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Speculation: Within and about Science
Peter Achinstein
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SPECULATION
SPECULATION
Within and About Science
PETER ACHINSTEIN
1
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Draga Juditomnak
“Speculation” (mass noun): The forming of a theory or conjecture
without firm evidence.
—Oxford Living Dictionaries
CONTENTS
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xv
1. Scientific Speculation: A Pragmatic Approach 1

2. The Complex Story of Simplicity: Ontological
and Epistemic Speculations 68
3. Non-Epistemic Simplicity: Maxwell, Newton,
and Speculation 122
4. Holism vs. Particularism: An Evidential
Debate (“Find the Ether”) 168
5. The Ultimate Speculation: A “Theory of
Everything” (What Is It, and Why Should We
Want One?) 216
6. Summing Up 262
Index 273
PREFACE
Every problem has a solution, and every solution has a

problem. That’s why there is speculation. It’s easier to do
and has fewer problems. That’s also why, according to some
scientists, philosophers speculate while scientists test and
prove. Philosophical claims are often just too vague, too
general, too abstract, and too numerous to be tested and
proved. When they become more precise, less general, more
concrete, and less numerous, they are candidates for sci-
entific investigation. They become capable of verification.
Therefore, according to some of the greatest defenders of sci-
ence, scientists have no need to speculate, and should com-
pletely avoid such a loose and unregulated activity.
This is not the only view about speculation that has been
advocated by great thinkers. A contrasting one is that spec-
ulation is crucial when you are trying to come up with an
explanation of a group of observed phenomena. For the ac-
tivity to be scientific, however, it must be followed, as soon
as possible, by an attempt to test and prove the speculation
x | P reface
by experiment and observation. Proponents of this view say

that the speculating stage should be subject to no rules or
constraints whatever. Scientists should be given free license
to invent even the wildest speculations. Rules and constraints
enter in the testing stage.
A third view is much more liberal than the other two.
It agrees with the second view in saying that speculation
is crucial and is not subject to rules and constraints, but it
disagrees with views one and two about testing. It says that
speculation is crucial in science especially in the absence of
testing and proof—indeed, when no tests have been made
or even planned. It is an important way of finding fault with
currently accepted theories, and it can lead to new ways of
thinking that may turn out to be fruitful and even right.
What shall we make of these contrasting positions? To
answer this question and others to be raised, we first need
to decide what a speculation is. Can this idea be defined in
some reasonable way so that what counts as a speculation
will match pretty well with claims that scientists and others
have classified as speculations? This is no easy task. Even
though there are philosophers and scientists who hold strong
views about the value of speculating and about when, if ever,
to do so, I find it surprising that they rarely attempt to define
the concept about which they have such views. Or, if they
do, they count as a speculation whatever fails to satisfy their
favorite rules of scientific method. So, my first task will be
to provide a clarifying definition that does not presuppose
any one particular view of scientific method. Assuming that
such a definition can be formulated, what attitude should be
taken with regard to speculations so defined? Is speculating
in science legitimate or not? If it is legitimate, is it subject to
P reface | x i
rules and constraints? Can speculations be evaluated even in

the absence of proof?
I will start with scientific speculations—ones made by
scientists about specific constituents of the physical world
and the laws governing them, e.g., nineteenth- century
speculations about the existence of light waves and an ether
in which light is waving, and twentieth-and twenty-first-
century speculations about the existence of strings vibrating
in 10-dimensional spacetime. Later, I will argue in some
detail that Newton’s law of gravity, despite his vehement
claims to the contrary, was indeed a speculation. I will also
consider much broader speculations made by scientists or
philosophers, or both, about the physical world and methods
to be used in finding out about that world. These include the
claim that nature is simple and that simplicity is an epistemic
virtue (claims made by Newton and Einstein in support of
theories they propose); that scientific theories can only be
confirmed “holistically” and not by establishing individual
propositions within them (Whewell, Duhem, Quine); and
that there is and must be a “Theory of Everything”—a theory
that can explain all phenomena by reference to fundamental
laws governing the universe and fundamental objects in that
universe (various physicists, especially string theorists, and
various philosophers, especially those who preach a strong
form of reductionism). These are all speculations, in a sense
I will give to that term. That, I will suggest, is not enough to
throw them out. But it is not enough to praise them, either.
What attitude should we take toward speculations, and why?
My answer will reject all three views mentioned above (“don’t
speculate,” “speculate, but test,” and “speculate like mad even
if you can’t test.”)
x i i | P reface
I have contrasted speculation with proof. But “proof ”

is too strong a term here because it suggests certainty. If
speculations are understood simply as claims that have
not been proved, too many scientific claims would be
speculations. What scientists typically supply is evidence.
And what they want, if they can get it, is evidence that
provides a good reason to believe a claim they are making.
If such evidence is lacking for a claim, then the latter might
well be considered a speculation. At least that is the general
idea of speculation I want to develop, make precise, and de-
fend. To do so, I will need to talk about evidence itself, a con-
cept I have examined in detail in other works.1 “Evidence,”
I argue, has several different senses, each of which can be
defined by reference to a basic concept I call “potential evi-
dence,” which I define using an objective epistemic concept
of probability and a concept of “correct explanation,” which
I also define.2 However, my purpose in the present work is
not to develop or defend these concepts further but, rather,
to use them to help us understand the idea of speculation, to
show how speculations are to be evaluated as speculations,
and to evaluate various “grand” and “less grand” speculations,
including the ones mentioned above, that have been made by
scientists and philosophers. For readers not familiar with my
concepts and definitions of evidence and explanation, I will
explain them briefly when they are introduced.
William Whewell regarded speculation as crucial to sci-
ence. The “tendencies of our speculative nature” lead the
1. See Peter Achinstein, The Book of Evidence (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001).
2. See Peter Achinstein, The Nature of Explanation (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1983).
P reface | x i i i
greatest scientists to produce the most important ideas.

“Advances in knowledge,” he writes, “are not commonly
made without the previous exercises of some boldness and
license in guessing.”3 Yes, Whewell argues, speculations have
to be proved, but that is a task in the “testing” stage of sci-
entific practice. The first stage is discovering and proposing
the ideas to be tested, which is not subject to constraints, he
claims. The second stage, the testing one, requires those ideas
to be proved or disproved. Is that all there is to it? If not, what
else is there?
James Clerk Maxwell, one of physics’ greatest speculators,
held strong pragmatic views about how and when to speculate
and how to evaluate speculations as such. He put them into
practice when theorizing about electricity and molecules.
In this book, I will invoke some of Maxwell’s speculations
in physics, particularly those about molecules, and his phil-
osophical views about speculating. Like him, I will take a
pragmatic approach. (For what this means, and how such
an approach works in the case of speculations, the reader is
invited to keep reading.) Unlike Maxwell, Isaac Newton held
a non-pragmatic opinion about speculation in his “Rules for
the Study of Natural Philosophy” and “General Scholium” in
Book 3 of the Principia. Briefly expressed: Prove, never spec-
ulate! His practice, however, is somewhat different, as I will
argue, even with respect to his greatest accomplishment, the
law of gravity. Newton and Maxwell both engaged in specu-
lation, and both defended important positions on the topic
3. William Whewell, The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded

upon their History, 2 vols. (London: John W. Parker, 1840); parts of vol. 1,
chap. 5, are reprinted in Peter Achinstein, Science Rules (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2004), 150–167.
x i v | P reface
that are well worth examining. Their views are among those
that will be considered in determining what attitude we
should take toward speculation. Unlike the suggestion at the
beginning, I will argue that speculation is an essential part
of science, not just philosophy, and it is not easy to do, or
at least to do well. But, by contrast with those scientists and
philosophers who are in favor of speculation and hold the
second and third views noted earlier, it is not, nor should it
be, done freely and without constraints.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am indebted to Justin Bledin, Richard Dawid, Steven

Gimbel, Fred Kronz, and Richard Richards for reading the
entire book or parts thereof and making important comments
and criticisms. I also want to thank students in my Spring
2017 graduate seminar for their participation in the study
and activity of speculating. That seminar included two who
thankfully agreed to read proofs: Maegan Reese and Richard
Teague; they did so with expertise. Finally, my deepest ap-
preciation is to Isaac Newton and James Clerk Maxwell not
only for their monumental speculations, but also for their
clashing philosophical views about speculating.
SPECULATION
1
✦
SCIENTIFIC SPECULATION
A Pragmatic Approach
Hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based

on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in ex-
perimental philosophy.
—I s a a c N e w t o n
I think that only daring speculation can lead us further,

and not accumulation of facts.
—A l b e r t E i n s t e i n
1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N
During the history of science, controversies have emerged

regarding the legitimacy of speculating in science. At
the outset, I will understand speculating as introducing
assumptions without knowing that there is evidence for
those assumptions. If there is evidence, the speculator does
not know that. If there is no such evidence, the speculator
may or may not know that. The speculator may even be
introducing such assumptions implicitly without realizing
that he is. In any of these cases (under certain conditions to
be specified later), he is speculating. I will use the term “spec-
ulation” to refer both to the activity of speculating and to the
product of that activity—i.e., the assumptions themselves.
2 | S peculation : W ithin and A bout S cience
Which meaning is intended should be clear from the con-

text. In this chapter, I propose to do three things: first, to
clarify and expand the initial characterization of speculation
just given; second, to ask whether and under what conditions
speculating in science is a legitimate activity; and third, as-
suming that speculating is or can be legitimate, to consider
how, if at all, speculations are to be evaluated. Although
philosophers and scientists have expressed strong and con-
flicting opinions on the subject of the second task, little has
been written about the other two, particularly the first.
In section 2, I offer three examples of speculations from
the history of physics. In section 3, I introduce three influen-
tial contrasting views about whether and when speculating
is legitimate in science. In sections 4 through 10, I focus on
the basic definitional question, attempting to show exactly
how the concept of speculation can be defined using var-
ious concepts of evidence—my own and Bayesian ones. In
section 11, I discuss and reject the three contrasting views
about speculation presented in section 3. In sections 12 and
13, I defend a different view—a pragmatic one suggested
by James Clerk Maxwell, one of the great speculators in
physics, who had very interesting philosophical ideas about
speculation.
2 . T H R E E S P E C U L AT I O N S
FROM PHYSICS
Let me begin with three examples from the history of physics,

together with claims of their detractors who reject or at least
criticize them not because they are false or refuted but be-
cause they are speculations.
S cientific S peculation | 3
a. Thomas Young’s Wave Theory of Light
In 1802, Thomas Young published “On the Theory of Light

and Colours,”1 in which he resuscitated the wave theory of
light by introducing four basic assumptions: first, that a rare
and highly elastic luminiferous ether pervades the universe;
second, that a luminous body excites undulations in this
ether; third, that the different colors depend on the frequency
of the vibrations; fourth, that bodies attract this medium so
that the medium accumulates within them and around them
for short distances. With these and other assumptions, Young
shows how to explain various observed properties of light.
In 1803, Henry Brougham, a defender of the particle
theory of light, wrote a scathing review of Young’s paper, in
which he says:
As this paper contains nothing which deserves the names ei-

ther of experiment or discovery, . . . it is in fact destitute of
every species of merit. . . . A discovery in mathematics, or a
successful induction of facts, when once completed, cannot be
too soon given to the world. But . . . an hypothesis is a work
of fancy, useless in science, and fit only for the amusement of
a vacant hour.2
Brougham defends the Newtonian particle theory of light on

the grounds that it is inductively supported by experiments,
and he rejects Young’s wave theory on the grounds that it is
mere speculation.
1. Thomas Young, “On the Theory of Light and Colours,” Philosophical

