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EURASIA’S
MARITIME
RISE AND
GLOBAL
SECURITY
From the Indian Ocean to
Pacific Asia and the Arctic
ED I T ED B Y G EO F F REY F. G RESH
With a foreword by ADM James Stavridis (Ret.)
Eurasia’s Maritime Rise and Global Security
Geoffrey F. Gresh
Editor
Eurasia’s Maritime
Rise and Global
Security
From the Indian Ocean to Pacific Asia
and the Arctic
Editor
Geoffrey F. Gresh
National Defense University
Washington, DC, USA
ISBN 978-3-319-71805-7 ISBN 978-3-319-71806-4 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71806-4
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017962970
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

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For John Curtis Perry
Foreword
In collaboration with the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and in

celebration of the Maritime Studies director emeritus, John Curtis Perry,
Geoffrey F. Gresh has compiled a cutting-edge volume of internationally
renowned scholars and practitioners writing about Eurasia’s essential
waterways, maritime affairs, and the continent’s important relationship to
the future of the world’s oceans. As a now retired Admiral in the US Navy
with command tenures in Europe and the Americas, I greatly embrace this
much needed analysis on the increasingly interconnected nature of
Eurasia’s maritime affairs, which is home to the world’s most important
sea-lanes of communication and strategic maritime choke points. This fan-
tastic effort to examine Eurasia from a maritime perspective, a view often
overlooked in the traditional literature, will be an essential reading for
scholars, practitioners, and the general reader alike due to its comprehen-
sive and easily accessible articles. Under the superb leadership of Geoffrey
Gresh, this volume is a first of its kind and brings together both a global
and regional picture that is essential for understanding the critical mari-
time regions of Eurasia from the Arctic to Pacific Asia and the Indian
Ocean. Tackling the maritime domain of the world’s largest landmass, a
daunting task, is still a fitting one for this book’s editor.
An understanding of Eurasia as a distinct and unified geographical space
takes just a glance at the map. The massive swath of terrain unites the
supercontinent diverse in its features, climates, and populations. And it
will only become more central to world politics with an increased melting
of the Arctic and the opening of new and sustained shipping lanes. A con-
stant coast traced from Kamchatka to Malacca, from the peninsulas of
vii
viii FOREWORD
Europe to those of South Asia, encases the supercontinent in blue borders.

The maritime space around the world’s largest contiguous stretch of land
is indeed a much welcomed focus of this book. These maritime borders
stand at the threshold of an ancient avenue, sea-lanes guiding admirals and
merchants of today and yesterday. The water’s depths source the quantities
that fed populations, the fuels that power fleets, and an endless and hum-
bling expanse that sparks innovation and artistry. The societies of the
shoreline frequently came into contact with fellow seafaring peoples; they
often traded peacefully, but other times fought for access to markets, a
share of the spoils, or dominion of the sea and the hinterlands beyond.
This book assesses this ancient continent’s maritime habits in the
twenty-first century. In the past decades, the rise of telecommunications
and the sprawling of fiber-optic cables have brought societies closer than
ever before, unleashing new opportunities for prosperity but also new are-
nas of conflict. The blue borders marked by the tides do not shift with the
speed of those borders created by states. However, new technologies cre-
ate new means for states and corporations to compete for access or domin-
ion of profitable sea lanes or undersea resource deposits. A changing
climate also opens new routes as yet untraveled by a seafaring mankind.
Shifting geopolitics creates new alliances, proliferates new threats in
ungoverned spaces, and challenges the basis of world order.
The facts that underlie the arguments and scenarios set forth in this
volume seem daunting and pessimistic. However, within each potential
conflict lies the possibility of diplomacy, each new technology inherently
solves a problem, and implicit in each challenge is a unified and firm
response to counter it. Upholding order and stability requires intelligent
and reasoned application of the elements of international and state power
suited to the job. This book takes us another step closer to the thoughtful
and holistic debate necessary to address the modern challenges to Eurasia’s
vast maritime space and ever-changing tides.
The Fletcher School Dean James Stavridis (USN ADM-Ret.)

of Law and Diplomacy
Tufts University
Acknowledgments
This volume emerged from a workshop on the future of the world’s oceans
hosted at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, in
the spring of 2015 to honor the legacy and groundbreaking work of John
Curtis Perry, director emeritus and founder of the Fletcher Maritime
Studies Program and the Henry Willard Denison Professor of History at
the Fletcher School. John has been a vital mentor, scholar, and friend to
countless students during several decades of service. Through his teach-
ings and writings, he inspired a future generation of scholars and practitio-
ners, many represented in this volume, dedicated to the importance of
rigorous historical and interdisciplinary research from a saltwater perspec-
tive. We are forever grateful and eternally indebted for all that he has done
to inspire and unpack our profound fascination of the sea. Additionally, I
would like to thank the Dean of the Fletcher School, ADM. James Stavridis
(Ret.), who was a strong supporter of this project from the beginning. In
a similar vein, I would like to thank all of the authors in the volume for
their support and insightful contributions. Certainly, it is important to
note that the views expressed here are those of the authors alone. They do
not represent official policy, nor do they represent any government entity.
At National Defense University (NDU) and the College of International
Security Affairs (CISA), I would like to thank the Chancellor, Michael
S. Bell, and the Academic Dean/Interim Chancellor Charles B. Cushman,
Jr., for their continued support of my research endeavors and for this proj-
ect in particular. I would also like to thank colleagues and mentors from
NDU and elsewhere, including Hassan Abbas, George Packard, Erik
Dahl, Alexis Dudden, David Ucko, and Andrea Ghiselli, who provided
ix
x ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
valuable insights, comments, and critiques throughout the compilation of

this volume. I am similarly grateful to the handful of CISA interns and
other support staff, including John Van Oudenaren, Lauren Kirby, Cole
Speidel, Logan Cunningham, William Chim, and Srijoni Banerjee who
assisted with varying elements of research, logistics, and copy editing. I am
also grateful for the fantastic editorial team at Palgrave, including senior
commissioning editor Anca Pusca. In addition, I would like to thank
Foreign Affairs for the copyright permission to reproduce Scott
G. Borgerson’s seminal article on the Arctic.
Last, I am forever grateful to my family for their continued encourage-
ment and love, including my daughters Audrey and Joan. Most impor-
tantly, I would like to thank my wife, Leigh E. Nolan, for her steadfast
patience, love, and invaluable editorial support. Leigh shared a similar
excitement for this project from its inception and equally values the loving
friendship we have developed with John Curtis Perry over the past decade.
Contents
1 Introduction: Why Maritime Eurasia? 1

Geoffrey F. Gresh
Part I The Indian Ocean 15
2 Strategic Maritime Chokepoints: Perspectives

from the Global Shipping and Port Sectors 17
Rockford Weitz
3 Chokepoints of the Western Indian Ocean, China’s

Maritime Silk Route, and the Future of Regional Security 31
Geoffrey F. Gresh
4 The Economics of Somali Counterpiracy: Assessing

Counterpiracy Measures for International Shipping
Companies 49
Jelmer D. Ikink
5 The Rise of an Indo-Japanese Maritime Partnership 67

Sea Sovereign Thomas
xi
xii Contents
6 The Fastest Way Across the Seas: Cyberspace Operations

and Cybersecurity in the Indo-Pacific 83
Jonathan Reiber
Part II Pacific Asia 95
7 Forgotten Borders: Japan’s Maritime Operations

in the Korean War and Implications for North Korea 97
Sung-Yoon Lee
8 Blurred Lines: Twenty-First Century Maritime

Security in the South China Sea 113
Joseph A. Gagliano
9 Sea Level Rise in the Pearl River Delta 129

Zachary White
10 The Great Convergence: Maritime Supremacy,

Energy Primacy, and the Oceanic Coalition in Asia 147
Stephen A. Lambo
Part III The Arctic & the Future of the World’s Oceans 181
11 The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts,

the Region Heats Up 183
Scott G. Borgerson
12 Public and National Imagination of the Arctic 197

Derek Kane O’Leary
13 Arctic Fisheries Management in the

Twenty-First Century 215
Elliot Creem
Contents
xiii
14 Security Competition Rising: Renewed

Militarization of the High North 235
Ethan Corbin
15 Tackling Greenhouse Gas Emissions

from the International Maritime Industry 259
Aaron L. Strong
Index 275
Notes on Editors and Contributors
Editor
Geoffrey F. Gresh is the Department Chair and Associate Professor of
International Security Studies at the College of International Security
Affairs, National Defense University in Washington, DC. He served previ-
ously as the college’s Director of the South and Central Asia Security Studies
Program. Prior to NDU, he was a Visiting Fellow at Sciences Po in Paris and
was the recipient of a Dwight D. Eisenhower/Clifford Roberts Fellowship.
He also received a US Fulbright-Hays Grant to teach international relations
at Salahaddin University in Erbil, Iraq. He has been awarded a Rotary
Ambassadorial Scholarship to Istanbul, Turkey, and a Presidential Scholarship
at the American University in Cairo, Egypt. Most recently, he was named as
a US-Japan Foundation Leadership Fellow, an Associate Member of the
Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at King’s College in London,
and as a term member to the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author
of Gulf Security and the U.S. Military: Regime Survival and the Politics of
Basing (Stanford University Press, http://goo.gl/hf7jJI). His research has
also appeared in such scholarly or peer-reviewed publications as World
Affairs Journal, Gulf Affairs, Sociology of Islam, Caucasian Review of
International Affairs, Iran and the Caucasus, The Fletcher Forum of World
Affairs, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Insight
Turkey, Al-Nakhlah, War on the Rocks, and Foreign Policy. He received a
PhD in International Relations and MALD from the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
xv
xvi Notes on Editors and Contributors
Contributors
Scott G. Borgerson is the CEO of CargoMetrics, a technology-driven
investment manager with a global macro and quantitative investment
focus. CargoMetrics’ investment platform incorporates big data and scal-
able computing technologies. Dr. Borgerson is also an expert on the
Arctic. He has published numerous landmark articles on the subject; he
advises national and international leaders on emerging Arctic issues; and
he is a co-founder of The Arctic Circle, a global NGO. Prior to co-found-
ing CargoMetrics, Dr. Borgerson was an International Affairs Fellow and
then the Visiting Fellow for Ocean Governance at the Council on Foreign
Relations. He also served as a Senior Research Scholar at the School of
International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. A former coast
guard officer with a decade of military service, he has held positions as a
ship navigator, a patrol boat captain, an assistant professor at the US Coast
Guard Academy, and the founding managing director of the Academy’s
Institute for Leadership. He earned the Achievement, Commendation,
and Meritorious Service Medals as well as numerous unit awards while on
active duty. He has testified before a number of congressional committees,
contributed to White House strategic policymaking, and his op-eds and
articles have appeared in The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The
Atlantic and Foreign Affairs, among other publications. Dr. Borgerson
earned a BS from the US Coast Guard Academy as well as MALD and
PhD degrees in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He has earned a US Merchant Marine
Officers License and holds a Series 3 Commodities Futures License. He
serves on the boards of The Arctic Circle, the Kostas Homeland Security
Institute, Catalyst Maritime, and the Institute for Global Maritime Studies.
He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Ethan Corbin is currently the Director of the Defence and Security
Committee at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. He completed his doc-
torate in international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy at Tufts University. Prior to joining the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly, Dr. Corbin was a Lecturer in international relations at Tufts
University teaching courses on US foreign policy and international secu-
rity studies. His research interests include US foreign policy, international
security, international organizations, and Middle Eastern politics. From
2011–2013, he was a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and
xvii
International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He

received his AB from Bowdoin College, a Master in Middle Eastern his-
tory from Université de Paris-IV (La Sorbonne), and a MALD from The
Fletcher School. Corbin has published on topics ranging from Syrian for-
eign policy, peacekeeping operations, and insurgency and counterinsur-
gency warfare. Ethan has also worked for the State Department and the
Department of Defense.
Elliot Creem is a regulatory analyst at Comverge, a clean energy technol-
ogy firm, working on demand-side management solutions for utility com-
panies in the company’s regulatory strategy team. He previously worked
at ClimateStore, Inc. He is a recent graduate from the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University where he concentrated on security
studies, maritime affairs, and energy policy. Before Fletcher, he received a
Bachelor in History and Italian and worked in New York City in market
research and recruitment positions. Creem is originally from Connecticut
and remains very interested in developments in Arctic energy and environ-
mental security. He currently resides in Washington, DC.
Joseph A. Gagliano previously served as the Director for Defense Policy
and Strategy in the Asia-Pacific at the US National Security Council. He
has also served as the Hudson Visiting Fellow at St. Antony’s College of
Oxford University. He is currently a US Navy Captain who specializes in
Sino-US relations, politico-military affairs, and naval strategic planning.
With a research focus on policymaking toward China in the complex polit-
ical environment of the Asia-Pacific, his politico-military work has focused
on the evolving nature of the US-China relationship, with postings as a
strategic planner on the Navy Staff in Deep Blue, the Quadrennial Defense
Review, and the Naval Warfare Integration Group. His active duty assign-
ments have included service on several ships, most recently commanding
USS Independence. Gagliano holds a PhD and MALD in International
Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University, an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the US
Naval War College, and a BS from the US Naval Academy. He is the
author of Congressional Policymaking in Sino-U.S. Relations during the
Post-Cold War Era (Routledge 2014), and he has been awarded research
fellowships with St. Antony’s College and Pembroke College at Oxford
University, as well as a visiting fellowship with the First Sea Lord’s Staff at
the UK Ministry of Defense.
xviii Notes on Editors and Contributors
Jelmer D. Ikink is a Partner at Liger Capital Management and COO of

