REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
Equity in Global Climate Policy and Implications
for India’s Energy Future
Tejal Kanitkar
The remaining carbon budget available to the world to
limit global warming to 1.5 degrees celsius or to “well
below 2°C” very small and is being rapidly depleted. The
year 2021 has witnessed a flurry of pledges by countries
to achieve net-zero emissions around the second half of
this century. But the analysis shows the pledges of
Annex-I parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change to be highly inadequate
to limit the temperature rise to below 1.5°C. In this
context, this paper reviews India’s climate change
mitigation efforts and policies over the last decade and
assesses the recently declared net-zero emissions pledge
against a range of illustrative emissions pathways and
the implied cumulative emissions of these pathways.
The ambition of India’s pledge is assessed, with a
discussion of the challenges that lie ahead for India’s
energy sector.
Tejal Kanitkar (tejalk@nias.res.in) teaches at the Energy and
Environment Program, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.
68
T
he report of the working group-I to the sixth assessment
report (AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC 2021) has clearly laid out the challenge
before the world, which is already experiencing warming of
about 1.07 degrees Celsius (°C) (a likely range of 0.8°C–1.3°C) as
compared to the pre-industrial period (1850–1900). Carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions are the largest contributor to this
warming. According to the IPCC (2021), about 2,390 (±240)
gigatonnes of CO2 (GtCO2) have been emitted cumulatively by
the world between 1850 and 2019. While there is no doubt that
the world needs multiple strategies to address climate change,
it is very clear from the scientific evidence that reducing CO2
emissions will have the largest long-term impact on mitigating
climate change, and therefore, this is where the world must
urgently focus.
The AR6 has also once again underscored the relationship
between cumulative emissions and the rise in global surface
temperature, which has been long established in the scientific
literature (IPCC 2013, 2021). This relationship between cumu-
lative emissions and temperature rise is near linear and allows
us to estimate a corresponding carbon budget for a particular
probability of limiting temperature rise to either 1.5°C or 2°C or
any other temperature limit.
From global emissions databases, we know that the cumula-
tive emissions of all greenhouse gases (GHGs) from 1850 to
2019 amount to about 2,516 GtCO2eq (excluding emissions
from the land use, land-use change, and forestry [LULUCF] sec-
tor) (Gütschow et al 2021). Estimates for the remaining carbon
budget for various probabilities of restricting temperature rise
to below 1.5°C and 2°C are given in the IPCC’s AR6. For a 50%
probability of limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C, only 17%
(about 500 GtCO2) of the total carbon budget of 3,016 GtCO2 is
now left. For a 50% probability of limiting temperature rise to
2°C, the remaining carbon budget is about 1,350 GtCO2, which
is about 35% of the total carbon budget. This understanding of
the global carbon budget leads directly to the question of who
is primarily responsible for the exhaustion of most of the car-
bon budget and the principles that must determine the use of
the remaining carbon budget.
The principle of “common but differentiated responsibility
and respective capabilities” (CBDR&RC) was enshrined in the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) in 1992, but has been sought to be continually diluted
by developed countries in subsequent negotiations. The
new language of “national circumstances” has replaced the
december 25, 2021 vol lVi no 52 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Figure 1: Contribution to Cumulative Emissions between 1850 and 1990,
and 1991 and 2019 for the United States, European Union+United Kingdom,
Other Annex-I Countries, China, India, and the Other Non-Annex-I Countries
Cumulative Proportion Cumulative
Emission from of Global Emission from
1850–1990 (% of Population 1991–2019 (% of
Global Emissions) in 1990 (%) Global Emissions)
US
EU (28)
Other Annex-I countries
China
India
Other non-Annex-I countries
Source: Past cumulative emissions—Gütschow et al (2021); figure created using
Datawrapper.
understanding of equity in many negotiating documents, es-
pecially since the Paris Agreement of 2015. However, CBDR&RC
continues to be a mainstay of India’s international negotiating
position even as the country pursues policies on green energy
domestically. There is, however, increasing pressure on India
to give up such a position. One section of those who argue for
India to “do more” justify their demand by terming India the
fourth largest emitter of GHGs. Another section argues that
since the situation is so dire, intra-generational equity must
take a back seat and inter-generation equity must be priori-
tised, that is, we must not focus on equity between regions
now. Both these arguments are assessed in this paper.