Transactions of the Royal Society 92 (1802): 12–48.
2. Henry Brougham, Edinburgh Review 1 (1803): 450, 455.
b. William Thomson (Lord Kelvin): Baltimore

Lectures on Molecules and the Wave Theory
of Light
In 1884, Sir William Thomson delivered a series of lectures at

Johns Hopkins University on “molecular dynamics and the
wave theory of light.” His aim was to provide a molecular
interpretation for the luminiferous ether postulated by the
wave theory. He assumes that there is an ether and that its
properties can be described mechanically. He writes:
It seems probable that the molecular theory of matter may be

so far advanced sometime or other that we can understand an
excessively fine-grained structure and understand the lumi-
niferous ether as differing from glass and water and metals in
being very much more finely grained in its structure.3
He proceeds by offering various mechanical models of the

ether to explain known optical phenomena, including recti-
linear propagation, reflection, refraction, and dispersion.
In his 1906 classic The Aim and Structure of Physical
Theory,4 Pierre Duhem excoriates Thomson for presenting
a disorderly series of contradictory models (as, he claims
British minds, incapable of continental (meaning French)
orderliness, are wont to do), for invoking occult causes,
and for not producing a “system of principles, which aim to
3. Reprinted in Robert Kargon and Peter Achinstein, eds., Kelvin’s

Baltimore Lectures and Modern Theoretical Physics (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1987), 14.
4. Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, trans. Philip P.
Wiener (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954, 1982).
represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible

a set of experimental laws” (p. 19). Duhem writes:
The multiplicity and variety of the models proposed by

Thomson to represent the constitution of matter does not
astonish the French reader very long, for he very quickly
recognizes that the great physicist has not claimed to be fur-
nishing an explanation acceptable to reason, and that he has
only wished to produce a work of imagination.5
Again, the complaint is that we have a theory, or set of them,

that are pure speculations, and ones of the worst kind, since
they lack order and simplicity.
c. String Theory
Characterized by some of its proponents as a “Theory of

Everything,” it attempts to unify general relativity and
quantum mechanics into a single framework by postulating
that all the particles and forces of nature arise from strings
that vibrate in 10-dimensional spacetime (according to one
prominent version) and are subject to a set of simple laws
specified in the theory. The strings, which can be open with
endpoints or closed loops, vibrate in different patterns giving
rise to particles such as electrons and quarks.
The major problem, or at least one of them, is that there
are no experiments that show that strings and 10-dimensional
spacetime exist. The theory is generally regarded, especially
by its critics, as being entirely speculative. Steven Weinberg,
5. Duhem, Aim and Structure, chap. 4, sec. 5.

once an enthusiastic supporter of string theory (as the “final

theory”) in 2015 writes:
String theory is . . . very beautiful. It appears to be just barely

consistent mathematically, so that its structure is not arbitrary,
but largely fixed by the requirement of mathematical consist-
ency. Thus it has the beauty of a rigid art form—a sonnet or
a sonata. Unfortunately, string theory has not yet led to any
predictions that can be tested experimentally, and as a result
theorists (at least most of us) are keeping an open mind as to
whether the theory actually applies to the real world. It is this
insistence on verification that we mostly miss in all the poetic
students of nature, from Thales to Plato.6
As these examples illustrate, speculations are assumptions

normally introduced in the course of activities such as
explaining, unifying, predicting, or calculating. Young sought
to explain, or at least to see whether it is possible to explain,
known phenomena of light by a theory other than the particle
theory. Kelvin was attempting to provide a molecular account
of the ether, and in terms of this, to explain the known op-
tical phenomena. String theorists want to explain and unify
the four known fundamental forces and calculate the funda-
mental constants of nature. In the course of doing so, they
introduce speculative assumptions.
There are two sorts of speculations I want to distinguish.
The first, and most common, are made by speculators who,
without knowing that there is evidence (if there is), intro-
duce assumptions under these conditions: (a) They believe
that the assumptions are either true, or close to the truth,
6. Steven Weinberg, To Explain the World (New York: Harper, 2015), 14.
or possible candidates for truth that are worth considering.

(b) They introduce such assumptions when explaining,
predicting, unifying, calculating, and the like, even if the
assumptions in question turn out to be incorrect.7 I will call
(a) and (b) “theorizing” conditions. Assumptions introduced,
without knowing that there is evidence for them, but in a
way satisfying these conditions, I will call truth-relevant
speculations. They are represented by the three examples
just given.
In other cases, assumptions, without evidence, are
introduced in the course of explaining, predicting, unifying,
etc., but their introducers do not believe that they are true,
or close to the truth, or even possible candidates for truth.
Indeed, it is often believed that they are false and cannot be
true. A good example, which I will discuss in section 12, is
Maxwell’s imaginary fluid hypothesis introduced in his 1855
paper “On Faraday’s Lines of Force.” Here, to represent the
electromagnetic field, Maxwell describes an incompressible
fluid flowing through tubes of varying section. The fluid is
not being proposed as something that exists or might exist.
It is, as Maxwell says, purely imaginary. Its purpose is to pro-
vide a fluid analogue of the electromagnetic field that will
help others to understand known electrical and magnetic
laws by employing an analogy between these laws and ones
governing an imaginary fluid.
Another prominent example of this second type of
speculation is atomic theory as viewed by some nineteenth-
century positivists. They employed the assumptions of
atomic theory not as ones they believed to be true, or close
7. Anti- realists can substitute “empirically adequate” for “true” and

“correct.” I don’t want to provide an account of speculation just for realists.
to it, or as possible candidates for truth, but as fictions useful

for explaining, predicting, and unifying certain observable
phenomena.8 For them, as for Maxwell in the imaginary fluid
case, no evidence is given for the truth of the assumptions
introduced. Indeed, evidence is irrelevant, since truth is.
I will call these truth-irrelevant speculations.
Both truth- relevant and truth- irrelevant speculations
contain assumptions about objects and their behavior for
which there is no known evidence. Both are introduced for
purposes of explaining, predicting, and organizing phe-
nomena.9 That is why I call them both speculations. The
8. As with Maxwell’s incompressible fluid, the explanations are not meant

to be causal. In Maxwell’s case, we explain, not what causes the phe-
nomena but what they are, as well as unify them, by invoking an analogy
between these phenomena and others, real or imagined (see section 12,
this chapter). In the atomic case, according to some positivists, we ex-
plain not what causes—e.g., Brownian motion—but how the observed
Brownian particles are moving. We explain that they are moving as if they
are being randomly bombarded by molecules (without committing our-
selves to the claim that they are being so bombarded). For my own ac-
count of explanation in general, and non-causal explanation in particular,
see Achinstein, Nature of Explanation. For a much more recent account
of non-causal explanations, see Marc Lange, Because without Cause: Non-
Causal Explanations in Science and Mathematics (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016).
9. There are non-speculative cases when assumptions are introduced
without knowing that there is evidence for them—e.g., introducing an as-
sumption known to be false in the course of giving a reductio argument,
or in the course of giving an historical account of a discarded theory, or
just to see whether it is consistent with what we know. But here the as-
sumption does not satisfy “theorizing” condition (b), required for both
truth-relevant and truth-irrelevant speculations. It is not introduced with
the purpose of explaining, predicting, etc., but in the first case, just with
the purpose of showing that it is false; in the second, just doing some his-
tory of science; and in the third just determining consistency. Nor, in such
cases, does the assumption satisfy the “theorizing” condition (a) required
difference between them stems from “theorizing” condition

(a). Truth-relevant speculations satisfy it, truth-irrelevant
speculations do not. However, both kinds are anathema to
writers such as Brougham, who demands inductive proof
based on experiment, and Duhem, who rejected atomic
theory construed either realistically or as a useful fiction.
According to their detractors, one must refrain from using
both truth-relevant and truth-irrelevant speculations. In the
former case, one is to do so until one determines that there is
sufficient evidence to believe the assumptions, in which case
they are no longer speculations. In the latter case, one is to
find assumptions for which there is such evidence. By con-
trast, according to proponents such as Maxwell, speculations
of both kinds are legitimate in science and can be evaluated.
They do not need to be avoided or rejected simply on the
grounds that they are speculations.
My discussion of truth-irrelevant speculations and how
they are to be evaluated will appear in section 12. The main
focus of this chapter will be on truth-relevant speculations.
Until section 12, when I speak of speculations I will mean
just these. (Some readers, indeed, might prefer to restrict the
term “speculation” to these, using a different term—e.g., “im-
aginary construction”—for truth-irrelevant ones. Because of
similarities just noted, I will continue to classify them both as
speculations, while recognizing an important difference be-
tween them.) Truth-relevant speculations have sparked the
for truth-relevant speculations. It is not introduced with the idea that it is

true, or close to the truth, or a candidate for truth worth considering. To
be sure, in such cases the epistemic situation of the introducer may change,
and the assumption may come to be treated by the introducer in a way sat-
isfying (a) and/or (b). But that is a different situation.
1 0 | S peculation : W ithin and A bout S cience
most controversy among scientists and philosophers. I turn

to three contrasting views about them next.
3 . S P E C U L AT I O N C O N T R O V E R S I E S
The conflicting views I have in mind are very conservative,

moderate, and very liberal.
a. Very Conservative
The idea can be simply expressed: “don’t speculate.” I will

take this to mean: Don’t introduce an assumption into a sci-
entific investigation, with the idea that it is or might be true
or close to it, if you don’t know that there is evidence for it.
Earlier we saw such a view expressed in Brougham’s response
to Thomas Young’s speculations about light. Let me mention
two other scientists who express this idea as part of their gen
eral scientific methodology: Descartes and Newton, both of
whom demand certainty when assumptions are introduced
in scientific investigations.
In his Rule 3 of “Rules for the Direction of the Mind,”
Descartes writes, “we ought to investigate what we can
clearly and evidently intuit or deduce with certainty, and
not what other people have thought or what we ourselves
conjecture. For knowledge can be obtained in no other
way.”10 He continues: those who, “on the basis of prob-
able conjectures venture also to make assertions on ob-
scure matters about which nothing is known, . . . gradually
10. Reprinted in Peter Achinstein, ed., Science Rules (Baltimore: Johns