Philippines Urban Living Solutions, the first affordable housing developer
dedicated to young professionals in the Philippines. Prior to this he worked
for Lehman Brothers as an M&A Analyst and for McKinsey & Company
as a Consultant in its private equity practice, among other things. Jelmer
was an Investment Manager at China-based private equity fund
Development Principles Group, where he was responsible for investment
analysis, structuring, execution, and monitoring. He taught principled
negotiation at the Harvard Law School and graduated with a Master of
Arts in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy at Tufts University in the USA. He has a BSc in International
Business from the Erasmus University in the Netherlands.
Stephen A. Lambo is the President of the American Strategic Group and
Vista Natural Gas. Previously, he was Assistant Professor of Northeast
Asian International Affairs in the Department of International Affairs at
Lewis and Clark College. He received his MALD and PhD from the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He was also a William Henry
Seward Fellow in North Pacific International History and coordinator for
the Fletcher North Pacific Program.
Sung-Yoon Lee is Kim Koo-Korea Foundation Professorship of Korean
Studies and Assistant Professor at the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University. Lee is Associate in Research at the Korea
Institute, Harvard University, and a former Research Fellow of the inau-
gural National Asia Research Program, a joint initiative by the National
Bureau of Asian Research and the Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars. Lee’s essays on the international politics of the Korean pen-
insula and Northeast Asia have been published multiple times in The
New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, LA Times,
Foreign Policy, Christian Science Monitor, CNN.com, Asia Times, The
Weekly Standard, and so on. Recent publications include “The Seoul-
Beijing-Tokyo Triangle: Terra-Centric Nordpolitik vs. Oceanic Realpolitik”
(Korea Economic Institute of America Press, 2014); “North Korean
Exceptionalism and South Korean Conventionalism: Prospects for a
Reverse Formulation?” Asia Policy 15 (January 2013); “Don’t Engage
Kim Jong Un – Bankrupt Him,” Foreign Policy (January 2013); and “The
Pyongyang Playbook,” Foreign Affairs (August 2010). Lee has been a
visiting professor at Bowdoin College, Sogang University, Seoul National
University, the Republic of Korea Ministry of Unification, and the
xix
Northeast Asian History Foundation. He has testified as an expert witness

before the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs
Hearing on North Korea policy and has advised senior officials and elected
leaders in the USA and the ROK.
Derek Kane O’Leary is a PhD candidate in UC Berkeley’s History
Department, where he works on US and global history and is currently
writing a dissertation on historical memory in the early republic and ante-
bellum USA. Meanwhile, he acts as Assistant Director of the BENELUX
Program at Berkeley’s Institute for European Studies and manages
Berkeley’s Interdisciplinary Working Group on the Early USA. Before
that, he completed an MA in international relations at Tufts University’s
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, with a thesis on the history of
popular conceptions and the international relations of the Arctic. He has a
BA, summa cum laude, in Political Science and French from Amherst
College. At points in between, he was a lecturer at the University of
Burgundy in Dijon, France; a trainee at the European Parliament in
Brussels and Washington, DC; and a research fellow at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Jonathan Reiber is a Senior Fellow at the University of California at
Berkeley’s Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity. He focuses his research
and writing on resilience, national contingency planning, and cybersecu-
rity in the Asia-Pacific region. Prior to his appointment at Berkeley, Mr.
Reiber held a number of positions in the Obama Administration within
the US Department of Defense. In his last position, he served as Chief
Strategy Officer for Cyber Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
As Chief Strategy Officer, he advised the Pentagon leadership and led stra-
tegic initiatives across the cyber policy portfolio to include strategic plan-
ning; key international, interagency, and industry partnerships; and
strategic communications. He was the principal author of the Department
of Defense Cyber Strategy (2015). In addition to serving as Chief Strategy
Officer, he was also the Executive Secretary of the Defense Science Board
Task Force on Cyber Deterrence. Earlier in the Obama Administration,
Mr. Reiber served as Special Assistant and Speechwriter to the US’ Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Dr. Ashton B. Carter, and previously as Special
Assistant to the US’ Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Dr. James N. Miller. In both positions he focused on cyber policy,
Middle East security, Asia-Pacific security, strategy, and public communi-
cations. From 2007 to 2009, Mr. Reiber was Research Manager at Ergo,
xx Notes on Editors and Contributors
a consulting and intelligence firm focusing on emerging markets. At Ergo

he coordinated scenario planning exercises and deep-dive geopolitical
analysis, advising Fortune 500 companies and other organizations on the
political and social affairs of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.
Earlier in his career, he served with the United Nations Peacekeeping
Mission in Sudan, as a policy advisor to the Episcopal Church of the USA
and as a Thomas J. Watson Fellow in South Africa, Italy, India, Turkey,
and Cyprus, where he studied the role of religion in political and social
change. Mr. Reiber is a graduate of Middlebury College, where he studied
religion, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, where he focused
his studies on international security and US diplomatic history and served
as Editor-in-Chief of The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs.
James Stavridis attended the US Naval Academy at Annapolis and spent
over 30 years in the Navy, rising to the rank of four-star Admiral. Among
his many commands were four years as the 16th Supreme Allied
Commander at NATO, where he oversaw operations in Afghanistan,
Libya, Syria, the Balkans, and piracy off the coast of Africa. He also com-
manded US Southern Command in Miami, charged with military opera-
tions through Latin America for nearly three years. He was the longest
serving Combatant Commander in recent US history. In the course of his
career in the Navy, he served as senior military assistant to the Secretary of
the Navy and the Secretary of Defense. He led the Navy’s premier opera-
tional think tank for innovation, Deep Blue, immediately after the 9/11
attacks. He won the Battenberg Cup for commanding the top ship in the
Atlantic Fleet and the Navy League John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational
Leadership, along more than 50 US and international medals and decora-
tions, including 28 from foreign nations. He also commanded a Destroyer
Squadron and a carrier strike group, both in combat. He earned a PhD
from the Fletcher School at Tufts, winning the Gullion prize as outstand-
ing student in his class in 1983, as well as academic honors from the
National and Naval War Colleges as a distinguished student. He speaks
Spanish and French. Jim has published six books on leadership, Latin
America, ship handling, and innovation, as well as over a hundred articles
in leading journals. An active user of social networks, he has thousands of
followers on Twitter and friends on Facebook. His TED talk on twenty-
first century security in 2012 has had over 700,000 views. He tweeted the
end of combat operations in the Libyan NATO intervention. His memoir
xxi
of the NATO years, The Accidental Admiral, was released in October

2014. Admiral Stavridis is also the Chair of the Board of the US Naval
Institute, the professional association of the Nation’s sea services: Navy,
Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Merchant Marine. He is a monthly col-
umnist for TIME Magazine and Chief International Security Analyst for
NBC News. Jim is the 12th Dean at the Fletcher School, a post he assumed
in the summer of 2013. He is happily married to Laura, and they have two
daughters—one working at Google and the other a Lieutenant in the US
Navy.
Aaron L. Strong is dually appointed as Assistant Professor of Marine
Policy and as cooperating assistant professor at the Climate Change
Institute at the University of Maine, Orono. He also serves as a faculty
fellow at the Senator George J. Mitchell Center for Sustainability
Solutions at the university. His research focuses on global to local climate
change policy development, water quality management, and the devel-
opment of coastal and marine sustainability solutions. He is a member of
the Northeast Coastal Acidification Network Policy Working Group and
the Maine Ocean and Coastal Acidification Partnership. Trained as an
interdisciplinary sustainability scientist, Strong holds a PhD in
Environment and Resources from Stanford University. He also holds a
Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School at Tufts
University, and a Bachelor of Arts in Biology and Political Science from
Swarthmore College.
Sea Sovereign Thomas is a US Marine Corps intelligence officer and
Regional Area Officer for Northeast Asia who currently serves as the
Director of the Commander’s Action Group at US Marine Corps Forces,
Pacific. Born and raised in Hawaii, Sea has spent the majority of his career
in the Pacific, serving tours with the III Marine Expeditionary Force and
US Pacific Command. He also served as the Speechwriter to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps and as a Naval ROTC instructor at the
College of the Holy Cross, where he taught leadership and military his-
tory. A distinguished graduate of the US Naval Academy, Sea holds mas-
ter’s degrees from the Fletcher School at Tufts University, the US Naval
War College, and Marine Corps University. He serves on the Board of
Directors of two nonprofits, the Institute for Global Maritime Studies and
Blue Water Metrics. Sea is a delegate to the US-Japan Leadership Program
(2017–2018).
xxii Notes on Editors and Contributors
Rockford Weitz is Entrepreneur Coach and Director of Maritime Studies

at Tufts University’s Fletcher School. He also serves as President of the
Institute for Global Maritime Studies Inc. and President and CEO at
Rhumb Line International LLC. He served as founding Executive Director
at FinTech Sandbox in 2014 and as founding CEO of CargoMetrics from
2008 to 2013. Before co-founding CargoMetrics, he was a team leader of
the Fletcher Abu Dhabi Project, a senior fellow at the Institute for Global
Maritime Studies, a fellow at Fletcher’s Maritime Studies Program, and a
counterterrorism fellow at Fletcher’s Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism
Studies. He has also taught courses in jurisprudence, maritime security,
and global maritime affairs at the Fletcher School and published op-eds in
The New York Times, The Christian Science Monitor, and The Straits Times
(Singapore), among others. Before co-founding Rhumb Line in 2005, he
served as international counsel at Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories
Inc., leading the effort to open 12 international subsidiaries and streamline
global operations. He also worked at the US Trade Representative and co-
founded and served as Program Director of the Borgenicht Peace Initiative,
a social entrepreneurship venture in Bethlehem. Rockford earned a JD
from Harvard Law School, MALD and PhD degrees from the Fletcher
School, and a BA in International Relations: Political Economy from the
College of William and Mary. He is a fellow in the US-Japan Leadership
Program, a member of the Fletcher School’s Advancement Council, and a
member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Zachary White is an independent researcher. He is a graduate of the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, where he focused his studies on
Asia-Pacific affairs. Mr. White was also named a John Curtis Perry Fellow
for his work researching the Northeast Asian space. Prior to the Fletcher
School, he spent three years on the JET Program teaching elementary and
junior high school English in rural Japan. During this time, Mr. White also
had the privilege of being the first non-Japanese citizen to become a fire-
fighter in Japan. He also spent two years studying and working in both
Southern and Northern China. Mr. White completed his Bachelor’s
degree in Political Science at St. John’s University, in his home state of
Minnesota. He is proficient in Chinese and Japanese.
List of Figures and Maps
Fig. 4.1 Ship rerouting options 53