Emissions and Carbon Budgets: Determining Fair Share
From 1850 to 1990 (around the time when the UNFCCC was
ratified and anthropogenic climate change was officially recog-
nised by governments), India, home to 16.6% of the global
population then, accounted for only 3.89% of the global cumu-
lative emissions. On the contrary, the Annex-I countries, that is,
43 of the most advanced industrialised economies together,
with 22.3% of the global population in 1990, accounted for 70%
of the global cumulative emissions between 1850 and 1990.
That these countries were disproportionately responsible for the
cumulative emissions till this time was the basis for the princi-
ple of equity and CBDR&RC in the UNFCCC. This picture has not
substantially changed for most of the developing countries,
with some exceptions, most notably China. India, in 2019, was
home to 17.9% of the global population, but responsible only
for 4.5% of the cumulative emissions between 1850 and 2019.
Figure 1 shows the contributions of some major economies to
cumulative emissions from 1850 to 1990 and 1991 to 2019.
The data shows clearly that the argument, that the situation
has changed substantially since 1990, does not hold, especially
Table 1: Total and Remaining Global Carbon Budget Estimates (values in
GtCO2eq)
Probability  Warming Relative to Pre-industrial Levels  1.5°C
50% Total carbon budget 3,016
Remaining carbon budget 500
67% Total carbon budget 2,916
Remaining carbon budget 400
Source: Past cumulative emissions—Gütschow et al (2021); remaining carbon budget: IPCC
(2021).
Economic & Political Weekly EPW december 25, 2021 vol lVi no 52
REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
with reference to India. Developed countries have continued
to emit more than their fair share even after 1990, a period
when they were required to take the lead in emissions reduc-
Proportion
of Global tion. Unless emissions can be removed from the atmosphere at
Population
in 2019 (%) a scalable level, it is clear that developing countries such as
India will be unable to access their full fair share of the total
carbon budget. The remaining carbon space is shrinking and
historical emitters such as the developed countries, and current
fast emitters such as China, are rapidly occupying the little
space that is remaining. The bulk of the burden of climate
change mitigation therefore is being transferred to developing
countries who will also have to bear the cost of dealing with
the impacts of climate change.
It is also quite evident that it will be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to meet the 1.5°C target and trying to achieve this
through some uniform reduction and net-zero goals will im-
pose highly unequal burdens on developing countries. In this
context, the adequacy of pledges made by parties as part of
the Paris Agreement, is assessed here against science- and
equity-based measures of the amount of action that is needed
from parties. It is important to emphasise here that Article 14
of the Paris Agreement mandates that a global stocktake be
done every five years starting from 2023 to assess the ambi-
tion and adequacy of the nationally determined contributions
(NDCs) of countries in light of equity and the best available
science (UNFCCC 2016).
If the total carbon budget is used as the basis for determining
fair shares of countries and regions, then the difference between
this fair share and actual emissions of countries will determine
what countries can make use of the remaining carbon budget
for their mitigation efforts to be considered “fair.” This approach
would account for historical responsibility in the most complete
sense. However, this would mean that some countries (mostly the
Annex-I countries) will have negative allocations for the future
implying that not only do they have no carbon space left, but
they have to, in fact, vacate carbon space which may then be
used by the developing world. While there is much discussion
of negative emissions and these occupy a significant place in the
emissions modelling literature of recent times (O’Neill et al
2014; Riahi et al 2017), it is necessary to note that most of the
methods available for carbon dioxide removal (CDR) are still
speculative, not necessarily scalable, and their collateral im-
pacts are highly varied by the kind of technology and method
applied (IPCC 2021). There is no reasonable basis, therefore, to
assume that developed countries will, in fact, be able to vacate
carbon space and make it available to developing countries.
On the contrary, if we determine fair share only based on
the remaining carbon budget, this will amount to a grandfa-
thering of the past emissions, that is, it will be akin to saying
that the past emissions of developed countries entitles them
2°C to a right to emit in the future as well. From the IPCC report
3,866 (technical summary), we know the estimates for the remain-
1,350
ing carbon budget for different probabilities of limiting tem-
3,666
perature rise to 1.5°C or 2°C. If we add the historical emissions
1,150
to these values, we get the total carbon budget.1 These are
shown in Table 1.
