Professional Documents
Culture Documents
THEODOR ME RO N
1
1
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DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198863434.001.0001
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Contents
Preface xi
Principle of Legality 73
Selective Accountability 91
Due Process 92
V. Trying Violations of Human Rights in International
Criminal Tribunals 103
Post-World War II Changes 104
The Establishment of International Criminal Tribunals 106
Common Article 3 and Crimes Against Humanity 107
Persecution 112
VI. Judicial Independence and Impartiality 116
Why Judicial Independence Matters 118
Ensuring an Independent Judiciary 119
Judicial Selection 121
Should Judges Respond to Outside Criticism? 123
Judicial Assignments and Court Presidents 124
Judicial Bias and Recusal 127
Institutional Design and Management 132
The Presidency and the Prosecution 133
Communicating with the Public 134
Rules and Obstructive Behavior of Defendants 135
The Saga of the Turkish Judge Akay 136
VII. Judicial Decision-Making and Deliberations 143
Decision-Making 143
The uniqueness of the Tribunals 144
Decision-makers 145
Judges and staff—background 146
Judges—processes 148
The Deliberation Process at International Criminal Tribunals 149
Civil Law and Common Law Courts 151
Deliberations at the ICTY/ICTR Appeals Chambers 152
Appeals from Judgements 152
Before the hearing 153
The hearing 154
After the hearing 155
Sentencing deliberations 158
Separate/dissenting opinions 159
C onte nt s vii
EPILOGUE
XIII. The Road Ahead: Does International Justice Work? 311
Invigorate the New Era of Accountability 311
Close the Accountability Gap 312
Comply with Existing Obligations 316
Encourage and Invigorate Prosecutions under the Principle
of Universal Jurisdiction 318
Review and Revise Laws and Practices to Ensure Due Process,
Fair Trials and Judicial Independence 320
Invest in Justice Infrastructure 322
Consider and Support Regional Accountability Initiatives 323
C onte nt s ix
Index 349
Preface
This book is about fairness, justice and due process of proceedings in inter-
national courts and tribunals, principles on which the legitimacy of the
project of international criminal justice rests. Standing up for them is vital,
now more than ever, when principles of international law and accountabil-
ity are challenged.
It is not about definitions of crimes and details of procedures. It is about
the judicial perspective of trying atrocity crimes, that is the crime of geno-
cide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
In writing I have benefited from my work over two decades as a Judge of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (Mechanism), and, in partic-
ular, from the experience gained over four terms as President of the ICTY
and three terms as President of the Mechanism.
I am grateful to my friends and colleagues for their suggestions and
comments, and in particular to Isabelle Lambert, Willow Crystal, Julie
Bloch, Professor Jean Galbraith, Professor Miles Jackson, Zoe Flood,
Gabrielle McIntyre, Karen Johnson and to the many law clerks who
have so greatly enriched my understanding of and commitment to
the law.
Many thanks to Merel Alstein for steering the book through the commis-
sioning process and for her insightful comments on early drafts; to Production
Editors Lucía Pérez and Matthew Humphrys for guiding and energizing the
production of the book; to Jack McNichol and all of Oxford University
Press; and to Joy Ruskin-Tompkins for her excellent copy-editing.
I appreciate Dame Hilary Boulding, President of Trinity College, Oxford,
and her predecessor Sir Ivor Roberts for giving me a friendly home in
Oxford and excellent facilities for writing.
xii P re fac e
Standing Up For Justice. Theodor Meron, Oxford University Press (2021). © Theodor Meron.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198863434.003.0001
4 R OOT S: T HE R OA D T O J U D G E S H I P
failure. Striking the right balance between the personal dimension and
saying something that may be of interest to readers is challenging. But
there is no question that what we write and when we write can only be
explained by our own life experiences. I am reminded of a saying attributed
to Talmudic sages: “We don’t see things as they are, we see things as we are.”
The Holocaust
What followed was the ghettos, work camps, most of my family falling
victim to the Holocaust.
The saving of its entire Jewish population by the people of Denmark will
remain forever as a rare epitome of true humanism.