Fig. 4.2 Ship speeding costs 54
Fig. 4.3 Ship hardening measures 56
Fig. 4.4 Different counterpiracy measures 60
Fig. 4.5 Counterpiracy decision-making tree 60
Map 1.1 Indian Ocean region 16

Map 2.1 East Asia 96
Map 3.1 Arctic region 182
xxiii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Why Maritime Eurasia?
Geoffrey F. Gresh
A geopolitical and economic shift is upon us, emerging across Eurasia’s

diverse maritime regions. Eurasian powers, including Russia, China, and
India, have increasingly embraced their maritime geography as they seek
to expand and strengthen their burgeoning economies, enhance their mil-
itary power projection capabilities to protect strategic national interests,
and magnify their global influence. At the same time, this increased eco-
nomic and military competition and power projection at sea has been
exacerbated by climate change and the melting of the Arctic. During the
upcoming century, the melting of the Arctic will transform Eurasia’s
importance and likely speed up political, economic, and military competi-
tion across Eurasia’s main maritime regions—from the Indian Ocean and
Pacific Asia to the Arctic—for the first time in modern history. This shift-
ing dynamic has already begun to alter maritime trade and investment
patterns and thus the global political economy. It also creates a rising
threat to the current status quo of world order that has long been domi-
nated by the Atlantic World and the United States specifically. This volume
examines Eurasia from a saltwater perspective, analyzing its main maritime
G. F. Gresh (*)
College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University,
Washington, DC, USA
© The Author(s) 2018 1

G. F. Gresh (ed.), Eurasia’s Maritime Rise and Global Security,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71806-4_1
2 G. F. GRESH
spaces in a threefold manner—as avenue, as arena, as source—to show the

significance of this geostrategic shift and Eurasia’s enhanced embrace of
the sea.1
Maritime Eurasia stretches from the Strait of Gibraltar and the
Mediterranean in the west to the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and
the Sea of Japan/East Sea in the east. It also stretches from the northerly
reaches of the Arctic to the southern portions of the Indian Ocean. With
more than 90 percent of the world’s goods arriving via the sea, the maritime
space remains prominent in an increasingly interconnected era. As Sir Walter
Raleigh noted, “Whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade.
Whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the
World, and consequently the world itself.”2 The control and security of the
maritime trading routes or sea lanes of communication are therefore essen-
tial and will continue as such for India, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea,
and others as they more actively expand into Eurasia’s blue water spaces.
Eurasia’s vast maritime regions also include some of the world’s most
important strategic maritime chokepoints—the Danish Straits, the Suez
Canal, the Bab el-Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, the Straits of Malacca,
and the Bosphorus Straits. Eurasia’s maritime domain also possesses 27 of
30 of the world’s largest container ports.3 Trade between Asia and either
Northern Europe, the Mediterranean, or the Middle East amounted to an
estimated 25.5 million TEUs on an annual basis in recent years, making
the East-West and West-East trade routes some of the largest and busiest
in the world.4 China in particular was recently named as the world’s largest
trading partner, surpassing the United States with about $4 billion in
annual trade volume. Some estimates also predict that China will domi-
nate 17 of the world’s top 25 bilateral trade avenues.5
These trends in trade align with eastern Eurasia’s growing popula-
tion—estimated at 60 percent of the world’s population, with China and
India accounting for 40 percent of it—and quest to secure more economic
or natural resources.6 Furthermore, since the 1990s 42 percent of the
world’s expanding energy consumption is directly linked to India and
China. On the supply side, Eurasia—mainly the Middle East and Central
Asia—accounts for 66 percent of proven oil reserves and an estimated 71
percent of proven natural gas.7 Of the world’s proven natural gas reserves,
Russia possesses 17 percent of it and will gain an even larger market share
when the Arctic opens up due to its vast and untapped natural resources.8
The continued challenge for the continent’s growing economies—and
even those of the status quo powers such as South Korea and Japan—is
that most of these resources must traverse the sea and travel via some of
INTRODUCTION: WHY MARITIME EURASIA? 3
the world’s most dangerous maritime chokepoints. More than 50 percent

of the world’s oil is shipped via the sea, for example, while the Strait of
Hormuz alone handles more than 20 percent of it or an estimated 17 mil-
lion barrels of oil per day.9 In a similar manner, approximately 85 percent
of China’s oil imports transit the Strait of Malacca. Anything that threat-
ens the closure of such a vital and narrow waterway could have devastating
world economic and political consequences.10
Analytical Framework
Throughout this volume, three main argument strands are asserted by all
of the authors regarding how Eurasia’s maritime space has grown in sig-
nificance. Specifically, it looks at how Eurasia’s maritime space is used:
–– As avenue
–– As arena
–– As source
To quote maritime historian John Curtis Perry:
[The Ocean] is an avenue for the flow of goods and resources, traditionally
for people as well as ideas, and an arena for struggle and combat.
Furthermore, the sea provides a source of foodstuffs and minerals, and will
offer perhaps much else in the future. Now a frontier of opportunity, it is
also a frontier of challenge. How we can exploit these resources without
severely damaging the natural environment or inflaming national passions is
a daunting task, especially in Pacific Asia where tensions are already high.11
During the upcoming century, Eurasia’s maritime avenues, arenas, and

vital resources will grow in importance if current political, economic, envi-
ronmental, and military trends continue apace at their present levels. At
the same time, the changing nature of the ocean and rising sea levels will
act as a devastating source and force that threatens the livelihood and
economies of Eurasia’s coastal nations.
In an age of complex interdependence, some believe that rising global-
ization and growing international commercial ties have contributed to the
relative peace that we see today, especially on the high seas.12 Moreover,
some of the threats faced at sea such as piracy, for example, can be addressed
through collective security or multilateral cooperation such as the
Combined Task Force 150 counter-piracy operations in the western
Indian Ocean. But there is also a competing school of thought that refers
4 G. F. GRESH
in part to the classic work of the naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan. In
his famous The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, Mahan
writes about how a nation’s wealth is tied to both sea power and maritime
trade. A nation cannot have domestic prosperity without maritime domi-
nance.13 Mahan believed that commercial rivalry did not necessarily result
in greater stability or peace but rather that it could transform into a more
competitive or adversarial relationship with a potential for escalating into
conflict.14 If tensions escalate further in line with Mahan’s sea power the-
ory, it could have devastating repercussions for both the global political
economy and Eurasian powers who increasingly rely upon the sea, includ-
ing established regional powers such as South Korea and Japan. The
United States will also likely be implicated and immersed into any conflict
to defend its security treaty allies such as Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan.
Though other works have applied either a neoliberal or Mahanian-like
thinking to specific cases or specific oceans such as the Indian Ocean,
South China Sea, or Pacific Asia, no book has yet to tackle Eurasia’s mari-
time space as a whole and from an interdisciplinary perspective.15 Some
prior works have attempted to analyze the Indo-Pacific as a collective
region, but they still fall short in providing a more comprehensive analysis
that integrates both climate change and/or military, economic, and secu-
rity challenges associated with the growing rivalries of the continent.16
With this volume’s unique maritime perspective, the contributors por-
tray a complex dynamic across Eurasia’s maritime regions that will con-
tinue to evolve and grow more accentuated with a warming planet over the
next century. Though the contributors might differ in what they believe as
Eurasia’s top maritime priority or concerns for the future, this volume
provides keen insights into how Eurasia’s maritime space has transformed
in recent years, in addition to how it will affect many of the current dynam-
ics and alliances that we often take for granted in the current international
system. Whether one believes it or not, Eurasia’s maritime rise has begun
with significant implications for the future of global security.
Volume Overview
For the organization of this volume, the authors have been divided among
the three main oceanic regions associated with Eurasia’s maritime spaces:
the Indian Ocean, Pacific Asia, and the Arctic. With any good maritime
study, however, it is important to note that some of the chapters have
regional overlap or address topics that apply to the larger Eurasian conti-
nent. Climate change, energy security, and the shipping industry, for
example, are not always bound by a specific region. That said, most of the
chapters do fit well into one or more of the three specific oceanic regions
highlighted above, and the last section takes on a more future leaning
approach related to the future of Eurasia and the world’s oceans. As a
volume that is interdisciplinary in nature, it represents vital perspectives
from the private and public sector, as well as regional maritime trends,
linked to the great importance of the past, present, and future of a mari-
time Eurasia. Additionally, for each regional ocean, the authors either
touch upon one or all three of the maritime themes of ocean as avenue,
arena, or source, thus making an important contribution to our larger
understanding about Eurasia’s growing maritime significance.
The Indian Ocean

In Chap. 2, Rockford Weitz begins by examining ocean as avenue and the
debates over the importance of some of Eurasia’s essential southern mari-
time chokepoints from a shipping and private sector perspective. Strategic
chokepoints are geographic constraints shaping sea routes and the global
shipping industry and, therefore, create numerous business opportunities
for those industries that support global shipping, including port opera-
tions, ship repair, bunkering, and ship brokering and chartering. As Weitz
discusses, global shipping companies do not view maritime chokepoints as
strategically important but rather as simply a geographic reality. In con-
trast, global port operators, bunkerers, ship repairers, and ship brokers and
charterers view having a physical presence at maritime chokepoints as a
competitive advantage because such waterways create a geographic con-
centration of global shipping. Through an examination of the three vital
cases that stretch from the Far East of Eurasia to the far west—the Strait
of Malacca, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Gibraltar—this chapter concludes
with an analysis of why strategic chokepoints are important to certain mar-
itime industries but not others and what implications that has for global
shipping and security.
In Chap. 3, Geoffrey Gresh examines Eurasia’s other key southern
chokepoints: the Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz. Here, he
looks at ocean as both avenue and arena through a case study on the rise
of China in the western Indian Ocean and the implications that China’s
rise has for regional security. China’s growing and more proactive presence
6 G. F. GRESH
has led to greater competition with India and thus the United States
throughout the Indian Ocean Region. In 2013, Chinese President Xi
Jinping announced the proposal of a “New Maritime Silk Road” in con-
junction with China’s “Silk Road Economic Belt” project or “One Belt,
One Road” initiative to support China’s growing economy and to expand
the PRC’s economic influence and network across Eurasia on land and at
sea. As Gresh argues, the Maritime Silk Road initiative specifically aligns
with a larger Chinese maritime strategy to expand China’s maritime pres-
ence in the Indian Ocean and Arabian/Persian Gulf for economic, politi-
cal, and security reasons. It also looks at how China might soon be well
positioned to act as an additional stabilizing force for Persian Gulf and
Arabian Sea security. For many Gulf Arab monarchies, they welcome an
increase in China’s political, economic, and other maritime regional activi-
ties, but the choice of security or economic partner is made more compli-
cated today by the domestic and regional instability stemming in part from
Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Iran, factors that threaten to alter totally the
broader Middle East’s security dynamic.
In Chap. 4, Jelmer Ikink looks at one of the Indian Ocean’s greatest
dilemmas: Somali piracy and successful counter-piracy measures. In this
chapter, he touches upon the ocean as source and avenue. The motives for
and means to eradicate Somali piracy have been thoroughly discussed by
academics, practitioners, policymakers, and research institutions. And for
good reason, pirates have the ability to endanger and seriously disrupt the
shipping industry. Anti-piracy solutions offered are frequently based on pro-
grams seeking to eradicate piracy through onshore programs that raise the
standard of living and opportunities for the average Somali, so that piracy
will not be regarded as their alternative to a life in destitution. In the mean-
time, the presence of pirates creates a real challenge to maritime trade and
other maritime economic opportunities today. During a period when ship-
pers are already facing financial volatility, international shipping has increas-
ingly become exposed to the threat of piracy. Unlike centuries ago, when the
height of the monsoon was the worst shipping season with its strong winds
and high waves, today sailors dread the off-monsoon season because the
pirates then board their skiffs. This chapter offers important insights into
how to protect lives and cargo of the shipping industry by providing a cost-
benefit analysis of each of the most often used counter-piracy measures.
Sea Sovereign Thomas in Chap. 5 addresses the theme of ocean as
arena through an examination of the rising Indo-Japanese maritime
partnership and growing, albeit overlapping, security concerns between
the Indian Ocean Region and Pacific Asia. In large part influenced by
China’s rise, India and Japan have created one of the fastest-growing bilat-
eral security relationships in Asia. Over the past decade or more, Tokyo
and New Delhi have wholly transformed the nature and scope of their
association, moving from negligible engagement to a full-blown “global
and strategic partnership.” Today, their security dialogue is routine and
substantive. Since 2005, successive prime ministers, for example, have
committed to an annual summit, and foreign and defense ministers now
meet frequently in a “two-plus-two” format, the same mechanism Japan
enjoys with the United States and Australia, and a format that India only
shares with Japan. Naval and coast guard exercises have grown in fre-
quency and substance, and India is buying the capable Japanese US-2
amphibious aircraft in Tokyo’s first overseas military sale since 1967. What
explains the extraordinary speed of this development? China’s rise and
America’s relative decline have provided the real sense of urgency. As
Beijing flexes its military and diplomatic muscles, Tokyo and New Delhi’s
shared interests have come into sharper relief. At the same time, America’s
position as unilateral guarantor of Asian maritime security has become
increasingly tenuous thus pushing at the importance of Eurasia’s maritime
rise. India and Japan’s vigorous response to these twin developments has
been informed by a common view of the saltwater domain, and the most
prominent manifestations of their strategic partnership have been nautical
in nature. As asserted in this chapter, India and Japan’s maritime relation-
ship is built on strong foundations, is likely to endure, and will have a posi-
tive effect on Indo-Pacific maritime security, particularly as a check against
Chinese naval activity.
To round out this section, Chap. 6 examines the interconnected nature
of cybersecurity and the Indo-Pacific’s maritime security or the theme of
ocean as avenue and arena. Certainly, the Internet has helped drive Asia’s
economic emergence. Major telecommunications investments in China,
India, and Southeast Asia over the last three decades integrated these
economies into the global system, allowing Asian companies to bring
goods and services to domestic and international markets in new and inno-
vative ways. Today China has the largest population of Internet users on
earth at 720 million, and in a sign of Asia’s continued rise, India recently
jumped past the United States for second place with over 460 million
users. Yet there is a dark side to all this connectivity. Asia’s current and
projected reliance on cyberspace for its business operations and economic
growth stands in stark contrast to the inadequacy of its cybersecurity.
While arguing that Asia by and large lacks a robust regional cybersecurity
8 G. F. GRESH
architecture, Jonathan Reiber analyzes the important maritime security