Hopkins University Press, 2004), 19.
S cientific S peculation | 1 1
come to have complete faith in these assertions, indiscrim-

inately mixing them up with others that are true and evi-
dent.” And in Rule 12, he writes: “If in the series of things
to be examined we come across something which our intel-
lect is unable to intuit sufficiently well, we must stop at that
point, and refrain from the superfluous task of examining
the remaining items.” Indeed, Descartes’ view is consider-
ably stronger than “don’t speculate” (in the sense of specu-
lation I briefly characterized earlier). His view of “evidence”
requires proof with mathematical certainty. And it requires
more than knowing that there is such a proof. It demands
knowing what the proof is.
Newton, at the end of the Principia, claims to have proved
the law of gravity (not with the certainty of mathematical
proof, but in his sense of empirically established: “deduced
from the phenomena”). He admits, however, that he has “not
yet assigned a cause to gravity”—i.e., a reason why the law of
gravity holds and has the consequences it does. He says he
will not “feign” a hypothesis about this cause, “for whatever is
not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypoth
esis, and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or
based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in
experimental philosophy. In this experimental philosophy,
propositions are deduced from the phenomena and are made
general by induction.”
Finally, when defenders of this “very conservative” view
say “don’t speculate,” I will take them to mean at least that
scientists should not make public their speculations. Perhaps
they would allow scientists to indulge in speculation in pri-
vate. (Descartes seems to disallow even that.) But, at a min-
imum, scientists should avoid publishing their speculations
or communicating them in other ways to the scientific
community, an injunction violated by Thomas Young, Lord

Kelvin, and string theorists.
b. Moderate
The slogan of this view is a modification of one expressed

by President Reagan: “Speculate, but verify.” In the mid-
nineteenth century, William Whewell formulated the idea
succinctly in this passage: “advances in knowledge are not
commonly made without the previous exercise of some bold-
ness and license in guessing.”11 In the twentieth century, it
was Karl Popper’s turn:
According to the view that will be put forward here, the

method of critically testing theories and selecting them ac-
cording to the results of test, always proceeds on the following
lines. From a new idea, put up tentatively, and not yet justi-
fied in any way—an anticipation, a hypothesis, a theoretical
system, or what you will—conclusions are drawn by means of
logical deduction.12
The general idea expressed by these and other so-called

hypothetico-deductivists, is that the correct scientific proce-
dure is to start with a speculation, which is then to be tested
by deriving consequences from it, at least some of which can
be established, or disproved, experimentally. Even if you do
not know that there is evidence for h, you can introduce h
11. William Whewell, chap. 5 from Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences,

quoted in Achinstein, Science Rules, 155.
12. Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Basic Books,
1959), 32.
into a scientific investigation as a (truth- relevant) spec-

ulation, provided you then proceed to test h to determine
whether there is evidence that h. The only constraint Popper
imposes on the speculation is that it be bold (e.g., speculating
that Newton’s law of gravity holds for the entire universe,
and not just for the solar system). Bolder speculations are
easier to test and falsify. According to Whewell, scientists are
usually capable of putting forth different speculations to ex-
plain a set of phenomena, and this is a good thing: “A facility
in devising [different] hypotheses, therefore, is so far from
being a fault in the intellectual character of a discoverer, that
it is, in truth, a faculty indispensable to his task.”13 For these
writers there are, then, no constraints on the character of
the speculation, other than (for Popper) boldness, and (for
Whewell) multiplicity.
The constraints emerge in the testing stage, concerning
which Whewell and Popper have significantly different
views. Whewell believes that speculative theories can be
verified to be true by showing that they exhibit “consili-
ence” (they can explain and predict a range of different phe-
nomena in addition to the ones that prompted the theories
in the first place) and “coherence” (they contain assumptions
that fit together, that are not ad-hoc, etc., especially as new
assumptions are added when new phenomena are discov-
ered). Popper believes that speculative theories cannot be
verified, only falsified, by deriving consequences from them
that can be tested experimentally and shown to be false. If
the speculative theory withstands such attempts to falsify it,
all we can claim is that it is well-tested, not that it is verified
or true. But, for our purposes, the important claim for both
13. In Achinstein, Science Rules, 154.

theorists is that speculation is not enough for science. There

must be empirical testing. So, in practical terms, we might
put it like this: If you want to do science, it is fine, even neces-
sary, to speculate. But that must be followed by testing. Don’t
publish your speculations without at least some progress in
testing, even if that amounts only to saying how experiments
should be designed.
c. Very Liberal
The slogan here is “Speculate like mad, even if you cannot

verify.” The most famous proponent of this idea is Paul
Feyerabend, who proposes adopting a “principle of prolifer-
ation: invent and elaborate theories which are inconsistent
with the accepted point of view, even if the latter should
happen to be highly confirmed and generally accepted . . . ,
such a principle would seem to be an essential part of any
critical empiricism.”14 Feyerabend believes that introducing
speculations, particularly ones that are incompatible with
accepted theories, is the best way to “test” those theories
critically by finding alternative explanations that might be
better than those offered by the accepted theories. He places
no restrictions on such speculations, other than that they
be worked out and taken seriously. On his view, you may,
and indeed are encouraged to, publish your speculations
even when you have no idea how to test them empirically.
Feyerabend would have awarded high marks to Thomas
Young, Lord Kelvin, and string theorists for inventing and
elaborating speculations about light waves, a mechanical
ether, and strings, even if they produced no testable results,
14. Paul Feyerabend, “Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory

of Knowledge,” reprinted in part in Achinstein, Science Rules, 377.
or, indeed, even if they produced results incompatible with

what are regarded as empirically established facts.15
4 . W H AT C O U N T S A S E V I D E N C E ?
How the conflicting claims in the previous section are to be

evaluated depends crucially on what is to count as evidence,
since the characterization of speculation I have given so far
does, too. We need to get clear about what concept or concepts
of evidence we should use in understanding what it is to be
a speculation, and what implications this will have for views,
including the three above, about whether speculating is le-
gitimate and how, if at all, speculations are to be evaluated.
A standard Bayesian idea is that something is evidence
for a hypothesis if and only if it increases the probability of
the hypothesis; that is:
(B) e is evidence that h if and only if p(h/e) > p(h).16
15. I began the chapter with two quotes, one from Newton and one from
Einstein. It is clear that Newton’s “official” view about speculation puts him
in the very conservative camp. (His practice, as I will note in section 11,
was somewhat different.) Where to put Einstein is less clear. Perhaps he
should be placed somewhere between the “moderate” and “very liberal”
camps, more toward the latter. Like Whewell, he believed that fundamental
theories in physics “cannot be extracted from experience but must be freely
invented.” But, unlike Whewell, he thought that theories cannot be em-
pirically verified by showing that they explain and predict a range of phe-
nomena. Theories are “underdetermined” by the evidence. (In chapter 3,
I will discuss this underdetermination claim.) And as my initial Einstein
quote suggests, and as Einstein in his actual practice confirmed, speculation
is crucial even in the absence of empirical test or knowledge of how to test.
16. Many of those who write about evidence use the letter h for “hypoth
esis.” I will do so, too, but will also use the terms “hypothesis” and “as-
sumption” interchangeably, and h for both.
I will call this B-(for Bayesian) evidence in what follows.

Depending on what sort of Bayesian you are, probability
here can be construed either subjectively or objectively. In
the former case, we obtain a subjective concept of evidence;
in the latter, an objective one.
Elsewhere, using numerous counterexamples, I have
argued that definition (B), whether understood subjectively
or objectively, provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for evidence—as the latter concept is employed in
the sciences.17 I replace this concept with several others, the
most basic of which I call “potential evidence.” It defines ev-
idence using a concept of (objective epistemic) probability
and a concept of explanation.18 The idea is that for e to be
potential evidence that h, there must be a high probability
(at least greater than ½) that, given e, there is an explana-
tory connection between h and e. There is an explanatory
connection between h and e, which I shall write as E(h,e),
if and only if either h correctly explains why e is true, or e
17. Briefly, here is an example that questions the sufficiency of (B): The fact
that I bought one ticket out of 1 million sold in a fair lottery is not evidence
that I won, although it increases the probability. Here is an example against
the necessity of (B): A patient takes medicine M to relieve symptoms S,
where M works 95% of the time. Ten minutes later he takes medicine
M′, which is 90% effective but has fewer side effects and destroys the ef-
ficacy of the first medicine. In this case, I claim that his taking M′ as he
did is evidence that his symptoms will be relieved, even though the prob-
ability of relief has decreased. For a detailed discussion of these and other
counterexamples, possible Bayesian replies to them, and my responses,
see Achinstein, The Book of Evidence (New York: Oxford University Press,
2001), chap. 4.
18. Both concepts are explicated in the books cited in notes 8 and 17. For
a discussion of the relevant concept of explanation, see chapter 4 in the
present book.
correctly explains why h is true, or some hypothesis correctly

explains why both h and e are true. In what follows, I will call
this and the related concepts I introduce A-(Achinsteinian)
evidence:
(A) Potential Evidence: Some fact e is potential evidence

that h if and only if p(E(h,e)/e) > ½; e is true; and e does not
entail h.
The concept of probability involved (objective epi-

stemic probability) measures the degree of reasonableness
of believing a proposition. I claim that evidence, and hence
reasonableness of belief, is a “threshold” concept with respect
to probability; and that when the threshold has been passed,
e provides a good reason to believe h—where the degree
of reasonableness increases with the degree of probability
p(E(h,e)/e).
I will briefly mention three other concepts of evidence
that are defined in terms of “potential evidence.”
(A′) Veridical Evidence: Some fact e is veridical evidence that

h if and only if e is potential evidence that h, h and e are both
true, and in fact there is an explanatory connection between
h and e.
Using (A′) we can define a concept of evidence that is

relativized to the epistemic situation ES of some actual or
potential agent:
(A″) ES-Evidence: Some fact e is ES-evidence that h (relative to

an epistemic situation ES) if e is true and anyone in ES is justi-
fied in believing that e is veridical evidence that h.
An epistemic situation is a type of abstract situation in which

one knows or believes that certain propositions are true, and
one is not in a position to know that others are, even if such a
situation does not in fact obtain for any person.19
Finally, as a counterpart to the Bayesian concept that is
subjective, I offer this:
(A′′′) Subjective Evidence: Some fact e is person P’s subjective

evidence that h if and only if P believes that e is veridical evi-
dence that h, and P’s reason for believing that h is true is that
e is true.
An example of all four types of A-evidence is given in note

