1795-S-TS-E-2400 Protection System Manual-1

Consultancy Services for EEP
Engineering Office Capacity Building

PROJECT FINANCED BY THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
POWER PROTECTION SYSTEM

COORDINATION MANUAL
Document No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00

Consultancy Services for EEP – Engineering Office Capacity Building
Project TiTeam Lead e:

Consultancy Services for EEP - Engineering Office Capacity Building
Project Site: Ethiopia
Project No: P-ET-FAO-011 - Loan No. 2000200000253
Report Ref: PROTECTION SYSTEM COORDINATION MANUAL
Client Contact Name: Mr. Tesfaye Tilaye

Client Company Name: Ethiopian Electric Power - EEP
Issued By: ELC-Electroconsult S.p.A.
Via Marostica, 1 - 20146 Milano - Italy
Ph. +39 02 49538450
Fax +39 02 49538470
Document Production / Approval Record

Rev. n. Name Signature Date Position
Mr. R. Nagaraja
Prepared by 25/08/2023 Expert Team
Mr.S. M. Takalkar
Checked by Mr. Antonio Comelli Project Manager
Approved by Mr. Antonio Comelli Project Manager
Document Review Record

Review Date Version details
00 25/08/2023 Original Issue
01
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page i

Table of Contents
1 PROTECTION STUDY SECTION I ...............................................................................................................1

1.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................1
1.1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................................1
1.1.2 SCOPE .................................................................................................................................................1
1.2 INPUT AND OUTPUT DEFINITION .....................................................................................................2
1.2.1 INPUTS................................................................................................................................................2
1.2.2 OUTPUTS ...........................................................................................................................................2
1.2.3 ACTIVITES INVOLVED SPECIFIC TO PROTECTION STUDIES..........................................3
1.2.4 PROTECTION STUDIES OUTPUT ................................................................................................7
1.3.1 OVER CURRENT AND EARTH FAULT CO-ORDINATION STUDY .....................................8
1.3.2 BUS BAR PROTECTION STUDY .................................................................................................15
1.3.3 GENERATOR PROTECTION STUDY ........................................................................................21
1.3.4 MOTOR PROTECTION STUDY ..................................................................................................44
1.3.5 DISTANCE PROTECTION STUDY .............................................................................................45
1.3.6 TRANSFORMER DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION STUDY....................................................52
1.3.7 RESTRICTED EARTH FAULT PROTECTION STUDY ..........................................................56
1.3 REFERENCES .........................................................................................................................................60
1.4 APPENDIX................................................................................................................................................61
1.A.1 OVER CURRENT AND EARTH FAULT PROTECTION SETTING FORMAT..........................62
1.A.2 BUS BAR PROTECTION RELAY SETTING FORMAT (REB 500) ..............................................63
1.A.3 GENERATOR PROTECTION RELAY SETTINGS FORMAT- REM545.....................................66
1.A.4 DISTANCE PROTECTION RELAY SETTINGS FORMAT (MICOMP441) ................................85
1.A.5 LINE/CABLE DIFFERENTIAL (87L) RELAY (7SD610 ) SETTING FORMAT ..........................90
1.A.6 MOTOR PROTECTION RELAY SETTINGS FORMAT (REM 615) ...........................................94
1.A.7 TRANSFORMER UNIT PROTECTION RELAY SETTING FORMAT ........................................98
2 POWER PROTECTION SYSTEM SECTION II:......................................................................................100
2.1 INTRODUCTION: .................................................................................................................................100
3 BASIC OF POWER PROTECTION............................................................................................................102
3.1 INTRODUCTION: .................................................................................................................................102
3.2 FAULT CLEARANCE SYSTEMS .......................................................................................................104
3.3 BACK–UP PROTECTION....................................................................................................................105
3.4 REMOTE BACK–UP PROTECTION .................................................................................................106
3.5 CIRCUIT LOCAL BACK UP PROTECTION ...................................................................................106
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3.6 SUBSTATION LOCAL BACK UP PROTECTION ...........................................................................106

3.7 BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION ................................................................................................107
3.8 DUPLICATED MAIN PROTECTIONS ..............................................................................................108
3.9 APPLICATION OF SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION ...................................................................109
3.10 SPECIAL PROTECTION SCHEMES (SPS) ......................................................................................109
3.11 REQUIREMENTS OF SPS ...................................................................................................................110
3.12 ISLANDING SCHEME .........................................................................................................................113
4 BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF POWER PROTECTION ..........................................................................115
4.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................115
4.2 EXTERNAL REQUIREMENTS ..........................................................................................................115
4.3 POWER SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................................116
4.4 PROTECTION CRITERIA...................................................................................................................116
4.5 FAULT CURRENT WITHSTAND CAPABILITY .............................................................................116
4.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SYSTEM PLANNERS AND PROTECTION ENGINEERS .........117
5 GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTION SYSTEMENGINEERING ..............................................................118
5.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................118
5.2 ENGINEERING OF PROTECTION SYSTEM ..................................................................................118
5.3 TRIP CIRCUIT SUPERVISION ..........................................................................................................121
6 GENERATOR AND GENERATOR TRANSFORMER PROTECTION: ................................................130
6.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................130
6.2 REQUIREMENTS AND SETTING GUIDELINES ...........................................................................132
6.3 GENERATOR-TRANSFORMER PROTECTION ............................................................................143
6.4 UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER PROTECTIONS...................................................................144
7 PROTECTION OF TRANSMISSION LINES AND CABLES .................................................................147
7.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................147
7.2 OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION CIRCUITS .......................................................................................147
7.3 UNDERGROUND TRANSMISSION CIRCUITS (CABLES) ...........................................................148
7.4 COMPOSITE TRANSMISSION CIRCUITS ......................................................................................148
7.5 COMPLEX TRANSMISSION CIRCUITS..........................................................................................148
7.6 PARALLEL TRANSMISSION CIRCUITS.........................................................................................149
7.7 MULTI–TERMINAL TRANSMISSION CIRCUITS .........................................................................150
7.8 TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT FAILURE MODES AND RATES .......................................................151
7.9 TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS ....................................................152
7.10 TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT PROTECTION SCHEMES .................................................................153
7.11 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LINE PROTECTION RELAY .........................................................159
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7.12 REQUIREMENTS OF PROTECTION RELAYS / FUNCTIONS ....................................................160

7.13 TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT PROTECTION SETTING CRITERIA: UNCOMPENSATED
TRANSMISSION LINES ..................................................................................................................................163
7.14 TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT PROTECTION SETTING CRITERIA: ...........................................168
8 AUTO–RECLOSING .....................................................................................................................................169
8.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................169
8.2 BASIC PARAMETERS OF AN AUTORECLOSE SCHEME...........................................................170
8.3 REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................................................................174
8.4 SETTING GUIDELINES ......................................................................................................................174
8.5 APPLICATION NOTES ........................................................................................................................175
9 PROTECTION OF POWER TRANSFORMERS ......................................................................................176
9.1 TRANSFORMER DESIGN ...................................................................................................................176
9.2 TYPICAL TRANSFORMER ARRANGEMENTS .............................................................................176
9.3 FAILURE RATES OF POWER TRANSFORMER............................................................................176
9.4 TRANSFORMER PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS......................................................................176
9.5 PROTECTION SCHEMES ...................................................................................................................177
9.6 TRANSFORMER PROTECTION SCHEME:....................................................................................190
9.7 REQUIREMENTS AND SETTING GUIDELINES ...........................................................................191
10 PROTECTION OF SHUNT REACTORS ...............................................................................................195
10.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................195
10.2 SHUNT REACTOR PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS ..................................................................195
10.4 TYPICAL MAIN–1 PROTECTION SCHEMES (GROUP A) .........................................................198
10.5 MAIN–2 AND BACK UP PROTECTION SCHEMES (GROUP B) .................................................198
10.6 REQUIREMENTS AND SETTING GUIDE LINES ..........................................................................198
10.7 ENGINEERING GUIDELINES ..........................................................................................................200
10.8 APPLICATION NOTES ........................................................................................................................201
11 PROTECTION OF BUSBAR ....................................................................................................................202
11.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................202
11.2 TYPICAL BUSBAR ARRANGEMENTS ............................................................................................202
11.3 LOCATION OF CURRENT TRANSFORMERS ...............................................................................203
11.4 BUSBAR PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS ....................................................................................203
11.6 BACKUP PROTECTION......................................................................................................................206
12 LOCAL BREAKER BACKUP PROTECTION......................................................................................208
12.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................208
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12.2 TYPES OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS......................................................................................................208

12.3 REQUIREMENTS OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS..................................................................................208
12.4 RELIABILITY OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS ........................................................................................208
12.5 DUPLICATION OF TRIP COILS .......................................................................................................209
12.6 CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION .............................................................................209
12.7 TRIPPING SCHEMES ..........................................................................................................................212
12.8 TRIP COIL AND CLOSE COIL SUPERVISION ..............................................................................212
12.9 RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................................................................213
12.10 REQUIREMENTS AND SETTING GUIDELINES .......................................................................213
13 PROTECTION OF FACTS (FSC AND TCSC) .......................................................................................215
13.1 GENERAL ON SERIES COMPENSATION (FSC & TCSC)............................................................215
13.2 PROTECTION OF CAPACITOR ELEMENTS AND UNITS ..........................................................217
13.3 PROTECTION OF SERIES CAPACITOR BANKS ..........................................................................218
13.4 ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR TCSC BANKS ......................................................................221
13.5 SIGNAL TRANSMISSION ...................................................................................................................223
14 BASICS FOR DESIGNING PROTECTION SCHEMESBASED ON IEC 61850 STANDARD ........224
14.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................224
14.2 HISTORY ................................................................................................................................................225
14.3 CONCEPTS ............................................................................................................................................225
14.4 INTEROPERABILITY..........................................................................................................................226
14.5 THE DATA MODEL ..............................................................................................................................226
14.6 IEC 61850 BASIC ARCHITECTURE ..................................................................................................228
14.7 PERFORMANCE ...................................................................................................................................230
14.8 APPLICATIONS ....................................................................................................................................230
14.9 CYBER SECURITY...............................................................................................................................232
14.10 SECURITY TOOLS ...........................................................................................................................233
14.11 BENEFITS OF IEC 61850 .................................................................................................................234
14.12 CHALLENGES IN IEC 61850 IMPLEMENTATION....................................................................237
14.13 REQUIREMENTS FOR NETWORK COMMUNICATION AND PROCESSING ....................238
14.14 SPECIFYING IEC 61850 BASED PROTECTION SCHEMES ....................................................238
14.15 GOOSE FOR IEC 61850 IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................239
14.16 TOPOLOGY CONSIDERATIONS ..................................................................................................240
14.17 ENGINEERING TOOLS ...................................................................................................................242
14.18 TESTING AND MAINTENANCE....................................................................................................244
15 PROTECTION OF ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS WITHRENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES .....250
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15.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................250

15.2 BASIC CONSIDERATIONS .................................................................................................................251
15.3 PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................................................251
15.4 UNGROUNDED MV CONNECTION .................................................................................................256
15.5 SOLIDLY GROUNDED MV & HV CONNECTION .........................................................................256
15.6 SOLIDLY GROUNDED MV AND DELTA HV ..................................................................................256
15.7 PROTECTION OF THE RES INTERCONNECTION......................................................................257
15.8 TRANSFORMER CONNECTIONS ....................................................................................................259
15.9 PROTECTION OF DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WITH RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES
260
16 DISTURBANCE RECORDER, ALARMS AND EVENT LOGGING .................................................262
16.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................262
16.2 TYPES OF DISTURBANCES...............................................................................................................262
16.3 DISTURBANCE RECORDING CONSIDERATIONS ......................................................................263
16.4 TYPES OF RECORDS ..........................................................................................................................264
16.5 PHASOR MEASUREMENT UNIT (PMU) .........................................................................................265
16.6 PROTECTIVE RELAYS WITH FAULT DISTURBANCE RECORDING AND EVENT
RECORDING .....................................................................................................................................................266
16.7 TIME SYNCHRONIZATION...............................................................................................................266
16.8 PROCESSING ........................................................................................................................................267
16.9 DISTURBANCE RECORD AND RECORDED SIGNALS ...............................................................268
16.10 RECOMMENDED DIGITAL SIGNALS (TYPICAL) & TRIGGER OPTIONS FOR DRS ......269
16.11 APPLICATION OF DISTRUBANCE RECORDERS: ..................................................................269
16.12 PROPOSALS ......................................................................................................................................270
17 VALIDATION, ACCEPTANCE AND FIELD TESTINGTECHNIQUES FOR TESTING OF
PROTECTION RELAYS ......................................................................................................................................271
17.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................271
17.2 FACTORY ACCEPTANCE TESTS (FAT) ..........................................................................................271
17.3 SAT/COMMISSIONING TESTS .........................................................................................................271
17.4 PERIODIC MAINTENANCE TESTS .................................................................................................272
17.5 APPLICATION TESTS .........................................................................................................................272
17.6 METHODS TO TEST PROTECTION DEVICES .............................................................................273
17.7 RECOMMENDATION OF BEFORE START TO TEST RELAYING SCHEME BY USING
COMPUTERIZED RELAY TESTING KIT ...................................................................................................274
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Index of Figures
Figure 1 H-type station ...............................................................................................................................................15
Figure 2 breaker stations............................................................................................................................................16
Figure 3 Double busbar – single breaker station with two bus-coupler CBs and two bus-section CBs .....................16
Figure 4 Simple bus differential scheme with paralleled CTs ....................................................................................17
Figure 5 Low-impedance bus differential scheme showing an external fault, F1, and an internal fault, F2 ..............18
Figure 6 Percentage current differential characteristic of a low-impedance bus differential relay with and without an
internal bus fault .........................................................................................................................................................18
Figure 7 Paralleled CTs connected to a high-impedance bus differential relay .........................................................20
Figure 8 High-impedance bus differential relay internal elements.............................................................................20
Figure 1-9 Block schematic of a typical generator protection system........................................................................21
Figure 10 Zones of protection ....................................................................................................................................46
Figure 11 : Differential protection scheme for transformer ........................................................................................52
Figure 12 Transformer differential protection characteristics ....................................................................................53
Figure 13 An earth fault outside a transformer with current distribution ...................................................................56
Figure 14 An earth fault in a transformer with current distribution ...........................................................................57
Figure 15 The fault clearance system ......................................................................................................................105
Figure 17 Flow diagram for breaker failure protection ...........................................................................................108
Figure 16 Duplication of main protections ..............................................................................................................108
Figure 18 Typical Process to Wide–Area Blackout ................................................................................................111
Figure19 General Structure of a System Protection Scheme ...................................................................................113
Figure 20 Double bus-bar arrangement ....................................................................................................................126
Figure 21 Double Main with Transfer bus arrangement..........................................................................................127
Figure 22 Overlapping of zones of protection in double Main with Transfer bus arrangement..............................127
Figure 23 One and half breaker arrangement with 4CTs.........................................................................................128
Figure 24 Overlapping of zones of protection in One and half breaker arrangement with 4 CTs and 3 CTs .........128
Figure 25 One and Half breaker arrangement with 6 CTs Figure 26 One and Half breaker arrangement with 5 CTs
..................................................................................................................................................................................129
Figure 27 Power Swing Impedance Trajectory .......................................................................................................167
Figure 28 A/R cycle for a transient fault .................................................................................................................169
Figure 29 Typical A/R cycle for a permanent fault ..................................................................................................170
Figure 30 An example of single – phase single shot AR cycle for a successful reclosing ......................................172
Figure 31 Synchro check supervised auto reclosing................................................................................................172
Figure 32 Bias differential relay characteristic .........................................................................................................179
Figure 33 waveform during the inrush current .........................................................................................................180
Figure 34 Typical Differential protection scheme for Dy11 Transformer (using external vector group correction)
..................................................................................................................................................................................180
Figure 35 Typical Differential protection scheme for Dy11 Transformer (Vector group correction inside numerical
relay) .........................................................................................................................................................................181
Figure 36 Restricted earth fault protection using a high impedance relay ..............................................................182
Figure 37 REF high impedance relay, Current flow with one saturated CT ...........................................................182
Figure 38 REF Slope Characteristic ........................................................................................................................183
Figure 39 Low Impedance REF (Numerical) relay .................................................................................................184
Figure 40 Distance Relay Protection .......................................................................................................................184
Figure 41 Directional Overcurrent protection application ........................................................................................185
Figure 42 Permissive over fluxing in two power transformers ...............................................................................187
Figure 43 Buchholz Relay .......................................................................................................................................188
Figure 44 Location of Current transformer in feeder ...............................................................................................203
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Figure 45 Flow diagram for breaker fail protection .................................................................................................210

Figure 46 Total Backup fault clearance time ............................................................................................................211
Figure 47 MOV (gapless) Figure 48 Single Gap .................................................................216
Figure 49 Dual gap Figure 50 MOV + bypass gap ..........................................................................................216
Figure 51 Thyristor controlled series capacitor ........................................................................................................217
Figure 52 Typical connection diagram for FSC .......................................................................................................218
Figure 53 Typical connection diagram for TCSC ....................................................................................................219
Figure 54 Basic Concept of Architecture of Protection System as per IEC 61850 ..................................................226
Figure 55 Common Data Classes of Information .....................................................................................................227
Figure 56 Communication Architecture of IEC 61850 (Substation & Processed Bus) ............................................228
Figure 57 Interaction between different IEDs & Clients (IEC 61850 - Station Bus) ...............................................229
Figure 58 Basics for Designing Protection Schemes ................................................................................................231
Figure 59 Intermediate Layers in the Model Sub-Functions of IED ........................................................................231
Figure.60 IED Configuration Language ...................................................................................................................232
Figure 61 Goose Publishing .....................................................................................................................................239
Figure 62 Ethernet Topology (Star Network) ...........................................................................................................241
Figure 63 Loop Topology .........................................................................................................................................242
Figure 64 Functional Element Testing .....................................................................................................................245
Figure 65Testing of IEC 61850 Systems ..................................................................................................................245
Figure 66 Functional Testing of Merging Units .......................................................................................................247
Figure 67 Functional Testing of Goose Based IEDs ................................................................................................247
Figure 68 Functional Testing IEC 61850 - 9 - 2 Based IEDs ...................................................................................248
Figure 69 Functional Testing of Distributed Applications .......................................................................................249
Figure 70 Various Grounding Methods ....................................................................................................................257
Figure 71 Interface Protection .................................................................................................................................259
Figure 72 Protection of Distribution System with RE Resources ............................................................................261
Figure 73 Transient Event Captured by High Speed Recording ..............................................................................264
Figure 74 Secondary Injection Test ..........................................................................................................................273
Figure 75 Pre–fault, Fault & Post fault condition applied for Dynamic steady state tests .......................................275
Figure 76 Transient Testing ......................................................................................................................................277
Figure 77 Differential Protection Relay Testing ......................................................................................................281
Index of Tables
Table 1 : Activities flow - Protection Study. ................................................................................................................3

Table 2 Various protections recommended for the generator and generator transformer protection .........................22
Table 1-3 Recommended Protections for Generators .................................................................................................24
Table 1-4 The minimum protection features for different capacity of the 3 phase induction motor ..........................44
Table 1-5 Typical Settings of Composite Motor Protection .......................................................................................44
Table 1-6 Rated Breaking Current of Switchgear at Different Voltages ..................................................................117
Table 1-8 Recommended Protections for Generator Transformers ..........................................................................130
Table 1-9 Recommended protections for Generators ...............................................................................................131
Table 1-10 Recommended Protection Settings.........................................................................................................138
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Table 1-11 Recommended Relay Settings for Voltage & Current ...........................................................................143
Table 12 Relay Setting and Maximum operating times ...........................................................................................161
Table 13 Ways of Grouping Protections ..................................................................................................................200
Table 1-14 Survey Data on Probability of Circuit Breaker to Open or Break..........................................................208
Table 1-15 IEC 62439 Standard ...............................................................................................................................242
Table 16 Showing typical comparative specification of DRs and Numerical relays (IED) .....................................268
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page ix

1 PROTECTION STUDY SECTION I
1.1 INTRODUCTION
1.1.1 PURPOSE
The purpose of this document is to define the steps involved for conducting the protection studies.
1.1.2 SCOPE
Scope covers the protection studies under various power system studies.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 1

1.2 INPUT AND OUTPUT DEFINITION
1.2.1 INPUTS
1.2.1.1 Scope
1.2.1.2 Customer requirement & interaction, site visit as required
1.2.1.3 Data
1.2.1.4 Data base
1.2.1.5 SLD
1.2.1.6 Short circuit study in approved software to establish initial conditions
1.2.1.7 Legal requirement
1.2.1.8 Updated software
1.2.1.9 Reference documents (Library, all the previous projects done for the same or similar customer, other
sources)
1.2.1.10Technical interface with other department
1.2.1.11Input from technical experts.