I find it striking that a country which was as anti-Semitic as Poland pro-
duced the highest number of righteous gentiles, non-Jews who saved Jews,
recognized as such by Yad Vashem in Israel.
And yes, there are stories of bravery and righteousness, of individuals
standing up to be counted when the time to do so has come. I think of the
young German soldier who found my maternal grandparents in their hiding
place and, risking his life, decided not to turn them in.They thus survived for
a few more months until caught in the Nazi net.
I think of the Warsaw Catholic baker who sheltered a little girl for all those
years, risking her life and that of her own daughter.
I think of Aristides de Sousa Mendes, the Portuguese consul in Bordeaux
who in defiance of orders saved thousands of Jews by giving them visas and
was, as a result, destroyed by Salazar, or the Pole Jan Karski who infiltrated
the Warsaw Ghetto and an extermination camp and then travelled to the
West to report to the Allies on the unbelievable destruction that was being
inflicted on the Jews. Alas, bombing rail lines to the death camps was not on
the Allies’ priority list.
It is from acts of humanity that seeds of reconciliation and a shared sense of
humanity emerge. Remembrance and acknowledgement of historic crimes,
coming clean with the past, is essential to the process of reconciliation.
…
I pay homage to President Chirac who, breaking with a long taboo,
accepted the responsibility of France for Vichy’s collaboration with the
enforcement of the Holocaust, for committing, in the words of Chirac, “the
irreparable.”
When the war ended I emerged with a hunger for school, for learning, for
normality. That I, a child of the Holocaust, was given by fate the honour of
presiding over UN War Crimes Tribunals, and of judging the Krstić appeal,
the first post-war genocide committed on European soil, the mass killings at
Srebrenica, and doing it justly and fairly, is, to myself, one of the wonders of
my life.1
I ended the speech with the prayer that “neither we nor our children will
be victims, or even worse, perpetrators of genocide,” and, to paraphrase
Sir Michael Howard’s Holocaust speech to the Oxford Chabad Society, that
we will not be “those who simply let this happen: thinking the kind of things,
tolerating the kind of behavior that ultimately makes genocides possible.”
My U.N. period ended with the Six-Day War in June 1967; a traumatic
period in which, from the perspective of an Israeli diplomat in New York,
the future and the survival of Israel were very much at stake. In June, shortly
after the fighting was concluded with a victory for Israel, I was offered the
job of the Legal Adviser of the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem—a significant
promotion for a 37 year old—to succeed the great scholar Shabtai Rosenne,
who was being moved to New York.
It was in many ways a baptism of fire. Within weeks of my arrival in
Jerusalem, I was requested to advise the Prime Minister whether the estab-
lishment of Jewish civilian settlements in the occupied West Bank, the Golan
Heights and Gaza was allowed by international law. I refer here to a secret
10 R OOT S: T HE R OA D T O J U D G E S H I P
legal opinion brought to light many years later by the Israeli journalist Tom
Segev,2 and the historian Gershom Gorenberg in his book The Accidental
Empire (2006), and reported in The New York Times,3 and by Donald
Macintyre in The Independent,4 and subsequently Christiane Amanpour on
CNN, and many others. In this Opinion, I wrote that the establishment
of civilian settlements in occupied territory violated the Fourth Geneva
Convention as well as the private property rights of the Arab inhabitants.
The Israeli Government chose to go another way and a wave of settle-
ments followed, making the prospects for a political solution so much more
difficult. Although I knew that this was not the opinion that the Prime
Minister would have wished me to deliver, I had no doubt that legal advis-
ers of governments must be faithful to the law and call the law as they
see it. To the credit of the Israeli government, I must note that there were
no repercussions, of which I was aware, from my unpopular opinion. The
opinion reflected a commitment to human rights and humanitarian law
and it dealt not only with the rights and obligations of States, but with the
rights of inhabitants. The following year, on 12 March 1968, I gave another
controversial opinion, one in which I stated that the demolition of houses
and deportations of Arabs suspected of subversive activities were violations
of the Geneva Conventions and constituted collective punishment. The full
opinion was later translated into English by the NGO HaMoked.5
Oddly, these two opinions have become the best known of all my writings.
