The Soviet Union’s Agricultural

Biowarfare Programme: Ploughshares

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The Soviet Union’s
Agricultural Biowarfare
Programme
Ploughshares to Swords
Anthony Rimmington
The Soviet Union’s Agricultural Biowarfare
Programme
 Anthony Rimmington

The Soviet Union’s

Agricultural
Biowarfare
Programme
Ploughshares to Swords
Anthony Rimmington
Birmingham, UK

ISBN 978-3-030-73842-6    ISBN 978-3-030-73843-3 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73843-3

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
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 Acknowledgements

A great debt of gratitude is owed by the author to the men and women
employed within the USSR Ministry of Agriculture’s secret biological
warfare network. In the transformed reality which resulted from the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, many came to realise that they were no longer
bound by their bonds of loyalty and allegiance to a system which had
imploded and disappeared, never to return. Chief among those who wres-
tled with their conscience, and the highest-level and most important
source for the present work, is the now-deceased Tsyren Tsybekzhapovich
Khanduev. This impressive individual was representative of some of the
more positive aspects of the Soviet system, especially that associated with
social mobility. Khanduev was born on 17 August 1918 in Buryatia, the
son of a cattle breeder. From these humble origins his career followed an
astonishing trajectory, with him eventually serving as a colonel in the
USSR Ministry of Defence’s Scientific-Research Sanitary Institute (67-i
km settlement, Sergiev Posad)—the Soviet Union’s lead virology BW cen-
tre—then being transferred to a major anti-livestock institute in Gvardeiskii,
Kazakhstan, before finishing his career as an Academician within the
National Academy of Sciences of Kyrgyzstan. Khanduev spent many long,
highly emotional hours, considering whether, in the wake of the collapse
of the Soviet Union, his oath of loyalty prevented him from telling the
extraordinary story of the agricultural biowarfare programme pursued by
the USSR Ministry of Agriculture. It is thanks to his courageous decision
to write his memoirs that we are provided with a fascinating insight and
knowledge of this highly secretive Soviet endeavour.

v
vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Another individual who made a significant contribution to this project

is Stephen Mylrea Asbridge (1952–2015). Lacking any formal scientific
background, he had a most detailed knowledge of fermentation technol-
ogy, working for many decades in this branch of the UK’s bioindustry. His
main contribution to this work, however, centres on the wide network of
contacts he had developed within the life sciences industry in the former
Soviet Union. He was greatly loved and respected by an array of senior
researchers and directors based in Moscow and many other cities across
the USSR. In the chaos and disorder following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, it was only through these highly personal channels of communica-
tion that it was possible to schedule interviews and for former weapons
scientists to be able to talk openly about their work.
Two other key individuals should be thanked for their critical contribu-
tion to the present work: Dr David Stead and Dr Robert Bolton, both
formerly attached to the Central Science Laboratory (York) were fine trav-
elling companions on several adventures across the post-Soviet space.
Their expert knowledge provided fascinating insight into the programmes
which had been pursued by the USSR Ministry of Agriculture. In addi-
tion, David’s fine singing voice was capable of transforming an ordinary
social occasion into an extraordinary one.
Alex Donaldson and Richard Strange very kindly read and commented
on the manuscript as it was being finally prepared. Their contributions
have greatly improved the quality of the book. Grateful thanks are also
extended to the anonymous reviewer for Palgrave Macmillan.
Finally, a special and very personal thank you is also offered to Dr
Edward Arfon Rees (1949–2019), late of the Centre for Russian, European
and Eurasian Studies (CREES) at the University of Birmingham. He was
a most brilliant historian of the Soviet Union, as is evidenced by an array
of superlative publications, who provided myself and very many others,
with a deep insight into this fascinating period of history. He shall be most
remembered by me as a very dear colleague whose enthusiasm, infectious
humour and love of life brightened up many a dull day in the Russian
Centre at Birmingham.
 Contents

1 Introduction  1

2 Origins: The International Race to Develop Anti-crop and

Anti-livestock Biological Weapons 13
The Initial Soviet Post-War Anti-crop Biological Warfare
Programme  22
The Trigger: The US Offensive Biological Warfare Programme
Targeting the Soviet Union  24

3 Codename Ekologiya: Khrushchev and the Launch of the

Soviet Union’s Large-­Scale Agricultural Biowarfare
Programme 33
The Generals in Charge: Military Oversight of the Ekologiya
Programme  36
First Steps: Pursuit of the Ekologiya Programme at the Palace on
the Znamenskoe-Sadki Estate  40
The Concentration of Veterinary BW Facilities in the Vladimir
Region  52
The Gvardeiskii Experimental Proving Ground: Biological
Warfare on the Kazakh Steppe  55
An Invisible Network: Visiting Western Plant Pathology and
Veterinary Specialists Are Unaware of the Existence of the New
Agricultural BW Facilities  60

vii
viii Contents

Numbers Employed in the Ministry of Agriculture’s BW

Programme  62
The Targeting of China by the Ekologiya Programme?  63

4 From Estonia to Sakhalin Island: The Expansion of the

USSR Ministry of Agriculture’s Toxic Archipelago in the
1970s and 1980s 79
The Interdepartmental Council and the New Focus on
Molecular Biology  79
The Development of Linkages to the USSR Ministry of Defence,
Biopreparat and Other Branches of the Soviet BW Programme  82
The Expansion of the Ekologiya Programme and the Opening of
New Facilities in Estonia, Armenia and Tajikistan  84
Harnessing Virulent Plant Pathogens from the Soviet Network of
Monitoring Stations and Plant Breeding Facilities  91
Africa as a Source of Novel Pathogens? The International
Dimensions of the Ekologiya Programme  92
The Emergence of the New Scientific Leadership of the Soviet
Anti-crop BW Programme  94
The Maintenance of a Strict Regime of Secrecy Within the
GUNIiEPU Network: Security Measures in Place at Ekologiya
Facilities in Uzbekistan and Georgia  96
The Launch of the Flora Programme and the Development of
Tactical Herbicides for the Military 100
Alibek’s Account of the Early Termination of GUNIiEPU’s BW
Programme 101

5 Heart of Darkness: The Creation of Reserve Mobilisation

Capacity for Production of Viral Agents109
The Soviet System of Mobilisation Preparedness 109
The Creation of Reserve Mobilisation Production Facilities for
Anti-agricultural Agents 110
BW Mobilisation Capacity at the Pokrov Biologics Plant 112
Identification of Mobilisation Capacity at Pokrov by Western
Visitors 115
The Nature of Activity at Pokrov: Linkages to an Alleged
Soviet Variola Virus Programme 117
Delivery Systems for Weaponised Agricultural BW Agents 119
 Contents  ix

6 Through a Glass Darkly: Analysis of the Soviet Union’s

Military Agricultural R&D Programmes125
Western Intelligence Assessments of the Soviet Agricultural
Biowarfare Programme 125
Central Asia’s “Sverdlovsk Incident”? The Rinderpest (Cattle
Plague) Programme and the First Major Disease Outbreak
from an Ekologiya Laboratory 127
The Pursuit of FMD Research Programmes by VNIYaI 133
Construction of FMD Vaccine Facilities by the Soviet Union 134
VNIIVViM’s Focus on Anthrax 136
R&D Programmes in Vol’ginskii and Gvardeiskii Focused on
African Swine Fever (ASF) and African Horse Sickness (AHS) 138
Sheeppox, Goatpox and Fowlpox Viruses 139
R&D Programmes Conducted by Soviet Anti-crop BW Facilities:
Rice Blast (Magnaporthe grisea) and Rice Bacteriosis
(Xanthomonas oryzae) 140
Late Blight of Potatoes (Phytophthora infestans) 141
Diseases of Cereal Crops 144
The Use of Insects to Transmit Plant Pathogens 145
Offence or Defence? The Conflicting Narratives with Regard to
the Ekologiya Programme 146

7 From Military to Agro-industrial Complex: The Legacy of

the Agricultural BW Programme in the Post-Soviet States155
The Collapse of the USSR and the Evacuation of Weapons
Scientists to the Russian Federation 155
The Transfer to Civil Control of Russia’s Anti-crop and Anti-­
livestock Facilities 157
Iran and the Proliferation Threat Arising in the Wake of the
Collapse of the Soviet Union 160
From Isolated Cold War Outpost to National Lead-­Edge Plant
Pathology Research Centre: The “Rediscovery” of Georgia’s
Soviet-Era Time Capsule 166
The Role of Kobuleti in Soviet Military Programmes 170
The UK Ministry of Defence Counters the Critical Proliferation
Threat in Kobuleti: The Launch of the Pilot Biological
Redirection Project 174
x Contents

The Yerevan Branch of VNIYaI Emerges as the Main Research

Hub of the Armenian Veterinary Sector 177
The Fate of Kazakhstan’s Agricultural Biowarfare Facilities 178
The Use of Former Soviet Weapons Scientists in the War Against
Drugs 182

8 Conclusion199
Characteristics of the Ekologiya BW Programme 199
Soviet Rationale for the Launch of the Ekologiya Programme 201
The Achievements of the Soviet Agricultural BW Programme 204
Ekologiya’s Legacy 205

Appendix A: Soviet/Russian Abbreviations and Acronyms209


Appendix B: Composition of the Scientific and Technical
Council (NTS) and Interbranch Scientific and Technical
Council for Molecular Biology and Genetics (MNTS)215

Appendix C: Lead Scientists in the Ekologiya Programme217

Index225
 About the Author

Anthony Rimmington is a former senior research fellow at the University

of Birmingham’s Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies
(CREES), UK. He was the winner, as a postgraduate student at this insti-
tution, of the John Grayson Memorial Prize. He has written widely on the
civil life sciences industry in Russia and the former Soviet Republics and is
the author of Technology and Transition: A Survey of Biotechnology in
Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic States (London and Westport, Connecticut,
1992). Other publications on this topic include Tekhnologiya i perekhodnyi
period. Obzor biotekhnologii v Rossii, na Ukraine i v stranakh baltii, in
Biotekhnologiya, ekologiya, meditsina: Materialy III–IV Mezhdunarodnykh
nauchnykh seminarov 2001–2002, Volga-Vyatka Centre of Applied
Microbiology, Kirov, 2002, pp. 75–8; Biotechnology Legislation in
Central and Eastern Europe, European Federation of Biotechnology Task
Group on Public Perceptions of Biotechnology’s Briefing Paper No. 9,
June 1999, pp. 4; “Biotechnology and industrial microbiology regulations
in Russia and the former Soviet republics”, in Hambleton, P., Melling, J.,
Salusbury, T.T. (Eds.), Biosafety in Industrial Biotechnology, London,
1994, pp. 67–89; “Perestroika and Soviet biotechnology”, Technology
Analysis and Strategic Management, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1990, pp. 63–79;
“Soviet biotechnology: the case of single cell protein”, in Amann, R.,

The Lord will strike your grazing herds, your horses and asses, your camels,
cattle and sheep with a terrible pestilence (Exodus, 9:3). I destroyed your crops
with blight and disease (Amos, 4:9)

xi
xii ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Cooper, J.(Eds.), Technical Progress and Soviet Economic Development,

Oxford, 1986, pp. 75–93; and “Issues in Soviet biotechnology: the case of
single-cell protein”, in Adaptability to New Technologies of the USSR and
East European Countries, Brussels, 17–19 April 1985, pp. 217–234.
Numerous contributions regarding the Soviet and Russian civil life sci-
ences industry have also been made to a number of popular scientific pub-
lications including New Scientist, Bio/Technology, International Industrial
Biotechnology, The Genetic Engineer and Biotechnologist, European
Microbiology and Microbiology Europe.
Rimmington has also written extensively on the Soviet Union’s offen-
sive biological weapons programme including Stalin’s Secret Weapon: The
Origins of Soviet Biological Warfare (London and New York, 2018). He
has completed a series of journal articles and book chapters on the subject
including “From Offence to Defence? Russia’s Reform of its Biological
Weapons Complex and the Implications for Western Security”, The
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2003, pp. 1–43; “The
Soviet Union’s Offensive Programme: The Implications for Contemporary
Arms Control”, in Wright, S, (Ed.), Biological Warfare and Disarmament:
New Problems/New Perspectives, Lanham, 2002, pp. 103–50; “Invisible
Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Soviet Union’s BW Programme and
Its Implications for Contemporary Arms Control”, The Journal of Slavic
Military Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, September 2000, pp. 1–46; “Konversion
Sowjetischer BW-produktions-einrichtungen: Der fall Biomedpreparat,
Stepnogorsk, Kasachstan”, in Buder, E. (Ed.), Möglichkeiten und Grenzen
der Konversion von B-Waffen-Einrichtungen, Lit Verlag, Münster, 2000,
pp. 245–262; “Fragmentation and Proliferation? The Fate of the Soviet
Union’s Offensive Biological Weapons Programme”, Contemporary
Security Policy, Vol. 20, No. 1, April 1999, pp. 86–110; “Conversion of
BW Facilities in Kazakhstan”, in Geissler, E., Gazsó, L., Buder, E. (Eds.),
Conversion of Former BTW Facilities, NATO Science Series, London,
1998, pp. 167–186; and “From military to industrial complex? The con-
version of biological weapons' facilities in the Russian Federation”,
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 17, No. 1, April 1996, pp. 80–112.
During the very last years of existence of the Soviet Union, Rimmington
travelled to a number of research establishments at sites located across the
country. Following upon the collapse of the USSR, he was allowed access
to a number of former Soviet life sciences R&D institutes and manufactur-
ing facilities with a view to assisting with their participation in interna-
tional non-proliferation programmes.
 List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 View of Narkomzem Building in Moscow, 15:36:01, 3