angle as well. He argues that nowhere is this nexus more important than
in the development of secure power projection capabilities—especially in
naval power, which will play such a key part in the region’s strategic future
and in the successful implementation of the United States and its allies’
strategic investments. India, South Korea, Japan, and the United States
must harden their naval systems in anticipation of any contingency with
China, not to mention the continent of Eurasia as a whole. As a result,
they must prepare for any potential contingency whereby they may lose
assured access; in short, they must prepare to fight blind. States across the
Indo-Pacific region have made a modicum of progress in this regard but
more must be done to secure the communications infrastructure that
underpins the region’s naval, shipping, and other maritime infrastructure
investments.
Pacific Asia
To begin this section, Sung-Yoon Lee in Chap. 7 provides a more histori-
cal perspective on the ocean as avenue and arena through his examina-
tion of Japan’s maritime relationship with the Korean peninsula. Lee
argues that if the United States fought in the Korean War primarily to
repel the North Korean invading forces, a deeper primal reason was to
prevent Japan from falling into hostile hands of China and the Soviet
Union. Moreover, by taking the initiative to go to war in Korea under
the rubric of “police action,” the United States gave credence to the
concept of collective security implemented under the banner of the
United Nations. Hence, an all-important precedent had been set in
Korea. That the Republic of Korea was saved by this campaign was an
almost tangential, although entirely necessary, condition to achieving
bigger national objectives and establishing far-reaching international
principles. In this ambitious campaign, the United States sought assis-
tance not only from the 15 other nations that came to South Korea under
the UN imprimatur but also America’s most natural source of men and
materiel in the region, Japan. The United States employed thousands of
Japanese nationals, to a limited extent, in combat duties in and around
the Korean peninsula, including dozens of Japanese vessels in the Korean
waters and harbors of Wonsan, Kunsan, Inchon, Haeju, and Chinnampo.
In any future c ontingency operations in the Korean peninsula, Japan’s
military experience in Korea—especially that of its maritime forces—will
be a strategic asset not forgotten. Chief among the humanitarian and
strategic needs for Japan’s seaborne involvement in a future contingency

in Korea will be the constant US interest in preserving the security of its
most highly valued prize in the region, Japan.
Shifting southward, the next two chapters examine the current and
possible future dynamics of the South China Sea. They hit upon all three
of the themes of ocean as avenue, arena, and source. Joseph Gagliano
writes in Chap. 8 that the dividing lines between high and low politics in
maritime security have become increasingly indiscernible in the South
China Sea, creating a more complex policymaking environment in this
contested ocean area. Amid longstanding territorial disputes, two major
factors—China’s more assertive foreign policies and a newly acquired mili-
tary power to back them—have had profound effects on maritime security
in the region. The increased frequency of national security encounters
with China in the South China Sea has blurred the lines between human,
economic, and national security dimensions within the broader category
of maritime security. When a state deploys forces for maritime security,
should they be equipped for low-intensity human security missions or
must they also be prepared for high-intensity national defense missions?
States without territorial disputes with a great power can more easily dis-
tinguish between these missions, sending law enforcement forces for one
and naval forces for the other. For states dealing with these types of terri-
torial disputes, however, this differentiation is often not possible, because
maritime security boats assigned to rescue fishermen in distress may sud-
denly find themselves defending their nation’s claimed borders against
superior Chinese naval forces. Faced with China’s increased foreign policy
assertiveness and more powerful military, states are incentivized to deploy
naval warships rather than law enforcement patrol vessels. This policymak-
ing environment has caused the boundary to become increasingly indistin-
guishable between maritime security and traditional naval deployments.
As a complement to this military and legal perspective, Zachary White
writes in Chap. 9 on the current and upcoming impact that climate change
and rising sea levels have or will potentially have on China’s economy and
shipping industry or the themes of ocean as vital avenue and source of
revenue. It explores the effects of sea level rise in the Pearl River Delta
(PRD) in Southern China specifically. The PRD is one of the most impor-
tant economic regions or generators of revenue in China and represents
almost ten percent of China’s GDP. The central government in Beijing
plans to turn the nine municipalities in the PRD into one large megacity
by mid-century. These plans fail to account, however, for the changing
reality of climate change-induced sea level rise in the region, where sea
10 G. F. GRESH
levels could rise 1 meter by the end of the century due to a 4-degree
Celsius rise in temperature and the increasingly changing nature of the
Earth’s oceans. Beijing’s reliance on mitigating carbon emissions shifts the
focus of the policy debate away from adapting to the coming metamor-
phosis of the region and prevents a coordinated response to sea level rise.
If nothing is done, the Pearl River Delta faces extraordinary economic and
human loss that would deal a large blow to a flattening Chinese economy.
As White argues, Beijing needs to identify that adaptation strategies are an
acceptable form of climate change policy and work to implement both
hard and soft armoring designs into the PRD climate change infrastruc-
ture, as well as create a better organizational response to sea level rise.
The last chapter of this section embraces the larger theme of energy
security in Pacific Asia or the ocean as source and the implications for
global maritime order and maritime supremacy. In Chap. 10, Stephen
Lambo analyzes the importance of US energy production and the critical
lifeline it has provided to US allies in East Asia, especially South Korea and
Japan. He begins with an historical overview of what he deems as the
energy and oceanic coalition in Asia. He then examines the new energy
multi-polarity created by the rapid increase in US energy supplies in recent
years—such as the shale gas revolution—delving into the critical ways the
United States will likely use its newfound ability to export energy by sea to
support Asian allies and to balance foes in Pacific Asia.
The Arctic and the Future of the World’s Oceans

This last section pulls the entire volume together with its salient analysis
on the historical, present-day, and future trajectory of the Arctic and
Eurasian continent as a whole. To begin, Scott G. Borgerson in Chap. 11
writes that climate change is transforming the Arctic from a geopolitical
afterthought into an epic bounty ripe for this century’s entrepreneurs,
touching upon the themes of ocean as avenue and arena. As he argues,
countries should continue their commitment to the peaceful course they
have charted there so far. But he also asserts that policymakers need to get
serious about establishing a shared vision of how to harness the Arctic’s
resources. With the Arctic heating up faster than many predicted, it is a
matter of not if but when the summer sea ice will be gone and the region
will open up to widespread development. If managed correctly, the Arctic
could be both a carefully protected environment and a major driver of
economic growth—with enormous benefits for both outsiders and the
inhabitants of this prime real estate. In a similar vein, Derek O’Leary helps
to set the scene for our deeper understanding of the state rivalries and
sovereignty dynamics at play in the Arctic. In Chap. 12, he writes about
the evolution of the public and national imaginations tied to the Arctic
region. Here he looks at the Arctic as both an arena and source of inspira-
tion. In the Arctic, as O’Leary argues, no two littoral nations diverge so
much on their Arctic orientation and aspirations as the United States and
Russia, historically and today. Yet, if the Eurasian behemoth has tradition-
ally drawn far more in resources and identity from the Arctic, for both
Russia and in North America, we may now hope that the Arctic land and
seascape offers far less “ferocious enchantment” than it has. Increasingly,
and for the first time in the international relations of the Arctic, it appears
that the emerging tensions will be managed within a complex framework
of international law, which all major parties—of the Arctic littoral and
farther afield—have a strong interest in maintaining.
Elliot Creem builds off of this important discussion in Chap. 13 with a
study of the threat posed to Arctic fisheries—a valuable source of food and
revenue—due in large part to global warming. The Arctic Ocean contin-
ues to warm and sea ice retreat means that previously frozen, unexplored
areas of the Central Arctic are now navigable and accessible. As Creem
discusses, these international waters, outside of the eight Arctic states’
exclusive economic zones, require laws and regulations to protect the
marine ecosystem and govern sustainable industries like commercial fish-
ing. While commercial fishermen have trawled Arctic waters for decades,
they have never had access to the 1.1 million square-mile zone in the
Central Arctic. Though a regulatory regime composed of international
law, national regulations, and regional frameworks currently governs Arctic
fisheries, many gaps and shortcomings preclude full coverage of the Arctic
Ocean, including a lack of compliance and enforcement mechanisms.
The last two chapters of this final section take on a more future leaning
approach when it comes to the Arctic and Eurasia, whether from a geo-
politics or environmental perspective. In Chap. 14, Ethan Corbin provides
a valuable and unique NATO maritime take, examining the ocean as arena
theme. From his perspective, 2014 was a pivotal year for NATO and its
growing concerns over a more aggressive Russia in Europe and the Middle
East. In response, NATO scrambled to prove its “readiness” in the face of
challenges to its eastern and southern flanks. Far north of the Ukrainian
and Middle Eastern conflicts, however, NATO has begun to take aim on
the strategic competition growing in the Arctic, especially between Russia
and the European Union. As Arctic states such as Russia seek to protect
and project their interests in the High North, the region is witnessing
12 G. F. GRESH
unparalleled and increased military activity, posing significant challenges