69
REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

Table 2 shows the estimates of fair shares for some select Even in the grandfathering approach, the Annex I countries
countries/regions. For method 1, where historical responsibility must reach net-zero emissions in 2030 to ensure that the
is considered, these are estimated as the difference between 1.5°C target is met by the world. Taking historical responsibility
the per capita shares of the total carbon budget and the actual into account would mean that the Annex I countries need to
emissions of the country or region. For method 2, where past reach net-zero emissions immediately and start vacating car-
emissions are ignored, these are simply the per capita shares bon space to allow developing countries to use the resources
of the remaining carbon budget. These are assessed for four available to them for development. It is against this back-
different values of the global carbon budget—50% and 67% ground that we must examine India’s approach to internation-
probability of limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C, and 50% and al negotiations and climate mitigation and the country’s do-
67% probability of limiting temperature rise to 2°C. mestic policies. While a range of policies on energy and envi-
The limit on the remaining carbon budget implies the need ronment covering many ministries and line departments are
for urgent action by those who have overused carbon space in relevant here, the discussion in the subsequent sections is re-
the past. Given the estimates shown in Table 2, it is evident stricted to the energy sector.
that the current pledges from developed countries fall woeful-
ly short in terms of what is required to limit global warming Energy and Climate Action in India
and also violate the principle of equity. In the international arena, India has consistently, since 1992,
argued for an equitable and fair regime for climate change
Net-zero Emissions mitigation, wherein the differentiation between developed and
In the run up to COP26, some developed countries enhanced developing nations is recognised. The argument recognises
their NDCs and many pledged a long-term goal to reach net- climate change mitigation as a collective action problem. All
zero emissions. However, these goals are neither in keeping countries will need to contribute efforts to mitigate climate
with the “best available science” nor are they equitable, both change. However, the scale and extent of contribution must be
of which are the basis on which adequacy and ambition of determined based on the principles of equity. As discussed in
countries must be assessed in the global stocktake as per the earlier sections, this principle is quite comprehensively
Article 14 of the Paris Agreement. Table 3 shows the year by captured in the UNFCCC itself. However, for India, like for
which the Annex I countries must reach net zero to stay with- many other developing countries, this argument is not just
in their fair share of the remaining carbon budget given in based on political discourse—providing rhetorical flourish to
Table 2. escape climate action. After all, it is a matter of public record
Table 2: Fair Shares of the Remaining Carbon Budget Estimated Based on Two Methods— that India has taken significant steps to integrate
Method 1—Historical Responsibility and Method 2—Grandfathering climate change mitigation in its energy policy design
All Values in GtCO2eq 1.5°C (50% 1.5°C (67% 2°C (50% 2°C (67% for some years now (UNEP 2018). The argument for
Probability) Probability) Probability) Probability)
Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2
CBDR is rooted in the understanding of India’s
US -424 21 -428 17 -387 58 -396 49 developmental challenges and the country’s need
EU (28) (with UK) -260 32 -267 26 -206 86 -219 74 for energy. This need will continue to guide future
Australia -21 2 -22 1 -18 4 -19 4
action also.
Canada -30 2 -31 2 -26 7 -27 6
Japan -25 8 -27 7 -11 22 -15 19
Other Annex I countries -178 21 -182 17 -141 58 -150 49 Energy and Development
China 214 91 196 73 369 247 333 210
India’s per capita energy consumption in 2019 was
Brazil 37 14 34 11 61 37 55 32
South Africa -3 4 -4 3 3 10 2 9 33.89 exajoules (1018 joules)2 (BP 2021). This trans-
India 427 89 409 71 579 241 543 206 lates to a per capita energy consumption of about
Other countries 763 214 721 172 1,128 579 1,042 493 24.8 gigajoules (GJ) per person. This is significantly
Values calculated by the author as a per capita share of the total or remaining carbon budget. The global
carbon budget is a combination of past emissions from Gütschow et al (2021) and the remaining carbon less than the world average of 75.4 GJ per person for
budget from IPCC (2021). the same year. Even if we exclude the Organisation
Table 3: Year to Reach Net-zero Emissions to Remain within Their Fair for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) coun-
Share of the Carbon Budget for a 50% Probability of Limiting Temperature tries, the non-OECD world average per capita energy consump-
Rise to 1.5°C
tion is about 54.6 GJ, more than double that of India. There is
Fair Share Based Year to Reach Fair Share Based Year to Reach
on Method 1— Net-zero on Method 2— Net-zero consensus in the literature on the significantly high correlation
Full Historical Emissions Grandfathering of Emissions between a number of developmental indicators and energy use
Responsibility (GtCO2) (Method 1) Past Emissions (GtCO2) (Method 2)
US -424 21 2025 (Martinez and Ebenhack 2008; Ouedraogo 2013). Table 4 (p 71)
EU (28) (with UK) -260 32 2034 shows the per capita gross national income (GNI), human de-
Australia -21 2 2025 velopment indicators, electricity consumption and emissions
Canada -30 2 2026
Japan -25
2020*
8 2033
for some countries.