September 2017, Moscow, Russian Federation. Photographer:
Ludvig14 (Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/ File: Moscow_Narkomzem_1234.jpg,
Accessed on the 26 February 2020) 14
Fig. 2.2 View of All-Russian Institute of Plant Protection, 20:30:00, 22
March 2012. Photographer: Grichanov (Wikimedia Commons,
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/ 6/6e/
VIZRbuilding1.jpg, Accessed on the 28 May 2019) 23
Fig. 3.1 Palace on the Znamenskoye-Sadki Estate, Bitsa, Moscow
oblast’, 18:15:52, 30 July 2007. Photographer: Maslova,
Lyudmila, Moscow (This file is licensed under the Creative
Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license;
This image was uploaded as part of European Science Photo
Competition 2015, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
commons/e/ed/%D0%9C%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BA%D0
%B2%D0%B0._%D0%94%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B5%
D1%86_%D1%83%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%B4%D1%8C%D0%B1
%D1%8B_%D0%97%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%
BD%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B5-­
%D0%A1%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%BA%D0%B8.jpg)41
Fig. 3.2 View of main building, Georgian Branch of the All-Union
Scientific-­Research Institute of Phytopathology, Kobuleti,
Georgia, 4 May 2001. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 47

xiii
xiv List of Figures

Fig. 3.3 View of water tower erected in 1959, Central Asian Scientific-­
Research Institute of Phytopathology, Yuqori-Yuz, Tashkent,
Uzbekistan, 11 December 2002. Photographer: Anthony
Rimmington48
Fig. 3.4 View of hazard sign “Radioactivity” at entrance to SANIIF site
for testing uptake of radionucleotides in crops, Yuqori-Yuz,
Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 19 May 2003. Photographer: Anthony
Rimmington50
Fig. 3.5 View of All‑Union Scientific‑Research Foot‑and‑Mouth Disease
Institute (VNIYaI), Yur’evets, Vladimir oblast’. Photographer:
Anthony Rimmington 53
Fig. 3.6 View of Soviet-era placards on display at the Scientific-Research
Agricultural Institute—one depicting NISKhI, with stylized
images of a horse and a leaf symbolizing the twin activities of
animal and plant science, another placard celebrating the
Achievements of Science for Field and Farm, a slogan popularized
by Academician Pavel Pavlovich Lobanov, President of the
V.I. Lenin All-Union Academy of Sciences (1956–1961 and
1965–1978), Gvardeiskii, near Otar, Zhambul’ oblast’,
Kazakhstan, 8 April 2003. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 57
Fig. 3.7 View of greenhouse facility on site at Scientific-Research
Agricultural Institute, Gvardeiskii, near Otar, Zhambul’ oblast’,
Kazakhstan, 9 April 2003. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 58
Fig. 3.8 View of a centrifugal freeze dryer manufactured by Edwards
High Vacuum Ltd. (Crawley, UK)—part of the historical
large-scale installation of the latest Western equipment at
NISKhI, Gvardeiskii, near Otar, Kazakhstan, 13 September
1999. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 59
Fig. 4.1 View of dedicated storage area housing 15,000 wheat varieties,
Laboratory of Plant Immunity, Scientific-Research Institute of
Agriculture, Gvardeiskii, Kazakhstan, 13 September 1999.
Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 85
Fig. 4.2 View of road sign for Kamara, location of former Experimental
Station, Estonia, 3 July 2002. Photographer: Anthony
Rimmington86
Fig. 4.3 View of block of flats constructed for Experimental Station,
Kamara, Estonia, 3 July 2002. Photographer: Anthony
Rimmington87
Fig. 4.4 Elaborate security system preventing unauthorised access to
offices and laboratories at Georgian Branch of VNIIF, Kobuleti,
Georgia, 4 May 2001. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 98
 List of Figures  xv

Fig. 5.1 View of bunkered facilities at Pokrov biologics factory,

Vol’ginskii, Vladimir oblast’, Russian Federation. Photographer:
Anthony Rimmington 115
Fig. 6.1 Rinderpest outbreak in South Africa, 1896. Photographer:
Unknown, public domain, created on the 17 February 2011,
Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Rinderpest_1896-CN.jpg#/media/ File:Rinderpest
1896-CN.jpg127
Fig. 6.2 View of containment system employed within Georgian Branch
of VNIIF’s greenhouse, Kobuleti, Georgia, 4 May 2001.
Photographer: Anthony Rimmington (Note: Date stamp on
this photograph is incorrect) 143
Fig. 7.1 View of entrance to All-Russian Scientific-Research Institute of
Animal Health (VNIIZZh), Yur’evets, Russian Federation,
1994. Photographer: Alex Donaldson (used with author’s
permission)158
Fig. 7.2 View of concentric rings of security walls in place at anti-crop
BW facility, Kobuleti, Georgia, 4 May 2001. Photographer:
Anthony Rimmington (Note: Date stamp on this photograph is
incorrect)168
Fig. 7.3 View of nameplate of the renamed Plant Immunity Research
Institute, Kobuleti, Georgia, 4 May 2001. Photographer:
Anthony Rimmington (Note: Date stamp on this photograph is
incorrect)169
Fig. 7.4 View of greenhouse complex, Kobuleti, Georgia, 4 May 2001.
Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 170
Fig. 7.5 Georgette Naskidashvili, Director of Institute of Plant
Immunity, Kobuleti, Georgia, 4 May 2001. Photographer:
Anthony Rimmington (Note: Date stamp on this photograph is
incorrect)172
Fig. 7.6 View of Soviet-era bioreactors at NISKhI, Gvardeiskii, near
Otar, Kazakhstan, 9 April 2003. Photographer: Anthony
Rimmington179
Fig. 7.7 View of Soviet-era phytotrons at the Institute of Genetics and
Plant Experimental Biology, Yuqori-Yuz, Tashkent, Uzbekistan,
11 December 2002. Photographer: Anthony Rimmington 184
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In August 1958, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union (CPSU) and the USSR Council of Ministers, under the
leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, issued decree No. 909-426 “for strength-
ening work in the field of microbiology and virology” and embarked upon
the largest agricultural biowarfare programme the world has ever seen.1
Embracing defensive and offensive components, six institutes were ini-
tially created and placed under the control of a secret department, the
Main Administration for Scientific-Research and Experimental-Production
Establishments (GUNIiEPU) within the USSR Ministry of Agriculture.
The secret programme operated under the codename Ekologiya (Ecology),
which was also referred to as Problem “E”. For more than three decades
the new Soviet BW facilities were to focus their research on a range of
pathogens with utility as anti-crop and anti-livestock weapons. By the time
the programme had terminated in 1991, the network, with its store of
highly dangerous pathogens, had the capability to inflict enormous dam-
age on Western agriculture.
An array of Western scholars and journalists and high-level Soviet defec-
tors have alluded to the secret Soviet agricultural network, which, at its
height, embraced around 10,000 personnel, equating to a quarter to a
sixth of all those who were employed within the USSR’s vast BW pro-
gramme. This agricultural biowarfare workforce eclipses the numbers
employed in historic BW programmes pursued by other countries. It

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2021
A. Rimmington, The Soviet Union’s Agricultural Biowarfare
Programme, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73843-3_1
2 A. RIMMINGTON

exceeds that of the entire US BW programme, fewer than 8000 people;

the Japanese BW programme, which employed fewer than 5000; and the
British and Canadian BW programme, employing fewer than 3000 per-
sonnel. The Soviet weapons scientists worked within a network which
consisted of 15 anti-crop facilities, 4 anti-livestock facilities, 1 institute
embracing both animal and plant BW programmes and at least 3 dedi-
cated proving grounds, alongside an unknown number of reserve mobili-
sation BW production units.
The agricultural BW technology developed by the Soviet Union would
make tempting targets for nations wishing to acquire their own such capa-
bility or for terrorist groups seeking to inflict damage on Western agricul-
tural targets. As Colonel Robert Kadlec has indicated, the consequences of
such a strike could be catastrophic: “Agroterror offers an adversary the
means to wage a potentially subtle yet devastating form of warfare, one
which would impact on the political, social and economic sectors of soci-
ety and potentially threaten national survival itself”.2 Two key factors exac-
erbate the problem of countering the use of such agents. The first concerns
the relative ease with which agricultural pathogens can be weaponised and
disseminated. Work on such agents may also require far lower levels of
biosafety than that required for mainstream BW programmes aimed at
human targets. And the second concerns the plausible deniability with
regard to accusations that a nation or terrorist group had employed such
weapons. Against a background of a dramatic increase in natural outbreaks
of novel plant diseases over the past decade for example, a food crop epi-
demic initiated by a BW attack might never be detected, freeing the covert
aggressor from blame and repercussion.3 There is also a reduced moral
and ethical burden associated with the use of such agents.4 In addition, the
geographical distribution of Soviet-era agricultural BW facilities is a matter
of some concern with respect to the possible proliferation of agriculturally
directed biological weapons. For the network was dispersed across a vast
geographic area encompassing sites in Armenia, Estonia, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This greatly complicated
the task of Western agencies seeking to prevent the proliferation of weap-
ons technologies associated with the Soviet programme.
A number of recent reports have highlighted the vulnerability of
Western agriculture to attack by a variety of pathogens and causative
agents. The high health status of agricultural crops, combined with the
extensive use of monoculture in modern agriculture across vast areas,
means that plants present a particularly vulnerable target. A National
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

Academy of Sciences study, “Genetic Vulnerability of Major Crops” pub-

lished in August 1972, warned that US crops were “impressively uniform
genetically and impressively vulnerable”.5 Once infection has developed, it
is often too late in the growing season to plough it in and plant a resistant
alternative.6 The livestock sector in the West has also become more vulner-
able to attack, experiencing both a decrease in genetic diversity and a sig-
nificant concentration of production (in 1970, e.g., there were about
500,000 dairy farms in the United States, with this number decreasing to
160,000 by 1988).7 As one US expert noted, “for the user of biological
agents, the trend to concentration has reduced the target’s geographic
area, increased the potential for spread of infectious agents, and magnified
the impact of limited use”.8
Attacks on agricultural crops and livestock with BW agents could lead
to potential economic losses of immense proportions. In the nineteenth
century, coffee leaf rust caused by the fungus Hemileia vastatrix destroyed
coffee plantations worth millions of dollars in South-East Asia and for the
past two decades has been a pressing problem in Latin America. In 1970 in
the United States, Southern corn leaf blight (SCLB), caused by the fungus
Bipolaris maydis, devastated 15 per cent of the maize crop, reducing the
average national corn yield from 83.9 to 71.7 bushels per acre and costing
farmers about US$1 billion in losses.9 More recently in 1996 a limited
outbreak of Karnal bunt (Tilletia indica)—a fungal pathogen of wheat—
in the American Southwest led to an estimated US$250 million in loss. In
this case although the actual extent of the infections was limited, other
countries enacted trade embargoes in order to prevent imports of infected
wheat.10 A January 2001 report produced by the US Department of
Defence estimates that an attack utilising Asian soybean rust (caused by
the fungus Phakopsora pachyrhizi) could potentially result in American
losses for farmers, processors, livestock producers and consumers of up to
US$8 billion per annum.11 The deliberate deployment of anti-crop agents
could also be highly effective in causing mass casualties in civilian popula-
tions. During the period 1845–1846, for example, late blight of potatoes,
caused by the fungus-like microorganism, Phytophthora infestans, was one
of the primary causes of the Irish famine which resulted in the deaths of
about one million people and forced another one million to emigrate.
Again in 1942–1943 the brown spot disease of rice was partially respon-
sible for the Bengal famine in India in which more than two million people
starved.12
4 A. RIMMINGTON

Potential economic losses associated with attacks on a country’s live-

stock sector could be just as severe. In 1997 in Taiwan, for example, an
outbreak in pigs of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is estimated to have
probably cost tens of thousands of US dollars in direct losses. However,
the costs of eradication and disinfection amounted to US$4 billion, along-
side a cumulative US$15 billion in lost export revenues.13 The FMD out-
break in the UK in 2001, meanwhile, led to losses to agriculture and the
food chain amounting to about £3.1 billion. In addition, businesses
directly affected by a loss of revenue as a result of reduced numbers of
tourists visiting the countryside are estimated to have lost a similar total
amount of between £2.7 and £3.2 billion.14
It is evident from the above descriptions that the USSR Ministry of
Agriculture’s anti-crop and anti-livestock BW programme and its subse-
quent unravelling was a matter of great importance to Western govern-
ments. The BW technologies and strains of pathogens developed by the
Soviet Union made tempting targets for nation states or terrorist groups
wishing to acquire an anti-crop or anti-livestock capability. The acquisition
of production technologies and highly pathogenic agents from former
Ekologiya facilities might have offered one of the least complicated and
risk-free routes with which to attack Western targets. Evidence is pre-
sented that Western nations, especially the US and UK, acted effectively to
stem the flow of these pathogens and technologies to states wishing to
enhance their own biological weapons capabilities. Their intervention pro-
vided a financial lifeline to former Soviet agricultural BW facilities and
personnel in the wake of a suspension of orders from the military and mas-
sive reductions in funding for research and operating budgets. It is also
apparent that, during a period of improved international relations with the
West, Russian and post-Soviet institutions, formerly engaged in the
Ekologiya programme, were active collaborators with an array of Western
agencies seeking to sponsor projects intended to benefit both agriculture
and wider civil society.
Until the publication of this present study, our knowledge and under-
standing of the Ekologiya programme has rather resembled the nature of
that concerning the case of dark matter. For until now, this globally signifi-
cant project has remained impervious to any penetrative investigation. All
the leading academic authorities are agreed upon the fact of its existence
and its huge scale but, thus far, there has been no adequate description
and analysis of its aims and objectives or its constituent parts in any detail
at all. This situation is alluded to by Leitenberg and Zilinskas, who, in
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

their magisterial account of the Soviet BW programme, state that “due to

the lack of adequate information, we decided not to address … the Soviet
programme headed by MOA (USSR Ministry of Agriculture) to produce
biological weapons against animals and plants”.15
The present study seeks to address this critical gap in the scientific and
military history of the Soviet Union and to fully assess its significance with
regard to the global development of biological weapons.
One of the most severe obstacles to gaining an understanding of the
secret programme is the fact that following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the former agricultural BW facilities are now subordinate to a mul-
tiplicity of agencies in many different newly independent countries. In
addition, several military agricultural facilities have now been amalgam-
ated with civil R&D institutes which further prevent any reliable analysis
of the original military-focused GUNIiEPU network. Another fundamen-
tal block to gaining an understanding of the Ekologiya programme is the
continuing secrecy surrounding historical Soviet BW activities. For ana-
lysts seeking information on national BW programmes, both here in the
UK and in the US, numerous documents have been made available in the
respective national archives, accounts written by the lead scientists them-
selves, and a voluminous secondary literature has been published.
Meanwhile, no corresponding access for Western researchers has been
provided to primary materials relating to the USSR’s military biological
programmes. Moreover, there has been a continuing attempt at disinfor-
mation, with the repeated appearance of publications arguing the case that
the Soviet Union’s BW programmes were of a defensive nature.
The absence of any substantive written account of the programme
combined with the lack of access to secret archives means that in order to
generate a historical narrative, this study relies upon a forensic reconstruc-
tion. Rather like the pieces of a jigsaw scattered across a board the size of
the USSR, the author has gathered together as many critical pieces of
historical evidence as could be mustered. As is inevitable, in the complete
absence of official accounts regarding Ekologiya, there is still much that
remains subject to conjecture and educated guesswork. To address this
gap in knowledge, multiple interviews were undertaken with senior scien-
tists over a period of more than a decade, at facilities located at sites sepa-
rated across huge distances. As a result, a recognisable shape and design of
the programme has been compiled from the dispersed fragments and
many of the key personalities and secret locations have emerged from the
shadows.
6 A. RIMMINGTON