1.2.2 OUTPUTS
1.2.2.1 Critical clearing time of the generators considering faults at different locations
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1.2.2.2 Fault current sensed by relay in Amperes
1.2.2.3 Relay setting
1.2.2.4 Relay co-ordination curves
1.2.2.5 Operating time of relay in Seconds for various faults selected as part of simulation.
1.2.2.6 Report
1.2.2.7 Protection SLD with results

1.2.3 ACTIVITES INVOLVED SPECIFIC TO PROTECTION STUDIES
Table 1 : Activities flow - Protection Study.
Activity Input Detailed Description Output Responsibility Records

Modeling the data base and
Data based &
Data SLD using approved software
SLD
as per the scope requirement.
For utility system relay co-
ordination studies the
reference data base to be taken
Data based &
- and updated. If SLD is
SLD
available from the past studies
then same can be taken and
Data base and Project
updated. Soft copy
SLD Engineer
For Industrial system relay co-
ordination studies the data
base/SLD to be modeled based
on the data collected from
Data based &
- customer. If database/SLD is
SLD
available from the past studies
carried out for the customer
then same can be taken and
updated.
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Generally data base and SLD created for the short circuit studies will be used for relay co-ordination study and
additional data required for relay co-ordination study would be updated wherever necessary. Depending on the
client requirement, bus branch model or bus breaker model to be adopted in SLD.
Relay co-ordination study to

be executed using approved
software for the type of faults
as per the project requirement.
Short circuit study gives the
initial conditions for the relay
co-ordination study execution.
Short circuit study to be
executed first as per the Results from
procedure of Short Circuit Short circuit approved
Database and Project
Study to establish the initial and transient software
SLD Engineer
conditions before executing stability output
the relay coordination study. studies
Also, transient stability studies
need to be carried out as
required as per the procedure
of Transient study, in order to
Execution determine the critical clearing
time of the generators for
faults at various buses and
different voltage levels.
For carrying out overcurrent
and earth fault relay
coordination study refer the
guideline document on
overcurrent and earth fault -
relay coordination study . In Project
-
case the study needs to be - Engineer /Sr.
carried out as per the Engineer/ Team
guidelines/philosophy of the Lead /Manager
customer, the relevant details
need to be discussed and
confirmed with the customer
on case to case basis.
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Simulation studies have to be
performed for various system
configurations to verify the
existing and proposed settings.
The same has to be verified for
both minimum and maximum
Results from fault levels of the system. Once
Short circuit the relay co-ordination study is
Project
and transient executed then w.r.t fault current Study results -
Engineer
stability and time of operation, relay co-
studies ordination curves to be plotted
and results to be analyzed and
recommendations to be given
in the report. Report should
also consist of operating time of
the relays for various faults at
different locations.
Apart from overcurrent and
earth fault relay coordination
studies, emphasis is provided to
- - -
unit protection and distance
protection depending upon the
scope requirements. -
Unit protection studies include
the following
1. Transformer
protection
2. Generator protection
3. Bus bar protection
Data for unit 4. Lines/Cables
Project
protection protection Study results -
5. Motor protection Engineer
studies
6. Distance protection
7. REF protection
Refer the guide lines for the
individual unit protection
studies considering typical
relay
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 5


Any modifications in relay Project
settings/ protection schemes Engineer /Sr.
Study results recommended as per the study - Engineer/ Team Soft copy
needs to be justified and Lead
qualified in the report. Manager
The comparative statement
Project
consisting of existing and
Engineer /Sr.
proposed settings to be Comparative
Execution Study results Engineer/ Team Soft copy
prepared and thoroughly statement
Lead
analysed before qualifying in
Manager
the report
Based on the results, report to
be prepared highlighting the
critical observations like
critical clearing time of all the
generators in the vicinity,
element damage curves are
plotted with relay operating
curve and verified for proper
Project
Study Report Study results coordination based on customer Report Soft Copy
Engineer
requirement considering the
necessary guidelines. The unit
protection schemes and settings
for individual equipment as
listed are reviewed and any
modifications, if required as per
the standard guidelines, are
recommended in the report.
Upon acceptance of the
proposed relay settings, we will
supervise (ensuring the
recommendations are properly
enabled) for the Project
Implementation Proposed Implementati
implementation of the settings Engineer/Sr. -
of relay settings relay settings on at field
in the field depending upon the Engineer
scope requirement. The
implementation of the settings
is to be done by the customer
only.
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1.2.4 PROTECTION STUDIES OUTPUT
• Data base
• SLD with results for relay coordination studies
• Report
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1.3.1 OVER CURRENT AND EARTH FAULT CO-ORDINATION STUDY
1.3.1.1 Data collection
a) Collect all the relay data and protection settings according to the data format.
b) Collect protection SLD of complete system
c) Compilation of collected data
1.3.1.2 Requirement for protection study
a) Critical clearance time of all the generators in the vicinity

b) Motor starting characteristics of all the motors to be protected
c) Transformer damage curve for all power transformers
d) Cable damage curve for all the HV cables
e) Generator characteristics for all the generators
f) Fuse characteristics of all the fuses used
g) CT,PT and CBCT ratios
h) All the relay manuals of the relay used
1.3.1.3 Data base for coordination study
a) For over current and earth fault protection study, data base is prepared by considering
- CT ratio
- Relay type (Directional/Non-directional)
- Relay used (numerical/ electromechanical/ other)
- Operating cure (NI/VI/EI/LTI/other)
- Plug setting
- Time multiplier setting (TMS)
- Current pickups for definite time (DT) settings
- Time settings for DT settings
b) Relay library
- Relay make and name
- Relay type
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- Plug setting range

- TMS setting range
- Curve type
- DT current setting range
- DT time setting range
c) Element damage curves
The damage curves for Transformers, cables, Motors and generators are created in database
based on data sheets or standards (IEEE/IEC)
1.3.1.4 Relay coordination study
i. Study philosophy
-Before the coordination study, a fixed philosophy is prepared and the general over current
and earth fault coordination philosophy adopted for typical industrial system is given below.
A) Distribution Transformers
Relay placed on Transformer primary:

Phase settings:
 Phase IDMT Pick up (I>) is given based on 110% - 150% of transformer rated current.
 Phase IDMT TMS (T>) selected such that, for secondary side (LT) fault Phase IDMT operating
time should be ≤ 0.5 second.
 Phase DT current (I>>) is given based on 1.3 times of reflected fault current or Inrush current
(Typically 8 to 10 times of the transformer rated current) whichever is higher.
 Phase DT setting (T>>): Instantaneous (0.05 second).
Earth settings:
 Earth IDMT Pick up (Ie>) is given based on 10% - 20% of transformer rated current.
 Earth IDMT TMS (Ie>): Minimal value of TMS is selected (typically 0.1).
 Earth DT setting (Ie>>): 20% SLG fault current limited on transformer primary side or transformer
rated current.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 9

 Earth DT setting (Te>>): Instantaneous (0.05 second).
B) Converter Transformers
Phase settings:
 Phase IDMT Pick up (I>): Typically 110% of converter transformer rated current.
 Phase IDMT TMS (T>): Minimal value of TMS is selected (typically 0.1).
 Phase DT current (I>>): Inrush current, typically 8 to 10 times of the transformer rated current.
 Phase DT time (T>>): Instantaneous (0.05sec).
Earth settings:
 Earth IDMT Pick up (Ie>): 10-20% of transformer rated current.
 Earth DT setting (Ie>>): 20-30% SLG fault current limited on transformer primary side or
transformer rated current.
C) HT Motors :
Phase settings:
 Phase IDMT Pick up (I>): 110% of motor rated current for HT motors.
 Phase IDMT TMS (T>): TMS is selected such that, the IDMT characteristics lies above the starting
time characteristics and below the hot run characteristics.
 Phase DT current (I>>): 1.3 to1.65 times of motor starting current.
Earth settings:
 Earth IDMT Pick up (Ie>): 20% of motor rated current.
 Earth DT setting (Ie>>): Motor rated current or 20% of the earth fault current whichever is lower.
 Earth DT setting (Te>>): Instantaneous (0.05sec).
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 10

D) Capacitor Banks
Phase settings:
 Phase IDMT Pick up (I>): 135% of capacitor bank rated current.
 Phase IDMT TMS (T>): Minimal value of TMS is selected (typically 0.1).
 Phase DT current (I>>):
Earth settings:
 Earth IDMT Pick up (Ie>): 20% of capacitor rated current.
 Earth DT setting (Ie>>): 20% SLG fault current limited.
 Earth DT setting (Te>>): Instantaneous (0.05sec).
E) Bus Couplers and Incomers
Phase settings:
 Phase IDMT Pick up (I>): Based on Maximum demand, line capacity or connected load.
 Phase IDMT TMS (T>): TMS selection is based on two considerations,
1. It should provide proper IDMT back protection for all the feeders connected to that particular
board with appropriate time discrimination.
2. It should allow the starting of largest rated motor or a motor with longest starting time, whichever
is the worst condition.
Earth settings:
 Earth IDMT Pick up (Ie>): 10 to 20% of Earth fault current
 Earth IDMT TMS (Ie>): TMS selected to be such that proper discrimination (0.2 - 0.3sec) with
O/G feeders.
F) O/G feeders
In order to reduce the operating times of Phase & Earth (both IDMT & DT), same settings have been
proposed on both ends of these feeders.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 11

G) Tie Feeder
Relay settings are provided on case to case basis depending upon the network configuration.
H) Power Transformer Primary
Relay placed on Transformer primary (HV side)

Phase relay settings:
 Phase IDMT Pick up (I>): Typically 110-150% of transformer rated current.
 Phase IDMT TMS (T>): TMS selected such that, for secondary side fault (LV) the operating time
of IDMT (should be ≤ 1.0 second) is coordinated with the LV side relay.
 Phase DT current (I>>): 1.3 times of reflected fault current or Inrush current (Typically 8 to 10
times of the transformer rated current) whichever is higher.
Earth settings:
 Earth IDMT Pick up (Ie>): 10% - 20% of transformer rated current.
 Earth IDMT TMS (Ie>): Minimal value of TMS is selected (typically 0.1) in case of Dyn
transformers. In cases of Ynyn transformers the settings are to be coordinated with downstream
relays. In case of Ynd transformers the settings are to be provided such that the transformer relay
does not operate for upstream faults.
 Earth DT setting (Ie>>): Typically around 20% of the close in SLG fault current on transformer
primary side or rated current of the transformer (applicable for Dyn transformers) in case the system
is resistive grounded. In case the transformer is of Ynyn configuration it is to be set at 1.3-1.5 times
the through fault current. For Ynd configuration, Ie>> is typically set to atleast 4 times the rated
current of the transformer such that there is no possible maloperations during charging of the
transformer.
I) Generator protection
Phase settings:
 Phase IDMT Pick up (I>): Typically 110% of rated current.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 12

 Phase IDMT TMS (T>): TMS is selected in such a way that the generator is coordinated with
outgoing feeder.
Earth settings:
 Earth fault protection settings are provided base on type of generator Earthing and detail philosophy
are provided in Generator unit protection calculation.
ii. Study process
- Relay coordination study is carried by considering fault current at transient reactance
- Existing setting (if available) are verified for proper coordination
- Appropriate Plug settings and TMS are proposed based on philosophy for proper coordination if
discrepancy found in existing setting
- New settings are proposed wherever settings are not available or if the plant is under commissioning
- Relay settings are verified and coordinated with damage curve of the elements
- Relay settings are verified and coordinated with critical clearance time of in-plant Generators
1. Relay coordination simulation

a. CT’s and Relays are modeled based on data available
b. Existing and proposed relay settings are entered in to the data base
c. The relays that need to be coordinated are selected
d. Simulated for phase and earth fault and coordination is verified by means of plots.
e. Fuse characteristics ,element damage curve are plotted with relay operating curve and verified for
proper coordination
2. Report preparation
The relay coordination report should consists of following subjects
a) Data collected
b) Coordination philosophy
c) Existing relay settings
d) Proposed relay settings
e) Simulation graphs with damage curve
f) Sequence of events/Trip tables
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 13

g) Comparison of existing and proposed relay settings with remarks

h) Observations and recommendations
i) Protection SLD’s
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 14

1.3.2 BUS BAR PROTECTION STUDY
System protection that includes overcurrent or distance protection will inherently give protection cover to
the bus bars. Overcurrent protection will only be applied to relatively simple distribution systems, or as a
back-up protection, set to give a considerable time delay. Distance protection will provide cover for bus
bar faults with its reverse zone. In both cases the bus bar protection obtained is slow and suitable only for
limiting the consequential damage.
Bus bar protection is primarily concerned with removal of bus bar faults in less time than could be achieved
by back-up line protection, with the object of maintaining system stability by limiting the consequential
damage. The basis of most modern schemes is a differential system using either low impedance biased or
high impedance unbiased relays capable of operating in a time of the order of one cycle at a very moderate
multiple of fault setting. The application of the high impedance differential relay is based on all of the CT’s
being set to the same ratio.
High Impedance (voltage operated) Differential Relay is applied on the assumption that the CT associated
with the faulted feeder (carrying the total fault current) saturates completely. The relay, which is connected
across the junction point of the CT’s has an impedance which is much greater than the total resistance of
the CT circuit which is comprised of the CT resistance plus any lead resistance from the junction point to
the relay. The voltage (Vr) produced across the relay, will then be equal to the drop in the resistance
resulting from the total fault current flowing through this resistance. Calculations are made for each CT
circuit to determine the maximum possible voltage that can be developed across the relay (assuming total
saturation in each circuit). The relay is then set greater than this voltage by a suitable margin.
The typical bus bar schemes are presented in Figure 1 to Figure 4
Figure 1 H-type station
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 15

Figure 2 breaker stations
Figure 3 Double busbar – single breaker station with two bus-coupler CBs and two bus-section CBs
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 16

Figure 4 Simple bus differential scheme with paralleled CTs
LOW-IMPEDANCE BUS DIFFERENTIAL:
Low-impedance bus differential relays are so named because the differential relay current inputs have low
impedance to the flow of CT secondary current. This means that the low-impedance bus differential relays
can share the CTs with other relays, meters, transducers, etc. The low impedance bus differential scheme
typically has one set of current inputs for each phase from every set of CTs in the scheme. Fig. 5 shows a
single-phase representation of a low impedance bus differential relay installation. A single low impedance
bus differential relay can provide protection for a single phase, two phases, or all three phases, depending
on the number of relay current inputs.
The low-impedance bus differential relay vectorially sums the normalized currents from all CT inputs to
detect the difference current resulting from an internal fault (i.e., internal to the protection zone defined by
the location of all CTs connected to the relay). To account for small differences in CT performance, the
relay also arithmetically sums the current magnitudes to create a restraint current, IRT. The difference
current from the vectorial current summation, referred to as the operate current, IOP, is compared with
IRT. The relay operates when IOP exceeds a minimum threshold and a percentage of IRT, defined by a
slope setting. Fig. 6 shows this “percentage current differential characteristic” graphically.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 17

Figure 5 Low-impedance bus differential scheme showing an external fault, F1, and an internal fault, F2
Figure 6 Percentage current differential characteristic of a low-impedance bus differential relay with and without an internal
bus fault
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 18

HIGH-IMPEDANCE BUS DIFFERENTIAL:
High-impedance bus differential relays are applied to the paralleled output of all CTs from each phase
connected to a common bus, as shown in Fig. 7. As the name implies, the high-impedance bus differential
relay presents a very high impedance to the flow of current. The paralleled CTs must have the same ratio
and proper polarity connection to ensure that the secondary current outputs from the paralleled CTs
vectorially add up to zero in the same way the primary currents in the bus do under normal through-load
conditions. Any current difference is forced through the high impedance of the bus differential relay
causing a voltage drop across the relay. The high-impedance relay, which is calibrated and set to trip based
on the voltage across the relay, is extremely sensitive to CT difference current. For this reason, not only
must the CT ratios match, but the CT accuracy ratings must also match to minimize the CT performance
differences that could create CT difference current.
The high-impedance input is created by an internal impedance, typically resistive, of 2000 ohms or higher.
A sensitive current element in series with the high-impedance element is calibrated in volts based on the
voltage drop across the internal impedance. Fig. 8 shows the basic elements of a high-impedance bus
differential relay. The 87Z element is a sensitive, low impedance, adjustable, pickup current element scaled
in voltage. An MOV is connected across the high-impedance circuit to prevent high voltage from damaging
the relay and CT circuitry. The energy absorption capability of the MOV must be sufficient to tolerate the
energy the paralleled CTs deliver for a period of several cycles. Under worst-case scenarios with a breaker
that fails to interrupt fault current, the current can continue to flow for as long as 20 to 30 cycles. Some
high-impedance bus differential relays offer MOVs with sufficient size to tolerate the energy absorption
over this extended period. Others reduce the MOV energy absorption requirements by connecting a lockout
relay (86) contact across the high-impedance branch of the relay. This diverts current away from the high-
impedance relay path after the relay trips the lockout relay for an internal bus fault.
Modern microprocessor-based high-impedance bus differential relays often include at least two levels of
voltage elements: one level set higher for fast and secure tripping and one level set lower for triggering
event reports and/or providing a more sensitive trip function with time delay added for security. A separate
set of overcurrent elements connected in series with the parallel combination of high-impedance element
and MOV provides backup protection for MOV failure and a separate current measurement after the
lockout relay contact closes. This circuit bypasses the high impedance voltage element.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 19

Figure 7 Paralleled CTs connected to a high-impedance bus differential relay
Figure 8 High-impedance bus differential relay internal elements
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 20

1.3.3 GENERATOR PROTECTION STUDY
Figure 1-9 Block schematic of a typical generator protection system
In view of generator unit being a complex system, various electrical hazards- require Consideration. These
are given below:
— Stator insulation failure
— Overvoltage
— Rotor faults
— Loss of synchronism
— Over/under frequency
— Overload
— Unbalanced loading
— Loss of excitation
— Reverse power
— Inadvertent energisation of generator
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 21

Following are the various protections recommended for the generator and generator transformer
protection
Table 2 Various protections recommended for the generator and generator transformer protection
Type of Fault ANSI Device No. Protection Functions

GENERATOR STATOR
Short Circuits 87 G Generator differential
87 GT Overall differential
21 G Minimum impedance (alternatively
51/27 G Over current/under voltage)
Asymmetry Stator 46 G Negative sequence

overload Earth fault 51 G
stator 64 Gl Overload
64 G2 95% stator earth fault

100% stator earth fault
Loss of excitation 40 G Loss of excitation
Out of step 98 G Pole slip
Monitoring 32 G/37 G Low forward power/reverse power (Double

protection for large generators)
Blade fatigue 81 G Minimum frequency
Inter turn fault 95 G Over voltage or over current
Mag. Circuits 99 G Overfluxing volt/Hz
Higher voltage 59 G Over voltage
Accidental! energisation 27/50 G Dead machine
Monitoring 60 G PT fuse failure
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 22

GENERATOR ROTOR
Rotor ground 64 F Rotor earth fault
GENERATOR TRANSFORMER
Short circuits 87 GT Overall differential

51 GT Overcurrent Transformer
differential
87 T
Ground fault 51 NGT Earth fault over-current
Restricted earth fault
87 NT
Overhang 87 HV HV winding cum overhang

differential
UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER
Short circuit 87 UAT Transformer differential Over-

51 UAT current
Ground fault 51 NUAT Residual over-current
64 UAT Restricted earth fault
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 23

Recommendations regarding selection of the generator protections for units of different types and
sizes are summarised in the table given below:
Table 1-3 Recommended Protections for Generators
Functions Steam/Gas Turbines Hydro Turbines
Small Medium Large Small Medium Large

(<10 (<10 (>100
MVA) (10-100 (>100 MVA) (10-100
MVA)
MVA) MVA) MVA)
Differential Y Y Y Y Y Y
95% Stator E/F Y Y Y Y Y Y
100% Stator E/F N Y/N Y N Y/N Y
Interturn Faults Y Y Y Y Y Y
Backup Impedance N Y Y N Y Y
Voltage Controlled Y N N Y N N
O/C
Negative Sequence Y Y Y Y Y Y
Field Failure Y Y Y Y Y Y
Reverse Power Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pole Slipping N N Y N N Y
Overload N N N Y Y Y
Over voltage Y Y Y Y Y Y
Under frequency Y Y Y Y Y Y
Dead Machine N N Y N Y Y
Rotor Earth Fault Y Y Y Y Y Y
Overfluxing N Y Y N Y Y
*N- NO; Y- YES
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 24

DETAILED REQUIREMENTS
Generator Differential Protection (87 G)

This is a unit type protection, instantaneous in operation, covering the stator winding for phase to
phase faults.
The generator differential relay is not sensitive to single phase to earth faults due to the high neutral
earthing resistance arrangement.
As this protection operates for generator internal faults, opening the generator breaker in class-A
eliminates the system in-feed to the fault (if the unit is synchronised).
For all machines of ratings 10 MVA and above, this protection shall be provided.
Requirements:
i. Be triple pole type with individual phase indication
ii. Have operating time less than 30 milliseconds at 2 times setting
iii. Be high or low impedance principle based
iv. Operating current 5 to 10% of nominal current
v. High stability against maximum through fault condition, CT saturation, harmonics and DC
transients.
vi. Be provided with suitable voltage dependent resistors across the relay to limit the voltage to
safe level, in case of high impedance type relay
Generator-Transformer differential protection (87 GT)

This is a unit type protection with coverage from the generator terminals up to the HV breaker and
the generator transformer HV terminals.
It will detect phase faults on both sides of the generator transformer and single phase to earth faults
of the HV side only (the earth fault current on the LV side is very small, due to the high neutral
earthing resistance).
Generator transformer differential relays have harmonic restraint circuits to prevent incorrect
operation when the generator and unit transformers are energised from the system.
This shall be provided for all machines of rating 10 MVA above. The protection need not include
Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) in its zone and UAT should be covered by a separate protection.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 25

In case of breaker-and-half switching scheme, the CT's associated with main and tie breakers shall
be connected to separate bias winding and these shall not be paralleled in order to avoid false
operation due to dissimilar CT transient response.
Requirements:
i. Be triple pole type with individual phase indication
ii. Have through fault restraint features for external faults with an adjustable or multi-bias setting
iii. Have, magnetizing inrush restraint features and also be stable for inrush under normal over
fluxing conditions, magnetising inrush proof feature shall not be achieved through any
intentional time delay e.g. use of timers to block relay operation
iv. Shall have unrestrained instantaneous highset overcurrent unit operation which is unaffected
by inrush
v. Have one bias winding per phase and per CT input (However UAT CT need not have separate
input and may be paralled with the Generator CT)
vi. Have an adjustable operating current
vii. Have an operating time not greater than 30 milli seconds at 5 times setting
viii. Have facility for ratio and phase angle correction either through auxiliary transformer or
through in built provisions.
Backup Protections for Short Circuits

This shall be provided for all machines of 10 MVA and above. Voltage restrained over current relay
may be used in place of minimum impedance relay in case of machines with rating less than 10
MVA.
Backup impedance protection (21 G)
This operates for phase faults in the unit, in the HV yard or in the adjacent transmission lines, with a
suitable delay, for cases when the corresponding main protection fails to operate.
The impedance measured by the relay is influenced by the relay connection, the fault type and
generator and system source impedance for faults on the high voltage side of the delta-star connected
generator transformer. A circular characteristic the center of which corresponds to connection
position of VT should be used for this reason.
The impedance relay shall have fuse-fail interlock.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 26

Requirements
i. Be triple pole type
ii. Be of single step under impedance type
iii. Shall have two adjustable definite time delay relays of 0.5-5 seconds
iv. Be suitable for measuring two and three phase faults within a set distance from the point of
installation
v. Shall be able to operate for fault currents down to 0.3 In.
Setting Recommendations
The impedance relay shall have reach setting to cover the longest HV outgoing line or 70% of rated
generator load impedance.
- Time relay of step 1 - 0.5 sec.
- Time relay of step 2 shall be set to coordinate with third zone time of distance relay or back
up o/c relay of the outgoing lin
Overcurrent/Undervoltage protection (51/27) G

Requirements
ii. Shall be able to operate when the fault current from the generator terminals becomes low due
to excitation system characteristic
iii. Shall have under voltage criteria
iv. Shall reset to de-energised position if under-voltage criteria disappears
Negative Phase Sequence Protection (46G)

