PBL CASE REVIEW

NASH V. INMAN [1908] 2KB 1

MERRITT V. MERRITT [1970] 2 All ER 760

Presented by Group 8
 Meet The Group

MUHAMMAD ADHAM BIN MOHSIN (A202251)

NOOR FARAHIN BINTI AMIRUDDIN (A203745)
SYED ABDILLAH BIN SYED HOOD (A202153)
MUHAMMAD HAZIQ BIN YAHYA (A202240)
MUHAMMAD SYAHMI BIN MUHAMMAD KHAIRUL (A203688)
MUHAMMAD IKHWAN NAIM BIN RIZAL (A204042)
 “
“ NASH V INMAN [1908] 2KB 1
 Issue
● Whether all the waistcoats supplied by P to D who was an infant at the time
considered a necessity for him?
● Whether D had already been supplied by his father with enough clothes?
 MATERIAL FACTS
The plaintiff is tailor Saville Row and the defendant is an undergraduate student at
Trinity College, Cambridge who is still considered as an infant at the time. The D
does not reach the age of 21 years old. The P had made a contract with D by
supplying 13 fancy waistcoats which cost about 145 pounds. However, D’s father had
supplied him with enough clothes before the contract was made. This created
dissatisfaction with P and wanted to sue D to get back his money for all the
waistcoats. At the trial, D had pleaded infancy during the time the contract was
made and arose an issue of necessity. Ridley, J had decided in favor of D by saying
that there is no evidence to prove that all the waistcoats were necessary for D. The
judge had directed the jury to enter the judgment in favor of D. Dissatisfied with the
decision made by the judge, he then went to appeal.

SIR HERBERT COZENS-
HARDY MR
Appeals were dismissed
since the jury couldn’t find
any evidence to support the
claim by P that the clothes
supplied by him to D were
necessary. If the jury had
found the evidence, surely
the court would grant a new
trial. With that, there is no
reason for the P to interfere
with the judgment of the
trial judge.
Judgement
FLETCHER MOULTON LJ BUCKLEJ LJ
Based on the principle of The judge agreed
the case Ryder v
with the decision of
Wombwell, the jury in the
trial had found that the the jury during the
question of fact regarding trial since there was
the evidence to support no evidence being
the claim made by P is established to affirm
absent. Therefore, appeals that the goods were
were dismissed since there
necessary. Therefore,
was no evidence to prove
appeals were
the necessity of the
waistcoats. dismissed.
 RATIO DECIDENDI & PRINCIPLE
SIR HERBERT COZENS-HARDY MR
The contract entered by the infant is void according to the s 2. Of the Infants Relief Act 1874 unless
the contract was about necessaries. Since the P had pleaded infancy, the P had to prove that the
waistcoats supplied to the D were necessary by looking at the two (2) factors. Firstly, the P had to
show to the court that the clothes supplied were suitable for the condition of an infant’s life. Next, the
P also needs to prove that the waistcoats are suitable to D’s actual requirements at the time of the
sale and delivery. The P somehow failed to prove any evidence or even made any cross-examination
saying that the clothes supplied were necessary. The decision made by the trial judges is correct.

Regarding the second issue, no one challenged or questioned that issue in cross- examination, and the
fact that the person was underage was accepted. This individual, an undergraduate at Trinity College,
Cambridge, who had recently started university when the goods were provided, was confirmed to have
received clothing appropriate and essential for their status as a university student.
 RATIO DECIDENDI & PRINCIPLE
FLETCHER MOULTON LJ
The judge had equated an infant with a lunatic in which they are incapable of making a
contract If the P can show the clothes (waistcoats) are something that is “necessary” as
aligns with the definition of the word necessary in the s 2 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, the
D is liable for the repayment of that goods or services. Even if the infant or lunatic is liable
to pay the price, it must be a reasonable price and not the contract price.

Moving on to the second issue, D's father had become a witness to prove that D already
had an adequate supply of clothes. The father is confident that D already has enough
supply. The P had never touched his statement or cross-examined to shake the credibility of
what he said, which clearly showed to us that the D had enough supply of clothes at the
early place before the contract was made.
 RATIO DECIDENDI & PRINCIPLE
BUCKLEY LJ
The judge provided the Infants Relief Act 1874 in which in a certain section had mentioned that
“All contracts entered... into infants... (other than contract for necessaries) and all accounts
started with infants shall be void ...." This has shown that the P must prove that the contract
made with D falls into this element of necessity. From the Act above, any infants have no power
to make or enter into a contract unless it involves necessaries. The onus is on the P to show that
the clothes (waistcoats) supplied are necessities to D.