The author draws heavily upon some 64 interviews conducted during

the period 1995 through to 2004 with leading scientists formerly employed
within the USSR Ministry of Agriculture’s BW network. The bulk of these
interviews were conducted in the newly independent states which had pre-
viously accommodated components of the Ekologiya programme, includ-
ing Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Also, four
interviews were conducted in the United Kingdom. In addition, visits to
Ekologiya R&D and production facilities in the Russian Federation were
undertaken, including the author’s participation in an international sym-
posium on the control of zoonotic diseases. This latter event took place at
the Pokrov biologics factory in December 1995. Seminars conducted in
Frankfurt, Germany, in March 1993; in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in October
1996; and in Tbilisi, Georgia, in October 2000 also afforded opportuni-
ties to converse with lead figures who had been previously engaged in
research for the agricultural BW programme.
Some of the interviews took place over a considerable span of time,
with the author returning to an institute after a period of a year or two and
asking a series of follow-up questions. In some cases, a period of a few days
was spent at a specific institute, which meant that questions concerning
Ekologiya could be pursued both during formal sessions and then subse-
quently in a more convivial atmosphere, over lunch or dinner breaks, or
during sightseeing excursions. In other cases, the interviews may only
have taken 20 minutes or so and were conducted during the course of a
working visit. Most of these interviews were conducted in the decade or
so immediately following upon the collapse of the Soviet Union when
there was a strong sense of newly found freedoms in the air and the reach
of state security apparatuses had, at least temporarily, been greatly dimin-
ished. Despite this, many former weapons scientists continued to fear the
consequences if they were to reveal anything of substance about their pre-
vious activities. A few of the individuals interviewed did, however, feel able
to freely discuss events which had been initiated by a state which had no
current existence and to which they no longer had any strong bonds of
loyalty. Moreover, they were in most cases facing a massive diminution of
their status in the post-Soviet landscape with a concomitant collapse in the
living standards of themselves and their families. There was a sense among
these former Ekologiya scientists that the Soviet system to which they had
devoted their whole lives had betrayed them. The majority of these infor-
mants, unless deceased, have been anonymised in the text to protect both
themselves and their wider families from any state-directed repercussions.
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

With regard to sources other than the interviews, the author has also
drawn on the memoirs of leading individuals concerned with the manage-
ment of the Soviet BW programme, such as Igor’ Valerianovich
Domaradskii, who included some information in his account on the agri-
cultural programme. He has also consulted the work of Lev Aleksandrovich
Fedorov, who was one of a handful of researchers to have been granted
some limited access to historical archives relating to the Soviet BW pro-
gramme. In addition, some useful historical information has been gleaned
from the websites of the various institutes linked to the Ekologiya network.
Two unpublished memoirs focused on Ekologiya were also consulted. As
detailed in the acknowledgements, the most detailed of these was pre-
pared by Colonel Tsyren Tsybekzhapovich Khanduev, now deceased, who
spearheaded Ekologiya’s focus on viral pathogens.
This book is in the main organised on a chronological basis. Chapter 1
traces early Soviet programmes focused on agricultural BW which were
pursued by the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture, the forerunner of
the USSR Ministry of Agriculture. The major activities and accomplish-
ments are described in the period through to, during and shortly after the
end of the Second World War. The acquisition of both German and
Japanese expertise in anti-livestock BW and anti-crop BW is pointed to as
pivotal in the development of Soviet post-war programmes in this area. It
is argued that the creation of anti-crop and anti-livestock biological weap-
ons by the US during the immediate post-war period may have acted as
one of the key triggers for the launch of Ekologiya.
The first phase of the Ekologiya BW programme focused on the use of
classical microbiology methods for the selection of unmodified, highly
virulent pathogens for potential wartime use against an enemy’s crops and
livestock. Chapter 2 describes the launch of Ekologiya under the auspices
of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and its control by the Soviet military.
Initially, there was an emphasis on virology and Mendelian genetics, two
key areas where the USSR lagged behind the West. The BW facilities and
proving grounds within this closed network were kept hidden from suc-
cessive teams of veterinarians and plant pathologists visiting from the US
and other Western countries. The secret programme appears to have been
primarily directed against agriculture in both the US and its allies, and
China. In the second phase of the Ekologiya programme, initiated in the
early 1970s, there was a new focus on the employment of molecular biol-
ogy at its research facilities. Chapter 3 describes the creation of a new
Interdepartmental Scientific-Technical Council for Molecular Biology and
8 A. RIMMINGTON

Genetics (MNTS) which had a sharp focus on the development of geneti-

cally modified agents, with wholly new and unexpected properties. During
this second phase the network was expanded with new facilities appearing
at a number of locations including Sakhalin Island and Estonia. Despite
the new emphasis on molecular biology, it must be stressed that there is
absolutely no evidence that the network succeeded in genetically enhanc-
ing any potential BW agents in any way.
A key feature of both the USSR’s mainstream and agricultural BW pro-
grammes was the maintenance of reserve mobilisation capacity in civil pro-
duction plants. In its most extreme form, such capacity comprised fully
outfitted, tested and ready to operate BW production plants, with weapon-­
filling lines. They were intended for use in the event of an outbreak of
hostilities. Chapter 4 focuses on the well-documented mobilisation capac-
ity maintained by the USSR Ministry of Agriculture at its Pokrov biologics
plant. One UK weapons inspector is reported to have departed Pokrov
with the feeling that this was “the most sinister facility” he had visited
in Russia.
Chapter 5 describes the scientific research undertaken within the
Ekologiya network. A key feature of the Soviet mainstream BW programme
was the occurrence of repeated lapses in safety which resulted in a number
of serious incidents. The most notorious of these was the well-documented
Sverdlovsk anthrax disaster which occurred on 2 April 1979. An anthrax
aerosol was released from a local BW institute belonging to the USSR
Ministry of Defence which resulted in the deaths of at least sixty-eight
people in Sverdlovsk and to cases of animal anthrax in nearby villages to
the south-east of the city. The Ekologiya programme was no exception and
it too was responsible for a major outbreak of rinderpest in an area of
Kazakhstan situated close to one of its BW proving grounds. The collapse
of the USSR and the subsequent unravelling of the Ekologiya network
posed enormous problems for US and UK agencies seeking to curtail the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Chapter 6 contends that
owing to the intensive efforts of agencies in both the US and UK, there is
no evidence that any BW technologies and/or pathogens were transferred
from the former Soviet network to countries of proliferation concern.
The concluding chapter attempts to summarise the key findings of this
present study, focusing on the characteristics of the Ekologiya network and
the Soviet rationale for the pursuit of an offensive agricultural BW capability,
which was later to be continued in direct defiance of the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). It also details the main achievements
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

of the programme and its legacy. The work concludes with three appendi-
ces: Soviet/Russian Abbreviations and Acronyms; Composition of the
Scientific and Technical Council (NTS) and Interbranch Scientific and
Technical Council for Molecular Biology and Genetics (MNTS); and Lead
Scientists in the Ekologiya Programme.
Some might look upon this present work with extreme scepticism and
view it as just another attempt to promote a condemnatory narrative of
Soviet history. However, prior to rushing to such a hasty conclusion, it
should be noted that this account does not seek to castigate those who
were employed within the Ekologiya programme, and full acknowledge-
ment is made that it was, at least in part, a response to offensive agricul-
tural capabilities which had been previously developed in the West. It is
the author’s contention that only with a true understanding of the Soviet
scientific legacy, including its inordinately wasteful pursuit of a grandiose
military agricultural BW programme, can Russia and the post-Soviet states
seek to successfully pursue new, civil-oriented commercial projects and
avoid the mistakes of the past. It is also clear and apparent that the vast
bulk of the men and women who served in the secret network had no real
knowledge of its aims and objectives and simply believed they were patri-
otically serving their Soviet motherland and defending their compatriots
from oblivion. These individuals cannot be simply airbrushed from history
and their fascinating story deserves to be told.

Notes
1. The secret decree No. 909-426 was issued on 7 August 1958. The text of
the decree has never been released but it is referred to in the official scien-
tific archive of the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences. Lev
Aleksandrovich Fedorov, a leading Russian expert on the Soviet BW pro-
gramme, cites the decree and it is also referenced in the official histories of
several institutes which formerly formed part of the Soviet agricultural BW
programme. See Nauchnyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi akademii sel’skokhozyaist­
vennykh nauk, http://isaran.ru/?=ru/fund&guid=C16E22C1-­CB84-­
4BE5-­AEB0-­FBBB8DBF3A9A&ida=42, Accessed on the 17 November
2020; Fedorov, L., Khronika pamyatnykh dat “khimicheskoi” zhizni TsK
KPSS, Posev, No. 1, 1999; Zakharov, V.M., Perevozchikova, N.A., Na kur-
tom perelome, Veterinariya segodnya, No. 2(5), May 2013, p. 6, http://
rsn-­msk.ru/files/veterinary-­5-­2013.pdf, Accessed on the 17 November
2020; and Otchet o rabote, prodelannoi v FGBU “federal’nyi tsentr
10 A. RIMMINGTON

okhrany zdorov’ya zhivotnykh (FGBU “VNIIZZh”) v oblasti veterinar-

nogo nadzora za 1 kvartal 2013 goda, https://arriah.ru/main/about/
report/, Accessed on the 17 November 2020.
2. Chalk, P., The US agricultural sector: a new target for terrorism?, Janes
Intelligence Review, 9 February 2001.
3. Recent advances in nucleic acid sequencing may aid in the identification of
potential perpetrators. Schaad, N.W., Shaw, J.J., Vidaver, A., Leach, J.,
Erlick, B.J., Crop Biosecurity, APSnet Plant Pathology On-Line, 15–31
October 1999, http://www.scisoc.org/feature/BioSecurity/Top.html.
4. Hugh-Jones, M.E., Agricultural Bioterrorism, p. 222 in High-Impact
Terrorism: Proceedings of a Russian-American Workshop, National Research
Council, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2002,
https://doi.org/10.17226/10301, Accessed on the 3 February 2021.
5. Genetic Vulnerability of Major Crops, National Academy of Sciences,
Washington, D.C., 1972, p. 1.
6. Strauss, H. King, J., The hazards of defensive biological warfare pro-
grammes, in Wright, S. (Ed.), Preventing a Biological Arms Race, The
MIT Press, London, 1990, pp. 120–132. Strauss, H., King, J., The fallacy
of defensive biological weapon programmes, in Geissler, E. (Ed.), Biological
and Toxin Weapons Today, Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 66–73.
7. Hugh-Jones, M.E., Agricultural Bioterrorism, p. 223.
8. Deen, W.A., Trends in American Agriculture: Their Implications for
Biological Warfare Against Crop and Animal Resources, p. 165 in Frazier,
T.W., Richardson, D.C., Food and Agricultural Security: Guarding Against
Natural Threats and Terrorist Attacks Affecting Health, National Food
Supplies, and Agricultural Economics, Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences, Vol. 894, 1999.
9. Some southern states lost more than 50 per cent of their corn crop. In all,
more than 1.02 billion bushels of corn were lost in 1970. See Doyle, J.,
Altered Harvest: Agriculture, Genetics and the Fate of the World’s Food
Supply, Viking Penguin, New York, 1985.
10. Casagrande, R., Biological terrorism targeted at agriculture: the threat to
US national security, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall–Winter, 2000,
pp. 92–105.
11. Proliferation: Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary of Defence, US
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., USA, January 2001,
pp. 64–65.
12. Rogers, P., Whitby, S., Dando, M., Biological Warfare Against Crops,
Scientific American, June 1999, p. 62.
13. Hugh-Jones, M.E., Agricultural Bioterrorism, p. 225.
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

14. Thompson, D., Muriel, P., Russell, D., Osborne, P., Bromley, A., Rowland,
M., Creigh-Tyte, S., Brown, C., Economic costs of the foot and mouth
disease outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001, Revue Scientifique et
Technique Off. Int. Epiz., Vol. 21, No. 3, 2002, p. 675, https://doc.oie.
int/dyn/portal/index.seam?page=alo&aloId=30156, Accessed on the 11
March 2020.
15. Leitenberg, M., Zilinskas, R.A., with Kuhn, J.H., The Soviet Biological
Weapons Programme: A History, Harvard University Press, London,
2012, p. 9.
 CHAPTER 2

Origins: The International Race to Develop

Anti-crop and Anti-livestock Biological
Weapons

There is evidence that in the period leading up to the Second World War,
the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture (Narodnyi kommissariat zemle-
deliya—Narkomzem)—the forerunner of the Ministry of Agriculture—
was closely linked to the Soviet offensive biological weapons programme
(see Fig. 2.1). The lead agricultural BW facility at this time was the State
Experimental Veterinary Institute (GIEV). It had its origins in 1898 in
Imperial Russia with the creation in St. Petersburg of the Veterinary-­
Bacteriological Laboratory under the Veterinary Administration of the
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. On 10 October 1917, Russia’s
Provisional Government issued a decree on the formation, based on the
laboratory, of the Experimental Veterinary Institute in Petrograd. In 1918
the institute was evacuated to an estate in Kuz’minki in the Moscow sub-
urbs.1 Prior to the October Revolution, the site had belonged to the
Golitsyn family. In 1915 the main palace on the estate, built by the Swiss-­
born architect, Domenico Gilardi, had been devastated by a fire. On 14
March 1921 the new communist authorities renamed the facility as GIEV
and placed it under the control of Narkomzem’s Central Veterinary
Administration.2 In his description of the Soviet biological warfare pro-
gramme, Fedorov suggests that some of the Soviet Union’s very first
experiments focused on Bacillus anthracis (the causal agent of anthrax)
were conducted in Kuz’minki in 1918.3

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 13

Switzerland AG 2021
A. Rimmington, The Soviet Union’s Agricultural Biowarfare
Programme, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73843-3_2
14 A. RIMMINGTON

Fig. 2.1 View of Narkomzem Building in Moscow, 15:36:01, 3 September

2017, Moscow, Russian Federation. Photographer: Ludvig14 (Wikimedia
Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ File: Moscow_
Narkomzem_1234.jpg, Accessed on the 26 February 2020)

While there is scant evidence available regarding GIEV’s involvement in

work on anthrax, there is a substantive body of evidence available docu-
menting the institute’s engagement in studies of the foot-and-mouth dis-
ease (FMD) virus. The first serious scientific research on FMD by
Narkomzem had been initiated in 1926 at GIEV in Kuz’minki. Initially
work was conducted within a group belonging to the Department of
Tuberculosis. But subsequently a specialised laboratory was created which,
together with other departments, began work on FMD under the leader-
ship of Professor Sergei Nikolaevich Vyshelesskii.4 Researchers at the lab
are reported to have published a number of scientific papers on FMD. In
the summer of 1926, Vyshelesskii undertook research visits on behalf of
Narkomzem’s Veterinary Administration to both Germany and Denmark.
These may have been focused on interactions with FMD laboratories. By
1927 he had been appointed director of GIEV. Sometime around 1934,
 2 ORIGINS: THE INTERNATIONAL RACE TO DEVELOP ANTI-CROP… 15

