a systematic decrease in the number of
people who made a living off farming. The share of farmers, gardeners,
foresters and fishermen decreased during the period in question from 46.4
to 27.4%, with a simultaneous increase in the share of people living off
non-farming activity. This applied to all socio-professional groups in the
countryside. A part of this process was the gradual disappearance of the
farmers/workers group, who either retired or worked only in the industry.
Some of them joined other professional groups. The changes in the
structure of professional groups in the countryside were the most visible in
the years 1995–2007 (Michalska, 2020, pp. 22–26).
The economic changes forced the appearance of new professions and
job positions and transformations of professional terminologies. These
processes resulted to the greatest extent from the increase in the
significance of the developing business environment and the service sector.
A part of the consequences of these processes delighted some neoliberal
politicians or ideologists. Some of the negative consequences were hidden,
some appeared only after a few years, and some others were interpreted as
positive for society. They created new hierarchies which were unstable and
often short-lived and were formed according to blurred and impermanent
criteria. Next to them, permanent tendencies were formed—one of which
was strengthening the role of education and realising the importance of
having a good profession or skills. In spite of that, the social and economic
reality had not taken its final shape by that point and was changing
intensively. At the same time, the researchers tried to describe the hierarchy
and structure of society. The description started from a narrow elite of
wealth and capital, white-collar workers of both higher and lower level, and
ended with workers, lower classes and the “underclass” characterised by
extreme poverty (Domański, 1994, p. 266). The structure was neither
obvious nor unambiguous. After two decades of changes, the situation
remained similar. At that point, the structure was said to have been created
by entrepreneurs, managers, experts, directors and self-employed people—
those working for their own account, white-collar workers, qualified and
unqualified blue-collar workers and farmers. The structural
conceptualisation so conducted was considered optimal until the end of the
first decade of the twenty-first century (Słomczyński et al., 2017, pp. 375–
376).
The “shock therapy” pushed many groups to the margin of society and
they experienced persistent destitution, material poverty and previously
unknown degradation. The costs of transformation had the most significant
impact on the poorest (Jarosz, 2008, p. 10), who inherited their destitution
after the Polish People’s Republic. The consent lack of employment, the
learned helplessness and the attitudes based on expecting support from the
state all strengthened the processes leading to the expansion of the
“underclass”. Any group where the position of an individual—determined
by the income of the whole family divided by the number of family
members—was lower than 50% of average national income was included
among the “underclass”. According to Henryk Domański, from 1987 to
1992, this percentage rose twofold—from 11.7 to 23.4%—and then
decreased to 18.2% by 1999 (2000, p. 125). Among the “marginalised”, the
dominant groups were those later counted among those losing on the
reform, mainly the former State Agricultural Farm (PGR) employees,
owners of small, unprofitable farms and farmers/workers.
The growing distances and income inequalities were becoming
increasingly noticeable between the budget sector and the private one, as
well as between the pauperised intelligentsia and certain groups of
businesspeople that were becoming rich. In this process, the privatisation
processes played a tremendous role, which were “a powerful generator of
social inequalities, enfranchising certain people while simultaneously
disenfranchising others” (Heymann, 1998, p. 143). The differences in
income were becoming increasingly noticeable and translated to access to
white-collar jobs, especially concerning people coming from farmer and
worker families. The growing role in access to education was played by the
parents’ financial standing and social background. Such tendencies
confirmed that the equal chances promoted by the neoliberals (Domański,
2000, pp. 23–26) were only an empty, ideological slogan.
With time, the high costs of reforms became more noticeable, resulting
in them losing their charm and attractiveness (Jasiecki, 2002, p. 92)—
although the neoliberals never lost faith in their “healing” impact on the
economy. The approval for income diversification (Cichomski, 2001, pp.
27–59) was still present, but the inequalities themselves were becoming
unacceptable to many people. At the turn of the century, the conviction that
inequalities reflected skills, talents and efforts was growing weaker. These
feelings were not placated by assurances that it was a temporary situation
and that everyone would ultimately experience an improvement in their
financial standing and reap the fruit of the free market. The inequalities
noticed caused a deepening of the feeling of social loneliness and
realisation of the constant degradation of material situations. At the same
time, “the growing differences in financial standing were additionally
accompanied by a sense of tremendous injustice” (Gortat, 1995, p. 44). As
much as 92% of the Poles surveyed in 1999 thought that “the differences
between the rich and the poor in our country are excessive” (Egalitaryzm,
2000). What dominated was forced pragmatism, consisting of approval of
inequalities with simultaneous “rejection of their uncontrollable growth and
glaring contrasts” (Domański, 2000, p. 128).
Continuation of Communist-Era Social Division
The political tension of the 1980s, the Round Table agreements, the result
of elections of 4th June 1989, the socio-economic collapse and the
formation of the Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s government all led to the
appearance of the phenomenon of “common time” (Ziółkowski, 2006, p.
150). It was a period characterised by the disappearance of a sense of
political conflict and a stronger experience of participation in the political
community (Borowiec, 2013, p. 279 et seq.), waiting for an improvement in
the economic situation, uncertainty of the future and not experiencing the
“us” vs “them” division. While it lasted, political differences did not play a
major role. In fact, for over a year, they were completely forgotten and
everyone experienced unity; “they wanted to be and were together”. The
actions of the Solidarity movement elites reinforced this unique perception
of the moment.
What can be considered a symbolic end of the “common time” is the
proposal to “accelerate”, raised in April 1990 (To, co, 1990, p. 3). The
“common time” was questioned politically, also through a different
valuation of past and current events—especially through the negation of the
pace of changes that was too slow. The idea of common hard work and
rebuilding, a “joint march” towards the new order, was also rejected. This
strategy was considered socially harmful as it kept society in a sense of
artificial unity and blocked the building of democratic mechanisms based
on disputes and recognition of differences. The “common time” was
accused of creating and maintaining an untrue image of reality and trying to
convince people that the “us” vs “them” division no longer existed. It was
also accused of blocking the appearance of party pluralism, which was
impossible to appear without actual differences.
After the “common time” was rejected, negative evaluations of both the
compromise and the changes carried out started to appear. The compromise
itself (i.e., the method of “toppling communism”) brought about hope for
bridging the existing gap, and actions were made towards this end.
However, against the expectation of many people who dreamed of
“bonding” society back together, it made the totalitarian future the
foundation of the new order created. It was a result of the lack of partition
between these periods, confirmed by inviting “them” to create the new
reality. Thus, the automatically negatively evaluated past became a part of
the present. The outrage of a part of society was caused by allowing
participation in democracy to people who led the country to the brink of
collapse and its population to existential vegetation, as well as ruined the
lives and chances of a few generations. What completed this bitterness was
the fact the people who committed crimes, both after 1945 and during the
martial law period, had not been held accountable. It was a paradox that the
compromise that should help solve the conflict by design actually helped
survive the “us” vs “them” division and even reinforced it.
The compromise established strengthened the persistence of division on
many planes. It became an object of political dispute, a basis for the
formulation of divergent opinions on reforms, undermining the changes
made and harassment of the nomenklatura within the transformations. It
contributed to asking the question about whether what happened in 1989
was “a revolution of the Solidarity” or only “a controlled change” (Dudek,
2004). The agreement aroused social emotions and led to doubts of not only
an economic and political nature, but also a moral one. According to those
criticising the compromise, the “them” side had no moral right to receive
equal treatment, and such an approach towards it was effective at blurring
the line between good and evil. It deepened the normative chaos and blurred
the differences between doing right and wrong things. It also undermined
the fair course of the transformation. In effect, it was supposed to lead to
purposeful and conscious blurring of the borders between the sides of the
division and built a false image of reality, negating the ultimately negative
image of the communist order. The compromise led to the “us” vs “them”
division persisting, but at the same time becoming ambiguous, as a result of
“them” being supported by some Solidarity activists.
The time of communism, although rejected, aroused positive memories
in many individuals, or even nostalgia. A part of society bid farewell to it
with regret, which is why it was more than a negative resource that the pro-
independence groups could easily employ. Next to reprehensible actions,
destruction and abuse, there were also phenomena present that were valued
positively—such as altruistic individual and collective actions and good
individual involvement leading to improvement of living conditions—
which were a positive resource that could be referred to, in spite the fact
that they ultimately led to reinforcement of the order and prolongation of its
existence. Thus, the communist past was not one-dimensional and purely
evil, which was confirmed by previous analyses of how the social relations
in the Polish People’s Republic were created.
The growing intensity of the political dispute between the groups rooted
in the “us” vs “them” division sustained the aversion and enmity on both
sides. On the other hand, some post-communists expected quick failure of
the “order of freedom” and were convinced that it would lead to a change in
the perception of communism. The distances were not “damaged” by the
“common time” period, but only preserved, and their exploitation was
postponed. Attempts to eliminate the existing sense of injustice were not
made easier due to opinions of some of the discourse participants, claiming
that the distances were bridged due to the communists accepting the
conditions for handing over the power and supporting the reforms loyally.
The conviction that this division needed to be eliminated quickly, without
holding the people who committed abuses in the Polish People’s Republic
accountable—even symbolically—was supported by some intellectuals.
They believed that it was possible to change the people’s attitude towards
communism without compensating for the wrongs. It turned out, however,
that it was not enough to tell society who to respect if it desired justice.
That is why the slogans about the compromise having eliminated the
division were a display of severe political naivety and suggested other
potentially hidden and not too commendable reasons for promoting such
views.
On the other hand, to a part of society it was an attractive postulate to
bridge the gap discussed, which is why it received significant political
support. It constituted a valuable solution of the future of these people
because of the encumbrances that the past generated for them. It allowed
finding one’s place quicker in the new reality, limiting the uncertainty
regarding the future and eliminating the source of strong anxiety originating
in the past that was significant to them. This applied especially to people
who committed violations of the law or belonged to the law-and-order
services that helped sustain the regime. Eliminating the division allowed the
people or groups affiliated with the former order to join the democratic
politics quicker, incorporate the post-communist capital into the free market
and maintain the interest groups formed.
The division originating from the Polish People’s Republic was built on
inequalities—which is why it was sustained not only by the demands for
justice towards the past, but also by the everyday observation of persisting
privileged position of the former party apparatus. Observing the significant
participation of the former nomenklatura in the privatisation of enterprises
and publicised business scandals preserved the changes in social
consciousness. What angered society even more were the examples of
successful ventures of representatives of the party apparatus, both political
and economic. That is why the negative evaluations of communist
inequalities were not only persisting, but even becoming stronger, thus
solidifying the conviction that “nothing has changed”. A significant role in
sustaining this division was played by individual experiences, examples of
unfair or unnecessary privatisation and planned bankruptcies of companies,
which people saw with their own eyes, as well as the experience of long-
lasting unemployment.
The people included among “them” were also those who unfairly—as it
was sometimes suspected—expanded their economic resources. Their
success resulted in negative feelings, especially when it manifested in
ostentatious consumption that the majority of society could not afford. Such
a consumption for show was not only incompatible with justice, but also a
sense of decency. Due to the participation of the nomenklatura in creating
the market, a part of society kept looking at economic inequalities through
the prism of differences in goods and resources. It was highlighted that
economic goods reinforce political successes and that the factors leading to
richness are knowledge of legal loopholes and access to information. This
privilege was noticed and mentioned already during the creation of political
parties. The post-communist part of the political scene took a lot of
advantage of the social capital accumulated (Kitschelt et al., 1999, p. 283).
The parties had significant resources, financial and member base and
experience in organisation. Thus, it is hard to claim that there were equal
chances for development of party structures (Grabowska, 2004, p. 24). Such
opinions stemmed from the fact that the post-communists were supporting
their political actions using the money coming from business activity.
The “us” vs “them” division had an impact on the shape of the forming
pluralism and translated to the formation of the party system, as the parties
established positioned themselves around its inequalities (Grabowska &
Szawiel, 2003, p. 20). After 1989, most parties fit into the useful discursive
interpretations typical for the division. Often the dispute participants were
forced to choose the side of the division, for example, by either supporting
or opposing lustration. For many years, it was almost impossible to be
present in politics without having a clear opinion with regard to certain
consequences of this division. However, there were also political groups
that refused to fit into the division discussed and informed about it
extensively, making a political advantage out of it. An example of that is the
Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN), which attempted to overcome
the “us” vs “them” division. This party saw no differences in the statements
of both sides, did not accept polarity and rejected the division. It underlined
the continuity between the Polish People’s Republic and the Third Polish
Republic and the lack of differences between the elites and the identities to
which they were referring.
Remembering was a significant factor, but it was not the only one
sustaining the “us” vs “them” division. Such an intensive use of it stemmed
from more than just anchorage in past events. An example of sustaining
unjust relations, which appealed strongly to imagination, was the pension
privileges of officers of former repression services. The division made sure
that the politics relied on issues that were still significant to a large part of
society, issues that were experienced and aroused emotions. By politicizing
the division, the politics maintained contact with voters, establishing
relations not only with their past, but also their present. It is no wonder that
by referring to “us”, they employed this division to contact society. It was
done so for many years, not only at the moment of breakthrough at the
beginning of the transformation.
The politicization of the division meant taking advantage of resources
of the past spent in opposition, exposing one’s own courage and fighting
with the regime. However, these actions also sustained the division. Taking
advantage of the “Solidarity background” and underlining the fact that
political opponents used to be members of the party apparatus were
methods of further solidification of the division. Additionally, the symbolic
capital of Solidarity (i.e., the collective success in fighting totalitarianism)
was employed as well. The behaviour of people sympathising with the
division differed significantly. The majority of post-Solidarity activists
underlined the need for further introduction of justice, while a part of the
post-communists was hiding their past. To the opposition, the past was a
useful resource and let the politicians underline that they were on the side of
freedom in the “moment of trial”. The past achievements provided initial
moral advantage, but after 1993, they underwent a major loss of
effectiveness. Society realised very quickly that the political leaders of both
sides were similar to each other, had the same shortcomings or lacked a
sense of responsibility for the common good. Because of that, sympathising
with “them” stopped being a discrediting thing and was even presented as
something to be proud of. The long-standing, ineffective isolation of post-
communist parties and politicians was growing weaker, translating to the
decreasing role of the division.
Taking advantage of the “us” category was initially exceptionally
beneficial and provided an advantage. Looking through the programmes of
111 electoral committees in the parliamentary elections of 1991 (Dudek,
2002, p. 202) provides confirmation of intensive exploitation of the “us” vs
“them” division, its meaning for building identity and positioning oneself
and opponents. Most of the political groups presented their own
interpretations of the division, underlining what of it remained valid and
what lost significance. The analysis of the programmes confirms that the
division became a space for presenting differences and showing what
differentiates one group from the competing ones. Often those were issues
related to lustration or decommunisation (i.e., regarding how to settle the
existing instances of injustice). This attitude was hampered neither by the
splitting of the political scene (during the years 1991–1993) nor by the later
changes in it, the appearance of Christian democratic and national parties or
the strengthening of the position of the post-communist party. All of these
actions did not eliminate the “us” vs “them” division as it was anchored in
the existing social wrongs.
The division utilised the existing examples of injustice, confirmed by
numerous calls to eliminate specific types of discrimination. It was
especially the demand catalogue of the Solidarity parties that referred to the
injustices created before 1989. Therefore, the first demands referred to
compensating the victims of the non-democratic order, redressing damage
and holding accountable the people who violated the law, acted to the
detriment of the citizens and opposed the democratic demands of society.
To this extent, the demands included conducting decommunisation, also
understood as transforming the most important elements of the state and
passing judgement on people who committed crimes and abuses. The
postulates appearing in the programmes resulted from the persistence of
many problems and the transfer of pathological relations to contemporary
reality.
 The sense of being wronged sustained the line of division and made
reckoning the most politically important issue. A significant role in
strengthening such demands was played by the fall of Jan Olszewski’s
government in 1992. The anti-communist formula of legitimisation of that
government allowed it to present its fall as a coup of the post-communist
forces and a significant point on the battle axis between good and evil. The
toppling of that government was allegedly caused by a coup d’etat carried
out at night, with tense and nervous counting of votes. Its dismissal was
called a “change at night”, performed by a “coalition of fear” (Gelberg,
1993) and fear of lustration. Those who led to that dismissal were assigned
the status of a “post-communist plot” and presented as an example of both
the “old and new nomenklatura”. The strategy of such reconstruction (i.e.,
instrumental politicization of the division from the Polish People’s Republic
period) was commonly employed and constituted a useful tool for
demarcating, moving and also maintaining the division boundaries. At the
same time, it was a practice of repartition, the basis of which was the “us”
vs “them” division, and it relied on a sense of injustice stemming from it
that was still present.
The division was often presented in the form of a dichotomous pattern
of: “for reckoning with communism” vs “against reckoning with
communism”. A part of the group supporting the reckoning with the past
adopted conservative values and sustaining strong positive references to the
nation and Catholicism. The side of “them” adopted a sceptical attitude
towards the values preferred by the above groups, and it was also supported
by Solidarity activists who were not in favour of the collective-conservative
vision of a good life. It was an important transformation of the depiction of
the “us” vs “them” division, changing the identities of its sides,
rationalising the political choices made and determining the political
influences. In practice, the difference in attitude towards a reckoning with
communism led to a split among Solidarity activists. The side of “them”—
at least according to a part of society—was joined by those of the Solidarity
activists who rejected the need for reckoning with the past and accepted the
option of agreements with the post-communists that would protect them
against criminal and political liability. Either side presented the other in the
worst possible light, exposing its incompetence, bad intentions and
representation of narrow groups of voters. Although the composition of the
division sides was reconstructed instrumentally, this action still regarded the
gap between “us” and “them” dating back to the communist times.
Transferred into the new order, it had an impact mainly in the economic
aspect, manifested as underlining the unauthorised disposal of goods by the
nomenklatura. The takeover of a part of the goods was referred to as illegal,
and there was no justification for such actions—which is why it was
demanded that any impact on the former apparatus on the economic market
should be terminated (Świdnicki, 1990, p. 1). Some politicians suggested
directly that the changes were made, first and foremost, in aid of the
nomenklatura and existing criminal systems. This was allegedly confirmed
by numerous business scandals that exposed relations between some party
apparatus and the criminal underworld, often originating from former
security services. Examples of property theft and participation of Security
Service associates in business activity further testified to that. The danger
for the whole economic system caused by the influence of secret services
was being underlined. It was also claimed that the free market would be
distorted in the case of the capital being at the disposal of only a small
group of people. The party programmes included even declarations of
depriving the nomenklatura of the illegally appropriated property and
limiting its access to public life. There were also demands to deprive the
officers of the former Security Service of the Polish People’s Republic of all
retirement and pension privileges. A part of society considered enabling the
nomenklatura to take over the state property a reason for delegitimising the
new order. The evaluation of the processes taking place, stating that “the
‘new’ does not come from new or nothing, but from the transformation of
the previously existing resources” (Jasiecki, 2002, p. 186), was extremely
popular.
This division was also applied to explain the causes for the lack of
expected effects of changes. It was used to channel the worsening public
sentiment and provided a simplified version of reality in which the post-
communists stood in the way to change and achieving a breakthrough. Such
an attitude found its confirmation when the post-communists won further
elections, thus not only making the “prophecies” of the return of
nomenklatura come true, but also enabling further underlining of this
division. It was even claimed that communism was back. Such rhetoric
created a sense of the existence of the “us” vs “them” dichotomy and
reinforced the atmosphere and sentiments known from the late 1980s. The
election victories of the post-communists in 1993 and that of Aleksander
Kwaśniewski in the presidential elections of 1995 maintained the “us” vs
“them” bipolar system, in which the poles were longer internally coherent,
but still relatively obvious. On one side, there were those unjustly
privileged and their defenders; on the other, a society that called for justice.
In many individuals, the election victory of post-communists reinforced the
sense of being wronged and renewed the emotions caused by injustice in
the Polish People’s Republic.
The division discussed was included within the situation description
presented: “the communism continues” vs “the communism is gone”. It also
took the form of “post-communism” vs “anti-communism” opposition. The
constant highlighting of anti-communism meant more than maintaining the
division, subscribing to it and transforming it instrumentally. Both the fight
with the post-communism and consequences of past inequalities and the
rejection of “witch hunting” or “collective responsibility” confirmed its
persistence. The division was confirmed by the formation of two currents
distinguished by Mirosława Grabowska: the post-communist one and the
post-Solidarity one (Grabowska, 1996, 1999, pp. 25–28; 2003a, p. 195),
which determined the competition of the parties. The currents distinguished
were not a new division, but rather another politicization of the “us” vs
“them” division and adjusting it to the new conditions. For many years, the
continued presence of this division was a source of many disappointments
and public regrets, which needs to be considered another particularly
intelligent form of politicizing it that was created by the parties of the
political dispute.