The first opinion written in Hebrew bureaucratic language uses expressions
I would not use as a scholar or a Judge. But it is clear and concise and does
not try to mask the conflict between the establishment of the settlements and
international law. Here it is, in part, in translation from the original Hebrew:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Jerusalem,13 Elul 5727
18 September 1967
TOP SECRET
To: Mr Adi Yafeh, Political Secretary to the Prime Minister
From: Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2. Tom Segev, Israel in 1967: and the Land Changed its Visage 611 (2005).
3. Gershom Gorenberg, Israel’s Tragedy Foretold, New York Times, 10 Mar. 2006, Editorials/
Op-Ed. Web.
4. Donald Macintyre, Israelis Were Warned on Illegality of Settlements in 1967 Memo, The Independent,
11 Mar. 2006, Web.
5. See http://www.hamoked.org.
T he P ale sti ne Opi ni on s 11
[signed]
T. Meron
Copy: Mr A. Shimoni, Director of the Minister’s Office
14.9.67
To: Minister of Foreign Affairs
From: Legal Adviser
Most Urgent
TOP SECRET
Subject: Settlement in the Administered Territories
… From the point of view of international law, the key provision is the
one that appears in the last paragraph of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention. Israel, of course, is a party to this Convention. The paragraph
stipulates as follows:
“The occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own
civilian population into the territory it occupies”.
This clause was adopted after some hesitation, by the XVIIth International
Red Cross Conference. It is intended to prevent a practice adopted during
the Second World War by certain Powers, which transferred portions of
their own population to occupied territory for political and racial reasons
or in order, as they claimed, to colonize those territories. Such transfers
worsened the economic situation of the native population and endan-
gered their separate existence as a race.
In Academia
This was a difficult and critical period in my life both personally and profes-
sionally. I was looking for ways to leave the foreign service and to enter the
academy. NYU was beckoning and soon invited me to join the full-time
faculty but I was 48 and still a bit uncertain what I should be doing in my
future life. After a short period as Permanent Representative to the U.N. in
Geneva, I resigned from the Israeli Foreign Ministry and NYU became my
intellectual home. I found the change exciting but also a bit terrifying.
Upon my appointment to the NYU faculty, the question came up about
my principal teaching subjects. At that time, human rights were not regu-
larly taught, although the Law School benefited from offerings of human
rights by visiting professors.There was clearly student interest in the subject,
and the Law School recognized a need for a regular human rights course.
I was asked to focus on human rights, and somewhat nervously prepared to
teach in what for me was still rather uncharted territory. My background
in international law was in State responsibility, treaties and humanitarian
law. My knowledge and experience in human rights were, however, thin.
(Humanitarian law deals largely with protection by a foreign government of
civilians and combatants belonging to the adversary and applicable in times
of armed conflict or war. Human rights concern protection of individuals
by and from their own authorities or governments primarily in times of
peace, although the law has been expanding to times of armed conflicts
as well.)
Teaching human rights proved a blessing, offering a natural partner
to international humanitarian law. My books Human Rights Law-Making
in the United Nations (1986), written as a visiting researcher at the Max
Planck Institute in Heidelberg, Human Rights in Internal Strife (Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures) (1987), Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms
as Customary Law (1989), International Law in the Age of Human Rights (2004),
a general course in the Hague Academy of International Law and its revised
version, Humanization of International Law (2006), the book that is closest
to capturing the core focus of my work, offered an integrated approach to
human rights and humanitarian law, grounding both in general interna-
tional law. It seemed to me clear that repression of human dignity occurs
in a continuum of situations of strife, from normality to full-blown inter-
national armed conflict, and that all these situations must be covered to
T h e Inte rnati onal C om m it te e of th e Re d C ro s s 17
law project) was both demanding and rewarding. The project on custom-
ary rules, which required a significant multi-year commitment, fit perfectly
with my academic interests, especially as it followed my book Human Rights
and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law.