Vyshelesskii is reported to have been arrested by the OGPU secret police

and imprisoned within a special prison laboratory, or sharashka, located in
Suzdal’, where a number of leading Soviet microbiologists were arrested
and held captive and forced to work on the development of offensive and
defensive biological weapons.5 One group of experts located here are
reported to have focused on anti-livestock BW agents.6
In June 1930, construction began of the Soviet Union’s first microbiol-
ogy facility focused solely on FMD, the Scientific-Research Institute for
the Study of FMD. The ceremonial opening of the new facility took place
on 20 October 1932. Subordinate to the People’s Commissariat of Agri-
culture (Narkomzem) , the establishment, which was modelled on Ger-
many’s Insel Riems State Research Institute (Staatliche Forschungsanstalt
Insel Riems—see pp. 18–20), was located on Gorodomlya Island, Lake
Seliger (Kalinin oblast’). Professor Aleksandr Leont’evich Skomorokhov,
who was appointed the facility’s first director in 1932, and other research-
ers at the new FMD Institute, had been transferred from the All-Union
Scientific-Research Experimental Veterinary Institute (VIEV, the former
GIEV).7 L.S. Ratner, a major in the Soviet military veterinary service, is
reported to have served as Skomorokhov’s deputy director.8 In November
1931, Ratner wrote a short report on the new institute for the journal,
Front nauki i tekhniki. He noted that it was fitted out with the very best
Soviet and imported equipment and that its huge main building (occupy-
ing 25,000 square metres) incorporated both production facilities and
research laboratories, a guinea pig nursery, biological wastewater treat-
ment facilities, a museum, a library, a micro-photo laboratory, a cinema
and a 100-seat lecture room.9 There was also living accommodation for
employees together with a canteen, a bath house, a shop and a school.10
Work on FMD began immediately upon the opening of the institute. A
local commentator noted that “the Soviet government has appropriated
2,200,000 roubles for the construction of the institute. … The institute
received several tens of telegrams from eminent scientists of the
West—Professor Albert Calmette, Professor Otto Waldmann, Professor
Gins, Professor Aleksandre Besredka and others. Some of them wrote that
they would have been glad to be present at the opening of the foot-and-­
mouth disease institute, but that the material conditions gave them no
such opportunity.”11 However, long-term research programmes on FMD
were terminated in 1934 when Institute No. V/2-1094, a branch of the
Red Army’s BW facility, the Biotechnical Institute (Vlasikha, Moscow
16 A. RIMMINGTON

oblast’), appropriated the buildings, laboratories and equipment of the

FMD institute on Gorodomlya Island.12
Narkomzem acted quickly to reorganise a new dedicated FMD facility.
On 2 June 1938, Narkomzem’s Main Veterinary Administration issued
decree No. 136 regarding the creation under VIEV of a new research
laboratory for the study of FMD on the remote Lisii Island. The experi-
mental base for the study of foot-and-mouth disease became operational
in December 1938.13 The military facilities on nearby Gorodomlya Island
are reported to have been used as a model for the construction of the labo-
ratory. The facility was apparently created shortly after the authorities
issued an official warning encouraging Soviet veterinary organisations to
develop countermeasures against anti-livestock agents. Lisii Island is
located on Vyshnevolotskoe reservoir, close to the town of Vyshny
Volochek, located 119 kilometres north-west of Kalinin on the strategic
Moscow to Leningrad railway. The island is reported to have been covered
with pine forest and occupy an area encompassing some 236 hectares. US
intelligence noted that its location near Vyshny Volochek did not provide
the degree of seclusion ideal for offensive BW activities.14
Major Ratner was appointed the new director of the Lisii Island FMD
laboratory and noted in 1938 that “The work of the laboratory on the
indicated themes has begun, and the experiments on small laboratory ani-
mals have been arranged. … By its geographical location and negligible
value in economic respect, the uninhabited Lisii Island is a most favour-
able place for carrying out experiments on Foot and Mouth Disease. … A
land area measuring 9.85 hectares has been set aside for the construction
of the experimental base for the study of foot and mouth disease. It is
proposed to locate on this section three cattle yards consisting of 25 head
of cattle each, an ice plant, a nursery for guinea pigs, living quarters, bath
and other private facilities. … It is projected to construct a sanitary sewer
and a laboratory in each cattle yard. Thus, it will be possible to conduct
experiments simultaneously with three types of the virus of foot-and-­
mouth disease. … The total cost of the construction will be approximately
500,000 roubles. … The methodical commission of VIEV has approved,
for study in the laboratory in 1938, two principal themes on the problem
of specific prophylaxis of foot and mouth disease: a) search for the meth-
ods of active immunization against foot and mouth disease; b) further
perfection of the methods of obtaining and using the serum of
convalescents.”15
 2 ORIGINS: THE INTERNATIONAL RACE TO DEVELOP ANTI-CROP… 17

Despite the existence of the Red Army BW facility on Gorodomlya

Island, a mere 65 miles from Vyshny Volochek, US analysts could find no
evidence of any cooperative research between the Red Army personnel
and those based on Lisii Island during the three-year period of their coex-
istence. They concluded that the programmes at the two sites were being
deliberately compartmentalised by the Soviet authorities. This strict com-
partmentalisation was to become a strong feature of future Soviet agricul-
tural biowarfare programmes. In 1956, US intelligence concluded that
the VIEV branch on Lisii Island “had almost certainly been involved in
both offensive and defensive anti-livestock BW research”.16 Its operations
had apparently included the acquisition of foreign strains of the foot-and-
mouth disease virus and may have included studies on the experimental
transmission of the infection in domestic animals. Such operations could
potentially signal an early attempt to screen candidate agents, but they
were also considered essential stages in the development of effective vac-
cines used in defensive BW. US intelligence therefore concluded that
“such effort can actually be construed as either offensive or defensive,
depending upon the nature of ancillary information”.17
There is evidence that the Soviet military utilised the country’s exper-
tise regarding the FMD virus to undertake an evaluation of its potential as
a biological weapon. The early Soviet focus on this agent may well have
been as a result of intelligence regarding substantive German capabilities
with regard to this virus, especially at the Insel Riems State Research
Institute (see pp. 18–20). Open-air tests were initially conducted in 1935
at the army’s chemical weapons proving ground at Shikhany, located some
15 kilometres from Vol’sk on the Volga River. Here, military scientists
sought to develop reliable methods of disseminating the FMD virus in
combat situations.18 Further tests using the FMD virus in the autumn of
that year were conducted on a ten-square kilometre range on
Gorodomlya Island (see p. 16).19 In the summer of 1937 the Red Army’s
BW facility, the Biotechnical Institute, undertook tests involving the FMD
virus at their remote proving ground on Vozrozhdenie Island.20 Two air-
planes were made available for use in the experiments.21 The Soviet mili-
tary programme of research on the FMD virus was suspended after the
German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. Presumably it was
later reactivated and eventually assimilated within the USSR Ministry of
Agriculture’s Ekologiya programme (see Chap. 2).
The launch by the Germans in October 1941 of Operation Typhoon
focused on the capture of Moscow led to the evacuation of VIEV’s main
18 A. RIMMINGTON

facility in Kuz’minki and its subordinate FMD laboratory on Lisii Island.

Both facilities were relocated to Omsk in Siberia where they were tempo-
rarily based at a local veterinary research institute. During the Second
World War, the Luftwaffe is reported to have conducted aerial reconnais-
sance of Lisii Island. The aerial photography of the FMD laboratory
revealed the facility to be “neither extensive nor impressive”.22 VIEV
returned to Moscow from Siberia in 1943.23 A year later, the Lisii Island
base was reactivated and experimentation involving foot-and-mouth dis-
ease was resumed under the leadership of Major Ratner.24
In the devastated post-war landscape both the Western allies and the
Soviet Union sought to acquire German FMD experts who had been
employed at the Insel Riems State Research Institute. This facility, one of
the world’s oldest virus research institutes, had been founded by Friedrich
Loeffler in 1910 on Riems Island in the Baltic, north of Greifswald, for the
study and treatment of FMD. Loeffler was one of the founders of the sci-
ence of virology and, together with Paul Frosch, had, in 1898, described
the causative agent of FMD as a filterable, but corpuscular, replication-­
competent agent.25 During the war the institute had employed 99–140
personnel (including around 20 scientists) on a site occupying some 1000
square metres. The facility was headed by Professor Otto Waldmann and
comprised laboratories, research stables, post-mortem rooms, workshops
and living quarters. The intensive effort by both sides to capture the insti-
tute’s FMD scientists was a portent of the Cold War biological arms race
which was to come.
Geissler reports that in the early years of the Second World War the
Insel Riems State Research Institute was not involved in any biological
warfare activity.26 However, there is evidence that one of Germany’s main
concerns regarding biological warfare focused on potential enemy use of
FMD virus against its cattle. In 1940 a virulent strain of FMD to which
German cattle were vulnerable, had been detected in the Balkans and
Southern Russia. This prompted the Gas Protection Office of the Army
Ordnance Office (Wa Prüf 9) to provide sufficient vaccine for prophylactic
use. According to Geissler, retaliatory use of this strain was also contem-
plated by the Germans. A 1943 study by Eduard Richters discussed pos-
sible means of dissemination of FMD virus by aircraft over pasture land.
Geissler argues that the seriousness with which FMD was regarded by the
German authorities is evidenced by the fact that it was one of the very few
biological agents which was studied for offensive purposes in open-air
trials.
 2 ORIGINS: THE INTERNATIONAL RACE TO DEVELOP ANTI-CROP… 19

The Insel Riems State Research Institute was also linked to the
Blitzableiter Committee. This committee was created in 1943 on order of
the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) with the aim
of coordinating German biological warfare activities. The committee was
composed of experts drawn from relevant Army departments. The head of
the committee’s Veterinary Section was Riem’s researcher Dr Hanns-­
Christoph Nagel who presumably kept his director, Professor Waldmann,
informed of his activities. At the initial meeting of the Blitzableiter
Committee, Nagel envisioned the use of FMD against the United
Kingdom arguing that “this virus would be especially devastating since
British cattle were poorly immunized. … Mass use may perhaps infect
6–12 per cent of the cattle.”27 Meanwhile, a declassified CIA report sug-
gests that the US was also considered as a target. Nagel and his colleagues
considered that an “enemy country could be attacked with FMD virus;
the virus could be dried, flown over enemy country, and dropped”.28 This
scheme was never practically applied because it required German air supe-
riority. Geissler reports that the Riems facility supplied the FMD virus that
during 1942 and/or 1943 was used in aerial spraying experiments that
were conducted by Nagel and his associate, Dr Kurt Stantien (Army
Ordnance Office), over an island in Lake Peipus. The latter is the fifth
largest lake in Europe and is situated on the border between Russia and
Estonia. There is conflicting testimony as to whether cattle or reindeer
were the subject of the German experiments.29 Geissler also points to the
use of a Testing Ground East (Versuchsfeld Ost) or Bacteria Field East
(B-Feld Ost) at an unknown location, where it was also planned to conduct
experiments with FMD virus.30 The CIA report that in Spring 1944 an SS
officer travelled to Riems and requested large supplies of dried FMD virus
which were to be disseminated in the Soviet Union in the wake of retreat-
ing German forces. However, the institute refused this request which was
then taken to higher authorities in Berlin. The project was finally aban-
doned after the Riems institute successfully argued that the use of the
agent would have the “boomerang” effect of spreading the disease from
Soviet territory to Germany.31
On 2 May 1945, Soviet forces under the command of Marshal
Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky occupied Riems Island and
immediately began to pilfer the institute. According to a top-secret CIA
intelligence report, within a few days the Soviet authorities had restored
order at the site which was placed under the personal protection of Stalin.
Between July and October 1945, two Soviet commissions, one military
20 A. RIMMINGTON

and one civilian, began to totally dismantle the institute as part of war
reparations. The military commission seized 10,000 guinea pigs, 3 ultra-
centrifuges, a range of chemical-physical apparatus, low-temperature
refrigerators, special apparatus for the production of vaccines and sera,
thermostats and water baths. All of this dismantled equipment was shipped
to Riga and then transferred to the Soviet Military Veterinary Academy.
Major Ratner (see p. 16), a leading Soviet FMD specialist, is reported to
have played a major role in the military’s interaction with the German
facility. Other Soviet military personnel visiting the facility included
Professor Svizov, who was at the site in 1948. The Soviet civilian commis-
sion is then reported to have taken possession of anything not seized by
the military, primarily equipment used for the production of vaccines and
sera, and to have shipped this back to Riga.32
The Soviets are subsequently reported to have relocated the FMD facil-
ity to a site on the mainland opposite Riems Island. It was rebuilt and
renamed as the Land Office II for Animal Epidemic Diseases and supplied
with coal and technical equipment from the USSR. By June 1948, the
institute is estimated to have regained around half of its former capacity
and was engaged in both R&D and production of vaccines. A number of
scientists were restored to their employment at the facility including
Professor Heinz Röhrer, the former head of its pathology department,
and Dr Hubert Möhlmann, a former specialist in the production of FMD
vaccines.33
During the immediate post-war period, Soviet specialists are reported
to have become increasingly interested in the BW potential of the Riems
facility. They are reported to have determined that the institute could pro-
duce sufficient dried FMD virus harvested from cattle tongue epithelial
tissue to attack an enemy country using aerial dispersal. A Soviet Colonel,
Lyssov, is reported to have visited the site and queried as to why the
Germans had not employed the FMD virus as a weapon in retaliation for
the indiscriminate bombing of German cities by US planes. Sometime
around October 1945, the Soviets are also reported to have invited
Professor Waldmann, who had fled to Argentina, and other specialists to
work on FMD in the USSR.34 It is not known how many of the Riem
scientists took up this offer.
One key BW scientist who did fall into the hands of the Soviet Union
was the virologist Dr Erich Traub, a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine, who
since 1942 had been second in command at Riems. He was an expert in
foot-and-mouth disease, rinderpest and Newcastle disease. During the
 2 ORIGINS: THE INTERNATIONAL RACE TO DEVELOP ANTI-CROP… 21

period 1932 through to 1938 he had served as a member of staff at the

Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in Princeton, New Jersey.
Involved in Nazi activities in the US, he was described by his former col-
leagues there, as being surly and having a violent temper. Prior to the war,
he was provided with an opportunity to remain in the US, but choose to
return to Germany where he served in the Wehrmacht Veterinary Corps.
He was also a member of several Nazi organisations including the National
Socialist Motor Corps (Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps or NSKK).
Eventually Traub’s talents as a virologist were recognised and he was
pulled-back from the front and assigned to biological weapons work.
Traub is reported to have been linked to the offensive BW trials of FMD
conducted by the Riems institute in the Soviet Union and to have trav-
elled to Turkey to find a lethal strain of rinderpest virus for use against the
allies.35 Apparently, he was considered the most talented scientist working
on anti-animal biological weapons. At the end of the war he and his family
fell into Soviet hands and he was quickly put back to work, allegedly on
bioweapons related research.36
Traub rapidly became a high priority target for the British intelligence
services. They wished both to deprive the Soviet Union of his BW knowl-
edge and know-how and simultaneously to learn what was going on at the
new Riems facility. In July 1948, the UK’s Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Branch (STIB) is reported to have evacuated Traub from the
Soviet zone. He is reported to have brought with him some of the viruses
and sera he had been working on for the Soviets.37 The acquisition of
Traub was part of an aggressive operation codenamed Matchbox under
which British intelligence sought to bring to the British Zone (BOZ),
German scientists, engineers and technicians who might otherwise add
significantly to Soviet military capability.38 Traub was probably influenced
in his decision to flee westwards by Soviet actions such as Operation
Osoaviakhim, under which thousands of German scientific workers and
their families had been rounded-up and forcibly deported to the USSR in
the dead of night.39 Just a year later Traub was transferred to the United
States under the auspices of Operation Paperclip—another secret pro-
gramme aimed at targeting German scientists for US government employ-
ment—where he was then for a number of years associated with the Naval
Medical Research Institute (Bethesda, Maryland).
The discovery of the secret German wartime offensive BW programme
focused on FMD undoubtedly alerted the Soviet authorities as to the mili-
tary potential of this disease and the devastating impact it could have on
22 A. RIMMINGTON

the country’s livestock sector if unleashed by an enemy. During the early

to mid-1950s a great deal of momentum built-up in the Soviet Union
with regard to the creation of the country’s own dedicated institute for
the study of FMD. In 1953, at a meeting of the 39th Plenary Session of
the Veterinary Section of the V.I. Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural
Sciences (VASKhNIL) , Skomorokhov, who had headed up the Soviet
Union’s first foot-and-mouth disease institute on Gorodomlya Island,
urged the creation of a specialised institute focusing on FMD. In 1957, a
meeting of the Scientific Council of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture
noted that FMD research had become dispersed among a number of vet-
erinary research facilities based at sites in the RSFSR, Kazakh SSR, Kyrgyz
SSR, Tajik SSR and Ukrainian SSR.40 It was against this background that,
in 1958, the Soviet authorities created the All-Union Scientific-Research
Foot-and-Mouth Disease Institute (VNIYaI) which, within the secret
Ekologiya network, was able to focus on both civil and military aspects of
FMD virus R&D and production (see pp. 52–54). It is highly likely that
the new facility incorporated technologies which had been seized by the
Soviets from the Insel Riems State Research Institute.