Transformation and Further Politicization of the

“Us”—“Them” Division
The Round Table agreements were an object of intensive criticism for many
years, coming mainly from the side of right-wing parties and politicians. A
quick change in the approach to this compromise also influenced the
attitude of a part of society towards the social division analysed. It turned
out that a large part of society rejected that compromise, which was
confirmed by election results—both those in 1989 and later years. The way
the voters cast their votes at the ballot box also confirmed that the division
was present and that some of the voters did not accept bridging it and did
not consent to forgetting its inequalities and going back to business as usual
despite the wrongs committed. A part of society interpreted the agreement
with communists as a “plot”. The confirmation of the existence of such a
plot was, allegedly, the reluctance of some of the post-Solidarity
communities to make a reckoning with the past. These interpretations were
reinforced by the information appearing regarding the collaboration of some
of the agreement signatories with the secret services of the Polish People’s
Republic. What spoke against the agreement’s supporters was its political
portion, ensuring that the former nomenklatura would retain its influence
and blocking the quick introduction of full democracy and pluralism.
Doubts were also raised by the provisions regarding the limitation of
competition in the 1989 elections, prohibition of criticism towards the
Polish People’s Republic, the martial law period (Grabowska & Szawiel,
2003, p. 19), principles of the communist system and limitation of
discussions on responsibility for the past. This is why some of the right-
wing groups very quickly encumbered the politicians who made a
compromise with the communists with liability for sustaining post-
communism.
If the “us” vs “them” division stemmed from unequal access to goods
by using authority to violate rights and blocking society’s demands of
freedom, it comes as no surprise that not only the post-communists, but also
some of the post-Solidarity parties reluctant towards lustration and
decommunisation became an object of criticism from the point of view of
lack of justice. An example of that is the demands for President Lech
Wałęsa to resign from office not only due to not having fulfilled his basic
election promises, but also the lack of justice that he declared. Thus, Lech
Wałęsa was also included among “them”, which took place using
accusations that he stopped the process of holding the communists
accountable and defended their interests, and later also of relations with
secret services during the Polish People’s Republic period. His opponents
claimed that Wałęsa chose the side of “them” when he failed to meet the
obligations he made at the presidential elections.
The political “dispute within the family” among the former Solidarity
activists had the most impact on the modification of the division. However,
the split among the former opposition activists and some of them taking the
side of the post-communists did not eliminate the division but actually
strengthened it. It stemmed from the fact that the main reason behind
shattering the unity of opposition was a different attitude towards the past,
including the forms of eliminating inequalities. The rejection to reckon with
the past was received as support for “maintaining” the privileged position of
people originating from the old order. For these reasons, the division
constituted a resource useful to both sides of the political dispute—for
transforming, modifying and developing its constituents and creating new,
politically useful boundaries. It is necessary to remember that the structure
of “them” changed only to a minor degree, as confirmed by the loyalty of
voters, exceptionally strongly bound to the post-communist parties. There
were many factors influencing such behaviour, but they undoubtedly
included defending their own benefits stemming from old privileges and not
only the concern about being held accountable for supporting the old order.
Because of that, nearly all parties “guarded” the division and kept
politicizing it. In certain periods, they even protected it against becoming a
thing of the past.
Taking advantage of the division, weakening some of its meanings,
reconstructing it for their own benefit and eventually eliminating it and
imposing a new one became the objective pursued by post-communist
parties and politicians. A form of politicization of this division after 1989
was the instrumental use of the “us” category in the discourse on the part of
the post-communist opposition. To this end, it took advantage of the change
taking place and the takeover of power by the post-Solidarity camp. It was
claimed that the “us” vs “them” division no longer existed because the “old
authorities (‘them’) became the new opposition (the new ‘us’), while the
anti-communist opposition (‘us’) became the new ruling group (the new
‘them’)” (Drzonek, 2001, p. 34). Such politicization of the division was a
play on the part of some political communities that strived not only to reject
the negative consequences of the division but also to take over its positive
capital. It was a complete negation of the hierarchies of values formed
earlier and the privileges and inequalities that arose and was an attempt at
depriving the post-Solidarity communities of their fundamental resource
reliant on the past. It only meant making it shallow and reducing it to the
dimension of authority-based inequalities. Such a reversal of meanings of
the “us” vs “them” division did not succeed as it had little basis in the
inequalities that were being formed then.
After 1989, a similar politicization of the division was also applied by
some of the post-Solidarity elites that were systematically deprived of
influence on political decisions. In view of tremendous social and economic
problems, such an attitude was convincing to many voters. A part of society
started treating the current authorities as “them”, irrespective of their past. It
adopted such interpretations of the division, especially when it experienced
a major disappointment towards the governing post-Solidarity elites. The
disappointment with elites solidified the conviction that they deserve being
included in the “them” category while, at the same time, retaining faith in
the cunning post-communists and remaining distrustful of any politics. Part
of society kept considering the “people in power” disposers of undeserved
privileges.
A part of the politicization of the division was the negative definition of
post-communist politicians and voters supporting them as people holding
anti-Christian and anti-national beliefs, even though the communists
flaunted their love for their socialist fatherland and referred to national
values instrumentally. Their past attitude towards religion turned out to be
part of the reason for their negative valuation. At the same time, including
the post-communists among “them” had two main consequences—it
delegitimised them but, at the same time, strengthened their community of
the past and sustained the foundations of their identity. That is why a
statement that anti-communism was functional for post-communist parties
after 1989 does not seem excessive. What became similarly useful was their
political isolation applied for many years as well as all forms of symbolic
exclusion. Refusing to respect them and treating them as equal partners in
public life sustained their need to remain together, gathered around the
feeling of mistreatment. These actions maintained hierarchies of
inequalities and created new ones in which the post-communists appeared
as those discriminated against. The exclusion of post-communists generated
further defensive strategies that sustained the community of “them”. Such
an approach strengthened [in them] the need for loyalty towards the group,
their own biography and shared past. Additionally, the group of voters
loyally supporting the post-communists in elections was becoming
solidified. Their loyalty in elections stemmed from having similar past
experiences (Grabowska, 2003a, p. 164).
The errors and omission of post-Solidarity governments contributed to
the undermining of solidified valuing and moral aspects of the sides of the
division. Some of their mottos, demands and promises turned out to be
empty slogans. Additionally, sometimes the behaviour of post-Solidarity
elites had little to do with Christian morality. Being aware of this was a
traumatic experience for some people. Thus, the original dichotomy of good
and evil related to the division was undermined. This is why it was claimed
with regard to some of the elites originating from Solidarity and reforming
the economy that they are alienated and make decisions that are impossible
to understand and seek privileged places in the economy for themselves and
their friends and families. In this narration, the post-communist parties
played a significant role and the scale of attacks from them exceeded all
expectations. This is confirmed by the words of Donald Tusk from 1993:
“We all watch the election spots of various parties on TV. The Democratic
Left Alliance (SLD) is the most eager to show poverty in Poland: the
dilapidated walls of houses in the countryside, ruins, beggars. It is
interesting that we see two different realities. As for me, I know how many
new buildings were built in Poland, how the shop displays look and that
new shopping centres and hotels appeared” (Jeszcze, 1993, p. 3).
The phenomena described above have put and strengthened a question
mark in relation not only to inequalities in Polish People’s Republic, but
also to the intentions of some of the neoliberal elites. The demands to slow
down the rate of changes hit the foundations of the “us” vs “them” division
and even “forced” taking an interest in the newly formed inequalities,
including the economic ones. What appeared with growing intensity was
the allegation of worsening the existing inequalities and creating new ones.
The politicizations of the “us” vs “them” division took a social character to
a growing extent and were gaining in significance with every passing year.
These actions integrated even stronger the communities of post-communist
voters, who had a positive opinion of the communist past. The scale of
economic inequalities led to a part of society changing their view on the
“us” vs “them” division. They noticed no differences between the sides of
the division and were ready to cast their votes for parties and politicians
who were not related to those two political identities. They started
identifying “them” with anyone in power after 1989, which is why the “new
them” appeared, originating from “us” (i.e., the “new nomenklatura”)
(Wasilewski, 1990).
The religious aspect of the division discussed was a sphere of its
constant reconstruction and a basis for noticing other unjustified wrongs. In
the Polish People’s Republic, inequalities manifested in discriminating
against the religious and limiting the freedom of religious cults. They were
also revealed in the form of the rejection of these exclusions and opposing
the authorities who denied others their fundamental rights, as well as in
seeking an advocate of society’s rights in the institutional Catholic Church.
The matters of religious inequalities and lack of possibility to freely
perform the religious practices co-created the “us” vs “them” division, and
it was around them that its most important distances were created. The
exclusion of religious people from public life was the most important
symptom of religious discrimination. The experience of this discrimination
mobilised a part of society to stand against the totalitarian order, and
defeating that order meant a victory of religious freedom. Religious people
stopped being second-class citizens and joined the public discourse in
various roles.
After 1989, the role of the Catholic Church in leading to the fall of
communism was constantly reminded, without avoiding triumphalism or a
sense of moral victory. The Catholic Church, guided by its mission, did not
abandon spreading moral and ethical principles (Krzemiński, 2015, p. 23)
or exerting influence on the formation of certain spheres of the order
(Wnuk-Lipiński, 2003, p. 113), often going beyond the influence assigned
to religion. It not only intended to regain the rights belonging to it, but also
became involved in defending its own economic interests. A part of these
actions was recovering real estate that the communists had illegally taken
away from parishes and orders after 1945. It soon turned out that the
Church became one of the most important beneficiaries of the change, as
the other groups that were also deprived of their property had problems
asserting their rights. At the same time, religious symbols were returned to
the public sphere, the bond between the Polish nation and Catholicism was
stressed and it was argued that religious people needed to participate in
politics. The participation of some of the Catholic Church representatives in
political activity resulted in accusations that the Solidarity elites favour
Church hierarchs and even that some politicians were “on the Church’s
leash”. The involvement of some hierarchs in building support for certain
parties and speaking on political matters was criticised. Imposing a single
world view and making oneself an instance that settles disputes regarding
the model of humanity was met with opposition among a part of society.
Many people realised that new discriminations were appearing and new
anxieties increasing the distance between two groups—non-believers and
people trying to sustain the Christian model of life—were becoming visible.
The answer to such feelings in a part of society was dissatisfaction, the
formation of anti-Church postulates and demands for limiting the influence
of the Church, moving religion to a private sphere and creating a secular
state. At first, they received little support from society, but it grew over time
—first, among individuals with post-communist views and later among
secular left originating from Solidarity and young voters.
This is how the “us” vs “them” division became less sharp due to
transformation within its previous inequalities, within the framework of the
reconstruction of social consciousness. The redefining of the division
entailed the presence of new discriminations. It was useful and made post-
communists aware that they suffered wrongs as well. However, the
distances regarding the religions and world view were changing their
fundamental direction. The religious—or, more specifically, the Catholic
Church representing them—were presented as a source of domination and
bias. They were questioned as the positive heroes of collective imagination
and called the source of new oppression. This happened as a result of a part
of society starting to perceive the Church as a community bound together
with greed and hypocrisy and demanding further privileges, often at the
expense of principles that were the basis of its existence. Additionally, it
was perceived as an institution filled with a sense of superiority and
considering itself an oracle, imposing a particular way of thinking onto
others and contributing to the exclusion of individuals. This resulted from
the fact that, according to the opponents of the Church, it was impossible to
debate with its hierarchs as their messages were of an unquestionable
nature, going beyond the character of religious doctrine and becoming
oppressive. Numerous individuals, not only non-believers, started to
perceive this situation as a threat and discrimination.
This sort of politicization of the division was not a sociotechnical
strategy, then. It made political the increasingly visible social division
having its foundations in the new order building period and resulting from
noticeable wrongs committed contemporarily and ascribed to the influence
of the Catholic Church and politicians sympathising with it. It was of no
importance that a feeling of being discriminated against was initially
present in a small number of people, as this number kept growing with
further individuals realised the existing and arising limitations. The
politicization of this division between the “non-believers” and “believers”
was a protest of the minority against the majority, as well as a protest of the
non-believers against the Church that expanded its influence. The new
division confirmed that the differences and inequalities regarding religion
(Szawiel, 2003a, p. 277) still remain universal bases for divisions and that
politicizing these inequalities is in the interest of politicians.
The existence of a large religious group next to non-believer groups or
groups of other faiths does not form social divisions, even if the religious
morality of majority groups forms political views, impacts the formation of
political parties and defines the political discourse. The existence of
religious communities translates to the political behaviour of some of the
voters and the formation of the party system, even more than the class
issues, according to some scholars (Grabowska, 2003b, p. 57). A division
appears when different religious beliefs translate to relations between
individuals and communities. The appearance of discrimination, depriving
other groups of individuals of equal rights and refusing to respect them, is
the beginning of divisions and may stem from actions of either majority or
minority groups that try to impose their views on others. Thus, in order for
social divisions of a religious character to appear, the discrimination of
other views or beliefs and refusing dignity to individuals in view of their
beliefs or lack thereof is “indispensable”. That is how some post-
communists, who had denied others the right to religious freedom before
1989, later became the defenders of the freedom of others. On the other
hand, the Catholic Church, which was a depositary of collective freedom,
started to be perceived as a threat to its further expansion and as an entity
limiting individual freedoms.
The appearance of this division in the religious aspect was “facilitated”
by the attempts at imposing a single system of values onto the whole of
society. These attempts were considered a threat to people’s own choices,
lifestyle models and visions of good and moral behaviour. In this process,
neoliberal ideology played an important role, according to which there is no
place in society for domination of religious or moral systems. Thus, it
automatically perceived majority groups as a threat. A consequence of that
was the attacks on “two strongly established elements: the socialist
egalitarian experience and the Polish tradition, onto which that experience
was superimposed in a sense” (Wolność, 2015, pp. 63–64). Neoliberalism
saw a threat in the Catholic axiology, and the believers saw it in the
promotion of nihilism and relativism by some neoliberals and in
considering all views equal. It turned out eventually that liberal democracy,
focusing on the absolutisation of freedom, is not compatible with religion
because of the latter’s strong and dominating identity- and culture-related
aspect. The clash between the supporters of those two systems of values
was becoming increasingly brutal with time. The Church decided that
neoliberal values constituted a threat to its model of an individual’s life and,
therefore, opposed the expansion of the neoliberal model—especially in the
sphere of morality.
In the new division, the wronged were those who felt threatened by the
domination of the Catholic Church in public life. Now it was them who
were filling the collective imagination. The category of privilege and
domination was assigned to the institution of the Church, politicians
supporting Christian morality and the believers themselves. This
domination was considered the greatest threat to democracy and individual
freedom. Demands to limit the influence of the Church appeared that
included not only moving the matters of faith and religion to the private
sphere (Wnuk-Lipiński, 2003, p. 113), but also liberalising the Anti-
Abortion Act and abandoning the Concordat Act. These postulates were
complemented by the demands to limit the Church’s involvement in
politics. Similarly to what happened during the communist period, some
people formulated a claim that the Church was the root of all evil. Those
and other demands stemmed from the domination of the Church and the
appearance of examples of discrimination of values other than Christian
ones. Some of the demands mentioned violated the right of believers to
participate fully in public life, an example of which could be demanding to
limit their right to spread their axiology and views in the public sphere. A
social conflict was rising that was typical for developed or modern
societies, and its radical character was exacerbated by the fact that some
believers again felt being an object of disdain and experienced attempts at
pushing them to the margin of social life.
Numerous practices of repartition, presenting the existing injustice and
discrimination in detail, were also employed instrumentally to politicize this
division. One of the examples of that can be putting “enlightened
Europeans” in opposition to “Catholic backwater”, the latter being
synonymous with backwardness and clericalism. An alternative to this
practice was putting “true Poles, patriots and Catholics” in opposition to
“communists and traitors of the Fatherland serving the interests of
Moscow”. Additionally, “those who wanted to serve Poland” were
contrasted with “those who never thought of any service”, which translated
to the moral dichotomy of: “clean hand Poland” vs “dirty hand Poland”
(Pietrzyk-Zieniewicz & Zieniewicz, 1995, pp. 103, 118). There were many
more practices displaying this division and partially referring to the past.
After 1989, an attempt was also made to further politicize the political
dichotomy of “left” vs “right”. The categories of “leftism” and “rightism”
allowed the voters to understand better the matters of affiliation of parties
and politicians. They were “employed at the level of both elites and
elections” (Lipiński, 2017, p. 143). They entailed certain imaginations and
utilised simplifications such as the one that the free market characterises the
right and the left always strived to minimise social inequalities (Karnowska,
2009, p. 139). The Polish experience proved that the “left” vs “right”
dichotomy was employed for a long time to subordinate the political scene.
Past experiences connected these categories with the “us” vs “them”
division but, in practice, the two descriptions did not match in whole. It was
not always possible to maintain the conviction that post-Solidary is the right
and the post-communists are the left. This is why the statement of Tadeusz
Szawiel was so important—he underlined that in every instance, the “left”
vs “right” pattern should be referred to as specific social problems and the
existing party system (2003b, p. 222). Using the notions of “left” and
“right” did not create a new social division, which does not mean, however,
that they did not take over some of the meanings of inequalities, wrongs
and the sense of injustice that were included in the “us” vs “them” division.
Both categories were also taking advantage of the previously formed sense
of superiority, intellectual advantage and disdain towards the opponents, as
well as utilised the respect or prestige resources.
The opposition between “left” and “right” was only a form of
interpretation of the new party system and the connection with the
dominance of the “us” vs “them” division. Such combinations resulted in
the notion of the “left” being identified with pathological actions of
communists, with an anti-Polish stance or social compassion, while the
“right” was associated with patriotism, responsibility and also radicalism
due to calls for lustration and decommunisation. Discrediting of the “left”
continued for a long time by reminding of the achievement of “them” and
presenting examples of the defence of interests and gravy trains of the post-
communist communities. Similarly negative examples of actions, but
stemming from contemporary times, were directed against right-wing
communities. These political actions helped lead to the “left” vs “right”
dichotomy no longer playing any major role later on. Because of that, some
authors wrote about the decreasing adequacy of this pattern in relation to
the Polish political scene (Dziemidok, 1998, p. 200), and the party system
created was growing less consistent with this spatial opposition (Grabowska
& Szawiel, 2003, p. 270). Significant weakening of the “left” vs “right”
orientation as the axis of political rivalry and conflict in Poland was
noticed, especially after 2005 (Górka, 2009, p. 58).
The post-communist and post-Solidarity currents highlighted after 1989
did not reflect the new division anymore as they were not based on the new
inequalities but only constituted politicization of the “us” vs “them”
division. The previously formed identities had an impact on politics. It was
the “society” vs “nomenklatura” division that shaped the political actions in
conditions of the democracy and free market being created. This stemmed
from the depth of this division, which translated to it being very useful,
even in the form of a certain “security” for many politicians from both sides
of the political scene who had benefited from this division for many years.
“Making use” of remains after communism guaranteed the political scene
actors’ stable functioning with a coherent and loyal voter base. It also
limited the need to find other inequalities or forms of mobilising voters,
thus condemning some political parties to stagnation in terms of the
programme. It meant creating politics solely based on attitude towards the
Polish People’s Republic (Wojtaszczyk, 1995, p. 90). That is why it is
justified to claim that “the political conflicts present in Poland in the early
1990s can be divided, according to their source, into two main categories:
those having their source in the former system and those that became a side
effect of the system change” (Drzonek, 2001, p. 34).

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© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023
P. Borowiec, The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26530-3_5

5. Consequences of the Second

Experiment: The “Winners”–“Losers”
Division
Piotr Borowiec1
(1) Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Jagiellonian
University, Kraków, Poland

Piotr Borowiec
Email: piotr.borowiec@uj.edu.pl

Keywords Social inequalities – Minority groups – Freedom – Political

competition

A New Register of Wrongs and Transformation of

the Social Structure
The last decade of the twentieth century was a traumatic experience for a
large part of society and the one that followed was not much better. The
necessity of creating a free market, expending private ownership and
continuing the economic reform was still promoted. The conviction that the
model of neoliberal changes implemented after 1989 was the only option
was dominant, even though the declared objective of the transformation had
not been reached. Increasingly often, people had an impression that it was
not about reaching any objective, but continuing changes infinitely. For the
same reason, many individuals were growing disappointed with the
changes. At the same time, the dogma of “no alternatives to neoliberalism”
faltered, and new competing solutions appeared—an example of which is
the sustainable growth concept.
 In the second half of the 2010s, there was an influx of politicians
claiming that the objective of the transformation had been reached and
spreading positive definitions of contemporary times. In 2015, they even
claimed that it was a “golden age” (Borowiec, 2016, pp. 186–219). Such
and similar opinions were typical of groups in power and obtained support
from those voters doing well in the new reality. The order transformation
provided certain chances that some individuals effectively took advantage
of. It turned out that it was not only the privileged starting conditions that
created “satisfying positions” in the economic order. However, the change
made also had—as Maria Jarosz wrote—“a dark side to it” (Jarosz, 2010, p.
9).
This “dark side” coincided with both expected and unexpected negative
socio-economic consequences of rebuilding capitalism. Only a few people
remembered the mechanisms of self-enfranchisement of the nomenklatura
with the use of joint national property, which have already been mentioned
in this book. Further discontentment was caused by entirely unjustified
cases of certain minority groups—lawyers, bailiffs, judges, notaries or
doctors—“elbowing their way through”. The bitterness was caused by these
groups’ impunity and, frequently, audacity and conviction of having power
and privilege at their disposal—which they expressed without second
thoughts.
The economic system created was described perfectly by Tadeusz
Klementewicz: “In the global division of labour, we became an economy of
sub-suppliers, experts at tightening the screws. Our speciality is cheap
labour and a large internal market for foreign guests. Everything for the
business: advantageous conditions for employing workers and a regressive
fiscal system; the Polish neoliberal Leviathan has provided businessmen
with major possibilities of labour cost reduction” (2019). Unemployment
was driving the demand for work, which led to minimisation of its costs.
The exploitation present in it was defined positively as “low labour costs”.
At the basis of this exploitation was the unfortunate leap into capitalism
using the method of original capital accumulation, the expression of which
was mainly the so-called “transformation recession”. There was a shift of
income and wealth from the poor to the rich (Kowalik, 2010, p. 168). Such
a creation of inequalities automatically deprived a large part of society of
capital, condemned it to exclusion and limited its development possibilities.
A recurring practice was to change people’s employment basis to so-called
“junk contracts” that employ people illegally or offer salaries at the level of
biological existence (PAP, 2020). The strategy of “low labour costs” was
not invented by critics of the neoliberal change for media purposes, but an
experience of millions of employees.
The above solutions constituted a part of the mechanism intended for
the accumulation of capital. They were appreciated and evaluated positively
by subsequent cabinets, irrespective of their ideological image or social
justice principles adopted. Despite criticism of this development paradigm,
it was sustained for over two decades as it brought benefits, although only
to a part of society—including businesspeople and foreign investors.
Increasing salaries was not recommended as it would supposedly lead to
inhibition of economic growth. This was the caricatural form taken by some
of the implemented market solutions, and they were what the whole
economic system was built on. The model of development adopted in 1989
and the international economic conditions had a decisive impact on the
economic order created, leading to the creation of a peripheral economy.
The centralist supervision was gradually replaced by the “invisible hand of
the market”, which—for many years—remained a “political hand”
(Krasnodębski, 2005, p. 93).
The demands for changing the policy were not receiving a clear
advantage in society in view of the enduring domination of the neoliberal
ideology. This was confirmed by the privatisation of everything in the name
of the neoliberal dogma. Privatisation encompassed healthcare and even
municipal enterprises providing access to goods such as potable water or
heating. This meant the privatisation of “public problems” (Żuk, 2016, pp.
103–105). The attempts to stop these actions failed, showing even more
explicitly the presence of strong ideological blocks. The media institutions
of the new order sustained the legitimisation of the relations created. Media
provided information, opinions, interpretations and slogans beneficial to the
order. The dominance so built limited the possibilities of the alternative
ideas of justice “reaching” the shared consciousness. However, the majority
of society considered neoliberalism an ideology imposed by the elites and
not resulting from society’s beliefs (Wróbel, 2010, pp. 23–29).
In the interpretation of changes so imposed, it was easy to believe that
one is responsible for their own misery and that one became a client of
changes. A sense of shame appeared, and the lack of participation in the
division of goods confirmed the social uselessness. Those with a low level
of education were told they were “unnecessary” within the whole order.
Both the unemployed and those who remained employed at the cost of
feeling humiliated realised their own dependency, helplessness and
harmlessness. The lack of hope was participated by those who—according
to the emerging opinion—did not contribute to the creation of wealth. It
seems that the breakthrough moment that made people realise the existence
of permanent subordination was the instrumental actions of the government
aiming at increasing the retirement age—which were incompatible not only
with their declarations during elections but also with society’s sense of
justice. The increase in retirement age for blue-collar workers receiving the
minimum wage meant condemning them to work until death and that many
individuals would never receive their retirement pensions. In the eyes of a
large part of society, such actions confirmed the pathology of the system
formed.
During the first two decades of changes, there were no bases for the
realisation of post-materialistic values by individuals. What the majority
experienced instead was a fight for biological survival. The assumption that
“the dawn of free market logic and dominance of competition in public life
were supposed to—according to the assumptions of economic liberals—
result in the diversity of not only the consumption offers, but also ideas,
lifestyles, religions, political concepts and, finally, cultural models” (Żuk &
Żuk, 2014, p. 9) found no confirmation. The observation of the free market
showed the nature of individuals was often exceptionally predatory. It was
easy to notice disconcerting egoistic behaviour, dominated by care only for
oneself or one’s closest family and friends. The brutal elimination of
competition was terrifying. The aspirations awakened released previously
unobserved layers of greed and baseness. Equally horrifying was the
everyday experience of unkindness, suspicion, aggression, lack of
cooperation, brutalisation of manners and cult of strength and poorly
understood resourcefulness and cleverness (Mokrzycki, 2000, p. 23). Some
characteristics that were quickly becoming visible were primitive
consumerism (Kozarzewski, 2010, p. 162) or individualism, constituting a
rebound reaction after the previous shortage of goods. What turned out to
be a hazard was the neoliberal turbocapitalism. The homo oeconomicus has
triumphed (Leśniewicz, 2019). Examples of ostentatious consumption led
to the decline of previously cultivated family ties. Wealth and poverty
started dividing the families, showing many individuals the hierarchies of
superiority and inferiority among their close ones. Thus, the same family
relations that earlier constituted a source of security became dehumanised.
The employee experience of unfair relations at work, humiliation and
exploitation created a sense of permanent injustice. A large part of society
considered the order existing alien as if created for certain small groups
only. This was confirmed by examples of political control over economic
resources, consisting of the distribution of capital among the people and
groups close to politicians. This made many individuals certain that politics
was the main path leading to goods, just as it was before 1989. The
“simplified” access to goods stemmed from participating in politics, and the
election games—including compromises—preceded the distribution of
more than just positions in the state apparatus. The top-down method of
building the market meant releasing a lot of economic power into the hands
of politicians, thus privileging them. Such opinions were not isolated but
confirmed by incoming information on abuse during unfair privatisation
and examples of pathological relations between business and politics. The
examples of pathologies present in the discourse formed a negative attitude
of a significant part of society towards subsequent cabinets and built
distance between the government and society.
The negative opinions on political elites and subsequent cabinets
stemmed not only from observing their achievements or omissions. They
resulted from subjective evaluation of one’s own situation and the
effectiveness at adjusting to the order created and finding one’s place in it.
Outside of the sphere of values, which was of great importance, economic
interest became the decisive factor after 1989. The fact that political elites
designed and implemented economic solutions that were supposed to
improve the lives of everyone but eventually turned out beneficial only to
specific groups and individuals raised growing objections. The distrust
towards political elites confirmed that the initial way of thinking—full of
faith and optimism—ceased to exist. The lack of sense of security and
deprivation of dignity and opportunities caused severe anxiety and concern
among a part of society. The gap between the expected living standard and
the possibilities of achieving it was growing.
Stating that “social inequalities are a natural and common phenomenon,
similarly to the sense of injustice accompanying them” (Kinowska, 2010, p.
301) was not a description, but rather a form of justification for the order
built. However, in the case of the neoliberal experiment, one of the
objectives was to create economic differences (i.e., deepen the inequalities).
Once the top-down communist redistribution of resources was rejected and
the economy was switched to spontaneous and uncontrolled actions,
inequalities started growing at a fast rate. Sociologists noticed these
tendencies. They were confirmed by all the economic and social indicators
—especially at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Sadowski, 2009).
The opulence with a tendency to ostentatiousness was clearly visible, while
destitution, poverty, marginalisation and exclusion were “in hiding”.
Opinions appeared that an order that pauperises millions of people excludes
them from benefits and pushes them to the margin cannot be just.
The level of destitution and poverty could arouse terror despite
problems with establishing reliable data regarding social differentiations
(Panek, 2011, pp. 11–22). In the first decade of the twenty-first century,
nearly one-third of society lived in poverty. In October 2008, 7.8% of
households out of 13.2 million (i.e., about a million) lived in extreme
poverty (Danecka, 2008, p. 109). Other data showed that nearly half of the
population lived at the level of social minimum, at least two million
children were living in poverty (Sadowski, 2010, p. 40). At the end of the
first decade of the twenty-first century, Polish inequalities expressed using
the Gini coefficient were ranked second highest among EU member states
(Kowalik, 2010, p. 168). In 2019, the economy was characterised as
follows: “According to the Central Statistical Office (GUS), 1.5 million
people work under civil law contracts, 1.1 million are self-employed and 3
million work under fixed-term employment contracts. These people earn
30% less than their peers employed under permanent employment
contracts. Add to this the unpaid or low-paid internships and hundreds of
thousands of people trying to make ends meet while working in the grey
market. It is not surprising that 1.5 million Poles are the working poor who
barely exceed the minimum wage” (Klementewicz, 2019).
It was increasingly frequent that poverty was experienced by large
families and those that included pensioners (Danecka, 2008, p. 113). At the
same time, it was usually rural areas in the eastern provinces (Gilejko,
2001, pp. 20–21) that were affected by poverty and exclusion
(Kozarzewski, 2010, p. 159). In these places, whole families, whose
members had been unemployed for months or years, were condemned to
exclusion. According to the Central Statistical Office (GUS), in 2005,
“among the households with at least one unemployed person, the rate of
extreme poverty was about 27% (9% in families without anyone
unemployed)” (Danecka, 2008, p. 115). The tendencies listed had been
“enriched”, as confirmed by an article from the Gazeta Wyborcza daily
entitled “What we are. Polish society after 12 years of transformation”
(Polish: Jacy jesteśmy. Społeczeństwo polskie po 12 latach transformacji)
prepared based on a census. That summary, made on the basis of data
ranging back to 1988, showed a society with an increased number of older
people, including pensioners, a growing phenomenon of loneliness, an
increase in the percentage of people dependent on “another person”, with a
simultaneous decrease in the percentage of people “making a living from
their own work” (Gilejko, 2008, p. 86).
The range of stratifications was growing, as confirmed by studies.
According to data from the Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS)
from 2003, 90% of the people surveyed believed that the differences
between the rich and the poor in Poland were excessive (Stosunek, 2003).
In 2017, the same answer to the same question was provided by 86% of the
surveyed (Stosunek, 2017). The assessment of own consumption
capabilities was also puzzling. In 2000, over half of the surveyed believed
that they cannot meet their fundamental needs, and only every 1 in 19
declares that the income achieved in their household enables them to live at
a satisfactory level (Zaborowski, 2014, p. 347). Seven years later, the
surveys of CBOS suggested that nearly 40% of the surveyed believed that
as much as 50% of Polish society lived in poverty (Opinie, 2007).
The rise in the unemployment rate did not slow down in the twenty-first
century. The data that regarded the year 2000 specifically can be considered
“quite alarming” (Zaborowski, 2014, pp. 331–332). The peak was reached
in 2001 when the overall unemployment rate exceeded 20% and, in some
regions, it was even above 30% (Sadowski, 2010, p. 38). According to the
census of 2002, the number of unemployed was even higher than that
resulting from official communications. It amounted to 3.5 million people,
while the unemployment rate was 21.2% (Gilejko, 2008, p. 87). The worst
situation was experienced by those with long-lasting unemployment, who
remained without work for over 12 months (Danecka, 2008, pp. 115–116).
However, structural unemployment decreased, and the number of people
remaining without work for over three years was on the decrease, too. The
situation of women in the labour market was particularly difficult (Firlit-
Fesnak, 2008, p. 13). Long-term unemployment was also more frequent
among women.
What turned out to be the “rescue” for the unemployment rates was the
mass work emigration of young people, especially after the EU member
states opened their borders to Polish workers. In this manner, the “surplus
employees on the job market” were pushed beyond the order that had been
unable to reduce unemployment for over 15 years.
The neoliberal promise that the appearance of the free market would
lead to an improved standard of living for the whole society was not
fulfilled. It turned out that economic differentiation is ineffective in fighting
destitution, as it aggravates rather than eliminates it, expanding the
marginalised group (Wnuk-Lipiński, 2008, p. 282). At first, it was believed
that this was an element of a healing process; but later, it turned out that
millions of people became impoverished, with only a small part of society
experiencing an improvement in their situation. At the same time, the
groups benefiting from it noticed, together with the increase in criticism of
the free market created, a threat to the unemployed. That is why some of the
beneficiaries “hardened their standing” and defended the existing solutions,
depreciating at the same time anyone who dared criticise the new order.
This is how populists “made themselves heard”, interfering with
neoliberals’ joy from the policy implemented as it turned out that they were
also an effect of the neoliberal way of governing. This process was
described perfectly by Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński—who observed “society in
the field”. “Small towns will speak during the coming elections. The more
their problems are ignored and pushed to the margin by politicians, the
greater the probability that their small-town electorate will withdraw its
support for the system changes and turn towards alternative political offers
—even if that would mean searching for a new utopia” (2003, p. 125).
Inequalities were presented using economic resources determining the
possibilities of acquiring and accumulating other goods. It turned out that
people’s education and professional standing increasingly determine the
level of financial rewards obtained (Domański, 1998, p. 13). When writing
about the social structure change processes, Andrzej Rychard underlined
three differentiating factors: market regulation, non-market regulation and
status of employee and employer (2005, p. 117). Building a new structure
consisted of creating inequalities within the scope of disposal of resources
necessary for existence, resulting from access to work.
 The economic differentiation translated to difficulties with clearly
defining the structure’s shape, which was confirmed by the research
conducted. In 2005, scholars presented the social structure using nine “class
categories” (Słomczyński & Janicka, 2005, p. 163). A more developed
image of it was presented by Juliusz Gardawski, who applied the criterion
of attitude towards productive forces and use of the national property
(2001a, pp. 51–52). Next to the groups traditional for the Polish structure
(i.e., farm owners and workers), there also appeared those formed by the
“market transformation”—situated in the middle of the social structure, an
example of which can be the small business or the managers, usually
included among the middle class.
The ideological and political pressure influenced the formation of the
middle class. The expansion of this “returning class” (Gardawski, 2001b, p.
48) was one of the expected indicators of structural changes. Its appearance
was supposed to “approximate” the Polish structure towards that of
societies with a market economy. The middle class was formed by people
from the “old nomenklatura” and, later, its composition was expanded with
the so-called “new nomenklatura” (i.e., businesspeople related to
subsequent cabinets or political parties after 1989) (Gilejko, 2010, p. 24). It
was claimed that these groups were creating the phenomenon of political
capitalism. At the same time, some of these people (such as owners of large
companies) quickly entered the higher class. It is necessary to mention that
the majority of the middle class was formed by people who did not take
advantage of the privileges stemming from the previous order or later
political acquaintances. The changes resulted in a systematic increase in the
number of professional categories related to having high qualifications and
exercising authority in the organisational structure. The number of people
working on their own account, sole proprietors and businesspeople
employing a small number of workers was growing.
The most popular approach was recognising the middle class according
to the income achieved. The basis for that was income per household
member (net income) obtained from all sources by all the household
members. According to the Klasa średnia w Polsce report of 1992, 41.3%
of the population was optimistically included among the middle class, and
in 2016—34.3%. Twenty years later, in 2019, the population of the middle
class was optimistically estimated to amount to 11–12 million people
(Kukołowicz, 2019). According to the studies of 2020, as much as 77% of
the people surveyed considered themselves middle class (Klasa niższa,
2020).
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the working class
employed in the large industry constituted 22.4% of all professionally
active citizens (Gilejko, 2010, p. 33), but, in spite of that, it was commonly
considered “the greatest loser” concerning the changes. The condition of
contemporary public life confirmed that the people of labour lost influence
on the course of events—on the further course of the transformation. The
workers directed their resentment against the politicians, as confirmed by
their distrust towards political parties (as much as 75% of workers declared
distrust towards them) and lack of attachment to any party (declared by
90% of them) (Łazarz, 2003). The exclusion of workers translated to their
passiveness and withdrawal. Particularly bitter were those who experienced
long-term unemployment and were forced to undergo retraining or change
their jobs multiple times. At the same time, there was a growing number of
workers employed in small and medium enterprises in the private sector,
which meant “degradation of their professional status—including their
earnings, working conditions and labour rights, including the right to
associate” (Gilejko, 2008, p. 73). In view of the existing unemployment,
such companies not only offered low salaries but also forced employees to
work in a way that was against the provisions of the labour code (Gilejko,
2001, p. 22). Small businesses were characterised by limiting employee
rights, including blocking the formation of labour unions. Studies showed
that workers had a sense of being exploited excessively and that their work
was mainly the source of wealth for company owners. They also noticed the
growing distance between them and the enterprise owners (Gardawski,
2001b, p. 149).
The changes in the agricultural structure took place even before Poland
joined the European Union, and later they only got more intensive.
According to the statistics, in 2005, there was 14.25% of employers and
self-employed workers in agriculture, while this number was 24.3% ten
years earlier. During that period, there was an increase in the number of
large farms with an acreage of over 20 ha (Podedworna, 2006, p. 222). The
processes mentioned above led to further internal differentiations,
stratification among farmers and poor and rich farmers becoming more
distinguishable.
 The situation of the countryside formed at the beginning of the twenty-
first century corresponded neither to the expectations of the free market
proponents nor the farmers themselves. However, the first symptoms of
improvement appeared. This resulted from the growing knowledge about
the agricultural market of the European Union. The functioning of the
European agricultural market weakened the radical expectations of the
neoliberals towards changing the structure of the Polish countryside. The
subsidies to agricultural production received raised the hopes of the farmers
and provided a basis for thinking that competing with European produce
would take place on equal terms. It seemed that the “stream” of funds
directed to agriculture could lead to the transformation and modernisation
of farms and creating new jobs around agricultural production. Non-
profitable farms were also supposed to receive a chance as subsidies were
intended to help them change the form of their activity and focus on
agritourism. Hopes appeared for greater participation of farmers in
maintaining order, as well as opinions treating the countryside as a
“deadweight” which was becoming a thing of the past (Fedyszak-
Radziejowska, 1995, p. 181).

