Social Norms Gender and Collective Behaviour Development Paradigms in India Indranil de All Chapter

Social Norms, Gender and Collective
Behaviour: Development Paradigms in

India Indranil De
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Social Norms, Gender and
Collective Behaviour
Development Paradigms
in India
Shyam Singh
Shilpi Smita Panda
Social Norms, Gender and Collective Behaviour
Indranil De · Shyam Singh · Shilpi Smita Panda
Social Norms, Gender

and Collective
Behaviour
Development Paradigms in India
Indranil De Shyam Singh
Institute of Rural Management Anand Institute of Rural Management Anand
Anand, Gujarat, India Anand, Gujarat, India
Shilpi Smita Panda

Studies on Tribal and Marginalized
Communities
Utkal University
Bhubaneswar, Odisha, India
ISBN 978-981-16-6951-4 ISBN 978-981-16-6952-1 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6952-1
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
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Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

for the financial assistance provided to conduct the research work at Social
Norms Knowledge Hub in Institute of Rural Management Anand.
The authors are thankful to SGR Consultancy Marketing Planning
Service, Kolkata for survey data collection.
v
Contents
1 Introduction: Institutions and Social Norms 1

1.1 Introduction 2
1.2 Social Norms, Social Capital and Institutions 4
1.3 Institutions 5
1.4 Social Norms 6
1.5 Development of Institutions 7
1.6 The Role of Institutions 10
1.7 Institutionalization Process 11
1.8 Institutional Change 13
1.9 Study on Implications of Norms 16
References 18
2 Understanding Social Norms 21
2.1 Introduction 21
2.2 Collective Behaviour and Social Norms 23
2.3 Collective Action and Evolution of Social Norms 27
2.4 Change of Norms 30
References 34
3 Social Norms and Women Workforce Participation 37
3.1 Introduction 37
3.2 Social Norms and Gender Norms 40
3.3 Conceptual Framework 41
3.4 Methodology 42
vii
viii CONTENTS
3.5 Socio-Economic Profile of the Respondents 43

3.6 Customs 47
3.7 Moral Norms 49
3.8 Descriptive Norms 50
3.9 Social Norms 53
3.10 Discussion and Conclusion 61
References 64
4 Gender and Agriculture: Cases of Woman Participation
in Rural Odisha 67
4.1 Introduction 67
4.2 Overview of Literature 71
4.3 Conceptual Framework 72
4.4 Methodology 74
4.5 Socio-Economic Profile of the Study Villages 76
4.6 Demographic Profile of the Respondents in the Villages 78
4.7 Norms Affecting Women Participation
in Agricultural Activities 78
4.8 Customs 81
4.9 Moral Norms 85
4.10 Descriptive Norms 88
4.11 Social Norms 90
4.12 Household Decision-Making by Woman 96
References 101
5 Reference Network and Sanitation Norms 105
5.1 Introduction 105
5.2 Structure of a Reference Network 106
5.3 Methodology 110
5.4 Analysis and Results 115
References 125
6 Sanitation and Social Norms: A Study on Villages
in Gujarat and West Bengal 129
6.2 Methodology 131
6.3 Socio-Economic Characteristics 134
6.4 Access and Use of Toilet 139
CONTENTS ix
6.5 Sanitation and Social Norms 147

6.6 Response to the Vignettes 157
References 165
7 Collective Behaviour and Development Management:
Policy Response to Social Norms and Behaviour Change 167
7.2 Public Policy and Social Change 169
7.3 An Action Framework for Managing Development
Policy—Context of Sanitation 171
References 176
Index 179
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 The logical structure of institutional facts (Note Author’s

Construction based on Searle [2005]) 9
Fig. 1.2 Institutionalisation process of social norms (Note Adapted
from Tolbert and Zucker [1999, p. 182]; modified
and contextualized) 13
Fig. 1.3 Institutional endogeneity and institutional change (Note
Adapted from Acemoglu et al. [2005, p. 392]; modified
and contextualized) 15
Fig. 2.1 Development of social norms (Note Adapted from Ostrom
[2007, 2010, p. 162]; modified and contextualized) 29
Fig. 3.1 Women workforce participation and social norms:
A conceptual framework (Note Adapted from Bicchieri
[2006, p. 4]; modified and contextualized) 41
Fig. 4.1 Women participation in agriculture: a social norm
framework (Note Author’s Construction based on Bicchieri
[2006, 2012, July]) 73
Fig. 4.2 Changing the social and gender norms (Source Authors
Compilation) 74
Fig. 4.3 Case selection framework (Source Authors Compilation) 76
Fig. 5.1 An ego network of three degrees of contacts (Source
Authors Contribution) 113
Fig. 5.2 Khorwad, Gujarat (Legends (1) Shape by Gender: Circle:
Male; Circle -in-Box: Female (2) Colour by Caste:
General: Green; OBC: Blue; SC: Red; ST: Black. Source
xi
xii LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 5.3 Majhra, West Bengal (Legends (1) Shape by Gender:

Circle: Male; Circle-in-Box: Female (2) Colour by Caste:
General: Green; OBC: Blue; SC: Red; ST: Black. Source
Fig. 5.4 Overall size (Source Primary Survey) 116
Fig. 5.5 Size of the egos in Majhra (Source Primary Survey) 116
Fig. 5.6 Size of the egos in Khorwad (Source Primary Survey) 117
Fig. 5.7 Average degree for each degree of separation (Source
Fig. 6.1 Sampling framework (Note Hhs = Number of sample
households. Source Author’s Contribution) 131
Fig. 6.2 Reasons for constructing toilet outside room (Source
Author’s Compilation) 146
Fig. 6.3 Households having functional toilet (Source Author’s
Compilation) 146
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Conceptual understanding of social norms framework 25

Table 3.1 Socio-economic details of the working women 44
Table 3.2 Socio-economic details of non-working women 46
Table 4.1 Key indicators of the study villages 77
Table 4.2 Demographic details of women in non-irrigated
and irrigated villages 79
Table 4.3 Common practices related to women participation
in agriculture 81
Table 4.4 Caste-wise women role in household decision-making 97
Table 5.1 Social network method glossary 111
Table 5.2 Sample characteristics 114
Table 5.3 Structural properties of both the reference networks 118
Table 5.4 Top 10 Nodes in betweenness centrality scores 119
Table 5.5 Inter and intra-gender connections (No of ties)
(Primary Survey) 121
Table 5.6 Inter and intra-castes connections (No of ties) (Primary
Survey) 121
Table 6.1 Sample households in the random nodes 133
Table 6.2 Percentage distribution of sample households
by religion and caste 135
Table 6.3 Income and size of the survey households 136
Table 6.4 Percentage distribution of household members by level
of education 137
Table 6.5 Percentage distribution of members by primary
occupation 138
xiii
xiv LIST OF TABLES
Table 6.6 Percentage distribution of households by access to toilet 140

Table 6.7 Average score of reasons for toilet construction 141
Table 6.8 Average score of source of influence of toilet
construction 142
Table 6.9 Distribution of households by location of toilet
and average distance of toilet 144
Table 6.10 Reasons for construction of toilet at particular position 145
Table 6.11 Percentage distribution of households by reasons
for having non-functional toilets 148
Table 6.12 Percentage of household members who do not use toilet 148
Table 6.13 Personal normative beliefs of the Respondents regarding
sanitation behaviour 149
Table 6.14 Knowledge about condition of sanitation in the locality 151
Table 6.15 Percentage distribution of households by expectation
of sanitation behaviour of neighbours in locality 152
Table 6.16 Percentage of households perceive no problems as other
neighbours practice open defecation 152
Table 6.17 Conditional preference for stopping open defecation 154
Table 6.18 Perception of preference of households members
about toilet use 154
Table 6.19 Willingness to influence for toilet construction 155
Table 6.20 Parties to be influenced by the respondent 155
Table 6.21 Percentage of households having different normative
expectations 156
Table 6.22 Reasons given by respondent as to why Ramesh should
use toilet 159
Table 6.23 Reasons given by respondents as to why Reena’s
husband should construct toilet 161
Table 7.1 Social Nudges against regressive/detrimental collective
behaviour 174
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Institutions and Social Norms
Abstract Understanding of social norms is important for effective devel-