to the European Union. Competition and cooperation dominated the
Arctic in the twentieth century but today’s increased militarization and
exploitation bring fears of accidents, escalation, and even conflict. As
Corbin argues, maintaining the Arctic as an arena for strategic cooperation
is more important than ever. NATO member states and Russia have a
chance to allow for the Arctic to become an area of mutual responsibility
and benefit to the globe, but the current state of play remains tenuous.
In Chap. 15, Aaron Strong provides an insightful analysis on the future
challenges of the oceanic space from a maritime shipping and environmen-
tal or CO2 emission perspective. Certainly, Eurasia’s rising powers will play
an important future role in the trajectory of the continent but environmen-
tal challenges and concerns may soon surpass them in future decades. In
this last chapter of the volume, Strong writes that no industry is as global
in nature as maritime shipping and no environmental problem is as global
in scope as anthropogenic climate change. Given the international nature
of the maritime industry, in which goods owned by a company based in
one country may be transported between two more countries by a ship
flagged to a fourth country, responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions
from international shipping has not been easily assigned to individual states
and has instead been classified as “international emissions,” excluded from
any national emissions inventories. For over two decades, this problem of
attribution has confounded international environmental institutions’
attempts to develop regulations for reducing emissions from international
transport, just as the share of global greenhouse gas emissions from ship-
ping has risen steadily; international shipping emissions now comprise over
three percent of humankind’s carbon footprint. This chapter, therefore,
examines the problem of greenhouse gas emissions from the international
maritime industry and assesses the development of competing ideas for
solutions to this problem. This has direct implications for countries such as
China and India specifically as some of the largest Eurasian maritime actors.
By exploring the institutional responses to this issue from both the global
climate change regime and the International Maritime Organization, a UN
specialized agency which develops guidelines, protocols, and regulations
for the maritime industry, Strong seeks to shed light on the mechanisms
that underlie the failure of international agreements to tackle global cli-
mate change. Additionally, he highlights the opportunities that have arisen
through this process to improve not only the sustainability of the shipping
industry but also the future sustainability of our entire global economy on
which Eurasia is dependent.
Disclaimer The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not
represent official policy or the views of the National Defense University, the
Department of Defense, and the US Government.
Notes
1. This construct is inspired by John Curtis Perry, “Beyond the Terracentric:
Maritime Ruminations,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 37, no. 3
(2013): 141–145.
2. Op. Cit. Geoffrey Till, Seapower (New York: Routledge, 2013, 3rd
Edition), 12.
3. See “Top 50 World Container Ports,” World Shipping Council, 2016,
http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/
top-50-world-container-ports
4. In cargo shipping, TEUs is short for Twenty-foot equivalent units. “Trade
Routes,” World Shipping Council, 2013 estimates, http://www.world-
shipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/trade-routes
5. Malte Humpert, “The Future of Arctic Shipping: A New Silk Road for
China?” The Arctic Institute, 2013, 8, https://issuu.com/thearcticinsti-
tute/docs/the_future_of_arctic_shipping_-_a_n
6. David D. Arnold, “Six Pressing Issues in Asia and How We’re Adapting
Our Approach to Address Them,” The Asia Foundation, September 6,
2016, http://asiafoundation.org/2016/09/06/six-pressing-issues-asia-
adapting-approach-address/
7. Kent E. Calder, New Continentalism: Energy and Twenty-First-Century
Eurasian Geopolitics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012): xxv.
8. Jude Clemente, “How Much Energy Does Russia Have Anyways?”
Forbes, March 25, 2015, https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/
2015/03/25/how-much-energy-does-r ussia-have-anyways/
#3ca1c54c7c59
9. Geoffrey F. Gresh, Gulf Security and the U.S. Military: Regime Survival
and the Politics of Basing (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015): 7.
10. “Maritime Choke Points and Strategic Interruption,” TSG Intel Brief,
June 6, 2014, http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-maritime-choke-
points-and-strategic-interruption/
11. Emphasis by author. John Curtis Perry, “Oceanic Revolution and Pacific
Asia,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 35, no. 2 (2011): 123–131.
12. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence
Revisited. International Organization 41, no. 4 (1987): 725–753.
13. Seth Cropsey and Arthur Milikh, “Mahan’s Naval Strategy: China
Learned It. Will America Forget It?” World Affairs Journal
(April/May 2012), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/
mahan’s-naval-strategy-china-learned-it-will-america-forget-it
14 G. F. GRESH
14. Daniel Moran and James A. Russell, eds., Maritime Strategy and Global
Order: Markets, Resources, Security (Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press, 2016): 34–35; Geoffrey Till, Seapower (New York:
Routledge, 2013, 3rd Edition): 11.
15. See Thomas Mahnken and Dan Blumenthal, Strategy in Asia: The Past,
Present, and Future of Regional Security (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2014); Dave Sloggett, Anarchic Sea: Maritime Security in the
Twenty-First Century (London: Hurst, 2013); Peter Dombrowski and
Andrew C. Winner, The Indian Ocean and U.S. Grand Strategy: Ensuring
Access and Promoting Security (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University
Press, 2014); John Garofano and Andrea J. Dew, Deep Currents and
Rising Tides The Indian Ocean and International Security (Washington,
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013); James Kraska, Arctic Security
in an Age of Climate Change (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2013); Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014); Toshi Yoshihara and James
R. Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to
U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press,
2010); Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Asia Looks Seaward: Power
and Maritime Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International,
2007); James R. Holmes and Andrew C. Winner; Indian Naval Strategy
in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Routledge, 2010); Andrew
S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, China Goes to Sea: Maritime
Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective (Annapolis,
Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2009); Bernard Cole, Asian Maritime
Strategies (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2013); Robert
Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power
(New York: Random House, 2010).
16. Michael R. Auslin, The End of the Asian Century: War, Stagnation, and the
Risks to the World’s Most Dynamic Region (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2017); Priya Chacko, New Regional Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific: Drivers,
Dynamics and Consequences (New York: Routledge, 2016); C. Raja Mohan,
Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific (New York:
Carnegie Endowment, 2012); Sam Bateman and Joshua Ho, eds. Southeast
Asia and the Rise of Chinese and Indian Naval Power: Between Rising Naval
Powers (New York: Routledge, 2012).
PART I
The Indian Ocean

16 The Indian Ocean
Map 1.1 Indian Ocean region

CHAPTER 2
Strategic Maritime Chokepoints: Perspectives

from the Global Shipping and Port Sectors
Rockford Weitz
Global shipping companies do not view maritime chokepoints as strategi-

cally important but rather simply as a geographic reality for their busi-
nesses. In contrast, global port operators, ship charterers, bunkerers, ship
repairers, and other maritime support service companies view having a
physical presence at maritime chokepoints as a competitive advantage
because such waterways create a geographic concentration of global ship-
ping routes. This chapter touches upon the theme of ocean as avenue and
examines why strategic chokepoints are important to certain maritime
industries but not others.
Over 90 percent of international trade is carried by sea, but the global
shipping industry and maritime support services receive relatively little
attention in scholarly journals and books, including from academics focused
on maritime security. Martin Stopford has examined global shipping from
a maritime economics perspective,1 and Marc Levinson has written about
how containerization reshaped the global economy.2 National Defense
University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies has published enlight-
ening articles on strategic chokepoints, such as those by John Noer3 and
Donna Nincic,4 but only Daniel Coulter’s piece on the rise of hub ports5
R. Weitz (*)
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University,
Medford, MA, USA
© The Author(s) 2018 17

G. F. Gresh (ed.), Eurasia’s Maritime Rise and Global Security,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71806-4_2
18 R. WEITZ
begins to provide the maritime industry perspectives offered by this

chapter.
This chapter builds upon my long-standing academic interest in how
transnational actors influence global maritime affairs, such as how Lloyd’s
of London, the world’s largest insurance market, has had an impact on
maritime security cooperation in the Malacca Straits.6 Similar to other
transnational actors such as marine insurers and credit rating agencies,
shipping companies, global port operators, and other maritime support
services sometimes influence international affairs, often unintentionally, by
pursuing their business interests.
Charting the course for this intellectual voyage, this chapter starts with
overviews of strategic maritime chokepoints, the commercial shipping indus-
try, and global port operators and other maritime support services. The
chapter then examines three case studies of Eurasian strategic chokepoints—
(i) the Malacca Straits, (ii) the Suez Canal, and (iii) the Strait of Gibraltar—
by providing a brief historical summary of how each waterway has evolved
over time, and then concludes by exploring possible reasons why strategic
chokepoints are important to certain maritime industries but not others.
Strategic Maritime Chokepoints

Although the world ocean covers over 70 percent of the globe, commer-
cial shipping routes are remarkably concentrated. Strategic chokepoints
are narrow waterways where sea routes converge due to geography, includ-
ing straits, capes, canals, and passages. The modern shipping industry’s
focus on speed and efficiency causes international trade flows to merge in
the following strategic waterways: the Malacca Straits, the Strait of
Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Turkish Straits, Bab al-Mandab, the Strait of
Hormuz, the Cape of Good Hope, Cape Horn, the Bering Strait, the
English Channel, the Danish Straits, the Panama Canal, and the Windward
and Mona Passages. Each maritime chokepoint has a different strategic
significance depending on its geography, history, infrastructure, and avail-
ability of alternative sea routes.
The importance of strategic chokepoints has varied throughout human
history, evolving with technological improvements and changing patterns
of human movement. The development of advanced naval weaponry
allowed European nations, and later America and Japan, to expand their
influence around the globe. The establishment of colonial empires moti-
vated European powers to secure their trade routes with strategic naval
outposts, such as the British in Singapore. The increasing importance of
STRATEGIC MARITIME CHOKEPOINTS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE GLOBAL… 19
seaborne trade over the last three centuries fueled the struggle to retain
control over such chokepoints. The growing dependence of modern
navies on coal in the nineteenth century gave naval bases on strategic
waterways a new role as coaling stations. The military function of choke-
points changed again in the mid-twentieth century as they became sites for
air bases necessary for projecting air power.
Since World War II, most strategic chokepoints have transitioned from
military outposts to thriving commercial seaports open to global port
operators and maritime service providers offering fuel, provisions, ship
repair, and other support services. Singapore has leveraged its position on
the Malacca Straits to create the world’s most important transshipment
hub and maritime innovation cluster. The Suez Canal now boasts modern
container terminals at Port Said and supports services for supertankers on
both ends of the canal. Gibraltar has become a prominent tax haven and
tourist destination, and the neighboring Port of Algeciras has grown into
Spain’s top container port7 and the largest transshipment hub on the
Mediterranean Sea.8
Global Shipping Industry

The world’s commercial shipping industry is diverse and includes busi-
nesses ranging from container lines following fixed schedules to bulk car-
riers transporting commodities, including wet bulk cargoes such as crude
oil and refined petroleum products and dry bulk cargoes such as iron ore,
coal, and grains. Furthermore, specialized shipping companies transport
heavy machinery, electric power substations, oil rigs, livestock, automo-
biles, and many other cargoes that cannot easily fit in 20-foot or 40-foot
containers.
For this chapter, the most important difference among global shipping
businesses is between container carriers, which operate a fixed liner sched-
ule with planned stops at various container ports, and bulk carriers and
specialized shipping companies, which often operate on demand.
Container shipping lines depend on reliable delivery times and face mon-
etary penalties for delays within their control. They operate in a global
hub-and-spoke system of container ports, with large transshipment hub
ports connecting to smaller regional container ports.
In contrast to container lines, bulk carriers and specialized shipping
companies usually operate on demand, carrying goods from one port to
another, sometimes with stops at multiple ports. Bulk shipping companies
20 R. WEITZ
range from small to large and have diverse business models. Some bulk
ship owners operate their own vessels while others charter their ships to
vessel operating companies. Certain bulk shipping businesses have long-
term contracts with shippers, particularly in specialized bulk cargoes such
as liquefied natural gas (LNG). These bulk carriers with long-term con-
tracts operate scheduled services similar to container lines.
In general, global shipping companies do not derive any competitive
advantage from strategic maritime chokepoints. Shipping lines operating a
fixed schedule may have a minor business interest in having a physical
presence at chokepoints but only as a means to maintain reliable service by
expediting passage through crowded waterways. Rather, the global ship-
ping industry approaches strategic chokepoints as a geographic reality that
they take into account when planning efficient and reliable voyages.
Global Port Operators and Maritime