The establishment of the group on internal strife was, in part, triggered
by my advocacy for a declaration of minimum humanitarian standards.
When I was first settling in at NYU, an invitation arrived to present a paper
at a Red Cross conference in Hawaii (February 1983) on the relationship
between human rights and humanitarian law. My work on the paper led me
to believe that there was a gaping hole in the protections offered by human-
itarian and human rights law. In my paper in Hawaii and in follow-up papers
for the American Journal of International Law, I explained that the conventions
on international humanitarian law protect victims of international wars, but
offer only very limited protections to victims of internal armed conflicts
and disturbances or strife. Moreover, disputes over the characterization of
conflicts create opportunities for States to evade the law altogether. Human
rights treaties protect individuals from abuses in times of peace, but many of
the important protections may be derogated from on grounds of national
emergency. In some situations, non-governmental actors exercise control
over people while denying that they are bound by international standards.
Moreover, most of the rules on permissible weapons and the conduct of hos-
tilities were not considered applicable to non-international armed conflicts.
There was thus a significant gap between humanitarian and human rights
instruments to the detriment of victims.This was occasionally referred to in
the literature as “the Meron gap.” As a partial remedy, I proposed the adop-
tion of a declaration of minimum humanitarian standards that would state
norms capable of filling that gap for all situations of strife. I was grateful to
Oscar Schachter and Louis Henkin, the editors of the journal at the time,
for publishing the first of my many articles on this subject,7 an article that
challenged many received wisdoms. I pursued these ideas in my Hersch
Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures on “Human Rights in Internal Strife” at
the University of Cambridge.
One of the joys of academic law as a discipline is that it allows give
and take within the profession— the chance to use the law, which is
naturally fluid, to overcome the stark barriers put up by the academic
7. Theodor Meron, On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the Need
for a New Instrument, 77 Am. J. Int’l L. 589 (1983)
T he Dauc hy C ase 19
Over the course of my life, I have litigated and advised on only a small
number of cases, including two before the International Court of Justice.
But following my Rockefeller Foundation Fellowship, international admin-
istrative law remained close to my heart. One case I argued before the U.N.
Administrative Tribunal arose from my continuing interest in international
administrative law and women’s rights. In 1990, Jacqueline Dauchy, a French
national working for the U.N., asked that I represent her before the U.N.
Administrative Tribunal in a case against the U.N. Secretary-General. She
had expressed interest in being considered for the post of director of the
Codification Division, for which she was fully qualified. That post, how-
ever, had been traditionally held by a national of the Soviet Union, and the
20 R OOT S: T HE R OA D T O J U D G E S H I P
When I moved to the United States in 1978 and joined the faculty of
NYU Law School, I had to start my life almost from scratch. I found the
opportunities given by NYU, the academic community and the country to
be wonderful. In 1984, I became a citizen. I was grateful for the welcome
I was given by my adopted country, such as election to the Board of Editors
and later as co-editor-in-chief of the American Journal of International Law,
to the Council on Foreign Relations and to membership of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences. I was looking for an opportunity to serve, to
make a contribution. I was therefore particularly pleased when, in 1990, the
State Department invited me to become a public member of the US delega-
tion led by Ambassador Max Kampelman to the Conference on the Human
Dimension of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe), held in Copenhagen. These were exciting, heady times, when the
walls of Eastern Europe were crumbling and we, in Copenhagen, believed
that we were moving into a period when human rights and the Helsinki
J udg e shi p s 21
Judgeships
Being a Judge has proved the most exciting and rewarding assignment in
my life. It required a change of instincts, of intuitions, of habits of work. It
22 R OOT S: T HE R OA D T O J U D G E S H I P
of the fugitives. It was a demanding job from which I could never disen-
gage, day and night, weekend or not, but I found it truly rewarding. I also
had the unique privilege of serving at different times a total of four terms
as President of the ICTY, and three terms as the first President of the suc-
cessor tribunal of the ICTY and that of Rwanda (ICTR), the International
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. I was happy to be involved in
the act of the creation of the Mechanism and to end my presidency leav-
ing behind a well-functioning, efficient and fair international court. For a
survivor of the Holocaust and a person with my history, to spend nearly
two decades judging individuals accused of crimes of atrocity and doing so
fairly is something that I can best express by paraphrasing Prospero in The
Tempest: this is the stuff that dreams are made of.
