Akimov Nikita,

1s Year MA Student
Faculty of World Politics and Worlds Economy
National Research University
“Higher School of Economics”
Moscow, Russian Federation
E-mail: ndakimov@edu.hse.ru

The issues of Japanese perceptions of a Soviet Union Within a Japanese-

Soviet Relations framework in 1960-1990

Abstract: This article is devoted to the analysis of issues in Japanese perception of

a Soviet Union within the USSR-Japan bilateral relations framework in 1960-1990.
The author argues that issues regarding the Japanese perceptions of a Soviet Union
were intertwined both with the World War II trauma, consequential development
of Japan as democratic country, the ideological incompatibility between the two
countries and relative issues withing the diplomatic talks throughout the study
period. Author tries to prove that Japanese perceptions of a USSR remained
consequently low despite some minor fluctuations.
Keywords: USSR, Japan, Bilateral Relations, Perceptions, The Kurile Islands
Dispute, Opinion Polls

General framework of Soviet-Japanese relations in 1960-80s

Despite the signing of Joint Soviet-Japanese declaration and seemingly

fruitful prospects for the regulation of territorial disputes between the two
countries, the period of 1960s can be characterized with escalation of bilateral
relations. Signing of US-Japanese Security Treaty has become a serious concern
for the soviet leadership, especially considering the fact that Japan agreed to host a
number US Military bases on its territory. Therefore, in the wake of these events,
on January 27 1960, Japanese ambassador in the USSR was given 1an aide-
memoire of the following content: “Due to the fact that this [US-Japan Security]
Treaty, in fact, strips Japan from its independence and that foreign military forces
1
Панов, А. Н., Саркисов, К. О., & Стрельцов, Д. В. (2019). История внешней политики
Японии 1868–2018 (1st ed.). Международные отношения
that are still being quartered in Japan as the result of its occupation, a new state
of affairs is forming thus making it impossible to withhold Soviet Government’s
promise on giving Japan islands of Habomai and Shikotan… Therefore, Soviet
Government deems it necessary to inform Japan that only on the condition of
withdrawing all of the foreign military forces from the territory of Japan and
signing the USSR-Japan Peace Treaty will the islands of Habomai and Shikotan
be given to Japan”.

This proved to be detrimental to the development of Soviet-Diplomatic

Diplomatic relations in a way that for Japan this was considered a violation of the
clauses of 1956 Joint Declaration and, therefore, considering also that the said
Declaration was ratified by the Higher Instances of both countries, the clauses of
this Declaration can not be altered by one side or the other. These events naturally
hampered the perception of a Soviet Union as untrustworthy (however, it should be
noted that the freezing of diplomatic relation barely affected the development of
bilateral trade between the USSR and Japan).

The period of 1970s, however, was more fruitful for the development of
USSR-Japan bilateral relations. The July 1971 Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to
Beijing and the announcement of President Nixon's forthcoming visit to China left
2
the Japanese conservative government with the feeling of being “left out” and
further incentivized Japan to restore its relations with PRC, - i.e. by the
establishment of full diplomatic relations and de-recognizing Taiwan. Tokyo
followed Washington in another respect: Japan opted for a policy of equidistance
between Beijing and Moscow along the lines of the Nixon-Kissinger detente.
Nixon's trip to Beijing was followed by a trip to Moscow. Prime Minister Kakuei
Tanaka's trip to Beijing in September 1972 was followed by a trip to Moscow in
October 1973. Furthermore, a year prior to that, Soviet Union, driven by the
incentive of deepening the economic cooperation with Japan and also by exploiting
the US’ weakened position in the region, mainly due to the US’ unsuccessful
2
Berton, P. (1986). Soviet-Japanese Relations: Perceptions, Goals, Interactions. Asian Survey,
26(12), 1259–1283.
Vietnam Campaign made its own attempts to restore the USSR-Japan bilateral
relations. In January 1972, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Gromyko A.A.
3
visited Tokyo. During this visit he emphasized the Soviet side’s readiness to
deepen the bilateral relation in every sphere, including political. Furthermore, he
demonstrated 4a positive approach to the signing of peace treaty and conducting
negotiations on this issue, with the Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956 as the
foundation of said negotiations. However, even regardless of Brezhnev
acknowledging to Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka that territorial dispute was one
of aspect of unresolved since World War II issues, the negotiations on the Peace
Treaty and territorial issues did not have any tangible result.