Division of the Time of Economic Differentiation:

“Winners”–“Losers”
The observation of processes taking place and analysis of changes on the
plane of gains or losses led many individuals to employ a dichotomous
pattern to describe them. These realised losses and the differences noticed
in goods resources turned out to be as a result of the comparison made, a
path towards the formation of divisions. Being employed influenced that
first and foremost. Both the common everyday language and the scientific
publications mentioned processes in which “those ‘winning’ were the
people who turned out best prepared to join the market economy in view of
their education, qualifications, industriousness, overall dynamism in life
and age” (Hausner & Marody, 1999, p. 128). On the other side were those
who lacked those characteristics. This is how the division into “losers” and
“beneficiaries of change”—something that “was born” among individuals—
was reinforced in social consciousness. There were even references to the
existence of two completely different classes. The notions of “losing” and
“gaining” serving the general description of the basic differences were
becoming solidified and fundamental for describing the changes taking
place.
It was underlined frequently in the discourse that unemployment is an
experience that needs to be lived through, not a tragedy. Despite that, it was
exactly the unemployed who first ended up in the category of “losers”,
followed by those permanently deprived of employment and all those who
experienced poverty and destitution. In the scientific discourse, they were
referred to as the “costs of changes” or “structural victims of the
transformation” (Wnuk-Lipiński, 2008, p. 271). The first to be included
among “gainers” were the owners of economic resources, who took
advantage of the so-called “transformation pension” stemming from being
in power, including from belonging to either old or new nomenklatura
(Gilejko, 2008, p. 74). The group of winners also included all those who
had capital at their disposal. It also included both the businesspeople and
those who acquired their capital unfairly. Among the “gainers”, others
included were the political elites and all the groups in power, irrespective of
their ideological image. The connections between the spheres of economy
and politics generated numerous scandals, thus sustaining the conviction
that the authority defines economic resources. With time, the initial division
into “losers” and “gainers” turned increasingly often into a permanent
description. It was already underlined prior to 2005 that society can be
defined using the “solidarity”–“liberalism” opposition (Cześnik &
Kotnarowski, 2011, p. 132). There was a clear emergence of those who won
and lost in the change process. Additionally, the former stopped caring
about the fate of those losing and began despising them, considering
themselves exceptional and drawing that conclusion from the fact of
managing to find their place in the economic order created. The satisfaction
and pride stemming from the feeling of advantage were combined with the
humiliation of others. The processes described turned out to be permanent,
and the “losers” were growing convinced that their fate would never
change.
The “losers”–“winners” opposition became an understandable social
description of the consequences of the change implemented. It underlined
the significance of the competition for economic goods for interpreting
reality. It also announced that the competition had already taken place, the
final decisions had already been made and the contemporary situation of
many individuals and groups could not change further. Meanwhile, the
competition continued. Few individuals decided to withdraw from it, while
many others became certain that they joined it without having any chance
of winning it. It turned out that the spatial distribution of both these
communities, related to specific cities or regions, was decisive for the result
of the competition taking place, which more strongly limited some people’s
faith in victory. In fact, a lot of people were condemned to lose as a result of
it. The depth of the economic differences noticed between the inhabitants of
individual regions either limited or increased the chances of success. The
lack of complete knowledge of financial inequalities turned out to be useful
to those benefiting from the change (Jasiecki, 2010, p. 75), who could keep
increasing their advantage without any major obstacles. It led to sustaining
faith in the sense of participation in further competition and reduced the
tendency to reject participation in the order. The negative consequences for
competition participants also stemmed from it being extended, practically
ad infinitum. Such a situation meant functioning in constantly changing
conditions without any feeling of stability.
The consequences of the appearance of “winners” and “losers” were
visible on the structural plane. The nearly economically homogeneous
structure was changing. The level of wealth had the greatest impact on the
individuals growing apart. This growing distance was first defined by the
property owned and then other factors became more visible (such as
education or income). The number of differences was increasing over time
and, while not all of them coincided with the economic aspect, they
undoubtedly showed the presence and deepening of an opposing relation
within the structure, transforming into a conflict having a “total character”
(Siewierski, 2001, p. 61).
The processes taking place did not immediately form noticeable and
permanent differences concerning the changes. Representatives of all social
groups were on both sides of the social division, which featured both
supporters and opponents of the change (Hausner & Marody, 1999, p. 129).
The attitude towards the past and the identification with either post-
communist or post-Solidarity communities did not overlap with the social
maps of “losers” and “winners”. They were recruited from all the political
and ideological camps.
Any attempts at defining more precisely the composition of both sides
—the “losing” one and the “winning” one—are not easy. The researchers
employed various tools and methodologies to that end. The evaluations
depended not only on the time in which they were performed but also on
the intentions of the evaluator, their political preferences, the concept of
justice supported, one’s vision of good life, etc. The attempts at describing
the processes taking place and the quantitative composition of both sides
were also taken by politicians or journalists who participated in the
discourse themselves. Jacek Kuroń, a symbol of fighting poverty and
unemployment in the 1990s, claimed that over 40% of society needed to be
counted among “losers” and that only a few people were the privilege
beneficiaries of the change process. Meanwhile, according to Dariusz Filar,
the changes brought objective losses to about 33% of society, while about
17% profited from them (Gilejko, 2001, pp. 20–21).
The comparison of stratification between 1989 and 1995 allowed
noticing changes in the financial standing of many socio-professional
groups. The presence of four such groups was noticed, defined as follows:
“high income—gaining”, “low income—losing”, “medium income—
losing” and “low income—gaining”. Those four categories were intended to
describe the wealthiness transformation process taking place. That pattern
was created based on evaluations and declarations of the people surveyed
and therefore did not reflect the objective situation. An example of that is
the last group, consisting mainly of pensioners, reportedly gaining at the
time (Beskid, 1999, pp. 16–19). The pattern showed only the tendencies
appearing. Further studies over successes and failures of the transformation,
regarding the system change taking place during the years 1988–2000, were
conducted using factor-based analysis employing three variables—income
per person in the household, living standard of the household and financial
capabilities of the family—all of which showed five inseparable categories
of social positioning of individuals in 2000. They were as follows: the
category of “losers”, situated the lowest and constituting 14.7% of the
sample; the category of “non-winners”, constituting 45%; the category of
“non-losers” encompassing 33%; the category of “winners” encompassing
15.2% of the sample and, finally, the category of “superwinners”, which
encompassed 5.1% and included the most wealthy respondents. The
individuals from the “losers” category were in a situation of threat to their
biological basics of existence. The second category encompassed people
with drastically reduced capabilities to satisfy their basic needs. The
individuals in the third category achieved the level that satisfied their basic
needs. The fourth category encompassed individuals who found their place
in the new reality. The individuals in the last category, the “superwinners”,
lived at a level that the other ones could only dream of (Zaborowski, 2014,
pp. 332–333). The results confirmed that the division into the poor and the
rich, the “losers” and the “winners”, was consolidating.
Attempts were also made to define the composition of both sides using
listing the elements of constituent groups, either professional or territorial.
In the studies, the groups included most often among the “victims of the
transformation” were the farmers, farmer-workers and unqualified workers
(Zaborowski, 2014, p. 335). When talking about the “losers”, references
were made to territorial factors, disproportions and developmental
differences between the rural and urban areas. The economic data
confirmed the stagnation of Poland’s eastern regions, where the agricultural
economy had a high share. It also showed that unequal development
resulted from the transformation as well, not only from actions and
omissions during the communist period. The disproportions between major
cities and the rest of the country were visible, and those cities dominated
with regard to income (Kozak, 2010, p. 45). This process of unequal
experience of development was defined perfectly by Tadeusz
Klementewicz, who wrote that “the wealth generated stopped trickling
down” (2019). Thus, the fundamental conditions of the agreement
concluded between society and the liberal elites, saying that everyone
would benefit from the transformation, were undermined.
The first to “enter” the group of “winners” were the people who had
capital at their disposal, the power elites, including both the high-level
nomenklatura and the people originating from Solidarity. These groups had
“the positional and personal resources—particularly useful in system
transformation conditions—greater than any other social groups at their
disposal” (Jasiecki, 2002, p. 8). The community of the “winners” was
defined not only by social researchers or politicians. The society included
the “new nomenklatura”—i.e., the individuals who were assigned
management positions through political involvement—who established
their own private companies and took advantage of the network of contacts
and access to goods developed as a result of their political activity. In their
case, a major role was played by contacts, favours or possibilities of
returning these (Jarosz, 2004, p. 46).
The free market implemented created chances for entering the group of
“winners” not only to those individuals who had resources in the form of
political connections or past capital. The composition of the “winners” also
included the individuals who achieved success through their own work,
industriousness or an original business idea. Success appeared after over a
dozen years of hard, intensive work that employed education, skills,
qualification and the ability to sense the needs of society and discover gaps
in the free market. What was decisive was often young age, openness
towards the world, establishing international collaboration and knowledge
of foreign languages.
With time, the “winners” became interested in maintaining and
stabilising the order that had been formed. The conviction that the winners
(i.e., also the middle class) would become its supporters gained
confirmation. Stabilisation was also necessary to enable the “winners” to
take advantage of the goods they achieved and indulge in consumption they
felt they deserved. They considered that they earned those goods and
claimed that it happened according to fair rules of the market and according
to the competition standards adopted, even if those standards deviated from
the moral principles. For these reasons, they did not intend to hide their
consumption or limit it. These tendencies gained confirmation not only in
the public discourse but also in the course and results of all the
parliamentary and presidential elections in the twenty-first century
(Markowski et al., 2015).
The division between the “losers” and the “winners” constituted an
object of uncountable politicizations. Their main form was the opposition
against the increasing inequalities and the attempts at concealing them.
However, references were usually made to this division, thus politicizing in
different ways the dichotomy of transformation “gainers” and “losers”. An
example of such a repartition practice was underlining the existence of “two
Polands”, and the most famous one was the opposition between “Poland B”
and “Poland A” (Kęska, 2008, p. 51). However, subsequent politicizations
featured spatial or regional references that were characterised specifically.
In these oppositions, the dominant aspects were economic and cultural.
References to different attitudes and systems of values also appeared. The
political differences, recalled during an analysis of election results, were a
significant factor. This aspect of the division was referred to by the
comments of Anna Giza-Poleszczuk regarding the phenomenon of the
“two-vector nature”, consisting of the fact that two aspects of Poland were
emerging. On the one hand, “a modern, cosmopolitan, well-earning and
world-travelling Poland. On the other—the increasingly visible Poland
lagging behind: traditional, rural, and marginalised” (2004, p. 265).
Andrzej Rychard, in his book entitled Polska jedna czy wiele?,
presented his own perspectives on the division functioning on different
planes (2005, pp. 109–142). They were all created as a result of the
transformation of the “us” vs “them” and the “losers” vs “winners”
divisions, although it was hard to notice some of them in society. The
divisions listed became the basis for the intensive creation of repartition
practices. Here it is possible to list oppositions such as “Solidarity’s
Poland”–“post-communist Poland” (Hall, 1996), “enlightened
Poland”–“backwater Poland” (Bogucka, 1997) or “open Poland”–“closed
Poland” (Pycha, 2015, p. 14). In 2015, it was suggested that “Poland broke
into two halves, lordly and plebeian, content and wronged, modern and
traditional” (Kalukin, 2015, p. 8). The dichotomy of “true Poles” vs “false
Poles” fitted the same convention. The repartition practices referring to
“two Polands” were often employed due to how easy it was to create them
and prove their effectiveness.
The sociological studies started to feature attempts at breaking this
discursive two-way division and going beyond its consequences. The
pattern presenting the existence of “multiple Polands” was suggested by
Mirosława Marody. According to her, it was possible to distinguish “three
Polands”, differing in terms of the method of obtaining income. The first
one was the “capital Poland”, where income was obtained according to the
market logic. The second one was “state-employed Poland”, where income
originated from jobs assigned by the state. And the third one was “Poland
on benefits”, where the income originated from various benefits offered by
the state (1999).
The “us” vs “them” division was still present and continued to be
politicized even in the twenty-first century. It allowed the creation of
definitions of the time of transformation that underlined the feeling of
having been wronged that was still present in many individuals. The
constant existence of the “us” vs “them” division was confirmed by the
results of scientific research. An example of that is the research carried out
in 2007 (Kęska, 2008, p. 80). The party sustaining, generating and
maintaining this division in the social consciousness was society standing
before the said “them”. The people surveyed often determined the
composition of “them” using “discursive suggestions” of politicians. It
turned out that “them” still included a part of the old nomenklatura—the
one that achieved political and economic success. Thus, even though the
division was based on the communist past, it did not define the parties
solely in the categories of the former system but also based on new
inequalities, differences in income and disposal of goods.
Such a recognition of the division was solidified due to a negative
evaluation of the social reality and dissatisfaction with the condition of the
state. The disappointment with the state, the functioning of administration
and public offices and the attitude of the public sector employees towards
citizens made many individuals aware of the continued existence of “them”.
The ineffectiveness of the state and the administration was noticed, as well
as the lack of responsibility for the common good and the politicians’
interest being limited only to guarding their own interests. These
pathologies not only delegitimised the ruling elites and increased the
frustration of the losing groups and the sense of threat, but also maintained
authentic polarisation, including the transformed “us” vs “them” division.
For a part of Polish society, the promise of satisfaction of needs was
fulfilled and some were also able to satisfy their non-material needs. Any
satisfaction of needs or the lack thereof solidified the significance of the
“losers” vs “winners” division. The former were enclosed in a world of
fight for material survival, while the latter—especially their children—
could focus on new experiences, thus manifesting their new advantages. In
some people, they transformed into unrestrained consumption. On the other
hand, others did not even dream of consumption as their lives consisted of
fighting for elementary existence. Being excluded from consumption was
painful, especially when a part of society experienced full “freedom of
consumption”, i.e., a specific power available to the few people having high
income at their disposal (Żuk & Żuk, 2014, p. 10). In such conditions, the
feeling of being a “loser” was becoming exacerbated.
The dream of consumption led many individuals to intensify their action
to increase their available funds. What became a reality were the claims of
free market enthusiasts regarding material aspirations as “growth-driving
mechanisms”. On the other hand, costs at the personality level appeared in
the form of imperfectly satisfied consumption aspirations. This was
particularly visible at the level of existing relations, many of which became
transformed. Those originating from communist times rarely remained and
most changed under the influence of the free market rules. In social
relations, the decisive role started to be played by the material aspect.
People who were not achieving success separated themselves from others,
limited relations and started believing that the “loser” tag functioning in the
public discourse could be justified in their case. The lack of participation in
the “consumption show” (Greda, 2012, p. 87) generated a feeling of
inferiority and being handicapped, as well as limited chances for adopting
new identities. Instead of bringing equality for all, as assumed, consumption
deepened the sense of injustice in people. Instead of making everyone
similar, it made people experience differences in the disposal of goods.
The differentiation of society was strengthened through media and
symbolic measures (Zagórski & Strzeszewski, 2000). Mass culture did this,
the new patterns of cynical consumption and the dominant media that also
dealt with the “seduction” of consumers (Ziółkowski, 2006, p. 156). The
anxiety and sense of injustice, due to unsatisfied consumption needs, were
aggravated by producers of individual goods who left no choices to
individuals in their advertisements. They convinced people that purchasing
their products would make their dreams of happiness come true. They said
that buying a specific product would be a conscious choice, fitting an
individual into the current trends and showing support for its modernity and
progress. It was supposed to provide safety, return health, increase the
chances of finding a partner desired and protect against death, disease and
other unpleasant events. But not only those above-listed forms of narration
caused a sense of unfulfillment and bitterness and generated anxiety
(Pieszek, 2012, p. 117). Such conditions also came as a surprise since the
anxiety was supposed to be forever forgotten together with the fall of
communism.