Other Annex I -178 21 2033 While there is variation within groups of developed and
countries developing countries, the difference between these groups is
Annex I as a group -938 87 2030
* Negative emissions needed from 2020 onwards for all Annex I countries as the fair share
far more significant. The idea of “saturation,” that is, that con-
of the total budget that has already been exhausted. sumption increases do not translate into development increases
70 december 25, 2021 vol lVi no 52 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

beyond a point, becomes relevant at much higher levels of amount of fossil fuels will thus be essential, even if the resulting
energy consumption and income. Additionally, inequity of CO2 emissions deplete the carbon budget. Indeed, for countries
energy consumption within the country is significantly lower such as India, carbon space constitutes a strategic resource,
than the inequity of energy consumption between countries which, if safeguarded, would also be necessary for the country
(Oswald et al 2020). There is little doubt, therefore, that India to be able to propel itself into a low carbon future.
would need to increase its energy consumption to achieve rea-
sonable levels of well-being for the majority of its people. The India’s Energy Challenge
sources from which the energy can and should be supplied is, Most “footprint calculators” show the carbon footprint of our
however, the source of contestation. Modern energy supply domestic energy use (as in electricity or petrol consumed di-
in India has been dominated by coal—the only fossil-fuel rectly by households). But energy is needed for much more
resource that the country has in abundance. The energy ques- than direct domestic use. Expanding industrial production,
tion is therefore at the heart of the argument of “equitable modernising it in small and medium industries, improving
access to carbon space.” agricultural productivity, and increasing infrastructure for
Very often, the argument in favour of continued expansion housing, transport, healthcare, and education among other
of energy consumption to meet development goals is interpreted things, all require a significant increase in energy supply. Till
as a demand for a “right to pollute” (Bell 2008). This is a mis- 2010, India’s energy expansion was focused on coal and
guided notion for many reasons. First, the main driver of hydro resources. However, in the last decade, the country has
climate change is CO2. CO2 is not a pollutant in the local sense witnessed a significant increase in capacity of variable renew-
but the main driver of global warming at the global scale. This able energy (VRE) sources, a rise which would have been un-
means that local action to reduce CO2 emissions may not result imaginable even about five years before it happened.
in climate change benefits. Even if CO2 emission levels are For example, renewable energy (RE) sources, that include,
reduced locally, unless action from other regions and nations solar, wind, small hydro, and biomass-based energy sources,
is forthcoming, it will not lead to changes in the impacts that had an installed capacity of 18 megawatts (MW) in 1990. By
will be faced locally. For instance, India accounts for only 2019, the capacity of these sources of power had increased to
about 6%–7% of current annual global emissions, and unilat- 77,642 MW. This means that the country added about 2,600 MW
erally shutting down its emissions will have virtually no im- of RE capacity (not counting large hydropower) every year
pact on the climate. Second, there are a limited number of en- since 1990. A bulk of the new RE capacity (62,000 MW) was
ergy technologies and sources from which countries can pow- added in the last decade, between 2010 and 2019. Solar energy
er their growth and development. Not all sources of energy are capacity in 2020 was over 14 times more than it was in 2015
available to all countries, either because of geographical, po- (CEA 2021). However, contrary to popular rhetoric, this RE ex-
litical, or technological constraints. Moreover, fossil fuels are pansion in India has not happened because it was more finan-
valuable precisely because the “energy return on energy cially viable, but in fact, it has been facilitated by significant fiscal
invested” (the energy “surplus” they provide) is far higher incentives, subsidies, and policy support (Kanitkar et al 2021).