But some periods on the court were hard. During my years on the Bench,
I issued many decisions. A few rulings leading to acquittals received many
comments—and much criticism. That criticism was painful. One of the
qualities of leadership that I have not acquired is a thick skin. By tradition
and custom, Judges do not answer criticism of their judicial work.They take
harsh criticism stoically.
Some have suggested that these acquittals demonstrated that international
justice is failing. To my mind, nothing is further from the truth. Before
I explain why, however, I want to take a moment to sketch out the contours
of international criminal justice.
Atrocities are not new to human history. But it was only after World War
II that an international criminal tribunal was established, by the victori-
ous powers, in Nuremberg, to try the most serious war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed by the Nazi occupiers. The crime of geno-
cide had not yet been recognized and Holocaust crimes were prosecuted as
crimes against humanity. Twenty-two leading Nazis were in the dock and,
on 1 October 1946, seven received prison terms, twelve were sentenced to
hang and three were acquitted. Trials of alleged Japanese war crimes were
also held in Tokyo. After the postwar trials there were no international trials
for almost half a century.
But in the 1990s, atrocities in the Yugoslav wars and the genocide in
Rwanda, perhaps due to the wide publicity they attracted, caused the U.N. to
establish two ad hoc Tribunals in 1993 and 1994 respectively. In addition to
the Nuremberg crimes (except for crimes against peace), these Tribunals
were given explicit jurisdiction over the crime of genocide. Other tribunals
followed and, in 1998, the first permanent international criminal court, the
24 R OOT S: T HE R OA D T O J U D G E S H I P
ICC, was established at The Hague and began operations in 2002. After a
pause of more than 50 years, international criminal justice had come alive.
In 1946, I hardly knew about the trials going on in Nuremberg. But my
life had been formed and forever altered by war. Although my career has fol-
lowed a circuitous path, the constant theme has been an attempt to grapple
with the chaos and pain of war. War shattered my childhood and imbued in
me both a craving for education and the desire for the law to right wrongs
and bring an end to atrocities.War led me to write my legal opinion against
settlement on the West Bank. Later, as a law professor, I taught the law of
war. And then, as a Judge of an international criminal tribunal, I heard the
appeals of individuals accused of atrocities in times of armed conflict.
International criminal courts, in many ways, resemble criminal courts in
national jurisdictions around the world. They weigh evidence, follow due
process, ensure the parties are heard and apply and abide by the law and
respect human rights. At the same time, international criminal courts—and
the cases they hear—are extraordinary.The cases are of tremendous breadth,
often involving alleged crimes on a massive scale committed over long peri-
ods across many localities. The magnitude of evidence is enormous. This
evidence must be obtained without any independent police force—and
with the cooperation of sovereign States, which is not always available. The
crimes can have complex political dimensions, not least because the indi-
viduals charged are frequently a country’s top leaders.
Because of their unique role and the nature of the crimes charged,
international criminal courts are also often seen as something more than
criminal courts. Their judgements are sometimes expected to be definitive
histories of the conflict. Their mission is sometimes said to be to foster
reconciliation among parties to a conflict or to bring closure to victims
through convictions. Indeed, sometimes members of the public, including
victims, equate the bringing of heads of State, leaders of political parties and
military or paramilitary groups “to justice” with the entering of convictions.