20.20 The first three are objective concepts, in the sense that
whether e is evidence that h does not depend on whether an-
yone in fact believes that e is evidence that h. In this sense,
only the last, A′′′, is subjective.
19. A person in a given epistemic situation ES may not know that some
propositions P1, . . . ,Pn believed in that situation are true. But if, on the
basis of P1, . . . ,Pn, such a person is to be justified in believing that e is
veridical evidence that h, then the person must be justified in believing
P1, . . . ,Pn. For more on epistemic situations and ES-evidence, see
Achinstein, Book of Evidence, chap. 1.
20. In 1883, Heinrich Hertz performed experiments on cathode rays
in which he attempted to deflect them electrically. He was unable to do
so, and concluded that they are not charged. Fourteen years later, J. J.
Thomson claimed that Hertz’s experiments were flawed because the air
in the cathode tube used was not sufficiently evacuated, thus blocking
any electrical effects. In Thomson’s experiments when greater evacua-
tion was achieved, electrical effects were demonstrated. Hertz’s experi-
mental results constituted his subjective evidence that cathode rays are not
charged. They were also ES-evidence for this hypothesis, since, given his
epistemic situation in 1883, he was justified in believing that the results
I much prefer the definitions supplied by the (As) to that

supplied by (B). But since there are so many adherents to
the Bayesian definition, I will make reference to that as
well as to the (As) in my discussion of scientific specula-
tion. Let’s see how far we can get with either type of def-
inition. Later, I will show why, in order to offer a more
complete definition of speculation, the basic Bayesian
definition (B) needs to be upgraded in a way that makes it
much closer to (A).
5 . T R U T H -R E L E VA N T
S P E C U L AT I O N S
With these concepts of evidence in mind, I return to the

task of clarifying what it is to be a truth-relevant specula-
tion. In the case of such a speculation, a speculator P, without
knowing that there is evidence for assumption h, introduces
h under “theorizing” conditions (a) and (b) of section 2. In
saying that P is speculating when introducing h under con-
dition (a), I don’t mean that P believes true (or close to the
truth, or a candidate for truth worth considering) just a con-
ditional statement of the form “if h, then. . . .” I mean that
he believes this with respect to h itself. Of course, the spec-
ulative assumption introduced may itself be a conditional
constituted veridical evidence. But because the experimental set-up was

flawed, unbeknownst to him, they constituted neither potential nor ve-
ridical evidence. By contrast, Thomson’s experimental results constituted
evidence in all four of these senses for the hypothesis that cathode rays are
electrically charged.
whose antecedent is h. But then it is the entire conditional

that is the speculation, not h by itself.21
If P introduces h in a way that satisfies the “theorizing”
conditions (a) and (b), we might say that
(Spec): h is a (truth-relevant) speculation for P if and only if P

does not know that there is evidence that h.
One way to know that there is evidence that h is to know

what that evidence is and to know that it is evidence that
h—i.e., to know of some fact e that it is evidence that h. But it
is also possible to know that there is evidence that h without
knowing what that evidence is. If authoritative textbooks all
tell me that that there is evidence for the existence of the top
quark without telling me what that evidence is, and I intro-
duce the assumption that the top quark exists and do so in
a way that satisfies the “theorizing” conditions, then my as-
sumption is not a speculation for me, since I know there is
evidence for its existence.
If you introduce a hypothesis h under the “theorizing”
conditions, and you don’t know that there is evidence that
21. What about “thought experiments,” understood as describable by

conditionals whose antecedents will not be, or could not be, satisfied?
Some are not speculations at all, since the thought experimenter knows
there is evidence for the conditional expressing the thought experiment.
An example is Newton’s thought experiment involving many moons re-
volving around the earth, the lowest of which barely grazes the highest
mountains on the earth. Newton provides evidence that if such a moon
did exist and lost its inertial motion, it would fall at the same rate of ac-
celeration as bodies do near the earth (see c hapter 3). If Newton did not
know that there is evidence for such a conditionally expressed thought
experiment, then if he introduced it while “theorizing,” it would have been
a truth-relevant speculation.
h, then if h is true you don’t know that it is. Speculating in

this way entails lack of knowledge of the truth of the specu-
lation. However, the converse is not true. If you introduce h
under the “theorizing” conditions without knowing that h is
true, it doesn’t follow that you are speculating, at least on the
concept of speculation I am proposing, since you may know
that there is evidence that h is true. On this concept, lack of
knowledge that h is a necessary but not a sufficient condi-
tion for speculating that h. By extension, if you introduce h
under the “theorizing” conditions, and unbeknownst to you
h is false, the fact that h is false doesn’t make h a speculation
for you, since you may know facts that you know to be evi-
dence that h is true.22
A good deal more needs to be said about various ideas
associated with (Spec). I will do so in the remainder of this
section and the next two sections.
In (Spec), h stands for an individual assumption. Now,
as is the case with the three examples of speculations from
physics at the beginning of this chapter, theories usually con-
tain sets of assumptions, some of which may be speculations,
some not. It is not my claim that each assumption in a spec-
ulative theory is necessarily a speculation.
I have spoken of speculators introducing assumptions.
As noted earlier, normally this is done in the course of
“theorizing” activities such as explaining, predicting,
22. An example: Let e, which you know to be true, be that you own 95% of
the tickets in a fair lottery. Let h be that you will win the lottery. Assume
that e is (potential) evidence that h, and that you know this. Suppose
that, unbeknownst to you, h is false, and you introduce h in the course of
“theorizing,” doing so believing that h is true. Since you know that there is
evidence that h—indeed, very strong evidence—you are not speculating,
even though h is false.
calculating, etc. But occasionally it is done with little if any

“theorizing” on that occasion by writing them down and
calling them “assumptions,” “speculations,” or “hypotheses”
that the speculator believes to be true or possible and worth
further investigation at some point. Newton does this in his
Queries in the Opticks when he speculates about the particle
nature of light, though even there he theorizes a bit by of-
fering a few arguments against the rival wave theory. I will
call both cases speculating while “theorizing,” even if the
theorizing is intended for a future occasion.
Among the speculations introduced in a theory consisting
of many assumptions, some may be intended as literally true,
some may be thought of as approximations with different
degrees of closeness to the truth, while still others may be
regarded as just possibilities worth considering. In chapter 3,
I will argue that, despite Newton’s claims to the contrary, his
law of gravity was a speculation, but one he believed to be lit-
erally true. His assumption that the only gravitational force
acting to produce the orbit of a given planet was the gravita-
tional force of the sun acting on the planet was also a specu-
lation, but an assumption he regarded as only approximately
true. And the speculation that “the center of the system of the
world is at rest”—which he explicitly classified as a specula-
tion (or “hypothesis”)—he perhaps regarded as a possibility.
Whether speculations are introduced boldly with the
idea that they are true, or more cautiously with the idea that
that if not true they are close to it, or even more cautiously
with the idea they are possibilities worth considering, does
not affect their speculative status if the speculator does not
know that there is evidence for them. What it does affect is
the question “Evidence for what?” Evidence that h is a pos-
sibility, or that h is close to the truth, or that h is true will
usually be different. If I introduce the assumption that h is

a possibility—meaning that it is not precluded by known
laws or facts—without knowing that there is evidence for the
claim that it is not so precluded, then I am speculating when
I claim that h is a possibility.
Accordingly, we could modify (Spec) by introducing
distinctions between types of speculations: speculating that
h is true, speculating that h is close to the truth, speculating
that h is a possibility, and perhaps others. But I will not do so.
When some assumption h is classified as a speculation, the
focus of the scientific community is normally on the truth
of h, even if the speculator is introducing h only as a pos-
sibility. When Brougham criticized Young for producing a
speculation (“a work of fancy”), it is not very convincing for
Young to reply: “No I am not, I am only saying that the wave
theory is a possibility, that it is consistent with Newtonian
mechanics, and for that claim I can provide evidence.” Even
if this reply correctly represents Young’s intentions, the main
interest of scientists, including Brougham, is the question of
whether the theory is true. Scientists want to know if there is
evidence that light is a wave motion in the ether, not simply
whether this is a possibility. So, in such cases I will retain
(Spec), and say that even if the speculative assumption h was
introduced by P with the idea that it is a possibility, h is a
speculation for P with respect to the truth of h, since P does
not know that there is evidence that h is true.
What about “closeness to truth”? Newton in defending
Phenomenon 1 pertaining to the Keplerian motions of the
moons of Jupiter introduces the assumption that the orbits
of these moons are circular. The assumption itself is literally
false, which Newton realized, but it is a good approximation.
Since Newton had evidence that this is a good approximation,
the latter claim was not a speculation for him. In view of

such cases we could keep (Spec) as is but add another type of
speculation for cases in which no evidence is known for “h is
close to the truth.” Or we could simply retain (Spec) without
adding other types, and understand “true” in a broad way to
include “true or close to it.” I prefer the latter.
There is a view about the introduction of speculations that
I want to reject. It is based on a distinction that philosophers
once regarded as important (perhaps some still do) between
the “context of discovery” (when one first gets the idea of
the hypothesis) and the “context of justification” (when one
is attempting to test or defend it by providing evidence).
Those wedded to this distinction claim that speculations ap-
pear in the first context, not the second. On the view I am
defending, whether something is a speculation does not
depend on whether it is introduced when one first gets the
idea, or afterwards when one is (or is not) attempting to de-
fend it. For speculations, what matters is only that they are
introduced in the course of “theorizing” activities with the
idea that they are truths or close to it, or at least possibilities
worth considering.
Finally, in accordance with (Spec), a “theorizing” as-
sumption h introduced by P can be a speculation even if P
does not believe that h is the sort of assumption for which
evidence is possible. Assumption h might be regarded by P
as “metaphysical,” or “theological,” or of some other sort for
which there can be no evidence. In such a case, it follows
trivially that P does not know that there is evidence that h,
so that if P introduces h under the “theorizing” conditions,
then h is a speculation for P. At the other extreme, what if P
regards h as self-evident, having and needing no evidence?
Whether there are cases of self-evident propositions having
and needing no evidence is controversial. But if there are,

and if P knows that h is one of them and “theorizes” using
h, then, since P knows that h is “self-evident,” and therefore
true, I will say that P is not speculating.
6 . E X A M P L E S T O C L A R I F Y
THE SCOPE OF (SPEC)
The three examples of speculations noted in section 2—