The “Solidary”–“Liberal” Practice as a

Confirmation of the Continuity of Divisions
The economic inequalities between the “losers” and the “winners” were
often politicized in political programmes and discourse. A part of these
processes were also specific project of social and support activities. The
polarisation was complemented by negative opinions on the economic
changes and criticism of the consequences of the transformation carried out.
Thus, the negative attitude of some voters towards inequalities and
neoliberal mechanisms was not a temporary creation, but had existed in the
discourse since 1989 (Obacz, 2018, p. 179) and constituted an element of
consciousness of a significant part of society (Krzemiński, 2005, p. 20).
During the periods between elections, the inequalities were battled
using various solutions limiting certain consequences of the reforms. These
projects’ effectiveness and capacity for reducing inequalities turned out to
be rather limited, as shown by the above-presented data regarding growing
economic differences. Besides, the solutions implemented were often purely
propagandist and only pretended to solve problems while not eliminating
the discriminations present. It was a persistent and fundamental part of the
dominant order, built around specific meritocracy and total rejection of
ideas of redistribution, interventionism, statism or extensive social welfare
system. What surprised society was the fact that the social policy was not
carried out by the post-communist cabinets that referred to social
sensibility. For these reasons, the post-communists were associated with
neoliberals and accused of abandoning the left-wing programme, adopting
the neoliberal ideology and participating in forming the “unjust and
corrupting order of the Third Polish Republic” (Krzemiński, 2005).
To increase the chances of introducing solutions based on redistributive
justice, repartitions were also employed that underlined the oppression of
neoliberal hierarchies and vertical systems filled with aversion towards
other individuals that refused to grant them dignity due to them not having
basic goods at their disposal. The best-known repartitions reflecting these
hierarchies were two dichotomies: “Fourth Polish Republic”–“Third Polish
Republic” (Szalkiewicz, 2007, pp. 19–21) and “solidary Poland”–“liberal
Poland”. The former focused on injustices resulting from the weakness of
the state and the dominance of systems that took control over it. It played a
significant role in the election campaigns (Śpiewak, 2010, p. 22) that led to
the formation of the cabinet and the office of the president being taken by
Lech Kaczyński in 2005. It focused more on social and economic
inequalities. Both these dichotomies were similar, although they referred to
different aspects of the “losers” vs “winner” division. A confirmation of
that can be found in one of the election slogan related to the first
dichotomy: “Fourth Polish Republic—Justice for All” (Michoń, 2016, p.
178).
The “solidary Poland”–“liberal Poland” repartition referred to the
“marginalised usefulness” of the idea of community and collective actions
known from the times of fighting communism. In terms of symbolism, it
referred to the period of August 1980 and the formation of “Solidarity”
(Kubisiak, 2005). It also received a strong relation with the domination of
the time of community that was previously defined as “us”. The word
solidary carried positive historical connotations and linked contemporary
times to the fight and values of the “Solidarność” Independent Self-
Governing Trade Union. It pointed to solidarity and social paternalism
(Rubisz, 2010, p. 66) and referred to the redistributive justice concept in a
different form. “Solidarity” meant caring for all the citizens through fair
redistribution of goods (Nalewajko, 2010, p. 241). The solidarity preferred
did not mean “economic backwardness, autarky or the communist
uravnilovka (i.e., unreasonable and unjustified equalisation). It is only about
enabling everyone, not only the richest, to take advantage of the fruit of
economic growth. In other words, it is necessary to distribute the wealth
fairly, which does not necessary mean doing it according to the ‘to each
equally’ principle” (Figiel, 2009, p. 110). The practice did not reject the
foundations of the meritocratic concept, but stated the need to eliminate the
related distortions that appeared after 1989. It was not “friendly” to
neoliberalism and valued it in a clearly negative way, rejected all of its
pathologies. The practice did not make this ideology repulsive to society
overnight. This repulsion was caused by its proponents, who had referred to
that ideology for many years and sustained the conviction of its unique
character. The conviction that neoliberalism meant ruthlessness and
exploitation and furthered only the interests of the rich was not something
that could be created within a single campaign. Thus, the practice was a
“summary” of the long-standing criticism of neoliberalism and underlined
its negative role in building social relations. The practice exposed the
neoliberal fraud consisting of convincing that the differences between those
losing and winning on the transformation would be only of ranking nature,
would not bring about any other consequences and would be temporary.
Starting with the moment of its appearance, the practice called for
undermining the hierarchies shaped, formed an opposition between “just
Poland” and “unjust Poland” and employed the justice idea resources
intensively (Obacz, 2018, p. 200). The practice opposed the negative social
and economic consequences of the implementation of neoliberal solutions
and questioned continuing them in the previous form. It was without
compromise as the feeling of a large part of society supported it
(Zaborowski, 2014, p. 331). The repartition delegitimised the order since it
added all the actions expanding the poverty and discrimination, as well as
both existing and sustained forms of distribution and division of goods. In
this manner, it “utilised” the issues known to a large part of society and was
a discursive story about the negative experiences of a large part of society.
It reached for both current experiences and past, already forgotten ones.
Without any scruples, it took advantage of the hierarchy of wrongs society
became aware of. By “opening old wounds”, it called to reduce them and
eliminate them from the relations.
The unfair economic hierarchy dominated the repartition, a part of
which was the social hierarchies and the existing differences in the
distribution of prestige and dignity. The consequences of economic failure
translated to many spheres of life of individuals, and one of them was the
attitude of those benefiting from the change towards the “losers”. It
manifested in denying respect to societies, groups and people who had
difficulties managing the new reality. They were convinced—unfortunately,
also through humiliation—that they should be unhappy with themselves. It
is not surprising, then, that it was a capacious space for generating emotions
stemming from numerous wrongs, negative experiences and bitterness
caused by the failures experienced. It directed its message towards those
exploited at work, unfairly discharged, publicly ridiculed and referred to
over the years as losers, clients or “costs of the transformation”.
Sociological studies confirmed this—the systematically growing
disproportion between the “losers” and the “winners” was not only
noticeable, but caused growing negative emotions among the people
surveyed (Jarosz & Kozak, 2008, p. 316).
Referring to the discriminating side—having economic advantage and
power at its disposal—as “liberal” constituted not only questioning of these
advantages but also the method of obtaining them (i.e., the long-standing
neoliberal politics associated with dishonest activities). Therefore, a
substantial part of the practice was the moral asymmetry present between
the two sides (Obacz, 2018, p. 175), consisting of denying advantage and
respect to the beneficiaries of the transformation. In fact, those who
achieved their success fairly were pooled together with those who
employed morally questionable methods. By employing the “honest vs
dishonest” opposition, the practice suggested that “liberalism” had a lining
of unfairness, leading to many groups being deprived of benefits from
changes as if it was only one side that “grabbed” all the goods for itself.
Such an approach was followed by moral condemnation of the political
elites who led the majority of society to poverty. The practice was a
suggestion of an alternative morality, a new social justice and conducting
politics based on equal utilisation “of the blessings of free Poland”
(Borowiec, 2021, pp. 75–94). This is symbolised perfectly by one of the
many statements from Lech Kaczyński from 2009, who called for “a Poland
for everyone, not only for the rich” (Lech, 2019).
The practice did not define clearly the composition of “losers”, nor did
it intend to specify all the “winners”. The affiliation was made nearly
voluntary, and no one was limited in terms of identification and fitting their
own experience of being wronged in the suggested dichotomous description
of reality. That does not mean, however, that no one was invited to join the
solidary or that the political opponents were not pushed away towards the
“liberal”. The composition of both sides was described precisely in the
discourse and sometimes consciously complemented. Depending on the
course of the campaign, individuals or groups could become qualified
among the “liberal”. Although there were certain unspoken limitations, the
entrance to the solidary camp was open to everyone, while there were a few
groups and individuals who had no access to the liberal one. Those included
the groups that were directly associated with the liberal reforms and those
political opponents who were responsible for the neoliberal reforms. In
2007, this meant the richest oligarchs who had good relations with politics,
politicians with liberal views or representatives of former communist circles
(Kochanowicz, 2007, p. 1). Therefore, a differentiating factor
complementing the compositions of both sides of the repartition was also
the attitude towards the communist past and “towards the consequences of
transformation, as well as the evaluation whether the post-1989 political
system is ‘just’” (Obacz, 2018, p. 220).
The quick and extensive determination of the composition of the
“liberal” side by the creator of this practice could have brought negative
political consequences and limited the potential voter base. A voter
counting themselves among “losers” may have learned that those applying
the practice include them among the “winners”. Such an approach could
thwart the socio-political impact of the practice. That is why a rational
solution was to convince further groups that they were ignored and
disregarded by the liberal governments, and some of them did experience
such an attitude. The solidary were always identified with individuals who
had trouble managing the existing normative chaos, not only in the sphere
of economy. This is indirectly confirmed by the studies conducted by
Mikołaj Cześnik and Michał Kotnarowski, which showed how the
dichotomy discussed was anchored in the social structure (2011, pp. 154–
155).
The practice discussed suggested a political and economic alternative
and gave it a special meaning (Obacz, 2018, p. 206), as well as focused on
popularising it. It was a political invitation to participate in democracy—
through activity at the ballot box and also through increasing the share of
“losers” in consumption. The practical actions were directed towards those
most impoverished, and the funds granted to them were supposed to create
a sense of improvement in life and bring a moment of satisfaction. The
confirmation and continuation of the income redistribution were to lead to
the creation of a welfare state where everyone would live at a high standard.
The egalitarian policy applied was to lead to the elimination of the
economic gap between the urban and rural population and between the
inhabitants of the western and eastern regions of Poland. According to the
politicians employing the practice discussed, the path to equalising the
standard of living would include continuing the sustainable development
policy and creating mechanisms modernising the economy ((pm) 2019).
The above determination regarding the “solidary Poland”–“liberal
Poland” dichotomy confirms that it was not a division, but another practice,
speaking towards both those who lost and those who gained on the long-
standing transformation, especially the economic one. It “recreated” a
division fundamental for the Third Polish Republic period, similar to many
other practices suggested to the recipients. All the repartitions “based” on
the “losers”–“winners” division became further proposals and simplified
definitions of the imperfect reality. They spoke to those who, for various
reasons, were unable to take advantage of the fruit of the change, felt
humiliated, wronged and treated unfairly. As it was underlined in the work
entitled “A Discarded Past. The End of Post-Communism in Poland”
(Borowiec, 2022), the practice was a political call directed at those who
also wanted to “have a barbecue” (i.e., rest after their everyday work). They
wanted peace and a sense that their years of hard work (as not everyone was
avoiding it) also brought them benefits and satisfaction, that they could be
“winners”.
 The relation between the “solidary Poland”–“liberal Poland” repartition
and the “losers”–“winners” division of the transformation period is
confirmed by numerous definitions presented in the political discourse,
intended in practice to question this repartition and transform or even
eliminate its revolutionary character. In 2005, Donald Tusk said: “Solidarity
can never mean one against the other. (…) We will not build solidary
Poland by dividing people—the way we both heard during the campaign
and hear now—into the weaker and the stronger, the poorer and the richer,
the workers and the businesspeople” (quoted after: Figiel, 2009, pp. 112–
113). There are many examples of the “neutralisation” of the practice and
weakening its harmful impact on liberal circles. In 2007, Bronisław
Komorowski underlined that this opposition was “a fraud worthy of
Goebbels”, completely untrue and instrumentally forged. Turning towards
the politicians employing that dichotomy, he said: “You are lying to Poland
by telling it’s split in half, while you sense yourself that it is completely not
true” (PAP, 2007). Descriptions saying that the dichotomy is no longer
applicable were also a redefinition of the practice: “Today there is no longer
any such thing as a clash of liberal Poland with solidary Poland. All the
parties are solidary nowadays, to a lesser or greater extent” (Koziński,
2019).
Criticism of the practice also originated from the scientific community,
although it rarely went beyond political attempts at weakening it
(Krzemiński, 2005, pp. 20–21). The critics of the repartition discussed
underlined that the adopted method of understanding solidarity may lead to
arresting the market processes and consolidating an obsolete economic
model. It was noticed that the idea of solidarity understood in the collective
aspect (community values) may lead to limiting individual freedoms (e.g.,
through top-down enforcement of principles and values considered the only
valid ones) (Sanecka-Tyczyńska, 2011, p. 115).
The politicization of the “losers”–“winners” division did not end with
the “solidary Poland”–“liberal Poland” repartition being employed. Its
direct extension, next to the whole discourse regarding social inequalities,
was the “Poland plus”–“Poland minus” dichotomy (Baran, 2019), showing
two different worlds, filled with differences, which the voters again had to
choose between. The notion of “plus” referred to a part of programmes,
particularly welfare and social programmes, implemented by the right-wing
parties during the 2015–2019 term, being practical forms of changing the
unjust hierarchies included in the “solidary Poland”–“liberal Poland”
repartition.
The most important element of the “Poland plus” vision was
maintaining the redistribution policy introduced, which resulted from the
continuously excessive economic differentiation of society. It was
underlined that there were still both wealthy and poor regions: “However,
certain large regions of our country have 30% of [what] Warsaw [has]. It is
a tremendous difference. (…) You can find districts in Poland that may have
an income per capita that is ten times lower than the one in Warsaw. It is a
situation that needs to be changed, and the policy that we are implementing
is leading towards that consistently” (Baran, 2019). That is why it was
further declared that the introduction of equal chances for anyone,
irrespective of their place of residence, would be pursued. A solution to
these problems could be a welfare state, an institution modelled after the
Western version of it, but improved, with Polish features that take
traditional values into account. The task of such a state was to improve
everyone’s standard of living up to the level enjoyed by the inhabitants of
the wealthiest European countries. The appearance of such an institution
was supposed to ensure decent living for everyone without having to form
informal systems and fight for unjustified privileges. The welfare state was
also supposed to be a state based on justice, freedom and solidarity.
“Poland minus” was presented as a threat to the continuation of
egalitarian activities as a dominance standing in the way of justice and
equality. It was supposed to block all the actions aimed at increasing the
living standard of families and stand on the way towards eliminating other
hierarchies in which it retained its domination. It was supposed to
counteract the elimination of inequalities carried out through social
programmes. “Poland minus” was the past that fought for its present
privileges. It still did not care “for the common good, for the interest of all
citizens, but only for the interests of selected circles and social groups”
(List, 2019). “Polska minus” was characterised by a lack of any plans for
economy, growth or support for social groups and only guarded interests of
certain groups. That is why it was reminded that it was a “Poland of
injustice, inequality and powerlessness”, without the “500+” programme,
extra pensions, time, funds recovered from VAT fraud networks and
lowered retirement age (Bogdańska, 2019). “Polska minus” meant
privileges for a part of society, a return “in the direction of post-
communism, in the direction of everything that limited our possibilities,
hurt so many people and led to the chances we had during those past
30 years being taken advantage of only partially” (gah/PAP, 2019). The
claim regarding the desire to return was illustrated with examples of
questioning and undermining of all the initiatives leading to the elimination
of inequalities. The trademark of “Poland minus” was the actions
suspending any attempts at helping the poorest. It was claimed that such
actions of the political opposition aimed at defending the privileged, who
guarded their position.
The presumptive victory of politicians defined as “Poland minus” was
to mean the return to the undeserved elevation of the groups whose values
were foreign to the majority of society. That Poland represented the strong
and rich, reportedly supporting a further continuation of the moral
revolution and destroying the state’s moral order. The threat was also
supposed to result from the introduction of sexual education at schools for
the youngest children. This education was described as “purposeful
demoralisation, conducted in a calculated manner in order to focus the child
on matters that they should not even think about at this age” (PAP, 2019).

The Practices of Repartition—Consequences of a

Homogeneous Society
At the beginning of the 1990s, the domination of the religious community
and national community was universally noticed, but raised no objections.
Both communities sustained a high level of social homogeneity. Such a
structure was not an obstacle to introducing market-based economic
solutions, but was not consistent with the cultural pluralism expected.
Especially so, since in the 1990s, a part of society accepted the ideological
message that the purpose of the order is also appreciating cultural
differences (Żuk & Żuk, 2014, p. 9). However, focusing on the material
dimension of life and problems with existential survival limited the rate of
alternative lifestyles coming out of hiding. It turned out that they were not
the first need of the majority of society experiencing economic difficulties.
However, the cultural variety was expected, supported and sometimes
intensively inspired by many individuals. The actions referred to as
“looking for differences” fit into creating it, which is why sometimes this
process consisted of building differences. The aim of such a “mechanical”
differentiation was the emergence of differences from a homogeneous
society. They consisted of extensive actions aimed at showing that there
exist individuals using patterns different from those imposed by the
monocultural reality. Some useful activity methods were marches,
happenings, provocations or mocking initiatives aimed at discrediting the
“old” values. They were also supposed to show alternatives to the dominant
communities.
The possibility of choice was to constitute a feature of the order created,
where it was assumed that this was going to happen in a society of people
having the time and freedom to shape their own lives at their disposal. In
order to achieve the above objectives, it was necessary not only to improve
the economic conditions or suggest new ways of life, but also to reduce the
significance of those already dominating in society—and these were the
models of majority communities: national and religious. However, it is
necessary to remember that the majorities creating the dominant entities
were not tight-knit, uniform and homogeneous communities—it was only
the appearance they usually took in the consciousness and communications
of those competing with them. According to the rules of democracy, they
had an impact on the legislation and judicature, allowing privileges and
advantages. Without limiting the influence of these groups, it was
impossible for the values of minority groups to participate equally in the
culture. Similarly to how the economic groups excluded after 1989
undermined the dominance of the neoliberal ideology, the minorities later
excluded put their claims for dignity forward. The task they set for
themselves was to weaken the dominant communities, the value orders of
which prohibited making free choices. That is why the hazard was situated
in Christian morality, claiming the right to decide what a decent life worthy
of support is. The culprit was seen in the Catholic Church, which claimed
the right to define what was good and what was evil (kb, 2019a). The
groups demanding rights and dignity undermined the monopoly of religious
communities for moralising, imposing lifestyles, instructing and
admonishing. At the same time, it was added that there was no place in the
world of “free choices” for those “denying others the right to choose”. The
actions listed constituted a part of the process—in line with the arguments
communicated—of implementing pluralism, eliminating existing prejudice
and unblocking the inhibited and supervised processes of the emergence of
authentic differences. From a long-term perspective, what began was the
installation of the concept of a new vision of the human being, not only
professing humanist values but also sanctioning materialism, consumerism
(Ziółkowski et al., 2020, pp. 56–61), relativism and cultural post-
modernism.
Striving to make the values of cultural liberalism appear in reality, to
extend the sphere of choice led to an inevitable clash with religious and
moral standards and conservative values (Figiel, 2009, p. 118). It was
impossible to introduce the alternative values without undermining the
dominant communities’ cultural homogeneity and political privileges,
eliminating homogeneity resulting in the feeling of “social closure” and
breaking up with the single model of life imposed on individuals.
Therefore, statements appeared regarding these communities not being
compatible with contemporary times in view of limiting other individuals.
At the same time, those criticising severed ties with these communities and
argued that they had no obligations towards them. References were made to
building an order to be “dominated by a variety of communities”.
It was argued, however, that privileges for everyone do not appear as a
result of the goodwill of the dominating groups and waiving their
advantages to the benefit of the legacy, values and identities of minorities
willingly waives power or domination for anyone. Thus, it was necessary to
limit them politically and underline the necessity to reject all
discrimination. Also, these were not imagined problems, created for a
political game by small political circles. Reminding of the differences
between the dominating groups and those deprived of rights, as well as
showing the situation of minority groups, ethnic or sexual, was inevitable in
view of individuals who experienced exclusion. The political actions fit into
“forming space for these groups” in the homogeneous order and took a
moral aspect.
Diversity could not come into existence without systematic “uncovering
and discovering” the dominated lifestyles. The delay in this process, typical
for contemporary societies, was caused by the long-standing “us”–“them”
division and the continuing socio-economic crisis. Forty-five years under
communist rule also were of significance here. As Paweł Śpiewak noted:
“Communism was a sort of a refrigerator that froze or hid deeper social
divisions, which emerged only in conditions of liberty and democratic
freedoms, and deepened significantly as a result of social processes taking
place in recent years” (2005, p. 160). This applied mainly to cultural
divisions stemming from the domination of religions, nation or a family-life
model. The “unfreezing” did not take place automatically, but it was
becoming increasingly intensive and noticeable with time. These matters
were gaining significance.
The state institutions played the decisive role in rivalry for which
lifestyle is to be dominant. The observation of the actions of the neoliberal
elites confirmed that considering the state an arena where various groups
and cultural differences could appear had no confirmation in reality. The
state that existed did not lead to assigning equal rights to all groups. The
idea that no model of life cannot be privileged remained in the declarative
sphere. The state was not neutral to which communities had a decisive
voice. The ruling neoliberal elites took advantage of the state institutions
and funds to support the values close to them. It was not a surprise that the
ruling elites turned out to be “biased” in supporting various groups and their
values. The authorities made choices according to their own values, and it
was according to them that they stigmatised the existing constraints and
privileges. They did not adopt a pluralist stance, but preferred individualist
values while at the same time ridiculing and excluding the collective ones.
Neoliberals were not too interested in communities and therefore rejected
the need to create social cohesion and even attempted to disintegrate
society, although they did not abandon creating and promoting “substitute”
ideas or communities. An example of that is the concept of civic society
that had been promoted for many years, which was sometimes set in
opposition to the nation or the religious or ethnic groups.
The undermining of the dominance of religious or national values meant
questioning these communities’ contemporary meaning for the functioning
of the order. The postulates to undermine the advantage of these
communities resulted not only from the desire to replace the communality
with autonomic individuals but even creating new categories of “us”. Such
a task was also extremely difficult as “(…) the most energetic attempts at
deriving “us” from “me”, at stemming a community from an individual,
made by the most gifted thinkers ultimately end in failure” (Lash, 2009, p.
202). The politicians could not do it in practice, even those representing the
interests of the excluded. It resulted from the fact that “a community does
not consist of sharing the same interest. Political parties and social classes
—characterised by common interests—are not communities” (Lash, 2009,
p. 207). For the process to succeed, it needs to be based on values
connecting the individuals, not interests. It is indispensable for the
communities to be organised according to values, providing a basis for the
framework of group identity. Only a community of values, justice and
equality builds social coherence.
The above claims undermined the existing hierarchies. These actions
took place in line with the known mechanism of elevating the dominated
groups. The fight for changing the hierarchy was also a fight with
uniformity and its authority figures and symbols. The commencement of
this rivalry with new fields of conflict with the dominant identities
automatically invited uncertainty and threat into the social reality. It
destroyed the joy, particularly the sense of victory of communities
dominating after 1989. This was confirmed perfectly by a statement from
many Church hierarchs outraged that there was not even enough time to
“enjoy the victory over communism” in peace and even surprised by the
demand and assessments directed towards them. Previously, a similar
surprise was experienced by certain post-Solidarity politicians responsible
for building the neoliberal economic world of wealth when the voters
suddenly withdrew their support for them. Some post-Solidarity politicians
were outraged that someone might not appreciate their effort, merits,
involvement and sacrifice (Jakubowska, 2009, pp. 223–224). The level of
unpreparedness of the majority groups to defend the values considered
important was commonly noticed. They became the victims of the created
illusion of strength and significance in which they were functioning.
Questioning of dominance included examples of subordination,
exclusion of LGBT individuals and stories of individuals unable to find a
place for themselves in society existing, supplemented with definitions of
new values and significance for society. Their disposal of exception
aesthetics, sense of taste or sensibility was underlined. Their capabilities for
creating politics and culture were discussed, and examples of historical
achievements of people belonging to ethnic or sexual minorities were
referred to. Their lifestyle, views and values were positioned on the polar
opposite concerning the conservative values of the dominant communities.
Examples of such returning of place in the political community were the
campaigns of support of unbelievers, Romani and other ethnic groups. One
of the symbolic actions, carried out since 2010, had been “I Miss You, Jew”
(Polish: Tęsknię za Tobą Żydzie) (Kowalska, 2010). A similar role was
performed by Tolerance Marches or Equality Parades. Such actions were
dedicated to many individuals from the minority groups “retrieved from
oblivion”, and their role and contribution to the culture were presented. The
sense of social significance was returned to them.
The fight for the minority groups “coming out of the shadows” started
with striving to be “seen” and “heard”, and translated into actions leading to
political emancipation. In the election campaigns, intensive actions and
messages of left-wing parties appeared. An example of that is the demand
for the right to express opinions in media and present the fundamental
standards and values, for example, by homosexual couples. This does not
mean that all the representatives of these minorities had such a sense of
discrimination and exclusion. However, bringing them to light—as the
majority of society was unusually unaware of them—was made a political
task by the left-wing parties. This extended the field of discourse by further
fragmenting of unjust reality and took the dispute beyond the existing
divisions. It hit the existing discourse blocks and the most widespread
politicizations of economic inequalities. The excluded started becoming
organised and fighting the reality that was hierarchical and homogeneous to
them. It was a fight similar to that carried out by the economically excluded
(i.e., the “losers” of the transformation process). With time, the activity of
people and parties referring to the excluded led to a powerful question mark
being put regarding the domination of the majority.
Again, the repartition practices were employed for presenting these
divisions. It was recognised that to achieve the elimination of inequalities, it
was not enough to just request the rights, document the exclusion, destroy
hierarchy, create an atmosphere of compassion and wait patiently for the
way of life valuable to the excluded to become accepted. It is not enough to
arouse social interest, and the campaigns aimed at supporting the excluded
are not of much use either as the social division slowly disappears when
using them. Repartitions turned out to be useful yet again, similarly to the
cause of “us”–“them” or “losers”–“winners” divisions. This time, another
division had become crystallised in the form of conflict between the values
of majority communities and those of minority groups. It was also referred
to suggestively by opposing the “order of conservative values” to the “order
of cultural liberalism values” (Figiel, 2009, p. 118). The division so defined
was created over time and first influenced the relations, being invisible and
not translating to social conflicts.
 The repartition practices referring to that division and reflecting the
discrimination of minorities and philosophical beliefs were offered
intensively to voters by politicians. They appeared already after 1989 but
intensified in the 2010s. In 2006, the “normal Poland”–“abnormal Poland”
repartition appeared. In 2015, one of the politicians spoke of “open Poland”
where, among others, “no one interferes too much in the life of citizens
without good reason” (Pycha, 2015), suggesting that there also exists a
“closed Poland” filled with domination and supervision by others.
However, such inequalities appeared the strongest in another practice,
contrasting “rational Poland” with “radical Poland” (Andrzej, 2015). This
practice had already been employed in various forms since the 1990s and
referred to voters who felt the domination of people “unwilling to
compromise”, extremists, people of extreme views and tendencies (Beczek,
2015)—including those politically frustrated. The “radical” side, also
referred to as the “Poland of quarrelling, Poland of conflict, Poland of
rejection of each other” (PAP, 2015b) or “Poland of dispute and aggression”
(PAP, 2015c), was dominated by fanatics threatening the freedom and not
allowing others to take advantage of theirs. Those presenting a radical,
national-Catholic, uncompromising vision of the world and their
dominances were shown explicitly. It was claimed that they were replacing
compromise with a “fundamentalist principle of getting one’s own way”
(tw, PAP, 2015). Radicalism was a threat to the public debate and, therefore,
there were appeals for not letting it “set the tone of the public debate in
Poland, divide Poles into better and worse ones and destroy the chance for
political compromises” ((JS) 2015). Further specifications left no doubt
where the threat to the egalitarian order was present: “There is a
fundamentalist radicalism growing in the young generation of Poles. Let us
pray for them to emigrate as soon as possible, thank to which we will be
able to protect the order” (mkd, 2015). Due to their numbers and the values
they presented, the “radical” were allegedly generating negative emotions,
fear and anxiety, and standing in the way of achieving rights and a decent
living for the excluded.
The dichotomy applied left no illusions. Next to the “radical” were the
discriminated and the excluded, disposing of rationality, creating a “civic
Poland” ((bs) 2015b), “Poland of freedom”, “Poland of responsibility”
(PAP, 2015f), “European Poland” (MT, 2015) or “Poland of cooperation and
Poland of national concord” (PAP, 2015b). One of the candidates (during
the Polish presidential elections of 2015) directed the following words to
them: “I turn to those of you who particularly value moderation, dialogue
and compromises in public life—as a method of political activity; to those
who do not stand on the barricades of radicalism and do not want to do it,
those who reject seeking ideological wars, those who respect different
sensibilities of other co-citizens, often different from their own. Let us not
allow the radicalism to set the tone of the public debate in Poland, divide
Poles into better and worse ones and destroy the chance for political
compromises” ((JS) 2015). After losing in the elections, he kept declaring
that he would be “a part of the front defending Poland against the radical
right-wing groups” ((jsch) 2015). In another campaign, this time for
parliamentary elections, the rivalry with the “radical” was continued by
declaring that: “We will not let the radicals tear Poland apart” (PAP, 2015e).
The philosophical matters, including the right to modern and
progressive life and equal rights of the minority groups, manifested in these
repartitions in underlining the problems of differences in approach towards
the in vitro method. The candidate of the “radical” side in the presidential
elections in 2015 represented “dangerous and tremendously outrageous”
views on this matter. He was reportedly an opponent of this method because
it was unnatural and incompatible with the teachings of the Catholic
Church. It was also alleged that he supported a draft solution assuming the
imprisonment of women taking advantage of the in vitro method (PAP,
2015a). An opinion was expressed that “an attempt at punishing with
imprisonment for using in vitro is a type of cruelty stemming from
fundamentalism” (Komorowski, 2015). The standing of one of the
candidates so presented provided a basis for describing the dominance
towards infertile individuals demanding the possibility of using the in vitro
method. Thus, this practice, anchored in cultural differences between the
dominant communities and the excluded minority groups, was supposed to
present a reality dominated by the Catholic worldview.
As a continuation of this practice, the “theocratic republic” was opposed
to the “civic state”, and the act of refusal of domination of the former, a
single system of values, was the declaration: “I do not want to live in a
theocratic republic” ((RC) 2015a). The “theocratic republic” was supposed
to appear after the right-wing parties’ success in elections and cause a major
regression in Poland. There were warnings that steps were being made
towards a new Poland—theocratic, right-wing, hierarchical and based on
symbols (Środa, 2015). On the other hand, there would be normalcy,
defined in the electoral and political aspect through the following statement:
“(…) My party provides people with a very large sphere of freedom. We do
not want to control Poles but provide them with conditions in which they
will be able to make independent decisions. We cannot accept censorship of
the conscience that Law and Order intends to impose upon all of us” ((KT)
2015). The practice showed not only different values, but also the
dominance of the “radical ones”, and rejected them simultaneously. It also
presented two hierarchies, one with dominances, where the “radical” were
dominating, and another, where the “rational” (Henzel, 2015) deserved a
new, higher position in the hierarchies of the order. The practice equalised
the chances, “added” certain privileges to some and removed certain
privileges from others. However, it also entailed a lack of respect towards
anyone identifying in any form with the radical, who preferred
fundamentalist values, which—in the electoral aspect—was supposed to
discourage voters from identifying with the right-wing parties. Respect and
moral and intellectual high ground were assigned only to the rational, while
others were denied these characteristics.
The practice analysed was transformed intensively. One of the most
exposed of its subsequent discursive version was the dichotomy of: “Poland
of oppression”–“Poland of freedom”. It fit the division created whole and
supplemented the “radical”–“rational” opposition. In the new variety, it was
the freedom, responsibility for one’s own decisions and words, trust,
openness and tolerance that were highlighted. The “Poland of freedom” was
supposed to respect people’s views and, therefore, diversity. In 2019, the
most frequently employed repartition practice, underlining the issues of
freedom and respect for the law and including the objection against its
violation by the authorities, was the “democratic opposition”–“non-
democratic” government dichotomy (kb, 2019b).
The “Poland of oppression” focused on being oppressive, was full of
suspicion and distrust towards every citizen and was accused of interfering
with their life. It was not changing and was still focused on “provoking
citizens to commit wrong deeds to catch them red-handed and make an
example of them before a court” (Bronisław, 2015). It lurked for those
citizens and argued that there was always some dirt to be found on
someone, wanting the draw out the worst from them. The representatives of
that Poland were reportedly claiming that everyone has some dirty secret
waiting to be discovered, “for example, during an investigation or a trial”
(Głowacka, 2015). The “Poland of oppression” was to take the appearance
of a theocratic state, a museum of fanaticism, similar to Iran, characterised
by “medieval views” ((br) 2015). In such a state, the secular authorities
would be guided by ultra-Catholic and ideological premises. It was
suggested that the “‘oppressive’ wanted ‘an ideological war and taking us
back to the Middle Ages” (Geje, 2015). For example, the following
comment was made: “With all my sympathy towards the Middle Ages, I am
noticing phenomena similar to those of those times: reckoning people for
their views, pushing people beyond the Church community and beyond the
sphere of patriotism” ((JM) 2015).
On another occasion, the division was drawn even more precisely, using
a statement that the voters are choosing between “a free Poland, pro-
European, respecting every citizen and telling them that their private
property is undeniable, or a Poland that they described in the draft
constitution, a place where the equal status of men and women is fading and
where the independence of judges is undermined” (PAP, 2015d). The
“Poland open to Europe” and “anti-European Poland” opposition appeared
exceptionally often. The latter was also referred to as “xenophobic Poland
with its back turned towards the European problems, aversive and
aggressive” ((RC) 2015b). The European one focused on patriotism “that is
not against other, against Europe, but is a part of the European identity and
respects everyone with whom we live together within unified borders, in
one great Europe” (PAP, 2015i). It showed on one side those “who are
afraid of Europe and use it to scare people” and those “who are not afraid of
Europe and do not make a scare out of it” ((pp) 2015).
It was underlined that a condition of variety and tolerance was making
compromises (Bronisław, 2015). There were references to an example of
limiting the freedom of expressing opinions and demonstrating them in
public places. Some of the examples referred to were anti-gay
manifestations, claiming that one of the candidates taking part in the
elections would undoubtedly be “a shield against this kind of discrimination
and aggression against minorities, and not only sexual ones” (red, 2015).
The dichotomy constituting the choice was defined as follows: “On one side
are those who will not interfere with them or limit their citizen’s rights,
their freedom. On the other—those whose interference will be permanent
and who will want to fit them forcefully into their sole valid model of
living” ((bs) 2015a).
In the detailed practices, the dominating role of the Church and its
numerous privileges were presented and, therefore, also the hazards for
other lifestyles stemming from this. The presumptive election victory of
right-wing parties in 2015 was supposed to lead to further expansion of the
power of the Church hierarchs who were reportedly ruling “from the back
seat” (Mordarski, 2015), thus strengthening the conservative orientations.
From the perspective of those perceiving religion as a form of oppression
and lack of freedom, the arguments were provided by the politicians
themselves, who tried to show the threat posed by the left and show the
meaning of religion for social life. It was said, for example, that “the
Church was and is the promoter and holder of the only system of values that
is commonly known in Poland or that a family is ‘one woman and one man
in a stable relationship, and their children’” (Gądek, 2019). Following that
path, the system of values of the Church was set in opposition to nihilism,
relativism and the “great offensive of evil”, “rainbow plague” and “LGBT
ideology”. In 2019, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said the following
to the conservative voters: “We are guarding our Polish values, not some
ideological whims and moral revolution” (Kozińska, 2019). Every person
that did not respect the Church was destroying Poland and contributing to
the end of the current Christian civilisation. Such creation of politics based
on exposing the threat towards the Catholic-national ideology could
strengthen the sense of exclusion in some individuals and mobilise them to
fight for equal rights and strengthen the existing socio-political dispute.
Another confirmation of the exclusion of minority groups was blocking
the act on sex reassignment. It was made into a symbol, and claims were
made that by vetoing that act, the president “(…) rejected the minority’s
right to dignity. Because this is the only thing that act was about, nothing
else. Besides, I would like Andrzej Duda to keep his word. He promised he
would be the president of all Polish men and women. Also, the transgender
ones” (Gałczyńska, 2015). The inequalities resulting from an inability to
have one’s sex reassigned were noticed (PAP, 2015h). It was noticed that
the Church assigns rights to the chosen and the right-wing speaking of the
right of individuals living in marital relationships, making such individuals
privileged.
 The majority of repartition practices in the campaign of 2015 referred to
divisions stemming from the domination of community groups and
subordination of many spheres of an individual’s life—not only legal, but
also symbolic and cultural—to them. The repartition practice that clearly
referred to this category of divisions was the one talking about “liberal,
friendly and socially sensible Poland” (PAP, 2015g), with “hardcore
conservatism, stagnation and emigration” standing on the other side ((FF)
2015). The “explosion of conservatism” was considered a threat along with
voter support for right-wing parties. In the event of their victory, Poland
was threatened by “the rule of Ku-Klux-Klan—Kaczyński [Jarosław],
Korwin [Janusz], Kukiz [Paweł]”. The offensive of conservative circles
resulted in disappointment, but hope for “the liberal-leftist world coming
back” ((bs) 2015d) was noticed. The above hazards were also presented
through the “European liberal Poland”–“national conservative Poland”
opposition ((bs) 2015c).
In the process of politicization of the inequalities experienced and the
creation of repartition practices, i.e., the process that is being discussed
here, there is nothing surprising if we remember that the post-communist
society was still traditional and homogeneous in many aspects. This is
shown perfectly by the repartition practices suggested by politicians who
were referring to minority groups and the excluded, opposing the politicians
referring to the dominant communities. The path to the subjectiveness of all
the excluded groups always leads to employing political tools such as the
repartition practices discussed in this book.