opment intervention. This chapter provides basic understanding of social
norms, social networks and institutions. It explains why social norms
institutions are and how institutions are developed through collective
intentionality and assignment of functions to objects or features. It also
explains how institutions evolve through institutionalization process such
as habitualization, objectification and sedimentation. The challenge for
development invention is regressive social norms which needs to be
changed. However, changing social norms is very difficult when it is insti-
tutionalized. As institutions are endogenous, changing institutions require
an external shock. This chapter also delineates the broader contours of
studies conducted on social norms related to women workforce partic-
ipation and sanitation behaviour. These studies have been elaborated in
different changes of the book.
Keywords Social norms · Institutions · Institutionalization
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
I. De et al., Social Norms, Gender and Collective Behaviour,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6952-1_1
2 I. DE ET AL.
1.1 Introduction
Development interventions are meant for empowering communities
regarding income, health, education and overall social status. Neverthe-
less, they are often constrained by lack of response from the society
in a desired direction. Bureaucrats, technocrats and economists have
proposed and implemented development programmes which have not
elicited response as they should have. Governments have made provision
for resources for these programmes from their tight budget in developing
countries, but the benefits of investment in development programmes are
often very limited. This raises question on efficacy of resource allocation.
Lack of accountability, inefficiency and corruption are important reasons
why resources are wasted, but there are many more to it. Sometimes the
communities are not willing to accept the change, even if changes are
progressive. This difficulty is akin in social development projects such as
gender equality and sanitation behaviour. This book attempts to inves-
tigate the extent and nature of the difficulty through a few studies in
India.
The concern for gender equality has surfaced in the international
forum time and again. The first UN conference on women took place
in 1975 in Mexico with an objective of full gender equality and elimi-
nation of gender discrimination. The congregation received momentum
in the fourth UN conference on women which took place in Beijing
with an unprecedented very high participation throughout the world.
The whole diaspora joined with a single purpose of gender equality and
empowerment of all women everywhere in the world. Back in India,
the government has taken many initiatives for furthering gender equality
through Ministry of Women and Child Development. National Policy
for the Empowerment of Women was formulated in 2001. The policy
prescribes gearing up the judicial system, decision-making in political
process, mainstreaming women’s perspectives in developmental process,
and economic and social empowerment of women. It also suggests opera-
tional strategies including action plans, institutional mechanisms, resource
management, legislation and gender sensitization. The UN has consid-
ered achievement of gender equality and empowerment of all women and
girls as Goal 5 under the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).
In spite of several initiatives on economic, social, political and legisla-
tive fronts, women’s labour force participation, one important indicator
of economic empowerment of woman, has shown discouraging trends
1 INTRODUCTION: INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL NORMS 3
over time. According to National Sample Survey, percentage of women

participating in workforce has fallen down from 33% in 2004–2005 to
25% in 2011–2012 in rural India and from 18 to 16% in Urban India.
Participation of urban male in the labour force has not shown such a
decline between these periods. The overall growth rate in the interme-
diate years was high with most of the years experiencing an annual growth
rate above 7.5%. The long-term trend in other South Asian countries
such as Bangladesh and Pakistan also showed workforce participation
of women increasing over time (Verick, 2014). This calls for further
investigation as to why women’s workforce participation is low in spite
of fairly good economic opportunities. It raises question whether social
institutions and norms constrain women to participate in workforce and
constrain women’s empowerment.
Ensuring availability and sustainable management of water and sani-
tation for all has been mandated as Goal 6 under SDG. However,
behavioural change in sanitation has been attempted in India since the
launch of Central Rural Sanitation Programme (CRSP) in 1986. A revised
programme was launched as Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) in 1999
following a community led, people centric and ‘demand driven’ approach.
India also provided special attention to provision of water and sanitation
for the women. The National Policy for the Empowerment of Women
(2001) advocated women’s participation in planning, delivery and main-
tenance of such services. Further, Swatch Bharat Mission (SBM) was
launched in 2014 to eradicate open defecation in India. Under SBM,
1077.27 toilets were built till April 2021. In October 2019, all villages of
India were declared open defecation free.
The National Sample Survey 2018 reveals that nearly 3.5% house-
holds in rural India have never used latrine in spite of having access to
it. The reasons for not using are varied. Having no superstructure is the
reason for not using toilet for 3.5% of such individuals and no or insuffi-
cient access to water is reason for not using for around 10% individuals.
However, 7.6% cite personal preference and around 73% cite no other
or no specific reasons for not using toilet. It means that a majority of
the reasons for not using toilet are not infrastructural. A large part of
non-use of toilet may be attributable to behavioural issue which are influ-
enced by social norms. Cultural norms regarding human waste may create
hindrance for toilet use (Gupta et al., 2016; Jewitt, 2011).
4 I. DE ET AL.
In this chapter, we provide in-depth understanding about social norms

and institutions. We establish the relation between social norms and insti-
tutions. We explain the process of institutionalization of an action or idea.
Furthermore, we explain why changing social norms is difficult. Finally,
we explain how other chapters of the book explain the influence of social
norms in gendered division of work and sanitation behaviour.
1.2 Social Norms, Social Capital and Institutions

Social norms specify actions that are regarded as proper or correct, or
improper and incorrect (Coleman, 1990). The rewards for compliance
and punishments for noncompliance of norms are the sole determinants
of decisions by rational actors (Coleman, 1987). Thus, social norm may
determine whether a women should participate in workforce or a person
should use toilet. If norms are not met, then the cost of social sanctions
and punishments would make individual decision unviable. This cost may
be higher than benefit of action leading individuals to reverse actions in
future. Thus, norms drive people to behave and reciprocate in a particular
manner that is accepted by the society.
Social norms can influence human behaviour because individuals
are interconnected through social network. Putnam (2001) interprets
networks and associated norms of reciprocity as social capital. Woolcock
(1998) observes social capital as norms and networks that facilitate collec-
tive action. Thus, social capital and social norms are intertwined and one
influences the other. Norms and networks are two sides of social capital;
while the norm is cognitive and network is structural manifestation of
social capital (Uphoff, 2000). The strength of social norms depends on
both depth and breadth: how much it is imbedded in people’s mind
and how many are included. Social capital can be formal and informal.
Members of labour union or SHG group form formal social capital. A
group of people meeting in a park everyday or a group of people residing
in a village form informal social capital. The casual forms of social connec-
tions, which constitute informal social capital, are as significant as formal
social capital.
As social norms fix a set of expected behaviour or norms of reciprocity,
it also develops trust in the society. People would find other’s commit-
ment more credible. Higher trust and credible commitment may help in
resoling collective action problems more easily. Everyone would exhibit
similar behaviour with regard to gender norms and sanitation behaviour.
Thus, there is lesser necessity to incur cost for monitoring actions. With
larger fraction of people in a society sharing norms and wider the radius
of trust and trustworthiness, lesser is the monitoring cost of performance
(Fukuyama, 2000). If a small number of people follow gender norms
or norms of sanitation behaviour then it requires a great effort for the
followers of the norms to monitor others and punish the detractors. Grad-
ually many would unfollow the norms and trust on an expected set or
behaviour and its reciprocation by others would become weaker.
Trust has great importance in human development. Trusting attitude
of people has positive implications for economic development (Knack &
Keefer, 1997). Social norms promote trust and trustworthy behaviour
through social capital or networks. The networks themselves earn repu-
tation as being trustworthy. People become trustworthy because their
self-benefit maximizing behaviour is constrained by social norms or
informal rules, which are institutions. The evidence suggests that trust and
trustworthy behaviour are less likely when institutions are weak, imposing
weak constraint on human self-maximizing behaviour (Keefer & Knack,
2008).
1.3 Institutions
Institutions are rules and regulations that govern the society, polity and
also individual behaviour. Following North (1991, p. 97), ‘Institutions
are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic
and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanc-
tions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules
(constitutions, laws, property rights)’. Institutions are not only impor-
tant for economic analysis but also other disciplines in social sciences
such as sociology, political sciences and geography. This is because the
formal and informal rules and constrains determine human behaviour in
social, economic and political domain. These rules are also embedded in
spaces and would vary when the context changes. Other scholars have
also defined institutions from different perspectives and realm of knowl-
edge. Following Hodgson (2006, p. 2), ‘we may define institutions as
systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social inter-
actions’. These formal and informal social rules define social structure
(Wells, 1970, p. 3). These rules or social institutions are social norms
or conventions. They define human behaviour by constraining unfettered
human desire for maximization of self-benefit.
6 I. DE ET AL.
The social relations and interactions defined by the gender norms and
socially approved sanitation behaviour are institutions. The division of
work between male and female members of household is largely deter-
mined by gender norms. The social structure would endorse the kind
division of work between male and female which conforms the prevailing
social norms (Moser, 1989). Sanitation behaviour is very much personal
but social norms may have influence. The use of space for defecation, i.e.
where to defecate outside or inside house or in which place inside house,
may be determined by norms. Any violation of such norm may invite
social sanction. Since in both gender norms and sanitation behaviour may
be determined by socially determined rules, they are institutions.
1.4 Social Norms