Young’s 1802 assumptions about the wave nature of light,
Kelvin’s assumptions about the molecular nature of the
ether, and string theory’s assumptions about strings and 10-
dimensional spacetime—all satisfy (Spec). Let me mention
two other types of cases that will help to clarify the scope of
(Spec).
Case 1 Suppose that I have read in a usually but not

completely reliable newspaper that there is evidence that
10-dimensional spacetime exists. And suppose the news-
paper is right in saying this. Because the newspaper is not
completely reliable, I do not know that there really is such
evidence, though I have a good reason to believe there is.
In accordance with (Spec), if, while “theorizing,” I intro-
duce the assumption that such a spacetime exists, I am
speculating.
Case 2. Suppose I read in Science magazine, a very re-

liable source, that evidence for 10-dimensional spacetime
has been discovered, and I use the assumption that
10-dimensional spacetime exists in theorizing in a way that
satisfies “theorizing” conditions (a) and (b). In fact, however,
unlike Case 1, what Science magazine reports is false: what it

took to be evidence is not so, and indeed no evidence exists.
According to (Spec), when having read the article I intro-
duce the 10- dimensional spacetime assumption into my
theorizing, I am speculating. I am justified in believing that
there is evidence that 10-dimensional spacetime exists, but
in fact there is no such evidence, so I don’t know that there is.
I believe I am not speculating, I am justified in so believing,
but it turns out that I am speculating.
In view of cases such as (1) and (2), the concept of specula-

tion I have introduced is a strong one, since it rules some-
thing as a speculation in a situation in which the speculator
has a good reason to believe there is evidence for the spec-
ulation but not enough to know that there is. This doesn’t
imply that any assumption that I put forth while “theorizing”
whose truth I don’t know is a speculation for me. That would
be much too strong. It means only that any such assumption
is a speculation if I don’t know that there is evidence for the
assumption.23 So, if I assume that h is true, but don’t know
that it is, h will not be a speculation for me if I know there is
evidence that h. We might call this the “no knowledge of the
existence of evidence” concept of speculation.
A weaker concept might require only that, given my ep-
istemic situation, I am not justified in believing that there
is evidence. If I am so justified, I would not be speculating.
But suppose I am justified in believing that there is evidence
that h, even though there is no such evidence. Then, on this
23. This has a range of possibilities, including cases in which e is true and
I know that it is, and e is evidence that h, but I don’t know that e, or any-
thing else I know to be true, is evidence that h.
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conceive of the possibility that the soul should exist, independent of
some union with matter. He therefore invented the doctrine of the
Metempsychosis; in order to provide some receptacle of organised
matter for that imperishable intellectual principle attached to our
nature here, after its departure from the human frame; and to which
new vehicle of the vital spirit of its original but abandoned abode, the
extinguished corporeal man, its union with it should impart the
powers and faculties of animal life.
Cultivating, as Plato did, the mind-expanding science of

Astronomy, faintly even as the true principles of this branch of
science were then perceived,[10] this philosopher could not fail to
derive, from the vastness, beauty and order, manifested in the
appearances and revolutions of the heavenly bodies, a conviction of
the perpetual existence of a great intelligent First Cause. It was,
indeed, as the Abbé Barthelemy justly remarks, the order and beauty
apparent through the whole universe, that compelled men to resort
to a First Cause:[11] This, he observes, the early philosophers of the
Ionian school (which owed its origin to Thales) had acknowledged.
But Anaxagoras[12] was the first who discriminated that First Cause
from matter; and not only this distinguished pupil of Thales,[13] but
Anaximander, who, antecedently to him, taught philosophy at
Athens, with Archelaus the master of Socrates, all treated in their
writings of the formation of the universe, of the nature of things, and
of geometry and astronomy.
According to Mr. Gibbon, the philosophers of Greece deduced

their morals from the nature of man, rather than from that of God.
They meditated, however, as we are informed by this very ingenious
historian, on the Divine Nature, as a most curious and important
speculation; and, in the profound enquiry, they displayed both the
strength and the weakness of the human understanding. The Stoics
and the Platonists endeavoured to reconcile the interests of reason
with their notions of piety. The opinions of the Academicians and
Epicureans, the two other of the four most celebrated schools, were
of a less religious cast: But, continues Mr. Gibbon, whilst the modest
science of the former induced them to doubt, the positive ignorance
of the latter urged them to deny, the providence of a Supreme Ruler.
Cicero[14] denominated the God of Plato the Maker, and the God of
Aristotle the Governor, of the world.[15] It is somewhere observed,
that it is no reflection on the character of Plato, to have been unable,
by the efforts of his own reason, to acquire any notion of a proper
creation; since we, who have the advantage of his writings, nay of
writings infinitely more valuable than his, to instruct us, find it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to conceive how any thing can
first begin to have an existence. We believe the fact, on the authority
of Revelation.
Great were, undoubtedly, the improvements in astronomy, made

by the Greek philosophers of early ages, on such of its rudiments as
were handed down to them from those nations by whom it was first
cultivated:[16] Yet it can scarcely be conceived, that, until the
celebrated Euclid of Alexandria,[17] and his followers, had reduced
the mathematics of Thales and others of those philosophers, into
regular systems of arithmetical and geometrical science, the true
principles of astronomy could be ascertained. In fact, seventeen
centuries and an half had elapsed, from the time of that great
geometrician, before Copernicus appeared: when this wonderful
genius, availing himself of such remnants of the ancient philosophy,
as the intervening irruptions of the barbarous nations of the north
upon the then civilized world had left to their posterity, opened to the
view of mankind the real system of the universe.[18]—So vast was the
chasm, during which the nobler branches of physics remained
uncultivated and neglected, that, from the age of Euclid, fourteen
centuries passed away, before Roger Bacon, an English Franciscan
friar, began his successful enquiries into experimental philosophy.—
This extraordinary man is said to have been almost the only
astronomer of his age; and he himself tells us, that there were not,
then, more than three or four persons in the world who had made
any considerable proficiency in the mathematics!
But after the appearance of Copernicus,[19] succeeded by the
ingenious Tycho Brahe[20] and sagacious Kepler,[21] arose the learned
physiologist Bacon, Viscount of St. Albans,—one of the most
illustrious contributors to the yet scanty stock of experimental
philosophy.[22] And soon after, in the same age and nation, was
manifested to the world, in the full glory of meridian splendour, that
great luminary of natural science, who first enlightened mankind by
diffusing among them the rays of well-ascertained truths; clearly
exhibiting to all, those fundamental principles of the laws of nature,
by which the grand, the stupendous system of the material universe
is both sustained and governed:—
“Nature and Nature’s Laws lay hid in night;

God said, Let Newton be,—and all was Light.”
Finally, it was reserved for our own age and country to derive
dignity and fame, from having given birth to an illustrious successor
and disciple of that immortal man, in the person of the yet recently-
departed Rittenhouse.
The objects of a genuine philosophy, are the discovery and

promulgation of the truths which emanate from a knowledge of the
laws of nature, in relation to the material world, and the inseparable
influence of those truths, consequent on an acquaintance with them,
in giving a right direction to the moral faculty of man. The intimate
connexion subsisting between natural and moral science, is
indubitable; and it is equally certain, that the accordant order, fitness
and rectitude, which unite into one glorious plan of wisdom,
goodness and power, all portions of creation, intellectual and
sensitive as well as material, must rest on the same unerring
principles. The infinite variety and boundless extent of nature’s works
constitute a sublime system; manifesting a correspondent perfection
in the design, and all-bountiful dispensation of good in its purposes.
[23]
The Almighty First Cause has founded this system on immutable
principles; wherein truth, in relation to the moral world, may be
considered as its basis,—as fitness is, when applied to the
constitution of the natural world. These are, respectively, the
correlatives of the one and the other: and the unity of design
apparent in the whole system, plainly indicates the connexion that
subsists, in the nature of things, between moral virtue, which is the
result of a right perception of truth, and the fitness and order, to
which all the operations of the material universe conform.[24]—
Towards an investigation of these things, the researches of the great
American philosopher were eagerly directed: such were the objects
of his unwearied pursuit; and such were the views entertained by
him, of the utility and importance of those sublime branches of
knowledge, which he cultivated so ardently and successfully.[25]
The enlightened part of the people have, in every civilized nation

and in all ages, very rationally valued themselves on their great men.
It is both useful and proper to commemorate the renown of such as
have approved themselves, in an eminent degree, Benefactors of
Mankind. The Life, therefore, of so distinguished a Philosopher as
Rittenhouse, must be expected to interest the feelings, as well as
the curiosity, of the good and the wise, not only of our own country
but of foreign nations.
With respect to the usefulness and importance of that majestic

science, which was the favourite study and principal object of the
pursuit of our philosopher, during a life of ordinary extent but of very
extraordinary attainments and character, something may with
propriety be said, with a view to an illustration of the subject. And
among other evidence, which, it is presumed, may not be unaptly
adduced on the occasion, the Memorialist will cite in the first place,
as well as occasionally afterwards, the sentiments of a distinguished
foreign astronomer, whose abilities and erudition rendered him
eminently qualified to decide, in a discussion of this nature: He shall
be made to speak for himself, though not in his own tongue; the
great work from which the quoted extracts are made, being written in
French.
Among the numerous and important advantages, then, resulting