Despite the simultaneous development of trade relations between the USSR

and Japan, which were indeed far more fruitful than those of political nature, a
number of joint projects was established, i.e. an agreement on joint reconnaissance
on the oil and gas deposits in the Sakhalin shell zone, deepening the economic
relations, etc. Regardless, due to the Soviet policy makers continued to think that
economic cooperation with the USSR was a natural incentive for Japan, hence the
was no need to make any political concessions, and Japanese side exaggerated
Japan’s importance for the Soviet Union and so overplayed 5their cards by closely
linking politics and economics in the expectation that the lure of Japanese
investment would eventually force the Kremlin to make political concessions.
Furthermore, the overall trade balance between the USSR and Japan was also not
perfect. Indeed, starting from the signing of Trade Agreement between the USSR
and Japan, the trade volume was consistently rising up until 1980s. Since then, the
overall trade volume started 6to fluctuate: having reached its peak of 5.6 Billion
Dollars in 1982, it soon dropped only to reach 5.9 Billion Dollars only in 1988.
3
Панов, А. Н., Саркисов, К. О., & Стрельцов, Д. В. (2019). История внешней политики
Японии 1868–2018 (1st ed.). Международные отношения
4
Ibidem
5
Radchenko S. (2011) Japanese Business, Soviet Development and Territorial Conflict 1975-85.
Asia-Pacific Journal, 9-35(1)
6
村上 隆. (1991). 日本と旧ソ連との経済関係の展望. ソ連東欧経済研究所, 20(1), 8-16
(Murakami T. (1991). The Framework of Japanese-Soviet Economic Relations. USSR and
Eastern Europe Research Centre. 20(1), 8-16)
Despite the positive dynamic and good prospects for the bilateral trade starting
from Gorbachev’s Perestroika, liberalization of trade and the overall volume
reaching record 6.1 Billion Dollars in 1989, the volume dropped next year to 5.9
Billion Dollars.

This fact, alongside with further deterioration of political relations between

the USSR and Japan only further hampered the bilateral relations and the prospect
for the signing of Peace Treaty and the regulation of territorial issues. In 1976
Lieutenant Belenko, piloting a MiG-25 jet fighter, landed 7at Hakodate airport in
order to seek refuge in the United States via Japan. The decision then taken by the
Tokyo government to disassemble and examine the airplane in cooperation with
U.S. Air Force technical experts made the Soviets furious. To make things worse,
in 1978 Japan and the PRC signed a peace treaty containing an "anti-hegemony"
clause. China uses this phrase to indicate opposition to Soviet expansionism.
Within this framework, however, an issue of perception also remained an
important factor in approaching both the issues of diplomatic and trade relations.
Therefore, it is important to discuss the issues of mutual perception.

The Issues of perceptions of a Soviet Union in Japan.

Within the aforementioned bilateral relations framework an issue of mutual

perception is also important due to that preconceptions people of one country may
have towards another also find its reflection on the nature of any form of
interaction. Interestingly enough, both perceptions, whether Japanese of Soviet
Union or vice a versa are based on the war trauma. For Japanese side, the overall
structure of decision-making process that is based on fractionalization and the seek
of consensus notwithstanding, Soviet Union is not only a possible military threat,
but also is a source of communist ideology, which even in post-war Japan has been
treated with caution. In 1955, (as one of the reasons), in order to counter the

7
Kimura, H. (1980). Japan-Soviet Relations: Framework, Developments, Prospects. Asian
Survey, 20(7), 707–725
merged Socialist Party, a distinct at that point Liberal and Democratic Parties were
also merged together thus creating Liberal-Democratic Party. This new party’s
agenda was, according to its draft 8, promoting the ideas and principles of
democracy, ensuring peoples’ well-being, economic growth and country’s post-
war resurrection, etc. This is especially important when considering why
communists failed to seize the tangible political power. One of the reasons seems
to be the fact that even by that time the was only one large opposing party –
Socialist Party, that, logically, proposed leftists view on political process based
more on the Soviet model, which naturally constituted its rather low ratings. The
point is that democratic regime established with the effort of American
administration naturally created a social demand for more democratic political
structure within the Japanese people. This demand, as well as yet remaining
distrust for the communism as an ideology and prejudices amongst common
Japanese due to the fact that according to some of them, Soviet Union was one of
the biggest threats for the country since some believed Soviet Union to break the
USSR-Japanese Empire non-aggression treaty. Therefore, a strong sense of
distrust towards the Soviet Union was created in Japan. Furthermore, some of the
diplomatic issues, like one of 1960 and the unwillingness of the USSR to continue
negotiations on the disputed territories for as long as US Military bases remains in
country only further emphasized this sense of distrust. These notions are further
reinforced should one inspect the sociological studies of that time. For instance, in
the 1960s the popularity of the Soviet Union was 9around 4 %, but after 1977 it
dropped to around 1 %, and in the 1980s it even declined below 1 %, dropping to 0
.8 % in 1984 and 0 .9 % in 1985 . Thus it is possible to say that the popular image
of the Soviet Union shows a gradual declining tendency since 1964. Like it was
already mentioned, one of the possible reasons for such a low rating lies in the
possible military threat coming from USSR. In fact, some scholars even propose