Support Services
Global port operators have consolidated over the last two decades, and
three companies now dominate the industry: (i) Singapore-based PSA
International, (ii) Hong Kong-based Hutchison Port Holdings, and (iii)
Dubai-based DP World. All three of these global port operators have
invested in container terminals and transshipment hubs along the world’s
strategic chokepoints. Given the hub-and-spoke nature of containerized
shipping, the geographic consolidation of global sea routes in strategic
chokepoints presents a business opportunity, and securing deep water
ports near such waterways is a source of competitive advantage.
Maritime service providers supporting the global shipping industry also
derive competitive advantage by locating themselves near maritime choke-
points. Examples include companies providing bunkering, ship repair,
provisioning, vessel maintenance, ship classification services, marine insur-
ance, maritime arbitration, and ship broking and/or chartering. Singapore
has one of the world’s leading maritime innovation clusters, largely
because it lies on the world’s busiest shipping lane and most important
strategic chokepoint.
Malacca Straits
The sea dominates Southeast Asia, covering approximately 90 percent of
its surface area. The Malacca Straits constitute the key strategic choke-
point connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Roman, Greek, Chinese,
and Indian traders took advantage of this natural channel since antiquity.
Malacca’s strategic location made it a source of international friction after
the fifteenth century. The Portuguese captured the strategic outpost of
Melaka in 1511 under the leadership of Afonso de Albuquerque, holding
it until the Dutch seized control in 1641.
In 1819, Sir Stamford Raffles founded colonial Singapore as a trading
post of the East India Company. Singapore became an increasingly impor-
tant British naval base on the sea route connecting Pacific Asia with British
colonial holdings in South Asia and Africa and with Britain itself. The
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, reducing the distance between Europe
and Pacific Asia by a third, only increased the Malacca Straits’ significance
as the most important maritime link between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Today over one-third of world trade and one-half of the world’s oil ship-
ments transit the Malacca Straits,9 including 80 percent of Japan’s oil
imports,10 80 percent of China’s oil imports,11 and 99 percent of South
Korea’s oil imports.12 Numerous LNG tankers destined for Japan and
South Korea, the two largest LNG importers, also traverse the waterway.13
After gaining independence from Britain and Malaysia, Singapore
focused its economy seaward, using its natural deep water port on the
world’s busiest shipping route to build a thriving transshipment hub.
Singapore invested in port infrastructure, while the rise of containeriza-
tion set the maritime city-state on an impressive growth trajectory.
Furthermore, Singapore built one of the world’s most extensive maritime
innovation clusters, offering maritime support services ranging from bun-
kering to ship repair to maritime arbitration.
But Singapore is not alone among thriving seaports on the Malacca
Straits. The Port of Tanjung Pelepas, located in Malaysia’s Johor province,
opened in 2000 as a direct competitor to nearby Singapore. Maersk estab-
lished major container operations in Tanjung Pelepas, in part, to pressure
the Port of Singapore to lower container handling prices. Malaysia’s Port
Klang is another major container hub on the Malacca Straits, serving the
economic zone surrounding Kuala Lumpur. This combination of
22 R. WEITZ
impressive container hub ports makes the Malacca Straits the most impor-
tant strategic chokepoint for containerized cargo.
The Malacca Straits also offer attractive anchorage for vessels waiting to
be brokered or chartered. Oil tankers, bulk carriers, and specialized vessels
anchor off of Singapore, ready to set sail for ports in Pacific Asia or the
Indian Ocean. In addition to geographic proximity to the world’s major
seaports, vessel operators waiting for charters take advantage of relatively
cheap bunker fuel and provisioning services for their crews. Singapore,
Malaysia, and Indonesia also offer ship repair facilities and dry docks where
vessels can be inspected by ship classification societies and marine insurers.
Given all these maritime support services, Singapore has become a world
leader in ship broking and chartering services for all vessel types.
Strait of Gibraltar
Throughout most of history, the Strait of Gibraltar acted as the only mari-
time passage out of the Mediterranean, and control over the Rock of
Gibraltar offered dominance over distant lands. Towering 1398 ft above
the Strait, the Rock served as a fortress and sheltered port for the
Phoenicians, Romans, Moors, Spanish, and British.14 After seizing
Gibraltar from Spain in the early eighteenth century, Britain erected for-
midable defenses that enabled the Rock’s garrison to withstand over
200,000 cannon shot and an army four times its size during the Great
Siege (1779–1783).15
The 1805 victory at Trafalgar and the subsequent dominance of the
Royal Navy removed the Rock’s Achilles heel—the threat of being block-
aded by sea. After the first steamship arrived in 1823, the Rock developed
into an important coaling station, especially after the 1869 opening of the
Suez Canal.16 By the end of the nineteenth century, the rising German
challenge to British sea power, the development of the submarine, and
huge growth in trade and British colonial holdings increased Gibraltar’s
importance as a military base defending both the Atlantic Ocean and the
Mediterranean Sea.17
From the 1906 creation of the Atlantic Fleet until the end of the Cold
War, the Gibraltar naval base played a key role in British, Allied, and
NATO strategy.18 In World War I, Gibraltar served as a coaling station and
key point in the anti-submarine campaign.19 However, the Rock reached
its strategic zenith in early World War II when it acted as a listening post,
a harbor for repairing ships, a base for the air and surface cover of eastern
Atlantic convoys, and a gathering point for the approximately 650 aircraft,
160 warships, and 200 transport and auxiliary vessels preparing for the
invasion of French North Africa.20 Gibraltar housed sophisticated elec-
tronic equipment for monitoring traffic passing through the Strait during
the Cold War.21
The Rock has created tensions between Britain and Spain since the
1960s, with Spain sealing the border from 1969 to 1985.22 Although the
UN Special Committee on Decolonization heard the case of Gibraltar in
1964, Spain, as a former colonial power, found it difficult to challenge
British occupation, especially with the native Gibraltarians expressing a
strong desire to stay with Britain.23
Since the end of the Cold War, Gibraltar has emerged as an interna-
tional financial center and tax haven.24 With the privatization of the dock-
yard, the rise of the tourist industry, and its emergence as a tax haven, the
Rock “has seen a major structural shift from a public to a private sector
economy.”25 For example, Victor Chandler, a gambling firm formerly
based in Britain, replaced the Royal Navy as Gibraltar’s largest employer in
2000.26
Gibraltar’s limited territory has led to the rise of the Port of Algeciras
as the largest container port in Spain. With a protected harbor on the
crossroads of the Mediterranean’s East-West trade and North-South trade
between Europe and Africa, Algeciras has a natural hinterland of Spain,
North African ports, and the Western Mediterranean. In 2014, the Port of
Algeciras emerged as the largest container transshipment port on the
Mediterranean Sea.27
Suez Canal
After much diplomatic maneuvering by France and Britain, the Suez Canal
opened on November 17, 1869. The canal accelerated the emergence of
the steamship because sailing vessels faced difficulty navigating through
the Red Sea and needed towing through the canal.28 During its first 40
years of operation, Britain accounted for the vast majority of shipping
through the Suez Canal: 71 percent of tonnage the first year, 80 percent
in 1880, 76 percent in 1890, and 62 percent in 1910.29 As it became more
dependent on the canal, Britain sought to establish a military presence to
protect it from attack, eventually invading Ottoman Egypt in 1882.30
By the late 1880s, in response to French and Turkish impatience with
Britain’s “temporary” occupation of Egypt, European powers negotiated
24 R. WEITZ
the 1888 Constantinople Convention, stating that the Suez Canal “shall
always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel
of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.”31 However, the
Convention remained inoperative until the other signatories agreed to a
British reservation in 1904 postponing the creation of an international
commission to oversee the canal until British occupation ended. On
December 18, 1914, Egypt was proclaimed a British protectorate, and
Britain assumed all powers conferred upon Turkey by the 1888
Convention, including the responsibility to “protect free navigation”
through the canal.32
During both world wars, Britain used its mandate to “protect free navi-
gation” to close the waterway to enemy warships and turn the Canal Zone
into “a vast military base with 150 depots.”33 Although the British repelled
several ground attacks by Turkish troops from Sinai in 1915 and 1916,
the main threats to the canal’s traffic in World War I came from German
submarines in the Mediterranean.34 With the closure of the Mediterranean
early in World War II, the Suez Canal became a vital supply line to Allied
forces in Egypt. Although German and Italian aircraft repeatedly
dropped magnetic mines in the canal, they sank few ships and the canal
remained open.35
In 1952, Egyptian nationalism rushed Gamal Abdel Nasser to power
and, two years later, the British agreed to withdraw all troops from Egypt
within 20 months.36 After Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26,
1956, Britain, France, and Israel became embroiled in the Suez Crisis. In
the end, Egypt blocked the canal, and the United States pressured Britain
and France to withdraw their troops.37 The canal reopened in April 1957,
but closed again during the 1967 and 1973 wars between Egypt and
Israel, finally reopening in 1975. Since the 1979 Camp David Accords,
the Suez Canal has enjoyed one of its most quiet periods.
As a sea-level canal, Suez can accommodate large ships, including air-
craft carriers and small supertankers, and can be widened and deepened
relatively easily. The rise of supertankers and larger container ships moti-
vated the Egyptian government to further widen and deepen the Suez
Canal since 2000.38 In 2014, the Egyptian government launched the New
Suez Canal project to allow for larger vessels and two-way ship traffic,
doubling capacity and reducing wait times.39
Port Said, a city along the north entrance to the Suez Canal, has become
an increasingly important container transshipment hub over the last
15 years. Suez Canal Container Terminals, a private terminal operator in
Another random document with
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Howe Syr Anthony Woduile Lord
Riuers and Scales, Gouernour of
Prince Edward, was with his Nephue
Lord Richard Gray and other
causelesse imprisoned and cruelly
murdered, Anno 1483.[1232]
1.
As seely suiters letted by delayes

To shew their prince the meaning of their minde,
That long haue bought their brokers yeas and nays,
And neuer the nyer, doe dayly wayte to finde
The prince’s grace, from waighty affaires vntwind:
Which time attaynde, by attending all the yeare,
The weried prince will than no suyters heare:
2.
My case[1233] was such not many dayes agoe,

For, after bruite had blazed all abroade,
That Baldwine, through the ayde of[1234] other moe,
Of fame or shame fall’n[1235] princes would vnloade,
Out from our graues wee got[1236] without abode,
And preaced forward with the ruefull[1237] rout,
That sought to haue their doinges boulted out.
3.
But whan I had long tended[1238] for my turne
To tell my tale, as diuers other did,
In hope I should no longer while soiourne,
But from my suites haue speedely ben ryd,
Whan course and place both orderly had bid
Mee shewe my minde, and I preparde to say,
The hearers pausde, arose, and went their way.
4.
These doubtfull doings draue mee to my dumpes,

Uncertaine what should moue them so to doe:
I feared least affections lothly lumpes
Or inward grudge had driuen[1239] them thereto,
Whose wicked stinges all storyes truth vndoe,
Oft causing good to bee reported ill,
Or drownd in suds of Læthe’s muddy swill.
5.
For hitherto slye wryters wily wits,

Which haue engrossed princes chiefe affayres,
Haue bene like horses snaffled with the bits
Of fancy, feare, or doubts full deepe dispayres,
Whose raynes enchained to the cheifest chayres,
Haue so bene straynde of those that bare the stroke
That truth was forste to chow or els to choke.
6.
This caused such as lothed lowd to ly,

To passe with silence sundry princes lyues:
Lesse fault it is to leaue, then leade awry,
And better dround, then[1240] euer bound in gyues:
For fatall fraud this world so fondly driues,
That whatsoeuer writer’s braines may brue
Bee it neuer so false, at length is tane for true.
7.
What harme may hap by help of lying pennes,

How written lies may lewdely bee mayntainde,
The lothly rites, the diuilishe ydoll dennes,
With guiltlesse bloud of vertuous men bestaynde,
Is such a proofe as all good hartes haue plainde,
The taly groundes of stories throughly tries,
The death of martyrs vengeaunce on it cries.
8.[1241]
Far better therefore not to write at all,

Than staine the truth, for any maner cause,
For this they meane to let my story fall,
(Thought I) and ere my time theyr[1242] volume clause:
But after I knew it only was a pause
Made purposely, most for the reader’s ease,
Assure thee, Baldwine, highly it did mee please.
9.
For[1243] freshest wits I know will sone be weary,