from astronomy, noticed by the celebrated Lalande (in the preface to
his book, entitled Astronomie,) he remarks that it is well known, that
besides the tendency of this science to dissipate many vulgar errors
and prejudices,[26] cosmography and geography cannot go on, but by
its means: that the discovery of the satellites of Jupiter has given
greater perfection to our geographical and marine charts, than they
could have attained by ten thousand years of navigation and
voyages;[27] and, that when their theory shall become still better
known, the method of determining the longitude at sea will be more
exact and more easy.
“It is to astronomy,” says Mr. Lalande, “that we are indebted for the
first voyages of the Phœnicians, and the earliest progress of industry
and commerce: it is likewise to it, that we owe the discovery of the
New World. If there remain any thing to desire for the perfection and
security of navigation, it is, to find the longitude at sea.” In
continuation, he says:—
“The utility of navigation for the welfare of a state, serves to prove

that of astronomy. But it seems to me, that it is difficult for a good
citizen to be ignorant, now, of the usefulness of navigation; above all,
(says Lalande, feelingly,) in France. The success of the English, in
the war of 1764, has but too well shewn, that a marine alone governs
the fortune of empires, their power, their commerce; that peace and
war are decided on the ocean; and that, in fine, as Mr. Miere has
expressed it,—
“Ancient chronology deduces, from a knowledge and calculation of

eclipses, the best established periods in time, that it is possible to
obtain: and in ages anterior to regular observations, nothing but
obscurity is to be met with. We should not have in the history of
nations any uncertainty in dates, if there had always been
astronomers. We may perceive, above all, the connexions of
astronomy in The Art of verifying Dates. It is by an eclipse of the
Moon,[28] that we discover the error of date that exists in the vulgar
era with respect to the birth of Christ. It is known that Herod was king
of Judea, and that there was an eclipse of the moon immediately
before the death of that prince: we find this eclipse was in the night,
between the 12th and 13th of March, of the fourth year before the
vulgar era; so that this era ought to be removed three years back, at
least.
“It is besides from astronomy, that we borrow the division of time in

the common transactions of life, and the art of regulating clocks and
watches. We may say, that the order and the multiplicity of our
affairs, of our duties, our amusements; the attachment to exactness
and precision; in short, our habits; all have rendered this measure of
time almost indispensable, and placed it among the number of the
desiderata of human life.
“If, for want of clocks and watches, we should be under the

necessity of recurring to meridians and sundials, even this would
further prove the advantages derived from astronomical science;
since dialling is only an application of spherical trigonometry and
astronomy.
“Le Sage is displeased with good reason with those, whom an

admiration of the stars has carried so far, as that they fancied them
to be Deities:[29] but, far from condemning the study of them, he
recommends it, for the glory of the Creator.”
Adverting to such as considered “fire, or wind, or the swift air, or

the circle of the stars, or the violent water, or the lights of heaven, to
be gods which govern the world,”[30] he applies the words of
Solomon:—“With whose beauty, if they, being delighted, took them to
be gods; let them know how much better the Lord of them is: for the
first Author of beauty has created them—For, by the greatness and
beauty of the creatures, proportionably the Maker of them is
seen.”[31]
“David found also, in the stars,” continues Lalande, “means of

elevating his contemplation of the Deity:”—“The heavens declare the
glory of God;”[32] “I will view thy heavens, the works of thy fingers, the
moon and the stars which thou hast established:” and we see that
Mr. Derham has called by the name of “Astro-Theology,” a work, in
which is presented, in all their force, the singularity and grandeur of
the discoveries that have been made in astronomy; as being so
many proofs of the existence of a God. (See what Aristotle thought
on this subject, in the eighth book of his Physics.)
Such were the reflections of Mr. Lalande, on a subject with which

he was intimately acquainted.
The opinions of eminent and enlightened men have deservedly

great weight, in all those matters on which it is presumable, from the
nature of their pursuits, their thoughts have been most employed.
Notwithstanding, therefore, the fulness of the foregoing extracts, the
writer believes that the very apt and judicious observations contained
in the following passage, in support of similar sentiments, extracted
from a voluminous work of a distinguished English astronomer, of the
present day, will not be deemed to have been improperly brought
into view, on this occasion:—
“The obvious argument of the existence of a Deity, who formed

and governs the universe,” (says Mr. Vince, the author referred to,)
“is founded upon the uniformity of the laws which take place in the
production of similar effects; and from the simplicity of the causes
which produce the various phænomena. The most common views of
nature, however imperfect and of small extent, suggest the idea of
the government of a God, and every further discovery tends to
confirm that persuasion. The ancient philosophers, who scarce knew
a single law by which the bodies in the system are governed, still
saw the Deity in his works: how visible therefore ought He to be to
us, who are acquainted with the laws by which the whole is directed.
The same law takes place in our system, between the periodic times
and distances of every body revolving about the same centre. Every
body describes about its respective centre equal areas in equal
times. Every body is spherical. Every planet, as far as our
observations reach, is found to revolve about an axis; and the axis of
each is observed to continue parallel to itself. Now as the
circumstances which might have attended these bodies are indefinite
in variety, the uniform similarity which is found to exist amongst
them, is an irrefragable argument of design. To produce a
succession of day and night, either the sun must revolve every day
about the earth, or the earth must revolve about its axis: the latter is
the most simple cause; and, accordingly, we find that the regular
return of day and night is so produced. As far also as observations
have enabled us to discover, the return of day and night, in the
planets, is produced by the operation of a similar cause. It is also
found, that the axis of each planet is inclined to the plane of its orbit,
by which a provision is made for a variety of seasons; and by
preserving the axis always parallel to itself, summer and winter
return at their stated periods. Where there are such incontestable
marks of design, there must be a DESIGNER; and the unity of design
through the whole system, proves it to be the work of One. The
general laws of nature shew the existence of a Divine Intelligence,
in a much stronger point of view, than any work of man can prove
him to have acted from intention; inasmuch as the operations of the
former are uniform, and subject to no variation; whereas in the latter
case, we see continual alterations of plan, and deviations from
established rules. And without this permanent order of things,
experience could not have directed man in respect to his future
operations. These fixed laws of nature, so necessary for us, is an
irresistible argument that the world is the work of a wise and
benevolent Being. The laws of nature are the laws of God; and how
far soever we may be able to trace up causes, they must terminate
in his will. We see nothing in the heavens which argues imperfection;
the whole creation is stamped with the marks of Divinity.”—[See A
Complete System of Astronomy; by the Rev. S. Vince, A. M. F. R. S. &c.
printed at Cambridge, in 1799—vol. ii. p. 290, 291.]
None of the works of creation present to the contemplation of man

objects more worthy of the dignity of his nature, than those which
engage the attention of the astronomer. They have, interested men
of the sublimest genius, in all ages of the world: and the science of
astronomy is spoken of with admiration, by the most celebrated
sages of antiquity.
Although no astronomer of our day, how enthusiastic soever he

may be in favour of his science, will be disposed to say with
Anaxagoras, that the purpose for which he himself or any other man
was born, was, that he might contemplate the stars; yet it does
seem, as if the objects of this science more naturally attracted the
attention and employed the research of elevated minds, than those
things, within the narrow limits of this world, an acquaintance with
which constitutes the ordinary mass of human knowledge. The
disposition of man to direct his eyes frequently upwards, and the
faculty to do so, arising from his erect figure and the position and
structure of the organs of his vision, furnish no feeble argument in
proving, that this temporary lord of his fellow-beings on this globe
has nobler destinies, infinitely beyond them; being enabled and
permitted by the Author of his being, even while in this circumscribed
state of his existence, to survey those myriads of worlds which
occupy the immensity of space; to contemplate their nature, and the
laws that govern them; thence, to discern, with the eye of reason, the
Great First Cause of their being;[33] and thus having acquired, a
juster knowledge of his own nature, to grasp at an endless futurity for
its existence.
That the erect countenance and upward aspect of the human

species were his peculiar endowments by the Deity, for these
purposes among others, appears to have been the impression on
the mind of Ovid, when he said:—
“Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta deorum;

Pronaque cum spectent animalia cætera terram,
Os homini sublime dedit, cælumque tueri
Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.”[34]
Met. i. 88.
Mr. Pope has well observed, that—
“The proper study of mankind, is Man:”—
But, in order that he may be enabled to know himself, it is

indispensably necessary for him to acquire such a knowledge of
other created beings that surround him, as the limited nature of his
faculties will allow. He must attentively observe the operations of
nature in the material universe, survey with a reflecting mind its
stupendous fabric, and study its laws. Hence, he will be made
acquainted, and although in a partial, yet not an inconsiderable
degree, with the powers and extent of that intellectual principle which
he finds in the government of the moral, as well as the natural world.
And being thus enabled to know his own proper standing in creation,
and his appropriate relation to all its parts, he will by these means be
qualified to ascend to those enquiries, which will open to his mind a
just sense of the attributes of the Deity, of whose existence he will
feel a perfect conviction. In this way, will man obtain a due
knowledge of his own “being, end and aim;” and become fully
sensible of his entire dependence on his Creator: while he will
thereby learn, that he incessantly owes him the highest adoration
and the most devoted service.[35] In this way it is, that the
philosopher, more especially the astronomer,—
“Looks, through Nature, up to Nature’s God.”[36]

Pope’s Ess. on Man.
Besides the various and important uses of astronomy, here

pointed out, it is connected, by means of numerous ramifications,
with other departments of science, directed to some of the most
useful pursuits of human life. Lalande has even shewn us, in the
preface to his Astronomie, in what manner this science has a relation
to the administration of civil and ecclesiastical affairs, to medicine,
and to agriculture. A knowledge of astronomy is obviously
connected, by means of chronology, with history. It is even a
necessary study, in order to become acquainted with the heathen
mythology; and many beautiful passages in the works of the ancient
poets can neither be distinctly understood nor properly relished,
without a knowledge of the stars: nay, that finely poetical one, in the
book of Job, in which the Deity is represented as manifesting to that
patient man of affliction and sorrow the extreme imbecility of his
nature, is unintelligible without some knowledge of astronomy:—
“Canst thou bind the sweet influences of Pleiades, or loose the

bands of Orion?—
Canst thou bring forth Mazzaroth in his season; or canst thou
guide Arcturus, with his sons?”
Some of the greatest poets of antiquity were in a manner

fascinated, by the grandeur of that science, (though they
accompanied it with mystical notions,) which furnishes the sublimest
objects in nature to the contemplation of the astronomer.
Ovid tells us, he wished to take his flight among the stars:
—-—-—“Juvat ire per alta