8
Draft Agenda at the meeting for Launching New Party. (1955). National Diet Library, URL:
https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/img_l/219/219-004l.html (Retrieved: 10.06.2022)
9
Hasegawa T. (1986). Japanese Perceptions of a Soviet Union: 1960-1985. Slavic Research
Center, Hokkaido University
that this sense of threat originates as far back as from Tokugawa period when
10
Russian Navy led by Khvostov launched an attack on the island of Etorofu in
1807. Another reason lies in field of ideology, to be precise – the implications of a
Communist ideology spreading amongst some of the Japanese intellectuals.
Finally, a sense of being “Stabbed in the back” longing back from the World War
II and USSR violating the USSR-Japanese Empire Neutrality Pact also stipulated
the sense of distrust.

Therefore, a stable trend for the perception of a Soviet Union both within the
Japanese establishment and Japanese society likewise to remain continuously low
seems vivid. The inability to come to terms in signing the peace treaty and
resolving the territorial dispute (regardless of “who’s to blame” factor) as well as
certain actions of both sides in regards to these issues (see aforementioned aide-
memoire case or Japan’s side for the returnal of 4 islands rather than 2 as stated in
Joint Declaration) certainly did not contribute to the improvement of said
perceptions. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the shooting 11down of the Korean
airline contributed to further deteriorating of Japanese perceptions of a Soviet
Union, leading to Japan applying economic sanctions on USSR and boycotting of
the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games The suppression of the Solidarity movement in
Poland and the several revelations of Soviet spying activity in Japan further
contributed to frigid relations, and USSR proving to be the most disliked country
within internal opinion polls. The only possible prospect for tangible
rapprochement within the Japan-USSR bilateral relations framework could be
observed in the late 1980s starting from Shevardnadze’s second visit to Japan in
December 1988. For the Soviet side, said rapprochement was important for the
12
enactment of USSR new Asian Policy first enunciated by Gorbachev's
Vladivostok speech in July 1986: to become a bona-fide member of the Asia-
Pacific region that could play an active role in political, economic, and cultural
10
Ibidem
11
Berton, P. (1986). Soviet-Japanese Relations: Perceptions, Goals, Interactions. Asian Survey,
26(12), 1259–1283.
12
Hasegawa T. (1992). Gorbachev’s Visit to Japan and Soviet-Japanese Relations. Acta Slavica
Iaponica, 10, 65-91
interactions in this region. Further development of USSR-Japan talks on the most
pressing issues certainly did positively affect on the Japanese perception of the
Soviet Union, however the proceedings of the talks and the then Gorbachev’s visit
with the subsequent summit have failed in resolving territorial issues and thus did
not manage to boost the mutual perception. Obviously, the Soviet domestic
13
situation did not allow Gorbachev any room for manoeuvre on the territorial
issue.

All in all, we may conclude that the perception of a Soviet Union in Japan,
despite slight fluctuations, remained consistently low. This perception, therefore,
was backed up by both Soviet attempt at negotiating their position in a strict way,
like in the case of 1960 aide-memoire or claiming that there is no territorial dispute
between the two countries. Japan, however, also remained adamant in its position,
insisting on all 4 islands to be returned to Japan. All these factors combined
contributed to cementing the perception framework, where both sides could not
fully trust one another.

13
Ibidem
 Bibliography

In English Language:

1. Berton, P. (1986). Soviet-Japanese Relations: Perceptions, Goals,

Interactions. Asian Survey, 26(12), 1259–1283.
2. Hasegawa T. (1992). Gorbachev’s Visit to Japan and Soviet-Japanese
Relations. Acta Slavica Iaponica, 10, 65-91
3. Hasegawa T. (1986). Japanese Perceptions of a Soviet Union: 1960-
1985. Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University
4. Kimura, H. (1980). Japan-Soviet Relations: Framework, Developments,
Prospects. Asian Survey, 20(7), 707–725
5. Radchenko S. (2011) Japanese Business, Soviet Development and
Territorial Conflict 1975-85. Asia-Pacific Journal, 9-35(1)

In Japanese Language:

1. Draft Agenda at the meeting for Launching New Party. (1955). National
Diet Library, URL: https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/img_l/219/219-
004l.html (Retrieved: 10.06.2022)
2. 村上 隆. (1991). 日本と旧ソ連との経済関係の展望. ソ連東欧経済研究
所, 20(1), 8-16 (Murakami T. (1991). The Framework of Japanese-Soviet
Economic Relations. USSR and Eastern Europe Research Centre. 20(1),
8-16)

In Russian Language:

1. Панов, А. Н., Саркисов, К. О., & Стрельцов, Д. В. (2019). История

внешней политики Японии 1868–2018 (1st ed.). Международные
отношения