than for renewables (the equipment for which is anyway man- The current average cost of solar energy is higher than that
ufactured using fossil fuels). The continued use of some of energy from thermal power plants in most states in India
Table 4: Income, Human Development Indicators, Per Capita Electricity (Kanitkar et al 2021; Das and Srikanth 2020). While it is true
Consumption and Emissions for Select Countries that new solar plants are cheaper, distribution utilities are tied
Gross Life Mean HDI HDI Per Capita Electricity Per Capita into long-term power purchase agreements with older plants
National Expectancy Years of Value Rank Consumption Emissions
Income at Birth Schooling (2020) (2020) (kWh/Person) (tCO2/Person)
which charge more than `7 per unit in some cases. Moreover,
(PPP $) (Years) (Years) (2019) (2019) distribution utilities are obligated to purchase all this VRE
(2020) (2020) (2020)
irrespective of the availability of cheaper fossil fuel-based
US 63,826 78.9 13.4 0.926 17 13,405 20.2
Germany 55,314 81.3 14.2 0.947 6 7,297 9.8 energy because of policies of “must run” for solar and wind
Canada 48,527 82.4 13.4 0.929 16 17,339 19.5 energy plants. As a result, states where the capacity of VRE is
Australia 48,085 83.4 12.7 0.944 8 10,550 21.6 high, for example, states in southern India, often end up paying
France 47,173 82.7 11.5 0.901 26 8,642 6.6
UK 46,071 81.3 13.2 0.932 13 4,809 6.8 significantly higher amounts in energy tariffs across sectors
Japan 42,932 84.6 12.9 0.919 19 8,121 9.6 (Das and Srikanth 2020). As solar energy becomes cheaper,
China 16,057 76.9 8.1 0.761 85 5,233 9.6 one may expect this problem to abate soon, enabling higher
Brazil 14,263 75.9 8 0.765 84 2,968 5.3
South Africa 12,129 64.1 10.2 0.709 114 4,313 9.5
contribution from this source of energy. However, a higher
India 6,681 69.7 6.5 0.645 131 1,174 2.4 contribution from solar energy is accompanied by the need for
Nigeria 4,910 54.7 6.7 0.539 161 177 2 energy storage.
Uganda 2,123 63.4 6.2 0.544 159 110 1.1
Source: GNI, and human development indicators are from the Human Development Report
VRE sources, especially wind and solar energy, can vary
of 2020 published by the UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2020.pdf; significantly over a span of 24 hours, across days, and across
estimates of the emission data are taken from PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions
time series (1750–2019) v2.3.1. ( https://zenodo.org/record/5494497#.YU13Pp0zbIU);
seasons. For example, in India, the availability of wind energy
electricity data is from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, https://www.bp.com/ is typically higher during monsoon. This is also when annual
en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html;
population data used for per capita estimates is from UN World Population Prospects
energy demand is relatively low due to a lower agricultural
database, https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population. load. On the contrary, solar energy varies significantly in just a
Economic & Political Weekly EPW december 25, 2021 vol lVi no 52 71
REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
day, going from zero to maximum capacity in a span of less than
12 hours, even as the total availability changes seasonally as
well, that is, the total solar energy available in the summer
months is higher than that in the monsoon months. However,
daily energy demand patterns do not necessarily follow the
availability-based generation pattern of VRE sources. In most
regions in India, power demand peaks in the evening, when there
is no solar energy. Therefore, as the amount of VRE-based power
generation expands, it becomes imperative that the capacity
of the system to buffer its variability is also strengthened.
Smaller amounts of RE can be absorbed by the grid and the
resulting intermittency can be balanced by ramping down
(and up) other sources of energy. However, the potential for
ramping is constrained technologically. Natural gas and hydro
plants have higher ramping speeds and are therefore well suited
for grid balancing. Unfortunately, with negligible natural gas
resources available domestically, India cannot, unlike devel-
oped countries, use this source of energy to support its growing
renewable energy supply. The United States has a natural
gas-based power capacity of about 510 gigawatts (GW), in ad-
dition to a coal capacity of 232 GW in 2020. The European
Union has a natural gas-based power capacity of 155 GW.
India, on the contrary, has only 24 GW of natural gas-based
power capacity, which is also not fully operational due to the
unreliable supply of natural gas (Kumar et al 2020). Hydro
resources, in contrast, are geographically constrained and are
typically multipurpose and must also be used for drinking
water supply and irrigation.