The negative phase sequence protection safeguards the generator rotor against overheating caused
by the induced double frequency (100 Hz) currents when negative phase sequence currents are
present in the stator. The negative phase sequence current can appear due to unbalanced single phase
loads or transmission line unsymmetrical faults. This shall be provided for all machines of ratings 10
MVA and above.
Requirements:
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 27

ii. Have an alarm unit and a trip unit
iii. Have a continuously adjustable negative sequence current setting
iv. Have alarm unit range covering negative phase sequence current of 5-10% of generator rated
current continuously adjustable
v. Have a definite time setting range of 1-10 sees, associated with an alarm unit
vi. Have a trip unit with a variable time current characteristics matching with the generator I22t
characteristic
The relays should be set to the NPS capability of the generator. The NPS capability of the machine
varies considerably from one machine to another.
Alarm unit shall be set at 50% of continuous withstand capability value of the machine and time
delay for alarm can be 3 Sees.
Generator Overload Protection (51G)
Overload relay is used as an additional check of the stator winding temperature.
This may be provided for hydro units where there are high head variations and connected for alarm.
It may also be connected for run back.
In case of thermal set there is no chance of thermal overloading as the machine is provided with
number of limiters and therefore is not recommended.
Requirements:
i. Be single pole type
ii. Be of definite time over-current type
iii. Have a continuously adjustable setting range of 50-200%
iv. Have a drop-off/pick-up ratio greater than 95%
v. Have an adjustable time setting range of 2.5 to 25 sec.
Generator Stator Earth Fault Protection
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The high neutral earthing resistance arrangement limits the generator earth fault current to less than
10 amperes, thus minimising damage to the core laminations. Although a single phase to earth fault
is not critical, it requires clearance within a short time, due to the following:
- It may develop into a phase to phase fault (due to presence of ionised air).
- If a second earth fault occurs the current is no longer limited by the earthing resistor.
- Fire may result from the earth fault arc.
Two different types of stator earth fault relays are recommended both installed in the secondary
circuit of the generator.
0-95% stator earth fault protection (64G1)
This protection zone is limited to approximately 95% of the stator winding due to the danger of false
tripping. This shall be voltage relay monitoring the voltage developed across the earthing resistor by
the neutral return current. This is normally used as back up protection. It also covers the generator
bus, low voltage winding of the unit transformer and the high voltage winding of the UAT. When
connected to open delta winding of generator PT, the protection shall be blocked for PT fuse failure.
For faults within 10% of the generator neutral, the resulting current is not enough to operate the relay.
This shall be provided for all machines of ratings 10 MVA and above.
Requirements:
i. Single pole type
ii. Shall have independently adjustable voltage and time setting
iii. Suitable to protect 95% of stator winding
iv. Be suitable for operation from broken-delta voltage transformers or neutral grounding
transformer secondary
v. Shall be insensitive to 3rd harmonic voltage
Pick up voltage of the relay - 5% of maximum neutral voltage Time delay - 0.3 to 0.5 sees.
100% stator earth fault protection (64G2)
This protects the whole stator winding and the generator neutral. The relay generally operates on the
principle of low frequency signal injection into the secondary of the earthing transformer, detecting
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 29

the corresponding current if an earth fault occurs. The relay is set in terms of insulation resistance.
This is normally used as the main protection.
Alternatively, a protection based on change in magnitude/distribution of 3rd harmonic voltage caused
by an earth fault is used. When provided, this shall have voltage check or - current check unit as
applicable, to prevent faulty operation of the relay at generator stand still or during the machine
running down period.
This protection shall always be provided for machine above 100 MVA. The option is left to the utility
depending upon the importance of the machine for machines of smaller sizes. Low frequency current
injection based relays are recommended for machines of 200 MVA and above.
The 95-100% relay if separately available may be connected for alarm and operator can take the
machine out.
Requirements:
i. Be suitable to protect 100%) of stator winding
ii. Be insensitive to external faults, transients and inherent harmonic currents.
iii. Shall be based on low frequency current injection principle/alternatively shall operate on the
principle of detecting change in the magnitude/distribution of 3rd harmonic voltage caused
by an earth fault.
iv. Have continuously adjustable time delay range 1-10 seconds
v. If based on injection principle
- shall continuously monitor ground circuit
- shall continuously monitor injection signal and injection equipment
- shall be in service at standstill, startup and stop
vi. If based on 3rd harmonic voltage principle
- shall have under voltage or over current check
100% stator earth fault relay (Injection Principle)
Pick up level of the relay = 500 ohms
Time delay - 2 seconds (Greater than 3rd zone of distance relay)
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 30

100% stator earth fault relay (3rd harmonics principle)

- Setting 0.45 V (should be checked w.r.t. 3rd harmonic voltage generated by the machine)
- Time delay 2.0 sec.
- Voltage check unit 80% of rated voltage
- Current check unit 20% of rated current
Loss of Excitation Protection (40G)

A complete loss of excitation may occur as a result of unintentional opening of the field breaker, an
open circuit or a short circuit of the main field or a fault in AVR.
When a generator with sufficient active load loses the field current, it goes out of synchronism and
starts to run asynchronously at a speed higher than the system absorbing reactive power for the
excitation from the system. Under these conditions the stator end regions and part of the rotor get
over heated.
This is recommended for machines of all sizes above 10 MVA.
Requirements:
i. Have mho characteristic lying in 3rd and 4th quadrant of impedance diagram with adjustable
reach and off set. Alternatively, this protection shall be based on directional current unit with
setting range to match generator capability curve
ii. Shall have an under voltage relay and/or over current relay as an additional check
iii. Shall have timer with adjustable range of 1-10 seconds to distinguish loss of excitation from
power swings
Setting Recommendations:
i. For off set mho type relay
- Diameter of mho circle - ( xd - x'a/2
- Off set of the mho circle from origin - X'd/2
- Time delay =1.0 sec.
- Under voltage relay = 70%
ii. For directional current type relay
- Direction current relay is set to match with the generator capability curve in 4th quadrant
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 31

- Time delay - 0.5 to 1 sec.

- Under voltage - 70%
- Over current - 110-115%
Pole Slipping Protection (98G)

The loss of field protection shall be supplemented by an additional out of step function which detects
all pole slips.
Pole slipping of generators with respect to the system, can be caused by a number of conditions
leading to an increase in rotor angular position beyond the generator transient stability limits. Some
of the causes of pole slipping are:
a. Large network disturbances
b. Faults on the electrical network close to the generator
c. Weak tie between the network and the generator (tripping of transmission lines)
d. Loss of generator field (field winding or excitation supply failure)
e. Operating the generator in an excessive under excited mode
This is recommended for machines of 100 MVA and above. For hydro machines utilities can decide
depending on machine parameters.
Requirements:
i. Shall be capable of detecting a power swing which can lead to instability in addition to
being able to detect an actual pole slip

ii. By varying size of the characteristic it shall be possible to ensure that a trip command is given
to the circuit breakers in such a way that separation of the poles occurs at a controlled angle
at any time.
a. If the source of oscillation lies within a generator/transformer unit, the machine has to
be isolated from the network after the first slip.
Forward reach of relay characteristics shall cover generator/generator transformer. Tripping in this
zone shall be in the first pole slip. The reach of this zone is 0.7 XT.
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b. If the source of oscillation lies outside the unit in the network, the generator should not
be switched off or atleast not until several pole slips have occurred.
Low forward power/reverse power interlock relays (32G/37G)

The low forward power interlock is recommended for thermal machines and reverse power
protection may be used for hydro machines to protect against motoring.
When the steam flow through turbine is interrupted by closing the ESVs or the governor valves, the
remaining energy stored in the set is delivered to the system and the machine enters into a motoring
condition drawing power from the system to supply its losses while keeping the turbo alternator shaft
at synchronous speed.
- The low forward power relay detects that the unit is motoring and must therefore be shutdown
- Tripping for mechanical faults and abnormal conditions
For faults in the turbine or boiler, the turbine protection closes the ESVs. For abnormal conditions,
the generator protection closes the ESVs. When the generator develops low forward power, the relay
after a short time delay trips the generator breaker.
A protection field suppression signal may also be required if the AVR does not have a built-in facility
to reduce the generator field current as the speed decreases, to avoid overfluxing conditions.
Requirements:
i. Be single phase power measuring type
ii. Have a power setting of approximately 0.5% - 1% of rated active power of generator
unit
iii. Have independent time delay relay with setting range of 1-10 seconds and 0-20
seconds respectively on pick up
iv. Have one more common timer with a pick up setting range 5-50 seconds for
annunciation that the Turbo generator set has started motoring
v. Have suitable arrangement for preventing the operation of this protection during start
up and synchronising of the unit
vi. Shall be provided with possibility of angle correction to facilitate measurement of

power accurately.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 33

- low forward power relay pickup < 0.05 x Pn
- timer tl - 2 seconds, t2 - 2 seconds
Under-frequency protection (81G)

The under frequency protection
- Prevents the steam turbine and generator from exceeding the permissible operating time at
reduced frequencies
- Ensures that the generating unit is separated from the network at a preset value of frequency
that is less than the final stage of system load shedding
- Prevents the AVR from exciting the machine at reduced speeds when some protective relays
may not perform at all
- Prevent over fluxing of the generator. The over fluxing relay is used to protect against small
overfluxing for long periods while the over voltage and under frequency relays also protect
against large over fluxing for short times
The stator under frequency relay measures the frequency of the stator terminal voltage
Though under frequency tripping is recommended by turbine manufactures, care should be taken by
grid operating personnel in ensuring that machines are not run at lower frequencies and instead resort
to means like load shedding in the event of overload.
Requirements:
i. Have one alarm stage and two tripping stages
ii. Shall have setting of range of 45 Hz - 55 Hz with a least count of 0.1 Hz for each
stage
iii. Timer for alarm stage have a range of 0.5 to 5 second with a least count of 0.5 second.
Timers for each tripping stage shall have range of 1 to 10 seconds with a least count
of 0.1 second
iv. Shall have undervoltage blocking
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 34

- Stator under frequency relay pick up level = 48.5 Hz
- Time delay for alarm - 2 Sec.
For time delay setting of tripping stages recommendations of turbine manufacturers may be followed.
Inter turn fault protection (95G)

It is generally considered difficult to obtain reliable protection against short circuit of one turn if the
stator winding has large number of turns per phase.
Inter turn fault protection is recommended only for machines where there is a split winding and all
the six terminals are brought out on the neutral side.
For generator with split neutrals, conventional inter-turn fault protective scheme comprises a time
delayed low set over-current relay which senses the current flowing in the connection between the
neutrals of the stator winding.
Alternatively a split phase differential protection may be used.
Requirements
i. Over current relay with time delay
ii. Over current relay shall have built in filters to reject higher harmonics
iii. Range of over current shall be selected depending on maximum spill current for
external fault
Setting Recommendation
Overcurrent relay shall be set to maximum unbalanced current in case of external fault.
Time delay 0.2 - 0.4 seconds
Generator Transformer Over Fluxing Protection (99 GT)
Overfluxing protection is provided to safeguard the generator, generator transformer and unit
auxiliary transformer against operation at flux densities which may cause accumulative damage to
the core.
From the fundamental equation V = 4.44 x f x n x ∅, the level of flux is proportional to the ratio of
terminal voltage to frequency (v/f). This ratio is monitored by the protective relay.
An over fluxing condition is more likely to occur while the generator is separated from the system
and the speed is allowed to drop, but it can also happen with the machine on load if the tap changer
of the generator transformer (HV side) is on a low tap position and the excitation of the generator is
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 35

manually increased. In this case the increased generator terminal voltage may cause over fluxing
tripping at nominal frequency.
The over fluxing protection operates with a time delay after which the tripping functions are
executed.
This protection must be provided for generator-transformers of size 10 MVA and above.
Requirements
i. Shall be phase to phase connected.
ii. Shall operate on the principle of measurement of voltage to frequency ratio.
iii. Have inverse time characteristics compatible with generator transformer over fluxing
withstand capability for tripping.
iv. Provide an independent alarm with a definite time delay of value of V/f between 100% to
130% of rated value.
v. Have a high resetting ratio of 98% or better.
The overfluxing capability of the transformer must be checked and the characteristic matched
accordingly for both alarm and trip.
Generator Over Voltage Protection (59G)
An over voltage on the terminals of the generator can damage the insulation of the generator, bus
ducting, breakers, generator transformer and auxiliary equipment such as voltage transformers,
excitation transformer etc.
This should be provided for machines of all sizes, hydro and thermal
Requirements:
i. Be single pole type/or triple pole type
ii. Shall have two separately adjustable stages
iii. Have a continuously adjustable setting range of 100 - 140% of rated voltage
iv. Have a drop off to pick up ratio greater than 95%
v. Have a continuously variable time delay setting range of 0.5 - 5 seconds for one relay and 2
to 20 seconds for the other relay.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 36

Stage 1 - Over voltage relay pick up - 1.15 x Vn
Timers tl - 10 seconds
Stage 2 - Over voltage relay pick up - 1.3 x Vn
Timer t2 - 0.5 seconds
Dead machine protection (27/50G)
Despite existence of interlocking schemes, a number of generators have been inadvertently energized
while at stand still or on turning gear. The generator and rotor may get damaged beyond repair under
this condition. Other protective relays like loss of excitation, back up impedance, reverse power
would operate with delays and this is not admissible. The dead machine protection permits fast
tripping.
This should be installed in switchyard panel rather than in generator panel to ensure that protection
is available during maintenance periods when the generator protection can be rendered inoperative
by switching off the DC supply to the panel.
This protection is recommended for all machines of size 100 MVA and above. The protection is
connected to trip generator breakers, generator transformer breaker and the HV Bus.
Requirements:
i. Shall consist of 3 high speed over current relays of range (0.02 - 20 In) to initiate
instantaneous tripping if generator terminal voltage is below set value.
ii. Shall have under voltage relays of range (0.2-1 Un) to permit operation of over current relays
when voltage is low
iii. Shall have timers with adjustable range (0-60s) to avoid operation of protection for nearby
fault when the machine is in service.
iv. Shall be secure against voltage transients at closing
For Weak System For Strong System
Overcurrent relay 1-2 pu 3-4 pu
Under voltage relay 20% to 40% rated voltage 50% to 70% of rated voltage
Activation of relay 20 Seconds after dead time 20 Seconds after dead time
Generator VT fuse failure monitoring (60G)
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 37

This has to be provided for all the machines since it is required for blocking of relays which can mal-
operate in the event of PT fuse blowing in primary side or secondary side.
Requirements:
ii. Be able to detect fuse failure in both primary and secondary side of VT
iii. Have a fixed setting of 70% of rated voltage and have a time delay of 40 to 50 milliseconds
on pick up
iv. Be of voltage balance or equivalent type
v. Have sufficient contacts to block tripping of those relays which are voltage dependent and
give alarm
Rotor ground fault protection

This protection shall be provided for machines of all sizes. It is recommended that the protection is
connected only for alarm and the operator may take the machine out at the earliest opportunity after
the first earth fault has occurred. The tripping logic should also include unit tripping in case field
circuit breaker opens when the machine is running.
Requirements:
i. Shall be based on DC injection principle or low frequency AC injection principle
ii. Shall be single stage or two stages
iii. Shall have built-in time delay to prevent unwanted operation of the relay Alternatively
A sensitive voltage function operating on bridge measuring basis with auxiliary equipment. This
shall have two levels, one for alarm and one for trip.
Setting ranges: Alarm stage 100 ohm to 25 k ohm, Time delay 2-60 Seconds Trip stage 100 ohm to
25 K ohm, Time delay 2-60 Seconds
- alarm level - 25 K ohm
- pick up level - 5 K ohm
- timer tl - 1 seconds
- timer t2 - 5 seconds
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Generator-Transformer Protection
For short circuit protection, transformer-differential relay and over-current relay connected to
different groups are recommended. For ground faults, earth fault o/c relays and restricted earth fault
relay connected to different groups are recommended.
In case an overhang protection is required, the same may be combined with REF protection on HV
side of generator transformer.
Generator Transformer Differential Protection (87 GT/87 T) Requirements:
i. Be triple pole with individual phase indication
ii. Have unrestricted instantaneous high set over current units which shall not operate during
inrush
iii. Have an adjustable or multi bias setting
iv. Have second harmonic or other inrush proof features and also shall be stable under normal
over fluxing conditions. Magnetising inrush proof feature shall not be achieved through any
intentional time delay e.g. use of timers to block relay operation or using disc operated relays.
v. Have one bias winding per phase and per C.T. input
vii. Have an operating time not greater than 30 milli seconds at 5 times of setting
viii. Shall have facility for ratio and phase angle correction either through auxiliary transformer
or through in built provisions.
Generator Transformer Backup Overcurrent Protection (51 GT)

Requirements:
ii. Be of definite time over current type
iii. Have an adjustable setting range of 50-200% of rated current and 0.5-5 seconds time delay
Generator Transformer Back Up Earth Fault Protection (51 NGT)

This relay monitors the current in the generator transformer neutral. It can detect faults in the
transformer HV side or in the adjacent network.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 39

Requirements:
i. Be of single pole type
ii. Be of definite time characteristic
iii. Have an adjustable setting range of 10 to 100% of rated current
iv. Have a timer setting range of 0.5 to 5 seconds
HV winding cum overhang differential protection (87 HV/87 NT)

This is a unit type protection which operates for earth faults on the generator transformer HV side
and also covers a large portion of the HV winding and the HV terminals upto the HV current
transformers.
Requirements:
i. Be triple pole type (Single pole if used as Restricted E/F Protection)
ii. Have operating time less than 30 milliseconds at 2 times setting
iii. Be high impedance or low impedance type
iv. Operating current shall be 0.1 - 0.4 In
transients
vi. Be provided with suitable non linear resistors across the relay to limit the peak voltage to
1000 volts, in case of high impedance type
vii. Be provided with faulty phase identification
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 40

Unit Auxiliary Transformer Protections

For short circuit protection, unit auxiliary transformer differential relay, overload relay for alarm and
over current relay connected to different groups are recommended. However a utility may carry out
an application check and decide not to have a separate differential relay for UAT.
For ground faults residual 0/c relay and Restricted E/F relays connected to different groups shall be
provided. The type of connection may be either current based or voltage based depending on the
grounding system.
Unit Transformer Differential Protection (87 UAT)
This is a unit type protection covering the unit transformer and the cable connection to the unit board.
This protection operates for phase faults, but not for single phase to earth faults as this current is
limited by the neutral earthing resistance.
The unit transformer differential relay initiates a general trip and unit shutdown.
Requirements:
i. Be triple pole with individual phase indication
ii. Have unrestricted instantaneous high set over current unit which shall not operate during
inrush
iii. Have an adjustable or multi bias setting
iv. Have second harmonic or other inrush proof features and also should be stable under normal
over fluxing conditions, magnetising inrush proof feature shall not be achieved through any
intentional time delay e.g. use of timers to block relay operation or using disc operated relays.
v. Have one bias winding per phase and per C.T. input
vii. Have an operating time not greater than 30 milli seconds at 5 times of setting
viii. Shall have facility for ratio and phase angle correction either through auxiliary transformer
or through in built provisions.
Unit Transformer back up over current protection (51 UAT) Relay

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 41

iii. Have an adjustable setting range of 50-200% of rated current and 0.5 to 5 seconds time delay
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 42

Unit Transformer back-up earth fault protection (51 NUAT)

iii. Have a setting rage of 10-100% of rated current and time setting range of 0.5-5 seconds
Unit transformer restricted earth fault protection (64 UAT)

ii. Have operating time less than 30 milli seconds at 2 times setting
iii. Be high impedance or low impedance type
iv. Operating current shall be 0.1 - 0.4 In
transients
vi. Be provided with suitable non-linear resistors across the relay to limit the peak voltage to
1000 volts, in case of high impedance type
vii. Be provided with fault indication
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 43

1.3.4 MOTOR PROTECTION STUDY
Table 1-4 The minimum protection features for different capacity of the 3 phase induction motor
Between Between
Between 5kW to Above 110
Protection Functions 15kW to 30 30kW to
15kW kW
kW 110kW
Thermal Protection Y Y Y Y
Earth Fault protection N Y Y Y

Unbalance /Negative sequence
N N Y Y
Protection
Lock rotor protection N N Y Y
Prolong start N N N Y
Short circuit protection N N N Y
No. of start limit N N N Y
Under Voltage protection N N N Y
Loss of Load N N N Y
RTD influenced protection N N N Y
Table 1-5 Typical Settings of Composite Motor Protection
Sl.
Protection Brief description Typical setting Remark
No
Current (ITH)=Full load
It is provided to Cooling constant (Tr) is
Thermal Heating Constant(Th)=as per
protect the motor provided as a multiple of
1 (Overload) motor thermal curve
from excessive heating constant. Typical
Protection Cooling Constant(Tr)=As per
heating setting is Tr = 3 xTh
motor thermal curve
a)Current setting(I) = 2*full
It is provided when load current
Start Time<Safe b)Time setting(T) should be
Prolong Stall time greater than starting time less
2 Start then cold stall curve
Protection
It is provided when It is provided through
Start Time>Safe additional speed sensing
Stall time device
It is provided for
a) Current setting(I) = 2*full
Stall protection against
3 load current
Protection stalling of motor
b)Time setting(T) should be
after successful start
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 44

greater than starting time less

then Hot stall curve
It is provided for the

It is provided to cater Current Setting(I)=120% of
Short Circuit motor which is fed
4 major stator fault or starting current
Protection through circuit
terminal fault Time Delay(T)=100ms
breaker
a)In case of residual
connection :10 % of the CT
It is provided when rated primary current, 100 ms
Earth Fault low resistance time delay
5
Protection earthing is provided b)In case of CBCT typical
in the system setting is 30 % of minimum
E/F current of the system, 100
ms time delay
It is provided when Sensitive earth fault with
Earth Fault high resistance typical setting of 125% of
6
Protection earthing is provided single phase capacitive
in the system charging current
a)Alarm is provided at 20% of
Negative
It is provided to FLC with a time delay of 30s
phase
7 protect motor in case b)Tripping is provided at 30%
sequence
of unbalance of FLC with a TMS of 1.0 for
protection
the IDMT element
It is provided to Protection is provided through
Bearing protect motor against external RTD. Output of the This is provided in case of
8
failure bearing RTD is sleeve bearing
failure taken into Relay
It is provided to A definite time under voltage
Under
protect motor from with setting 70% of nominal
9 voltage
stalling in case of voltage with time delay of 0.5
protection
under voltage to 3 sec.
It is provided to
No. of Start restrict motor Typical setting is as per motor
10
Limit starting in a given data sheet
period of time
It is provided to It is implemented with help of
Loss of load protect motor in case low forward power relays
11
protection of loss of elements with interlock in
load condition starting
1.3.5 DISTANCE PROTECTION STUDY
The distance relay responds to the ratio of measured voltage to measured current, which can be
expressed as impedance and is proportional to length of the line. The impedance measured by
distance relays includes the line impedance and the fault resistance. Whenever the measured line
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 45

impedance is less than the relay setting distance relay operates. In case of phase to phase and three
phase faults, the fault resistance is the only the resistance of the arc which is very small in comparison
to other impedances in the fault loop. For phase to earth faults, the fault resistance consists of the arc
resistance plus the tower footing resistance.
The Zone 1 elements of the distance relay have two settings. One is set to cover 80% of the protected
line length as in the basic distance scheme. The other, known as 'Extended Zone 1'or „Z1X‟, is set
to overreach the protected line, a setting of 120% of the protected line being common. The Zone 1
reach is normally controlled by the Z1X setting and is reset to the basic Zone 1 setting when a
command from the auto-reclose relay is received. On occurrence of a fault at any point within the
Z1X reach, the relay operates in Zone 1 time, trips the circuit breaker and initiates auto-reclosure.
The reach setting of the Zone 2 protection should be at least 120% of the protected line impedance.
In many applications it is common practice to set the Zone 2 reach to be equal to the protected line
section +50% of the shortest adjacent line. Where possible, this ensures that the resulting maximum
effective Zone 2 reach does not extend beyond the minimum effective Zone 1 reach of the adjacent
line protection.
Remote back-up protection for all faults on adjacent lines can be provided by a third zone of
protection that is time delayed to discriminate with Zone 2 protection plus circuit breaker trip time
for the adjacent line. Zone 3 reach should be set to at least 1.2 times the impedance presented to the
relay for a fault at the remote end of the second line section.
Zone 4 might be used to provide back-up protection for the local bus bar, by applying a reverse reach
setting of the order of 25% of the Zone 1 reach. The setting of the reverse-looking Zone 4 elements
must be greater than that of the Zone 2 elements at the remote end of the feeder; otherwise there is
the possibility of Zone 2 elements initiating tripping and the reverse looking Zone 4 elements failing
to see an external fault.
A Power Swing Block (PSB) function is available in modern relays to prevent unwanted distance
relay element operation during power swings. The setting of the power swing detection element in
reactive direction must be higher than the setting of the zone with the highest reach, which should
still be controlled by it.
ZONES OF PROTECTION
Figure 10 Zones of protection
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 46