The Initial Soviet Post-War Anti-crop Biological

Warfare Programme
Fedorov reports that the Soviet Union initiated work on anti-crop BW
and CW in the immediate period after the Second World War. The focus
is reported to have been on economically important targets in the United
States. This early work was undertaken at R&D facilities belonging to the
USSR Ministry of Agriculture which itself had been created in 1953, and
was led and coordinated by the Pushkin All-Union Scientific-Research
Institute of Plant Protection (VNIIZR) based in Pushkin, 24 km south of
Leningrad (see Fig. 2.2). The institute’s subordinate branch facility in
Central Asia is also alleged to have been engaged in such work.41 Certainly,
VNIIZR at this time, under the leadership of Ivan Mikhailovich Polyakov,
was a powerful research facility and embraced field stations, experimental
farms and toxicological laboratories at sites across the USSR.42 However,
Fedorov is unable to provide any additional information on the scope and
nature of this nascent anti-crop BW programme. There is some corrobora-
tion of Fedorov from Alibek (previously known as Kanatzhan Baizakovich
Alibekov), a high-level defector to the United States who was formerly
 2 ORIGINS: THE INTERNATIONAL RACE TO DEVELOP ANTI-CROP… 23

Fig. 2.2 View of All-Russian Institute of Plant Protection, 20:30:00, 22 March

2012. Photographer: Grichanov (Wikimedia Commons, https://upload.wikime-
dia.org/wikipedia/commons/ 6/6e/VIZRbuilding1.jpg, Accessed on the 28
May 2019)

employed within the Soviet biological weapons system, but someone who
might be expected to have fairly limited knowledge of agricultural BW
programmes. The latter reports that “although the Soviet Union had been
developing anti-personnel biological weapons since the late 1920s, it
began to develop anti-agricultural biological weapons only in the late
1940s or early 1950s”. Alibek postulates that the Soviet Union may only
have subsequently embarked upon its massive agricultural BW programme
as a direct response to US efforts at this time aimed at the development of
biological weapons against plants and animals.43
Western intelligence on Soviet capabilities at this time was extremely
limited. An authoritative CIA report, compiled some years later in April
1961, identified VNIIZR as the Soviet Union’s most important plant pro-
tection institute, “having primary responsibility for the investigation of
crop diseases, herbicides, and aerosols for agricultural employment”. It
was, the report emphasised, the USSR’s main facility for the study of cereal
rusts. The CIA also noted that research on environmental aspects of plant
infection and disease spread was significant with regard to possible selec-
tion and evaluation of anti-crop agents.44 However, the CIA could provide
no definitive evidence of any offensive anti-crop BW programmes having
been undertaken by VNIIZR in the preceding decade.
24 A. RIMMINGTON

The Trigger: The US Offensive Biological Warfare

Programme Targeting the Soviet Union
Every major offensive BW programme to date has developed a variety of
agents targeted against strategically and economically important food
crops and livestock. In the case of anti-crop biological weapons, the first
country to have initiated research on their development may have been
France which during the late 1930s was focussing its efforts on late blight
in potatoes. During the Second World War, Germany investigated a num-
ber of plant pathogens with a view to their utilisation as anti-crop agents
including late blight of potatoes and leaf-infecting yellow and stem rusts
of wheat, caused by Puccinia striiformis f.sp. tritici and Puccinia graminis
f.sp. tritici, respectively. Another Axis power which employed up to 100
workers in research on plant pathogens was Japan, which focused its
efforts on diseases which could destroy crops in the Soviet Union and
America. One of the most promising agents was considered to be wheat
smut, a disease caused by fungal species of the genus Tilletia. Wheat smuts
are endemic in many areas of the world and can in favourable conditions
result in massive reductions in crop yields. In addition, the Japanese built
a facility able to annually generate more than 90 kilogrammes of cereal
rust spores which, if employed, could have wreaked havoc on American
prairies.45
A key intelligence report issued in 1951 was to greatly influence US
policy with regard to biological weapons in the post-war period. On 10
January 1951, the Central Intelligence Agency released its National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE-18) on The Probability of Soviet Employment of
BW and CW (chemical warfare) in the Event of Attacks Upon the US. This
report, which reached the highest echelons of US government officials
stated that “it is highly probable that the Soviets are carrying an extensive
programme to develop BW agents and equipment, and they appear to
have given some attention to the possible use of BW agents for sabotage
activities. … At present, the Soviets are capable of producing a variety of
agents in sufficient quantities for sabotage or small-scale employment. By
1952 at the latest, the Soviets probably will be capable of mass production
of BW agents for large-scale employment.”46 The report noted that sabo-
tage attacks with BW agents might form “part of an overall plan to deter
the military effectiveness of the US. This includes attacks against crops and
livestock over a relatively long period of time with the objective of produc-
ing significant economic losses.”47
 2 ORIGINS: THE INTERNATIONAL RACE TO DEVELOP ANTI-CROP… 25

NIE-18 speculated further as to the nature of Soviet attacks on animals

and plants noting that “BW attack on animals would be directed primarily
at the food supply. Cattle could be attacked in shipping centres, stock-
yards, and other concentration areas. … Food crops would be a primary
target, but attack might also be directed against crops that are the source
of important industrial oils or textile fibres. … If cereal rusts are employed,
local winds would be utilized to spread the infection.”48 The report fur-
ther noted that “US livestock is notoriously vulnerable to foot-and-mouth
disease and rinderpest”.49
Much of the NIE-18 report appears to be speculative and theoretical
and based on presumptive Soviet capabilities, rather than hard intelligence.
However, Leitenberg and Zilinskas report that by this time the NIE con-
cept had become accepted as a briefing tool to the highest rung of US
government officials.50 It may therefore have been instrumental in further
accelerating US research on anti-crop and anti-livestock weapons. It was,
for example, precisely at this moment that the US Chemical Corps decided
it should pursue research on the weaponisation of rinderpest “both to bet-
ter determine how the Soviets might use it and to be ready to use it them-
selves”.51 By the end of 1951, the US, together with its Tripartite partners,
Canada and the UK, is reported to have accumulated a new stockpile of
rinderpest vaccines and to share “a growing interest in the virus’s offensive
capabilities”.52
Aside from that of the Soviet Union, the largest and most significant
BW programme against crops was conducted in the USA during the
period 1940–1969. Americans are reported to have had a range of agents
ready for mass production by 1945 including Athelia rolfsii, which is the
causal agent of “southern blight” in a number of commercially important
crops; Phytophthora infestans, which causes “late blight” in potatoes;
Magnaporthe grisea, a fungus, which causes blast disease in rice; and
Cochliobolus miyabeanus, the cause of brown spot disease in rice plants.53
In the post-war period, the main target for US anti-crop BW research
were the wheat fields of the western Soviet Union, especially Ukraine.
Many candidate anti-crop BW agents were screened, resulting in five stan-
dardised anti-crop agents.54 Research focused on Puccinia graminis f. sp.
tritici (Agent TX), the fungus which causes stem rust of wheat, and
between 1951 and 1969 the US stockpiled 40 tons of spores at Edgewood
Arsenal and Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Denver, Colorado—a quantity esti-
mated to be capable of infecting 106,400 square miles of wheat crop. The
wheat crops of the Warsaw Pact countries, including the Soviet Union,
26 A. RIMMINGTON

China and North Korea added up to approximately 124,000 square miles

at this time.55 P. graminis is ideal as an anti-crop agent since it remains
viable for two years under cool storage conditions and spreads rapidly after
being released. Another agent which was weaponised was Tilletia indica,
which causes Karnal bunt of wheat.56 The US selected M. grisea (Agent
LX) as its main anti-rice agent and between 1962 and 1969 spores were
produced under contract to Charles Pfizer and Company and shipped to
Fort Detrick for classification drying and storage.57 By 1966 a 0.9-ton
stockpile of spores had been accumulated sufficient to infect approxi-
mately 5000 square miles of rice crop.58
Since crops are grown over very wide areas the US doctrine for utilising
anti-crop weapons was to create several foci of infections distributed over
a wide area, not to carpet every area with agent.59 The US developed a
range of innovative weapons systems for the dissemination of its anti-crop
agents and between 1951 and 1969, 31 anti-crop dissemination trials
were conducted at 23 different locations including Camp Detrick in
Maryland and in the US Virgin Islands. Perhaps the most unusual of the
systems was a 500-pound “feather bomb” which utilised feathers to carry
fungal spores to initiate a cereal rust epidemic. Later, during the 1950s,
modified F-100, F-105 and F-4C strike aircraft were utilised to spray
pathogens over target areas.60
A number of reports applied theoretical vulnerability assessments to
scenarios involving attacks on the food crops of the Soviet Union. A previ-
ously classified US report in August 1958 “estimated that approximately
72 per cent of calorific intake per capita per day in the former Soviet Union
was made up of grain. It was estimated that 30 per cent reductions in body
weight could be achieved over a period of 12 months, with mortality and
death from starvation increasing significantly.”61 A report produced in
March 1956 estimated that the employment of such methods could “crip-
ple the USSR in eighteen months by … dissemination of the rust disease
in this grain belt”.62
Soviet specialists were quick to realise that with its arsenal of anti-crop
weapons the US was now in a position to launch a potentially catastrophic
attack on the USSR’s food supplies. In May 1963, Academician Vasilii
Niklolaevich Syurin, the lead figure in the newly emerging agricultural BW
network, detailed his assessment of the acute threat posed by the West to
Soviet agriculture. Together with V. Stativkin, head of the Plant Protection
Service, he issued a special explanatory note to the Soviet Union’s
1964–1965 Research Plan for Protecting Agricultural Crops from
 2 ORIGINS: THE INTERNATIONAL RACE TO DEVELOP ANTI-CROP… 27

Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Weapons. Syurin stated that “according

to the data we have, special research establishments in the USA, Canada,
England and other capitalist countries are engaged in intensive research
into developing biological and chemical weapons against agricultural
crops. To destroy the wheat and rye crops in the USSR they are preparing
stem rust, for the potato crop it will be potato blight, and for cotton, sun-
flower and soy, it will be the herbicides 2,4-D and 2,4,5-D.” Syurin fur-
ther argued that the system for protecting these agricultural crops must
embrace methods for confirming the use by the enemy of biological and
chemical agents. It must also “promptly establish the extent of the affected
areas, along with methods to localize and eliminate loci of contamination,
and also through selecting and cultivating agricultural crop varieties that
are resistant to disease”.63
The entire US anti-crop stockpile was eventually destroyed as part of
the country’s biological warfare demilitarisation programme which was
completed by February 1973. However, it is interesting to note that
Soviet concerns about US capabilities in this area did not totally disappear
and persisted well beyond this date into the late 1980s. Georgette
Naskidashvili, formerly employed as a senior scientist within the anti-crop
BW network and now deceased, reported that, despite a complete lack of
any hard evidence, there was a firm belief by Ekologiya analysts that the US
offensive anti-crop programme had continued beyond the date when it
was officially terminated. Lead scientists within the phytopathology net-
work erroneously asserted that BW agents had been utilised by the US
against Soviet wheat crops in the 1970s and 1980s.64 Similar unfounded
claims against the US with regard to offensive biological programmes
were made by senior personnel in the Soviet Biopreparat system. Such
assertions helped the Soviet Union to promulgate the myth that it was in
imminent danger of biological attack from the US and its allies, and served
to mask the offensive nature of the grandiose programmes which it pur-
sued. One should note that Western scholars have offered a far more con-
vincing explanation of shortfalls in the USSR’s wheat output which arose,
not as a result of any covert Western BW activity, but rather because of
failings in the central planning system, leading to the persistent ineffi-
ciency of Soviet agriculture. Specific failings of Soviet agriculture included
collective ownership and poorly defined property rights which provided
weak incentives to managers and workers, outdated agricultural produc-
tion and processing technology, inadequate rural infrastructure for storage
28 A. RIMMINGTON

and transport of commodities from farm to market and a lack of competi-

tion in the input and processing industries.65

Notes
1. Vserossiiskii nauchno-issledovatel’skii institut eksperimental’noi veterinarnii
im. Ya.P. Kovalenko (Moskva), Federal’noe gosudarstvennoe byudzhetnoe
nauchnoe uchrezhdenie Tsentral’naya nauchnaya sel’skokhozyaistvennaya
biblioteka, http://www.cnshb.ru/bul2.asp?s=af&p=katalog/af/ &a=ru_
csal_auth_249407612.htm, Accessed on the 10 July 2019.
2. Istoricheskaya spravka, Federal’nyi nauchnyi tsentr—vserossiiskii nauchno-­
issledovatel’skii institut eksperimental’noi veterinarii imeni K.I. Skryabina i
Ya.P. Kovalenko rossiiskoi akademii nauk, http://viev.ru/o-­viev/
istoricheskaya-­spravka/, Accessed on the 10 July 2019.
3. Fedorov, L.A., Soviet Biological Weapons: History. Ecology. Politics, Krasand,
Moscow, 2013, p. 37. The Western experts, Kuhn and Leitenberg, refer to
work initiated in 1918 at Kuz’minki on anti-livestock agents Kuhn, J.H.,
Leitenberg, M., The Soviet Biological Warfare Programme, in Lentzos,
F. (Ed.), Biological Threats in the 21st Century: The Politics, People, Science
and Historical Roots, Imperial College Press, London, 2016, pp. 81, 95.
4. Problemy infektsionnoi patologii sel’skokhozyaistvennykh zhivotnykh: Tezisy
dokladov konferentsii, posvyashchennoi 100-letiyu otkrytiya virusa yashchura,
27–31 October 1997, Vladimir, 1997, p. 55.
5. Rimmington, A., Stalin’s Secret Weapon: The Origins of Soviet Biological
Warfare, Hurst & Company, London, 2018, p. 40.
6. Fedorov, L.A., Soviet Biological Weapons, p. 49.
7. Problemy infektsionnoi patologii sel’skokhozyaistvennykh zhivotnykh, p. 55.
8. USSR: Biological Warfare and Related Research, Secret Information
Report, 30 November 1948, Approved for Release 25 May 2011, https://
www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-­r dp82-­00457r002
000320002-­6, Accessed on the 13 June 2019.
9. Ratner, L., Yashchurnyi institut, Front nauki i tekhniki, Nos. 10–11,
November 1931, p. 104.
10. Pis’mo iz proshlogo: k 90-letiyu so dnya osnovaniya pervogo v SSSR yash-
churnogo instituta, Veterinariya i zhizn’, Information Portal and
Newspaper, 13 May 2020, https://www.vetandlife.ru/vizh/sobytiya/
pismo-­iz-­proshlogo-­k-­90-­letiyu-­so-­dnya-­o, 14 December 2020.
11. A Review of Selected Soviet Articles on Foot and Mouth Disease 1929–1957, 1
January 1957, General CIA Records, https://www.cia.gov/library/readin-
groom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01426R009800010002-5.pdf, Accessed on
the 10 June 2019.
 2 ORIGINS: THE INTERNATIONAL RACE TO DEVELOP ANTI-CROP… 29