A social norm is an expectation about an appropriate behaviour in a group
context (McDonald & Crandall, 2015). Early philosophers including
Aristotle, Locke and Hume have also pronounced the concept of social
norms in their work (Keyt & Miller, 1993). The notion of norms is multi-
disciplinary. Many academic disciplines including Sociology (Durkheim,
1951), Economics (Ostrom, 2014), Law (Posner, 2009), Philosophy
(Nichols, 2002) and Social Psychology (Kahneman & Miller, 1986;
Miller & Prentice, 1994) have defined norms in different perspectives.
Definitions across these disciplines vary and contradict each other. A norm
is a social construct which exists as a collectively shared belief about what
others do and what is expected of what others do in a group or what
is appropriate (Heise & Manji, 2016). Social norms are maintained by
social approval or disapproval. In the simplest understanding, social norms
are informal, mostly unwritten, rules that define acceptable, appropriate
and obligatory actions in a given group or society (Cislaghi & Heise,
2018; Hectar & Opp, 2001). Customs, traditions, rules, fashions and
other criteria of conduct which are standardized as a consequence of the
contact of the individuals are considered as social norms (Pollis & Pollis,
1970).
Coleman (1990) argued that norms can be based on rational choice,
so it is the interest of a group to get another group to internalize a
norm. Bicchieri (1990, 1997) provided a third alternative view about
norm internalization. It is based on cognitive view and grounded on
the assumptions that social norms develop in small, close-knit groups
where ongoing interactions are the rule. Small groups can monitor their
member’s behaviour and successfully employ sanctions whenever some

deviance is observed. Social norms are interwoven with other social
processes and are a crucial part of the grammar of the society (Bicchieri,
2006). In the process of socialization, the individual learns the norms of
a given society when it is passed to the younger generation and is inter-
nalized (Jensen & Arnett, 2015). Thus, an individual learns to adapt to
other cultural norms (Ward & Geeraert, 2016).
Social norms are institutions as they determine approved set of rules
or behaviours which individuals believe and follow over generations.
However, there are many other components of social structure that are
not institutions. For example, demographic structure is not an institu-
tion. An organization on its own is not an institution. On the contrary,
along with social norms there are many subjects that are institutions
such as money, law, system of weight and other measurements and even
language. Hence, at this juncture it is important to understand the types
of human behaviour or structures independent or dependent on institu-
tions. To understand it in depth, Searle (2005) introduces the concept
of institutional facts, which would be different from other facts in the
society.
1.5 Development of Institutions

There are features in the world that are observer independent or inde-
pendent of human feelings and attitudes. Features determined by natural
sciences such as sex or nature’s call are independent of observer. On the
other hand, there are features that exists only relative to human attitude
or judgement. Gender roles or the choice of place for defecation may
be observer dependent. There are many other examples that are observer
dependent, such as money, marriage and football game. Not any piece of
paper or coin can be treated as medium of exchange. It is a legitimate
medium of exchange only when others and particularly the government
approve. Any congression of people is not marriage or any movement of
physical trajectories is not football game. They are so when others and
empowered authorities approve. All these features exist due to intentional
states of conscious human beings. These are all institutional facts.
Intentionalities ‘describe that feature of the mind by which it is
directed at, or about, or of, or concerns, objects and states of affairs in
the world’ (Searle, 2005, p. 6). It is intentionality which enables human
and some other animal species to engage in cooperative behaviour. The
8 I. DE ET AL.
agent would be acting only as a part of collective action such as joining

any political movement or following any social norm. This leads to the
fact that human has the ability to exercise collective intentionality, which
in turn enable them to create special forms of social reality.
Human being has the capacity to assign functions to natural objects or
phenomenon. They have the ability to assign particular work to partic-
ular person or group of people. They also have ability to assign spaces to
be used for particular function. When human assigns function to some
natural object or feature or phenomena with collective intentionality,
then through collective assignment of function the status of the object
or feature raises, becomes stronger and stable. For example, a printed
piece of paper becomes money when everyone accepts it as medium
of exchange. Human being may collectively assign the responsibility of
homecare or reproductive activity to female, while production activity
to male (Moser, 1989). People would adhere to the assigned role as
through collective assignment of functions the status of assigned role or
feature has enhanced and it becomes an institution. The logical structure
of institutional facts and the process of institution development is given
in Fig. 1.1.
Due to collective assignment of function, ‘X counts as Y in context C’.
X stands for certain feature of an object or person or state of affairs and Y
stands for assignment of special status. C sets the context or limits applied
for the special status (Searle, 2005). This may be conceived as status
function. This status function is the rule which is assigned collectively.
Thus, institutions are developed and all institutions as result of collec-
tive actions. Commons (1936) defined institution as collective action in
control of individual action. It may be unorganized (informal) collective
action in the form of custom or organized (formal) collective action such
as cooperative, trade union or the government or state.
Hodgson (2006, p. 3) defines institutions as the rules which are
‘socially transmitted and customary normative injunction or immanently
normative disposition, that in circumstances X do Y’. He also discusses
about how institutional rules may lose relevance if rules are very much
narrowly defined. If the physical and natural circumstances allow only one
option Y in circumstances X then the rule would not be so relevant. It
would be relevant as an institution when multiple options can be imag-
ined. One culture may mandate in circumstances X do Y, while the other
culture may institutionalize in circumstances X do Z. However, the law
of nature would constraint set of possible rules.
Fig. 1.1 The logical structure of institutional facts (Note Author’s Construction
based on Searle [2005])
A few examples may help in understanding institutionalization through

assignment of functions or rules. Natural facts such as sound becomes
language if people collectively assign certain functions to certain sounds
in specific region or context. Not any sound is language, it has to follow
the grammar of the language. The grammar is akin to status function.
The same sound or work may have different meaning or connotation in
different language, space or context. Hence, language is an institution
and institutions are valid in a specific context.
By the same logic gender norms are institutions. Women will take
care of reproductive work and men will perform productive work makes
no sense if the pattern of work allocation is collectively approved and
assigned. When they are collectively approved then it becomes a norm.
These norms may not be same in all the society. In matrilineal societies,
the patter of work allocation may be reverse as compared to patrilineal
society. Hence, work allocation by gender is possible through collective
assignment of functions. The pattern of collective assignment of functions
may be different in different communities.
10 I. DE ET AL.
In a similar way, toilet use, or no use is an institution. Toilet is a physical

structure. Its use should be determined by individual themselves. But it
may so happen that society collectively may have an opinion in favour or
against using toilet. Thus, society may assign or unassign function to toilet
for the purpose of defecation. When society collectively assign or unassign
the toilet for defecation, respectively, then toilet use or open defecation
becomes an institution. Some societies may find toilet use unacceptable
whereas other societies may find open defecation unacceptable.
1.6 The Role of Institutions