CALCULATION METHODOLOGY FOR DISTANCE RELAY

INPUT DATA
Line/Cable data (L1):

Line length (L1)
Pos. seq. resistance
Pos. seq. reactance
Zero seq. resistance
Zero seq. reactance
CT Ratio
PT ratio
Shortest adjacent Line:
Line length (L2)
Pos. seq. reactance
Zero seq. reactance
Longest adjacent Line from L2:
Line length (L3)
Pos. seq. reactance
Zero seq. reactance
Phase to Phase Impedance Calculation
Zone-1: Positive Sequence Impedance
Reactance X1(Z1) = K%* L1 (Where K= 80)
Resistance R1 (Z1) = K%* L1 (Where K = 80)
Total Impedance Z1 = (X12 +R12)1/2
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 47


Reactance X1(Z2) = 100% of L1 + K1%* L2 (Where K1=50)
Resistance R1 (Z2) = 100% of L1 + K1%*L2 (Where K1=50)
Reactance X1(Z3) = 100% of L1 + K2%* L3 (Where K2=125)
Resistance R1 (Z3) = 100% of L1 + K2%* L3 (Where K2=125)
Phase to Ground Impedance Calculation
Zone-1: Zero sequence Impedance
Reactance X0 (Z1) = K%*L1 (Where K=80)
Resistance R0 (Z1) = K%*L1 (Where K =80)
Reactance X0 (Z2) = 100% of L1 +K1%*L2 (Where K1=50)
Resistance R0 (Z2) = 100% of L1 +K1%* L2 (Where K1=50)
Reactance X0 (Z3) = 100% of L1 + K2%* L3 (Where K2 = 125)
Resistance R0 (Z3) = 100% of L1 +K2%* L3 (Where K2 = 125)
Total Impedance Z3= (X02 +R02)1/2
Resistive reach of distance protection for ph-e faults
Zone-1, RFPE1 = 3*zone-1 positive sequence for ph-e faults
Zone-2, RFPE2 = 3*zone-2 positive sequence for ph-e faults
Zone-3, RFPE3= 3*zone-3 positive sequence for ph-e faults
Resistive reach of distance protection for ph-ph faults
Zone-1, RFPP1 = 2*zone-1 positive sequence for ph-e faults
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Zone-2, RFPP2 =2*zone-2 positive sequence for ph-e faults

Zone-3, RFPP3= 2*zone-3 positive sequence for ph-e faults
Distance angle = Tan-1 of Zone-1 impedance
= Tan-1 (X1Z1 / R1Z1)
Residual Compensation: Resistive
Zone-1 = [(R0Z1 – R1Z1)]/3*(R1Z1)
Zone-2 = [(R0Z2 – R1Z2)]/3*(R1Z2)
Zone-3 = [(R0Z3 – R1Z3)]/3*(R1Z3)
Residual Compensation: Reactive
Zone-1 = [(X0Z1 – X1Z1)]/3*(X1Z1)
Zone-2 = [(X0Z2 – X1Z2)]/3*(X1Z2)
Zone-3 = [(X0Z3 – X1Z3)]/3*(X1Z3)
I. LINE DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION STUDY
The Line differential function offers phase-segregated current differential protection for
transmission, sub-transmission and distribution networks. The function compares the currents
entering and leaving the protected overhead line or cable. A dependable communication link is
needed to allow exchange of the current information between the terminals at the line ends. These
communication media may be fiber optic, galvanic communication link or more complex digital
communication systems like multiplexed and route switched networks. Normal steady state
capacitive charging currents can be allowed for if a voltage signal made available and the susceptance
of the protected zone is available.
CALCULATION METHODOLOGY LINE PROTECTION:
Line details and CT Details
Input Data:
1. Voltage level of the transmission Line/Cable.
2. Frequency of the system.
3. Length of the Line/Cable.
4. CT Ratio Connected for the protection.
5. Shunt capacitance of the line/Cable.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 49

Calculations:
Rated voltage of the line “Un”
Frequency of the system “fn”
Line/Cable length “L”
Line/cable Shunt capacitance “C”
CT Ratio “CTr”
Charging Current “Ic” = 3.63*Un*fn*C
Differential Current “Id” = 2.5*Ic
Differential current at CT secondary = Id/CTr
Set value of differential current = Id/CTr + tolerance (k) where k =0.1
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 50

PILOT WIRE PROTECTION STUDY
Pilot relaying is an adaptation of the principles of differential relaying for the protection of
transmission-line sections. Differential feeder protection requires a comparison of the currents
entering and leaving the protected zone. For faults occurring within the protected feeder it is desirable
to trip the circuit breakers at each end to isolate the fault. A pair of pilot wire is used to transmit
information between the two relays so that each may be able to compare the current flowing at its
respective end with current at the other end.
The pilot resistance is used in conjunction with settable padding resistance to achieve the stability
biasing of the relay. The padding resistance must be set in series with the pilot resistance to achieve
a standard value. Therefore there is a maximum value for the pilot resistance for which the padding
should be set to zero.
CALCULATION METHODOLOGY FOR PILOT WIRE PROTECTION

Input Data:
1) CT ratio at both the ends
2) Length of the pilot wire
3) Pilot wire cable resistance
4) Pilot wire loop resistance (on site measured value)
5) Knee point voltage
6) Lead resistance
7) CT resistance
Pilot wire loop resistance, RP

= (Length of the pilot wire) x (pilot wire cable resistance) x 2
Standard value of Pilot loop resistance, RSV
= 1000 if no isolating transformer fitted
Isolating transformer tap T = 1, if no isolating transformer fitted
Padding resistance = 0.5 x (RSV - RP)/T
Knee Point voltage (Vk) calculation:
CT Ratio=N
Minimum Knee point Voltage, Vk = (50/CS) + (If (RCT+ 2 RL)/N)
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1.3.6 TRANSFORMER DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION STUDY
Differential protection of transformer is described in this section. For transformer differential

protection CT connection depend on the vector group of power transformer. For transformers with
primary side star grounded windings the CT is connected in delta (Δ) to reject residual currents (i.e.
currents flowing to the transformer due to an earth fault outside the protected zone and which would
produce a differential current Id) and to prevent mal-operation of the differential protection. In the
same way transformer with secondary delta winding the CT is connected in star grounded.
Figure 11 : Differential protection scheme for transformer
Consider an ideal transformer with CT connections as shown in figure 1. To illustrate the principle
let us consider that the current rating of primary winding is 100A and that of the secondary winding
is 1000A. By using 100:1 and 1000:1 CT on the primary and secondary winding, under normal (no
fault) operating conditions the scaled CT currents will match in magnitudes. By connecting the
primary and secondary CTs with due care to the dots (polarity markings), a circulating current can
be set up as shown in figure 1 by dotted line.
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Now if an internal fault occurs within the device like inter turn short etc., then the normal mmf
balance is upset i.e. under this condition, the CT secondary currents of primary and secondary side
CTs will not match. The resulting differential current will flow through differential relay. If the
differential current value is more than the set value then immediately relay initiates the trip decision.
Figure 12 Transformer differential protection characteristics
a) Idiff> typically set to 20% transformer rated current.

b) Idiff>> > typically set to 1.3 to 1.5 times through fault current level (based on short
circuit study) reflected on the primary side for all the transformers.
c) Fast clearance of heavy internal transformer faults with high-set differential element
Idiff>>.
d) Idiff>>> > typically set to 2.5 times through fault current level (based on short circuit
study) reflected on the primary side for all the transformers.
e) The effect of magnetizing inrush during initial energization should be considered. It
can be mitigated by having 2nd harmonic restraint. The value of 2nd harmonic restrain
typically set to 15%.
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f) Restrain against overfluxing with a choice of 3rd or 5th harmonic stabilization is only
active up to a settable value for the fundamental component of the differential current,
additional restrain for an external fault with current transformer saturation. The value
of 5th harmonic restrain typically set to 30%.
g) The bias setting of transformer differential protection is given in order to
accommodate the transformer no load current, CT errors, relay errors, changing taps,
typical bias characteristics is shown below.
CALCULATION METHODOLOGY FOR TRANSFORMER:
Transformer details and CT Details
Input Data:
1. MVA Rating of the Transformer
2.Rated voltage levels of the Transformer.
3.Impedance of the transformer.
4.Vector group of the transformer.
5.Ratios of CT’s & ICT’s which are connected for the protection.
Calculation:
Transformer Rating ‘P’
Primary Voltage ‘Vp’
Secondary Voltage ‘Vs’
Primary CT Ratio ‘CTp’
Secondary CT Ratio ‘CTs’1
No. of taps
Max. tap Voltage Vmaxt.
Min. tap voltage Vmint.
2nd Harmonic Restraint = 15% (Typical)
5th Harmonic Restraint = 30% (Typical)
Phase angle Compensation =
Mid tap Voltage Vmidt = (Vmaxt. + Vmint.)/2
HV side full load current at mid tap voltage Imidt = P/(sqrt(3)*Vmidt)
HV side full load current at mid tap voltage at secondary side of the Primary CT
= Imidt / CTp
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HV Ratio Compensation RCp =

LV side full load current Is = P/ (sqrt(3)*Vs)
LV side full load current at secondary side of the Secondary CT = Is / CTs
LV Ratio Compensation RCs =
HV side full load current at max. tap voltage Imaxt = P/(sqrt(3)*Vmaxt)
HV side full load current on secondary of primary CT with Ratio Correction =
Is*RCs/CTs………………………………………………………………………….1
HV side full load current at min. tap voltage = P/ (sqrt
(3)*Vmint)……………………….................................................................2
HV side full load current on secondary of primary CT with Ratio Correction
=Imint*RCp/CTp……3
LV side full load current on secondary of secondary CT with Ratio Correction
= I mint*RCp/CTp…..4
At max. tap voltage Differential Current =
(Eqn.4-Eqn.1)…………………..…………………………………………………..5
At min. tap voltage Differential Current =
(Eqn.4-Eqn.3)……………………………………………………….……...………6
Therefore Differential setting = Eqn.6 + 0.1 (safety margin 10%)
Bias setting at max. tap Voltage = ( Eqn.4 – Eqn.1)/2
Bias setting at minimum tap Voltage = (Eqn.4+Eqn.3)/2
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 55

1.3.7 RESTRICTED EARTH FAULT PROTECTION STUDY
This is a unit protection scheme for one winding of the transformer. Conventional earth fault
protection using overcurrent elements fails to provide adequate protection for transformer windings.
Restricted Earth Fault Protection (REF) is applied on transformers in order to detect ground faults
on a given winding more sensitively than overall transformer differential protection is able to do.
The degree of protection is very much improved by the application of restricted earth fault protection
(or REF protection). Both windings of a transformer can be protected separately with restricted earth
fault protection, thereby providing high-speed protection against earth faults for the whole
transformer with relatively simple equipment.
For the high-impedance type, the residual current of three line current transformers is balanced
against the output of a current transformer in the neutral conductor. The system is operative for faults
within the region between current transformers, i.e. for faults on the star winding in question. The
system will remain stable for all through faults outside this zone.
A resistance called stabilizing resistance is inserted in the differential path in order to achieve the
required restraining level.
In case of any through fault, one of the current transformers experiences saturation. Hence it’s
normally high magnetizing inductance breaks down to a low value. Relatively high ohmic resistance
in the differential path results in the effect that differential current caused by the current transformer
saturation does not flow completely through the differential path but flows through the low
magnetizing inductance of the saturated current transformer. Thus the insertion of the resistance has
restraining effect and prevents the operation of the relay under through fault condition.
The input impedance of the low-impedance REF is very low. Low-impedance REF protection has
low inherent stability against CT saturation for external faults. The operating current of the low-
impedance REF protection is not realized by CT connection. The relay measures all four CTs
necessary to realize the element. If the existing equipment is of such a nature that the same ratios are
not available for both phase and neutral CTs, you should use low-impedance REF protection, because
this type of protection can handle different CT ratios for phase and neutral CTs.
Figure 13 An earth fault outside a transformer with current distribution
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 56

Figure 14 An earth fault in a transformer with current distribution
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 57

1. CALCULATION METHODOLOGY FOR HIGH IMPEDANCE REF PROTECTION
 Input Data:
a) Transformer Details:
1. MVA rating
2. High Voltage, HV in kV
3. Low Voltage, LV in kV
4. Primary Winding Configuration, Y/∆/Yn
5. Secondary Winding Configuration, Y/∆/Yn
6. Impedance, X in pu
7. Negative Tolerance, T in %
8. Ip, percentage of rated current of the winding
b) CT and Wiring Details
1. CT Primary, A
2. CT Secondary, A
3. CT Ratio, n
4. Knee point Voltage, Vk in V
5. Magnetizing current at Vk , Io in mA
6. CT internal resistance, Rct in Ω
7. One way lead resistance, RL in Ω
8. Number of CTs in parallel, m
9. Stabilizing factor, k
10. Relay peak voltage limit, Vlimit in V
11. Switchgear rating/ Max. Internal Fault Current, If in kA
 Calculate the maximum through fault current.
2. I rated = MVA / (1.732*kV) in A
3. Transformer Impedance with negative impedance Tolerance, Xn = X – (T.X/100)

in pu
4. Ikmax = Irated / Xn in A
 Calculate the value Stabilizing Voltage Vs using the below equation
5. Vs = k * (Ikmax /n) * (RCT + 2 RL) where (k=1.5)
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 58

6. Check if Vk ≥ k1 * Vs where (k1=2)
a) If the above condition is satisfied then proceed to step 5.

b) Else repeat the calculation with new value of V
 Compute the primary current and the relay current setting Ir.
7. Iprim = Ip * Irated
8. Ir = (Iprim/ n) – (m * (Vs/Vk) * Io)
 Check if Ir ≥ m * (Vs/Vk) * Io + k2*CT secondary rating in Ampere ( Where k2=0.05)
a) If above condition is satisfied, then “The current setting Ir calculated is

appropriate”
b) Else “The current setting Ir calculated is low and thus Ip should be increased and
repeat the calculation”.
 Compute the value of stabilizing resistor and short term power using the following
equations.
9. Rs = Vs/ Ir
10. P = (Vs2/ Rs)
In order to verify the requirement of a voltage dependent resistor (Varistor/ Metrosil) perform
the following computations.
11. Vf = (If/ n) * (RCT + 2 RL + Rs)
12. Vp = 2 * sqrt (2 * Vk (Vf – Vk))
13. Compare the values of Vlimit and Vp.
a) If Vlimit > Vp, then “Varistor is not required”.

b) If Vlimit < Vp, then “Varistor is required”.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 59

1.3 REFERENCES
• Standard guidelines on over current and earth fault relay coordination

• Standard guidelines on Unit protection studies which includes the following
o Transformer protection
o Generator protection
o Bus bar protection
o Lines/Cables protection
o Motor protection
o Distance protection
o REF protection
• 1795-S-TS-E-2201 – Power System Stability & Reliability Analysis Manual
• 1795-S-TS-E-2400 – Power Plant Grid Impact Assessment Studies Manual
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 60

1.4 APPENDIX
Since short circuit study and transient stability studies (as required) will be required for relay
co-ordination study, apart from the data required for short circuit and transient stability (as
required) studies, additional parameters for relay co-ordination study will be entered as per
the data format.
• Over current and earth fault protection setting data format
• Bus bar protection Relay setting data format
• Generator Protection Relay setting data format
• Line/Cable Differential (87L) RELAY (7SD610 ) setting data format
• Motor protection relay settings data
• Transformer unit protection relay setting data format
• Distance Protection Relay setting data format
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 61

1.A.1 OVER CURRENT AND EARTH FAULT PROTECTION SETTING FORMAT
Phase Relay Settings Earth Relay Settings Remarks
Ip>>/ Tp>>/ Ie> Ie>>/ Te>>/

CT Relay Curve Ip> TMS Relay Curve TMS
S.No Location Ip>>> Tp>>> (xI/In) Ie>>> Te>>>
Ratio Name Type (x I/In) (Tp>) Name Type (Te>)
(xI/In) Sec (xI/In) Sec
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 62

1.A.2 BUS BAR PROTECTION RELAY SETTING FORMAT (REB 500)

SUB STATION 400KV NEW PIRANA
R- Y- B-
PHASE
PHASE PHASE PHASE
Busbar differential protection (PDIF, 87B)
BBPBay1Ph(PTRC,87B)
BS01(Bay01)
-
Bay@
CT Cnnection Hardware CT input connection to the bay function block
Zone Selection How bay/CT is controlled towards the zones
Zone Switching bay/CT status during zones switching
Check Zone Selection bay/CT status for the Check zone
tTrip Pulse bay trip pulse duration if zone trips in self Reset mode
tZero Current Time delay to force current to zero via binary signals
tInvert Current Time delay to invert current via binary signals
BBPCheckZone1Ph(PDIF,87B)
Operation Check Zone Operation
OperLevel Check Zone Operation Level
Slope Check Zone Slope
BBPZoneA1Ph(PDIF,87B)
Operation Differential protection Operation
DiffOperLev Differential protection Operation Level
DiffTripOut Differential protection trip output mode
tTripHold Differential trip dropoff delay in selfReset mode
CheckZoneSup Check Zone supervision Differential protection
SlowOCTOper Operation of slow open CT alarm
FastOCTOper Operation of Fast open CT alarm
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 63


OCTOperLev Open CT operation level
tSlowOCT Time delay for slow open CT alarm
OCTReleaseLev Id level above which OCT alarm release in supervision mode
IdAlarmLev Differential Current alarm level
tIdAlarm Time delay for Differential Current alarm level
LinAlarmLev Incoming current alarm level
SensDiffOper Sensitive differential protection operation
SensOperLev Sensitive differential protection operation level
In level above which sensitive differential protection is
SenslinBlock blocked
tSensDiff Time delay for Sensitive differential protection
BBPZoneB1Ph(PDIF,87B)
Operation Differential protection Operation
DiffOperLev Differential protection Operation Level
DiffTripOut Differential protection trip output mode
tTripHold Differential trip dropoff delay in selfReset mode
CheckZoneSup Check Zone supervision Differential protection
SlowOCTOper Operation of slow open CT alarm
FastOCTOper Operation of Fast open CT alarm
OCTOperLev Open CT operation level
tSlowOCT Time delay for slow open CT alarm
OCTReleaseLev Id level above which OCT alarm release in supervision mode
IdAlarmLev Differential Current alarm level
tIdAlarm Time delay for Differential Current alarm level
LinAlarmLev Incoming current alarm level
SensDiffOper Sensitive differential protection operation
SensOperLev Sensitive differential protection operation level
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 64


In level above which sensitive differential protection is
SenslinBlock blocked
tSensDiff Time delay for Sensitive differential protection
BBPZoneInterc1Ph(GGIO,87B)
Operation Load Transfer/Zone Interconnection Operation
Time delayed alarm for too long Transfer/Zone
tAlarm Interconnection
Current protection
Breaker failure protection (RBRF, 50BF)
BF01 - BF12
Operation Operation Off / On
IBase Base current
FunctionMode Detection principle for back-up trip
RetripMode Operation mode of retrip logic
IP> Operate phase current level in % of IBase
I>BlkCont Current for blocking of CB contact operation in % of IBase
t1 Time delay of re-trip
t2 Time delay of re-trip
t3 Additional time delay to t2 for a second back-up trip
tCBAlarm Time delay for CB faulty signal
tPulse Trip pulse duration
Four step phase overcurrent protection (PTOC,51_67)
Operation Operation Off / On
IBase Base current
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 65

1.A.3 GENERATOR PROTECTION RELAY SETTINGS FORMAT- REM545
Gen Rating- MW
CT Ratio
SI.NO Parameter Range PT Ratio
Settings
Three-phase non-directional overcurrent protection, low-set
1
stage, NOC3Low, 3I>
Start current 0.10…5.00 x In
Operate time at DT mode 0.05…300.00 s
Time multiplier at IDMT mode 0.05…1.00
Not in use
Definite time
Extremely inverse
Very inverse
Operation mode Normal inverse
Long time inverse
RI-type inverse
RD-type inverse
IEEE curves
Three-phase non-directional overcurrent protection, high-set

2 stage, NOC3High, 3I>>,and instantaneous stage, NOC3Inst,
3I>>>
NOC3High, 3I>> (Inadvertent Energization)
Operate time 0.05…300.00 s
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 66