Astra; juvat, terris et inerti sede relictis,
Nube vehi, validique humeris insistere Atlantis.”[37]
Metamorph. lib. xv.
And Horace acquaints us with the objects of curiosity and

research, in the contemplation of which he envied his friend Iccius,
who was occupied in that way, on his farm:—
“Quæ mare compescant causæ, quid temperet annum;

Stellæ sponte suâ, jussæne, vagentur et errant,
Quid premat obscurum Lunæ, quid proferat orbem.”[38]
Lib. i. epist. 12, ad Iccium.
Virgil seemed willing to renounce every other study, in order that

he might devote himself to the wonders of astronomy. In the second
book of his Georgics, he says:
“Me vero primum dulces ante omnia Musæ,

Quarum sacra fero, ingenti perculsus amore,
Accipiant; cælique vias et sidera monstrent,
Defectus Solis varius, Lunæque labores;
Unde tremor terris, quâ vi maria alta tumescant
Obicibus ruptis, rursusque in se ipsa residant;
Quid tantum oceano properent se tingere soles
Hyberni, vel quæ tardis mora noctibus obstet—
Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.”[39]
l. 475 and seq.
And, in addition to these classical writers, a modern poet (Mr.
Voltaire) appears, by a letter written in the year 1738, to have
participated in the regrets expressed by Virgil; and to have been
desirous of directing all his faculties towards the sciences. He
produced, on the philosophy of Newton, a work which has
contributed to the expansion of genius; and, in his epistle to the
Marchioness du Chatelet, he pays that great man a very exalted
compliment, in these poetic lines:
“Confidens du Tres Haut, substances eternelles,

Qui parez de vos feux, qui couvrez de vos ailes
Le trône oú votre Maitre est assis parmi vous;
Parlez: Du grand Newton n’étiez-vous point jaloux?”[40]
Astronomy has not only engaged the attention of multitudes of

illustrious men, of every age and nation, but it has been patronized
by great and enlightened princes and states; cultivated by men of
genius and learning, of all ranks and professions; and celebrated by
historians and poets.
This charming, as well as sublime and invaluable science, has

also been studied, and even practically cultivated, by many
celebrated women, in modern times. There are indeed
circumstances connected with this innocent and engaging pursuit,
that must render it very interesting to the fair sex. Some ladies have
prosecuted this object with such success, as to acquire considerable
distinction in the philosophical world. While, therefore, the
meritorious transactions of men are held in grateful remembrance
and frequently recorded in the annals of fame, it is due to justice and
impartiality, that literary, scientific, and other attainments of the
gentler sex, calculated for the benefit of civil society, should be alike
commemorated. Among such then, as examples, may be named the
following:—
Maria Cunitia (Kunitz,) daughter of a physician in Silesia,

published Astronomical Tables, so early as the year 1650.
Maria-Clara, the daughter of Eimmart and wife of of Muller, both
well-known astronomers, cultivated the same science.
Jane Dumée published, in the year 1680, Conversations (or

Dialogues) on the Copernican System.
Maria-Margaretta Winckelman, wife of Godfrey Kirch, an

astronomer of some distinction[41] who died in 1710, at the age of
seventy-one years, worked at his Ephemerides, and carried on
Astronomical Observations with her husband. This respectable
woman discovered the Comet[42] of 1702, on the 20th of April in that
year: she produced, in 1712, a Work on Astronomy; and died at
Berlin, in the year 1720. Her three daughters continued, for thirty
years, to employ themselves in Astronomical Observations, for the
Almanacks of Berlin.
Elizabeth d’Oginsky Puzynina, Countess Puzynina and Castellane

of Mscislau, in Poland, erected and richly endowed a magnificent
Observatory at Wilna, in the year 1753; and in 1767, she added to
this establishment a fund equivalent to twelve thousand (American)
dollars, for the purpose of maintaining an observer and purchasing
instruments. The king of Poland afterwards gave to this institution
the title of a “Royal Observatory.”
The wife of the celebrated Hevelius was, likewise, an astronomer.

Madame Hevelius made Observations along with her husband; and
she is represented, in the Machina Cœlestis, as having been
engaged in measuring distances.
In the century just passed, the Marchioness du Chatelet translated

Newton: Besides whom,—
Madame Lepaute and Madame du Piery were both known in the

Astronomical World.
In our own time, Miss Caroline Herschel, sister of the great

practical astronomer of the same name, in England, has not only
distinguished herself, by having discovered the Comet of 1786;
another, on the 17th of April, 1790; and a third, on the 8th of October,
1793;[43] but likewise by attending to Astronomical Observations,
along with her brother, for several years.
To these may be added the name of an illustrious female;

Elizabeth, eldest daughter of Frederick V. Count Palatine of the
Rhine and King of Bohemia, by the only daughter of James I. This
Princess (who was an aunt of King George I.) cultivated a fine
genius for the several branches of natural philosophy, and was well
versed in mathematical science. Although this excellent woman was
a Protestant, she was Abbess of Herworden in Westphalia, where
she died in 1680, at the age of sixty-two years.
Mr. Lalande, in the prefatory department of his great work on

Astronomy, after noticing the Abbé Pluche’s book, entitled Spectacle
de la Nature, says: “The freshness of the shade, the stillness of
night, the soft beams of twilight, the luminaries that bespangle the
heavens, the various appearances of the moon, all form in the hands
of Pluche a fit subject for fine descriptive colouring: it takes in view
all the wants of man, regards the attention of the Supreme Being to
those wants, and recognizes the glory of the Creator. His book is a
treatise on final causes, as well as a philosophical work; and there
are a great many young persons to whom the reading of it would
afford satisfaction and pleasure.” Observing that he himself had no
object in view, in his own work, but merely to treat of Astronomy,
Lalande recommends to his readers, Nature Displayed, Derham’s
Astro-Theology, and the Dialogues of Fontenelle on The Plurality of
Worlds. Such works as these, with some elementary books on
astronomy and those branches of science most intimately connected
with that science, would be very proper for the study of that
respectable class of females, whose minds are too elevated and
correct to derive any gratification from the trifling productions of most
of the modern novellists and romance-writers; but who, at the same
time, might not be desirous of engaging in the more abstruse and
laborious researches, which demand the attention of profound
practical astronomers.[44] The grand, the delightful views of nature,
which studies of this sort would present to the vivid imagination, the
delicate sensibility, and the good dispositions of a woman of genius
and refinement, would not only improve her understanding and
sanction the best feelings of her heart, but they would furnish her
mind with an inexhaustible fund of animating reflections and rational
enjoyments: in every respect, indeed, they would contribute to her
happiness.
Let not, then, the beauties of astronomical science, and the

captivating studies of natural philosophy in general, be exclusively
enjoyed by men; but let the amiable, the intelligent, and the improved
part of the female sex, be invited to a participation, with them, in
these intellectual pleasures.[45]
Here, perhaps, might be rested the evidence of the all-important

usefulness of that branch of knowledge, in which our American
Philosopher was pre-eminently distinguished.
But, inasmuch as astronomy forms a part of mathematical science,

more especially of those branches of it, which, under the
denomination of mixed and practical mathematics, are intimately and
inseparably interwoven, every where, with physical considerations,
the reader will, it is presumed, be gratified by a perusal of the
following admirable description of the Uses of Mathematics,
extracted from the great Dr. Barrow’s Prefatory Oration,[46] upon his
admission into the Professorship, at Cambridge. Indeed, in writing
the Life of a man so eminently skilled as Dr. Rittenhouse was, in the
several departments or various branches of natural philosophy, it
seems proper and useful to exhibit to the reader such views as have
been furnished by men of renowned erudition, of the nature and
importance of that complicated, that widely-extended science, in the
cultivation of which our philosopher held so exalted a rank.
Dr. Barrow[47] thus eulogizes the Mathematics—a science “which

depends upon principles clear to the mind, and agreeable to
experience; which draws certain conclusions, instructs by profitable
rules, unfolds pleasant questions, and produces wonderful effects:
which is the fruitful parent of—I had almost said—all arts, the
unshaken foundation of sciences, and the plentiful fountain of
advantage to human affairs: In which last respect we may be said to
receive from mathematics the principal delights of life, securities of
health, increase of fortune and conveniences of labour: That we
dwell elegantly and commodiously, build decent houses for
ourselves, erect stately temples to God, and leave wonderful
monuments to posterity: That we are protected by those rampires
from the incursions of an enemy, rightly use arms, artfully manage
war, and skilfully range an army: That we have safe traffic through
the deceitful billows, pass in a direct road through the trackless ways
of the sea, and arrive at the designed ports by the uncertain impulse
of the winds: That we rightly cast up our accounts, do business
expeditiously, dispose, tabulate, and calculate scattered ranks of
numbers, and easily compute them, though expressive of huge
heaps of sand, nay immense hills of atoms: That we make pacific
separations of the bounds of lands, examine the momentums of
weights in an equal balance, and are enabled to distribute to every
one his own by a just measure: That, with a light touch, we thrust
forward bodies, which way we will, and step a huge resistance with a
very small force: That we accurately delineate the face of this earthly
orb, and subject the economy of the universe to our sight: That we
aptly digest the flowing series of time; distinguish what is acted, by
due intervals; rightly account and discern the various returns of the
seasons; the stated periods of the years and months, the alternate
increasements of days and nights, the doubtful limits of light and
shadow, and the exact difference of hours and minutes: That we
derive the solar virtue of the sun’s rays to our uses, infinitely extend
the sphere of light, enlarge the near appearances of objects, bring
remote objects near, discover hidden things, trace nature out of her
concealments, and unfold her dark mysteries: That we delight our
eyes with beautiful images, cunningly imitate the devices and portray
the works of nature; imitate, did I say? nay excel; while we form to
ourselves things not in being, exhibit things absent, and represent
things past: That we recreate our minds, and delight our ears, with
melodious sounds; attemperate the inconstant undulations of the air
to musical tones; add a pleasant voice to a sapless log; and draw a
sweet eloquence from a rigid metal; celebrate our Maker with an
harmonious praise, and not unaptly imitate the blessed choirs of
heaven: That we approach and examine the inaccessible seats of
the clouds, distant tracts of land, unfrequented paths of the sea; lofty
tops of mountains, low bottoms of vallies, and deep gulphs of the
ocean: That we scale the ethereal towers; freely range through the
celestial fields; measure the magnitudes and determine the
interstices of the stars; prescribe inviolable laws to the heavens
themselves, and contain the wandering circuit of the stars within
strict bounds: Lastly, that we comprehend the huge fabric of the
universe; admire and contemplate the wonderful beauty of the divine
workmanship, and so learn the incredible force and sagacity of our
own minds by certain experiments, as to acknowledge the blessings
of heaven with a pious affection.”
The honours that have been rendered to celebrated men in almost