12. Rimmington, A., Invisible Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Soviet

Union’s BW Programme and its Implications for Contemporary Arms
Control, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, September
2000, p. 43.
13. ‘Istoriya institute’, FGBNU Vserossiiskii nauchno-issledovatel’skii institut
eksperimental’noi veterinarii imeni Ya.R. Kovalenko, http://viev.ru/o-­-
viev/istoriya-­instituta; accessed 1 June 2016. See also A Review of Selected
Soviet Articles on Foot and Mouth Disease 1929–1957, 1 January 1957.
14. The Soviet BW Programme, Scientific Intelligence Research Aid,
OSI-RA/61-3, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Scientific
Intelligence, 24 April 1961, Approved for Release in September
1999, p. 70.
15. A Review of Selected Soviet Articles on Foot and Mouth Disease 1929–1957.
16. Ibid., p. 69.
17. The Soviet BW Programme, p. 69.
18. Bojtzov, V., Geissler, E., Military biology in the USSR, 1920–45, p. 159 in
Geissler, E., van Courtland Moon, J.E. (Eds.), Biological & Toxin Weapons:
Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, SIPRI
Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies No. 18, Oxford University
Press, 1999.
19. Ibid., p. 160.
20. Rimmington, A., Stalin’s Secret Weapon, p. 97.
21. Hirsch, W., Soviet BW and CW Preparations and Capabilities, trans. Zaven
Nalbandian, Intelligence Branch, Plans, Training and Intelligence Division,
Office of the Chief, Chemical Corps, Washington, DC, 1951, p. 158.
22. The Soviet BW Programme, p. 70.
23. ‘Istoriya institute’, FGBNU Vserossiiskii nauchno-issledovatel’skii institut
eksperimental’noi veterinarii imeni Ya.R. Kovalenko, http://viev.ru/o-­-
viev/istoriya-­instituta; accessed 1 June 2016.
24. Ibid.
25. History, Federal Research Institute for Animal Health, https://www.fli.
de/en/about-­us/historie/fli-­riems/, Accessed on the 14 June 2019.
26. Geissler, E., Biological warfare activities in Germany, 1923–45, in Geissler,
E., van Courtland Moon, J.E. (Eds.), Biological & Toxin Weapons: Research,
Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, SIPRI Chemical &
Biological Warfare Studies No. 18, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 110.
27. Ibid., p. 124.
28. The Bacteriological Research Institute on the Island of Riems, Top Secret
Information Report, General CIA Records, 15 February 1949, Approved
for Release 1 February 2006, https://www.cia.gov/library/reading-
room/ docs/CIA-RDP83-00415R002200020014-9.pdf, Accessed on
the 13 June 2019.
30 A. RIMMINGTON

29. Geissler, E., Biological Warfare in Germany, 1923–45, pp. 109-110, 120.
30. Geissler, E., Conversion of BTW Facilities: Lessons from German History,
p.60 in Geissler, E., Gazsό, Buder, E. (Eds.), Conversion of BTW Facilities,
NATO Science Series, 1. Disarmament Technologies—Vol. 21, Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1998.
31. The Bacteriological Research Institute on the Island of Riems.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Yeadon, G., with Hawkins, J., The Nazi Hydra in America: Suppressed
History of a Century, Wall Street and the Rise of the Fourth Reich, Progressive
Press, Joshua Tree, California, 2008.
36. Jacobsen, A., Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Programme that
Brought Nazi Scientists to America, Little, Brown, New York, 2014.
37. Maddrell, P., Operation Matchbox and the Scientific Containment of the
USSR, p. 173 in Jackson, P., Siegel, J. (Eds.), Intelligence and Statecraft:
The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society, Praeger,
Westport, CT, 2005.
38. Ibid., p. 187.
39. Ibid., pp. 186–187.
40. A Review of Selected Soviet Articles on Foot and Mouth Disease 1929–1957.
41. Fedorov, L.A., Soviet Biological Weapons, p. 71.
42. Rimmington, A., Ex-USSR Biotechnology Industry: Contact Directory,
Technology Detail, York, August 1993, p. 99.
43. Alibek, K., The Soviet Union’s Anti-Agricultural Biological Weapons,
pp. 18–19 in Frazier, T.W., Richardson, D.C., Food and Agricultural
Security: Guarding Against Natural Threats and Terrorist Attacks Affecting
Health, National Food Supplies, and Agricultural Economics, Annals of
the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 894, 1999.
44. The Soviet BW Programme, pp. 76-77.
45. Harris, R., Paxman, J., A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Gas
and Germ Warfare, Chatto & Windus, London, 1982, p. 99.
46. The Probability of Soviet Employment of BW and CW in the Event of
Attacks Upon the US, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-18), Central
Intelligence Agency, 10 January 1951, https://fas.org/irp/threat/
cbw/niecbw1951.pdf, Accessed on the 19 June 2019.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. The Soviet Biological Weapons Programme, p. 352.
51. McVety, A.K., The Rinderpest Campaigns: A Virus, Its Vaccines, and Global
Development in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, 2018,
pp. 187–188.
 2 ORIGINS: THE INTERNATIONAL RACE TO DEVELOP ANTI-CROP… 31

52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Covert, N.M., Cutting Edge: A History of Fort Detrick, Maryland
1943–1993, Public Affairs Office, Headquarters US Army Garrison, Fort
Detrick, Maryland, 1994, p. 28.
55. 145. Memorandum From Morton Halperin of the National Security
Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger), Washington, 28 August 1969, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1969–1976, Vol. E–2, Documents on Arms Control and
Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, Document 145, US Department of State,
Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1969-­76ve02/d145, Accessed on the 26 January 2021.
56. Barnaby, W., What Should the G8 do About the Biological Warfare Threat
to International Food Safety, in Frazier, T.W., Richardson, D.C., Food and
Agricultural Security: Guarding Against Natural Threats and Terrorist
Attacks Affecting Health, National Food Supplies, and Agricultural
Economics, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 894,
1999, p. 223.
57. Covert, N.M., Cutting Edge, p. 31.
58. Memorandum from Morton Halperin of the National Security Council
Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger).
59. Casagrande, R., Biological Terrorism Targeted at Agriculture: The Threat
to US National Security, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter,
2000, p. 96.
60. Harris, R., Paxman, J., A Higher Form of Killing, p. 99.
61. Millet, P.D., Whitby, S.M., State Agro-BW Programmes, in Pate, J.,
Cameron, G., Agro-Terrorism: What Is the Threat? Proceedings of a
Workshop Held at Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. November 12–13, 2000,
United States Department of Energy, 2001, p. 20, https://www.hsdl.
org/?view&did=3513, Accessed on the 29 March 2019.
62. Whitby, S.M., Biological Warfare Against Crops, Palgrave, Basingstoke,
2002, p. 149.
63. This is an excerpt from the Explanatory Note to the 1964–1965 Research
Plan for Protecting Agricultural Crops from Biological, Chemical and
Nuclear Weapons, reproduced in Soviet Biological Weapons, p. 72.
64. Information provided by Georgette Naskidashvili (then Director), Main
Building, Institute of Plant Immunity, Kobuleti, Achara Republic, Georgia,
4 May 2001.
65. Mudahar, Mohinder S., Jolly, Robert W., Srivastava, J.P., Transforming the
Agricultural Research Systems in Transition Economies: the Case of Russia,
The World Bank, Washington, D.C., May 1998, pp. 20–27.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
lukuunottamatta tietysti hetkiä, jolloin hän ajatteli Paulia. Hän tiesi
uskollisena isänmaansa palvelijana tehneensä maansa viholliselle
kaikenmoista haittaa. Itse hän ei kuitenkaan pitkiin aikoihin joutunut
katsomaan vihollista silmästä silmään.

*****

Joutuessaan näkemään sodan tekemää tuhoa, auttoi Dimitriä

hänen valoisa, optimistinen katsantokantansa ja hänen uskonsa, että
sota sittekin terveellisenä suoneniskuna oli edistävä ihmiskunnan
parasta. Sodan raaistava puoli oli sitäpaitsi suuresti vähentynyt sen
kautta, että nykyajan murha-aseet usein panivat joukot taistelemaan
silmänkantomattomissa olevaa vihollista vastaan. Ja sillähän jo oli
jotain voitettu.

Dimitrin tyytyväisyyttä lisäsi tietoisuus, että hän monesti oli voinut

säästää toisia ja lieventää heidän kärsimyksiään. Hänen miehensä
jumaloivat häntä, ja sekä ylempänä että alempana olevat pitivät
häntä onnen lellipoikana, jota haluttiin matkaan, kun oli
kysymyksessä jokin uskalias yritys. Onni petti harvoin Dimitri
Droscheffskyn ollessa matkassa.

Juuri tällaisella matkalla Dimitri ensi kertaa joutui katsomaan

vihollista kasvoista kasvoihin. Ja silloin tuo ihmeellinen tapahtui.

Heitä oli pieni joukkue tiedusteluretkellä vihollisen rintamaan päin.

He kulkivat omilla alueillaan, mutta siellä liikkui myöskin paljon
vihollisia. Kaikki tapahtui yks kaks. He olivat juuri päässeet pienelle
mäen rinteelle, kun metsästä vingahtava kuula kaatoi yhden heistä.
Vihollinen oli niskassa. Nyt oli taisteltava.
 Dimitri ei muistanut Paulia. Yhtävähän hän ajatteli sitäkään, että
hän nyt ensi kertaa seisoi surmanase kädessään lähimmäisensä
edessä. Hän taisteli henkensä puolesta.

Mutta tarkasti tähdätty ase hervahti yhtäkkiä hänen kädestään.

Silmänräpäys senjälkeen hän tunsi vihlovaa kipua oikeassa
käsivarressaan. Repäisevä kuula silpoi sen sijaltaan. Dimitri horjahti,
satutti päänsä johonkin ja meni tainnoksiin, Hän heräsi saksalaisten
sotavankina.

Hän ei oikeastaan ollut pahoin haavoitettu. Oikea käsi tosin oli

poissa, ja hän oli saanut tärähdyksen aivoihinsa. Mutta
tärähdyksestä johtunut tiedottomuus oli nyt ohi. Paraneminen edistyi
nopeaan.

Sairassalin ovi avautui samassa. Kynnykselle ilmestyi nuori,

solakkavartaloinen ja hienohipiäinen vänrikki, joka joskin hiukan
ontuen kiiruhti salin läpi Dimitri Droscheffskyn vuodetta kohti.

Kävi kuin sähkövirta Dimitrin koko olemuksen läpi. Se oli hän, juuri
hän! Ja hän muistutti todellakin Paulia.

Dimitri kohoutui kyynärpäälleen, esitti itsensä ja ojensi tulijalle

vasemman kätensä. — Ettekö istu?

Nuori vänrikki kumarsi, — Kiitoksia, minulla on kiire. Olen juuri

kotiin lähdössä.

Mutta te olitte pyytänyt — —

— Niin, minä pyysin saada tietoja siitä miehestä, jota aijoin

ampua, mutta joka sensijaan ampui minulta käsivarteni. Ja nyt
sainkin tavata teidät itsenne!
 Nuorukainen kumarsi. Hän näytti hämmentyneeltä. — Sota on
sotaa, hän sanoi.

— Sota on sotaa. Minä ymmärrän. Älkää luulko että syytän teitä.

Te teitte parhaanne ja minä samoin. Mutta nähkääs, minä en voinut
ampua teitä.

Vänrikki vilkastui. Oliko sillä siis todella syynsä? Hän muisti

tapahtuman selvään. Se hämmästytti häntä silloin. Mutta sitte se
painui unohduksiin. — Te tähtäsitte. Luulen että olisitte ehtinyt ennen
minua. Mutta kätenne painuikin samassa, ja minä ammuin.

Dimitri kohoutui sotilaallisen suoraksi vuoteellaan. Hänen silmänsä

säteilivät, ja suu oli hymyssä.

— Sillä oli syynsä. Minulla on hyvä ystävä, — teidän näköisenne.

Minun oli mahdoton ampua.

Vänrikin katse painui. Ihminen ja sotilas taistelivat keskenään. —

Minulla ei ole lupa kiittää tekoanne, — mutta äitini siunaukset tulevat
seuraamaan teitä. — Hänen huulensa vavahtivat. Oli monta, joille
hänen nuori elämänsä oli kallis.

— Seuratkoot ne ystävääni. — Dimitrin ääni värähti.

— Missä hän on? Sodassako? kysäsi vänrikki.

Dimitri epäröi hetken. — Ei, en tiedä, sanoi hän hiljaa. —

— Mutta teillä on kiire, — kiire kotiin. Kiitos että tulitte!

Vänrikin pää painui syvään. Hänen kätensä liikkeetkin ilmaisivat

hellyyttä, kun hän tarttuen Dimitri Groscheffskyn vasempaan käteen
kunnioittavasti painoi sen huulilleen, Sitte hän kääntyi ja kiiruhti pois.

*****

Oikeasta poissilvotusta käsivarrestaan ei Dimitri sen jälkeen

puhunut, ennenkuin häntä kuljetettiin kotimaata kohden. Hän oli sillä
matkalla entistäänkin iloisempi ja tartutti iloa koko ympäristöönsä.
Kuitenkin häntä yleisesti säälittiin hänen käsivartensa tähden.
Hänhän vielä oli nuori, ja käsivarsi sattui, olemaan oikea.

— Se nuori, voimakas käsi olisi vielä voinut tehdä paljon hyvää,

sanoi säälivästi sisar junassa, joka kuljetti palaavia läpi Suomen.

— Minä näin ystävän kasvot vihollisessani. Se ratkaisi asian.