The role of an institution is to shape expectations. Without institu-
tion human behaviour would become unpredictable. The institutions are
durable as they can create stable expectations of behaviour of others
(Hodgson, 2006). Through instituting form and consistency on human
activities institutions enable ordered thought, expectation and action.
The human behavioural regularities are developed due to reciprocating
intentions and expectation set through institutions. In case it is not recip-
rocated then sanctions are imposed to make people follow formal and
informal institutional norms.
Institutions shape expectations for the society, economy and gover-
nance. In society, institution upholds social order and maintain social
stratification. It ensures this is how people from different strata of the
society would behave. In case any aberration is found then such behaviour
would be sanctioned. Such social order or expectations may be progressive
or regressive. Altruism or helping in each other’s in crisis is a progres-
sive expectation. But strict division of labour by caste, social immobility
or gender division of work are regressive expectations. In the economic
sphere, the system of monetary exchange or measurement or weight are
economic institutions. It ensures the exact value being exchanged. In
governance, people’s expectations about the role and responsibilities of
government or central authority are shaped though constitutional means.
In all these spheres, institutions drive human behaviour in a particular
direction through creating stable expectations.
In the absence of institutions, it would be difficult to ascertain as to
how one would reciprocate. This difficulty may lead to high transac-
tion cost of any activity. The idea of transaction cost was first brought
in by Ronald Coase (1960). Transaction cost is the cost of negotiation
and coordination for exchange. Exchange involves reciprocation, which
require fair degree of certainty. Later Williamson (1981) defined trans-

action costs as costs incurred by agents or stakeholders for planning,
adapting and monitoring of task under alternative governing structures.
In this context, institutions are governance structures developed to reduce
transaction cost (North, 1991; Williamson, 1999). If institutions are
unable to reduce the transaction cost, then they lose relevance and
become weak. If it is difficult to monitor action, then transaction cost
remains high. As a result, it is difficult to maintain expected behaviour.
Social relations and exchanges have a lot of similarity with economic
exchanges. It also requires certain degree of certainty so that actions
of the agents are not challenged by others. In case others disagree due
to actions of one agent then the agent has to manage relations which
would raise the agent’s transaction cost. If the agent cannot manage
the distraught relations, then it would make interactions or exchanges
in other areas difficult for the agent, thus increasing transaction costs
in those areas. If there are frequent attempts to contravene the norms,
then strict monitoring and governing structures have to be developed
including provision for sanction. This would raise transaction cost. The
more stable is the institution, the lesser are the chances of violation of
rules and lesser are costs and efforts required to monitor.
The gender norms create clear expectations about the role of males
and females in workspace. Accordingly, they are groomed from child-
hood. Similarly, the norm of defecation would make it clear where to
defecate. Accordingly, buildings are built. Although defecation is a private
activity, but expectation of others is important to consider as it has exter-
nality, meaning, one’s defecation practice impact others. Defecation in an
inappropriate space may generate disagreement and discontent. Hence,
people modify their defecation behaviour considering other’s expecta-
tions. If women working for productive activities or households using
toilet is against the social norm or institution, then there could be social
sanction for dishonouring expectations.
1.7 Institutionalization Process

The process of institutionalization is slow and goes through various
stages. Tolbert and Zucker (1999) describe institutional process in an
organization through three distinct stages: habitualization, objectifica-
tion and sedimentation. Society as an organization would also follow
a similar process of institutionalization. Habitualization takes place in
12 I. DE ET AL.
the pre-institutionalization stage whereby new structural arrangements

or norms are generated in response to specific problem or set of prob-
lems. In the next stage, diffusion of structure and development of social
consensus is achieved through objectification. The latter process provides
more permanent and widespread status of the structures. The last stage of
institutionalization process, sedimentation, is characterized by complete
spread of structures across the group and perpetuation of the structure
over lengthy period of time.
Any new activity or idea, such as gender equality in workforce partic-
ipation or use of toilet, should go through these stages for institutional-
ization. Society needs to adopt and adapt various ideas, some of which
may been developed and practiced outside the society. The enforceable
institutions of society driven by cultural beliefs and the rules of the game
have to undergo change to adopt the new ideas and practices. In this
regard, it is important to understand the institutional path dependence
that determines successful intersociety adoption of institutions (Greif,
1994).
In the habitualization stage there would be few adopters who face
similar circumstances. The adoption of knowledge or ideas may occur in
close association with other societies. Imitation may happen but with little
or no consensus on general utility of new idea or practice. For example,
a few members in a village may understand the utility of using toilet as
they have members, especially older ones, who are habituated in toilet
use. It does not mean that other members of the society or village would
appreciate the use of toilet. Similarly, women may venture out for work
with men in a few families of a society for meeting immediate family
needs. However, the rest of the society may still believe that it is more
beneficial if women restrict themselves within household and concen-
trates only in reproductive work. Habitualization process may not ensure
institutionalization, but is the first step towards it.
Objectification is characterized by increasing adoption with some
degree of social consensus among the social decision-makers regarding the
value of structure. The society may assess the benefit and risk of adoption
using evidence gathered from various other sources including media. The
outcomes of prior experience will be a significant determinant of next
adoption decision. The benefits of women workforce participation and
use of toilet in other countries may encourage to do away with gender
norms in division of work and open defecation. The diffusion of structure
in this phase can be spearheaded by champions who have material stake
Fig. 1.2 Institutionalisation process of social norms (Note Adapted from

Tolbert and Zucker [1999, p. 182]; modified and contextualized)
in promotion of the structure. Elites and political leaders may emerge

as champions. Although some degree of diffusion would take place in
this stage, individuals would consciously monitor the accumulation of
evidence.
After semi-institutionalization through fairly wide diffusion of struc-
ture in the objectification phase, the process of full institutionalization
is known as sedimentation (Fig. 1.2). This involves historical continuity
of structure over generations. This phase is characterized by complete
spread of structures across the group of actors considered as appropriate
adopters. Societies are likely to abandon older arrangements in favour of
newer promising structures if costs associated with the change are rela-
tively lower than benefits. At this stage there would be low residence by
opposing groups whose interests get adversely affected by new structure.
The use of toilet or acceptance of women’s productive work are examples
of sedimentation of alternative structure.
1.8 Institutional Change

Institutions are durable and stable as they create stable expectations of
behaviour (Hodgson, 2006). Social norms also create expectations and
foster self-enforcing behaviour in community. Everyone conforms norms
as everyone is expected to conform, and everyone wants to conform as
they expect everyone else to conform (Young, 2015). In the evolutionary
process of social norms, the individuals reach a stable state as they respond
only to the prior-period actions. In spite of exogenous changes there are
tendencies of a norm to stay in place for long periods. The evolutionary
14 I. DE ET AL.
theory and supporting evidence suggest that modern humans have inher-
ited a propensity to learn social norms, similar to inheritance of property
(Pinker, 1994). However, both exogenous and endogenous factors may
challenge the long-term viability of social norms (Ostrom, 2000).
Institutions are endogenous, meaning self-reinforcing through inter-
play of different forces which makes institutions stable (Acemoglu et al.,
2005). Therefore, it is very difficult to change the institutions. To under-
stand why this happens we need to appreciate that the rules set by
institution or social norms may benefit one group against the other. The
rules of institution would primarily depend on the conditions that favour
the more powerful group over the less powerful group. For example, the
gender norms in a society may depend on the state of women’s empow-
erment in the context of women’s subordinate role to male. Sanitation
norm may depend on the power of group who prefer open defecation
against those who want to use toilet. The final shape of institution may
not be the one which delivers maximum benefit to the society but would
depend on political strengths of the groups.
The leaders or patriarchs of the society are mandated to protect the
interest of less powerful. But they may fail to ensure fairness due to their
self-interest. They would devise rules and regulations that are likely to best
serve their interests. This is a commitment failure on the part of the social
leaders. For example, despite knowing that women workforce participa-
tion would improve economic condition of family the gender norms may
mandate women to remain confined within the periphery of house and
concentrate in reproductive work. Social leaders are mostly male and this
norm would help male to hold more power in the household. Similarly,
even after understanding that toilet use is better practice the patriarchs
and social leaders may resist it to retain their command in the society by
making people follow the age-old practices and power structure.
The stranglehold of social and political elites is firm and stable because
of endogeneity of institutions. The power within the society, patron-
ized by social and political leaders, could be of two kinds: formal and
informal. Formal power is assigned by social and political institutions and
can be interpreted as de jure power. The informal power is not allotted by
social and political institutions. This power is driven from own resource
or community if the community can act collectively. This is de facto
power. It can influence the de jure power and hence social institutions and
social norms. Economic resource of upper caste or rights over economic
resources and property by male may provide de facto power by which
they may influence social institution to embed and propagate the regres-
sive norms to the detriment of lower caste or female. If the de facto power
supports open defecation, then the social and religious institutions would
resist toilet use. The elders who are often owner of property in a house-
hold may resist use of toilet within their premises due to concerns of
purity (De, 2018; Hathi et al., 2016; Jewitt, 2011). They may influence
the social and religious institutions to discourage and if needed prevent
use of toilet.
A gender norm restraining women to participate in productive activ-
ities may in turn weaken women’s economic and social position. This
would in turn embolden the male supremacy and gender discrimination.
Similarly, casteism would weaken the lower caste and further increase the
dominance of upper class in the institutional processes. Thus, individuals
would respond to prior-period actions. This is how sedimentation stage
is reached in institutionalization process. This process of de facto and de
jure power forming and maintaining social institutions which in turn re-
enforce their social and political position and strengthen their power in
the society makes institutions endogenous (Fig. 1.3). Thus, institutions
become very stable, and it reproduce itself over time.
Although institutions are stable as discussed above, it possible to
change institutions. People may leave their old norms and adopt a newer
Fig. 1.3 Institutional endogeneity and institutional change (Note Adapted from
Acemoglu et al. [2005, p. 392]; modified and contextualized)
16 I. DE ET AL.
one. Given institutions are endogenous, it is possible to change norms