Accused who come before international criminal courts thus often come
with—in the public mind—an existing narrative of guilt. “Ay, there’s the
rub,” as Shakespeare wrote in his Hamlet soliloquy. Different stakeholders
have different expectations or visions of international criminal justice. But
for Judges—including myself—bringing someone to justice means simply
that the individual charged will be tried: fairly, somberly, in accordance
with the law and the evidence, having heard from the parties, preserving
the presumption of innocence and observing the time-honored principles
J udg e shi p s 25
of fairness. This is what the rule of law requires on a domestic level and it
requires no less on the international level. However, the operation of inter-
national criminal courts in this way has often led to criticism and even the
claim that international criminal justice is failing. Several judgements of
acquittal at the Appeals Chambers of the war crimes tribunal of which I was
the President have been decried as evidence of this failing. Nothing is fur-
ther from the truth. Acquittals in any system cause some level of controversy,
and they unquestionably bring victims of crime real pain. This controversy
can be magnified at the international level, given the dimensions of the
crimes alleged and the political implications of those allegations. Indeed, for
victims, an acquittal may feel like a denial of what happened to them, and
a betrayal of their hopes and expectations. For others, an acquittal may be
seen as rewriting history or a failure of the international court to serve its
purpose as part of a broader transitional justice agenda. In my view, a true
failure of international criminal justice would be if international courts
were to convict an individual where there is an inadequate evidentiary or
legal basis to do so. When the law or the evidence do not support a finding
that a person is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the specific crime for
which he or she has been charged, it is the duty of international Judges to
rule accordingly. In so doing, Judges are not declaring an individual inno-
cent, they are not redefining history and they are not thinking about the
impact on national or transnational reconciliation. They are—or rather we
are—carrying out our responsibility to follow the dictates of the law—no
more and no less. Judges cannot be swayed by outside sentiment, by popular
perceptions or criticisms or by preexisting narratives of guilt. Justice is and
must be blind to that. Despite their occasional criticisms, I have frequently
met and greatly respected the victims’ organizations, especially the Mothers
of Srebrenica.
Indeed, although one must be careful not to make sweeping generaliza-
tions, acquittals—just like convictions—can be seen as a sign of a mature
system of law, an independent system, a system focused on its actual, narrow
mandate to try those charged, rather than on trying to satisfy the myriad
and sometimes conflicting expectations of victims, observers, civil society
groups and others. In my view, criticism of acquittals suggests the impor-
tance of strengthening respect for and understanding of the rule of law.
Establishing respect for the rule of law is critically important for ensuring
protections for human rights and for building and maintaining peaceful
and productive societies. And respect for the rule of law requires that we
26 R OOT S: T HE R OA D T O J U D G E S H I P
accept not only those judicial decisions with which we agree, but also those
decisions with which we disagree. An à la carte approach to accepting court
rulings is a denial of the fundamental principles of the rule of law.
My life, in many ways, has come full circle: From World War II to trying
war criminals justly and fairly. In doing my work as a Judge in a principled
way, come what may in terms of criticism, I have sought to ensure the
strength and integrity of international criminal justice. Successfully or not,
I have tried to live up to the way in which Shehzad Charania, then Legal
Adviser of the British Embassy in The Hague, and now Director at the U.K.
Attorney General’s Office, entitled his interview with me at The Hague of
27 July 2016: “A Life of Legal Principle, not of Politics.”8
And in years to come, I trust that others will see these first few decades
of international criminal justice for what they are: a time where vital
and difficult issues were confronted, and where fledgling courts strove—
and succeeded in making profoundly important contributions to the
larger shared goals of ending impunity and upholding human rights and
dignity.
Shakespeare
speak with a hundred voices and that there is hardly a text that could not be
understood in different, sometimes contradictory, ways.While risking accu-
sations of simplification, I found it worthwhile, nevertheless, to derive from
those voices certain themes of chivalry which I dared think were probably
Shakespeare’s own.
Oxford
Looking Back
experiences are the result of serendipitous diversions. In many ways, the title
of my book Humanization of International Law could describe the overarch-
ing theme of my life’s work. My interest in international law evolved from
a relatively narrow focus on State responsibility to encompass humanitar-
ian law, human rights law and international criminal law and my desire to
integrate these public international law disciplines. I have been blessed to
be able to pursue my intellectual passions both in the world of the academy,
where we enjoy the luxury of exploring Shakespeare and crafting pristine
theories, as well as in the nitty-g ritty world of handling cases, negotiating
instruments of international law and practicing the law. My time as a Judge
on the International Tribunals has been the best of both worlds—shaping
doctrines that often have an academic flair but always with an eye toward
their impact on the lives of real peoples. My hope is that in some small way,
these endeavors have contributed to our thinking critically about how to
create a more humane world.
