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6 -------------------------------------
8 Appellant,
9 - v -
11 Defendants,*
13 Defendant-Appellee.
14 -------------------------------------
*
Viktor Kozeny and David Pinkerton were both named as
defendants in the indictment. Kozeny, a resident of the Bahamas,
is appealing an order committing him to extradition to the United
States and is therefore not a party to this appeal. See United
States v. Kozeny, No. 1:05-cr-00518-SAS (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2007)
(minute entry). Pinkerton was initially an appellant, but the
government withdrew all charges against him after this appeal was
argued. See United States v. Kozeny, No. 1:05-cr-00518-SAS
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2008) (order of nolle prosequi as to
Pinkerton). The government's appeal as to Pinkerton was
withdrawn by stipulation filed July 16, 2008.
1 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3292 to suspend the running of a statute
4 Affirmed.
27 The court concluded that the charges against him in those counts
31 The district court held that this suspension was invalid because
33 period for the crimes under investigation had expired. The court
2
1 concluded that although the statutory text was ambiguous, the
14 BACKGROUND
20 the FCPA and the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 371; two counts of money
3
1 privatization of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic
9 within five years next after such offense shall have been
10 committed." Id.
20 September 2003.
25 May 2007.
4
1 Finally, the conduct related to the conspiracy charges
3 conspiracy and until February 1999 for the FCPA and Travel Act
7 2004, respectively.
24 (a)
25 (1) Upon application of the United
26 States, filed before return of an
27 indictment, indicating that evidence of
28 an offense is in a foreign country, the
5
1 district court before which a grand jury
2 is impaneled to investigate the offense
3 shall suspend the running of the statute
4 of limitations for the offense if the
5 court finds by a preponderance of the
6 evidence that an official request has
7 been made for such evidence and that it
8 reasonably appears, or reasonably
9 appeared at the time the request was
10 made, that such evidence is, or was, in
11 such foreign country.
12 (2) The court shall rule upon such
13 application not later than thirty days
14 after the filing of the application.
39 18 U.S.C. § 3292.
6
1 U.S.C. § 3292(b), the district court ordered that "the periods of
3 requests were made and shall end on the date on which the
8 dates, the last of which was September 10, 2004. The Dutch
10 the indictment was returned on May 12, 2005, after the date on
11 which Switzerland took final action but before the date on which
18 to the Netherlands.
26 all but the false statements charges. The district court held
7
1 that although the statutory text was "ambiguous," the legislative
8 the conspiracy charges and one FCPA count against Bourke on the
9 grounds that the statute of limitations had not run for these
10 charges when the section 3292 application was filed. That order
14 limitations grounds.
15 DISCUSSION
1
See United States v. Atiyeh, 402 F.3d 354, 362-67 (3d
Cir.) (application must be filed before government has received
all requested foreign evidence), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1068
(2005); United States v. Trainor, 376 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir.
2004) (interpreting "preponderance of the evidence" standard in
subsection 3292(a)); United States v. DeGeorge, 380 F.3d 1203,
1215 (9th Cir. 2004) ("'Final action' for purposes of § 3292
means a dispositive response from the foreign sovereign . . . ."
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States
v. Torres, 318 F.3d 1058, 1063 (11th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 827 (2003); DeGeorge v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent.
Dist. of Cal., 219 F.3d 930, 937, 939-41 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding, under a standard of review for mandamus petitions,
inter alia, that district court did not clearly err in concluding
that section 3292 allows ex parte applications and does not
require that a grand jury be impaneled and hearing evidence on
8
1 the question presented here. Both, United States v. Bischel, 61
2 F.3d 1429 (9th Cir. 1995), and United States v. Neill, 940 F.
7 disagree.
8 I. Standard of Review
17 Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194
20 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)
9
1 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917));
2 see also Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)
3 ("We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a
9 United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)); see also
17 of a statute not 'in isolation from the context of the whole Act'
19 object and policy.'" United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 154
10
1 Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 627
4 that result." Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 710 n.10
11 States v. Podde, 105 F.3d 813, 819-20 (2d Cir. 1997). This rule
14 against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by
20 A. "Plain Language"
11
1 parties argue that their interpretation of section 3292 is
2
See, e.g., Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary
1917 (2d ed. 2001) (defining "suspend" as "to cause to cease for
a time from operation or effect").
3
See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1487 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining "suspend" as "[t]o interrupt; postpone; defer").
4
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.").
12
1 it has expired at the end of the prescribed period.5 It follows
9 arguing that the only time limit explicitly set by the statute is
5
See Black's Law Dictionary 1361 (8th ed. 2004) (defining
"run" as having "expire[d] after a prescribed period").
6
Compare Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 632-33 (2003)
(concluding that "a law enacted after expiration of a previously
applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post Facto Clause
when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred
prosecution" (emphasis added)), with Bridges v. United States,
346 U.S. 209, 222 (1953) (concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 3287
"suspend[s] the running of . . . [a] statute of limitations . . .
only where fraud against the Government is an essential
ingredient of the crime [alleged]" (emphasis added)); see also
Black's Law Dictionary 1346 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "revival"
as, inter alia, "the act of restoring . . . validity or legal
force").
13
1 at issue in this appeal defines that time period by reference to
12 830 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1033
7
For the same reasons we think Miller inapposite, we think
that Bischel and Neill, which relied on Miller, carry little
persuasive force. Like the government, the Bischel and Neill
courts reasoned that because, according to Miller, a section 3292
14
1 The government's final textual argument looks to
4 request [for evidence from the foreign nation] is made and end on
7 argues that because the period of suspension begins "on the date
8 the official request [for evidence] is made" and not on the date
15
1 3292(b) for the same proposition. See Bischel, 61 F.3d at 1434;
11 the day on which the request for foreign evidence was made. When
16
1 We therefore conclude that the "plain language" of 18
9
The legislative history of section 3292 is meager. It
consists of a single House Report. H.R. Rep. 98-907 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3578. Referring broadly to the
motivation for the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, the
Report notes:
Id. at 3578-79.
17
1 whole Act' but to 'look to the provisions of the whole law, and
6 Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat.
7 1837 (1984) (the "CCCA"). The CCCA amended the United States
18
1 has been made for evidence" from a foreign country. Id.
2 § 3161(h)(9).10
12 serves as the dividing line between when the government can turn
10
This section does not require that the statute of
limitations be suspended pursuant to section 3292 in order for
the court to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act. It
requires only that, after indictment, a party be able to
demonstrate that it has made the type of request for foreign
evidence "defined in section 3292." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(9).
11
Our interpretation of section 3292 is also consistent
with internal Justice Department guidelines. A manual advises
federal prosecutors: "Make sure you file [the section 3292
application] before the statute runs; don't wait until the
foreign country responds to the request." Executive Office for
United States Attorneys, Evidence for Experienced Criminal
Litigators E-18 (1993).
19
1 remains fully relevant to the extent that it distinguishes
11 would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Due Process
18 Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000) (citations and
23 CONCLUSION
25 court is affirmed.
20