through exogenous shocks. These shocks may be delivered through new
technological innovations or political and social movements. New house-
hold appliances which reduce women’s drudgery for reproductive work
may release time for skill formation and productive work. Groups prop-
agating gender equality or NGOs promoting use of toilet may delve
external shocks to the exiting institutions and social norms. They would
exert their de facto power to overthrow the regressive norms.
1.9 Study on Implications of Norms

The objective of this book is to understand the significance of institutions
and social norms in women’s workforce participation, women’s empow-
erment and behaviour change in sanitation. The moot question asked in
the book is whether human choices are unconstrained or constrained by
the social norms. This book expounds this question with the help of a
few qualitative and quantitative studies. This understanding would help in
devising strategies for reversing harmful social norms and usher change.
In this context, this book differentiates between collective behaviour that
are driven by norm with penalties for non-compliance and other types
of collective behaviour. Strategies to mitigate the regressive collective
practices or promoting progressive ones should be devised as per this
understanding. To understand more on social norms and its evolution,
Chapter 2 provides the theoretical background for rest of the chapters.
Social norms may have bearing on women’s empowerment. Women’s
empowerment can be understood as capacity of women to increase
own self-reliance and internal strength rather than dominated by men
(Moser, 1989). Women’s empowerment is dependent on three interre-
lated components: resources, agency and achievements (Kabeer, 1999).
Women choices are dependent on access to resources. Agency is the ability
to make the choices and achievements are the outcome of choices. The
moot question is whether social norms impair or delimit the choices
for women. Chapters 3 and 4 of this book would discuss these issues
in the light of women’s choices for workforce participation, especially
participation in agriculture and decision-making.
In Chapter 3, we have attempt to answer whether women’s deci-
sions regarding participation in the workforce are influenced or guided
by social norms or customs or the urgency to earn additional money. Do
the women face any resistance from their families or society while exer-
cising choices over workforce participation? Are they sanctioned for going
against the norms? The study was conducted in six villages in Andhra
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Rajasthan states of India. In Chapter 4, we have
attempted to identify the social norms and its role in women’s participa-
tion in agriculture. Furthermore, it examines the relationship between
women’s participation in agriculture and their role in the intra-family
decision-making process. The study was conducted through case study,
observation and in-depth interview in two districts of Odisha state in
India. One of these districts has irrigation and the other one does not.
Sanitation is a private behaviour, but it has one of the greatest
public impact (McGranahan, 2015). Furthermore, sanitation behaviour
is dependent on cultural norms (De, 2018; Tarraf, 2016). These
cultural norms may create barriers to develop appropriate and cost-
effective excreta management systems (Jewitt, 2011). The sense of purity
imbedded in cultural norms may make it difficult to construct toilet at
home (De, 2018). Transformation from separating polluting (toilet) area
and pure spaces at home to modern attached bathroom is difficult and
time taking (see Srinivas, 2002). On the other hand, people may construct
toilet if they find it important for privacy and safety and are able to
overcome constraints imposed by poverty and women’s subordination at
household (Hirve et al., 2015; Khanna & Das, 2016). In this book, we
have attempted to understand the influence of social norms on sanitation
behaviour in Chapters 5 and 6.
The study of implications of social norms on sanitation behaviour was
conducted in four villages from two different states of India. These states
are Gujarat and West Bengal, which are geographically in two different
extremes of the country. The novelty of our study lies in tracing the
sanitation network of individual households. These networks have been
illustrated for the two states in Chapter 5. The major concerns leading
to behaviour change are analysed in Chapter 6. It attempts to look into
whether Indian society encourages open defecation or toilet use. It also
examines whether open defecation is a custom or social norm.
Chapter 7 deals with how collective behaviour of individuals and
households may be changed in a desired direction by appropriate devel-
opment intervention. If the behaviour is found to be detrimental and
regressive then it may be changed by strategies that are likely to
nudge behaviour, rather than through command-and-control policy. We
18 I. DE ET AL.
have discussed and suggested the development management policies for

changing norms in a desired or progressive direction in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
Understanding Social Norms
Abstract This chapter attempts to elaborate on social norms from the

perspectives of various scholars. It distinguishes social norms with other
collective behaviour and thus arrives at the definition of social norms.
Collective behaviour can be independent determined by individual pref-
erences. It may be depended on others’ opinion and actions. The latter
type of collective behaviour is considered as social norms. The different
types of preferences, options and beliefs that drive collective behaviour
have been elaborated in this chapter. The chapter also explains how social
norms are evolved though development of mutual trust and reciprocity.
Theories have been explained with examples drawn from gender norms
regarding workforce participation and sanitation behaviour. The chapter
also discusses the measures to change regressive social norms through
development intervention.
Keywords Social norms · Collective behaviour · Norms changing
2.1 Introduction
As not all features of the world constitute institutional facts, not all
common or collective behaviour are social norms. A collective behaviour
which is independent but common or similar is not part of institutional
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 21

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
I. De et al., Social Norms, Gender and Collective Behaviour,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6952-1_2
22 I. DE ET AL.
facts. This is because in such a situation there is hardly any collective