In reading long what euer booke it bee,
Except it bee vaine matter, strange, or mery,
Well sauste with lies, and glared all with glee,
With which because no graue truth may agree,
The closest stile for stories is the meetest,
In rufull moanes the shortest fourme is sweetest.
10.
And sith the playnts already by thee pende,

Are briefe inough, the nomber also small,
The tediousnesse I thinke doth none offend,
Saue such as haue no lust to learne at all:
Regard none such, no matter what they brall,
Warne thou the wary least they hap to stumble,
As for the carelesse, care not what they mumble.
11.
My life is such as (if thou note it well)

May cause the witty wealthy[1244] to beware:
For their sakes therefore playnly will I tell,
How false and cumbrous worldly honours are,
How cankred foes bring carelesse folke to care,
How tyrauntes suffered and not queld in time,
Doe cut theyr throates that suffer them to clime.
12.
Neither will I hyde the chiefest point of all

Which wisest rulers least of all regarde,
That was and will bee cause of many a fall:
This cannot bee too earnestly declarde
Because it is so seeld, and slackly harde,
The abuse[1245] and scorning of God’s ordinaunces,
Is chiefest cause of care and woefull chaunces.
13.
God’s holy orders highly are abused

Whan men doe chaunge their ends for straunge
respects:
They scorned are, whan they bee cleane refused,
For that they cannot serue our fond affects:
The one our shame, the other our sinne detects:
It is a shame for christians to abuse them,
But deadly sinne for scorners to refuse them.
14.
I meane not this al onely of degrees

Ordainde by God for people’s preseruation,
But of his lawe, good orders, and decrees,
Prouided for[1246] his creature’s conseruation:
And specially the state of procreation,
Wherein wee here the number of them encrease,
Which shall in heauen enioy eternall peace.
15.
The only end why God ordayned this,

Was for th’[1247] encreasing of that blessed nombre
For whom hee had preparde eternall blisse:
They that refuse it for the care or cumbre,
Being apt thereto, are in a sinfull slumbre:
No fond respect, no vayne devised vowes,
Can quit or bar what God in charge allowes.
16.
“It is not good for man to liue alone:”

Sayd God, and therfore made he him a make:
“Sole life,” sayd Christ, “is graunted few or none,
All seede sheders are bound like wiues to take:”
Yet not for lust, for landes, or riches sake,
But to beget and foster so theyr fruite,
That heauen and earth be stored with the suite.
17.
But as this[1248] state is damnably refused,

Of many apt and able thereunto,
So is it likewise wickedly abused
Of all that vse it as they should not doe:
Wherein are guilty all the greedy, who
For gayne, for friendship, landes, or honoures wed,
And these pollute the vndefiled bed.
18.
And therefore God, through iustice cannot cease
To plague these faults with sundry sortes of whips:
As disagreement, health’s, or welth’s decrease,
Or lothing sore the neuer liked lips:
Disdayne also with rigour some times nips
Presuming mates, vnequally that match:
Some bitter leauen sowers the musty batch.
19.
We worldly folke account him very wise

That hath the wit most welthely to wed:
By all meanes therefore, alwayes, wee deuise
To see our yssue rich in spousals sped:
Wee buy and sell rich orphanes, babes scant bred
Must mary, ere they know what mariage meanes,
Boyes mary old trots, old fooles wed yong queanes.
20.
Wee call this wedding, which, in any wise,

Can bee no mariage, but pollution playne:
A new found trade of humane marchaundise,
The deuil’s net, a filthy fleshly gayne,
Of kinde and nature an vnnaturall stayne,
A fowle abuse of God’s most holy order,
And yet allowde almost in euery border.
21.
Would God I were the last that shall haue cause

Agaynst this creping cankar to complayne,
That men would so regard theyr maker’s lawes,
That all would leaue the lewdenes of theyr brayne,
That holy orders holy might remayne,
That our respects in wedding should not choke
The end and fruite of God’s most holy yoke.
22.
The sage king Solon, after that hee sawe

What mischiefs follow missought mariages,
To barre all baits, established this lawe:
No friend nor father shall gieue herytages,
Coyne, cattell, stuffe, or other cariages,
With any mayde for dowry, or wedding sale,
By any meane, on paine of banning bale.
23.
Had this good law in England beene in force,

My father had not so cruelly beene slaine,
My brother had not causles lost his corps,
Our mariage had not bred vs such disdayne,
My selfe had lackt great part of greuous payne:
We wedded wiues for dignity and landes,
And left our liues in enuie’s[1249] bloudy handes.
24.
My father hight syr Richard Woduile, hee

Espousde the duches of Bedford,[1250] and by her
Had yssue males my brother Iohn, and mee
Calde Anthony: king Edward did prefer
Us farre aboue the state wherein wee were,
For hee espousde[1251] our sister Elizabeth,
Whom syr Iohn Gray made wydow by his death.
25.
How glad were wee, thinke you, of this alyaunce?

So neerely coupled with so noble[1252] a king:
Who durst with any of vs bee[1253] at defiaunce
Thus made of might the mightyest to wring?
But fye, what cares doe highest honoures bring?
What carelesnes our selues or frendes to knowe?
What spyte and enuy both of high and lowe?
26.
Because the king had made our sister queene,

It was his honour to prefer her kin:
And sith the redyest way, as wisest weene,
Was first by wedding welthy heyres to win,
It pleasde the prince by[1254] like meane to begin:
To mee hee gaue the rich lord Scales his heyre,
A vertuous mayde, in my minde very[1255] fayre.
27.
Hee ioyned to my brother Iohn, the olde

Duches of Northfolke notable of fame:
My nephue Thomas (who had in his holde
The honour and right of marquise Dorcet’s name)
Espoused Cicelie, a right welthy dame,
Lord Bonuile’s heyre: by whome hee was possest
In all the rightes where through that house was blest.
28.
The honours that my father[1256] attaynd were diuers,

First Chamberlayne, then constable hee was:
I doe omit the gaynfullest, earle Riuers:
Thus glistred wee to[1257] glory, clere as glasse:
Such miracles can princes bring to passe
Among theyr lieges, whom they minde to heaue
To honours false, who all theyr gestes deceiue.
29.
Honoures are like that cruell king of Thrace,

With new come gestes that fed his hungry horses:
Or like the tyrant Busiris, whose grace
Offred his gods all straungers strangled corses:
To forreyners so hard false honor’s force is,
That all her bourders, straungers, eyther geastes,
She spoyles to feede her gods and greedy beastes.
30.
Her gods be those whom God by law, or lot,

Or kinde by byrth, doth place in highest roumes,
Her beastes bee such as greedely haue got
Office, or charge, to guide the seely gromes:
These officers in law, or charge, are bromes
That sweepe away the sweete from simple wretches,
And spoyle th’[1258]enriched by theyr crafty fetches.
31.
These plucke downe those whome princes set aloft,

By wresting lawes, and false conspiracyes:
Yea kings themselues by these are spoyled oft,
When wilfull princes carelesly despise
To heare th’[1259]oppressed people’s heauy cryes,
Nor will correct theyr polling theues, then God
Doth make those reues the reckles princes’ rod.
32.
The second Richard is a proofe of this,

Whom crafty lawyers by theyr lawes deposed:
Another patern good king Henry is,
Whose right by them hath[1260] diuersly beene glosed,
Good while hee grew, bad whan hee was vnrosed:
And as they fodred[1261] these and diuers other,
With like deceit they vsde the king my brother.
33.
While he preuayled they sayde hee owed the crowne,
All lawes and rightes agreed with the same:
But whan by driftes hee seemed to be downe,
All lawes and right extremely did him blame,
Nought saue vsurping traytour was his name:
So constantly the judges construe lawes,
That all agree still with the stronger cause.
34.
These, as I sayde, and other like in charge

Are honour’s horses, whom shee feedes with gests:
For all whom princes frankly doe enlarge
With dignityes, these barke at in theyr brests,
Theyr spite, theyr might, theyr falsehoode neuer restes
Till they deuour them, sparing neyther bloud,
Ne lim, ne[1262] life, and all to get theyr good.
35.
The earle of Warwicke was a praunsing courser,

The hawty heart of his could beare no mate:
Our welth through him waxt many a time the worser,
So cankardly hee had our kin in hate:
Hee troubled oft the kinge’s vnsteady state,
And that because hee would not bee his warde
To wed and worke, as hee should list awarde.
36.
Hee spited vs because wee were preferde

By mariage to dignityes so greate,
But craftely his malice hee deferde,
Till, traytorously, he found meanes to entreate
Our brother of Clarence to assist his feate:
Whom when hee had by mariage to him bound,
Than wrought he straight our linage to confound.
37.
Through slaunderous brutes he brued many a broyle

Throughout the realme, against the king my brother:
And raysed trayterous rebels thirsting spoyle
To murder men: of whom among all other
One Robin of Riddesdale[1263] many a soule did smother,
His rascall rable at my father wroth
Tooke sire and sonne, and quicke beheaded both.
38.
This heynous act, although the king detested,

Yet was hee fayne to pardon, for the rout
Of rebels all the realme so sore infested,
That euery way assaylde, he stoode in doubt:
And though he were of courage high and stout,
Yet hee assayde by fayre meanes to asswage
His enemies ire, reueilde by rebels rage.
39.
But Warwicke was not pacified thus,

His constant rancour causeles was extreme,
No meane could serue the[1264] quarell to discus,
Till hee had driuen the king out of the realme:
Neyther[1265] would hee then be waked[1266] from his
dreame:
For when my brother was come and placed agayne,
He stinted not till hee was stoutly slaine.
40.
Then grewe the king and realme to quiet rest,

Our flocke and frends still stying higher and[1267] higher:
The queene with children fruitfully was blest,
I gouernd them, it was the king’s desier:
This set theyr vncles furiously on fier,
That wee, the queene’s bloud, were assignde to
gouerne
The prince, not they, the king’s owne bloud and
bretherne.
41.
This causde the duke of Clarence so to chafe,

That with the king hee brainlesse fell at bate:
The counsaile warely for[1268] to kepe him safe
From raising tumults, as he did of late,
Imprisoned him: where through his brother’s hate
He was condemnde, and murdered in such sort
As he himselfe hath truly made report.
42.
“Was none abhorde these mischiefs more then I,

Yet coulde I not bee therewith discontented,
Considering that his rancoure toucht mee ny:
Els would my conscience neuer haue consented
To wish him harme, could he haue beene contented:
But feare of hurt, for sauegard of our state,
Doth cause more mischiefe then desert or hate.”
43.
Such is the state that many wish to beare,

That eyther wee must with other’s bloud[1269] bee
stainde,
Or leade our liues continually in feare:
You mounting myndes behold here what is gaynde
By coumbrous honour, painfully attainde:
A damned soule for murdring them that hate you,
Or doubtfull lyfe, in daunger lest they mate you.
44.
The cause, I thinke, why some of high degree
Doe deadly hate all sekers to ascend,
Is this: the cloyne[1270] contented cannot bee
With any state, till tyme hee apprehend
The highest top, for therto clymers tend:
Which seldome is attaynd without the wracke
Of those betwene, that stay and beare him backe.
45.
To saue themselues they therfore are compeld

To hate such climers, and with wit and power
To compasse meanes where through they may bee
queld,
Ere they ascend their honours to deuour:
This causde the duke of Clarence frowne and lowre
At mee and other, whom the king promoted
To dignities: wherin he madly doted.
46.
For seing wee were his deare allied frends,

Our furderaunce should rather haue made him glad,
Then, enmy like, to wish our wofull ends,
Wee were the nerest kinsfolke that he had:
Wee ioyed with him, his sorrowe made vs sad,
But hee esteemde so much his paynted sheath,
That he disdaynd the loue of all beneath.
47.
But see how sharply God reuengeth sinne:

As hee maligned mee, and many other
His faithfull friends, and kindest of his kin,
So Richard, duke of Glocester, his very[1271] brother,
Maligned him, and beastly did him smother:
A deuelish deede, a most vnkindly part,
Yet iust reuenge for his vnnaturall hart.
48.
Although this brother-queller, tirant fell,

Enuide our state as much and more then hee:
Yet did his cloaking flattery so excell
To all our frendes ward, chiefly vnto mee,
That hee appeard our trusty stay to bee:
For outwardly hee wrought our stay to furder,
Where inwardly he mynded nought saue murder.
49.
Thus in appearaunce who but I was blest?