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72
The recent experience in Germany due to lower-than-
expected wind energy generation also points to challenges for
energy storage. A long period of low generation from VRE
sources, because of environmental conditions, would imply
that in the absence of alternative conventional sources of
energy, to meet energy demand at such times, we would
need energy storage systems that can store energy which can
last for more than a few hours. Capacities of battery energy
storage systems (BESS) currently do not exceed a few hours
(Mallapragada et al 2020). Pumped hydro systems have much
more potential for long-term storage, but their availability is
geographically and seasonally constrained. However, given
the economics of BESS versus pumped hydro systems, and the
assessed potential for the latter in India, it would be prudent
for energy policy in the country to focus on enhancing the
potential and capacity of pumped hydro systems (Songola and
Kanitkar 2019), while ensuring that environmental and social
impacts of such projects are minimised. Hydrogen as a storage
technology also has promise, but the availability of these sys-
tems at scale and at affordable prices, is currently plausible
only at medium- to long-term time frames. The National Hydro-
gen Mission launched earlier in 2021 by the Government of
India is an important step in this direction and it would be
necessary to provide significant funding for research and de-
velopment to make this is cost-effective alternative.3, 4
For the near term to possibly midterm, with increasing energy
demand, and currently available technology, India’s energy
mix is therefore critically dependent on coal, not only to supply
Features
Data is from 1954
onwards based on
availability.
Structured in six
major sections :
• Demography
• Health Status
• Infrastructure
• Health Manpower
• Education Facilities
• Health Finance
december 25, 2021 vol lVi no 52 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

increasing energy demand, but to also serve as back-up for an
increasing share of VRE sources in the grid. India’s position at
COP26 vis-à-vis the dependence on coal-based energy supply
must be understood in the context of these challenges that the
country’s energy sector currently faces.
Just Transitions
The other question that has gained increasing traction in the
international arena is one of “just transitions” to green energy
systems (UNFCCC 2016, 2020). The workforce and local, re-
gional, and national economies that are dependent on fossil
fuels are likely to be impacted by transitions out of fossil fuel
production and use. Therefore, alleviating this impact and
providing livelihood and fiscal alternatives becomes extreme-
ly important. In the case of India, the challenge is manifestly
higher. While the term transition can be applied to economies
that are sufficiently and stably carbonised, that is, developed
economies, for developing countries such as India, where en-
ergy demand must grow rapidly, industrialisation and mod-
ernisation of production has to still expand considerably
across all sectors, and the economy is dynamically undergoing
a structural transition, to do so without established forms of
energy becomes a bigger challenge. Additionally, the impact
on labour and local economies, at low levels of development, is
likely to be higher. While much of the literature so far has fo-
cused on just transitions in coal-dependent developed coun-
tries, it is only now that the literature is beginning to emerge
from developing countries.
A comparative study for Germany and China done by Mut-
titt and Kartha (2020) shows that while Germany has 15,000
coal miners constituting 0.03% of the national workforce, this
number is 5.2 million in China constituting 0.6% of the work-
force. The wage bill in these countries for coal mining as a
proportion of their gross domestic product (GDP) is also vastly
different; 0.03% for Germany versus 0.5% for China. For India,
Roy et al (2019) point out that while the coal sector is largely
publicly owned, employing 0.3 million people directly, according
to the monthly statistical report of the Ministry of Coal, the RE
sector is dominated by a contractual workforce. Even as the trend
in the coal sector is to increasingly rely on contractual workers,
a significant majority of the workforce here is still organised
as opposed to the RE sector where fragmented, short-term
jobs are the main form of employment currently. Additionally,
Sharma and Banerjee (2021) point out the spatial distribution
of RE versus fossil fuels in India and, therefore, the uneven
clustering of old versus potentially new jobs. Much of the
country’s coal resources are located in the eastern region, for
example, whereas the RE potential is higher in the southern
and western region. A recently released report of the National
Foundation for India (NFI 2021) on the “Socio-economic
Impacts of Coal Transitions in India” suggests that the work-
force directly and indirectly dependent on coal (that is, in the
coal-based power plants, coal transport, etc) amounts to at
least 13 million, which is more than the entire population of
160 countries around the world, and this does not include
some hard-to-measure informal employment in coal mining,
Economic & Political Weekly EPW december 25, 2021 vol lVi no 52
REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
warehousing, etc. The challenge of a just transition is there-
fore significant for India.
India’s Climate Mitigation Efforts
In 2015, as part of its intended nationally determined contribu-
tion (INDC) (now, after the ratification of the Paris Agreement,
termed as nationally determined contribution or NDC), India
promised to “reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP by 33%
to 35% by 2030 from 2005 levels,” and “achieve about 40%
cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil
fuel-based energy resources by 2030, with the help of transfer
of technology and low cost international finance including
from Green Climate Fund (GCF),” among other pledges.