Sisar, jolla oli rinnallaan punainen risti, merkki rakkaudesta, joka

antoi henkensä ihmisten edestä, ei häntä ymmärtänyt. Mutta hän
hymyili, sillä Dimitri Droscheffskyn hymyilyyn täytyi vastata.
VIERUSTOVERIT

Matkalla he eivät tietäneet mitään toisistaan. Mutta perille

jouduttuaan —, tai oikeammin kotimatkan etäisessä
pohjoismutkassa, he tulivat naapureiksi. Toinen heistä sijoitettiin
sotavankisairaalan suuren salin etäisimpään nurkkaan, toinen
vieressä seisovaan vuoteeseen.

Näytti melkein siltä kuin järjestelyssä olisi piillyt jokin ajatus, niin
perin erilaiset olivat nämä vierustoverit. Toinen oli joukkonsa iloisin
mies, toinen oli ainoa, joka ei ilmaissut vähintäkään iloa
kotiinpääsöstä. Toisella ei ollut yhtään mitään matkassaan, sillä
iloisella oli tavallista suurempi matkapussi, jota hän ei, ellei se käynyt
välttämättömäksi, hetkeksikään heittänyt luotaan. Toinen katseli
tuontuostakin osaaottavasti vierustoveriinsa, toinen ei koskaan edes
kääntänyt päätäänkään toveriinsa päin. Hän oli sokea ja hänellä oli
side silmillä.

Näkevä, joka oli iloinen luonteeltaan, puheli aina kun vain sai
tilaisuutta siihen. Hänen täytyi jakaa iloaan muillekin. Ja sekin, että
hänen vierustoverinsa oli sokea, kehoitti häntä puhumaan. Täytyihän
sokean edes saada kuulla, kuulla jotain iloista. Ja hänellä oli iloista
puhuttavaa.
 — Tiedättekö, meillä on vain laskettavana pitkä alamäki läpi
Ruotsin.
Sitte olemme kotona.

Sokea kuuli riemuväreen joka sanassa, ja se vihlasi hänen

sisintään kuin miekan terä. Hän ei vastannut.

— Jos uskaltaisin, niin soittaisin teille. Mutta en vielä tiedä, onko

se luvallista, — Hän puhui kuiskaamalla. — Soitto on oivallista
lääkettä.

Sokea päätti mielessään, että hänen vierustoverinsa oli hyvin

nuori. Vanhemman ääni ei koskaan voisi ilmaista tuollaista yli
äyräitten tulvehtivaa iloa, ei ainakaan sen, joka sodan kauhut
nähtyään palaa rintamasta.

— Koetelkaahan mitä minulla on tässä!

Sokea kuuli vierustoverinsa kopistelevan tavaroitaan. Sitte hän

tunsi, että jotain työnnettiin hänen viereensä. Hän kuljetti käsiään
tunnustelevasti peitettä pitkin ja sai käsiinsä viulun.

Toinen vetäisi jousella pari kertaa kielien poikki ja naurahti.

— Oletteko kuulleet moista senjälkeen kuin läksitte kotoa! — Ääni

oli ylpeä kuin kepposistaan kehuskelevan koulupojan.

Taas vetäisi hän muutamia rajun iloisia säveleitä, sitte hän alkoi
kertoa. Hän puhui nyt matalalla äänellä, melkein kuiskaamalla, mutta
nytkin värisi joka sana hillittyä iloa. Viulu oli koko ajan seurannut
häntä. Hän oli peljännyt sen kadottamista melkein enemmän kuin
henkeään. Kukapa oikeastaan ennätti ajatella henkeään sodassa.
Vaaraa hetkenä oli muuta ajattelemista, ja kun vaara oli ohi, oli hän
aina ajatellut viuluaan.

Tämä ei ollutkaan mikään tavallinen viulu. Se oli aito

Cremonalainen. Se puheli, itki ja iloitsi ihan kuin ihminen. Sillä oli
sisimmässään kaikki ihmisrinnan säveleet, ja se ilmaisi ne
ymmärrettävämmin, täyteläisemmin ja ihanammin kuin konsanaan
sanat.

Tämä viulu oli myöskin hankkinut hänelle sen pikku vaimon, joka
nyt kotona odotti häntä.

Sokea makasi liikahtamatta. Ei mikään hänessä ilmaissut, kuuliko

hän vai eikö, oliko hän tyytyväinen vai tyytymätön.

Mutta kukapa ei mielellään kuulisi tuollaisesta herttaisesta pikku

vaimosta, joka oli sulaa päivän paistetta kullalle vivahtavista
ruskeista kiharoistaan kiiltonahkaiseen kengänkärkeensä saakka.

Sentähden toinen jatkoi.

Jo heidän ensi tutustumisensa oli ollut kuin kirkasta kevätpaistetta.

Tosin se alkoi kuutamokävelyllä, mutta siinä ei ollut mitään
haikeamielistä haaveilua, sulaa iloisen kirkasta kevätaurinkoa vain.

Hän oli lähtenyt virkistysmatkalle Sveitsiin. Cremonalainen, jonka

hän äsken oli saanut isoisältään, oli hänellä matkatoverina.
Rajattoman hyvällä tuulella hän kierteli Zürichin nähtävyyksiä
ihailemassa. Illalla hän hankkiutui Zürichbergiin, sai viimeisen
vapaana olevan huoneen, tilasi illallisen itselleen ja asettui
parvekkeelle nauttimaan sekä näköalasta että illallisesta.
 — Ehkäpä hän nukkuu. — Kertoja katsoi hetkisen kysyvästi
vierustoveriinsa. Sitte hän ajatuksissaan jatkoi keskeytynyttä
kertomustaan. Kaikki oli yhtäkkiä käynyt niin eläväksi hänelle kuin
olisi se vasta tapahtumassa.

Hänen siinä istuessaan ja nauttiessaan on hänen katseensa

yhtäkkiä kiintynyt pieneen vaaleapukuiseen olentoon, joka kepeät
matkakapineet kädessään seisoo parvekkeen kynnyksellä. Se
vaaleapukuinen puhelee vahtimestarin kanssa. Hän koettaa saada
yösijaa itselleen, mutta tilaa ei ole muuta kuin etäämpänä olevassa
pienessä huvilassa. Vaaleapukuinen ei kuitenkaan siitä säikähdä.
Levollisesti hän tilaa illallista itselleen, valitsee parvekkeelta paikan
josta on mitä ihanin näköala ja asettuu siihen.

Cremonalainen on näihin asti rauhallisesti maannut kotelossaan.

Mutta nyt muistuttaa se olemassaolostaan, — Mitä te täällä istutte
kahden ja vaiteliaina. Olenhan minäkin matkassa.

Cremonalainen pääsee kotelostaan. Sen täytyy saada puhua.

Neiti syö huomattavan hitaasti. Kun hän vihdoin nousee, lähenee

hän soittajaa, — Kiitoksia! Te soitatte ihanan kauniisti, — Katse
säteilee ja kiharoissakin, jotka vallattomasti kurkkivat esiin
yksinkertaisen matkalakin alta, oli kuin kimmellystä.

Kun he viimein yhdessä lähtevät kulkemaan yömajaksi

suositeltuun huvilaan, ovat he jo kuin vanhat tuttavat. Mutta mistä he
puhuvat, sitä hän ei tiedä, ei tietänyt silloin eikä tiedä jälestäkään
päin. Hän tietää vain sen, että hänen rinnallaan kulkee pieni
vaaleapukuinen olento, jonka astunta on joustavaa kuin nuoren
vuorikauriin, ja jonka ympärillä kaikki paistaa ja kimaltelee kuin
auringon kirkkaassa valossa.
 Ja sitte, sitte, kun he olivat sanoneet hyvää yötä, teki hän sen,
tuon tavattoman, jota hän ei koskaan ollut katunut niin monesti kuin
sille olivatkin yhdessä nauraneet. Hän vetäisi esille matkakynän ja
nimikorttinsa ja kirjoitti kuutamon valossa suurin juhlallisin kirjaimin:
Huomentervehdys oppaaltanne. Sitte hän pujotti kortin sisään oven
rakoon siinä huoneessa, jonne hänen vaaleapukuinen tyttönsä oli
kadonnut. Kortti tarttui juuri ovenrivan kohdalle, ja hän iloitsi
ajatellessaan, että siitä se varmasti putoaa maahan huomen
aamuna, kun hän avaa oven.

Minkälaisia lapsia he silloin kumpikin olivat! Mutta miten onnellisia

lapsia! Nyt he jo olivat paljoa vanhemmat, vaikka siitä ei vielä ollut
kovinkaan pitkä aika. Mutta he olivat kokeneet paljon, se pikkuinen
kotona ja hän sekä rintamassa että sotavankina. Ja kuitenkin pyrki
nyt ihan lapsettamaan, kun hän ajatteli sitä, että matka lyheni ja koti
läheni. Ja siellä kotona oli kaksi odottamassa, se rakas pikku vaimo
ja ihmeellinen pieni, pehmeä, punainen ja valkoinen käärö.

Sokea viereisessä vuoteessa liikahti. Toinen käytti kohta tilaisuutta

hyväkseen.

— Oletteko valveilla? Kuulkaa, sanokaa minulle, ymmärrättekö,

miten mies voi erota herttaisesta pikku vaimosta kolmenkuukautisen
avioliiton jälkeen ja sitte elää näkemättä häntä enemmän kuin sitä
pehmeätä pikku olentoa, joka on saapunut kotiin isän poissa-
ollessa?

— Elämässä on paljon, jota ei kukaan ymmärrä. — Sokea puhui

kuin jatkoksi omiin ajatuksiinsa.

— Mutta me voimme katsoa kaikkea joko valoisalta tai synkältä

kannalta. — Huomautuksessa oli ojennuksen makua, mutta tarkoitus
oli parhain. — Nähkääs, minulta on toinen sääri mennyt. — Hän
hätkähti omia sanojaan muistaessaan että vierustoveri ei voinut
nähdä mitään. — Olisihan minullakin syytä surra, jatkoi hän
kuitenkin, — kun näin nuorella ijällä olen joutunut raajarikoksi. Mutta
sen sijaan olen iloinen, rajattoman iloinen. Mitä merkitsee poikki
ammuttu sääri, kun vaimoni ja se pieni, pehmoinen ovat kotona
odottamassa!

— Onko teillä lapsia? kysäisi hän äkkiä, samalla kun kohosi

istualleen ja kietaisi peitteen paremmin polven alta poikki sahatun
säären ympärille.

Sokea nosti hiukan kättään. Se tapahtui vaistomaisesti, kuin olisi

hän tahtonut suojata itseään.

Hyvä Jumala, kuinka kiduttavasti tuo toinen osasi asettaa

sanansa! Ikäänkuin hänellä ei olisi ollut murhetta tarpeeksi
sokeudestaan ja repivistä, raatelevista muistoista!

Äkkiä hän muisti kysymyksen. — Ei ole, vastasi hän väsyneesti.

— Mutta vaimo?

— Vaimo on.

— Me olemme kaikki kadottaneet paljon, mutta meidän täytyy

iloita siitä mitä meillä on.

Sokean mieli kuohahti.

*****
 Eikö hänellä vielä ollut ikää tarpeeksi ymmärtääkseen, että vaikka
he kaikki olivatkin palaavia, palasivat he eri asteisesti ruhjoutuneina,
eri mielentilassa ja erilaisiin oloihin. Rikkiammuttu sääri oli
korvattavissa keinotekoisella, mutta mikä korvasi sokealle hänen
näkönsä? Ja kuka aavisti, mitä näkö merkitsi juuri hänelle? Hän ei
voinut avautua ihmisille, ei kuten vierustoveri sanoin viskellä heille
sisintään niinkuin rikas rahoja taskustaan. Hän oli luonnostaan saita
sisimpänsä suhteen. Ja olot olivat yhä enemmän kehittäneet häntä
tähän suuntaan. Hän oli oppinut olemaan yksin ja yksinäisyydessä
tuijottamaan omaan sisimpäänsä, niinkuin saita raha-arkkuunsa,
Barbel ei käsittänyt tällaista. Ajatukset eivät koskaan rasittaneet
häntä. Hän purki sisimpänsä lauluun ja laverteluun. Kaikki oli
helppoa hänelle paitsi yksinäisyys. Sitä hän ei sietänyt. Sentähden
olivat he oppineet kulkemaan kukin omia teitään, toinen koko
maailman ystävänä, toinen sisäisesti eristettynä kaikista, joskin
ulkonaisesti yhtenään kosketuksessa sen monivivahteisen
ihmisvirran kanssa, joka päivittäin vieri hänen ja hänen kotinsa
ohitse.

Mutta hänenkin täytyi joskus avautua. Yksinäisyys kävi hänelle

liian raskaaksi. Ja sentähden avautui hän vuorisen kotiseutunsa
suurpiirteiselle luonnolle, tuolle luonnolle, jonka jokainen väri ja
vivahdus oli hänelle tuttu kuin piirteet rakkaissa kasvoissa, ja joka
ehdottomasti painaa syvän ja vakavan leimansa ystäviinsä. Sen
ystävän suhteen hän ei koskaan pettynyt. Sille hän uskoutui. Siltä
hän sai apua. Ja nyt, — nyt — —

Hoitajatar oli salin toisesta päästä siirtynyt yhä lähemmäksi

nurkkaa, missä vierustoverit makasivat. Sokea kuuli hänen
suojasidettä avatessaan puhelevan säärensä menettäneelle. Hän
puhui uudesta säärestä. Nykyaikana saatiin aivan erinomaisia.
Viuluniekka ei sitäpaitsi ollut riippuvainen säärestä. Hän saattoi sekä
edistyä että elättää itseään siitä riippumatta.

— Entä te? — Hoitajatar kääntyi sokean puoleen ruveten

aukomaan silmäsidettä. — Voitteko tekin jatkaa tointanne?

— Minulla on pieni liike ja majatalo alppiseudussa. — Ääni oli

kalsea, luota lykkäävä. Sen täytyi hinnasta mistä hyvänsä salata,
salata — — —

— Ettekä enää koskaan saa nähdä ihanaa maatanne! —

Huudahdus luiskahti kuin vahingossa hoitajattaren huulilta. Sokea
kuuli siinä osanottoa. Mutta sekin repi.

Hoitajatar irroitti samassa siteen. Sokea kuuli äännähdyksen, joka

purkautui kuin säikähdyksestä.

— Kauniin näköistä vai mitä? — Sokean kasvot vääntyivät

omituisesti. Hänen teki mieli ilkkua omaa onnettomuuttaan. Mutta
ainoa kohta hänen kasvoissaan, joka oli kyllin ehjä jotain tunnetta
ilmaistakseen, oli suu. Ja se osasi tulkita ainoastaan tuskaa.

Hoitajatar ei kohta vastannut. Hänen kätensä vapisivat, kurkkua

kuristi henkeä salpaavasti, — Miekkako teidät näin on ruhjonnut? sai
hän viimein kysytyksi.

— Miekka. Nenä poikki, silmät poissa! Minä mahdan olla kaunis!

— Vaimonne on hoitava teitä entistä hellemmin! — Uusi side

laskettiin hellävaroin ruhjoutuneille kasvoille.