Given my age, it is natural that I would think of Jacques’ “seven ages of
men” in As You Like It. Whatever my present frailties, and age, my Judgeship
legitimizes situating me in the fifth age: “the justice, in fair round belly
with good capon lined … full of wise saws and modern instances, and so he
plays his part.” It is the future, represented by the sixth and the seventh ages,
which is more frightening, especially in the age of Coronavirus. For the
time being, my intense work, new interests and projects and strong genes
may delay somewhat the inevitable coming of the seventh age:
… second childishness and mere oblivion,
Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything.
II
From Classroom to a
Criminal Courtroom
1. See Chapter I.
Standing Up For Justice. Theodor Meron, Oxford University Press (2021). © Theodor Meron.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198863434.003.0002
32 FR OM C L A SSR OOM T O A C R I M I N A L C O U RTRO O M
Classification of Rhabdocoelida.
ACOELA.
Family. Genus and British species.
Proporidae Proporus venenosus O. Sch. Plymouth.
Monoporus rubropunctatus O. Sch.
Plymouth.
Haplodiscus.
Aphanostomatidae Aphanostoma diversicolor Oe. Common.
A. elegans Jen. Plymouth.
Convoluta saliens Grff. Plymouth,
Millport.
C. paradoxa Oe. (Fig. 19, B). Common.
C. flavibacillum Jen. Plymouth, Port
Erin, Millport.
Amphicoerus.
Polychoerus.
RHABDOCOELA.
Macrostomatidae Mecynostoma.
Macrostoma hystrix Oe. Stagnant water.
Omalostoma.
Microstomatidae Microstoma lineare Oe. Fresh water.
M. groelandicum Lev. Plymouth, among
Ulva.
Stenostoma (Catenula) lemnae Dug.
Near Cork.
S. leucops O. Sch. Common in fresh
water.
Alaurina claparedii Grff. Skye.
Prorhynchidae Prorhynchus stagnalis M. Sch. In
Devonshire rivers.
Promesostoma marmoratum M. Sch.
Common.
P. ovoideum O. Sch., P. agile Lev.
Plymouth. P. solea O. Sch. Plymouth,
Port Erin. P. lenticulatum O. Sch. Port
Erin.
Mesostomatidae Byrsophlebs graffii Jen. Plymouth,
Millport.
B. intermedia Grff. Millport, Port Erin.
Proxenetes flabellifer Jen. Millport,
Plymouth, Port Erin.
P. cochlear Grff. Millport.
Otomesostoma.
Mesostoma productum Leuck., M. lingua
O. Sch., M. ehrenbergii O. Sch., M.
tetragonum O. F. M. (Fig. 19, A). All at
Cambridge.
M. rostratum Ehr. Widely distributed. M.
viridatum M. Sch. Manchester. M.
robertsonii Grff., M. flavidum Grff. Both
at Millport.
Bothromesostoma personatum O. Sch.
Preston.
Castrada.
Proboscidae Pseudorhynchus bifidus M‘Int. Millport,
St. Andrews, Port Erin.
Acrorhynchus caledonicus Clap.
Generally distributed.
Macrorhynchus naegelii Köll., M. croceus
Fabr. Plymouth, Millport.
M. helgolandicus Metsch. West coast.
Gyrator hermaphroditus Ehrbg. St.
Andrews. Also common in fresh water.
Hyporhynchus armatus Jen. Plymouth,
Port Erin.
H. penicillatus O. Sch. Plymouth.
Vorticidae Schultzia. Provortex balticus M. Sch.
Generally distributed.
P. affinis Jen., P. rubrobacillus Gamb.
Plymouth.
Vortex truncatus Ehrbg. Abundant in
fresh water.