Not in use
Operation mode Definite time
Instantaneous
NOC3Inst, 3I>>>
Not in use
Instantaneous
Three-phase directional overcurrent function, low-set stage,

3
DOC6Low, I>→
Not in use,
Definite time,
Extremely inv,
Very inverse,
Operation mode
Normal inverse,
Long-time inv,
RI-type inverse,
RD-type inverse.
Time multiplier 0.05…1.00
Basic angle ϕb 0…90°
Forward
Operation direction
Reverse
Disabled
Earth-fault protection
Enabled
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 67

Three-phase directional overcurrent function, high-set stage,

4 DOC6High, I>>→, and instantaneous stage, DOC6Inst,
I>>>→
Not in use
Instantaneous
Basic angle ϕb 0…90°
Forward
Operation direction
Reverse
Disabled
Earth-fault protection
Enabled
Non-directional operation (when the direction Disabled
cannot be determined) Enabled
Voltage-dependent overcurrent protection, low-set stage,

5
VOC6Low, I(U)>, and high-set stage, VOC6High, I(U)>>
Time multiplier at IDMT mode 0.05...1.00
Voltage step
Control mode for voltage control Voltage slope
Input step
Voltage limit for the voltage step mode 0.10...1.00 x Un
Upper voltage limit for the voltage slope mode 0.60...1.00 x Un
Lower voltage limit for the voltage slope mode 0.10...0.59 x Un
Current multiplier for lower start current value 0.05...1.00
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 68

Not in use
Definite time
Extremely inverse
Very inverse
Operation mode
Normal inverse
Long-time inverse
RI-type inverse
RD-type inverse
Three-phase under impedance protection, low-set stage

6 UI6Low, Z<,
and high-set stage UI6High, Z<<
UI6High
Z-setting 0.01…60.00 p.u.
UI6High Not in use; In use
UI6Low
Z-setting 0.01…60.00 p.u.
UI6Low Not in use; In use
Stabilized differential protection for generators, Diff6G,

7
3ΔΙ>,3ΔΙ>>
Basic setting; the lowest ratio of differential
5...50%
and nominal current to cause a trip
Starting ratio; slope of the 2nd line of the
10...50%
operating characteristics
Turn-point 1; turnpoint between the 1st and
0.0...1.0 x In
2nd line of the operating characteristics
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 69

Turn-point 2; turnpoint between the 2nd and

1.0...3.0 x In
3rd line of the operating characteristics
Tripping value of the instantaneous stage 5...30 x In
High impedance or flux-balance based differential

8
protection for generators and motors, Diff3, 3ΔI>
Basic setting 0.5…50%
Operation time 0.03...0.50 s
Not in use
Instantaneous
Non-directional earth-fault protection, low-set stage,

9
NEF1Low, I0>
Start current 1.0…100.0% of In
Not in use
Definite time
Extremely inverse
Very inverse
Operation mode Normal inverse
Long time inverse
RI-type inverse
RD-type inverse
IEEE curves
Non-directional earth-fault protection, high-set stage,

10
NEF1High, I0>>, and instantaneous stage, NEF1Inst, I0>>>
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 70

NEF1High
Not in use
Instantaneous
NEF1Inst
Not in use
Instantaneous
Directional earth-fault protection, low-set stage, DEF2Low,

11
I0>→
Start voltage 2.0…100.0% of Un
Not in use
Definite time
Extremely inverse
Operation mode
Very inverse
Normal inverse
Long time inverse
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 71

Basic angle & Uo

Basic angle
IoSin/Cos & Uo
Operation criteria
IoSin/Cos
Non-directional Io
Non-directional Uo
Forward
Operation direction
Reverse
-90°
-60°
Basic angle ϕb
-30°
0°
IoSin(ϕ)
Operation characteristic
IoCos(ϕ)
Not active
Intermittent E/F
Active
Directional earth-fault protection, high-set stage,

12 DEF2High, I0>>→, and instantaneous stage, DEF2Inst,
I0>>>→
Not in use
Instantaneous
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 72

Basic angle & Uo

Basic angle
IoSin/Cos & Uo
Operation criteria
IoSin/Cos
Non-directional Io
Non-directional Uo
Forward
Operation direction
Reverse
-90°
-60°
Basic angle ϕb
-30°
0°
IoSin(ϕ)
Operation characteristic
IoCos(ϕ)
Not active
Intermittent E/F
Active
High-impedance based restricted earth-fault protection,

13
REF1A, ΔI0>
Basic setting; the lowest ratio of differential
0.5...50%
and nominal current to cause a trip
Residual overvoltage protection, low-set stage, ROV1Low,

14
U0>
Not in use
Operation mode
Definite time
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 73

Residual overvoltage protection, high-set stage, ROV1High,

15
U0>>, and instantaneous stage, ROV1Inst, U0>>>
Not in use
Operation mode
Definite time
Three-phase thermal overload protection for motors,

16
generators and transformers, TOL3Dev, 3
BASIC SETTINGS
Starting current of the motor 0.10...10.00 x In
Max. starting time permitted for the motor 0.1...120.0 s
Number of starts allowed from cold state 1...3
Motor; through-ventilated, rated power < 1500 kW

Motor; through-ventilated, rated power > 1500 kW
Motor; surface cooling, rated power < 500 kW
Type of device to be protected Motor; surface cooling, rated power > 500 kW
Generator; hydro or small air-cooled turbine generators
Generator; large turbine generators
Transformer
Trip temperature 80.0…120.0%

Prior alarm temperature 40.0…100.0%
Restart inhibit (temperature limit for
40.0…100.0%
successful restarting)
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 74

Ambient temperature -50.0…100.0°C

Cooling time-constant 1.0...10.0 x time constant
Heating time-constant for generator or
1...999 min
transformer
ADVANCED SETTINGS
Short time-constant for stator 0.0...999.0 min
Long time-constant for stator 0.0...999.0 min
Weighting factor of the short time-constant for stator 0.00...1.00
Temperature rise of stator at rated current Maximum
0.0...350.0 °C
temperature of stator
Short time-constant for rotor 0.0...350.0 °C
Long time-constant for rotor 0.0...999.0 min
Weighting factor of the short time-constant for
0.0...999.0 min
rotor
Temperature rise of rotor at rated current 0.00...1.00
0.0...350.0 °C
Maximum temperature of rotor
0.0...350.0 °C
Not in use
Operation mode (principle of ambient temperature No sensors; the set ambient temperature
compensation) 1 sensor used
2 sensors used
Waiting time for a successful restart (Read only parameter) 0...86400 s
Estimated time to the trip (Read-only parameter) 0...86400 s
Negative phase-sequence protection, low-set stage,

17
NPS3Low, I2>, and high-set stage, NPS3High, I2>>
NPS3Low
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 75

Not in use
Inverse time
Start value of negative-sequence current I2 0.01...0.50 x In
Operate time 0.1....120.0 s
Operating characteristic constant K (corresponds to the
machine constant, equal to the I2 2t constant of the machine 5.0...100.0
as stated by machine manufacturer)
Definite start time at inverse-time mode 0.1...60.0 s
Definite minimum operate time 0.1...120.0 s
Maximum operate time 500...10000 s
Cooling time of the machine 5...10000 s
Number of phases to be measured 2 or 3
Forward
Rotation direction
Reverse
Drop-off time of the operate time counter 0...1000 ms
NPS3High
Not in use
Inverse time
Start value of negative-sequence current I2 0.01...0.50 x In
Operate time 0.1....120.0 s
Operating characteristic constant K (corresponds to the
machine constant, equal to the I2 2t constant of the machine 5.0...100.0
as stated by machine manufacturer)
Definite start time at inverse-time mode 0.1...60.0 s
Definite minimum operate time 0.1...120.0 s
Maximum operate time 500...10000 s
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 76

Cooling time of the machine 5...10000 s

Number of phases to be measured 2 or 3
Forward
Rotation direction
Reverse
Drop-off time of the operate time counter 0...1000 ms
Three-phase overvoltage protection, low-set stage,

18
OV3Low, 3U>
Start voltage 0.10…1.60 x Un
Not in use
Definite time
Operation mode
A curve
B curve
Three-phase overvoltage protection, high-set stage,

19
OV3High, 3U>>
Not in use
Operation mode
Definite time
Three-phase undervoltage protection, low-set stage,

20
UV3Low, 3U<
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 77

Not in use
C curve
Three-phase undervoltage protection, high-set stage,

21
UV3High, 3U<<
Not in use
Operation mode
Definite time
Phase-sequence voltage protection, PSV3St1 and PSV3St2,

22
U1<, U2>, U1>
Start value U2> 0.01…1.00 x Un
Start value U1< 0.01…1.20 x Un
Start value U1> 0.80…1.60 x Un
Operate time U2> 0.04…60.00 s
Operate time U1< 0.04…60.00 s
Operate time U1> 0.04…60.00 s
Not in use; U1< & U2> & U1>; U1< & U2>; U2> &
Operation mode U1>;
U1< & U1>; U2>; U1<; U1>
Dir. selection Forward; Reverse; Input ROT_DIR
Underfrequency or overfrequency protection, 5 stages,

23
Freq1St1… Freq1St5, f</f>, df/dt
Freq1St1
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 78

Not in use
f</f> 1 timer
f</f> 2 timers
Operation mode f</f> OR df/dt>
f</f> AND df/dt>
f</f> OR df/dt<
f</f> AND df/dt<
Undervoltage limit for blocking 0.30…0.90 x Un
Start value for under-/overfrequency prot. 25.00…75.00 Hz
Operate time for under-/over frequency prot. 0.10…120.00 s
Start value for df/dt protection 0.2…10.0 Hz/s
Operate time for df/dt protection 0.12…120.00 s
Freq1St2
Not in use
f</f> 1 timer
f</f> 2 timers
f</f> AND df/dt>
f</f> OR df/dt<
f</f> AND df/dt<
Under voltage limit for blocking 0.30…0.90 x Un
Start value for under-/over frequency prot. 25.00…75.00 Hz
Freq1St3
Not in use
Operation mode
f</f> 1 timer
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 79

f</f> 2 timers
f</f> OR df/dt>
f</f> AND df/dt>
f</f> OR df/dt<
f</f> AND df/dt<
Freq1St4
Not in use
f</f> 1 timer
f</f> 2 timers
f</f> AND df/dt>
f</f> OR df/dt<
f</f> AND df/dt<
Freq1St5
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 80

Not in use
f</f> 1 timer
f</f> 2 timers
f</f> AND df/dt>
f</f> OR df/dt<
f</f> AND df/dt<
Under voltage limit for blocking 0.30…0.90 x Un
Start value for under-/overfrequency port 25.00…75.00 Hz
Operate time for under-/overfrequency prot. 0.10…120.00 s
24 Under excitation protection, low-set stage, UE6Low, X<

Operate time 0.06...60.00 s
Distance of the top of the impedance circle
-10.00...10.00 p.u.
from the R-axis
Diameter of the impedance circle 0.01...60.00 p.u.
Displacement of the centre of the impedance
10.00...10.00 p.u.
circle from the X-axis
25 Under excitation protection, high-set stage, UE6High, X<<

Distance of the top of the impedance circle
-10.00...10.00 pp.
from the R-axis
Diameter of the impedance circle 0.01...60.00 pp.
Displacement of the center of the impedance
-10.00...10.00 pp.
circle from the X-axis
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 81

Overexcitation protection, low-set stage, OE1Low, U/f>,

26
and high-set stage, OE1High, U/ f>>
OE1 Low/High
U/f start (DT mode) 1.00...2.00 x U/f
U/f start (IDMT mode) 1.00...2.00 x U/f
U max cont. 0.80...1.60 x Un
k 0.1...100.0
Maximum time 500...10000 s
Constant delay 0.1...120.0 s
Cooling time 5...10000 s
Operation mode Not in use; Definite time; Curve#1; Curve#2
Directional overpower protection, 3 stages,

27
OPOW6St1...OPOW6St3, P>→/Q>→
OPOW6St1 Revere reactive
Angle (power direction) -90...90 °
Power setting (start power) 1.0...200.0 % Sn
Drop-off time 0.00...60.00 s
Under power or reverse power protection, 3 stages,

27
UPOW6St1...UPOW6St3, P</P>←
UPOW6St1
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 82

Under power
Operation mode
Reverse power
Power setting (start power) 1.0...200.0% Sn
Waiting time after closing a CB 0.0...60.0 s
OFF
Disable mode
ON
UPOW6St2
Under power
Operation mode
Reverse power
OFF
Disable mode
ON
UPOW6St3
Under power
Operation mode
Reverse power
OFF
Disable mode
ON
29 Phase reversal protection, PREV3,

Operation mode Not in use; 2-phase; 3-phase
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 83


Expected rotation direction Forward; Reverse
Synchro-check/voltage check function stage 1 and stage 2,

30
SCVCSt1 and SCVCSt2, SYNC
Upper threshold voltage Umax 0.50…1.00 x Un
Lower threshold voltage Umin 0.10…0.80 x Un
Voltage difference ΔU 0.02…0.60 x Un
Phase angle difference Δphase 5…90°
Frequency difference Δf 0.02…5.00 Hz
31 Fuse failure supervision, Fuse Fail, FUSEF

Ratio U2/U1> 10...50%
Ratio I2/I1< 10...50%
32 Standby Earth fault (ICM21)
Start current in A
Time multiplier at IDMT mode
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 84

1.A.4 DISTANCE PROTECTION RELAY SETTINGS FORMAT (MICOMP441)
CT AND VT RATIOS :
LINE SETTING
Relay Used
Main VT Primary
Main VT Sec'y
C/S VT Primary
C/S VT Secondary
Phase CT Primary
Phase CT Sec'y
MComp CT Primary
MComp CT Sec'y
C/S Input:
Main VT Location
CT Polarity
GROUP 1 : DISTANCE ELEMENTS
GROUP 1 Line Setting
Line Length
Line Impedance
Line Angle
GROUP 1 Zone Setting
Zone Status
KZ1 Res Comp
KZ1 Angle
Z1
R1G
R1Ph
tZ1
KZ2 Res Comp
KZ2 Angle
Z2
R2G
R2Ph
tZ2
KZ3/4 Res Comp
KZ3/4 Angle
Z3
R3G - R4G
R3Ph - R4Ph
tZ3
Z4
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 85

tZ4
GROUP 1 Other Parameters
Serial Cmp.line
Overlap Z Mode
Z1m Tilt Angle
Z1p Tilt Angle
Z2/p/q Tilt Angl
Fwd Z Chgt Delay
V Mem Validity
Earth I Detect
GROUP 1 Fault Locator
kZm Mutual Comp
kZm Angle
GROUP 1 DISTANCE SCHEMES
Program Mode
Standard Mode
Fault Type
Trip Mode
tReversal Guard
Unblocking Logic
SOTF/TOR Mode
SOTF Delay
Z1Ext Fail
GROUP 1 Weak Infeed
WI:Mode Status
GROUP 1 POWER-SWING
Delta R
Delta X
IN> status
IN> (%Imax)
I2> status
I2> (%Imax)
ImaxLine> Status
ImaxLine >
Delta I Status
Unblocking delay
Blocking Zones
Out of Step
Stable Swing
Broken Conductor
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 86

Broken Conductor
I2/I1 Setting
I2/I1 Time Delay
I2/I1 Trip
GROUP 1 O/C
I>1 Function
I>1 Directional
I>1 VTS Block
I>1 Current Set
I>1 Time delay
I>1 tReset
I>2 Function
I>2 Directional
I>2 Current Set
I>2 Time delay
I>2 tReset
I>3 Status
I>3 Current Set
I>3 Time delay
I>4 Status
I2>1 Function
I2>1 Directional
I2>1 Current Set
I2>1 Time delay
I2>1 tReset
I2>2 Function
I2>2 Directional
I2>2 Current Set
I2>2 Time delay
I2>2 tReset
I2>3 Status
I2>4 Status
GROUP 1 EARTH FAULT O/C
IN>1 Function
IN>1 Directional
IN>1 VTS Block
IN>1 Current Set
IN>1 Time delay
IN>1 tReset
IN>2 Function
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 87

IN>2 Directional
IN>2 Current Set
IN>2 Time delay
IN>2 tReset
IN>3 Status
IN>4 Status
GROUP 1 IN> DIRECTIONAL
IN Char An
Polarisation
GROUP 1 AIDED D.E.F
Aided ch. Status
Polarisation
V> Voltage Set
IN Forward
Time Delay
Scheme Logic
In Rev Factor
GROUP 1 UNDERVOLTAGE
V< Measur't Mode
V<1 Function
V<1 Voltage Set
V<1 Time Delay
V<2 Status
GROUP 1 OVERVOLTAGE:
V> Measur't Mode
V>1 Function
V>1 Voltage Set
V>1 Time Delay
V>2 Status
V>2 Voltage Set
V>2 Time Delay
GROUP 1 BREAKER FAIL
CB Fail 1 Status
CB Fail 1 Timer
CB Fail 2 Status
CBF Non I Rst
CBF Ext Reset
GROUP 1 UNDERCURRENT I<
I< Current set
GROUP 1 SUPERVISION:
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 88

GROUP 1 VT SUPERVISION
VTS Time Delay
VTS I2 & I0 Inh
Detect 3P
Threshold 3P
Delta I>
GROUP 1 CT SUPERVISION
CTS Status
GROUP 1 CVT SUPERVISION
CVTS Status
Chk scheme A/R
Chk scheme ManCB
V< Dead Line
V> Live Line
V< Dead Bus
V> Live Bus
Diff Voltage
Diff Frequency
Diff Phase
Bus-Line Delay
GROUP 1 AUTORECLOSE
GROUP 1 AUTORECLOSE MODE
1P Trip Mode
1P Dead Time 1
Reclaim Time
Close Pulse Time
Discrim. Time
A/R Inhibit Wind
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 89

1.A.5 LINE/CABLE DIFFERENTIAL (87L) RELAY (7SD610 ) SETTING FORMAT
1.Device Configuration Settings
Setting Group Change Option

87 Differential protection
DTT Direct Transfer Trip
Instantaneous High-speed / SOTF Overcurrent
Backup overcurrent
Trip Circuit Supervision

Thermal Overload Protection
Voltage transformers
50N/51N Ground Overcurrent
85-67N Pilot Protection Gnd. Overcurrent
81 Over/Under frequency Protection

27, 59 Under/Overvoltage Protection
Fault Locator
50BF Breaker Failure Protection

Protection Interface 1 (Port D)
Number of relays
Line sections for fault locator

2. Power System Data 1
CT Starpoint
Rated Primary Voltage

Rated Secondary Voltage (Ph-Ph)
CT Rated Primary Current
CT Rated Secondary Current
U4 voltage transformer is
Matching ratio Phase-VT To Open-Delta-VT
I4 current transformer is
Matching ratio I4/Iph for CT's
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 90

System Starpoint is
Rated Frequency
Distance measurement unit
Setting format for zero seq.comp. format
Minimum TRIP Command Duration
Maximum Close Command Duration
Dead Time for CB test-autoreclosure

k_alf/k_alf nominal
CT Error in % at k_alf/k_alf nominal
CT Error in % at k_alf nominal
3. Oscillographic Fault Records
Waveform Capture
Scope of Waveform Data
Max. length of a Waveform Capture Record
Captured Waveform Prior to Trigger

Captured Waveform after Event
Capture Time via Binary Input
Measurement: Full Scale Voltage (100%)

Measurement: Full Scale Current (100%)
P,Q operational measured values sign

Line Angle
x' - Line Reactance per length unit
c' - capacit. per unit line len. µF/km
Line Length
Zero seq. comp. factor RG/RL for Z1
Zero seq. comp. factor XG/XL for Z1
Zero seq. comp.factor RG/RL for Z1B...Z5
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 91

Zero seq. comp.factor XG/XL for Z1B...Z5
center phase of feeder

Pole Open Current Threshold
Pole Open Voltage Threshold
Seal-in Time after ALL closures
minimal time for line open before SOTF
Recognition of Line Closures with

RESET of Trip Command
open pole detector
Seal-in Time after MANUAL closures
Manual CLOSE COMMAND generation
MANUAL Closure Impulse after CONTROL

87 Differential Protection
State of differential protection
I-DIFF>: Pickup value

I-DIFF>: Value under switch on condition
I-DIFF>: Trip time delay
Min. local current to release DIFF-Trip

I-DIFF>>: Pickup value
I-DIFF>>: Value under switch on cond.
Inrush Restraint
2nd. harmonic in % of fundamental
Cross Block
Maximum inrush-peak value
Time for Crossblock with 2nd harmonic

Intertrip
State of transmit. the intertrip command
Reaction if intertrip command is receiv.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 92

Delay for intertrip via binary input
Prolongation for intertrip via bin.input

Direct Transfer Trip (DTT)
Trip Time Delay
Group Protection Interface
Time delay for data disturbance alarm
Time del for transmission failure alarm

Remote signal RESET DELAY for comm.fail
State of protection interface 1
Connection 1 over
Prot 1: Maximal permissible delay time
Prot 1: Diff. in send and receive time

Prot 1: Maximal permissible error rate
Prot.1: Block. due to unsym. delay time
Identification number of relay 1

Identification number of relay 2
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 93

1.A.6 MOTOR PROTECTION RELAY SETTINGS FORMAT (REM 615)
Three-phase non-directional overcurrent protection (PHxPTOC) main settings

Parameter Function Value (Range) Step Settings
PHLPTOC 0.05...5.00 × In 0.01
Start value
PHIPTOC 1.00...40.00 × In 0.01
Time multiplier PHLPTOC 0.05...15.00 0.01
PHLPTOC 40...200000 ms 10
Operate delay time
PHIPTOC 20...200000 ms 10
Definite or inverse time

PHLPTOC Curve type: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, -
Operating curve type 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 17, 18, 19
PHIPTOC Definite time -
Non-directional earth-fault protection (EFxPTOC)
EFLPTOC 0.01...5.00 × In 0.005
Start value
EFHPTOC 0.10...40.00 × In 0.01
Time multiplier EFLPTOC 0.05...15.00 0.01
EFHPTOC 0.05...15.00 0.01
EFLPTOC 40...200000 ms 10
Operate delay time
EFHPTOC 40...200000 ms 10

EFLPTOC Curve type: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, -
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 17, 18, 19
Operating curve type
EFHPTOC Curve type: 1, 3, 5, 9, 10, -
12, 15, 17
Directional earth-fault protection (DEFxPDEF)

Start value DEFLPDEF 0.010...5.000 × In 0.005
1 = Non-directional
Directional mode DEFLPDEF 2 = Forward
3 = Reverse
Time multiplier DEFLPDEF 0.05...15.00 0.01
Operate delay time DEFLPDEF 50...200000 ms 10
Curve type: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
Operating curve type DEFLPDEF -
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 17, 18, 19
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 94