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© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023
P. Borowiec, The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26530-3_6

6. The Formation of Social Divisions and

the Theory of Practices of Repartition
Piotr Borowiec1
(1) Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Jagiellonian
University, Kraków, Poland

Piotr Borowiec
Email: piotr.borowiec@uj.edu.pl

Keywords Social divisions – Practice of repartition – Social justice –

Ideology

Ideological and Structural Context and Social

Divisions
The retrospective look at the Polish changes allowed creating a pattern of
the formation of divisions and their Polish specificity in reference to the
theoretical knowledge available. It also led to the discovery of repartitions
employed to politicize the divisions. The conclusions presented earlier in
this work and the status of knowledge on the divisions indicate that they are
constituted by historical circumstances (i.e., actions taken that lead to the
appearance of inequalities). The historical perception of the divisions shows
that the main drive behind these phenomena was dynamic processes, mainly
of an economic nature. The analysis also showed that not all the Polish
divisions had to last long to take a permanent place in consciousness. They
were often formed in a much shorter time. This applied to both economic
divisions and unequal distribution of dignity, respect, freedom, etc. Taking
into consideration the political circumstances leading to inequalities is
indispensable, but focusing solely on them leads to attempts at explaining
the divisions into a dead end.
Attributing the impact on the Polish divisions to historical events such
as reformation, democratic and national revolutions or industrial revolutions
turns out to be groundless. It is difficult to demonstrate how they determine
the contemporary reality. The globalisation processes taking place and the
noticeable impact of the information society or technological systems only
confirm such conclusions. The Polish divisions “have taken on a life of
their own” and are often formed by other factors. This results from the
dynamic and slightly different structures of modern societies, idea resources
and values that contribute to creating them. Assigning the role of an
effective tool for discovering the truth about Polish phenomena to the
concept of Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan is a mistake, the same as
using them to “measure” divisions present during the communist times
(Grabowska, 2004, p. 18). Thus, the classic concepts should be treated
solely as inspirations for the studies conducted in contemporary times.
A consequence of the above conclusions is also the rejection of the
mechanism of formation of divisions through a society-dividing event. This
pattern, stemming partially from the ideas of Lipset and Rokkan, has often
been employed in Polish studies. In this vein, the fall of communism itself
was supposed to be such a dividing event (Grabowska, 2004, p. 15),
creating social and political divisions (Figiel, 2009, p. 35). Such an
expression could be accepted at the level of political discourse, but its
uncritical overuse may lead to erroneous conclusions. The divisions were
created by the unjust social space of communism that had been formed for
many years, and its fall was expected to eliminate them; but in the Polish
case at least, it sustained them for many years. The fall of communism did
not create new inequalities within a few months but only transferred a great
deal of pre-1989 ones to the new reality. The divisions were created by
communism, understood as a process (i.e., a long-lasting separation of two
groups from each other and the creation of inequalities and distances).
It has been a wrong approach to ascribe the power of creating divisions
to events with a “short duration”, such as assassinations, disasters, events
with political participation or differences in opinions and evaluations
present in the discourse. They do not create divisions, also in view of their
inflation, artificial generation and rate of fading away. After about a dozen
days, no one remembered most of them. This is why frequent attempts at
forming divisions based on an event, even one with tragic consequences,
end in failure. It is also why the majority of events turn out meaningless for
the divisions unless they fit into already existing ones—and then they
strengthen or weaken them. The divisions are created over time, and events
(i.e., points on the axis of time, even those generating political disputes) do
not generate them. At the same time, these points, when accompanied by
instrumental politicization, lead to the generation of emotions. The
divisions are also not created by discursive dichotomies, polarising
oppositions or other forms of politicization of the existing problems with
reality. If they divide, this is only because they fit themselves into the
already experienced wrongs. These comments are confirmed by observation
of the formation of Polish divisions.
Making events the bases for the generation of divisions entails their
visible inflation as it forces a quick replacement of one division with
another. It shows that the divisions are not characterised by persistence, but
only by political usefulness. The lack of persistence makes such divisions
problematic, which was discussed by Piotr Obacz (2018, p. 108). His
comments confirm that divisions cannot be “swapped” for new ones by
politicians every few years. The divisions do not disappear a few months
after the elections, in contrast to repartition practices, which are precisely
like that. Certain practices are replaced with others.
Divisions are inequalities realised, and the main role in their creation is
played by both the objective conditions of the order, measured using gauges
and indicators and the subjective opinions and attitudes of individuals. The
wrongs experienced play a role—both the actual ones and those imagined.
They force individuals to focus on the differences present in the social
space. The social order, mainly its economic and political dimension, forms
the basic dependencies between individuals. They are supplemented with
determinants hidden in the educational, religious or ethnic space. They
constitute substantial, but not sole, fields for distances. Presently, this
catalogue has been expanded, thus confirming that any matter regarding
human existence can form inequality. Currently, the differences stemming
from the character of work or division of labour lead to divisions less
frequently. Some of those differences now exist “beyond the sense of
injustice” of individuals. However, it is still the economic inequalities, also
those with a structural aspect, that have an impact on asking questions about
the justice of the order and the conditions of its moral aspect, as well as lead
to the injustices being noticed (Domański & Rychard, 1997). This is why
the economic structure, being a system and subordination of constituents,
not only determines but also “helps notice quicker” own exclusions
(Kaczor-Pańków, 1995, p. 41).
This means that a significant “fragment of the mechanism” of the
appearance of divisions is present in the relations between the structure and
the individual, in their connection and mutual impact. Relations between
individuals and the social structure (Skarżyńska, 2005, p. 26) are not
automatic and uniform—many deviations and differences occur among
them. They were discussed many times in the sociological literature. One of
the significant consequences of these relations is the resignation from
treating the structure as the sole determinant having an impact on the
functioning of individuals. Such an approach is applicable when explaining
the divisions. Thus, next to structural circumstances, the impact on the
formation of divisions comes from other factors in the form of ideological
structures together with their values—justice and equality. Personality and
mental determinants constitute an importing variable leading to divisions as
they help the individual build social experiences and transgress them.
The significance of ideologies for divisions—which are variable but
persistent constructs—raises no doubts. This is shown by the political
sphere and its most important part—the values imposed by politicians that
“co-create” the existing inequalities, “supervising” how people talk and
think about them. This underlines and confirms the role of ideological
determinants of divisions and the significance of politics for creating and
supervising orders, irrespective of the scope and methods of subsequent
discursive politicization of inequalities typical of these divisions.
Politicizations of divisions often indicate the structural inequalities
ambiguously or even completely ignore them, but they always include
valuing. It is impossible to employ evident economic inequalities to create
discursive definitions of divisions without anchoring them in the value of
justice. At the same time, economic inequalities are not always present
between the structural elements—often, divisions appearing stem from
other reasons. It is then that ideologies play an even bigger role.
Additionally, the structural distances do not translate automatically to the
shape of the politics, just as the divisions do not always reflect the existing
structures. Often, they stem from erroneous perceptions thereof. Divisions
often deviate from structural inequalities documented using empirical
research, as if ignoring them. However, similarly to conflicts, they are not
an inherent feature of every society.
The refusal to accept the assignment of indispensable goods and
unequal and unfair distribution thereof constitutes the beginning of division
formation. The clearest example presenting the path towards divisions is the
unequal access to power resources, which is so common in interpersonal
relations. This is particularly visible based on inequalities between those
disposing of political power and the rest of society, which translates to
unequal distribution of other goods. It is for this reason that power is
considered “the matrix of all inequalities”. Feeling the negative
consequences of the presence of power may accelerate the formation of
other negative orientations of society towards those possessing other goods.
It can also translate to a deeper sense of injustice. Every authority generates
divisions, even when it declares a need to eliminate other inequalities or
does it intensively. Removing certain inequalities through the extensive
application of various instruments does not limit the creation of other ones,
which is confirmed perfectly by the achievements of Polish communists.
The mechanism of creation and application of repartition practices
useful for the communist revolution confirms these comments. In part, they
referred to actual inequalities, and it was obvious that such inequalities
were present, not devised. The communist authorities found in the past
inequalities a source of legitimisation and shaped their visions of the future
in relation to them. They drew the most useful examples for their
propaganda from the feudal and capitalist inequalities, branding them as
unacceptable. Eliminating them became the purpose and meaning of
existence. It included hope in the change imposed, which is why it exposed
and politicized the inequalities that it inherited had a structural background.
The communists did not devise the fundamental divisions or examples of
injustice and poverty experienced by people—they were real. They had no
scruples about politicizing the contemporary divisions, adjusting them
instrumentally to the political situation. They always took advantage of
ideology and reminded of the humiliated, forgotten and exploited people
while elevating these people from the unacceptable capitalist inequalities
was the declared purpose of the social solutions introduced.
A significant role in the formation of divisions is played by the imposed
ideological and political orientations and the justifications and evaluations
disseminated that confirm the lack of justice. As an element of the existing
ideologies, the systems of values impose and underline the experience of
wrongs and deny them the right to keep appearing. Ideologies show which
inequalities are justified and which should be denied the right to exist,
present the relation between justice and other values—particularly with the
concepts of a good life—and argue how the understanding of justice
translates to the effectiveness of individuals at satisfying their needs.
Systems of values inspire individuals and prepare them for specific actions,
first formulating the bases for making them aware of their own inferiority
(i.e., being excluded from society). They prepare the ground for collective
realisation of the presence of distances. They reinforce or weaken the
individual convictions regarding the order and its relations being allowed to
remain or forced to change. The ideological and political orientations
constitute a set of variables that shape the public sentiment and the
dominant evaluations and opinions (Kaczor-Pańków, 1995, p. 41). These
variables reflect the influence of the surroundings and both form and are
formed by politicians and symbolic elites.
The role of ideology in the creation of divisions is also shown by
analyses by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan. The significance they
ascribed to long-lasting processes, such as reformation, democratic-national
revolutions or industrial revolution, imposes a perspective on their
ideological circumstances. The divisions they analysed appeared around the
consequences of actions inspired by equality and justice. Both these ideas,
irrespective of whether they were elevated or rejected, became the
legislation of many orders that were born, a basis for the activity of people
demanding freedom from external national dominations, restoration of a
group and individual dignity and granting the right to self-determination.
Their significance became solidified in time as a result of long-lasting
processes. The negation of the previously existing forms of injustice
changed the world and was the substantial meaning of the historical
experiences of humankind. Prior to modernity, the above-mentioned
political values were completely absent (Bauman, 2007, p. 136). The
previous observations of the Polish changes and research results confirm
that equality and justice were the content of divisions.
It turned out that the economic, ethnic or religious structuralisation
categories increasingly often lose their monopoly for generating divisions.
The economic divisions with sources stemming from the character of
ownership or the level of income arouse social emotions less and less
frequently. They cease being the main requirements for the future conflict-
free order. Increasingly often, it is the unequal treatment of minority groups
and a lack of equal distribution of dignity and respect that generate a sense
of injustice. The opacity of modern society leads to the deepening
alienation of many individuals, which is why they refuse to accept the
presence of existing relations. This is confirmed by their problems with
finding their place in these relations. Additionally, the diversity promoted
becomes the reason for reading the reality only in the categories of
inequalities or even seeking them. The weakening of the significance of the
economy for creating divisions is also a consequence of Polish society
moving from materialistic values to post-materialistic ones. This is why
other inequalities, e.g., related to gender and sexual violence, now
constitute the basis for the appearance of divisions. Additionally, the
evident limitations in access to many important spheres of life experienced
by individuals and exclusions due to different lifestyles constitute spaces for
new divisions.
The emergence of divisions that are less related to the fundamental
characteristics of the social structure resulted from the weakening of the
political mechanisms of “concealing” cultural inequalities. The ideological
blocks and instrumental interpretation hid effectively for many years the
existence of certain inequalities, even those that featured strong empirical
grounds. Despite existing, many of them did not raise any major social
outrage as this is what the dominant ideologies “decreed” and convinced the
majority of society to accept it. The neoliberal ideology turned out to be
exceptionally effective in such actions. It was undoubtedly at the forefront
of incapacitating society with its visions of social justice. It focused on
blocking the truth about many pathological spheres of life in which the
individual was denied dignity from “leaking” to the discursive space.
The “breeding grounds” of divisions are always social relations. Such
an approach leads to better noticing of aspects and a variety of mechanisms
underlying the formation of divisions. This applies not only to inequality of
domination, although it is the most apparent in its case. All the relations,
and especially the relation of power, “impose and expose” the
characteristics of a given order. The internalised interactions constituting
the relations, as well as their methods of recreation, the impact of roles on
their course, etc., constitute their “social regulations”, thus specifying their
course (i.e., determining it). They impose automatism on them and also
define their course in the categories of superiority and inferiority of sides.
However, it is never certain that the partners will recreate their course
precisely according to the existing templates. What is important about the
divisions is that the relations, next to showing hierarchy, force
subordination to unequal systems. Each interaction includes what the
individual is entitled to and the imagination of what they should have
according to themselves. Meanwhile, the lack of knowledge of hierarchies
does not prevent them from appearing within the framework of the relation
recreated. The new hierarchies may take forms that did not exist previously,
and the same inequality may be considered just in one order and unjust in
another. This was described by Anna Giza-Poleszczuk: “How people
perceive others – the potential or actual partners in interaction, how they
perceive the chances of the satisfactory establishment of relations with them
and what rules, principles or moods they notice as applicable in the course
of contact with others is, in essence, a description of how a given society
appears in an individual’s experience or how it is present in it” (1991, p.
69). What takes place in relations is the reading of hierarchies and assigning
importance to them using the evaluations of justice. The evaluations of
individuals place them in hierarchies through “adjusting oneself to them”.
This is clearly visible in such dimensions of the existence of distances and
diversity as ethnicity, wealth, religiousness, power, respect and dignity.
Personal experiences impose an evaluation of the order on the
individual. The inequalities are confirmed in these experiences in the form
of unrealised aspirations and everyday contact of individuals with one
another. Direct contact is significant—even a trifle conversation may make
someone realise limitations or subordination. The perception of relations as
just or unjust is a complex process in itself and goes beyond the scope of
this book. However, the distances discovered individually speak the most to
individuals. Participating in an unjust relation translates to emotions, a
sense of discomfort or humiliation. Experiencing injustice “binds an
individual to others” and results in every further action of an authority
institution—even one having nothing to do with the further exclusion of
those wronged—being perceived as discrimination by the individual. In
such situations, the wrongs “expand” within individuals even if they are not
wrongs at all. The order constantly provides the individual with reference
systems for solidification of their opinion on their own humiliation
(Narojek, 1982, p. 195). The perception of inequalities is conditioned by
psychological factors (Lachowicz-Tabaczek & Pachnowska, 2007, p. 390),
which is why every common unkindness, distrust or malice and envy may
be significant for consolidating divisions. During each interaction
reinforcing the feeling of deprivations, imaginations of justice, realised
interests, resources at one’s disposal or benefits imagined are employed.
These characteristics are reinforced using the current policy and alternative
ideologies. The constant reminding of subordination has an impact on the
reception of the order (e.g., accelerates searching for those culpable of such
a situation). It is also worth remembering that—according to Levis Coser—
distances are born not only at the moment of noticing differences or
injustices but also once a handicapped individual starts thinking about
withdrawing their acceptance of such a condition.
The experience of handicap will start the search for other wronged
people, which constitutes sustaining the positive imagination of oneself. An
individual does not want to be left alone with their sense of “not managing
within the order”, of having been “used” by the order or not fitting it.
Additionally, they feel helpless, powerless and humiliated. It is not
important that some individuals experience discrimination “retroactively”
and “realise it” under the influence of ideologies spread by political actors
(i.e., “spoon-fed” interpretations of what injustice and equality are). The
availability of other interpretations and their variety does not foster
transparency of the perception of inequalities. It reinforces their inflations,
forgetting some of them and then further returning to them. They also have
a potential for divisions, even when hiding among small groups of the
excluded, when they exist at the fringes of the discourse, with a stigma of
radicalism or incompatibility with modernity and when their opponents
perceive them as threats to the existing order.
The divisions appear where the individually experienced distances take
a collective aspect when they become a common experience. They appear
when the sense of injustice “escapes beyond” the individual consciousness,
beyond the individual experience of injustice. For such feelings to appear, it
is enough to be aware of the lack of place for oneself or chances for
competing with others effectively. Such situations are described by
statements such as: “I do not feel good in society”. Thus, the divisions
present are concealed and hidden in individual attitudes. The privileged and
the excluded rarely maintain mutual interactions and usually are unable to
discuss differences. Individuals tend to interact with others who are similar
to themselves in many ways. The interactions between different individuals
tend to increase the difference. Once they happen, they are awkward and
full of distance.
Nothing is as good at reinforcing the convictions of the presence of
persistent inequalities within an order as the observation of violation of
common rules or rights by a part of society or by the authorities. The cases
showing that some are allowed to do more than others provide bases for the
delegitimisation of the whole order. The lack of adherence to the agreed
upon order of supply or access to a rare good not only arouses a sense of
injustice but also creates the imagination of other privileges of such a
group. They are created through thoughts like “they have everything” and
“they can do everything”. In spite of the equality declared, “they” have
privileged access to rare goods. In such a situation, any attempts at
convincing uniform standards and equality of rights only provoke the
discriminated. They only reinforce the conviction that the interest of the
chosen is given priority over the interest of others. Thus, the experience of
inequalities in a redistributive aspect is not only a subjective interpretation
on the part of the individuals.
The hierarchies created do not leave much choice—they impose paths
of aspiration realisation to individuals, both upwards and downwards,
within the hierarchy. To obtain the missing goods of all kinds—both
material and respect-related, they need to take action in both directions.
This is shown perfectly by the communist hierarchies. At that time, in the
conditions of the contemporary order and limited resources of goods, it was
impossible to satisfy all needs by maintaining the level of goods available
to the nomenklatura and providing them to the excluded as well. The two
paths of completely different models of aspirations and lifestyles could not
have existed next to each other officially and without conflict. Accepting
life values of the freedom- and market-oriented order meant rejection of the
communist hierarchies. In view of the lack of goods, the promotion of
identical claims and equal methods of satisfying them turned out to be
impossible to implement in practice.
The occurrence of a structural tension inside the order, mentioned,
among others, by Neil Smelser (1963), accelerates the formation of
divisions. It generates the politics of protest and leads to the appearance of
not only social movements, but also divisions. These processes are driven
not only by living through injustice on one’s own, but also experiencing it
every day (i.e., being reminded of it through recurring relations). At its core
is the experience of being wronged, realising one’s inferiority or a lack of
equality in relations. The tension is created as a result of the realisation of
such relations. The sense of injustice is related to the appearance of relative
deprivation (Wnuk-Lipiński, 2014, p. 143). Deprivation is also a significant
factor for reinforcement of the sense of injustice as a result of comparing
one’s own aspirations and actual position with the situation of others. The
long-lasting inability to satisfy the aspirations of individuals (see Adamski
et al., 1986; Białecki & Zaborowski, 1998), comparing oneself and valuing
one’s own position (Białecki et al., 1996, p. 253; Lachowicz-Tabaczek &
Pachnowska, 2007, p. 393), were—as demonstrated by studies—the ever-
present characteristics of Polish society.
The assumption that the divisions start in the individual’s consciousness
and stem from their experiences makes them anchored entities rather than
products of political games, a domain of interpretation and politicization of
even the most traumatic events. It also takes into account the significance of
psychological and consciousness-based constructs for their formation.
Connecting the structural level with the individual experiences shifts the
politicization of divisions (i.e., also the repartitions, from the level of
“unclean trickery”) to the level of understandable and rational actions. It
also shows that the divisions are not formed as a result of mechanical
distinguishing of inequalities by means of obvious (i.e., easily noticeable
criteria) such as education, profession, religion or sex. It is not the criterion
of distinguishing inequalities that matters, even though it may sometimes
reflect the actual division. It is not enough to say that religion constitutes a
plane of division because there is a conflict or a difference of opinion
regarding how to arrange the relations between the state and the sphere of
spiritual life (Zuba, 2015, p. 17). The divisions are “complemented” by the
sense of injustice of one of the parties, stemming, for example, from actions
of the authorities, believers, Church hierarchs or politicians referring to a
specific religion. The divisions are created around the line determined by an
experience of discrimination, which was demonstrated clearly by the period
of communism. Thus, the lone presentation of quantitative data regarding
believers or non-believers and stating that society is divided along the
criterion of approach towards religions say nothing about the division. In
Poland, it is often that two parts of the Polish territory—eastern and western
—are often compared, and it is mentioned then that there is a division
between them. Yet, in practice, they just differ, for example, in terms of
economic growth. For a division to be created, something more than
distinguishing differences is necessary.
A social division is always present between communities having a final
composition that is difficult to determine. A significant increase in the
numbers of a given group within a society does not lead to the automatic
formation of a division axis around it. A division is characterised by
members of two communities having difficulty establishing and
maintaining mutual relations and feeling the existence of dissonances,
leading them to limit their relations to the indispensable minimum. The
members of these communities are aware of the persistence of differences,
usually manifesting in the form of having unequal resources of goods at
their disposal. From these inequalities, they derive their sense of having
being wronged, a sense of injustice, a lack of equality or a lack of rights
important to their existence. At the same time, the privileged individuals
consider the system just and think that it requires sustaining. For these
reasons, they may not even notice their higher position or think that the
goods at their disposal have been distributed fairly, given their
extraordinary work, talents and skills. On the other hand, the non-privileged
individuals refuse to legitimise the inequalities (Wnuk-Lipiński, 2014, pp.
142–143). Thus, the division is present when the group members are aware
of injustice and opposing interests (Kęska, 2008, p. 43).
When analysing the divisions, it is valid to separate the differences that
can be measured precisely (i.e., resources of goods from the cultural
diversity present). Different clothing, the behaviour or even lifestyle noticed
in someone else does not lead to distances and does not create or solidify
hierarchies. And this is the situation when diversity is the cultural model of
good social life, similar to the presence of different opinions on phenomena,
facts or actions of other individuals. The opinion that “Polish democracy is
doing fine” may exist next to the opinion that “Polish democracy is not
doing fine”. It is valid to notice diversity and pluralism in this. Divisions
may appear if differing evaluations and differences of opinion are followed
by valuing, messages of superiority or inferiority of individuals expressing
such evaluations or when people having a different opinion are denied
respect or even become objects of disdain, when discrimination appears—
i.e., when the people with a different opinion are denied intellectual
qualifications, the right to participate in democracy or the right to express
their opinion, when the different lifestyle of individuals is followed by
emotions confirming their exclusion and when disdain or superiority is
expressed towards others. Thus, what Zygmunt Bauman, among others, was
optimistically presenting as the intensification of polyphony, cultural
colourfulness of the urban life, mass culture and fullness with diversity or
types of people or lifestyles (Bauman, 2007, p. 120), is an example of
progressing homogenisation, a form of specific diversity of unity.
The passage of inequalities to social consciousness takes place in
various ways and depends on many factors, similar to the politicization of
inequalities. In totalitarian regimes, only the divisions beneficial to the
authorities are instrumentally exposed intensively and cynically. The other
ones may remain dormant for a long time. In a democratic system, the
probability of realising the injustice and the political actors considering the
inequalities is greater. It is even recognised that actions towards that form
the basis of democracy (Zuba, 2015, p. 17). In that system, all the divisions
are easier to notice, although often even the pluralist socio-political
environment does not ensure social interest in them. The constant
experience of inequalities (e.g., economic ones) does not guarantee social
visibility of injustices. Those economically excluded are pushed to the
margin of society and suffer alone. Among those responsible for it are the
dominant ideologies and their propagators, controlling interpretation of
what injustice is and imposing the conviction that the suffering of the
excluded is justified and fair. Inequalities are accompanied by whole
systems explaining them or legitimising a specific shape thereof. The
degree of their organisation decides the chances of articulation of specific
divisions. Injustices are blocked in all order, although the scope of such
blocks varies. However, it is impossible to conceal social distances forever.
That is why certain divisions and inequalities turn out to be functional with
regard to the order, although changing how they are evaluated requires
actions, not only the passage of time. Examples of such situations are
provided by the period during which the neoliberal ideology imposed on the
excluded—deprived of jobs—the feeling that their situation stems from
their lack of activity and qualifications. For over two decades, it kept
society in an atmosphere of an apparent, recovered, “right” justice.
In a democratic order where media play an important role, it is them
who have an impact on highlighting discrimination. The injustice
experienced, for example, by a celebrity has a greater chance of reaching
the public consciousness than discrimination against the so-called “common
man”. Everyone will learn about a celebrity who was humiliated, mobbed
or abused at work, while no one will learn about a worker from the lower
classes. Should both of those cases not be noticed and highlighted?
However, it is most likely that the injustice experienced by the celebrity will
be of greater interest to the media broadcasters, while individuals with
lower social standing experience discrimination in loneliness. It is not
surprising, then, that these two experiences have different paths towards
politicization and the two examples of injustice have decidedly different
chances for disclosure. The examples mentioned here show the unequal
chances of the two types of discrimination becoming highlighted and
gaining publicity.
The discrimination examples disseminated may become a direct
inspiration for politicizing injustice experiences by a greater number of
victims. Every such actual case is a reference to a part of society. It refers to
similar experiences and becomes a specific materialisation of politics. In
political programmes, such individual examples often change into specific
solutions, either legal or institutional, aimed at eliminating the risk of
occurrence of such discrimination in the future. They are complemented by
sets of information on the unjust socio-political reality. By inviting the
discriminated to be active as well, the political actors call for the
elimination of injustice. The actors’ attempts at fitting into existing
divisions increase chances in elections, but also promise effective
transformation of a disappointing fragment of reality. Through taking
advantage of divisions and subjecting them to politicization, politics
become connected to the issues of individuals. This is reflected in the words
of Seymour M. Lipset: “In the new electoral democracies, the parties will
be imminently unstable until the moment they find support in the deeply
rooted source of division, similarly to what happened in the case of older,
institutionalised democracies of the West” (Lipset, 2000, pp. 48–49). The
politicization of divisions and creating practices around them becomes an
instrument leading to the institutionalisation of conflicts (i.e., exposing
conflicting interests and making them the object of a political dispute).
It is complicated to capture the moment of birth of divisions, but it is
easier to notice the beginnings of their politicization. Often, the divisions
“reside for many years” within a society without being politicized, but
sometimes the politicizations drive their growth. The first discursive
mentions of the division constitute those. It is rather unjustified to claim
that they originate when the division becomes significant in the discourse.
However, every individual publicly arguing that inequalities exist is an
entity activating the politicization. Every politicization is a rejection of
indifference, a farewell to passiveness and a demonstration of involvement,
an abandonment of silence being a consent to the concealment of an
imperfect reality and a refusal to agree to the legitimisation of the existing
condition. Both remembering the distances and forgetting them constitute
their valuation and manifest in action or omission. In such a case, action
means considering that the inequalities existing constitute a social issue. At
the same time, the social recognition of inequalities and making them the
foundation of divisions testifies to the elevation of one of the many
concepts of ideological justice or equality.