V. armiger O. Sch. Millport (fresh water).
V. schmidtii Grff., V. millportianus Grff.
Millport. V. viridis M. Sch. Generally
distributed.
Jensenia.
Opistoma.
Derostoma unipunctatum Oe. Edinburgh.
Graffilla.
Anoplodium.
Fecampia erythrocephala Giard.
Plymouth, Port Erin.
Solenopharyngidae Solenopharynx.
ALLOEOCOELA.
Plagiostomatidae Acmostoma. Plagiostoma dioicum
Metsch., P. elongatum Gamb., P.
pseudomaculatum Gamb., P. sagitta
Ulj., P. caudatum Lev., P.
siphonophorum O. Sch., P.
ochroleucum Grff. All at Plymouth.
P. sulphureum Grff. Port Erin. P. vittatum
F. and Leuck. Millport, Plymouth, Port
Erin. P. koreni Jen. Plymouth, Millport.
P. girardi O. Sch. Plymouth, Port Erin,
Valencia.
Vorticeros auriculatum O. F. M. (Fig. 19,
C). Port Erin, Plymouth.
V. luteum Grff. Plymouth.
Enterostoma austriacum Grff. Plymouth,
Port Erin.
E. fingalianum Clap. Skye, Plymouth. E.
coecum Grff. Millport.
Allostoma pallidum van Ben. Millport.
Cylindrostoma 4-oculatum Leuck. Skye,
Millport, Plymouth.
C. inerme Hall, C. elongatum Lev.
Plymouth.
Monoophorum striatum Grff. Plymouth.
Bothrioplanidae Bothrioplana.
Bothrioplana sp.? Manchester.
Otoplana.
Monotidae Monotus lineatus O. F. M., M. fuscus Oe.
(Fig. 19, D). Both common littoral
forms.
M. albus Lev. Plymouth.
Automolos unipunctatus Oe. Skye, St.
Andrews, Plymouth.
A. horridus Gamb., A. ophiocephalus O.
Sch. Plymouth.
CHAPTER II
TREMATODA
The mouth is invariably present just beneath the anterior end of the
body. It leads into a muscular, pumping pharynx (Fig. 24, ph), and
this into a bifurcated intestine which ends blindly. The two openings
of the excretory system lie on the dorsal surface (as in
Temnocephala), and the excretory canals branch through the
substance of the body, ending usually in "flame-cells." The nervous
system is highly developed, and resembles that of Temnocephala
(Fig. 21) in detail. Upon the brain one or even two pairs of eye-spots
are present in the larvae, and may persist throughout life. Tactile
setae occur in Sphyranura, a parasite of the North American
Amphibian Necturus, but a cellular epidermis is apparently rendered
impossible, perhaps from the nature of the mucus in which the body
is bathed, or to the attempts of the host to free itself from these
parasites; and hence an investing membrane is present, which
morphologically is either a modified epithelium, or a cuticle formed
by the glandular secretion of the parenchyma.
Diplozoon paradoxum lays its eggs on the gills of the Minnow, which
it frequently infests in great numbers. The ovum divides rapidly at the
expense of the yolk-cells, and in a fortnight a larva (.2 mm. long) of
the shape and complexity shown in Fig. 27, B, hatches out, which,
however, succumbs if it does not meet with a Minnow in five or six
hours. Should it survive, a dorsal papilla, a median ventral sucker,
and a second pair of posterior suckers develop. Thus the Diporpa
stage is attained. These Diporpa may acquire a third and even a
fourth pair of suckers, and continue to live three months, but they
only develop and mature their reproductive organs, if each
conjugates with another Diporpa (Fig. 27, C, D), and this only occurs
in a small percentage of instances. Each grasps the dorsal papilla of
the other by its own ventral sucker, thus undergoing a certain
amount of torsion. Where the two bodies touch, complete fusion
occurs, and, as shown in Fig. 28, the united Diporpa (or Diplozoon,
as the product is now called) decussate, each forming one limb of
the X-shaped Diplozoon, within which the two sets of complex
genitalia develop (Fig. 28).