1 = Phase angle
2 = IoSin
Operation mode DEFxPDEF 3 = IoCos -
4 = Phase angle 80
5 = Phase angle 88
Three-phase under voltage protection (PHPTUV)
Start value PHPTUV 0.05...1.20 × Un 0.01
Time multiplier PHPTUV 0.05...15.00 0.01
Operate delay time PHPTUV 60...300000 ms 10
Operating curve type1 PHPTUV -
Curve type: 5,15,21,22,23
Positive-sequence under voltage protection (PSPTUV) main settings
Start value PSPTUV 0.010...1.200 × Un 0.001
Operate delay time PSPTUV 40...120000 ms 10
Voltage block value PSPTUV 0.01...1.00 × Un 0.01
Negative-sequence overvoltage protection (NSPTOV)
Start value NSPTOV 0.010...1.000 × Un 0.001
Operate delay time NSPTOV 40...120000 ms 1
Frequency protection (FRPFRQ) main settings
1 = Freq<
2 = Freq>
3 = df/dt
Operation mode FRPFRQ 4 = Freq< + df/dt -
5 = Freq> + df/dt
6 = Freq< OR df/dt
7 = Freq> OR df/dt
Start value Freq> FRPFRQ 0.9000...1.2000 × fn 0.0001

Start value Freq< FRPFRQ 0.8000...1.1000 × fn 0.0001
Start value df/dt FRPFRQ -0.2000...0.2000 × fn/s 0.005
Operate Tm Freq FRPFRQ 80...200000 ms 10
Operate Tm df/dt FRPFRQ 120...200000 ms 10
Negative-sequence overcurrent protection for machines (MNSPTOC)
Start value MNSPTOC 0.01...0.50 × In 0.01

Operating curve type MNSPTOC
Curve type: 5, 15, 17, 18
-
Operate delay time MNSPTOC 100...120000 ms 10
1 = on
Operation MNSPTOC
5 = off -
Cooling time MNSPTOC 5...7200 s 1
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 95

Loss of load supervision (LOFLPTUC) main settings

Start value low LOFLPTUC 0.01...0.50 × In 0.01
Start value high LOFLPTUC 0.01...1.00 × In 0.01
Operate delay time LOFLPTUC 400...600000 ms 10
Operation LOFLPTUC 1 = on -
5 = off
Motor load jam protection (JAMPTOC)
1 = on
Operation JAMPTOC -
5 = off
Start value JAMPTOC 0.10...10.00 × In 0.01
Operate delay time JAMPTOC 100...120000 ms 10
Motor start-up supervision (STTPMSU) main settings
Motor start-up A STTPMSU 1.0...10.0 × In 0.1
Motor start-up time STTPMSU 1...80 s 1
Lock rotor time STTPMSU 2...120 s 1
1 = on
STTPMSU -
Operation 5 = off
1 = IIt
2 = IIt, CB
Operation mode STTPMSU -
3 = IIt + stall
4 = IIt + stall, CB
Restart inhibit time STTPMSU 0...250 min 1
Phase reversal protection (PREVPTOC)
Start value PREVPTOC 0.05...1.00 x In 0.01
Operate delay time PREVPTOC 100...60000 ms 10
1 = on
Operation PREVPTOC -
5 = off
Thermal overload protection for motors (MPTTR) main settings
Overload factor MPTTR 1.00...1.20 0.01
Alarm thermal value MPTTR 50.0...100.0% 0.1
Restart thermal Val MPTTR 20.0...80.0% 0.1
Weighting factor p MPTTR 20.0...100.0% 0.1
Time constant normal MPTTR 80...4000 s 1
Time constant start MPTTR 80...4000 s 1
1 = FLC Only
Env temperature mode MPTTR 2 = Use input -
3 = Set Amb Temp
Env temperature Set MPTTR -20.0...70.0°C 0.1
Operation MPTTR 1 = on -
5 = off
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 96

Circuit breaker failure protection (CCBRBRF) main settings

Current value CCBRBRF 0.05...2.00 × In 0.05
Current value Res CCBRBRF 0.05...2.00 × In 0.05
1 = Current
CB failure mode CCBRBRF 2 = Breaker status -
3 = Both
1 = Off
CB fail trip mode CCBRBRF 2 = Without check -
3 = Current check
Retrip time CCBRBRF 0...60000 ms 10
CB failure delay CCBRBRF 0...60000 ms 10
CB fault delay CCBRBRF 0...60000 ms 10
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 97

1.A.7 TRANSFORMER UNIT PROTECTION RELAY SETTING FORMAT
Substation Name
Transformer Details
Relay SIEMENS 7UT61

Pri CT Ratio
Sec CT Ratio
Group 87 Differential Protection
ADDRESS Parameter
1201 87 Differential Protection ON/OFF
1205 87 Increase of Trip Char. During Start ON/OFF
1206 87 Inrush with 2. Harmonic Restraint ON/OFF
1207 87 n-th Harmonic Restraint
1221 87-1 Pickup Value of Differential Curr.
1226A 87-1 T I-DIFF> Time Delay
1231 87-2 Pickup Value of High Set Trip
1236A 87-2 T I-DIFF>> Time Delay
1241A 87 Slope 1 of Tripping Characteristic
1242A 87 Base Point for Slope 1 of Charac.
1243A 87 Slope 2 of Tripping Characteristic
1244A 87 Base Point for Slope 2 of Charac.
1251A 87 I-RESTRAINT for Start Detection
1252A 87 Factor for Increas. of Char. at Start
1253 87 Maximum Permissible Starting Time
1261A 87 Pickup for Add-on Stabilization
1262A 87 Duration of Add-on Stabilization
1263A 87 Time for Cross-block Add-on Stabiliz.
1271 87 2nd Harmonic Content in I-DIFF
1272A 87 Time for Cross-blocking 2nd Harm.
1276 87 n-th Harmonic Content in I-DIFF
1277A 87 Time for Cross-blocking n-th Harm.
1278A 87 Limit IDIFFmax of n-th Harm.Restr.
Group 87G Restricted Ground Fault Protection (HV Side)
1301 Restricted Ground Fault Protection
1311 Pick up value 87G-1
1312A T 87G-1 Time Delay
1313A Slope of Charac. 87G-1 = f(I-SUM)
1401 Restricted Ground Fault Protection. 2
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1.A.7 TRANSFORMER UNIT PROTECTION RELAY SETTING FORMAT
1411 Pick up value 87G-1

1412A T 87G-1 Time Delay
1413A Slope of Charac. 87G-1 = f(I-SUM)
Thermal Overload Protection
4201 Therm. Overload
4202 K - Factor
4203 Time constant (T) in min
4204 θ alarm
4205 I alarm in A
Over Excitation Protection
4301 Over Excitation. Protection
4302 U/F> Pickup
4303 T U/F> Time for alarm
4304 U/F>> Pickup
4305 T U/F>>
4306 T(U/F=1.05) time delay
4307 T(U/F= 1.1) time delay
4310 T(U/F =1.25) time delay
4314 T COOL DOWN
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 99

2 POWER PROTECTION SYSTEM SECTION II:
2.1 INTRODUCTION:
Demand for power is increasing day by day world over. The Alternating Current Transmission
Lines of 400kV and 765kV are very common along with 500kV and 800kV HVDC.
The complexity of the power system has further increased on account of high penetration of
renewable resources especially the wind and solar plants of MW scale the reliability
The protection and automation system plays an important role in meeting this requirement,
preventing system collapse during major system disturbances, reducing outage time and
minimizing the possibility of damage to the machines and equipment. Utilities should install
protection systems that are dependable.
There are very significant technology changes in the area of protection and Control. From
electronic static relays, there is a shift to digital microprocessor based relays and then further to
modern Numerical relays. The numerical technology has improved the protection functionality as
well as protection schemes. This has contributed is high reliability as well as dependability of
relays. The information and data communication capabilities of numerical relays provide vital
inputs for operation of the grid subsequent to a fault or power system disturbance. The
configuration of the relays has become vital to ensure above objectives.
Detailed specifications of each protection will have to be drawn by individual utilities while
framing purchase specifications. Major functional requirements and general setting criteria for
various protections have been dealt with in this document. It may be noted that wherever setting
ranges of relays have been mentioned in this manual, these are intended to be indicative.
Following considerations have been taken into account while making these recommendations:
 The state–of–art in the protection field and features of the presently available relays such
that the specified requirements may be complied with, by reputed manufacturers with their
proven products without any deviation and at reasonable costs.
 Enhancing dependability of fault clearance system.
When a fault occurs in the network a protective relay may fail to operate or a circuit breaker may
fail to open and interrupt the fault current. Such failures of a protective relay or a switching device
may prevent proper clearance of the fault.
The addition of a second main protection increases the availability and dependability of fault
clearance system. The provision of backup protection that operates independently of specified
devices in the main protection system enhances this further. However, there is bound to be extra
cost which needs to be justified against the consequences of power failure and consumer’s
dissatisfaction.
Therefore, the utilities should opt for the provision of additional protection and backup protection.
It is required that the protection engineer should keep this aspect in mind while reviewing
protection system in any given case. Numerical technology and IEC 61850 standard are
revolutionizing the protection and automation applications. The protection and control schemes
previously deployed using wire based philosophies can be implemented using IEC61850
mechanisms with improved performance, reliability, and operational benefits.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 100

Technology and Protection / control practices for new areas of power system such as HVDC,
renewable energy, FACTs etc. are evolving and may be different from manufacturer to
manufacturer. The practices and recommendations, in this manual are based on general acceptance
as on the date and may undergo changes as the technology moves further.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 101

3 BASIC OF POWER PROTECTION
3.1 INTRODUCTION:
Separation of the faulty section of the power system from the healthy section and minimizing the
isolated area prevents a widespread system disturbance and minimizes shutdown of power supply.
The protection scheme will prevent spreading of the fault or minimize the consequences of the
fault including effects arising from failure of a relay or breaker. The abnormal condition originated
by failure to operate a relay or a breaker to operate, a sudden change of power flow, or splitting of
the system during the process of fault clearance, any of which may cause the expansion of the
fault, and impact of the power system stability.
Fundamental requirements of Power Protection System are as follows:
 SENSITIVITY: Sensitivity is a term used when referring to the minimum operating level
(current, voltage, power etc.) of relays or complete protection schemes. Relays or protection
schemes are termed as sensitiveif their primary operating parameters are low.
 SELECTIVITY: When a fault occurs, the protection scheme is required to trip only those
circuit breakers whose operation is required to isolate the fault. This property of selective
tripping is also called ‘discrimination’.
 SPEED: The function of protection systems is to isolate faults on the power system as
rapidly as possible. One of the main objectives is to safeguard continuity of supply by
removing each disturbance before it leadsto widespread loss of synchronism and consequent
collapse of the power system.
The additional functions which are available with the numerical relay technology are as follows:
• Metering, oscillography, sequence of events captures with time tagging,
• Remote setting and monitoring through communications,
• User configurability of tripping schemes and other control logic.
• Multiple setting groups for easy adaptability to network changes
• The burden on the VTs and CTs is substantially reduced
• The systems have an ability for continuous self–checking.
 Protective Zone
• Protective zone is an important factor that determines selectivity among the performances
in which a protection relay should be required.
• Unit protection provides a protective zone by the location of the CTs to detect faults only
between the CT
• Locations as a well–defined zone according to the sensitivity of the settings.
• Non–unit protection (excluding directional comparison) has a zone which changes in
accordance with the setting values and is not constrained by other CT locations.
• The coordination between protection relays is the procedure to ensure that all the
protection relays operate systematically to minimize the power system outage area against
any fault based on the operation limitsor restriction conditions. On the other hand, when
a fault occurs in equipment which the protective zone does not cover, it may not be
cleared, or it may take longer time for the fault to develop into the protective zone and
then be cleared. Therefore, a fundamental principle of protection is that at least two different
devices are capable of detecting any fault anywhere on the power system.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 102

 CT Arrangement
There are three kinds of arrangement of CTs.
• In arrangement (1), a CT for bus bar protection and a CT for line protection are installed
at the line side from the breaker. In this case, the bus bar protection will operate for a fault
between the CT and the breaker, which should essentially be a line fault, so a part of the
busbar will be blacked out. However, as the fault is not totally cleared by the busbar
protection, the fault will also need to be cleared by the remote backup protection.
• In arrangement (2), CTs for busbar protection and CT for power line protection are
installed at the busbar side of the CB. In this arrangement, when a fault occurs between
the CT and the CB, which is originally a busbar fault, the line protection will operate
and therefore, the line will be out of operation. However, as the fault is not totally cleared
by the line protection, it will also need to be cleared by the remote backup protection or
locally by CBF if used.
• In arrangement (3), the CTs are installed at both sides of the CB; that is the CT for line
protection is installed at busbar side of the CB and the CT for busbar protection is installed
at line side of the CB. As both the line protection and the busbar protection will operate
against the fault between the CT and the CB will be cleared at high speed.
• The third arrangement is generally considered the best arrangement, because there is no
dead zone for fault detection between the CTs and the breaker as in the first two
arrangements. However, each must beconsidered in regard to the type of CT to be used
(e.g., bushing or post), or the substation space.
Fault clearance scheme and Special Protection scheme:
• Protection schemes are classified into two categories:
Fault clearance scheme: This comprises of Primary /Main Protection and Back up
protection that carries out isolation of faulty element of Power system
Special Protection Scheme: These are special schemes that prevents spread of
disturbance and ensures that all operating parameters are kept within allowable
operating limits.
• Primary /Main Protection: Main protection is installed for every equipment unit, such as a
transmission line, a busbar, a transformer etc.
When a fault occurs on any part of the power system, the main protection nearest to the fault must
operate faster than the other protection to minimize the extent of the power system that must be
isolated to clear the fault. As the protection zones must overlap, consideration must be given to
how the selectivity is achieved to avoid both zones to be tripped.
Main protection is generally provided as independent duplicate protection at higher Power system
voltages where the risk of one system failing to operate correctly in the intended high speed would
cause widespread consequential damage or power system instability. This is generally referred to
as Main 1 and Main 2, or Xand Y protection. Main I and main II protection is therefore provided
using the following configuration:
 Two independent CT cores at the same location

 Two VT signals on independent circuits from the VT even if they may be derived from the
same VT core.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 103

 Two relays of different operating principles or vendors e.g., distance and differential, two
distance from different vendors or two differential relays from different vendors
 Two independent trip coils in a common circuit breaker
A back–up protection is intended to operate when a power system fault is not cleared, or an
abnormal condition is not detected, in the required time because of failure or inability of main
protections to operate or failure of the appropriate circuit–breakers) to trip. The back–up
protection, by definition, is slower than main protection. Back–up protection is installed to improve
the dependability of the fault clearance system.
Back–up protection shall operate when main protection fails to clear a fault. In such a case, the
protection may not operate correctly, the circuit breaker may not receive any tripping command
or the circuit breakermay fail to open and interrupt the fault current. Such failures of a protective
relay or a switching device mayprevent proper clearance of the fault.
The requirements on back–up protection cannot be independent of the requirements on the entire
fault clearance system.
Use of elementary form of the single–failure criterion is often done while planning protection
system arrangement. It requires that the failure of any one component in a fault clearance system
should not result in a complete failure to clear a power system fault or abnormality.
Back–up protection is an important function of the protection system, and its design needs to be
coordinated with the design of the main protection. In this process, it is required that the protection
engineer should work closely with the power system planners and designers.
The system planner & protection engineers should be familiar with the following:
 System requirement and the system design criteria

 The plant specifications
 The failure rates of the protected plant
 The requirements of performance indices of the fault clearance system
 The requirements of reliability of protection equipment
 The probability that a switching device fails to interrupt the fault current.
 Stability of the power system
 Type of busbar arrangement / switching scheme
 Fault clearance system
The power system planner should help the protection engineer in formulating the requirements of
the fault clearance system. Points to be considered are the stability of the power system and the
type of bus bar arrangement and switching scheme. Protection engineers and the power system
designers must co–ordinate the demands on fault clearance system, as also the performance of
station equipment and strike a balance between technical and economic benefits and the risks
associated with making the protection system more complex.
3.2 FAULT CLEARANCE SYSTEMS
The basic task of any fault clearance system is to detect a specified class of power system faults
and abnormalities and to disconnect the associated item of substation or plant from the rest of the
power system. Figure below shows the components of a fault clearance system. Here TE stands
for tele-protection equipment.
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The faulty component should be disconnected as fast as possible and with minimum disturbance
to the consumers and minimum damage to the power apparatus. Reliability of protection includes
dependability and security of protection. Fault analysis and relay co-ordination are important
issues for the reliability of protection systems.
A power system fault is an abnormality that is the result of failure of primary equipment requiring
immediate disconnection of the faulty equipment from the rest of the power system by tripping of
the appropriate circuit breakers. Power system faults can be shunt, series or combination faults.
A non-power system fault tripping is tripping of a circuit breaker as a result of faults, other than
the power system faults. The tripping of a breaker may be due to other secondary equipment failure
or due to human error etc.
Figure 15 The fault clearance system
3.3 BACK–UP PROTECTION

By providing back-up protection, it is possible to reduce the risk when a protection relay or a
switching device fails to operate. There are number of reasons of failure of main protection system
or delay in operation.
The backup protections can be classified as under.
 Remote back up
The main protection and the back–up protection may be in different substations. It is installed at
the remote substation primarily to protect its own substation and the power line but is also to able
to detect faults that would normally be expected to be cleared by the local protection. The remote
back up relay will therefore have a slower operating time for faults in the local substation but will
operateif the local protection system (relay and breaker) fail to clear the fault.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 105

 Local back–up
It is installed locally in the same substation and operates when the main relay fails to operate for
a fault. These relays generally have a slower operating time than the main protection perhaps due
to different operating characteristics or due to grading between the relays.
The local back up protections can be further classified as:
• Circuit local back–up protection (The protection senses the same current and voltage
as the main protection.)
• Substation local back–up protection (The protection uses current different from the
one used by the main protection.)
Ideal back–up protection should be completely independent of the main protection. Current
transformers, voltage transformers, auxiliary tripping relay, trip coils and auxiliary DC supply
systems should be duplicated. This ideal condition is rarely attained in practice. The following
compromises are usually made:
 There is only one current transformer, but it has several cores. One core and its associated
secondarywinding energize each protection. Sometimes one CT secondary winding feeds
more than one protection.
 Common voltage transformers are normally used for cost and space optimization. Since
security of the VT output is vital, it is desirable that the supply to each protection is either
from separate cores or separately fused as close to the VT as possible and continuously
supervised by a relay that will give alarm on failure of the supply and prevent an unwanted
operation.
 Trip supplies to the two protections should be separately used. Duplication of tripping
batteries and of trip coils on circuit breakers is sometimes provided.
3.4 REMOTE BACK–UP PROTECTION
Remote back up protection is the ideal form of back–up protection, in systems where it can function
properly. Second and third zones of distance relays are examples of remote back up.
The advantage of remote back–up is that it is completely independent of the protection relays,
current transformers and voltage transformers of the main protection system. It is also independent
of the auxiliaryDC supply system and the breakers in the substation. There are hardly any hardware
failures that can affect both the main protection and the back–up protection. The setting of Remote
Back–up protection relays to cover the fault outside the first zone of protection beyond the remote
bus bars are quite complicated and sometimes less selective.
3.5 CIRCUIT LOCAL BACK UP PROTECTION
The circuit local back up protection uses the same current and voltage as the main protection.
Delayed directional or non-directional over current and earth fault relays that are provided in the
same circuit are examples of circuit local back up protection.
3.6 SUBSTATION LOCAL BACK UP PROTECTION
A substation back up protection is a time–delayed protection provided in the same substation but
normallyfed by a CT different from the one feeding the main protection. Over current protections
provided in the incoming feeders providing back up to protections in the outgoing feeders in a
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substation is one example of substation local back–up protection. It must be noted that in a meshed
network it may be difficult to obtain back up protection of EHV lines by means of substation local
back up protection.
In EHV substations it is possible to provide substation local back up protection by reverse looking
elements of distance relay.
3.7 BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
Breaker failure protection is part of the local back–up protection. The breaker failure protection
has to trip the adjacent breakers when the main breaker does not interrupt the fault current. The
most common, and simplest, breaker failure protection consists of a timer, which the protection
starts when it operates. If the fault current persists for longer time than the setting of the timer, the
breaker failure protection gives a trip command to adjacent breakers. Figure below shows the basic
decision process in any breaker failure protection. The re trip signal shown here is optional.
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Figure 16 Flow diagram for breaker failure protection
3.8 DUPLICATED MAIN PROTECTIONS

In EHV and UHV networks it is common practice to use duplicated line protections, viz.: Main,
Main 2 protections. Since the current transformers, the voltage transformers and the breakers are
the expensive components in the fault clearance system it may be difficult to justify the cost
for their duplication. Figure below shows example of modern line protection arrangement
suggested.
Figure 17 Duplication of main protections
Block 1 – First Main Protection for Main–1

Block 2 – Second Main Protection for Main–2
Block 3 – Tele protection equipment for Main–1
Block 4 – Tele protection equipment for Main–2
Block 5 – Telecommunication equipment for Main–1
Block 6 – Telecommunication equipment for Main–2
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3.9 APPLICATION OF SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION

An elementary form of the single–failure criterion requires that the failure of any one component
in a fault clearance system should not result in a complete failure to clear a power system fault or
abnormality. The single failure can be considered as follows:
Assume that the power system is either in its normal switching state or that one line is out
of Service. Further assume that a power system fault occurs on the power system as follows.
 Three–phase fault
 Phase–to–earth fault
 Phase–to–phase fault
 Open conductor or broken conductor fault
Assume that in the fault clearance system is faulty (in substation elements). Presume one of the
following types of faults in the fault clearance system.
 Loss of input from a voltage transformer,

 Loss of input from a current transformer,
 A failure to operate of a protection relay,
 A blown DC fuse,
 An interruption of a tripping circuit
 A failure of remote end communication (especially line differential protection)
 A failure to operate of a switching device.
Check if with the above fault(s), the fault clearance system clears the power system fault at pre–
defined
Locations considering the following types of faults on system elements:
 A line faults
 A bus bar fault
 A fault in power transformer
 A fault in the shunt reactor
Add second main protection or back–up protection until the fault clearance system clears all
thefaults.
 Check if the healthy lines and healthy items of plant can withstand the fault current for the
above cases. Add second main protection, back–up protection or reinforce the primary
equipment until it withstands the fault current during the fault clearance time.
It is necessary to carry out a more detailed analysis to check the above cases under different outage
conditions for which the system has been planned. Examples of outages to be considered are outage
of a line, outage of a power transformer, outage of a generator etc.
3.10 SPECIAL PROTECTION SCHEMES (SPS)
SPS are designed to detect abnormal system conditions and take predetermined, corrective
action (other than the isolation of faulted elements) to preserve system integrity and provide
acceptable system performance.
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3.11 REQUIREMENTS OF SPS