As of 2018, India had already achieved a 29% reduction in its
emissions intensity of GDP. This means that per unit of output
that India emits is about 29% less than what it did in 2005. At
COP26, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced an en-
hancement of this target from 33%–35% to 45% by 2030.5 A
reduction in the emissions intensity of GDP, even as the econo-
my is undergoing structural changes, can come about as a re-
sult of increased efficiency that is easier to achieve at higher
scales of production, an increasing contribution of the non-
energy intensive services sector as opposed to the manufac-
turing sector, and a shift towards non-fossil fuel-based supply
of energy to drive production. For India, the reduction in
emissions intensity is a result of all three factors (Kanitkar et al
2015). It must be emphasised, however, that this reducing en-
ergy intensity must not be assumed to be “business-as-usual”
as with potentially increased domestic manufacturing as per
stated policies of “Make in India” or “Atmanirbhar Bharat;”
meeting emission intensity reduction targets requires more
effort (Kanitkar et al 2015).
India’s energy sector NDC is closely tied to its domestic energy
plans, RE targets and policies, and these have been covered in
the previous section. It is important to note that all of these
targets for 2030 were part of India’s first NDC. However, at
COP26, the Prime Minister announced an enhancement of
these contributions. At the time of writing this paper, these
targets are yet to be communicated in written from by the
Government of India.
The Prime Minister also declared a long-term vision of
achieving net-zero emissions by 2070 at the World Leaders
Summit in Glasgow. Further clarification about the specific
nature of this long-term goal is awaited at the time of writing
this paper. However, I discuss here some implications of the
net-zero target. For the sake of illustration, GHG emissions
without emissions from the LULUCF are used for the discussion
in this section.
Six potential trajectories are constructed for India for dif-
ferent peaking years and levels of emissions. In three trajecto-
ries, emissions peak in 2040 at different rates of growth till
this time, after which they reduce to zero by 2070 linearly. In
the other three trajectories, emissions peak in 2050 with much
sharper reductions thereafter to reach zero emissions by 2070.
The level of peak emissions is different across trajectories
(Figure 2, p 74).
73
REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
Figure 2: Illustrative Emissions Trajectories for India for 2020 to 2070— conventional non-fossil fuel resources, have not been able to
Emissions Peak in 2040 or 2050 across the Trajectories at Different Levels
achieve high levels of industrialisation, energy supply, human
1010
development, and incomes, without fossil fuels.
2)
[GtCO2]

88
Emissons (GtCO

Conclusions
66
Annualemissons

Developed countries are responsible for over 60% of the 1.1°C

44 warming that the world is experiencing today. Even after the
Annual

recognition of anthropogenic global warming as a serious

22
problem, that is, since the Rio Conference in 1992, developed
00 countries have done little to mitigate it over the last three dec-
2019 2024 2029 2034 2039 2044 2049 2054 2059 2064 2069
ades, and their pledges for the future are evidence that they
Peak in 2050
2050 at
at 8.2
8.2GtCO2
GtCO2 (P1-2050)
(P1-2050) Peakin
Peak in2050
2050 at
at 6.4
6.4 GtCO
GtCO22 (P1-2050)
(P2-2050)
will consume a disproportionate share of even the remaining
Peak in 2050
2050 at
at 5.07
5.07GtCO2 (P3-2050)
GtCO2 (P3-2050) Peakin
Peak in2040
2040 at 6.8 GtCO
GtCO22 (P1-2040)
(P1-2040)
carbon budget. The shifting of goalposts on climate action has
Peak in 2040
2040atat4.63
4.63GtCO2 (P2-2040)
GtCO2 (P2-2040) Peak
Peakin
in2040 GtCO22 (P3-2040)
2040 at 4 GtCO (P3-2040)
been an enduring strategy of the developed countries since the
Source: Illustrative pathways constructed by author.