Mechanism of Dichotomous Practices of

Repartition
The analysis of methods of making repartitions public, particularly of the
contexts of presenting them, indicates that they require conducive
conditions. They appeared on the side of political subjects both at the
moments of experienced helplessness and at the moments of political
tension during a period of decrease in political support when the situation of
a political party or a politician propagating the practice was becoming
difficult. They appeared in situations that forced reaction—in decisive
moments of a campaign when politicians wanted to retain control over
events. That is why repartitions often serve to “stop an imminent failure”
and salvage political standing. The practices applied were a part of the
political game even when they were an element of an election plan, a
measured, internally coherent political structure relying on objective data
on the condition of society. They were presented when the polarisation
became aggravated, when the economic situation worsened or when further
drastic discrimination appeared. They depended on the environment and
appeared when the conditions were conducive to that. For these reasons, the
practices are the politics of contexts, and each can be assigned an
appropriate system of determinants, as well as receive a specification of the
features of time in which it appears. Similarly to myths, they are a social
creation related to the context. Only by placing practices in relation to
divisions and with conditions of the environment, is it possible to explain
and understand them.
The practices appear when the social issues deepen, when incomes
become polarised and the differences grow, and when the authorities
usually consider them justified for instrumental and ideological reasons.
Establishing such preconditions is not optimistic as it means that
repartitions correlate positively with deep stratifications and depend on the
existing spaces of injustice experienced by people. The more of them, the
more frequently they appear and, after all, there is still plenty of injustices
that require eliminating in Polish society. It turns out that the more
intensively the individuals are denied quality, the bigger the chance for the
appearance of repartitions. A lack of justice also increases the probability of
obtaining support for the suggested changes, which translates to eliminating
or reducing inequalities. This is the purpose of making discrimination
public and rooting them in the injustice experienced by many people. And
this, in turn, sounds more optimistic as repartitions may reduce human
suffering. It is not certain, though, as the practices are risky actions, the
result of which is never possible to predict.
The divisions first condition the practices and are then socially
constructed within them. This happens, at first, when they are realised by
individuals on their terms, leading to reinforcement of the “communities of
the wronged” and later, when they are developed, transformed and
supplemented with complementations so that they are read in line with the
experiences of the voters. The divisions are a substantial part of the
practices and govern them. They become active in them using not only the
imaginations of inequalities referred to in the discourse but also objective
data, such as precisely shown dominations and actual limitations, examples
taken straight from reality. In this way, they underline the contradictions
and conflicts present within a society. When they meet this condition of
being “rooted”, they arouse feelings, remind of interests and solidify the
appropriate meanings and expectations of individuals. They constitute
collective waiting for changes resulting from subjective evaluations and
objective conditions of reality. They are considered valid choices as they
receive their own confirmations as well as those of those closest from the
environment that has similar experiences and opinions. On the general
level, they take the form of simplified but ideologised declarations of
changes. The repartitions constitute a collective promise of a change that is
impossible to achieve individually as it exceeds the capabilities of any
individual.
The structure of repartitions is created by antagonist polarisation
(Ziółkowski, 2019, p. 311), a dichotomous, discursive, understandable
opposition, such as “rulers”–“ruled”, “poor”–“rich” (Olczyk, 2009, pp.
327–330) or “better”–“worse”. As Mirosław Karwat underlined: “(…) the
polarisation means considering situations in the categories of absolute
opposition and separation of parties—like two polars that cannot have any
contact or even a common buffer. They do not want to have anything in
common; they do not want to recognise anything, even some goods or
paramount values or principles that could connect them” (2005, pp. 66–67).
The parties to such opposition focus on themselves and the other party,
accept the pattern of bivalent logic and make dichotomy the most important
evaluation of a given order (Karwat, 2017, p. 143). The practices focus on
two mutually exclusive states and, additionally, are a negation of
differences between them. The bipolarity reflects the presence of a conflict,
usually already in an open form. The antagonism of the dichotomy is
indispensable as any approach towards the enemy community may weaken
the conviction of the true character of the inequalities presented among the
supporters.
The oppositions are built around the injustices experienced in the order,
which is why they have no scruples in reaching for Manichean morality,
optics and phraseology (Ziółkowski, 2017, p. 101). Normativeness controls
dichotomies radically, imposes unambiguous opinions on the parties and
does not shy away from expressiveness. The oppositions valuate, presenting
the rejected world image, as well as the image of the world as it should be.
That is why, they take the easily understood moral dimension of
“good”–“evil”, transitioning automatically to a group one of “us”–“them”
(Ziółkowski, 2013, pp. 158–159). They are supplemented with
complementary opposition formats, such as “true”–“false” or
“just”–“unjust”.
The dichotomies have a moral aspect, in which the most important
consequence is one of the parties being denied the right to respect. Thus, the
following oppositions appear: “just”–“unjust”, “workers”–“slackers”,
“people of labour”–“freeloaders” (Giza-Poleszczuk, 1991, p. 84). The
differences displayed usually regard values that are fundamental to the
discriminated, which confirms that on one side there are the wronged and
on the other, the people disposing of unjustified, immoral advantages. The
latter additionally keeps generating a sense of insecurity and either
constitutes a threat or only sustains it. The wronged, feeling threatened, are
usually communities of righteous people, honest, selfless and guided by
values. They always support truth, freedom and justice. That is why the
oppositions created take the “form of cosmic struggle of the forces of light
with the forces of darkness” (Słupik, 2005, p. 26). Underlining the presence
of goods and indicating the evil makes the dichotomies impose a clear and
understandable direction of values. They enable closing the discourse off
against inconvenient topics, often taking advantage of moral blackmail.
Immorality, anxiety and uncertainty originate from “them”—the privileged,
who sustain unjust relations and turn a blind eye towards discrimination.
The practices take advantage of the structure of dichotomy that is
reusable and situates the community not only horizontally and spatially—
which every dichotomy indicated—but also vertically, in the
“top”–“bottom” hierarchy system (i.e., “superiority”–“inferiority” and
“dominance”–“subordination”). Such a vertical arrangement reflects the
differences, i.e., unjust conditions that are rejected and the just conditions
that are suggested. The practices are epiphanies of social hierarchies. A
vertical hierarchy presents the source of suffering and its elimination. Their
combination in a dichotomy is a promise to the discriminated. The practices
are not stories of how the subordination and exclusion happened, but
provide meaning to the experience of exclusion and a lack of privilege.
They clearly show the presence of dependencies and control of certain
groups over the life of other ones. The creators of practices are arbitrary
disposers of resources, influence, power, income, cultural capital,
patriotism, respect and other rare goods for both sides of the dichotomy.
However, they always do it in political agreement with the wronged. Thus,
the inequalities are subjected to radical demystification and subsequent
mystification. The assignments in repartitions confirm the privileges
according to the negated vision of justice and appear in the interest of the
discriminated groups with which they identify. The two communities are
present as unequal, with advantages and limitations ascribed to them. At the
same time, the unjust hierarchy is questioned and, next to it, another one is
proposed as an “alternative world”. The practices demand a balance
between the mutually very distant sides, which means changes in disposing
of the goods, suggested—according to the repartition creators—in line with
the expectations of the wronged. The officially declared objective is never
the inversion of the inherited “top”–“bottom” hierarchy, but its equalisation
—which does not mean that the inversion does not occur in practice.
Usually, the practices are self-limiting and abandon rejecting the whole
order, which—on the one hand—makes them more acceptable and—on the
other—does not condemn them to a failure in execution.
The visions of order suggested in repartitions are general and imprecise
but are not based, contrary to myths, solely on an “act of faith”, although
they do not abandon it either. They show the unequal reality. Even if some
individuals have difficulty noticing these inequalities, they attempt to
unearth the frequently rejected and concealed difference. They strive to
reflect the existing injustices experienced by people, even though they do
not shy away from distorted images of the order. The practices connect
objective conditions with subjective imaginations of reality. That is why the
categories that serve generating inequalities and structurisation—such as
ethnicity, nationality, religiousness, level of income, origin or place of
residence—“will find application in the practices” in the first order. Using
them makes it easier to form repartitions, as always when such categories
are applied, there are some “others” existing next to “us” and, additionally,
they usually dispose of a level of valued goods that is different from ours.
The structure of repartitions relies on the group level, which is the level
of their existence, but they reach lower on purpose, turning to the individual
experiences and wrongs. In individual experiences—private and frequently
deeply hidden, subjective evaluations—they find their bases for existence.
They constitute invitations to participate in the open space, extended
practically to anyone who experienced injustice. It is the individual level
that the strength of their influence stems from. That strength reinforces the
collective consciousness of the sense of injustice. The practices are also
consequences of individually identified differences, wrongs, aversions and a
lack of respect or dignity. They are first processed individually and then
driving collective social thinking through recalling similar events from the
past or identical associations, arousing and sustaining emotional states.
The practices introduce chaos into the existing hierarchies through an
absolute rejection of unjust relations. Questioning of the relations is radical,
“there is no consent” to compromises, and the practices do not allow any
consensus consisting of co-opting a part of the wronged into the privileged
group. A repartition excludes negotiating the injustice, through which it
assumes a radical, nearly revolutionary character. That is why partial
concession and actions in aid of the discriminated are not enough to and do
not eliminate the divisions (i.e., the injustice). An example of that can be
the Round Table agreements which reconstructed the order significantly and
changed its most important values but did not eliminate all the wrongs and
injustice stemming from the “us”–“them” division. They did not eliminate
that division. The political compromise adopted, and allowing some of the
individuals to participate in the order reduced its significance but kept it
existing after 1989. Therefore, it was politicized, and further repartitions
regarding it were still arousing emotions and maintained in a part of society
the need for justice in relation to both the past actions and those designed to
take place in the future.
The dichotomy provides repartitions with static foundations for
enduring, but it would be a mistake to focus only on that element of its
structure. The most important and significant one is its dynamic structure,
which is poorly visible but determined by the openness towards
interpretations, the capability of permanent redefinition and processing of
content, and complementation through specifications, symbols and
references. This enables individuals and groups to interpret, transform and
fit into the dichotomies suggested. Additionally, it enables binding the
practices to social issues, which sustains dynamics in the practices, ensuring
adaptation of past-related resources, including bringing them effectively
into the present. The identification of differences made imposes a reduced
image of the world into which unlimited sets of imaginations are fitted. The
individuals accept repartitions as their own because they fit the
imaginations and expectations that they have formed. They are compatible
with their experiences and observations. This stems from cognitive
properties since a structured image of the order is easier to accept and
absorb. They identify themselves with the practices due to constant
supplementation of their definitions with subsequent examples of injustice
that, in turn, allow them to use the practices in thinking and telling others
about them. The practices help individuals find their place in a complex
reality. Thus, repartitions are one of the many forms of—and exceptional
tools for—reducing the complexity of reality.
The notions employed for naming the poles of dichotomy have certain
pre-established general meanings within society. They are not alien to it,
making them specific and inclusive simultaneously. Their final,
purposefully defined meanings do not lead to misunderstandings—they are
actually expected. The range of usable meanings and their multidimensional
character does not limit their fundamental characteristic (i.e., focus on the
substantial values). In this manner, the practices reflect the inequalities and
control their perception. The practices, which are open spaces, suggest
places where people can gather who often have trouble understanding
complex politics. They constitute partially filled places, but are still open to
new individuals, systematically persuaded and pulled towards one of the
sides. The borders are always open to everyone accepting the differences
presented. Persuading and retaining individuals is made easier by the
oppositions suggested, in which only one side is entitled to goodness and
the right to justice. The idealisation and elevation of one side always mean
the depreciation of the other or negative connotations with it. Such
meanings are not included only directly in oppositions, but appear in
discursive supplementations and specifications of what these practices
mean. Not constituting bases for dichotomies but rather complementations
thereof, they follow keywords used for promoting and differentiating the
repartition practices.
As underlined above, the terms employed do not reflect reality in an
accurate manner as it is not their purpose. They only strive to reflect the
subjective imaginations and objective conditions to not be an artificial,
solely instrumental product without ties to reality. They constitute an
attempt at recreating fragments of reality or the whole of it, but they are
more like constructing it and adjusting to the experiences of the largest
possible number of individuals. It turns out that a significant role is played
by the politicians’ knowledge of meanings that the individuals assigned to a
reality in which they function, ceaselessly striving to understand the
subsequently appearing motivational meanings, especially individual ones.
Then, the politicians use repartitions to help the ideas and values considered
important speak.
At the foundation of the creation of repartitions is also the conviction
that the language previously used to present inequalities turned out to be
ineffective. Changing the language and using it to draw the line of the
political dispute is the abandonment of previous politicizations of the
division, which means waiving them. It is a new form of politicization. The
language used for the complementing narration on the repartition content
shapes its interpretations and helps perceive reality and adjust the
repartition to it. The practices and their language aspect are focused on
communicating with the recipients, thus constituting also an element of
verbal attack on competitors. The simplicity of repartition manifests itself in
the terms applied, which are metaphors defining the parties, in the
composition tools employed. The language of dichotomy is treated
instrumentally, serving manipulation and subordinating itself to the
propaganda apparatus, approximating literary activity at times. It is not an
easy task to represent the actual cases of injustice accurately and
substantively at the same time, especially if one wants to additionally
include in the practice the persuasion required that everyone expects.
Often, attempts are made to make the terms or metaphors used seem
neutral and objective, thus trying to convince individuals and shape their
perception, thinking and actions. Although they often pretend to be
objective, or even scientific, behind the veil of neutrality there are always
ideologies—the virtues of justice and equality, which are the most effective
in guiding people and influencing their choices. The insufficient clarity of
certain dichotomies does not make them impossible to be understood by
their recipients. The presence of the sphere of meanings and symbols in
practices makes it easier to receive them, and their structure (i.e., polarity of
standings) is also a facilitation. This does not mean that the
misunderstandings regarding meaning, which often make receiving the
practices difficult, do not appear. Complementation of an opposition relies
on a large number of words, often equipped with non-obvious evaluating
tones. Their pretended naturalness is thus an illusion or instrument for
increasing their effectiveness, but it does not apply to certain practices.
However, these apparently neutral oppositions always become filled with
political content. That is why some researchers sometimes combine the
attractiveness of different dichotomies with skilful use of language,
determining the movement of individuals’ thoughts according to the
directions imposed in the oppositions (Kołakowski, 1994, p. 71).
Without a doubt, it is the task of the practices to anchor the individuals
in the communities of the wronged. Repartitions aim at including in these
communities the undecided individuals standing aside, not having strong
loyalties yet or having an unstable identity. They do not leave much space
for choice. The practices, being responses to the subordination of
individuals, refer to the excluded through declaring demands for changing
the situation and determining political actions. In this manner, they sustain
collective identities and confirm the existence of similarities, even if they
regard small groups of excluded—minorities that are only starting to fight
to change the relations. The practices channel the discontent, also through
forced and purposeful interference with the sphere of emotions, subjective
imaginations and realised and actual interests. Such an integrative
subordination to the practices constitutes an effective dam for the politics
abandoning significant current social issues.
The practices take advantage of manipulation and playing on emotions.
The axiological and emotional aspects play a significant role in them. It
constitutes an instrument serving to activate hidden resources of suffering
and accumulated frustration or even the desire for revenge. What dominates
is emotions, colloquial thinking and a sense of the appearance of long-
awaited justice. That is why remaining beyond the pole suggested in the
repartition turns out to be impossible. An individual fits into the “world of
emotions” of the side with which they identify. The lack of emotionality
and standing aside concerning the opposition imposed is excluded in the
case of intensive emotional messages. With regard to systematically and
purposefully presented examples of wrongs and images of injustice that
cover the social consciousness space, it is difficult to remain indifferent.
The examples of violating the idea of justice referred to in the discourse,
combined with the utilisation of strong, often primitive, but moralising tone
is a kind of manipulation that always impacts feelings. The emotional
message plays a fundamental role in planning, actual action and realisation
of the objectives set. The parties to a dichotomy participate “in emotions”,
but it is the wronged to whom symbolic advantage is attempted to be
assigned. This is why the creators of repartitions refer to the values,
stereotypes, convictions and ways of thinking. At the same time, it does not
mean the other party does not fill its own space with messages. Those
applying the practices rarely decide to go beyond the canon of symbols that
dominates at a given moment. The new ones, not having anchorage in the
past, are usually not used. The focus is on persistent symbolic meanings,
referring to the imaginations already shaped in the past as they turn out to
be the most useful. Thus, the symbols employed are not empty—as the
opponents of certain practices would like—because can the above be said
about symbols or values of the minority groups who demand equality or the
groups referring to economic equality?
 In repartitions, the values are given respect. The creators of practices are
partial. They do not pretend to be impartial, do not abandon the difference
and underline it on purpose, striving to inflate the inequalities. The practices
make a determination of which values are important, which forms of life are
worthy, carry respect, and which past and present states—which are part of
those behaviours and actions—require condemnation. They impose a
hierarchy of values or a preferred form of living that is the best for the
order. The assignment of value in repartitions follows the opposition and
both positive and negative palettes of valuation are present. It was perfectly
visible in the “solidary”–“liberal” practice where purposeful
supplementations were used for unambiguous valuation of meaningful
content of the parties to the dichotomy. The features of the rejected
condition and perceptions of justice typical of it were underlined
systematically, with features of the expected order being elevated.
References were made to the existing systems of values, some of which
were presented negatively to the recipient, while others were elevated. The
values were ceaselessly managed instrumentally, with uncompromising
incorporation of new ones into the existing hierarchies.
The perception of practices is not complete without underlining the
ideological perspective, which can be noticed using the sphere of political
values: justice and equality (Skarżyńska, 2005, p. 94). In interactions, the
individuals evaluate their behaviour with regard to the definitions of justice
and lawlessness that they recognise. These values constitute the basic
sources of legitimacy of the order, which is why there is no surprise in them
“organising” the dichotomies. The purpose of practices is to underline the
truth about injustice and the negation of unacceptable inequalities. They do
not serve to sustain the complacency of the satiated. Repartitions often
constitute a continuation of ideological disputes that had been carried out
for quite a while, although it is often difficult to clearly read the ideological
codes included in them. As a continuation of the disputes conducted, they
become a confirmation of permanent divisions. Often, the individuals
supporting one of the parties to a dichotomy are unaware that they choose a
specific ideology and support specific visions of a good life. However, they
are aware that they choose specific political options and specific politicians
or support individual, specific political decisions. They have support for a
better life for themselves and those similar to them, reacting to injustice.
 The following ancient words of wisdom are quoted in numerous works:
“If you desire peace, care for justice”. These values, next to equality,
constitute the main factor not only leading to divisions but also being at the
core of repartitions. Besides, can anyone suggest ideas better for organising
collective actions than justice and equality? Are there any more important
modern values around which the individual can become organised? In
modern times, they can be considered something that Karl Marx referred to
as “ruling ideas”, ones that are unquestionable and reflect the fundamental
features of orders, even if they are variable in time. Their position stems
from their “centrality” for human interactions (Skarżyńska, 1983, p. 18) and
shaping the lives of individuals. They organise societies, provide a sense of
purpose, “raise” individuals from humiliation and justify orders and forms
of mutual treatment among people. They constitute a mechanism of
controlling the orders, transforming them in time, providing reality with a
specific rate of change, and openness to changing the unjust conditions.
Their significance is not diminished by the fact that, due to being utopias,
they both have multiple meanings and are variable. They never ensure a
long and secure duration of meanings; they subject themselves to
transformations and exist in hiding, only to “soon return again in glory”
They generate disputes and political conflicts, thus competing with each
other.
The ideas listed often turn out significant for every state power, which is
why they are often absolutised to present the authorities as just in the moral
categories (Zaremba, 2001, p. 16) and thus legitimise their power. They are
instrumentally taken advantage of equally often, in spite of—or perhaps in
view of—their non-certainties, interpretation difficulties and internal
contradictions. Irrespective of their shortcomings, both these ideas shape
the visions of good order. The individuals evaluate their behaviour in
interaction with regard to the definitions of justice and lawlessness that they
recognise. However, for a significant majority of individuals, the just thing
will always be the thing that is consistent with their interests.
The virtues of justice and equality are of the greatest significance in
modern politics. They mobilise to political activity and help individuals
take a stand with regard to the unjust reality. Indifference is impossible and
even becomes insulting. It is only according to the values that it is possible
to evaluate the developed relations and consider them worthy of retaining or
rejecting them. Michael Sandel perceived justice as a force that regulates
interactions between individuals once social conflicts appear (Mandle,
2007). Such evaluations sustain the need for changes, and the overarching
political objectives limit individual egoisms and mobilise the communities
integratively. The decision to reconstruct the relations is an attempt at
realising justice.
The ideological values form divisions and help them transform into
practices. Each practice guided by disappointment—even the most ridiculed
and questioned one, being an object of constant redefinition or only
evaluation through the prism of instrumental dividing of society—is a
suggestion of the just hierarchy expected. It does not confirm relativism. On
the contrary, it is an anchorage of universal values, even though they are
understood differently. The rejection of injustice activates the practices and
provides them with actual possibilities of social influence. The values
organise the practices and determine their mechanism, ensuring their
effectiveness, persistence and transformation. They consolidate and sustain
optimism, while the moralist justification constitutes the strengthening of
paths leading to the elimination of injustice. Repartitions “breathe” justice
and equality; without them, they may not become useless, but definitely
impossible to create. They reinforce hope, enthusiasm and the sense of the
necessity of further activity. They build a moral trap that is very hard to
untangle oneself from.
The values of justice and equality together create an ideological
hegemony, and their interpretations bring acceptance of groups having
authority in the state. One of the consequences of that process is their
observable dominance in a specific range of time and, therefore, the
preparation of grounds for taking advantage of repartitions that reject it.
The hegemony of virtues of justice and equality results in their differing
definitions having a problem with reaching the recipients, but later they
become a serious alternative. Usually, the ideas of a just and good life
become depreciated the more they clash with the sets of everyday issues of
social orders that are difficult to solve. They crumble and even collapse
under the impact of problems for which they cannot find a solution. The
rivalry of a different vision of justice impacts the creation of practices and
binds the individuals with repartitions. The choice depends on the accepted
concepts of fundamental ideas. Such a rivalry is described in the comments
of Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński regarding the possibility of replacement—
during the period of transformation of Polish society—of the so-called
“revolutionary justice” with the justice of “those who are the strongest at a
given moment” (2003, p. 176).
The practices are attempts at showing where the limits between
communities run. Such definition of fields of affiliation contributes both to
rivalry and limitation thereof. The determination of affiliation assigns
individuals to groups similarly to territory marking among animals. The
territories marked are spaces in which the communities focus on
imagination. “Staying” together shows similarity that translates to trust and
a sense of security. Repartitions, even those employed by the totalitarian
authorities, led to the internal integration of groups and, at the same time, to
control over them using the embedded sets of values acceptable to
individuals. Identifying with individuals sharing the same values turns out
to be a value. This does not contradict the fact that practices aggravate the
political rivalry and contribute to the formation of conflict or lead to the
accumulation of enmity. The intensively presented narration of the
inequalities present forms closeness and social ties. Reminding about them
strengthens ethnocentrism and promotes group stability. Repartitions turn
out to be a legitimate method of building a political bond, modelled after
the mechanism that Ernesto Laclau noticed in populism (2005). What
brings closer to a bond is the place occupied in the structure, the position in
relation to rare goods and the current situation in life, especially the
financial one. The creation of bonds is also impacted by the method of
presenting both parties—the one which the repartition author identifies
with, bestowed with virtues, and the opposing one, dominant and excluding.
The practices integrated individuals, strengthening the “common reality”.
Repartitions reach for drama and do not shy away from causing and
sustaining anxiety or a state of contentment and appreciation due to
ascribing moral superiority to one of the parties. They rely on whitewashing
individuals and encumbering political opponents or power circles with
inequalities. The creators of a given practice assume that the voters
sympathising with it will accept the opposition and not verify it in terms of
truth and falseness. That is why they focus on taking advantage of the
involvement of the recipients and their affiliation with both communities.
The creators of practices offer a message about the importance of a single
group, usually about its unjust humiliation. This fits the individual
tendencies to putting particular weight on things that the individuals can
relate to. The creators of repartitions rely on the tendency of the individuals
to assign to themselves not only exceptional significance or being moral
and good, but also to include themselves in positive events and transfer the
responsibility for bad ones to others.
The practices help individuals understand reality. They are based on the
fact that the recipients are incapable of processing every single piece of
information reaching them and absorbing such a large amount of knowledge
about reality. What reaches them is only a slice or a fragment of it. Thus,
they employ simplifications in thinking in order to absorb a part of the
information. They go beyond formulating their own evaluation. The
practices take advantage of the phenomenon of the emergence of
accumulated social experience (Skarżyńska, 2005, p. 28). They provide the
recipient with a suggestion of the image of phenomenon, focusing on a
selected aspect thereof and consciously imposing central and general
beliefs. They mean focusing on one or a few aspects at the expense of
others, equally important (Gierowski et al., 2008, pp. 104–105; Reykowski,
1990, p. 14). The practices also save the individual the trouble of thinking
about the complex reality. The centration included in the practices clearly
forces looking at the order using the point of view of a politician,
completely discrediting other arguments and views. Repartitions introduce
order and simplicity into the evaluation of reality and support the conviction
of a “simple world” because—similarly to myths—“they contain ready-
made answers to questions about sources and causes of evil, while deciding
at the same time who can and who cannot be trusted and how to behave”
(Reykowski, 2000, p. 385). By releasing the individual from the necessity
to think, they propose anti-pluralism that is attractive, especially to those
wronged.
However, repartitions are not a source of knowledge on reality that is
impossible to undermine, although they do try to pretend to be one. Relying
on the subjectivity of the recipients to a great extent, they cannot guarantee
certainty. Additionally, they grow distant from objectivism due to taking
advantage of ideologies that falsify reality. The injustice examples provided
perform a mobilising role in them, but they are a simplification. They
seduce by releasing from thinking—accepting them does not require high
intellectual qualifications. The practices, being a reduction, constitute a
form of combining the convergent individual experiences and are tools for
tearing the individual away from the everyday chaos, the world that is
blasting through and impossible to understand. Being suggestions of
simplifications, they rely on a lack of complete knowledge of reality but, at
the same time, assume that the hierarchies presented should be politically
rejected and that the recipient will not accept them. They instead accept the
postulates and methods of solving the issue of division elimination included
in the practices.
The use of a dichotomous opposition is not intended to create
discussions, arrive at an agreement or explain situations together. It creates
unambiguity and clarity. The authors of practices and their propagators
strive to present them as sufficiently justified, undisputed and not raising
any doubts—and one cannot hold it against them. It cannot be any different
as it is hard to expect them to doubt the just image of reality they are
presenting and precede it with a reservation such as “it seems that”. The
practices are imposed closures of the political dispute over the status of the
current situation, which is why they are full of calculation and intolerance,
as well as without alternatives and destructive.
Many commenting and observing individuals reject the practices due to
their radicalism, but can they be any different if their guiding themes often
involve the excluded fighting for existence and if they reflect the relations
between groups having problems with approaching each other? The
practices involve demands for limiting the rights or privileges of a part of
society and modifying the dominant template of justice. Spreading such
demands needs to be preceded by individual questions about the principles
of the order. This happens before the individuals start noticing that the
change in the form of the distribution of goods lies in their objective
interest. It stems from this that the practices are radical and, since they offer
no alternatives, it is difficult to go beyond the dichotomy adopted—which
becomes nearly incapacitating. The uncompromising nature of equality-
related demands takes an anti-system dimension when they focus on radical
forms of introducing justice directed against the order. An example of such
absolutisation can be the parties being anchored around different ways of
perceiving the world (e.g., “Poland with democratic tendencies”–“Poland
with authoritarian tendencies”). It is hard for a compromise to be reached
between such parties. There is not a trace of doubt in them, which is why
they delight the supporters and irritate the opponents. Political parties,
utilising repartition practices, focus on monopolist activities and strive to
reduce the chances of competition (Szpringer, 1996, p. 75). Chantal Mouffe
claimed that every discursive hegemony means temporary closures (i.e.,
exclusions) (2013). The phenomenon analysed here applies to alternative
visions of justice, having problems with leaving the margin [of society].
That is why the majority of practices can be considered creations of
counter-hegemony.
A practice attempts to form a community around similar experiences,
thus forcing a reflection over the modern reality. Often, those taking a
collective place on a specific side are not connected by anything other than
similar imaginations of what should be included there. Thus, they do not
create any clear and recognisable community. Their structural meanings
enable individuals and communities having similar imaginations to become
related to them. They facilitate abandoning the feeling of alienation, which
applies not only to minority groups or individuals. They provide an
opportunity for finding oneself among the excluded, for the creation of
more numerous communities. This is where a peculiar egalitarianism of the
practices of division manifests, providing an individual with an illusion of
choice that is of value to them. It sustains the conviction of uniqueness and
moral superiority and justifies failures and setbacks experienced in life.
This, in turn, provides social elevation, an advancement based on
declarations of others and own evaluations in hierarchies, being an illusion
of elitism and, in truth, eventually a demand for egalitarianism.
Looking at the practices from the point of view of a non-privileged
party is the fundamental method for evaluating a given practice. This is
shown perfectly by examples of experiences of the excluded in the
“us”–“them” or “solidary”–“liberal” divisions. In all the politicizations of
these divisions, the non-privileged are mainly the individuals experiencing
economic exclusion, balancing on the verge of existential security. Often,
they are completely marginalised. They are excluded from consumption and
participation in public life and deprived of dignity and respect from the
winners. They are individuals who have been pushed to the margin because
their political representatives are refused equal participation in power. The
authorities considered the postulates of the excluded too radical and not
compatible with the “perfect” orders already created. In all repartitions, also
those employed by minority groups, the pattern of defensive narration takes
a similar form: your postulates are radical. Thus, they were expected to
remain silent and suffer in that silence.
Do repartitions exclude one of the parties by stigmatising it? Such
allegation is raised by the political opponents of the practices. The critics
focused on reinterpreting or excluding them, always guarding the interest of
the political or social option they support. It is not so, for is it possible to
hurt those unfairly privileged in society? The message of the practice is that
the privileged should share the goods, change the rules of distribution and
allow the excluded to participate in public life. That is why the practice is a
form of radical turning of attention to the injustice, not excluding but
restoring just relations. In the discourse, there are arguments that what has
been defined in this work as repartitions is an action aimed at searching for
things that divide, not the common ones. Such arguments seem to assume
that the discrimination questioned does not stem from the dominating ones
and does not prevent individuals from establishing relations and ties. Every
politicization of divisions ultimately attempts to bring certain groups
together, although often it is hard to find any impartiality or objectiveness
in it. The practices polarise society by building two opposing camps, but
they are not the only politicizations of a specific division and, therefore, it is
not valid to say that they promote aversion and intolerance and prevent
compromise. They call for reaching it. Some people perceive the practices
as instruments for raising anxiety, but they are rather a measure that brings
a sense of security. A sense of threat is embedded in unjust hierarchies. The
features listed make the practices a self-driving mechanism, which
underlines their expressions: a ruthless grimace targeted at the privileged
and a smile of hope directed towards the excluded.
The practices are a form of controlling the present and an attempt at
shaping the future. They constitute an institutionalisation of rivalry between
groups, indicating conditions that need to be rejected and demonstrating
measures and range of possible activity. They increase the sense of worth of
one social group at the expense of another. Thus, they are not only tools that
enable differentiating oneself from a political competitor. Their
effectiveness stems from being focused on the future in which the expected
consequences are to appear. They do not leave the inequalities existing to
randomness or a stroke of luck. All the practices state the following clearly:
“the tomorrow cannot be a continuation of the today”—and this is what
irritates those who dream of the today being identical to the tomorrow. The
practices make the future more predictable and controlled, assuming that
the realisation of demands included in them leads to improving the reality.
The practices make people realise the necessity of a community of
actions. They constitute suggestions intended for mobilising the excluded to
public expression of objection to the problems of the order. They strive to
activate actual socio-political forces transforming everyday life. It is not
inertia—as some people think—that keeps the orders stagnant, but the
stabilising actions of those who benefit from them. The practices are
examples of top–down influence focused on both mass and individual
recipients. They force a certain behaviour of the recipient as it is impossible
to take the role of an indifferent observer who wants to seek objective
information without considering the postulates of change. The practices
constitute political communication in the form of recollection, agreement
and domination. They are born from disappointment and objectification, but
they provide empowerment. They express disagreement, which is why they
include both the aspect of scepticism and the conviction of the necessity to
continue the political struggle. Persuasion to act is a part of repartitions,
especially when numerous factors exist that impact voter activity and
turnout (Dzwończyk, 2007, pp. 65 et seq.). They are intended to uproot
individuals from indifference and idleness. That is why sometimes it is said
that practices are manufactured only in order to activate selected groups. It
is also with the intention to make the activity of these groups legitimise the
authorities, which took place during the communist era in Poland when the
practices were used for falsifying reality. By using them, “the rulers of the
state hid behind the masks of revolutionaries” (Świda-Ziemba, 1998, p.
290).
The practices total the efforts of individuals and transform them into
collective action. The individuals do not solve the issues defined by using
repartitions on their own. This requires involving other actions, taking
advantage of imagination, adopting interpretations related to the practice
and, subsequently, specific activity. In such cases, they may have a nature of
significant sociotechnical and manipulation instruments increasing the
dynamics of political life. Abusing these instrumental and persuasive
features of the practices does not deprive them of significance or usefulness
for transforming the order when the useful capital accumulated is the
current political gains in the form of support and some of the citizens
identifying with specific parties (i.e., with the political sphere).