The chiefest honors heaped on my head,
Belou’d of all, enioying quiet rest:
The forward prince by mee alone was led,
A noble impe, to all good vertues bred:
The king, my liege, without my counsaile knowne,
Agreed nought: though wisest were his owne.
50.
But quiet blisse in no state lasteth long

Assailed still by mischief many wayes:
Whose spoyling battry glowing hote and strong,
No flowing welth, no force nor wisdom staies,
Her smoakles poulder beaten souldiers slaies:
By open force, foule mischief oft preuailes,
By secret sleight, shee seeld her purpose failes.
51.
The king was bent too much to foolish pleasure,

In banqueting he had so[1272] greate delight:
This made him grow in grosnes out of mesure,
Which as it kindleth carnall appetite,
So quencheth it the liuelynes of the sprite:[1273]
Whereof ensue such sicknes and diseases,
As none can cure, saue death, that all displeases.
52.
Through this fault furdered by his brother’s fraud,

(Now God forgeiue me if I iudge amisse)
Or through that beast, his ribald, or his baud,
That larded still these sinfull lusts of his,
He sodainely forsooke all worldly blisse:
That loathed leach, that neuer welcome death,
Through spasmous humours stopped vp his breath.
53.
That time lay I at Ludloe, Wales his border,

For, with the prince, the king had sent me thyther
To stay the robberies, spoyle, and foule disorder,
Of diuers outlawes gathered there together:
Whose banding tended no man wist well whither,
When these by wisdome safely were suppressed,
Came wofull newes, our souerayne was deceassed.
54.
The griefe whereof, when reason had[1274] asswaged,

Because the prince remayned in my guyde,
For his defence[1275] great store of men I waged:
Doubting the stormes which at such tyme betyde:
But while I there thus warely did prouide,
Commaundement came to send them home agayne,
And bring the king thence with his houshold trayne.
55.
This charge sent from the counsell and the queene,

Though much agaynst my mynde I beast obayed:
The deuill himselfe wrought all the drift I weene,
Because he would haue innocents betrayed:
For ere the king were halfe his way conuayed,
A sort of traytors falsly him betrapt,
I caught afore, and close in prison clapt.
56.
The duke of Glocester, that incarnate deuill,

Confedred with the duke of Buckingham,
With eke lord Hastings, hasty both to euill,
To meete the king in mourning habit came,
(A cruell wolfe though clothed like a lambe)
And at Northampton, where as then I bayted,
They tooke theire inne, as they on mee had wayted.
57.
The king that night at Stonystratford lay,

A towne to small to harboure all his trayne:
This was the cause why he was gone away,
While I with other did behinde remaine:
But will yow see how falsly frendes[1276] can faine?
Not Synon sly, whose fraude best fame rebukes,
Was halfe so suttle as these double dukes.
58.
First to myne inne commeth in my brother false,

Embraceth me: “Well met, good brother Scales:”
And weepes withall, the other me enhalse
With, “welcome cosin, now welcome out of Wales:
O happy day, for now all stormy gales
Of strife and rancour, vtterly are swaged,
And we your[1277] owne to liue, or dye, vnwaged.”
59.
This proferd seruice, saust with salutations

Immoderate, might cause me to suspect:
For, commonly, in all dissimulations,
Th’xcesse[1278] of glauering doth the guile detect:
Reason refuseth falsehode to dyrect:
The will therfore, for feare of being spied,
Exceedeth meane, because it wanteth guyde.
60.
This is the cause why such as fayne to weepe

Doe howle outright, or wayling cry, ah, ah,[1279]
Tearing themselues, and straining sighes most deepe:
Why such dissemblers as would seeme to laugh,
Breth not tihhee, but bray out, hah, hah, hah:
Why beggers fayning brauery are the prowd’st[1280]
Why cowards bragging boldnesse, wrangle lowd’st.
[1281]
61.
For commonly all that doe counterfayte

In any thing, exceede the naturall meane,
And that for feare of fayling in their feate:
But these conspirers couched all so cleane,
Through close demeanour, that their wyles did weane
My hart from doubts, so many a false deuice,
They[1282] forged fresh, to hyde their enterprise.
62.
They supt with mee, propounding frendly talke

Of our affayres, still geuing mee the prayse:
And euer among the cups to mee ward walke:
“I drinke to you, good cuz:” each traytoure saies:
Our banquet done, when they should goe their wayes
They tooke their leaue, oft wishing mee good night,
As hartely as any creature might.
63.
A noble heart they say is lyon like,

It can not couch, dissemble, crouch, nor fayne,
How villanous were these, and how vnlike?
Of noble stocke the most ignoble stayne:
Their woluish hearts, their trayterous foxly braine,
Or proue[1283] them base, of rascall race engendred,
Or from hault lynage, bastard like, degendred.
64.
Such polling heades as prayse for prudent pollicy

False practises, I wish were pact on poales:
I mean the bastard law broode, which can molifie
All kinde of causes in their crafty noales:
These vndermine all vertue, blinde as moales,
They bolster wrong, they racke and straine the right
And prayse for lawe both malice, fraud, and might.
65.
These quenche the worthy flames of noble kynde,

Prouoking best borne to the basest vices:
Through crafts they make the bouldest courage blind,
Disliking highly valiant enterprises,
And praysing vily, villanous deuices:
These make the bore a hog, the bull an oxe,
The swan a goose, the lyon a wolfe or foxe.
66.
The lawyer Catesby, and his crafty feeres,

A rout that nere[1284] did good in any reame,
Are they that had transformde these noble peeres:
They turnde theire bloud to melancholicke fleume,
Their courage hault to cowardise extreame,
Their force and manhoode, into fraud and malice,
Their wit to wyles, stout Hector into Paris.
67.
These glauerers gone, my selfe to rest I layde,

And doubting nothing, soundly fell a sleepe:
But sodainly my seruaunts, sore afrayde,
Awaked me, and drawing sighes full deepe:
“Alas,” quoth one, “my lord wee are betrayde:”
“How so,” quoth I, “the dukes are gone their waies?”
“Th’haue[1285] barde the gates, and borne away the
kayes.”
68.
While he thus spake, there came into my minde

This fearefull dreame, whereout I waked was:
I saw a riuer stopt with stormes of winde,
Wheare through a swan, a bull, and bore did passe,
Fraunching the fysh and fry, with teath of brasse,
The riuer dryde vp saue a title streame,
Which at the last did water all the reame.
69.
Me thought this streame did drowne the cruell bore

In litle space, it grew so deepe and brode:
But hee had kilde the bull and swan before:
Besides all this I sawe an ougly tode
Crall towarde mee, on which mee thought I trode:
But what became of her, or what of mee,
My sodayne waking woulde not let mee see.
70.
These dreames considered with this sodayne newes

So diuers from theyr doings ouer night,
Did cause me not a litle for to muse,
I blest me, and rise[1286] in all the hast I might:
By this, Aurora spred abroade the light,
Which fro the endes of Phebus beames she tooke,
Who than the bulls cheife gallery forsooke.
71.
Whan I had opened the window to looke out,

There might I see the stretes ech where beset,
My inne on each side compassed about
With armed watchmen, all escapes to let:
Thus had these Neroes caught me in their net,
But to what ende I could not throughly gesse,
Such was my plainnes, such their doublenesse.
72.
My conscience was so clere, I could not doubt

Their deadly drift, which lesse apparaunt lay,
Because they causde their men retourne the rout
That rode toward Stonystratford, as they say,
Because the dukes will first be there to day:
For this (thought I) they hinder me in iest,
For giltlesse myndes doe easel deeme the best.
73.
By this the dukes were come into myne inne,

For they were lodged in an other by:
I gote mee to them, thinking it a sinne
Within my chamber cowardly to lye:
And merily I asked my brother, why
He vsde me so? he sterne, in euill sadnes,
Cryed out: “I arrest thee, traytour, for thy badnes.”
74.
“How so,” quoth I, “whence riseth your suspition?”

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Eurasia’s Maritime Rise and Global

Security 1st ed. Edition Geoffrey F.

ISBN 978-3-319-71805-7 ISBN 978-3-319-71806-4 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017962970

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

Cover image © Adam Excell / Unsplash

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

In collaboration with the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and in

Europe to those of South Asia, encases the supercontinent in blue borders.

The Fletcher School Dean James Stavridis (USN ADM-Ret.)

valuable insights, comments, and critiques throughout the compilation of

1 Introduction: Why Maritime Eurasia? 1

Part I The Indian Ocean 15

2 Strategic Maritime Chokepoints: Perspectives

3 Chokepoints of the Western Indian Ocean, China’s

4 The Economics of Somali Counterpiracy: Assessing

5 The Rise of an Indo-Japanese Maritime Partnership 67

6 The Fastest Way Across the Seas: Cyberspace Operations

Part II Pacific Asia 95

7 Forgotten Borders: Japan’s Maritime Operations

8 Blurred Lines: Twenty-First Century Maritime

9 Sea Level Rise in the Pearl River Delta 129

10 The Great Convergence: Maritime Supremacy,

11 The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts,

12 Public and National Imagination of the Arctic 197

13 Arctic Fisheries Management in the

14 Security Competition Rising: Renewed

15 Tackling Greenhouse Gas Emissions

International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He

Jelmer D. Ikink is a Partner at Liger Capital Management and COO of

Northeast Asian History Foundation. He has testified as an expert witness

a consulting and intelligence firm focusing on emerging markets. At Ergo

of the NATO years, The Accidental Admiral, was released in October

Rockford Weitz is Entrepreneur Coach and Director of Maritime Studies

Fig. 4.1 Ship rerouting options 53

Map 1.1 Indian Ocean region 16

Introduction: Why Maritime Eurasia?

A geopolitical and economic shift is upon us, emerging across Eurasia’s

© The Author(s) 2018 1

spaces in a threefold manner—as avenue, as arena, as source—to show the

the world’s most dangerous maritime chokepoints. More than 50 percent

During the upcoming century, Eurasia’s maritime avenues, arenas, and

The Indian Ocean

architecture, Jonathan Reiber analyzes the important maritime security

strategic needs for Japan’s seaborne involvement in a future contingency

The Arctic and the Future of the World’s Oceans

unparalleled and increased military activity, posing significant challenges

The Indian Ocean

Map 1.1 Indian Ocean region

Strategic Maritime Chokepoints: Perspectives

Global shipping companies do not view maritime chokepoints as strategi-

© The Author(s) 2018 17

begins to provide the maritime industry perspectives offered by this

Strategic Maritime Chokepoints

Global Shipping Industry

Global Port Operators and Maritime

As seely suiters letted by delayes

My case[1233] was such not many dayes agoe,

These doubtfull doings draue mee to my dumpes,

For hitherto slye wryters wily wits,

This caused such as lothed lowd to ly,

What harme may hap by help of lying pennes,

1 Introduction: Why Maritime Eurasia? 1

Part I The Indian Ocean 15

2 Strategic Maritime Chokepoints: Perspectives

3 Chokepoints of the Western Indian Ocean, China’s

4 The Economics of Somali Counterpiracy: Assessing

5 The Rise of an Indo-Japanese Maritime Partnership 67

6 The Fastest Way Across the Seas: Cyberspace Operations

Part II Pacific Asia 95

7 Forgotten Borders: Japan’s Maritime Operations

8 Blurred Lines: Twenty-First Century Maritime

9 Sea Level Rise in the Pearl River Delta 129

10 The Great Convergence: Maritime Supremacy,

11 The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts,

12 Public and National Imagination of the Arctic 197

13 Arctic Fisheries Management in the

14 Security Competition Rising: Renewed

15 Tackling Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Fig. 4.1 Ship rerouting options 53

Map 1.1 Indian Ocean region 16