every age of the world, and by all nations concerning which we have
any historical memorials, are noticed by numberless writers, both
ancient and modern. The cultivation of astronomical science had,
doubtless, its origin in the remotest ages of antiquity,[48] through the
Chaldeans,[49] the Egyptians, the Phœnicians and Greeks, the Arabs,
and the Chinese. But the Indians of the western hemisphere appear
to have had little knowledge of astronomy, at the time of Columbus’s
discovery, yet they were not inattentive to its objects: for Acosta tells
us, that the Peruvians observed the equinoxes, by means of
columns erected before the temple of the sun at Cusco, and by a
circle traced around it. Condamine likewise relates, that the Indians
on the river of the Amazons gave to the Hyades, as we do, the name
of the Bull’s-head; and Father Lasitau says, that the Iroquois called
the same stars the Bear, to which we give that name; and
designated the Polar star by the appellation of the immoveable star.
Captain Cook informs us, that the inhabitants of Taiti, in like manner,
distinguish the different stars; and know in what part of the heavens
they will appear, for each month in the year; their year consisting of
thirteen lunar months, each being twenty-nine days.
Astronomy has been patronised by many great princes and

sovereign states. Lalande observes, that, about the year 1230, the
Emperor Frederick II.[50] prepared the way for the renewal of the
sciences among the moderns, and professed himself to be their
protector. His reign, according to the great French astronomer just
mentioned, forms the first epocha of the revival of astronomy in
Europe.
Coeval with that sovereign, was Johannes de Sacro-Bosco,[51] a

famous English ecclesiastic, who was the first astronomical writer
that acquired celebrity in the thirteenth century. Very nearly about the
same time, appeared also that prodigy of genius and learning, Friar
Bacon:[52] and from that period, down to our own day, there has been
a succession of illustrious philosophers: whose names have justly
been renowned, for the benefits they have conferred on mankind;
names which reflect honour on the countries to which they
respectively belong. Many of those benefactors of the world were
honoured with marks of high distinction, by their sovereigns and
cotemporaries; and their fame will descend to the latest posterity.
In recording these Memoirs of the Life of an American

Philosopher, whose name adds dignity to the country that gave him
birth, it is the design of the author to represent him as he truly was;
and in doing so, he feels a conscious satisfaction, that his pen is
employed in delineating the character of a man, who was rendered
singularly eminent by his genius, his virtues and his public services.
Deeply impressed with the magnitude and importance, as well as
delicacy of the subject, the writer has not undertaken the task
without some hesitation. He is sensible of the difficulties attending it,
and conscious of his inability to do justice to its merits. Arduous,
however, as the undertaking is, and since no abler pen has hitherto
attempted any thing more, on this subject, than to eulogize[53] some
of the prominent virtues and talents of our philosopher, his present
biographer will endeavour, by the fidelity with which he shall portray
the character of that truly estimable man, to atone for the
imperfections of the work in other respects. Possessing, as he does,
some peculiar advantages, in relation to the materials necessary for
this undertaking, he flatters himself it will be found, that he has been
enabled thereby to exhibit to his countrymen, and the world
generally, a portrait, which, in its more important features, may prove
deserving of some share of public regard.
Sir William Forbes, in the introduction to his interesting Account of

the Life and Writings of the late Dr. Beattie, reminds his readers, that
“Mr. Mason prefaces his excellent and entertaining Memoirs of the
Life and Writings of Gray, with an observation more remarkable for
its truth than novelty;” that “the Lives of men of letters seldom
abound with incidents.”—“A reader of sense and taste, therefore,”
continues Mr. Mason, “never expects to find, in the Memoirs of a
Philosopher or Poet, the same species of entertainment or
information, which he would receive from those of a Statesman or
General. He expects, however, to be informed or entertained. Nor
will he be disappointed, did the writer take care to dwell principally
on such topics as characterize the man, and distinguish that peculiar
part which he acted in the varied drama of society.”
Yet these observations of Mr. Gray’s biographer, though pretty

generally correct, admit of some qualification and many exceptions,
depending on a variety of circumstances. It is true, that a mere
narrative of the life of a “philosopher,” as well as of a “poet,”
considered only as such, and abstractedly, must be expected to be
devoid of much “incident” that can interest the generality of readers.
But, both philosophers and poets have, in some instances, been also
statesmen; sometimes, even generals: both have, not unfrequently,
distinguished themselves as patriots, and benefactors of mankind.
In writing the life of our philosopher, the plan of a dry recital of only
such circumstances and occurrences as have an immediate relation
to the individual, has not been pursued. Biographical Memoirs, it is
conceived, do not confine a writer to limits so narrow, but permit him
to take a much greater latitude. It is even allowable, in works of this
kind, to introduce historical facts, memorable events, proceedings of
public bodies, notices of eminent men, evidences of the progress
and state of literature, science and the arts, and the actual condition
of civil society, in the scene that is contemplated; together with
occasional reflections on those and similar subjects. Some of these
objects may not seem, perhaps, to be necessarily or very intimately
connected with the principal design, the life of the person treated of:
but such of them as should, at first view, appear to have the most
remote relation to that object, may be afterwards discovered to be
both useful and interesting in a discussion of this nature; while others
serve to elucidate the main scope of the work. A latitude of this
description, in the compilation of memoirs, seems to be quite
consistent with the genius and spirit of works of that nature; and the
modern practice of memoir-writers has been conformable to this
view of the subject.[54]
The writer of the present work has therefore ventured, with all due
deference to the public opinion, to pursue the course here described.
And in doing this, he presumes that the comprehensive range he has
allowed himself has enabled him to render his memoirs, even of a
“philosopher,” not altogether barren of incidents, nor destitute, he
trusts, either of pleasing information or useful instruction.
NOTE.—The reader is requested to substitute (with his pen) the word Earth, in
the place of “Sun,” in the sixth line of the note numbered (18), page xxxii. of the
foregoing Introduction: the error in the print is an essential one; and passed
unobserved, until it was too late to correct it in the press. At the same time the
reader will be pleased to insert the word security, in the place of “scarcity,” in the
ninth line from the top of page xlii.

Speculation Within and About Science Peter Achinstein All Chapter

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Speculation: Within and about Science

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© Oxford University Press 2019

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Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America

1. Scientific Speculation: A Pragmatic Approach 1

Every problem has a solution, and every solution has a

by experiment and observation. Proponents of this view say

rules and constraints? Can speculations be evaluated even in

I have contrasted speculation with proof. But “proof ”

greatest scientists to produce the most important ideas.

3. William Whewell, The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded

I am indebted to Justin Bledin, Richard Dawid, Steven

Hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based

I think that only daring speculation can lead us further,

During the history of science, controversies have emerged

Which meaning is intended should be clear from the con-

Let me begin with three examples from the history of physics,

a. Thomas Young’s Wave Theory of Light

In 1802, Thomas Young published “On the Theory of Light

As this paper contains nothing which deserves the names ei-

Brougham defends the Newtonian particle theory of light on

1. Thomas Young, “On the Theory of Light and Colours,” Philosophical

b. William Thomson (Lord Kelvin): Baltimore

In 1884, Sir William Thomson delivered a series of lectures at

It seems probable that the molecular theory of matter may be

He proceeds by offering various mechanical models of the

3. Reprinted in Robert Kargon and Peter Achinstein, eds., Kelvin’s

represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible

The multiplicity and variety of the models proposed by

Again, the complaint is that we have a theory, or set of them,

Characterized by some of its proponents as a “Theory of

5. Duhem, Aim and Structure, chap. 4, sec. 5.

once an enthusiastic supporter of string theory (as the “final

String theory is . . . very beautiful. It appears to be just barely

As these examples illustrate, speculations are assumptions

or possible candidates for truth that are worth considering.

7. Anti-​ realists can substitute “empirically adequate” for “true” and

to it, or as possible candidates for truth, but as fictions useful

8. As with Maxwell’s incompressible fluid, the explanations are not meant

difference between them stems from “theorizing” condition

for truth-​relevant speculations. It is not introduced with the idea that it is

most controversy among scientists and philosophers. I turn

The conflicting views I have in mind are very conservative,

The idea can be simply expressed: “don’t speculate.” I will

10. Reprinted in Peter Achinstein, ed., Science Rules (Baltimore: Johns

come to have complete faith in these assertions, indiscrim-

community, an injunction violated by Thomas Young, Lord

The slogan of this view is a modification of one expressed

According to the view that will be put forward here, the

The general idea expressed by these and other so-​called

11. William Whewell, chap. 5 from Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences,

into a scientific investigation as a (truth-​ relevant) spec-

13. In Achinstein, Science Rules, 154.

theorists is that speculation is not enough for science. There

The slogan here is “Speculate like mad, even if you cannot

14. Paul Feyerabend, “Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory

or, indeed, even if they produced results incompatible with

How the conflicting claims in the previous section are to be

I will call this B-​(for Bayesian) evidence in what follows.

correctly explains why h is true, or some hypothesis correctly

a. Thomas Young’s Wave Theory of Light

b. William Thomson (Lord Kelvin): Baltimore

7. Anti- realists can substitute “empirically adequate” for “true” and

for truth-relevant speculations. It is not introduced with the idea that it is

The general idea expressed by these and other so-called

into a scientific investigation as a (truth- relevant) spec-

I will call this B-(for Bayesian) evidence in what follows.

(A″) ES-Evidence: Some fact e is ES-evidence that h (relative to

An example of all four types of A-evidence is given in note

constituted veridical evidence. But because the experimental set-up was

(Spec): h is a (truth-relevant) speculation for P if and only if P

The three examples of speculations noted in section 2—