Conditions for Applying and Redefining

Repartition
Repartitions, being projects of changes and promises of changes will never
ensure the realisation of the project they declare. Similarly to other
politicizations, they never provide any certainty of becoming a new reality,
similarly to how they do not always serve effective conduct of politics.
Even when repartitions make it easier for their creators to gain or retain
power, this does not mean the elimination of inequalities. The practices
need to be translated effectively into specific actions. Polish politics are a
history of unrealised promises and change projects also presented with
repartitions. The practices consist of negative valuations, which is an
intrinsic part of them and employ criticism of social relations to describe
the detrimental order. They cannot exist without questioning the relations.
Such a negation of relations leads to rejection and undermining of the
practices themselves. By criticising the order, they expose themselves to
attacks from its defenders. A part of those ceaseless attacks is the suggested
redefinitions of repartitions and their subsequent differing valuations,
politically useful to the opponents. The repartitions, particularly those
undermining the foundations of the order, become an object of ruthless
political disputes.
Repartitions are tools serving communication between political actors,
practice initiators and creators and the wronged, taking advantage of the
injustice they experienced and their imaginations of them. It is a process of
finding social anxieties and dissatisfaction in the present, noticing
individuals and groups that experience blocks for their expectations being
satisfied and for their most basic forms of development of their life being
implemented. Noticing divisions that can be found in practices forces
looking to the past as creating an effective practice without recognising the
causes hidden in the past is impossible. The examples of injustice
legitimising the practice presented in the discourse are always past-oriented.
The reception of practices is always limited by the interpretations made
by their opponents, the politicians defending the privileged or supporting
their position and other participants of the discourse. Some political actors
do not notice the divisions, for ideological or political reasons, and often
because they also contributed to their appearance. These tendencies can be
clearly seen in the attitudes of many communities towards the politicization
of the “us”–“them” or “losers”–“winners” divisions. Their opponents
openly rejected any repartitions, negated the methods of presenting
inequalities and questioned their existence. They openly underestimated the
existing discrimination and wrongs, sustaining their own contempt for the
humiliated and excluded. At the same time, they sought different meanings
and interpretations in repartitions and the original perceptions thereof. A
part of such activation of repartitions was transforming them through the
manipulation of metaphorical meanings. The parties were ascribed different
personal compositions and values preferred, and it was confirmed that an
opposition between the parties existed, but it regarded other things. In this
manner, the practices were questioned. An example of such transformation
(completely admissible) was the behaviour concerning the “solidary
Poland”–“liberal Poland” practice, which was assigned new axes, thus
showing the presence of other inequalities. The “solidary” side was
assigned traditionalism, while the “liberal” one—modernism (Zuba, 2015,
p. 18). The attitude towards modernity, openness and social progress was
made the axis of such a reinterpreted practice. The reinterpretations of the
“solidary Poland”–“liberal Poland” practice were extraordinarily numerous.
The more intensively they were applied, the more they constituted
confirmations of the actual poverty of those who lost in the transformation.
Employing redefinitions testifies to the accuracy of the original dichotomy
and its adequacy in presenting inequalities.
Performing redefinitions requires skill as it always consists of
undermining the original, most obvious associations and values. What
happens frequently is reaching for ridiculing and the application of satirical
references, as well as reminding the alleged socially and politically
detrimental consequences of it. Such actions are often effective, especially
in a situation when the authors of the redefinition are backed by a monopoly
of media and information. All the discourse regarding the practice
conducted by communities averse to it has the task of neutralising it,
depriving it of impact or defacing its truths regarding inequalities. The same
purpose is served by creating information noise and interfering with
communication between the practice creators and recipients. It is done
similarly to underestimating the demands included in the practice—by
underlining that they are late because they have already been realised (e.g.,
by the authorities against whom a given practice is directed). Often, the
encountered form of weakening the practice’s significance is the
publicisation of the incompetence of its authors: “maybe their slogans are
right, but they are unfeasible due to the people who spread them”. They are
discredited by connecting them with a conspiracy-based perception of the
world (Głowiński, 2009, p. 245) on the part of the repartition authors. The
degree and intensity of such actions depend on the level of a sense of threat
among the representatives of the privileged. They perceive the practice as a
strategy; the beginning of something leading to depriving them of a part of
their current goods and privileges. Success of a redefinition strategy means
a situation when the recipients often no longer know what the original
practice was describing and what it called for.
The practices constitute an attempt at reflecting an already existing
conflict, which stems from a clash of interests of two communities. They
contain knowledge of the experience of many individuals, resulting from
the order rejecting their interests. Thus, they are not a case of making the
first step towards dialogue. Therefore, all the suggested redefinitions
thereof constitute a defence of inequalities and strive to maintain the status
quo at all costs. Redefinitions need to be read as a refusal to solve the
conflict and transfer goods between parties. They are a defence of the
negated perceptions of justice. An excellent example of such political
helplessness was the publicised political redefinitions of repartitions that
referred to the “us”–“them” or “losers”–“winners” divisions. The suggested
redefinitions of those practices constituted a rejection of dialogue on the
part of representatives of the privileged. The purpose of redefinitions was to
maintain the hierarchy (i.e., the current situation), but it was not always
possible to achieve.
In a democracy, repartitions are destined to be questioned by political
competitors. It is not surprising as they testify to the failure of the order,
causing discomfort in its creators and supporters. It is especially the
authorities striving to remain in power who notice threats in alternative
concepts of justice and forms of organisation of order. The description of
pathologies of reality presented in the practices requires a reaction. In
Polish politics, that questioning is usually based on simply accusing those
who apply this practice of dividing society, which is supposed to constitute
an offence excluding them from the democratic rivalry. In a situation of a
media monopoly, such interpretations may turn out effective to an extent.
They can be convincing, especially when the rivalry is based on
polarisation, in a discourse governed by strong emotions, in a situation
when “everyone listens only to their own” (Zaremba, 2019). When the
voters follow the messages of parties, often supporting their most illogical
and irrational suggestions and rejecting criticism and rational verification
completely, they provide support to the practices or redefinitions thereof
without any deeper consideration regarding what they refer to.
The degree of politicization of divisions with the use of repartitions
changes over time. During certain periods there is a greater intensity of it,
and sometimes they appear completely unexpectedly, even outside of
campaigns. Interruptions in their application, stemming from a lack of
political tensions or the political discourse being dominated by another
problem (such as a pandemic), also occur. Repartitions often become a
weapon of opposition leaders, anti-system parties and populist movements,
which is why they are often associated with a populist atmosphere.
Sometimes it is impossible to separate repartitions from populism, and they
become a single political instrument. The populists usually employ in
repartitions the well-known and utilised “oppressed people”—“evil and
egoistic elites” opposition. The universality of this opposition, irrespective
of the historical period, is puzzling. “In the past, this was called the
authorities being out of touch with the masses. Today it is referred to more
gently as the alienation of political elites who started to live their own lives,
their own disputes and the power struggle and stopped reactions to the
actual needs of people” (Wnuk-Lipiński, 2003, p. 176). The fact that the
populists employ repartitions does not disqualify them as they are often
justified when they regard actual cases of injustice. This is similar to
populism, which is often the path to the empowerment of new social forces
(Klementewicz, 2010, p. 109) when referring to the presence of
inequalities. Thus, not all practices are populism unless we consider any
demand to change relations populism.
It is hard to find a clean presence of populism in repartitions. Besides,
repartitions, being functional towards the order, threaten not only the
authorities and are an instrument that can be used irrespective of the
anchorage in power, even though it is closely related to it. This stems from
the characteristics of the phenomenon of power, which is inequality—a
hierarchy that always constitutes injustice for some of the individuals.
Acting against the authority appears not only in totalitarian orders, although
the practices created then are more frequently focused on the individuals
and groups excluded, which always constitute a threat towards the
authorities. It is usually then that the authorities present the excluded (i.e.,
“the healthy part of society” as a degenerated margin). That is why from the
point of view of the privileged groups disposing of power, it is justified to
talk about the populism of repartitions—which are a tool of the groups
standing against the authorities. The majority of practices take advantage of
a scapegoat, putting the whole blame for the inequalities created on one of
the parties. It is often that populists, similarly to what happens in
repartitions, recreate the vertical hierarchy that they define clearly as
requiring changes. This happens with greater intensity during breakthroughs
and social and economic transformations. “The populists joint the political
activity in a situation of acute structural crisis” (Marczewska-Rytko, 2011,
p. 25), taking advantage of radical politicizations.
All the politicians declare that they listen to the “voice of the people”,
but they do not always take action that would fit their expectations.
However, the opposition parties care the most for the conviction of their
connection to the people. Reading the expectations of this part of society
provides the capability of realising the demands of groups marginalised in
the social structure. The evidence confirming the existing discrimination
may lead to the creation of either a populist strategy or repartition practices,
which means that divisions and inequalities can be used for populist actions
in general, to which it is difficult to ascribe such characteristics. An
example is the “losers”–“winners” division, the politicization of which
consisted of both populist actions and rational messages and demands,
showing actual paths to changing the situation, even though the defenders
of the order often called all the politicizations populist. The stigma of
populism turns out to be useful for naming the criticism and critics of the
order.
A review of sources employed to write this work proves that those who
employed repartitions were accused of dividing society (i.e., going beyond
the admissible forms of conducting politics defined by those controlling the
discourse). A politician employing repartitions was compared to an
unethical athlete who reached for illegal supporting measures. Those
accused of committing such evil deeds were mostly the same who bravely
indicated the inequalities that needed to be rejected. Such an approach to
criticism stems not only from a lack of objectivism. It is a consequence of
the existence of a specific form of social consciousness, a political
“protective curtain”. It consists of the support of specific political camps
noticing the dividers only among those whose views they do not share.
Such a position is also influenced by the interests of those evaluating and
criticising the repartition, which is usually linked to the interests of groups
remaining in power. That is why it is extremely rare for those supporting
the order to react without emotions to the repartitions appearing that
undermine it. When the creators of repartitions are the politicians whom the
voters sympathise with, they immediately exonerate them by saying that
their hand was forced, for example, as a result of ruthless attacks of their
opponents. As a result of that, politicians to whom bad intentions are
ascribed and that are said to divide society, always appear on the other side
of the political dispute.
Effective repartitions require their creators to possess particular skills in
analysing reality and both political and cognitive competencies. The skills
of situation analysis, discovering actual divisions and connecting them to
examples of discrimination. They also need to be connected to earlier
evaluations of reality performed by parties or politicians who spread the
repartition and be coherent with previous postulates included in the
programme. What requires certain skills is also the ability to take advantage
of emotions. Such skill needs to be considered particularly useful. It is
indispensable to possess the ability to “read and then supervise” time and
connect past events and processes to present ones as every division is a
creation of the past. Choosing it and then identifying it using practices
constitutes valuation of time sections by social groups and, usually,
extracting negative aspects from both the past and the present.
Underlining the above skills does not change the evaluation that the
practices are structurally simple instruments based on an obvious template.
This structural simplicity regarding building and managing the practices
and communicating with the recipients contributes to them being used
frequently. After being announced, most practices are subject to ceaseless
verification of usefulness and confirmation that they reflect actual
inequalities that the individuals experience. In those who observe politics,
certain repartitions cause profound embarrassment as the oppositions
suggested turn out to be primitive and often blunt, leaving no space for
imagination. In such cases, what appears is the feeling that the sole purpose
of their creation was to discredit their opponents and their supporters. It is
as if depriving the whole of a certain community of its dignity guaranteed a
sense of superiority, uniqueness and moral high ground to the depriver.
Often, the influence of such narration is temporary. It does not translate to
long-term political support and does not create any grounds for actual
respect. It is as if the contempt towards the privileged was the last resort
against admitting failure.
The effectiveness of repartitions results from their connection with
inequalities and divisions that are the most important within a given
structure. Taking advantage of fictional inequalities having no confirmation,
in reality, leads to the devaluation of repartitions and even ridiculing them,
and ultimately to their delegitimisation. Such practices cannot arouse
emotions, encourage the individuals or masses to act, integrate or provide
advantages. The world of communist propaganda learnt that perfectly as the
arguments supporting many communist repartitions, memorised and
collected with effort, were of no avail. The fact that the order skillfully and
instrumentally utilised them did not change anything. The practices were
diverging from social reality and, even if the arguments for them had some
grounds, they were delegitimised by their creator—the propaganda
apparatus of the order deprived of legitimisation. What that order lacked
was the most valuable good—freedom, which made the repartitions
unreliable. The monopoly of propaganda made it easier to create and
transmit the repartitions, but using them in such conditions automatically
turned their status into lies.
Next to the populist atmosphere, another factor supporting repartitions
is the mediatisation of the political scene and being guided in
communication by images capable of interesting the recipients. The
changes in the media sphere led to politics becoming reduced to the level of
a media spectacle (Karwat, 2012, p. 568). The expressive, often
controversial presentation of social problems constitutes a significant
advantage in fighting for recipients in the media. The effectiveness of the
practices depends on the method of their presentation and the evaluations
made through media. The influence of even the most perfectly designed
repartition can be limited and, in the case of a media monopoly,
significantly inhibited. At the same time, the media’s search for topics that
arouse strong emotions and regard “political management of society”
provides opportunities for repartitions and sometimes even elevates them
among all of the other information. That is why practices become an
instrument of increasing the interest in media by providing a growing
number of recipients and, therefore, the funds necessary for further
functioning. Consequently, frequently, it is the media who “‘seduce”’ the
recipients with practices—not to promote a specific political option, but in
their own interest. Repartitions appear as significant items in information
and propaganda communications. The policy of media forces focuses on
differences, controversies, divisions and the existing or even artificial
distances.
The above comments confirm the determination that repartitions depend
the most on the democratic order. It is in it that they show the full extent of
their capabilities. There they can exist as a fragment driving the order or
inspiring the changes required. Totalitarianism also took advantage of the
practices, but did that while having complete control over their formation,
use and transformation. It did not allow the appearance of their
reinterpretations in the official discourse. This does not mean, however, that
certain inequalities of the order were not weakened instrumentally (i.e.,
explained by the totalitarian regimes). Repartitions appeared only to
“protect” the privileged groups, cooperating or constituting the social
resource for the authorities. The task of the repartitions was to maintain the
existing relations of the authorities and satisfy the particular interest of the
dominant groups supporting the authorities. They served to constantly
confirm the need for the persistence of the totalitarian order.