intentionality (as explained in Chapter 1) through which a behaviour
is assigned a higher status and hence it is followed by others. In case
of independent collective behaviour, no one in the community checks
for collective acceptance of the behaviour by the community. However,
there are certain collective or common behaviour that people perform just
because others approve it. Any aberration or contravention would not be
approved by community and hence sanctioned. This kind of collective
behaviour is an institutional fact. This chapter discussed the evolution of
social norms, distinction of social norms with other collective behaviour
and the process of changing norms, especially if it is regressive for the
society.
Social norms are not instincts or reactions like crying while cutting
an onion, or running away from the barking dogs in the street (Bell &
Cox, 2015; Poptiz, 2017). Social norms are not based on personal tastes
and preference such as drinking cold drinks during summers or wearing
new cloths during festivals (Anderson & Dunning, 2014; Bell & Cox,
2015). They are not mere personal habits or behavioural regularities
(Bicchieri et al., 2011). There are non-normative factors which shape
behavioural regularities such as environmental factors, policy and tech-
nological changes and scarcity of alternative choices (Legros & Cislaghi,
2020).
Previous studies have highlighted that social norm are beneficial for
cooperation and social order (Anderson & Dunnung, 2014; Burke &
Young, 2011; Dannals & Miller, 2017; Lapinski & Rimal, 2005; Young,
2015). However, there are few studies which have also pointed out that
social norms encourage some harmful practices such as child marriage
(Vaitla et al., 2017), female genital mutilation (Mackie et al., 2015),
feuding norms (Young, 2015) and caste norms (Sunstein, 1996). Social
norms also promote unhealthy behaviours including drinking alcohol and
smoking (Bell & Cox, 2015; Dannals & Miller, 2017; Reid et al., 2010).
There are contradictory claims whether social norms are an individual
or collective constructs. In terms of individual constructs, cognitive states
of individuals such as emotions or beliefs can be construed as social
norms, while in terms of collective constructs, norms are seen to be condi-
tions and features of the social group or structure (Legros & Cislaghi,
2020). Many theories of social norms have discussed it as an individual
construct, and it is the belief of an individual of what is common and
approved in a given society or group (Bicchieri et al., 2011; Mackie
2 UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL NORMS 23
et al., 2015; Reid et al., 2010; Siu et al., 2012; Sunstein, 1996; Vaitla
et al., 2017). Social norms as an individual construct are mostly used in
public health research, action research and in international development
programmes for behavioural change interventions (Cislaghi & Heise,
2018). On the other hand, there are theories which propound that social
norm are collective constructs external to the individual actions. These
collective constructs include shared community rules which are part of the
culture of the group or society (Anderson, 2000; Anderson & Dunning,
2014; Bell & Cox, 2015; Boytsun et al., 2011; Cialdini & Trost, 1998;
Mahmoud et al., 2014; Popitz, 2017; Villatoro et al., 2011). Some theo-
ries have also viewed social norms as a collective as well as individual
construct (Burke & Young, 2011; Chung & Rimal, 2016; Dannals &
Miller, 2017; Lapinski & Rimal, 2005; Morris et al., 2015; Young, 2015).
Individual actions may be influenced by both normative conditions and
individual rationality. When an individual is in a public space, norma-
tive conditions and imposition of punishment or sanctions would be
having intriguing impact on his decisions to act (Chung & Rimal, 2016).
If external forces or normative conditions have lesser impact then his
personal belief may be more influencing his behaviour. For instance, a
teenager may not get into smoking or alcohol because of the fear of the
family ethos or facing sanctions or punishments in the school. But he may
not smoke or drink when he is away from the family or school with his
friends because of his personal belief that it is injurious to health.
2.2 Collective Behaviour and Social Norms

As institutions are developed through collective assignment of status,
social norms are developed when certain behavioural pattern is collectively
approved for specific activity. As a result, people would follow these norms
and expect others would also follow. We have referred socially approved
collective behaviour as social norms in this book. Collective behaviour
driven by individual preference is not refereed as social norm in this book.
We follow the definition provided by Bicchieri (2016, p. 35), where she
defines social norms as ‘a rule of behavior such that individuals prefer
to conform to it on condition that they believe that (a) most people
in their relevant network conform to it (empirical expectation), and (b)
most people in their relevant network believe they ought to conform to
it (normative expectation)’ and may sanction deviations. If most of the
24 I. DE ET AL.
people use toilet in community then one may use toilet fearing sanc-
tions, punishments and mocking from other community members who
are using toilets. On the contrary, if most do not use toilet then people
may opt for open defecation as using toilet would invite social sanctions.
Preferences, options and beliefs model (Bicchieri, 2014) help to delin-
eate social norms from other collective practices including customs,
descriptive norms and moral norms. Various concepts including empir-
ical expectations, normative expectations, reference network, preferences,
belief, personal normative beliefs and factual belief have been discussed
by Bicchieri (2006). These concepts are discussed in Table 2.1.
Social norms are behavioural rules that are supported by a combination
of empirical and normative expectations. Should individuals have right
expectations then they have a conditional preference to obey a social norm
(Bicchieri, 2006). Empirical expectations are vital because in their absence
one might be tempted to disobey a social norm. Social norms required
to be obeyed and the belief that others think one has to obey them and
may face sanctions and punishment for transgressions are the normative
expectations which are usually consistent with the empirical expectations
of a norm (Bicchieri & Mercier, 2014). The presence of social norms
can be assessed by asking people about their normative expectations or
their second order beliefs about what others think to be appropriate
(Bicchieri & Chavez, 2010).
For instance, in our work on women workforce participation in
Chapter 3, it was found that women from higher caste community
were not allowed to work outside due to the society’s conservative
attitude. In such cases, the empirical expectations of the community
stated that women in their community don’t work outside and they only
do the household chores. The normative expectations stated that the
family members, neighbours and even the husband believe that women
shouldn’t work outside and only do domestic chores at home because no
other women in their community work outside. The non-participation
of women in workforce from higher caste became a social norm and
a woman who wanted to work and progress in her career had to face
negative sanctions for norm non-compliance which ranges from slight
displeasure to punishment. In such society the non-participation of higher
caste women in workforce was conditional on the empirical and normative
expectations of the community.
All collective practices are not based on social norms. Based on the
concepts of Bicchieri (2006) the collective practices are identified as
Table 2.1 Conceptual understanding of social norms framework
Concepts Meaning Example
Preferences A disposition to act in a A father chose to marry

specific way, in a specific his daughter early rather
situation or class of than spending on her
situation. Preferences and education. So, he prefers
choices are connected but marriage over education
not the same. Choices for his daughter
reveal our preferences An educated married
woman from higher caste
in rural areas often prefers
to take care of the
household responsibilities
like cooking, cleaning,
washing, taking care of the
children and elderly
compared to going out for
work
Unconditional Preferences Preferences regardless of A father’s preference to
what one expect others do marry his daughter is not
or what one expects others based on other’s
think one should do. It expectations. He wants to
reflects independent choices marry her because he
found a good match for
her
A married woman doesn’t
prefer to work outside
because she finds outside
work to be physically
draining
Conditional Preferences Preference depends on one’s A father prefers to marry
expectation about other’s his daughter early because
appropriate behaviour and all others in his village and
one’s expectation about in his family have married
other’s thought on one’s their daughter at an early
appropriate behaviour. It age
represents interdependent A woman doesn’t prefer to
choices work outside because no
woman in her in-law’s
family have ever gone
outside to work and her
husband is earning well to
maintain the family
(continued)
26 I. DE ET AL.
Table 2.1 (continued)
Concepts Meaning Example
Personal Normative Beliefs They are the personal beliefs A father’s belief that he
about what one should do should marry his daughter
at an early age because it
is best for girls
A woman thinks that she
should not go for work as
her primary responsibility
is looking after
reproductive work
Empirical expectations These are expectations A father accepts to marry
about what other people his daughter at an early
do. They are expectations age because all other
about the actions of our villagers have also married
reference network. Empirical their daughters at an early
expectations are unilateral age
and multilateral. Unilateral A married woman doesn’t
when we imitate successful go out to work because no
people and multilateral other married women in
when we want to coordinate her family and
with others. It includes neighbourhood have ever
imitation, social proof and worked outside
coordination
Normative Expectations They are beliefs about what A father accepts to marry
others think one should do. his daughter at an early
Normative expectations are age because the fellow
called second order beliefs villagers and his family
as these are beliefs about thinks he should to it
other’s normative beliefs A married woman doesn’t
prefer to work outside
home because everyone in
her family and community
believe she should
concentrate on household
work only
Reference Network It is composed of the The neighbours, family
people whose beliefs and relatives, kins and
behaviours matter for one’s workplace friends are the
behaviour. The reference reference network for the
group include one’s peer father
group, kin group, family The husband’s family,
and community relatives, kins and
neighbours are the
reference network for the
married woman
Source Authors Compilation