Barbelko hoitaisi entistä hellemmin, hän, joka vihasi kaikkea

rumaa ja joka aikoja sitte olisi jättänyt miehensä, ellei tämä olisi ollut
kaunis, arvossa pidetty ja hyvä vaimonsa elättäjä!

Kuinka kiduttavia sanoja ihmiset saivatkaan suuhunsa! He

seisoivat kuin rautaraipat käsissä häntä suomimassa. Mutta he eivät
tietäneet!

Sokea painui raskaasti takaisin vuoteelle.

Hellemmin kuin koskaan! Barbel hellästi ja lämpimästi hoitamassa

inhottaviksi ruhjoutuneita kasvoja!

Hänen täytyi nauraa. Sitte hän kääntyi seinään päin kuin

kääntyäkseen pois ajatuksista, jotka olivat liian raskaat. Mutta
ajatukset olivat yhtä armottomat kuin ihmiset. Ne eivät laskeneet
häntä rauhaan. Hän näki Barbelin edessään puhuttamassa
majataloon poikenneita vieraita, veikeä hymy suupielissä ja silmät
elämänhalua säteilevinä, Hän näki, miten kaunis hänen nuori, häntä
yhdeksän vuotta nuorempi vaimonsa oli. Hän tiesi, miten huolellisesti
ja sievästi hän pukeutui, ja että hän joka paikassa herätti huomiota.
Hän oli nähnyt tätä siksi usein, että hän nytkin sokeudestaan
huolimatta näki sen. Mutta hän tiesi senkin, että-Barbel ajatteli
muutakin kuin ulkokuorta, että hänessä oli kiihkeä, tarmokas halu
päästä eteenpäin ja ylöspäin elämässä. Hän pani arvoa kaikelle mille
ihmiset panivat arvoa. Hän rakasti kaikkea mikä kuului joltain ja
näytti joltain. Kuoren kauneutta vaille jääneet sisäiset arvot olivat
arvottomat hänelle.

— Minä poloinen, vaikeroi hän sisimmässään, — minä olin kaunis,

arvossa pidetty mies. Ihmiset kohtelivat minua kuten asemansa
yläpuolelle kohonnutta. Minä kelpasin hänelle porraspuuksi!

Sokea tavoitteli peitettä. Hänen oli vilu. Häntä puistatti.

 Heidän avioliittonsa oli ollut kovaa ja kuluttavaa kamppailua, siitä
asti kun ensi huumaus oli haihtunut. Barbel rakasti leikkiä ja sai
leikkiä. Mutta leikkikentän rajat olivat selvät. Miehen katse vartioi
häntä. Se puhui suoraa, tinkimätöntä kieltä. Se sanoi: "valitse, sinä
näet rajan. Rajan toisella puolella tulee meistä ero." Mutta Barbel ei
tahtonut erota. Arvossa pidetty aviomies ja luotettava elättäjä painoi
paljon vaa’assa. Heidän kaksintaistelunsa keskeytyi ainoastaan
siihen aikaan, kun he odottivat lastaan. Silloin hän hellitti ohjia. Hän
oli niin rajattoman onnellinen lapsesta. Aina kun hän siihen aikaan
palasi matkoiltaan kotiin ja laaksosta nousi rinnettä ylöspäin, katseli
hän vuoren kielekkeelle kohonnutta kotiaan omituisella hartaudella.
Se oli siinä kuin räystään alle rakennettu linnunpesä. Ja sydän
vavahti rinnassa, kun hän ajatteli, että sieltä pian kuuluisi sellaista
heikko-äänistä vikinää kuin linnunpesästä ainakin.

Hän oli jo näkevinään pienen, vakavakatseisen pojan kodin

kynnyksellä. Poika tähysteli tielle päin. Hän odotti isää. Ja kun isä
näkyi, juoksi poika vastaan. Hän pujotteli pienen kätensä isän
käteen, ja sitte he käsitysten jatkoivat matkaansa. Aurinko laski.
Alppien huiput hehkuivat kuin tulessa. Varjon puolella vivahtelivat
tummat, sulavanpehmeät värit keskenään, kilpaillen kauneudessa.
Ei isä eikä poika puhunut mitään. He kulkivat vaijeten toistensa
rinnalla. Mutta he ymmärsivät toistensa ajatukset ja tunsivat
toistensa tunteet. Isä ei ollut yksin eikä köyhä. Hän oli rikas ja
onnellinen.

Siihen aikaan, jolloin hän unelmoi tästä kaikesta, palvoi hän

vaimoaan korkeampana olentona. Hän oli vakuutettu siitä, että
Barbel lapsen synnyttyä kokonaan muuttuisi.
 Mutta muutoksen sijaan tulikin tuo hetki, joka opetti häntä
vihaamaan vaimoaan, tuo hetki, jolloin Barbel tiedottomana
kannettiin kotiin eräistä huvitilaisuuksista ja hänelle ilmoitettiin, että
hänen toivonsa oli surmattu!

Jospa hän vielä olisi voinut vihata niinkuin silloin! Mutta hän oli
taistellut voidakseen antaa anteeksi. Ja kun hän oli voinut sitä, oli
hän uudelleen ruvennut rakastamaan. Hän uskoi vieläkin
mahdolliseen muutokseen. Etenkin sodan puhjettua oli toivo
hänessä virinnyt. Ero oli yhdistävä heidät. Ero oli ehjentävä
särkyneen.

Hän näki monta kaunista unta, sillaikaa kun kuulat vinkuivat hänen
ympärillään ja tykit soittivat surmasäveleitään. Hän toivoi sekä
omasta että toisten puolesta. Ei kai tällainen hävityksen kauhistus
ollut vain äkillisen mielijohteen seuraus. Sillä täytyi olla jokin
tarkoitus, niin hyvä ja suuri tarkoitus, että sen saavuttamiseksi
kannatti kärsiä ja uhrautua.

Tuo tarkoitus näytti hänen omaan elämäänsä nähden läheiseltä ja

ymmärrettävältä. Miksi ei sitä olisi olemassa kokonaisuuteenkin
nähden?

Mutta nyt, nyt oli häneltä sammunut toivo kokonaisuuden

tarkoituksesta samalla kuin hänen omastaan. Hän tiesi, minkälainen
hänen osansa oli. Sokea, petetty, halveksittu mies hän oli. Hänkö
voisi toivoa?

— Te näytätte niin kovin synkältä. Minä soitan teille vähän. Ovet

ovat kiinni toisiin huoneisiin.

Sokea säpsähti. Hän oli ennättänyt unohtaa missä hän oli.

 Hiljainen, hillitty sävel kaikui salia pitkin. Tuntui siltä kuin soittaja
olisi käyttänyt sordiinoa, mutta sittekin väreili sävel iloa.

Parvi iloisia säveliä karkasi taas esille.

— Kuuletteko? Me palaamme kotiin, — odottavien luo.

Sokea ei liikahtanut. — Hän soittaa toisten iloa ja riemua, ajatteli

hän. Minulle hän soittaa maasta, jossa paimenpoikanen jokeltaa ja
kellot kilahtavat, maasta, joka oli ainoa ystäväni ja jota silmäni ei
koskaan enää näe.

*****

Hänen täytyi taas ajatella, millä inholla hänen vaimonsa kääntyisi

pois hänestä. Sokeudessaan hän näki sen kuin ruumiillistuneena.

— Kuulkaa! Ymmärrättekö näitä säveleitä?

Soittaja kumartui sokean puoleen. Hänen äänensä väreili

herkkänä kuin viulun kieli. — Näin jokeltaa pieni lapsi! —
Ymmärrättekö, hän on nukkunut levollista, makeaa lapsen unta. Sitte
hän ynähtää unissaan, — näin — ja nyt hän herää, — itkasee
pikkuisen, mutta näkee äidin ja nauraa! Näin, näin! — Kuuletteko, se
on oman pikku poikani ääni! Se on puhunut minulle vankeuden
maassa. Se on kutsunut ja kutsuu minua kotiin!

Sävelet loppuivat autuaalliseen jälleennäkemisen iloon. Sokea

kuuli soittajan pistävän viulun pussiinsa.

— Teistä minä kai olen puolihassu, mutta tiedättekö, minä

rakastan aivan rajattomasti tuota pientä, pehmeätä olentoa, jota en
vielä koskaan ole nähnyt.
 Hän naurahti kuin hämillään. — Kotiin palaava sotavanki on kai
hullu ilosta, lisäsi hän itseään puolustavasti.

Samassa tuli hoitaja. Hän tiedusteli kunkin vointia, korjasi vuoteita

ja toivotteli hyvää yötä. Vahvistava lepo oli tarpeen. Seuraavana
päivänä oli jatkettava matkaa.

— Kotiin, täydensi soittaja, ja kävi kuin hyminä läpi huoneen. —

Nukkukaa tekin hyvin, jatkoi hän, kääntyen sokean puoleen, samalla
kepeästi koskettaen häntä, ilmaistakseen kenelle hän puhui. — Uni
antaa voimia iloitsemaan.

— Kiitoksia! — Ääni ei enää ollut kylmä, mutta se oli väsynyt,

läpeensä väsynyt. Illan tulo, josta hän toisten kautta sai tiedon,
muistutti hänelle aina hänen nykyistä täydellistä avuttomuuttaan.
Vuoteessa kääntyminenkin muistutti, että hänen oli mahdoton
kääntyä valoon päin.

Nämä ajatukset kuluttivat ja kiduttivat häntä. Ja kuitenkin täytyi

ajatella. Eihän hän muuhun kyennyt.

Hän naurahti taas niin ilkeästi, että hän itsekin säikähti sitä. Hänen
mieleensä oli johtunut, ettei hän koskaan niinkuin muut illoin voinut
ummistaa silmiään. Hänellähän ei ollut silmiä.

Niin, hän oli ilkeästi ruhjottu raukka, jota kuka tahansa milloin
tahansa saattoi pettää, mies, joka ei enää voinut elättää itseään,
mies, jolta kaikki oli riistetty.

*****

Ajatus etsi haparoiden tukikohtaa.

 Saattoiko kaiken takana sittekin olla tarkoitusperä, päämäärä, joka
teki elämän elämisen arvoiseksi?

Jos saisi ajatella niin, jos voisi luottaa ja uskoa johonkin, ehkä
silloin jaksaisi elää tulematta hulluksi.

Häntä alkoi huimata. Hän tunsi suurta ruumiillista heikkoutta.

Sieluntuskat olivat jo kauan kiduttaneet häntä, ja vierustoveri oli
tänään nostanut hänen epätoivonsa huippuun asti.

Tuntui raukaisevan niin omituisesti. Tulisikohan uni vihdoin

hänellekin, jolla ei ollut silmiä, joita ummistaa?

Hän tunsi vaipuvansa kuin pohjattomaan syvyyteen. Mutta se

syvyys oli unen pehmeä syli.

Etäisyydestä hän kuuli viulun ääniä. Se jokelsi ja nauroi kuin pieni,

unesta heräävä lapsi.

Hän kohotti kätensä. Hän tahtoi pujottaa sen oman pikku poikansa
käteen ja kulkea hänen kanssaan kotirinteitten varjoisaa polkua
pitkin.

Mutta hänen kätensä painuikin hervottomasti takaisin vuoteelle.

Se ei tavannut tukea. Hän ei löytänytkään lapsensa kättä. Hänhän oli
sokea.
"SUURI TODISTAJIEN JOUKKO"

Feodor Feodorovits Iwanoffsky oli pitkä ja harteva. Leukapieliä peitti

tiheä, pikimusta parransänki. Töyhdöksi tuuhistuneiden viiksien alla
loistivat helakanpunaiset, paksut ja himokkaat huulet. Otsa oli
matala, kulmakarvat paksut ja tuuheat, silmäripsien alla välähtivät
mustat, keskitettyä voimaa ilmaisevat silmät.

Feodor Feodorovits oli syntynyt käskijäksi. Se ilmeni jo

lastenkamarissa, jossa hänen vanha "njanjansa" sai suojella sekä
silmiään että hiuksiaan aina, kun hän uskalsi asettua pojan tahtoa
vastustamaan. Sisaretkin, sekä Feodoria vanhempi että nuorempi,
oppivat häntä pelkäämään. He kätkivät visusti lukon taakse kaikki
millä oli jotain arvoa: nuket, kirjat ja koristukset, jotta ne eivät joutuisi
vaaraan, jos Feodorln päähän pälkähti käyttää niitä, ellei muuten niin
hävittämishalunsa esineenä.

Enimmän kärsi tästä kuitenkin äiti. Hän koetti kauan, mutta

turhaan, pitää puoliaan poikaa vastaan. Niin kauan kuin isä eli, taipui
poika pakosta ja pelosta hänen rautaisen tahtonsa alle. Mutta isän
kuoltua ei enää mikään pannut sulkuja pojan rajulle itsevaltiudelle.
 — Feodor, Feodor, minkätähden sinä olet tuollainen! Sinä poljet
sydämeni jalkojesi alle. — Äiti, joka turhaan oli koettanut sekä
hyvyyttä että kovuutta, puhkesi kerran valituksiin.

— Minkätähdenkö olen? Kysy itseltäsi! Pyysinkö minä tällaista

luontoa!

Vastaus taittoi ikiajoiksi kärjen kaikelta mitä äiti olisi tahtonut sanoa
pojalleen. Se suuntasi syytöksen hänen oman sisimpänsä
veristävään haavaan. Hän sulkeutui huoneeseensa. — Miksi, miksi,
kysyi hänkin. — Miksi tuli juuri Feodor Petrovits Iwanoffsky lasteni
isäksi?

Hän vastasi epätoivoisella vastakysymyksellä. Miksi oli olemassa

kouluja kaikkia mahdollisia ja mahdottomia tarkoitusperiä varten?
Miksi ahdettiin tietoja ihmisten aivoihin, kehitettiin heidän ääntään,
heidän jäseniään, valmistettiin heitä toimiin mitä erilaisimmilla aloilla,
mutta kun oli kysymyksessä elämän ratkaisevin askel, suurin ja
vaikein kaikista tehtävistä: äidin, silloin vaijettiin.

Hän muisti katkeruudella kuinka vanhat, kypsyneet ihmiset

touhuuttivat nuoria naimisiin. Ottaminen oli pääasia, kenen otti,
onnistuiko valinta vai eikö onnistunut se jäi sattuman varaan.

Sellaisella opastuksella hänkin nuorena oli lähtenyt liehumaan

huvista huviin, niistä löytääkseen oman onnenosansa. Ja hän luuli
sen löytäneensä silmätessään Wladimir Markowskyn syviin, tulisiin
silmiin. Mutta heille tuli pientä riitaa. Hän tahtoi tehdä Wladimirin
mustasukkaiseksi ja siten sytyttää hänet uudelleen. Siitä syystä hän
antautui Feodorin seuraan. Kun hän huomasi, että Wladimir tämän
perustuksella vain loittonemistaan loittoni hänestä, oli myöhäistä
korjata mitään. Wladimir oli poissa. Revolveri kädessä Feodor vaati