A fault which occurs in a power system will be usually cleared at high speed and with the minimum
blackout area by the selective tripping by fault clearance relays for stable operation in the power
system and localizing the section of the network to be isolated.
However, if the initial fault is followed by further or consequential events such as breaker failure or
unsuccessful reclosing, the network outage may extend to the whole power system. This may cause
a wide area and/or long duration blackout. It is rare that such consequential events occur
independently but rather two or more of these events occur sequentially or in parallel. This requires
to be addressed by SPS
An example of the process to wide–area blackout is shown in below.
Introduction of SPSs is one of the solutions to mitigate the influence of consequential events
in the Network.
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Figure 18 Typical Process to Wide–Area Blackout
SPS is used as the acronym for Special Protection Scheme, which has the same meaning as the
“System
Protection Scheme”. IEEE uses the term System Integrity Protection schemes (SIPS)
 Occurrences to be considered by the SPS

• Out–of–Step
In some cases, power system faults may evolve into “cross country faults” affecting more than one
transmission line simultaneously or sequentially causing significant changes in power flows on the
inter connected network. Power flows may also be affected by sudden load changes or loss of
generators on the grid. When these events occur, possibly in combination, the mechanical power
input and electric power output of generators may become unbalanced leading to under/over
frequency or under/over voltage on the network. In such conditions the generators will lose
synchronization with the power system. If this out–of–synchronism or out–of–step condition is
sustained for too long, cascading trip of the generators will be caused, and it has a possibility of
causingislanding of the power system network or widespread blackout of the whole power system.
When such anevent occurs, the suitable controls which stabilize the power system by various kinds
of protection relays or SPSs are necessary to be executed in the power system including the
generators which fall into out–of– step.
The SPS detects out–of–step near the electrical center, performs system splitting and prevents the
extension of the event. When a severe fault occurs in the system, the latter predicts out of
synchronous, and conducts the proper control such as a part of power shedding or system splitting
to stabilize the power system at anearly stage.
• Abnormal Frequency
Cascade tripping is the result of abrupt reduction in frequency
If the cascaded tripping of heavily loaded lines along with a power station outage causes the
frequency to drop, a SPS scheme will initiate controlled tripping such as load shedding or tripping
of a pumped storage generator during pumping in order to maintain the frequency. SPS schemes
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may also try to maintain the correct frequency in an islanded part of the system until it can be
reconnected to the rest of the system. Following could be initiated to normalize the system.
Tripping of generators
Fast generation reduction (runback) through fast valving or water diversion
HVDC Power transfer control
Load shedding
Controlled opening of interconnection to neighboring system to prevent spread
of disturbance
Controlled islanding of local system into spate areas with matching Generation
and Load
• Voltage Instability
When voltage instability results in voltage collapse, capacitors or shunt reactors are controlled by
a SPS and maintenance and recovery of voltage are performed so that it may not expand to the
whole system. Following may normally the site situation.
Change of voltage set point of Generator Voltage regulator
Automatic shunt switching
Control of series compensation
Blocking of tap changer of Transformers
Under voltage load shedding
• Overload
When transmission lines, bus bars, transformers or even the switchgear are overloaded above their
rated limits, it may be necessary to use an SPS to initiate load shedding or generator shedding to
prevent damage to the overloaded item that may otherwise lead to a more significant power system
fault.
Over loadings of transmission lines can occur due to excess demand coupled with outages on some
major lines of 220kV and above. If the control over the demand is not exercised, power system can
be paralyzed.
• “n–1” Criterion and SPS
Service reliability of the power system is maintained by giving the suitable priority to the measures
against prevention of cascade tripping and black outs. Whereas normal general protection schemes
are designed to deal with one fault event as an “n–1” criteria, the introduction of SPS also deals
with an “n–2” fault or an “n–3” fault. The use of SPSs is generally more economical than
significant power system network development to create parallel lines or mesh grids.
The general structure of a typical SPS is shown in Figure below:
One of the vital elements of SPS design is a reliable and secure communication infrastructure for
data exchange amongst monitoring and controlling action devices.
Synchro–phasors have now been deployed in Grid for real–time monitoring of network,
disturbance analysis and model validation.
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Figure19 General Structure of a System Protection Scheme
According to their control variables SPS can be classified as response–based or event–based.

Response– based SPS are based on measured electric variables (such as voltage, frequency, etc.)
and initiate their protective actions when the contingency has caused the measured value to hit the
trigger level.
The two most common response based types of SPS are under–frequency load shedding and under–
voltage load shedding
3.12 ISLANDING SCHEME
When power system disturbance takes place, several Special Protection schemes initiate actions to
limit the spread of disturbance. In spite of such action, the system parameters may further start
deviating adversely. In such situation it is recommended to isolate the region or area from
neighboring power system in order tosave part of the grid from total collapse. The power system
island thus formed is expected to remain stableby maintaining Load and Generation balance within
the Islanded area through several control actions.
Islanding scheme may consist of set of relays that detect Rate of change of frequency, under
frequency, direction of Power flow, under voltage, phasors etc. or combination of such sensors
connected on Tie points.
The fall in frequency can be at high rate. Frequency can touch very low value momentarily before
it starts recovering after islanding. It is necessary that Generating units ride through very low
frequency through suitable time delay provided on under frequency protection. It is advisable to
control the load once frequency starts falling.
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Pre–islanding load shedding is further supplemented by specially set of relays for under frequency
conditionduring islanded operation. Distress load shedding for a block of load may be necessary
by single manual command from control center (independent of SCDA system).
If the frequency starts rising, Automatic load restoration scheme may also be necessary.
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4 BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF POWER PROTECTION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Before we embark on the design of power protection, we need to understand the external
requirements and power system requirements.
4.2 EXTERNAL REQUIREMENTS
External requirements for protective systems encompass a wide range of nontechnical considerations
put on theprotection engineer by some external authorities. These considerations fall in the following
six categories:
 Requirements imposed by various governmental and other agencies regarding safety.
 Requirements imposed by manufacturers of the primary equipment in order to validate
equipment warranties.
 Requirements by insurance companies who underwrite equipment failures.
 Legal requirements to meet “prudent utility practice and industry standards” in the
event that primary equipment failures result in personal injury or property damage and
legal action is taken against the utility by the parties incurring damage.
 Requirements for the safety grounding systems.
 General power quality requirements from the customer
 Grid codes for Transmission connectivity - Indian Electricity Grid Code 1st April 2010
and Transmission planning criterion
Some of these requirements may not be imposed or felt at present by the protection engineers in
India. But as and when these are introduced by the concerned authorities to meet the requirements
of the system as aresult of deregulation and restructuring coming into force, the appropriate protection
application commensurate with the changed environment will have to make by the concerned
authorities. The following paragraphs give some more details of these requirements.
External requirements may comprise safety, legal, insurance, regulatory, grid code, technical (by
manufacturer) etc. They are described in brief as under:
 Safety Regulations
Electrical Safety Regulations may require some back-up protections. These requirements are
intended to meet the minimum requirements associated with public safety. This may have to be
complied with reference to the electricity rules & acts.
 Equipment Warranties
Each equipment carries warrantee. The manufacturer may require the utility to provide a minimum
level of protection.
 Insurance Requirements
Guarantee and protection system may be part of the insurance cover.
 Power Quality
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In the present time it is incumbent upon the power utility to supply quality power (Voltage &
frequency). The system may be suitable for it.
4.3 POWER SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
In general protection system criteria must meet the planning and operating criteria requirements
while meeting the specific requirements of the power system element being protected and
preventing damage toother power system elements supplying fault current.
Over tripping of protective system must be limited to events where more than (n-1) dimensioning
can be tolerated by the system. Failure of the protective system to operate during fault events must
be eliminatedby using appropriate back up protection to fulfill the requirement of planning criteria.
Duplicate protection and back-up protection must meet all of the design requirements of the planning
criteria at a minimal cost.
4.4 PROTECTION CRITERIA
Utilities may desire to provide for loss of one system element (such as equipment failure) during
peak load conditions. If this be the case such planning criteria should be made known to the
protection engineer. It is vital that there is very close collaboration between the planning and
protection engineers at the very early stages of the projects to identify the protection requirements
for the envisaged projects.
There are three types of criteria, as mentioned below, that the protective system must meet.
 Criteria specific to the equipment within the protective zone must be met. These are
construction specificrequirements such as tank rupture requirements of capacitor cans.
 Criteria specific to other equipment supplying fault current to the faulted element. These are
fault current withstand requirements such as the maximum fault current duration of a power
transformer.
 Criteria specific to the stability of the network. These are topology specific time limits
associated withvoltage and transient stability.
Power system faults subject the power generating units to voltage excursions and dips. If the power
system fault occurs close to the large power stations, there is a risk that many power generating
units could get disconnected from the transmission networks. This means that a correctly cleared
fault may cause an outageif the power-generating unit does not withstand severe voltage dips. Back-
up delayed clearance of a power system fault close to the power plant may cause a severe outage.
General voltage stability requirements determine the duration of the fault and are system
configuration dependent.
4.5 FAULT CURRENT WITHSTAND CAPABILITY
The substation equipment (Transformer, CB, CT, PT/CVT, Isolator etc.) must withstand only
system fault. The system elements are usually specified to withstand the fault currents associated
with back-up clearance times of 1.0 and 3.0 seconds.
The power system equipment must withstand both normal rated load currents and fault currents
specified. The rated peak withstands current and the rated short time withstand current characterize
the components. Fault currents are usually small in the initial stages of development of power
system. Normally, the magnitude of the fault current increases as the system develops. The
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magnitude of fault currents influences the dimensioning of the power system components like
transformers, circuit breakers and other primary equipment. High short circuit currents affect
primarily the mechanical and thermal dimensioning of the power system components.
The fault clearance system cannot normally influence the peak value of the fault current. The
properties of the fault clearance system can, however, influence the duration of the fault current.
Thus, the fault clearance time influences the heating of conductors during disturbances. The
protection engineer must know how long the power system components can withstand the fault
currents without permanent damage. In general, thecomponents of the power system are specified
to withstand the fault current duration associated with backup fault clearance as specified in
national and international standards. For example, transformer through fault capability is outlined
in ANSI/IEEE C57.12.00 and IEC Publications 76-5.
The fault level and duration of fault which are generally accepted are given in the table below.
Table 1-6 Rated Breaking Current of Switchgear at Different Voltages
System voltage Fault level Duration

132 kV 31.5 kA 1 sec.
220 kV 40 kA 1 sec.
400 kV 40/50/63 kA 1 Sec.
765 kV 40 kA 1 Sec.
4.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SYSTEM PLANNERS AND PROTECTION

ENGINEERS
It is recommended that the system planners and designers assess the requirements for 132kV,
220kV, 400kV and 765kV systems and coordinate with the protection engineers to ensure that
these requirements are fulfilled. Sometimes such requirements may have to be studied on case-
to-case basis where general guidelines may not be sufficient to meet the system requirements and
suitable measures taken.
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5 GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTION SYSTEMENGINEERING
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The increasing complexity in the substations of today, together with the increasing transmitted
power and the increasing fault current levels, increases requirement of control and protection
equipment.
The selection of the primary apparatus, choice of AIS, GIS or Hybrid switchgear, switching
arrangement tobe used and transformer sizes etc. are important in order to achieve a low life cycle
cost. Then choices ofcontrol and protection equipment is done e.g. conventional or computerized
control equipment, single or redundant protection systems, design and voltage of battery system,
choice of battery type etc. All choicesmust be done with the expected future development in mind.
Later changes will always mean a much higher cost than a selection made during inception
considering future needs.
These days, control and monitoring, signaling and event recording in most cases are done by
SCADA system.
5.2 ENGINEERING OF PROTECTION SYSTEM
 Group A and Group B Protection Systems

Wherever two sets of DC sources are available, the relays are electrically and physically
segregated into two groups. Grouping is done to the extent possible in such a way that each group
can independently carry out protective functions with near equal redundancy. Interconnection
between these two groups shall not generally be attempted. However, if absolutely necessary, such
interconnection shall be kept to the bare minimum. This will afford good maintenance.
The following can be implemented:
• Two groups of protections may be used each capable of performing the protection
function fully.
• Physical separation of the two groups as far as possible.
• Different cores may be used on the instrument transformers for the two protection
groups.
• Cables shall be laid in different cable ducts/layers as far as possible.
As the circuit breakers are not kept as standby, the failure of a breaker to operate will mean that
the fault is not cleared. In order to clear the faults, the surrounding breakers are then required to
operate. For applications where local back-up is required due to failure of “remote” protection
relays to detect the fault, a breaker failure relay is thus essential. The breaker failure relay measures
the fault current still fed through the breaker after expected tripping and will then trip all the
adjacent circuit breakers.
 Instrument Transformer Circuits

The instrument transformers are normally not duplicated but only provided with different cores
for the two sub-systems. The redundant protection systems are connected to different cores. One
current transformer core feeding both sub-systems should be avoided. Each Bus-bar protection
should be fed from a dedicated CT core. Any current loop feeding more than one panel should be
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avoided due to the risk of open circuits at terminating point or in the terminal itself (especially when
this has a disconnect able link). Both sub systems are normally connected to the same CT junction
box.
For voltage transformer circuits it is common to use separate secondary windings for the two sub-
systems. In some cases, if two windings are not available (ex. At lower voltage levels), the circuits
should be separatedusing different fuse groups in the marshalling box. This is normally acceptable
solution due to the high availability of voltage transformers.
 Physical Location of Panels

In subdivided systems the physical location of the protective relays and necessary auxiliary relays
in the panels is important.
It is preferable to use two different panels for group A and group B.
However, in some cases where the sub-systems take small place it is considered acceptable to put
the equipment for both sub-systems in the same panel. The risk of cable fire or other mechanical
damage which could influence the two systems in the same panel is negligible. Problems with
mixing up of circuits due to mistakes during erection, commissioning or maintenance must be
considered and steps should be taken to prevent such possibilities.
All equipment used in the protection system and also other auxiliary relays connected to the same
batterysystem, or fuse groups, shall be grouped together and clearly labelled. This includes the
equipment for closing, interlocking etc. which is located in the protection panel.
 Exchange of Information between two Subsystems

The main principle used when sub-divided systems are utilized is to avoid signal exchange between
the two systems. As far as possible, sub-systems shall operate completely independent of each other.
However, in most cases,some signals are required to go to other sub-system. Common signals are
discussed here under:
• Start and block of auto-recloser.
Auto-recloser is normally not duplicated due to speed problems with two units and also because a
failure to auto-reclose doesn’t result in serious issues. A number of signals are exchanged between
the sub-systems associated with starting and blocking of auto reclose function.
• Start of Breaker Failure Protection
Similar to Auto-recloser function, the Breaker failure relay/ function (BFR) is not standby in
redundant systems. The Breaker failure function has extremely high requirements on the security
against unnecessary tripping and duplication will mean an increased dependability but the security
will decrease. As the risk of breaker failure statistically is very low and the security aspect is more
important. The BFR function is only provided in one of the systems, normally in the Group A
protection system.
The exchange of information between the systems should be handled with utmost care to prevent
problems particularly when maintenance is done in one of the systems. Interface relays should be
put inside or on front ona preferably separate labelled area in one of the panels only. The terminals
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should also be clearly indicated inside the panel for easy identification and disconnection of the
correct terminals when the sub-systems are to be separated.
 Arrangement of Trip Circuits
Another main part of the protection system is the trip circuits. A failure of the trip circuit will cause
a failure to trip the breaker. As mentioned above the breaker itself is not duplicated for cost reason
and theonly realistic means of improving dependability is to use two trip coils on the breaker. This
will minimize CB operational failure problems associated with DC supply, the wiring or the trip
coil but will not give any advantage for mechanical problems in CB operating mechanism.
 Trip Unit
In case of segregation being made as indicated above, scheme associated with each circuit breaker
is provided with two sets of trip units, one in Gr A and one in Gr B. Each set consists of one unit
for 1phase and 3 phase tripping and another for 3 phase tripping only. 1 phase tripping unit and 3
phase tripping units are initiated by functions as described below. However, in case the protection
relay itself is having sufficient number of trip duty contacts then separate 1 phase trip units may not
be necessary. Dedicated 3 phase triprelay units are normally required to cater to various protection
functions giving 3 phase trip signals. Trip relaysupervision if often used to supervise healthiness
of trip coil and give alarm.
1-ph and 3-ph trip (Protections which start auto recloser function)
These units shall be applicable for line circuits only i.e., Main–I & Main II line protection and shall
be with self-reset type contacts
3-ph trip (protections which block auto reclosure function)
These will be latched type with hand/electrical reset facility indicated below
• Direct trip receive
• Reactor protections
• Bus bar protection
• LBB protection
• Transformer protections
• Overvoltage protection
• Back up protections
 Direct Trip of Remote End Breaker
It is recommended that for 400 kV and 765 kV systems, direct trip signal is sent to remote end on
the operation of following protections:
 LBB protection
 Reactor protection
 Overvoltage protection
 Bus Bar protection (under Tie CB open condition in case of one and half circuit breaker
layout)
 Manual line trip
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5.3 TRIP CIRCUIT SUPERVISION

Another means of improving dependability of the trip circuit is to include trip circuit supervision
relay/s. The trip circuit supervision relay shall be capable of monitoring under both CB OFF and
CB ON conditions. These can supervise the circuit from the relay panel to the breaker and will
detect open circuit or loss of DC supply. It should be ensured that all wiring is included in the
supervision.
 Cable Laying
For effective standby protection system, it is now a practice to use separate cables for
• AC & DC circuits
• DC–1 & DC–2 circuits
• CT & CVT circuits
 Alarming and Testing

The protection system is designed according to “single failure criteria”. This means that the “single
failures” in the protection system must be discovered within a reasonable time. An alarming of
secondary system faults is thus of same importance as the alarming of primary faults. The alarms
must be connected/ configured to give annunciation at remote control location as well.
Some faults are not detected by the supervision equipment. To detect these faults regular system
testing and post fault disturbance analysis are of vital importance. Testing and analyzing of
protection system behavior gives a possibility to detect “hidden faults” such as failure in some parts
of a protection relay and associated wiring connections or problems with selected settings,
configurations or with the used measuring principle.
 General about Security and Dependability

Most unwanted tripping in sub-stations is attributed mainly to human errors. A basic principle at
protection system design should be to design the protection system as simple as possible and also
fulfilling thesingle failure criteria.
The design of fault clearing system shall be such that human mistakes are avoided and this includes
mistakes during all stages of project.
The cost of an unnecessary tripping can be much higher than the initial incremental investment
needed to include some extra equipment for a robust system.
 DC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
A fault in the battery system will mean that neither control and protection equipment nor primary
equipment can fulfil their tasks. Often a complete station or a big part of a station is influenced by
a main problem in the auxiliary power system.
In many important substations of utility, it is usual to have a standby battery set for brake up and
proper distribution of DC supply.
 DC Power Distribution to Different Equipment
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Considerable care has to be given to the design of a system which will retain the reliability of the
protection system as a whole, under all conditions. Secondly from an operational point of view, it is
essential that it is possible to work on any part of the protection system with full security, while not
disturbing the rest of the protection system. Sub-fusing of the DC circuits shall be done with care
since blowing of the fuse will have to be monitored. Also, such sub-fusing shall be kept to the
minimum and can be augmented with isolating links as required.
Following can be considered for designing a suitable DC distribution system have been set forth.
• Following shall be connected to DC1
Group A protection through separately fused / MCB feed.
Close and trip coil 1 of associated circuit breaker through separately fused /MCB
feed.
Disconnector, earth switch and operation circuits and enabling circuits etc. through
separately fused/ MCB feed. In the case of a breaker and half CB arrangement, the
disconnector, earthing switch associated with the tie CB shall also be fed from DC1.
Bay control unit for control function through separately fused/ MCB feed with a DC
changeover supply circuit. (A DC change over scheme is used to change over to DC2
in case DC1 fails.)
LBB protection through a separately fused/ MCB feed.
• Following shall be connected to DC2
The DC2 distribution should be kept to minimum as much as possible. Preferably it
should only be
Used in relay panel and on breaker trip coil.
Protection Group B through separately fused/ MCB feed.
Trip coil 2 of circuit breaker through separately fused/ MCB feed.
 DC Supervision
A well designed supervision of the DC supply to each bay in a substation should be provided to
supervise the feeding fuse, an open circuit and a blown fuse/MCB in the sub distribution. Alarm
contact of the DC/ DC converters, if used, should be connected to the supervision so that a common
alarm is given when DC problems anywhere occurs.
Every DC supply going through fuse should be supervised with a no-volt relay. These no-volt relay
contacts used for alarm shall be delay and drop off type to take care of momentary supply
fluctuations. For trip circuits where separate trip circuit supervision relays are provided, it is good
practice to provide separate DC supervision relays in order to differentiate between DC incomer
fail and trip circuit fail.
Alarm circuits for DC problems will require secure AC supply and this must be ensured.
MCBs of adequate breaking capacity (short circuit current rating at rated voltage of the DC circuit)
can alsobe used instead of fuses. The auxiliary contacts (preferably fault trip type) of MCBs shall
be used for DC circuit supervision. DC fail, Trip circuit fail, IED fail contacts should be connected
to give alarm.
 PANEL DESIGN
The panel design and construction shall be done following a number of general guidelines:
• The layout should follow the layout of the primary switchgear to avoid confusion.
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• The panels should be clearly and visibly labelled, so that objects located in the panel
is easily identified.
• The possibilities of future extensions should be kept in mind both in panel design and
the location in the room etc.
Maintenance procedures should be simplified as much as possible and the design should minimize
the risk of mistakes such as testing the wrong object or the need of making a lot of reconnections,
to enable testing.
Panel enclosure shall be proven to offer adequate shielding for electromagnetic compatibility
particularly in the presence of intense electromagnetic interference fields.
 Terminals
The terminals inside a panel are small but important components in a substation. They should have
possibility to simply connect and disconnect wires with a clearly visible indication. A maximum
of two cores / wires are to be connected at each side of a terminal and a mixture of single core and
stranded wires should be avoided.
For terminal numbering, a clear nomenclature structure should be used to improve the total quality
and ease of troubleshooting. Different functional type of circuits in the panel can simply be
separated. The system used enables a clear separation of main and back-up protection and gives an
indication of interface and trip circuits which is of importance for the service and maintenance. A
terminal nomenclature system allowing for visibility of sub-system and circuit belonging is then an
important part to simplify and ensure a correct design.
 FAULT SIGNALING
When a fault takes place in the primary network. It is required that the operating personnel receives
information about fault type, whether the fault is persistent or transient, what phases are involved
and the fault location so that correct actions can be taken. At a fault in the protection and control
equipment, it is of great importance that the operating personal receives information about the
disturbances so that corrective actions can be taken. These faults don’t normally mean disturbance
for the system service but need to berepaired / rectified within a short time. An alarm for a fault
in the battery system like a lost battery chargingneed to be fixed within reasonable time depending
on the batteries capacity so that the station is not left without protection and control. Several
different equipment types are used to give information about primary and control equipment faults
which include:
• Local Annunciation and indication
• Sequential Event recorder
• Disturbance recorder
• Line Fault locator
• Remote signaling
 INTERLOCKING
The interlocking system will prevent human mistakes which can lead to severe damages of
equipment and/or injuries of persons. With the developments that have taken place in control
automation system and the increasing integration of circuits, it is of greatest importance to always
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 123

keep in mind the requirement ofindependence between the operation circuits and the interlocking
circuits.
 LOCATION OF CTs AND VTs