Customs, Descriptive Norms, Moral Norms and Social Norms. Custom

is a habitual pattern of behaviour in which individuals prefer to conform
to it because it meets their needs. The actors have similar motivations
and conditions, but each act individually and preferences are uncondi-
tional (Bichhieri, 2006). For example wearing new cloths during festivals
or both male and female members working to make the ends meet for
the family. Moral norm is the rule of behaviour which individuals prefer
to conform because it is appropriate and right thing to do. For example:
helping a stranger in crisis or male helping female members in house-
hold chores. People prefer to defecate in the open spaces away from their
homes in order to avoid the smell of faeces in the house (Bicchieri, 2016).
Descriptive norm is a pattern of behaviour which individuals prefer
to conform on condition that they believe most people in their refer-
ence network conform to it. It is based on empirical expectations.
For instances, fads, fashions, rules of etiquette, conventions like traffic
signalling rules. Cialdini et al. (1990) have discussed about descriptive
norms which specify what is to be done and injunctive norms as what
ought to be done. Descriptive norms are called popular norms as they
inform behaviour and injunctive norms are called prescriptive norms
which motivates actions by promising social rewards or social sanctions.
For instance, engaging in tax fraud, it would be a descriptive norm if an
individual manipulates and avoids tax because all others in his reference
group are doing it. While it would be an injunctive norm if an individual
perceives that tax fraud to be morally wrong and could be penalized (Cial-
dini et al., 1990). Customs, moral norms and descriptive norms are based
on factual belief, personal normative belief and empirical expectations,
while it is only social norms which are based on empirical expectations as
well as normative expectations.
2.3 Collective Action

and Evolution of Social Norms
Social norms and institutions are result of collective actions as discussed
in Chapter 1. Collective actions are difficult to organize. This is because
people want to receive benefits of collective actions but do not want to
contribute for it. The latter is called free riding. If every individual wants
to skip contribution but enjoy benefit then collective good would not
be produced and benefits would not be obtained. Norms drive people
to organize collective actions, which lead to production of public good
28 I. DE ET AL.
or sustainable management of common resource. It restrains people’s

propensity to free ride. Without norms either person would free ride as
cost of monitoring people’s actions would become prohibitively high.
The difficulty of organizing a collective action, called collective action
problem, may be resolved through development of trust (Ostrom, 1998).
Trust reduces the transaction cost of monitoring as any institution would
have done. Trust develops a system by which people believe that others
will reciprocate to their actions. Reciprocation is a norm, called norms
of reciprocity (Dawes & Thaler, 1988; Ostrom, 1998). Through recip-
rocation people exhibit a standard pattern of action. The norm of
reciprocation is an institution as it is a rule ensuring reciprocation. You
will help others if others help you but you would not care about others if
they do not.
The reciprocity of individuals is dependent on trust, which in turn
depends on reputation. When there are many individuals who use reci-
procity, then there is an incentive to acquire a reputation of using
reciprocity, such as keeping promises and performing actions even if
people have to bear short-term costs and refrain from free riding (Ostrom,
1998). They would get long-term benefits instead. The higher the bene-
fits from reciprocation, the more is the inclination to follow it. The actions
of individuals lead to the belief that this is how one should behave. If
they do not follow, then there would be punishment. The higher the
retribution, the lower the free riding. In this framework, reputation is
an important ingredient of building trust and developing social norms.
However, reputation cannot be built in a short span of time. It needs to
get evolved over a period of time (Fig. 2.1).
Norms are evolved after individuals learn their best response strategies
from repetitive situations (Ostrom, 2010). These best response strate-
gies are heuristics (Lubell & Scholz, 2001; Ostrom, 2010). The theory
of repeated games suggests that individuals may be dissuaded from free
riding from fear of losing the benefits of cooperation in future (Seabright,
1993). In fact, individuals may resolve to cooperate after experiencing
repetitive benefits from own and other’s cooperative action. On the other
hand, after gathering experience individuals may resolve to never initiate
unilateral cooperation and to sanction non-co-operators.
The evolutionary theory and other empirical research in this area
suggest that humans have propensity to learn social norms (Pinker, 1994).
Furthermore, humans use domain-specific reasoning, thus distinguishing
between reasonings about deontic relationships such as what is forbidden,
Fig. 2.1 Development of social norms (Note Adapted from Ostrom [2007,
2010, p. 162]; modified and contextualized)
obligated or permitted and reasoning about what is true and false (Oaks-
ford & Chater, 1994). Human reasoning may help in evolving social
norms. Suppose there are two types of individuals in the society. There
could be rational egoist who have some intrinsic payoff of an action
(Ostrom, 2000). The payoff may be thought to be higher by violating
social norms of reciprocity. There could be conditional co-operators who
would reciprocate by following the social norms only if others also do
the same. Eventually the conditional co-operators who play trustworthy
strategies will receive higher payoff more frequently than the rational
egoist. The rational egoist would receive lower payoff since others do
not trust them. Finally, the trustworthy type would survive the evolu-
tionary process. The new entrants would adopt the strategies of those
who obtained higher payoffs in immediate past. Thus, new entrants would
follow the trustworthy co-operators.
The gender norms of division of work are learned from the childhood,
so as sanitation practice. If a new entrant wants to adopt a different
practice, then social sanction may make him or her believe that it is
beneficial to follow the norms and become co-operator. People accept
the social norms as they see others doing the same. They reciprocate
30 I. DE ET AL.
due to the reputation that others value the practice. Gender division of
work develops a system of trust that this is how work should be divided
between male and female. Therefore, they should be trained from child-
hood for the future. In case of sanitation practice, the reputation that
people would object open defecation or toilet use would desist open defe-
cation or toilet use, respectively. A trust would be developed that certain
sanitation behaviour is accepted.
Sanctioning for violating social norms may be outside the legal system,
or at times may be against the law. Sanctioning for use of toilet or efforts
made to usher gender equality may not be acceptable to the legal system
but still it would have social legitimacy. The legitimacy to control other’s
actions is drawn from acceptance of other’s right to partially control
own actions (Coleman, 1987). From this standpoint, social sanctioning is
potentially self-policing. It internalizes norms with minimum transaction
cost.
Changing regressive norms are difficult as sanctions would dissuade
individuals to change behaviour. To change norms a different set of
expectation need to be built. It requires initiatives towards changing and
developing new reputation, which are respected by the society. These
initiatives can be interpreted as delivering external shock for institutional
change as discussed in Chapter 1. People need to be convinced that open
defecation is detrimental for health and privacy. This would be a difficult
task as the heuristics need to be altered which are imbedded in the society.
Development intervention may deliver shock for changing the expected
behaviour and heuristics. The change may be easier if the proportion
of rational egoist supporting toilet use is higher than conservative co-
operators who are against it. This will lead to a situation discussed as
pluralistic ignorance where as soon as people get to know that most others
prefer toilet use, they would follow the suit.
2.4 Change of Norms

The seminal work of Bicchieri (2016) ‘Norms in the Wild: How to
Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms’ discusses in details how
some undesirable social norms such as open defecation and female genital
cutting can be modified, changed or suppressed. As norm change is diffi-
cult, Bicchieri (2016) discusses that trendsetters or the first movers will
initiate norm change. These trendsetters may deliver external shock (as
discussed in the previous section) to the institutional structure ushering
in changes in norms. Trendsetters are more independent in their thought

process than others so once they deviate from a norm, the risk of deviance
is viewed by others which may motivate others to deviate. The first movers
should be targeted first through surveys and vignettes in interventions.
Other alternative is the formation of small trendsetter groups. Their
behaviour is propagated within their communities and society through
use of media and campaigns. For example: use of mass media, television
advertisements to spread awareness about the ill consequence of open
defecation can spread diseases.
In order to bring a change in a social norm, interventions must
create new beliefs within an individual reference network, so that the
collective expectations of the people allow new behaviour to emerge.
A command and control public policy may fail to usher in behavioural
change. Evidence suggests that it is difficult to change a behaviour that
is in congruence with the social norm. If an individual disobeys a norm,
he loses social approval, faces taunts criticisms, mocked at, gossiped and
sanctioned in the group (Heise & Manji, 2016). This happens as institu-
tions and norms are endogenous as explained in the previous chapter. The
endogeneity of institutions makes suppression of harmful social norms
difficult.
When suppression of harmful social norms is problematic, bad norms
are sometimes better than their alternatives. For example: the case of Inti-
mate Partner Violence (IPV) among women in Tanzania. IPV is seen as a
gendered social norm which restricts women from reporting the cases in
the fear that it would bring shame to the community and impose stigma
on the survivor rather than the perpetuator of IPV (McCleary-Sills et al.,
2016). As institutions are stable and attempts to undermine norms may
lead to trust deficit, which have may other ramifications, some undesir-
able behaviour may not be completely done away with. These undesirable
norms can be interpreted in a new way, by making an addition to the
previous norm rather than completely replacing it (Bicchieri, 2016). For
example: in a community where the existing social norm is women should
only engage in household chores and should not work outside. Rather
than completely replacing the norm, women participation in work outside
home can be promoted by highlighting that woman working outside can
also provide financial support to the family at the time of needs. Thus,
women can work outside at the same time look after the household chores
at home.
32 I. DE ET AL.
In this regard, the difference between practical gender need and