For the second issue, the father of D had been taken into the court to prove the infancy of D and
become a witness to whether D had enough supplied clothing (waistcoats). The question of
whether the clothes supplied are enough or not is a question of facts that will rely on the jury
itself to find whether there is enough evidence to say that the clothes supplied are sufficient. The
judge put this question to an end by stating that there is no evidence to establish that the goods
supplied by P are necessary
 Personal commentary
From my perspective, I agree with both the decisions made by the trial judge
and judges in this appeal. Dismissing the appeal is the only right thing to do in
this case. It is obvious for me to say that someone who does not reach the age
of majority is not capable of entering into a contract. However, if the contract
was made because of necessity then things will become different. In this case
Nash v Inman, clearly the P had entered a contract that involved an infant, D.
It is the responsibility of the P to check the age of the D whether he is surely
an adult or not. This is important to prevent any bad things from happening
again in the future. This case should become a precedent in P's life to not put
full trust in someone whenever it involves a huge amount of value on any
goods.
 “
“MERRITT V MERRITT [1970] 2 All ER 760
 Issue
● Whether it is still considered to have domestic relations in the matter of
intention to create legal relations between separated partners.
● Whether the piece of paper John signed is legally binding, as law usually
has a presumption against these agreements between husband and wife
being binding.
 MATERIAL FACTS
Plaintiff-Millicent Joan Merrit
Defendant-John Bertram Merrit
The husband and wife entered matrimony in 1941 and, following the war, acquired a
building plot in 1949, where they built a house at 133 Clayton Road, Hook,
Chessington. Initially, the house was in the husband's name, bearing a substantial
mortgage. Living there, they raised three children. In 1966, amidst marital discord
triggered by the husband's attachment to another woman, the couple reached an
agreement to put the house in joint names, reflecting their shared financial
contributions.
 MATERIAL FACTS
In a pivotal conversation on May 25, 1966, the husband, acknowledging his financial responsibilities,
pledged to make monthly payments of £40 to the wife, earmarked for the outstanding building
society payments. The husband documented this commitment in writing, expressing the intent to
transfer sole ownership of the property to the wife upon full mortgage repayment. Despite the
emotional strain, the wife diligently fulfilled her part of the agreement, settling the mortgage over
subsequent months, aided by the husband's £40 monthly contribution and her earnings. Post-
mortgage settlement, the husband reduced the monthly payment to £25.

However, when the wife requested the house's sole ownership, the husband refused. In response, the
wife initiated legal proceedings in the Chancery Division, seeking a declaration that the house
rightfully belonged to her and an order for the husband to complete the conveyance. While the initial
order was in her favor, the husband now appeals to this court. The case underscores the intricacies of
familial agreements, financial contributions, and the legal enforcement of commitments within the
context of evolving relationships.
 Judgement
Lord Denning dismissed the application and upheld the original judgment.
Widgery LJ rejected the appeal, siding with Lord Denning.
 RATIO DECIDENDI & PRINCIPLE
LORD DENNING:
In the initial matter, Lord Denning asserted that in cases like Balfour v Balfour, where domestic
arrangements are involved, the presumption is that they do not intend to establish legal relations.
However, if the parties are not living harmoniously and are separated or on the verge of separation,
the dynamics change. In such situations, they engage in careful negotiations, not relying on
honorable understanding but seeking precise agreements. It can be reasonably assumed that they
intend to create legal relations.

Regarding the second issue, Lord Denning elaborated that the husband's counsel argued, based on
Section 17 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882, that the house should be jointly owned by the
husband and wife. Even if the house were transferred to the wife, it was suggested that she would
hold it in trust for both jointly. Lord Denning rejected this argument, emphasizing that the document
signed by the husband specifically addressed the beneficial ownership of the house, clearly
indicating the intention for it to belong entirely to the wife. Consequently, Lord Denning dismissed
the application and upheld the original judgment.
 RATIO DECIDENDI & PRINCIPLE
WIDGERY LJ
Once the natural love and affection within a relationship have dissipated, which typically occurs in the aftermath of
a marital breakdown, the presumption in favor of legal relations becomes irrelevant. This principle was elucidated
by Salmon LJ in Jones v Padavatton, as referenced earlier. In that case, Salmon LJ asserted that when close
relations, such as spouses, parents, and children, or uncles and nephews, engage in arrangements involving giving
items, there exists a presumption against an intention to establish a legal relationship. This presumption, not legally
binding but derived from factual observation, stems from the common understanding that individuals in such
familial connections generally do not intend to create legal rights and obligations. Instead, they rely on the familial
bonds of trust and affection.

Yet, this presumption loses its relevance when the affection that originally formed the basis of the relationship fades
away. In the case of a husband and wife happily living together, the presumption may hold, but it becomes
unsupported when the emotional bond fostering confidence in the relationship diminishes. To put it simply, the idea
that close family members typically don't intend to create legal rights and obligations loses its weight when the
emotional connection that initially supported such trust is no longer present. In line with the first issue, Widgery LJ
rejected the appeal, siding with Lord Denning.
 Personal commentary
I fully agree with the judgment of the case of Merritt v Merritt on both issues that I have
discovered. Lord Denning makes it clear that for us to safely presume the intention between
domestic parties we need to first understand the condition of both partners, whether they are in
amity with each other or have no remorse for each other. This shows the seriousness of the
intention between both parties. We can see this especially when Mr. Merrit signs the document
wanting the meeting and having both parties part ways and we can see that the motive of his
meeting was to have Mrs. Merrit pay the remaining balance. By having the house as a
consideration Mr. Merrit accepted the agreement showing that he intended it now not as
husband and wife but as a separate entity trying to make a contract with each other. All this can
be seen in Lord Denning's statement saying.
“It is altogether different when the parties are not living in amity but are separated, or about to separate.
They then bargain keenly. They do not rely on honorable understanding. They want everything cut and
dried. It may safely be presumed that they intend to create legal relations.”
In concluding my comment this comment came about a new condition between a domestic
relationship and it is the condition of their relationship when creating a contract.
Do you have any questions for us?