004. Is it ever justifiable to believe something for which you have no evidence?

This essay’s main thesis is that there are instances where it is justifiable to believe something without evidence. For
Clifford (1876) “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence”. By
introducing an essential distinction between verifiable and non-verifiable beliefs, I point out there are at least two
exceptions to his universal claim in the latter category. Self-fulfilling beliefs must be allowed for without evidence in
order not to miss out on the positive consequences. Never-verifiable beliefs can be justifiably held on no evidence,
when such evidence can never be attained. Consequently, I investigate some possible objections and argue that they
are misguided.

A belief is defined as an attitude of an agent towards some proposition (Schwitzgebel, 2015). Adopting Clifford’s
definition, a belief is justifiable if it is based on sufficient evidence to constitute knowledge and does not create a risk
of harm. He requires evidence for all kinds of beliefs in order to avoid arbitrary belief-formation. If we want to
minimise the risk of falsehood and the resulting negative consequences, Clifford advocates to postpone or suspend
judgement for all beliefs until there is evidence. Religion can never satisfy Clifford’s requirement, since it is based on
no physical evidence.

In order to legitimize beliefs on no evidence, I will follow James line of reasoning that abstention from belief risks
“missing out important truths” (James,1979), and hence a too risk-averse attitude to belief does not maximise the
positive consequences.

A belief is verifiable if there could theoretically be a way for us humans to verify it. This applies to most
scientific/factual beliefs. Importantly, the truth value of the proposition is independent of the belief. For instance,
the historical claim that Jesus walked on water is verifiable. Theoretically, someone at the time could have witnessed
and hence verified the event. Similarly, if somebody claims that Martians exist, but there is no way yet to travel
there and test it in practice, this belief is still verifiable. In theory, we could travel to Mars and test our belief. The
barrier is only a practical one.

A belief is unverifiable if there exists no evidence. We don’t simply lack the evidence, rather there is no conceivable
method of finding evidence at the time of belief-formation. Self-fulfilling beliefs and never-verifiable beliefs are two
examples of unverifiable beliefs. For instance, the confidence-level of someone is likely to affect their ability to fulfil
a task. Suppose that if you believe you can catch the train, you will run faster and succeed. The truth of the
proposition is dependent on the belief. So, all self-fulfilling beliefs are unverifiable in advance, but only ex post.
Alternatively, a belief may be never-verifiable in the sense that it can never be verified. The barrier lies in the non-
physical nature of the belief. This applies to beliefs in the existence of anything non-physical, such as God.

Self-fulfilling beliefs must be allowed for without evidence at the time of belief-formation. For illustration, take the
example of placebo-medicine. If the patient believes (on no evidence) that the medicine works, it will work. If the
patient does not believe in it, the placebo will not work. In retrospect, both beliefs appear justified. But in no case is
the belief based on evidence, as the evidence comes after the belief has already been formed. Since the truth of the
proposition requires a belief beforehand, judgement cannot be postponed. In turn, suspending judgement would
risk “missing out” on the positive consequences.

A Cliffordian may request that such self-fulfilling beliefs are based on empirical evidence of previous cases. He may
say that at the time of belief-formation, we do not know whether the belief is self-fulfilling. The best practice to
avoid error in the long run is to base the belief on evidence of previous placebo cases. However, following the
empirical chain one would land at the first placebo-case where a patient must have believed without evidence from
previous cases. Yet, if we do not allow for that belief, all following truths could not have existed. Thus, allowing for
these truths (and their positive consequences) may require beliefs that can only be verified ex post.

Never-verifiable beliefs must be allowed for because they are non-physical in nature and hence pose no physical
harm. For illustration, let us draw a distinction between common elements of superstitions and religious beliefs. All
factual claims made in the Bible, such as Jesus walking on water, as well as most superstitions, such as a physical
Santa Claus living on the north pole, are verifiable based on evidence independently of the belief. However, the faith
in the existence of God, or a similar kind of “faith” in some non-physical Santa Claus are never-verifiable. If there is
no possibility of being “right” or “wrong” in the sense of verifiable (or falsifiable), there appears no prudential reason
to prefer abstention over belief or disbelief. According to Wittgenstein (2007), it is a category mistake to require
physical evidence for non-physical beliefs: “The point is that if there were evidence, this would in fact destroy the
whole business. Anything that I normally call evidence wouldn’t in the slightest influence me”. Therefore, while
factual components of religion and superstition can and should be tested using Clifford’s scientific method, it is
justifiable to allow for “freedom of the mind” in the domain of never-verifiable beliefs.

A Cliffordian may deny the existence of never-verifiable beliefs. He will point out how science over time can produce
wholly new methods to verify claims that might previously have been deemed unverifiable. Similarly, it may
someday be possible to “test” for God. There have already been some attempts to prove or disprove particular
images of god. One such test concludes that if God is omnibenevolent and omnipotent, then He would not allow for
suffering. As suffering exists, this kind of God can be ruled out. Over time, tests may develop for all existing “images”
of God, or non-physical superstitions, up to the point of ruling out their existence.

However, such tests cannot go further than testing the physical consequences of a particular image of God (or Santa
Claus). This leaves plenty of “loopholes” for belief. If God is purely non-physical (i.e. has no influence on the physical
world), the image is unverifiable as there is no physical consequence (and hence no empirical evidence) to rule out
God’s existence. Furthermore, the plain belief in the existence of God does not entail any assumptions (e.g.
omnibenevolence) that may be used to find logical contradictions resulting from the belief. Hence, there appears no
prospect of ruling out a purely non-physical belief, either empirically or logically, and it remains never-verifiable.

Cliffordians might object that never-verifiable beliefs have no practical benefit and may even cause harm. If one were
to include God in a scientific theory, this would not add to the explanatory power but just to complexity. Since there
is no evidence, why not simply leave it out. Moreover, when it affects our mind, “no belief […]is truly insignificant”
(Clifford, 1876) as holding beliefs without evidence puts the method of scientific inquiry at risk. Even if we allow for
some non-physical beliefs without evidence, we risk confusion as the line between verifiable and unverifiable beliefs
is not clear-cut. We may mistakenly believe that there is no prospect of evidence even as science progresses. Even
more troublingly, the practice of believing without evidence may spread to other domains, where there already is
physical evidence.

Yet, even if a belief is of no practical use, if it can never be disproven, belief is still equally justifiable as abstention,
precisely because it makes no practical difference. Moreover, the belief may have positive consequences (e.g. if
religious people are generally happier), thereby justifying it if these outweigh the added complexity to our “theory of
everything”. Regarding the threat to the method of inquiry, it raises the question if we should allow for justifiable
exceptions to the rule and risk confusion or propagate a risk-averse behaviour in all domains and risk missing
important truths. First, the existence of religious scientists shows that it is possible to keep the two domains
separate. Moreover, good scientific practice requires working hypotheses, i.e. first forming a belief on little or no
evidence and testing it afterwards. In daily life, trust on little evidence is necessary to build cooperative
relationships, which then confirm the initial trust. Cliffordian scepticism risks ruling these practices out.

To conclude, I have argued that there are at least two examples of justified beliefs on no evidence. Firstly, self-
fulfilling beliefs require a belief to be formed prior to any evidence. Secondly, I have argued that for never-verifiable
beliefs, there is no prudential reason to prefer abstention over belief. While setting high evidence-standards is
necessary with verifiable beliefs, it is a category mistake to require evidence for unverifiable beliefs. It suffices to
accept one of the two examples in order to refute Clifford’s universal claim that it is never justifiable to hold beliefs
on no evidence by counterexample.
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