strategic gender needs of women can be differentiated (Moser, 1989).
These needs are the gender concerns that may be satisfied through plan-
ning. The practical gender needs are formulated within sexual division
of labour and are response to immediate perceived necessities within a
specific context. Practical gender needs do not challenge the prevailing
forms of subordination. It only addresses women’s concerns in the
existing institutional structure, such as concerns of income-earning activ-
ities and domestic arenas and access to basic services. This is contrary
to the strategic gender needs which are formulated considering women’s
subordination to men and the need for a more equal and satisfactory alter-
native. Some examples of strategic gender needs are abolition of sexual
division of labour, freedom of choice over childbearing, measures against
male violence and control over women. The empowerment approach
seeks to reach the strategic gender needs though providing support
and security for practical gender needs. Thus, instead of challenging
norms directly, sometimes supporting within the existing norm may usher
desired set of norms.
The compliance of norms depends on the information available about
compliance in the public. Bicchieri et al. (2011) opined that norm
compliance is context dependent. In some cases where norm revealing
information are freely available and accessible, people’s behaviour is influ-
enced by the observation of what others do or by knowing what others
expect them to do. While in cases where norm relevant information is
less transparent, particularly private and costly to obtain, there is vari-
ability in individual behaviour and more selfish choices are made. Hence,
information on contravention of norms may weaken the norm itself. It
had implications for changing norms that are detrimental for the society.
Smerdon et al. (2019) argue that bad or discriminatory norms would
continue to exist as long as it is difficult or costly to communicate, size of
reference group is large, personal incentive to deviate from norm is small,
cost of communication and the sanctions for deviation are small or social
factors are strong.
Changing detrimental social norms is easier when there is plural-
istic ignorance. Pluralistic ignorance refers to a situation in which most
people have personal attitudes, beliefs and judgements that differ from the
prevailing norm but they falsely believe that the majority of the members
in a community have a private preference to maintain the status quo
(Miller & McFarland, 1987). Bicchieri (2006) explains that it is a cogni-

tive state of mind in which a person believes his personal normative beliefs
are different from the normative expectations. People comply with the
norm because they do not know the extent to which most people disagree
with it. By intervening change, pluralistic ignorance can be uncovered
by correcting people’s misperceptions of what other’s approve of and
eventually reducing compliance with the harmful practice sustained by
a norm (Anderson & Dunning, 2014; Dannals & Miller, 2017). In order
to abandon negative and undesirable norms the people’s empirical and
normative expectations are to be first changed. Bicchieri and Mercier
(2014) suggested that discussions and deliberations are effective ways
to enact change, as it will help to create new empirical and normative
expectations.
Another way of changing the norm is to impose government injunc-
tions (Bicchieri & Mercier, 2014) such as to abolish open defecation and
promote use of latrines. The change in shared norms would not be easily
complied in the group but with the imposition of sanctions in form of
fines and penalties, the norm of open defecation can be changed. The
social rewards in terms of granting money for building toilets would
bring a change in the norm. Government intervention such as the Swachh
Bharat Abhiyan in India for making the country open defecation free is
one such programme. But in all such cases a person’s personal normative
belief can be changed but the normative expectation and empirical expec-
tations are difficult to change. Even after attaining campaigns, imposing
fines and legislative interventions people may defecate in the open despite
building toilets. Deliberation and collective discussion can play a crucial
role in changing the normative expectations and avoiding the pluralistic
ignorance (Bicchieri & Mercier, 2014). But there are issues in discus-
sion because people might not be open about their private life in the
group setting, they may not discuss their sanitation behaviour in common.
However, with rounds of meetings and discussion people may agree to
abandon old norm and agree to accept new norm (Dagne, 2006). In case
of women workforce participation, the role of Self-Help Groups (SHGs)
could be significant. Gender norms can be altered through frequent
discussions and motivating and changing attitudes of other women who
believed that women should not work outside.
For changing a harmful social norm, the first step is to understand
the beliefs that reinforce the compliance to the norm. By changing the
empirical and normative expectations, one can abandon the norm. The
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Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made
consistent when a predominant preference was found in the
original book; otherwise they were not changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced
quotation marks were remedied when the change was
obvious, and otherwise left unbalanced.
Just for the curious: Chapter XVIII has four references to
“F. P. A.” but doesn’t give the full name. When this book was
written, he was a well-known columnist: Franklin P. Adams.
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Social Norms Gender and Collective Behaviour Development Paradigms in India Indranil de All Chapter

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Social Norms, Gender and Collective

Behaviour: Development Paradigms in

Social Norms, Gender

Shilpi Smita Panda

ISBN 978-981-16-6951-4 ISBN 978-981-16-6952-1 (eBook)

Cover illustration: © Melisa Hasan

The authors are grateful to United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

1 Introduction: Institutions and Social Norms 1

3.5 Socio-Economic Profile of the Respondents 43

6.5 Sanitation and Social Norms 147

Fig. 1.1 The logical structure of institutional facts (Note Author’s

Fig. 5.3 Majhra, West Bengal (Legends (1) Shape by Gender:

Table 2.1 Conceptual understanding of social norms framework 25

Table 6.6 Percentage distribution of households by access to toilet 140

Introduction: Institutions and Social Norms

Abstract Understanding of social norms is important for effective devel-

Keywords Social norms · Institutions · Institutionalization

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

over time. According to National Sample Survey, percentage of women

In this chapter, we provide in-depth understanding about social norms

1.2 Social Norms, Social Capital and Institutions

1.4 Social Norms

member’s behaviour and successfully employ sanctions whenever some

1.5 Development of Institutions

agent would be acting only as a part of collective action such as joining

A few examples may help in understanding institutionalization through

In a similar way, toilet use, or no use is an institution. Toilet is a physical

1.6 The Role of Institutions

require fair degree of certainty. Later Williamson (1981) defined trans-

1.7 Institutionalization Process

the pre-institutionalization stage whereby new structural arrangements

Fig. 1.2 Institutionalisation process of social norms (Note Adapted from

in promotion of the structure. Elites and political leaders may emerge

1.8 Institutional Change

one. Given institutions are endogenous, it is possible to change norms

1.9 Study on Implications of Norms

have discussed and suggested the development management policies for

North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), 97–

Understanding Social Norms

Abstract This chapter attempts to elaborate on social norms from the

Keywords Social norms · Collective behaviour · Norms changing

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 21

facts. This is because in such a situation there is hardly any collective

2.2 Collective Behaviour and Social Norms

Table 2.1 Conceptual understanding of social norms framework

Concepts Meaning Example

Preferences A disposition to act in a A father chose to marry

Table 2.1 (continued)

Concepts Meaning Example

Source Authors Compilation

Customs, Descriptive Norms, Moral Norms and Social Norms. Custom

2.3 Collective Action

or sustainable management of common resource. It restrains people’s

2.4 Change of Norms

in changes in norms. Trendsetters are more independent in their thought

In this regard, the difference between practical gender need and

(Miller & McFarland, 1987). Bicchieri (2006) explains that it is a cogni-

“Than by slow, pallid sunsets in autumn, ye watch from the shore,

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