Practices of Repartition—Homogeneity
Destruction Instruments
The analysis has demonstrated that repartitions are applicable in order full
of profound inequalities and divisions. Such conclusions can be drawn from
the historical and economic experiences of Polish society after 1945. Back
then, taking advantage of the practices stemmed from the influence of pre-
war divisions and later from the formation of the “us”–“them” division, its
persistence until 1989, and then the “losers”–“winners” division resulting
from the radicalism of creation of the free market and errors made
concerning that. The majority of repartitions analysed in this work resulted
from the divisions listed above.
However, not all of the inequalities transformed into social divisions. It
happened when the excluded were under strong ideological control and
political supervision. Additionally, the nearly homogeneous social structure
often limited a wider presentation of certain inequalities to society,
especially when they afflicted small communities or individuals not
remaining in contact with one another. The homogenised structure
hampered the emergence of divisions as the discriminated had trouble
meeting one another. That is why repartitions exposing problems of
minority groups appeared with lower intensity. On the other hand, there
were other tendencies that appeared in Polish society. As the material
standard of living and the economic self-sufficiency of some individuals
improved, the economic divisions that earlier constituted the basis for
inequalities lost their dominant role. Additionally, the political groups
remaining in power were intensively obscuring certain inequalities
purposefully and instrumentally, in the interest of its power and the unjust
relations formed. It turned out that the instruments intended for “hiding”
divisions are also at the disposal of the democratic order, which, similarly to
the totalitarian ones, blocks the appearance of truth about the excluded in
the discourse.
In the context of the creation of repartition practices, the existence of a
homogeneous society meant the domination of a single vision of justice in
the discourse and imposing it upon everyone, thus permanently excluding
the individuals referring to other concepts of a good life. Despite
functioning in such a controlled society, the excluded were finding ways of
building communities that demanded justice. To this end, they also reached
for repartitions, which turned out to be not a threat, but a deliverance to the
democratic, homogeneous order. It turned out that the practices still seem
indispensable in a society where certain divisions are less noticeable. The
homogeneous society formed as a consequence of communism limited the
visibility of the exclusion of many minority groups. Chantal Mouffe
similarly analysed the issue of homogenisation of orders and “ejecting”
differences and conflicts beyond their margin. She saw a threat to
democracy in the liberal thought and solutions suggested by it. That threat
is supposed to result from the rationalist liberal thought negating the need
for conflict, dispute and discord—things that form the basis of democracy.
In party systems, this is to manifest itself through programme similarity, a
lack of possibility of actual differentiation and forcing consensus at all
costs. In such situations, democracies are to suggest “elections without
choice” to citizens (Muller, 2017, p. 83).
The more uniformity in society, the more it encloses the politicians
within the present. Uniformity suggests that there is no future different from
the present, it is decidedly more difficult to recreate differences, and there
are problems with the imagination of any other future. Any images different
from those presented by the present encounter difficulties in their path.
Uniformity tries to pass as predictability and becomes an illusion of the
security sought. It satisfies itself with continuation and enduring and loses
energy in order to sustain the conviction that it constitutes an achievement.
It does not provide any grounds for being surprised by imperfections and
for planning the future by entering into it with different actions. It deprives
of grounds for taking action and reduces the demand for politicians and
alternative political programmes to the minimum. What suffices is the
administrators, who keep society in the condition considered the target one.
Any ideologically supported uniformity pays no attention to the future. It
expects nothing from and has nothing to offer it. It has neither any respect
towards suggestions of far-reaching changes, visions of transformations, nor
any time for these. Here a sentence from Donald Tusk can be quoted: “If
anyone has a vision, they better go see a doctor” (Cimoszewicz, 2018).
Although, in this case, it did not testify to acceptance of the existing social
uniformities, but only legitimisation of the idleness of his political party. A
homogeneous society can be presented as a perfect reality but, in practice, it
questions the right to change.
Repartitions appear when the minority lifestyles and values, different
from the dominant ones, have trouble with “getting out of” subordination,
remaining under control and domination of values or identities of majority
groups. They lack the resources to dispose of the domination, which is why
they must keep pretending acceptance for the existing order. Then, the
imposed ideology imprisons them by forming a supervising shell in the
form of sets of institutions, rules and standards constituting a whole that is
difficult to break. A part of that shell is the domination of a single vision of
justice which is difficult to question and reject promptly. Then even the
existing democratic order does not discourage them from living according
to their own values. In such social conditions, the practices help and
become the audible voice of the excluded. They can lead to empowerment
and self-realisation of social groups and individuals or at least help
publicise such demands. The practices are not only messages about
discrimination of individuals, but also support the process of the knowledge
on discrimination reaching the public opinion to ultimately enable and
accelerate the actions aimed at changing relations. The dominant reluctance
to give rights to minority groups, present among majority groups, is in itself
an invitation to create repartition practices.
 It turns out that repartitions are used for underlining and, at the same
time, negating the homogeneities present in a society characterised by
significant uniformities. This does not apply only to a society formed under
the influence of a communist ideology focused on creating unity at all costs,
but all kinds of formed societies where the conviction of the existing
equality is an ideological part of the domination sustaining mechanism
created, societies where the diversity is fictional and expressed only in the
form of different styles of clothing, forms of consumption or participation
in mass culture. The majority of such diversities do not diverge from
homogenisation and usually served to hide deeper inequalities that are
significant to the order. The diversity expressed in the above forms is
usually a creation for the needs of a media game, artificially created images
imposed not only in the interest of ideology and politics but mainly of the
market. Often, this kind of diversity only forms a screen behind which the
actual homogeneity and far-reaching uniformisation of the majority are
hidden. Spreading such diversity usually constitutes a part of the process of
closing the political discourse to the problems of others excluded or the
people who are yet to be excluded. Social homogeneity does not tolerate
actual differences, is afraid of them, fights them and notices in them (and
rightly so) the greatest enemy for domination of the ideologies that support
it.
In a homogeneous society, often presented as a perfect one, the conflicts
and social divisions related to them do not disappear. Some of them “expose
themselves”, generating protests and manifestations and leading to the
formation of social movements. On the other hand, other divisions existing
for many years become blurred and lose significance without having any
major support in the structure, which is why they stop being an object of
politicization. A critical attitude (i.e., employing repartitions) with regard to
the divisions that no longer exist causes a reflex of pity, and no one cares to
redefine them or react to them. Sometimes there are present inequalities that
are considered irremovable and ideologically decreed as such. Different
ideological justifications adhered to them, and they became a part of long-
term political strategies. Homogeneity does not notice the borderlines
between groups. It does not mean that they do not exist; it just pretends they
are not present. Transgressing them violates the peace of the order and
introduces anxiety among the groups that support it and benefit from it.
They stopped being noticed despite some people making a living out of
finding the wronged and establishing political care over them. Usually, the
lack of interest in them stems from the fact that the benefits of remaining
silent about them exceed the benefits resulting from exposing the
inequalities. Or, alternatively, it may be the dominant ideology that made all
the injustices of the order invisible.
The examples already listed in the previous chapter confirm the
“benefits” resulting from employing the practices in nearly uniform social
contexts. In such cases, the practices are created by people who refer to
representing the interests of minority groups—the excluded, deprived of
chances for implementing a change in social relations due to remaining
outside of the main current of public life. The people originating from niche
cultures with visions of equality and justice are different from the dominant
ones. This regards situations where individuals have trouble presenting the
wrongs suffered and convincing the majority of them having taken place.
Such cases also include matters related to a sense of a lack of sexual
freedom, limitation of free speech or a lack of tolerance for alternative
lifestyles. The practices have been applied not only by leaders competing
for the highest position in the state and strived to convince the excluded to
joint their side. They have also been employed by anti-discrimination
movements referring directly to values defined as left-wing, whose banners
have born not only individualism but also postulates of appreciation of all
differences.
The usefulness of repartitions for the order was confirmed by means of
the above-quoted descriptions of the formation of the practices in politics.
They confirm that the idea of justice also constitutes them, irrespective of
the existence of a nearly homogeneous society. The examples analysed
show their application in a situation of presence and domination of clearly
formed hierarchies and being under the influence of large communities and
their dominating values. This confirms, then, that repartitions were aimed
against those dominances and advantages, which means that talking about
the impossibility of the formation of divisions when a single group within
the order performs the role of a monopolist is not valid (Herbut, 1997, p.
42).
Homogeneity creates repartitions and generates demand for them. It is
when they become instruments for “hitting” subsequent privileged
majorities, underlining their unjustified advantages and reminding them of
the need to eliminate further hierarchies. At such moments, taking
advantage of repartitions gains special significance, particularly through
media and sociotechnical actions upon which the promotion of rules and
values by minority groups depends. Also, it is definitely not limited solely
to presenting the repartitions. Promoting them is a fragment of other
politicization aimed at changing the situation of the excluded. A part of
them is creating the “demand for values”, just like it happens in the case of
new technological devices. In such strategies, the practices become the
instruments of supporters and propagators of cultural privilege destruction.
They take the form of dichotomies in which the minorities are presented as
threatened by the lifestyle of majority groups (excluded and discriminated).
Repartitions are complemented with further examples of discrimination and
facts, sometimes even subjected to mythologisation. Minority groups are
presented as disposing of special skills that are valuable and necessary to
society. That is why repartitions regarding discriminated groups often
require the distribution of resources according to new rules. They call for
assigning a higher place to such individuals—this time, just one. However,
they do not demand privileged treatment, but only justice they deserve
because of exhibiting exceptional characteristics.
A high level of homogeneity does not limit the frequency of employing
repartitions. On the contrary, it often forces employing them. Similarly to
the presence of numerous differences between individuals, it does not
translate to a greater number of divisions. The logic of political rivalry and
competition is also of little significance to repartitions, so often reminded in
the discourse. In a homogeneous society, in relation to the existing and
dominant communities, forming a new community of political feelings is
always more difficult. That is why representatives of minorities politicize
the divisions regarding them, becoming involved in seeking people similar
to them, the excluded. Their minority character constitutes a hindrance as
they find it harder to activate and integrate. However, the practices carry a
special facilitation in finding similar people; perhaps that is why they can
become the main (and sufficient) instrument for uniting the excluded. In
other words, inequality can be perceived individually, which means it can
be socially invisible, and this is when the practice becomes a rallying point
for dispersed individuals.
The Polish experiences indicate that the practices are not instruments
that can be used frequently and in all circumstances. They are unfit for
daily, ceaseless application (i.e., systematic and mostly artificial stimulation
of recipients). They are not similar to political advertising, which is
employed without limitations. It is impossible to accelerate the production
of practices at will. Their excess or far-reaching variability in terms of
referring to constantly changing divisions may also have negative
consequences. These limitations stem from the capabilities of consumption
of the practices by the recipients. They are unable to anchor themselves in
subsequent, different practices within a relatively short time span. It is
exceptionally difficult to change one’s own place and that of one’s voters
within the social space (i.e., the side determined by the dichotomy).
However, these oppositions can be constantly supplemented and
systematically complemented with further similar examples of inequalities
and descriptions of further examples of injustice. Abandoning them quickly
would suggest that the character of the issues troubling the individuals is
not serious. Instead of the so-expected and desired building of trust in the
“politicians–individuals” relation, distrust would appear. It would increase
the distance between the individual and the practice creators, thus
destroying hope that the practices brought together with their appearance.
For the above reasons, an important matter is sustaining a meaningful
practice—i.e., one solving the fundamental problem of the existing division
—in the discourse.
The above comments confirm that justice still remains a serious matter
and a superior value—one that is still in short supply in society. It disposes
of strength even when ambiguity makes it impossible to ultimately define it.
Also, in the case of minority groups reaching for it. This confirms that a
rational reflection on society still exists and that the dreams of a better
world can drive individuals and stimulate them to act. It also confirms that
the change projects are still alive, that individuals still believe in their own
capacity for rebuilding the world and that they still want to lead to replacing
the uncontrolled and turbulent social transformations with a rational design.
In those so frequently criticised practices still lies a note of the
Enlightenment’s faith in the just order being able to achieve as a result of
the purposeful and considerate organisation of social processes supported
by science. However, it is better to listen well to the messages carried by
repartitions, even if these are only interpretations subjected to further
reinterpretations.
The knowledge shaping the repartition practices does not come from
intellectual analyses but is gained through experience and the spread of
knowledge on human suffering through noticing groups and individuals
functioning on the margin of society. The structure, together with its
contradictions and shortcomings, often legitimises not only participation in
politics but also revolutionary actions, although the contemporary
observations made in homogeneous orders with invisible constituents of the
structures raise certain doubts. At the same time, the social divisions
themselves keep structuring politics, even though they are not transferred
automatically to parties (Grabowska, 2003, p. 56). However, the presence of
divisions has an “impact on the way of shaping the space of national
political rivalry” (Herbut, 1999, p. 112). This is completely unquestionable
—and confirmed by numerous studies also devoted to the Polish party
system. The political actors take advantage of divisions in the rivalry,
“approximating” different fractions of society that they want to represent
and taking root among them. The politicization of social life always leads to
the enrichment of the political sphere (Karwat, 2012, p. 15). However, the
additional politicization of divisions, or rather a fragment thereof in the
form of repartitions practices, also turns out to be “an effective method of
gaining control over the election market and recruiting a stable clientele”
(Herbut, 1999, p. 113). The politicians who refer to intellectual analyses
and ideological treaties in their practices quickly realise that they are
completely out of touch with social issues. All the tricks performed with
practices and applying them without connection to social divisions (i.e.,
without the sense of injustice and inequality) do not lead to obtaining any
significant social support.

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© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023
P. Borowiec, The Politicization of Social Divisions in Post-War Poland
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26530-3_7

7. Conclusion
Piotr Borowiec1
(1) Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Jagiellonian
University, Kraków, Poland

Piotr Borowiec
Email: piotr.borowiec@uj.edu.pl

Keywords Social divisions – Practice of repartition – Theory of politics

Polish society participated in two sudden changes, bringing hope for a life
in dignity, embodiment of dreams to many, and generating negative
consequences—discrimination, injustice and atrocity. Still, the intensity of
employment of physical violence, leading to the creation of resources of
injustice and wrongdoings, was not identical in these two changes. The
declared purpose of these changes was to build a just order. They promised
improved material conditions, welfare and satisfaction of the basic needs of
society. They persuaded, forced and encouraged everyone to participate in
the work towards the realisation of either the socialist society concept, or
capitalism and free market. They excluded and stigmatised those who did
not want to participate in these actions. Both revolutions mentioned
restoring respect and dignity in public space. However, they were ruthless
in designating their enemies, although they excluded them to a different
extent. They made human happiness—something hard to attain—the
purpose of the actions made, which is why they were eventually forced to
manipulate the states of reality achieved. They were both focused on
practical actions and wanted to transform the order found, including social
relations, clearly rejecting the previously applicable values and forms of
living. They shattered society in a different manner and for various
purposes. The first revolution strived to atomise individuals and, at the
same time, build controlled social classes to be able to rule over them, while
the other empowered individuals and even purposefully weakened large
communities in order to bring hope to the excluded, striving to release their
models of living from subordination.
Comparing these two experiments is not an instrumental attempt at
“equating them morally”, but at highlighting that the changes conducted
were similar in many aspects, that they were based on similar mechanisms
and that they often employed the same political instruments. Both were
based on rejecting the inequalities experienced by individuals and
intensively politicized their negative experiences. For these reasons, both
experiments extensively referred to differently understood ideas of justice
and equality. They called for giving all individuals a universal right to
equality and dignified existence, although they gave different meanings to
these postulates. Both these experiments constituted, to a large extent, a
reflection of the large, centuries-old political dispute regarding the vision of
a good life. In this manner, they became anchored in the intellectual
achievements of humankind. Their sources were located in the fundamental
image of good social order. At the same time, both these changes were, to a
great extent, imposed and implemented top-down without discussion,
although within a varying scope and with various scales of the physical
violence employed. Additionally, they had support in history and were
eager to create a new reality while convinced that history made the final
choice and decided to stand on their side exactly.
Some of the similarities listed in this book were underlined in view of
their significance for the main research problem, while others were
purposefully omitted. They have been presented in other elaborations that
are publicly accessible and regard the history and transformations of Polish
society. Some of the features of both changes were reminded to underline
the universal nature of mechanisms of formation of Polish divisions, to
capture the forms of their politicization and the repartition practices first
and foremost. This approach to both changes, performed chronologically
and comparatively, allowed building the foundations of the formation of
divisions and the nature, character and application of repartitions.
The analysis showed that divisions are creations that require time and
are determined by social and economic environment conditions. They arise
quicker than the creations in the classic determinations of Seymour M.
Lipset and Stein Rokkan and are determined by political and economic
activities leading to the formation of not only noticeable, but also onerous
structural inequalities. It turned out that the economic structure still
conditions social life to the greatest extent. The unequal arrangement of
individuals within the social structure, i.e., according to the factors
determining their lifetime chances, leads to individuals reflecting on the
ubiquitous lack of justice. Justice is evaluated by comparing one’s chances
and possibilities for satisfying one’s needs with the actual satisfaction of
needs by other individuals. Additionally, the capacity for evaluating one’s
own position stems from mental predispositions, personal experiences and
subjective and psychological factors, and cognitive differences and differing
interpretations of existing inequalities govern them. They often lead to a
sense of individual injustice, exclusion and discrimination. These
conditions find confirmation in unequal social relations undertaken and
recreated by individuals. The collective anxiety arising or—in a wider
perspective—specific claims appearing are usually shaped by ideological
and moral beliefs, mainly by the disseminated visions of the values of
justice and equality. The meanings and interpretation of these values are
particularly important for the excluded individuals. They are usually hidden
deeply and marginalised. They are only accepted by minorities—groups
without any major influence or hope of gaining significance. Social
divisions are formed when inequalities become a part of the collective
consciousness, when they go beyond the individual sense of injustice and
become the experienced social distances. These studies have shown the
divisions to be actual and real structural problems and social tasks, dynamic
and universal, originating from social relations.
The perspective presented in this work assumed that the appearance of
divisions is a consequence, first and foremost, of the existence of wrongs,
inequalities and discriminations, which stems indirectly from the internal
contradictions between elements having a structural and functional genesis.
It is those that become the sources of tension. They are confirmed by the
individuals constantly drifting away from one another, usually due to
disposing of different resources of goods. A significant place for the
divisions is the process of creation and transformation of relations, leading
to inequalities due to the multifaceted, purposeful political actions spread
over time, as well as spontaneous social transformations. The divisions are
structures created socially as a result of the individuals’ continuous
confirmation of their own advantages and limitations. The existing and
recognised imaginations of justice and equality play the central role in this
process of assigning meanings. According to the concept preferred in this
work, the divisions are not created as a result of sociotechnical tricks,
fictional oppositions or intensive propaganda activities.
The formation of divisions shows the unique role of morality, hidden in
the visions of societies, in the concept of a good life implemented for
decades (often even driven to extremes). They contain universal values of
justice and equality and expectations towards orders, as well as constitute in
the individuals the disappointment regarding the orders. Thus, the
ideologies serve to impose domination of selected values.
Both the experiments discussed in this work eliminated the division
found and officially declared such objectives. The first one, after 1945,
strived to equalise the pre-war social structure that was full of inequalities,
but led to the formation of the “us” vs “them” social division. The second
one, after 1989, tried to eliminate the communist-era division using
economic reforms, but only sustained it and led to the formation of new
ones, the dominant one among them being that between the “losers” and
“winners” in the transformation. It not only generated inequalities but, in
the political discourse, it applied extensive forms of exclusions and
discrimination, both open and hidden, with ruthless “ideological cruelty”.
The observation of Polish divisions confirmed that the political and
economic attempts at eliminating the division found created new spaces of
injustice that were exploited politically afterwards. Subsequent hierarchies
of inequality appeared intensively, officially referred to as just, which, to
many people, deviated from what they understood as justice. They were
noticed first by a few individuals and later realised socially. Often they were
also politicized at the same time. In both experiments, the authorities
created new inequalities while trying to eliminate existing ones. Then they
were hiding the new ones intensively, but ineffectively, which is why they
quickly became a powerful source of threat to the orders, as they threatened
the life of a part of society.
In view of the inequalities existing in every order, repartition practices
turned out to be one of the intangible products of society that serves to
transform the reality, mainly in the material aspect, but not only. They
become a mechanism of the planned social change and interference aiming
at transforming the social structures, an indirectly significant, but not the
sole instrument used for controlling the social life by driving individuals to
act. Repartitions are attempts at recreating the existing relations of society
with itself based on the realisation of its own pathologies, states of
wrongdoing and injustice and its existing weak points, often hidden deep
within its structure. Repartitions are, first of all, an attribution of guilt
valued over the needs of the excluded. But later, it turns out that they are
products of political actors who notice collective needs and, because of that,
initiate actions aimed at the transformation of relations. They strive to move
past the present, leave the historically shaped condition and go beyond the
existing order and relation (i.e., create an alternative reality).
Repartitions constitute consequences of the existing divisions, of the
inequalities not only socially realised and felt, but also usually already
questioned by individuals. Politicizing them using repartitions is a
confirmation of loss of control of the orders over supervising the divisions.
The main role of the practices is always criticising the order. Thus, they
constitute only a part of the technical instruments that politicians employ to
eliminate evil from the life of societies. They lead to extracting and
underlining the evil existing in the inequality hierarchies created. They
expose the main inequalities and the mechanisms supporting them. Thus,
they take the dimensions of simplified “dichotomous images” of reality but,
at the same time, developed, internally open and capacious definitions
available to all individuals who experience injustice.
The practices are not only a method of conducting political activity to
increase voter support or recover position in politics. They perform the role
of instruments serving to eliminate divisions and inequalities, perfectly
visible on the level of social structure, as well as for crushing the
homogeneous society in which it is harder to notice those discriminated
against. They have a significant share in creating the change, also
constituting a claims policy that is possible in practice. They reflect
tensions resulting from unjust privileges. When they are answers expected
by the wronged, they lead to a reduction in structural tension and are
political methods of dismantling the substrate that leads to a violent
conflict. They anchor the excluded in the new reality—an alternative to that
presently existing. They keep them convinced that their involvement and
becoming a part of repair mechanisms is necessary. It seems that they drive
the conflict but, in practice, they mainly serve to stabilise every order by
neutralising problems and enabling solving them, thus postponing the
necessity for radical destruction of the relations found.
Repartition practices are not manufacturing divisions as it is hard to
divide those already divided. They are calls for rejecting the space of
injustice experienced together and present inequalities between the parties
that require mutual approximation. The subordination of particular groups
neighbours there with the domination of others. However, this is not an
example of resignation and accepting one’s fate. The practices show images
of inequalities but are filled with hope and strength, as the promises of
changing the situation are a part of them. They serve to solve the
dysfunctional character of structures through the propagation of alternative
hierarchies. That is why skilful reading of the order, i.e., the distances and
inequalities existing, eventually makes the repartitions effective. They lead
to handling the fundamental issues, not the accessory or substitute ones.
They provide empowerment to the excluded. They make a democratic
choice a true choice that is additionally anchored around justice and
equality.
At the same time, the repartitions mobilise and help in fighting for
political support and forcing one’s own programme through. Politicians
employ repartitions to achieve their own objectives effectively and to
ensure and maintain voter support. Therefore, they still constitute an
important part of politics and ensure their existence. Meanwhile, the voices
of outrage and condemnation directed against the actors who take
advantage of repartitions are nothing but a further politicization of divisions
that serves to sustain them. Thus, when politicians say that repartitions
“divide the country”, they usually act in this manner to defend the current
distribution of goods (i.e., they strive to maintain the position of the
privileged groups).
Repartitions are one of the few confirmations of the existence of politics
based on an alternative system of equality and justice. As long as the
dispute regarding these ideas lives on, we can keep talking about the
persistence of moral sensitivity in politics, on the existence of actual public
debate and not a sort of game of politicians played only for instrumental
purposes. And we can also keep talking about the reference to the grand
Enlightenment Era legacy, or rather sustaining it. They are a confirmation
that politics keep “serving”, irrespective of the interpretation of what
equality and justice are, the search for a good life. They provide evidence
that politics do not yield, do not abandon a part of their rights and are
capable of further determining the direction of changes (as they regard the
actual problems to be solved) significant to social groups. The appearance
of politicizations of the divisions, including repartitions, guarantees that
society keeps managing its future and that it builds alternative definitions of
reality by taking advantage of differentiating judgements.
In view of the rate of changes that is uncontrollable, of the impossibility
to identify their direction, the practices are that tiny particle—an element of
the democratic order—which includes symbolic violence and aggression
that people need to learn to tolerate. It cannot be any different as the
division itself is a confirmation and sustaining of violence, and its
elimination is impossible if the violence is fully abandoned. That is why
practices become instruments for designing and maximising the expected
political objectives. It is a sort of conveyor belt, a part of the unbreakable
game on a scale most important to individuals. Therefore, they build actual
and real alternatives for voters. They enable the belief that politics are truly
where the suffering human heart is. They confirm that society is ahead of
politics and keeps the instruments of agency in its hands.
Index
A
Adamski, Władysław 80, 85, 92, 93, 95, 206
agricultural reform 26, 35, 36, 45, 51, 60
B
Balcerowicz, Leszek 110, 121
Bartolini, Stefan 6
Bauman, Zygmunt 107, 202, 208
Berlin, Isaiah 112
Brezhnev, Leonid 78
Bugaj, Ryszard 109, 110, 116, 121
C
Catholic Church 23, 86, 94, 139–142, 177, 183
Central Statistical Office (GUS) 110, 156
Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS) 156
collectivisation 15, 36, 38, 51, 83
communism 2, 15, 17, 23, 25, 26, 36, 44, 47, 49, 65, 75, 77, 78, 105, 107,
109, 117, 118, 122, 127–129, 133, 134, 139, 144, 168, 170, 180, 198, 207,
236
Concordat Act 142
Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN) 131
Coser, Levis 204
Cześnik, Mikołaj 6, 162, 173
D
Dembowski, Edward 23
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 138
Domański, Henryk 3, 4, 39, 73, 90, 113–116, 118–122, 125–127, 158, 199
Duda, Andrzej 16, 186
E
European Union (UE) 160
F
Figiel, Agnieszka 6, 170, 174, 178, 181, 198
Filar, Dariusz 163
Flanagan, C. Scott 6
G
Gardawski, Juliusz 122, 158, 160
Gazeta Wyborcza 156
Gierek, Adam 64, 79
Giza-Poleszczuk, Anna 72, 74, 81, 93, 97, 166, 203, 213
Gomułka, Władysław 25, 31, 64, 89
Grabowska, Mirosława 5, 6, 15, 65, 93, 94, 99, 130, 135, 136, 138, 141,
144, 198, 241
H
Hamilton, Malcolm 106
Herbut, Ryszard 6, 239, 241
Hirszowicz, Maria 15–17, 58, 87, 106
homo oeconomicus 111, 154
I
Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” 82, 108, 170
industrialisation process 39, 40, 47
Inglehart, Ronald 6
J
Jaroszewicz, Piotr 79
Jarosz, Maria 94, 110, 125, 152, 165, 171
K
Kaczyński, Jarosław 186
Kaczyński, Lech 170, 172
Karwat, Mirosław 5, 212, 234, 241
Kenney, Padraic 31, 34, 48, 65, 66, 68, 71, 72, 74, 75, 87
Kitschelt, Herbert 6, 130
Klementewicz, Tadeusz 152, 156, 164, 231
Knutsen, Oddbjørn 6
Komorowski, Bronisław 174, 183
Kopernik, Mikołaj 23
Korwin-Mikke, Janusz 186
Kościuszko, Tadeusz 23
Kotnarowski, Michał 6, 162, 173
Kukiz, Paweł 186
Kurczewski, Jacek 114, 120
Kuroń, Jacek 163
Kwaśniewski, Aleksander 134
L
Laclau, Ernesto 222
Lenin, Vladimir 23, 24
Lipset, M. Seymour 6, 198, 202, 210, 246
M
Mair, Peter 6
Markowski, Radosław 6, 94, 165
Marody, Mirosława 3, 34, 44, 61, 62, 91, 96, 161, 163, 166
Marx, Karl 6, 19, 58, 220
Mazowiecki, Tadeusz 127
Michnik, Adam 2
Mickiewicz, Adam 23, 24
Morawiecki, Mateusz 186
Morawski, Witold 87, 96, 108, 113
Mouffe, Chantal 225, 236
N
nomenklatura 51, 61, 62, 76, 82, 86, 87, 91–99, 105, 106, 113, 118, 121,
128, 130, 133–135, 139, 144, 152, 158, 161, 164, 167, 206
Nowak, Stefan 42, 94
O
Obacz, Piotr 6, 169, 171–173, 199
Olszewski, Jan 132
P
Poleszczuk, Jan 67, 68, 71, 73
Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) 24, 26, 35
Polish People’s Republic (PRL) 29, 61, 64, 81, 83, 93, 97, 99, 111, 115,
116, 118, 121, 125, 129, 131, 133–136, 139, 144
Polish Socialist Party (PPS) 27, 44
Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) 15, 27, 44, 72, 93, 97
Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) 26, 27, 44
Provisional Government of National Unity 26
R
Rakowski, F. Mieczysław 97, 98
Red Army 33
Rokkan, Stein 6, 198, 202, 246
Round Table 108, 127, 135, 215
Rychard, Andrzej 14, 61, 76, 79, 80, 82, 83, 90, 118, 158, 166, 199
S
Samoobrona 123
Sandel, Michael 221
Scarbrough, Elinor 6
Ściegienny, Piotr 23
Second Polish Republic 13, 17, 33
Security Office (UB) 15, 69, 74, 88
Smelser, Neil 206
socialism 14, 20, 24, 29, 31, 32, 40, 51, 78, 79, 81, 82
Solidarity 82, 96, 108, 112, 127, 128, 131–133, 135–138, 140, 162–164,
166, 170, 174
Śpiewak, Paweł 170, 178
Stalinism 19, 68
Stalin, Joseph 15, 21, 24, 64
Stanley, Ben 6
State Agricultural Farm (PGR) 126
Świda-Ziemba, Hanna 2, 14, 16, 19, 23, 43, 63, 67, 68, 71, 72, 75, 80, 88,
89, 91, 95, 227
Szawiel, Tadeusz 47, 94, 130, 136, 141, 143, 144
Szela, Jakub 23
T
Third Polish Republic 131, 169, 173
Trotsky, Leon 20
Tusk, Donald 138, 174, 236
U
Union of Polish Youth (ZMP) 43
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 15
uravnilovka 170
W
Wałęsa, Lech 136
Wasilewski, Jacek 4, 85, 94, 139
Wnuk-Lipiński, Edmund 14, 79, 87, 92, 96, 97, 99, 115, 121, 123, 140,
142, 157, 158, 161, 206, 208, 222, 231
Z
Zarycki, Tomasz 6