Kyoto Protocol was ratified, with a continuous postponement
The cumulative emissions, implied in each trajectory against of mitigation action in their own countries, accompanied by
India’s fair share of the global carbon budget calculated using utter inadequacy in mobilising finance to support developing
the two methods discussed earlier, are shown in Table 5. countries in their energy transitions. There are serious implica-
All of the pathways imply cumulative emissions that are sig- tions of such delayed action for developing countries in general,
nificantly less than India’s fair share of the global carbon budget and India in particular.
if we consider historical responsibility. Of course, for India and In the context of increasing developmental and climate
other developing countries to be able to access their fair share adaptation requirements, it is necessary to assess India’s en-
of the total budget, developed countries would not only have ergy needs and challenges going forward. Despite significant-
to reach net-zero emissions immediately, but also remove CO2 ly lower levels of energy use as compared to the global aver-
from the atmosphere at a scale equivalent to their overuse of age, India is punching far above its weight in terms of climate
the carbon budget. As discussed earlier, there is no evidence action. However, this climate action is not without cost, which
that this would be possible. Given the extent of overuse of the is currently being borne by Indian citizens in the form of
global carbon budget, it would be an impossible ask for devel- higher electricity tariffs, for example. At the same time, the
oping countries to deliver on the 1.5°C target, especially given scale of India’s coal-dependent workforce and the fact that
that developed country pledges, despite their higher econom- some local and regional economies are entirely dependent on
ic capabilities, fall very short of what is required for such a sce- the coal sector makes it imperative that the country fore-
nario. It is important to note, however, that unlike developed grounds considerations of just transitions and what this
country pledges, India’s pledge is 2°C, compliant in four out of means for India as it charts its energy path for the future.
the six illustrative scenarios shown here. Given the lack of domestically available natural gas resourc-
Table 5: Cumulative Emissions between 2020 and 2070 Implied by the Illustrative Emission es, spatially dispersed and seasonally con-
Pathways in Figure 2 for India strained hydropower resources, and the lack
Pathway P1-2050 P2-2050 P3-2050 P1-2040 P2-2040 P3-2040 of immediately cost-effective energy-storage
Peaking year 2050 2050 2050 2040 2040 2040
Emissions at peak (GtCO2eq) 8.2 6.4 5.07 6.8 4.63 4
options to absorb the increasingly higher
Cumulative emissions (2020–70) 272 226 189 208 155 137 amounts of renewable energy in the electrici-
Fair share— ty grid, India’s short- to medium-term need for
method 1: 427
historical
coal must not be dismissed simply as “unwill-
responsibility 1.5 °C ingness to change.”
(50%
Fair share— It is the reticence and outright refusal in
probability)
method 2: 89
grandfathering some cases, of developed countries at COP26
Fair share— to address the issues raised by developing
method 1: 543 countries—from adaptation and loss and
historical 2 °C
responsibility damage to fi nance—that has delayed action
(67%
Fair share— probability) in this critical decade. Nevertheless, as COP26
method 2: 206 ended, there were attempts to blame develop-
grandfathering
ing countries, especially India, for any per-
The pathways shown here are only illustrative and real ceived failure on climate ambition. The attempt of the COP26
emissions pathways would depend on a lot of factors, a discus- presidency itself to blame India for the dilution of the lan-
sion which is outside the scope of this paper. However, given guage on “coal phase-out” in a critical paragraph in the COP26
the status of energy technologies today, achieving net-zero decision is an example.6 However, India’s intervention at
emissions would be challenging for India. Even countries that COP26 served to ensure that developed countries could not
have significantly higher hydro or nuclear resources, that is, avoid discussing their continuing dependence on oil and gas,
74 december 25, 2021 vol lVi no 52 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

as GHG emissions from all fossil fuels (and not coal alone)
are responsible for global warming. It also served to fore-
ground the principles of equity and differentiation. Different
countries have different natural resource endowments and
notes
1 The historical emissions considered here are
for all greenhouse gases expressed in CO2
equivalent terms. The remaining carbon budg-
et estimates are for CO2, taking the effect of
non-CO2 drivers across different scenarios into
account. As these are the best available esti-
mates, I have combined these two values—his-
torical cumulative emissions and the remain-
ing carbon budget—to arrive at estimates for
the global carbon budget.
2 Data for 2020 is available, but since this was an
atypical year due to COVID-19, data for 2019 is
used here.
3 Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, press
release, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.
aspx?PRID=1696498.
4 Ministry of New and Renewable Energy website,
https://mnre.gov.in/img/documents/uploads/
file_f-1612941710983.pdf.
5 Prime Minister’s Office, press release, https://pib.
gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1768712.
6 https://www.theguardian.com/environ-
ment/2021/nov/14/alok-sharma-deeply-frus-
trated-by-india-and-china-over-coal.
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