Instrument transformers (CTs and VTs) are used to obtain measured quantities of current and
voltage in appropriate form for use in control, protection and measuring equipment. In a substation
these are installed in different bays such as line, transformer, and Bus coupler and also at the
busbar. The location of instrument transformers has an impact on the engineering of the control
and protection schemes.
 Current Transformers
• Location
The location of the current transformers decides the protection zones. The most common approach
is to locate the current transformer outside the circuit breaker, so that bus bar differential protection
can cover the circuit breaker. The location should generally be as close to the circuit breaker as
possible. With this thezones where an incorrect tripping is achieved is kept to minimum. For GIS
switchgears a requirement to cover all GIS compartments from the bus bar protection without any
dead/blind zone is desirable. This can be achieved by providing CT cores on both sides of each
circuit breaker. This ensures an instantaneous trip for all faults in the GIS and minimizes the risk
of “burn-through”.
In double bus-bars scheme with bus coupler, the CTs are located on both sides of bus section breaker,
which facilitates overlapping of the two zones of protection and avoid blind zone. However, it is
also common to provide CT on only one side of the circuit breaker to reduce costs.
When Transfer bus bars are used a location of current transformers outside the C-disconnector is
preferred. The protected object will then still be in operation when the transfer bus bar and transfer
breaker is used to bypass any of the main breaker scheduled for maintenance and only a
rearrangement of the trip circuit to the transfer breaker needs to be done which is quite simple.
In one and a half breaker scheme for two lines, we can deploy 3, 4, 5, 6 or 8 CTs depending upon
the control requirement and space availability.
• Earthing
To prevent dangerous potential in the secondary circuit of a current transformer all secondary
circuits shall be earthed. The grounding of CTs is important to both safety and the correct operation
of protective relays. To assure safe and reliable operation, the neutral of the CT secondary should
have a single ground locationfor each circuit. The single ground is irrespective of the number of
CTs or the chosen grounding location. Utilizing a single ground eliminates the risk of redundant
ground loops and associated problems.
It is possible to earth the CT neutral either in CT junction box or in the control/protection cubicle.
However, it is preferable to earth the CT secondary neutral in the control/protection cubicle in order
to provide maximum security to the operating personnel. This should always be done at the panels
where it enters first.
• Terminals
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To enable a simple testing and reconnection of current circuits at commissioning/fault finding the
terminalsshould be brought to separate terminal blocks and suitable connections made on to these.
With this a simple change of current direction is achieved by changing the link. A simple test of
each core can be done from the terminals. The terminals should be of disconnecting types and
should be suitable for connection of normal test wires.
 Voltage Transformer
• Location
Normally, voltage transformers connected to the bus bars and at the low voltage side of the
transformers are satisfactory in a distribution substation. Directional Protection on outgoing bays
is then fed from the busbar VTs.
On the transmission voltage level, the protection equipment will normally require voltage
transformers at all objects, sometimes with exception of the HV side of power transformers.
Further, a single phase set is located at the bus bars for voltage, frequency and synchronizing
purpose. This avoids complex voltage selection schemes
 Earthing and Fusing

The secondary circuits are fused and earthed in the VT marshalling box or in the control/ protection
cubicle.This will ensure that dangerous voltages will not occur. However, it is preferable to earth
the VT secondary neutral in the control/protection cubicle in order to provide maximum security
to the operating personnel.
The fusing can be done with dazed fuses or Miniature Circuit Breakers (MCBs). VT secondary
neutral should also be grounded at one point only.
• Supervision
When a fault occurs, it is important that the fault is immediately detected and an alarm given to
enable the maintenance personnel to quickly repair the fault. A fault in a metering circuit will mean
incorrect metering, with loss of revenue. A fault in a protection circuit can mean one missing or
incorrect tripping which will lead to unnecessary disconnection of one or several objects.
The supervision of a voltage transformer secondary circuit can be done using a relay designed to
check asymmetry between the phases. Any fuse failure will mean asymmetry between the phases
which is then detected and the relay can detect one or two phase fuse failure.
Another method is using a differential voltage where the voltage of a main fuse, supplying the
protection relay, and a pilot fuse are compared. This principle will detect one, two or three phase
fuse failures.
If MCBs are used an auxiliary contact can be used to give alarm. If Distance protection relays shall be
blockeda special MCB with low instantaneous level and a very fast auxiliary contact must be used.
• Cabling
Dedicated cables shall be used for the voltage transformer secondary circuits. The cable shall be
screened and earthed at both ends to keep the disturbance voltages to low levels.
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The secondary cabling must ensure that fuse/MCB will operate, in a reasonable time, for a fault
at the far end of the cables.
Keep the voltage drop, due to the burden, one level lower than the inaccuracies in the voltage
transformer.
• Line CVTs
CVTs are used for metering, protection and synchronization. Located at the line entry they also
enable indication of voltage on a line energized from the opposite end. CVTs can also be used as
coupling capacitors for power line carrier (PLC). They are then to be located at the line side of the
line traps and line earthing switches.
For 220kV, 400kV and 765kV level it is recommended that each line bay is provided with CVTs
in all the 3-phases.
• Bus VTs/CVTs
3-phase VTs/CVTs on the bus bars provide input for metering equipment, relays and reference
voltage for synchronization.
• CT and VT Locations in Different Types of Bus Configurations
• Double Bus Arrangement
This is shown in Figure below. The CTs shall be placed near the circuit breakers (CBs) and on the
line side. The detection zones of line relays and bus-bar relays start at the CTs. It is advantageous
if the CT is located close to the CB. In the improbable case of a fault between the CT and CB the
bus bar protection will detect and clear the fault.
Figure 20 Double bus-bar arrangement
• Double Main and Transfer Bus Arrangement

This is shown in Figure below. It is advantageous to locate the CTs on the line side of the
disconnectors for Line and Transformer bays. In this way the protective relay connected to the CT
will remain connected to the line or Transformer when it is switched over to the transfer busbar.
A separate CT is required to be provided in the Transfer bus coupler bay to obtain selective tripping
for faults on Transfer bus. Figure below shows overlapping of zones of protection
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Figure 21 Double Main with Transfer bus arrangement
Figure 22 Overlapping of zones of protection in double Main with Transfer bus arrangement
• Bus Coupler and Bus Sectionalizer Bays

In the bus coupler and bus sectionaliser bays shown in figures above a set of CTs is necessaryto
enable different bus-bar protection zones to be formed. For faults between CB and CT the
protection can be arranged to give complete fault clearing with a short time-delay similar to LBB
time delay. Sometimes CTs on the two sides of CB are employed by some utilities but are usually
not considered necessary. Therefore, only one set of CTs is recommended considering costs
involved in providing one more set of CTs.
• CT and VT Locations in One and a Half Breaker Bus Configuration
These are shown in Figure 23Figure 24Figure 25 Figure 26. There are four main arrangements
that are normally used which are as follows.
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One and a half breaker arrangement with 4CTs

• One and a half breaker arrangement with 4CTs
This is shown in Figure 23. The CTs are located close to the CBs. Tie CB is provided with two
CTs. Thus, altogether there are 4 CTs per diameter.
Figure 23 One and half breaker arrangement with 4CTs
• One and a Half Breaker Arrangement with 3CTs

This is shown in Figure 24. The Tie CB is provided with only one CT. Thus, altogether there are
3 CTs perdiameter. This means saving of one set of CTs per diameter which is quite substantial. In
the secondary side one more metering core is provided. Thus, these CTs have 6 cores on the
secondary side compared to the those used in 4CT arrangement which have only 5 cores on the
secondary side.
Figure 24 shows overlapping of zones of protection in both 4CT and 3 CT arrangement.
Figure 24 Overlapping of zones of protection in One and half breaker arrangement with 4 CTs and 3 CTs
• One and a half breaker arrangement with 5 CTs
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Figure 25 shows 5CT arrangement. One CT each for the main CB and one CT for the Tie CB. In
addition, aseparate CT is provided on the line side thus making it altogether 5CTs per diameter.
The advantages with this arrangement are:
Paralleling of two CTs to the main line protection is not required. This gives better transient
response.
Many utilities have installations with 4CT arrangement where paralleling of 2CT cores need to be
done to obtain the current flowing through the line. The performance of this 4CT arrangement has
been satisfactory.
• One and a half breaker arrangement with 6 CTs
Figure 26 shows 6 CT arrangement. 1 CT each for the main CB and 2 CTs for the Tie CB. In
addition, a separate CT is provided on the line side thus making it altogether 6 CTs per diameter.
The advantages with this arrangement are similar to that of 5 CT arrangement. Since one more
CT is provided for the Tie CB,
Paralleling of two CTs to the main line protection is not required. This gives better transient
response
Fault between CB and CT is cleared instantaneously
Presently there are many installations with 4 CT arrangement where paralleling of 2 CT cores
need to be done to obtain the current flowing through the line. The performance of this 4 CT
arrangement has been satisfactory. For 765kV stations, generally 3 CT arrangement is used from
cost considerations. 6 CT arrangement is used where delayed fault clearance for faults between the
CT and the CB in the diameter is not acceptable.
Figure 25 One and Half breaker arrangement with 6 CTs Figure 26 One and Half breaker arrangement with 5 CTs
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 129

6 GENERATOR AND GENERATOR TRANSFORMER PROTECTION:
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Generators are designed to work continuously for years together. Despite the monitoring, electrical
and mechanical faults occur. The generators must be provided with protective relays, which,
quickly initiate a disconnection of the machine from the system and initiate acomplete shutdown
of the machine (if required) during fault condition.
• Generator protection system has undergone change from standalone discrete

electromechanical relays to static relays and now to multifunction generator protection
(MFGP) relay. Because of its distinctive advantages, MFGP, are being retrofitted even in
older machines. As most of the protection functions are available in both Main I and II
relays, Main I and Main II relays preferably be specified to be on different hardware
platform.
• Generator can be connected to the primary transmission system in following two ways:
Unit Scheme
In this scheme no switchgear is provided between the generator and generator transformer which
are treated as a unit. A unit auxiliary transformer is tapped off at the interconnection, for the supply
of power to the auxiliary plant.
Generator Circuit Breaker Scheme
In this scheme, a generator circuit breaker is provided between the generator and generator
transformer:
Generator unit is a complex system, associated with various electrical hazards which
require consideration. Some of them are as follows:
Stator insulation failure
Overvoltage
Rotor faults
Loss of synchronism
Over/under frequency
Overload
Unbalanced loading
Loss of excitation
Reverse power
Inadvertent energization of generator
6.1.1 Following are the various protections recommended for the generator and generator
transformer protection.
Table 1-7 Recommended Protections for Generator Transformers
GENERATOR STATOR
Short Circuits 87 G Generator differential
87 GT Overall differential
21 G Minimum impedance (alternatively
51/27 G Over current/under voltage)
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Asymmetry Stator overload Earth 46G Negative sequence

fault stator 51G Overload
64 Gl 95% stator earth fault
64 G2 100% stator earth fault
Loss of excitation 40 G Loss of excitation
Out of step 98 G Pole slip
Monitoring 32 G/37 G Low forward power/reverse power (Double
protection for large generators)
Blade fatigue 81 G Minimum frequency
Inter turn fault 95 G Over voltage or over current
Mag. Circuits 24G Over fluxing volt/Hz
Higher voltage 59 G Over voltage
Accidental energization 27/50 G Dead machine
Monitoring 60 G PT fuse failure
GENERATOR ROTOR
Rotor ground 64 F Rotor earth fault
GENERATOR TRANSFORMER
Short circuits 87 Overall Generator – Transformer differential
51GT Overcurrent
87 T Transformer differential
Ground fault 51 NGT Earth fault over-current Restricted earthfault
87 NT
Overhang 87 HV HV winding cum overhang differential
including TEED (required CTs can be
provided in GT Bushing)
UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER
Short circuit 87 UAT Transformer differential
51 UAT Over-current
Ground fault 51 NUAT Residual over-current
64 UAT Restricted earth fault
The above are in addition to normal transformer protection like Buchholz, Winding/Oil
temperature etc.
The transformer guards like Buchholtz protection, Winding temperature high, Oil temperature
high, etc. are also, important and shall be provided as per transformer manufacturer’s
recommendations.
Recommendations regarding selection of the generator protections for units of
different types and sizes are summarized in the table given below:
Table 1-8 Recommended protections for Generators
Functions Steam/Gas Turbines Hydro Turbines
Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
(<10 MVA) (10-100 MVA) (>100 MVA) (<10 MVA) (10-100 MVA) (>100 MVA)
Differential Y Y Y Y Y Y
95% Stator E/F Y Y Y Y Y Y
100% Stator E/F N O Y N O Y
Interturn Faults N Y Y Y Y Y
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Backup Impedance N Y Y N Y Y
Voltage Controlled O/C Y N N Y N N
Negative Sequence Y Y Y Y Y Y
Field Failure Y Y Y Y Y Y
Reverse Power Y Y Y Y Y Y
Pole Slipping N N Y N N Y
Overload N N N Y Y Y
Over voltage Y Y Y Y Y Y
Under frequency Y Y Y Y Y Y
Dead Machine N N Y N N Y
Rotor Earth Fault N Y Y Y Y Y
Over fluxing N Y Y N Y Y
Y- Recommended N- Not Recommended O- Optional
In addition to above, the protections recommended by manufacturer may also need to be provided.
6.2 REQUIREMENTS AND SETTING GUIDELINES
 Generator Stator
• Generator Differential Protection (87 G)

This is a unit type protection, instantaneous in operation, covering the stator winding for phase to
phase faults.
The generator differential relay is not sensitive to single phase to earth faults due to the high neutral
earthing resistance arrangement. As this protection operates for generator internal faults, opening
the generator breaker in class-A or non- sequential mode, eliminates the system in-feed to the fault
(if the unit is synchronized). For all machines of ratings 10 MVA and above, this protection shall
be provided.
• Requirements:
Shall be triple pole type with individual phase indication

Shall have operating time less than 30 milliseconds at 2 times setting
Shall be low impedance principle based
Shall have operating current 5 to 10% of nominal current
Shall have high stability against maximum through fault condition, CT saturation,
harmonics and DC transients
• Setting guidelines
The differential current setting should be set to a low setting to protect as much of the machine
windingas possible. A setting of 5% of rated current of the machine is generally considered to be
adequate. This sensitive setting is only allowed if the current transformers are well designed i.e.,
same types on both sides and good transient behavior even in the case of small fault currents with
large DC time constants.
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The first part of the slope in the bias characteristic would typically be set to 0% in order to maintain
protection
Sensitivity irrespective of the generator loading condition.
The bias slope break-point threshold setting would be set to a value above the generator rated
current, say120%, to achieve external fault stability in case of transient asymmetric CT saturation.
Slope of second partof the bias characteristic would typically be set at 15-20%.
Also refer to manufacturer’s manual for slope setting recommendations as they are dependent on
algorithms used.
• Overall Generator-Transformer Differential Protection (87)
This is a unit type protection with coverage from the generator terminals up to the HV breaker and
the generator transformer HV terminals. For GCB scheme duplicated transformer differential and
generator differential scheme may be provided instead of overall Generator- Transformer differential.
Alternately, Overall differential Zone may be restricted up to GT bushing whereas Zone of Teed
protection may be extended tocover up to GT bushing thereby eliminating the requirement of line
side CT in GT Bays.
It will detect phase faults on both sides of the generator transformer and single phase to earth faults
of the HV side only (the earth fault current on the LV side is very small, due to the high neutral
earthing resistance).
In case of breaker-and-half switching scheme, the CT’s associated with main and tie breakers shall
be connected to separate bias winding and these shall not be paralleled in order to avoid false
operation dueto dissimilar CT transient response.”
• Requirements:
Shall be triple pole type with individual phase indication
Shall have through fault restraint features for external faults with an adjustable or
multi-bias setting
Shall have, magnetizing inrush restraint features and also be stable for inrush under
normal over fluxing conditions, magnetizing inrush proof feature shall not be
achieved through any intentional time delay E.g., use of timers to block relay
operation
Shall have unrestrained instantaneous highest overcurrent unit operation which is
unaffected by Inrush
Shall have one bias winding per phase and per CT input. CT secondaries shall not be
paralleled in order to avoid false operation due to dissimilar transient responses.
Shall have an adjustable operating current
Shall have an operating time not greater than 30 milli seconds at 5 times setting
Shall have facility for ratio and phase angle correction through in built provisions.
• Setting guidelines
Minimum operating current setting
A minimum operating current setting of about 15% greater than the worst turns ratio mismatch at
the tap changer extreme should normally be selected.
Bias setting as per manufacturer’s recommendations.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 133

Unrestrained operating current setting

This is to provide instantaneous tripping in the event of severe internal faults and it is not blocked
for magnetizing inrush or transient over fluxing conditions. It should be set above the anticipated
level of inrush current. A setting of 10 pu is typically acceptable for most of the standard power
transformer applications.
Backup Protections for Short Circuits
This shall be provided for all machines of 10 MVA and above. Voltage restrained over current relay
may be used in place of minimum impedance relay in case of machines with rating less than 10
MVA.
Backup impedance protection (21 G)
This operates for phase faults in the unit, in the HV yard or in the adjacent transmission lines, with
a suitable delay, when the corresponding main protection fails to operate.
The impedance measured by the relay is influenced by the relay connection, the fault type and
generator and system source impedance for faults on the high voltage side of the delta-star connected
generator transformer. A circular characteristic the center of which corresponds to connection
position of VT or compensation for star delta transformer, should be used for this reason.
The impedance relay shall have fuse-fail interlock.
Requirements:
 Shall be triple pole type
 Shall have facility for at least two impedance zone with load encroach feature
 Shall have two adjustable definite time delay relays of 0.5-5 seconds
 Shall be suitable for measuring 2 and 3-phase faults within a set distance
from the point ofinstallation
Setting guidelines
First stage can be set to reach the step-up transformer and another stage to reach further into power
system. It normally needs to be set with a time delay to coordinate with other downstream relays
on the system.
The first stage detects short circuits in the generator or the LV-side of the step-up transformer. To
coordinate with the differential protection a short delay is used (close to 0.1s) to allow the
differential protection to tripfirst.
The second stage should be set to 70% of the maximum load impedance. This gives an adequate
margin for short time overloads, voltage variation etc., whilst giving adequate back-up protection
for generator, generator transformer and bus bar faults.
The time delay should allow coordination with downstream overcurrent and distance protection
devices and with stage 1 under impedance protection. Alternatively, it can be graded with the line
protection, both in impedance and in time settings.
Voltage restrained/controlled overcurrent (51V) protection for small generators
This protection is recommended for small generators as protection against phase faults. For grid
connected generators, overcurrent protection should be fed from CTs located on phase side or HV
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Bushing CT of Generator transformer. This type of protection should have following

characteristics
 Shall be able to operate when the fault current from the generator terminals
becomes low due to excitation system characteristic
 Shall have under voltage criteria
 Shall reset to de-energized position if under-voltage criteria disappear
Negative Phase Sequence Protection (46G)

The Negative Phase Sequence (NPS) protection safeguards the generator rotor against overheating
caused by the induced double frequency (100 Hz) currents when negative phase sequence currents are
present in the stator. The negative phase sequence current can appear due to unbalanced single
phase loads or transmission line unsymmetrical faults. This shall be provided for all machines of
ratings 10 MVA and above.
Requirements:
 Shall have an alarm unit and a trip unit
 Shall have a continuously adjustable negative sequence current setting
 Shall have alarm unit range covering negative phase sequence current of 5-10%
of generator rated current continuously adjustable
 Shall have a definite time setting range of 1-10 sees, associated with an alarm unit
 Shall have a trip unit with a variable time current characteristics matching with
the generator Characteristic
Setting guidelines
This protection has normally a pick-up range of 0.03 to 0.3 per unit and can protect the generator
suitable for the inverse time (I2)2t withstand capability, and the continuous negative sequence
withstand capability. The inverse time characteristic should consider the thermal heating by
integration of the current over time. The relays should be set to the NPS capability of the generator.
The NPS capability of the machine
Varies considerably from one machine to another. Alarm unit shall be set at 70-80% of continuous
withstand capability value of the machine and time delay for alarm can be 3 seconds.
Generator Overload Protection (51G)
Overload relay is used as an additional check of the stator winding temperature.
This may be provided for hydro units where there are high head variations and connected for alarm.
In case of thermal set there is no chance of thermal overloading as the machine is provided with
number oflimiters and therefore is not recommended.
Requirements:
 Shall be of definite time over-current type
 Shall have a continuously adjustable setting range of 50-200%
 Shall have a drop-off/pick-up ratio greater than 95%
 Shall have an adjustable time setting range of 2.5 to 25 sec.
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Generator Stator Earth Fault Protection

The high neutral earthing resistance arrangement limits the generator earth fault current to less
than 10 amperes, thus minimizing damage to the core laminations. Although a single phase to
earth fault is not critical, it requires clearance within a short time, due to the following:
It may develop into a phase to phase fault (due to presence of ionized air).
If a second earth fault occurs the current is no longer limited by the earthing resistor.
Fire may result from the earth fault arc.
To overcome the above, two different types of stator earth fault relays are recommended both
installed in the secondary circuit of the generator.
0-95% stator earth fault protection (64G1)
This protection zone is limited to approximately 95% of the stator winding due to the danger of false
tripping. This shall be voltage relay monitoring the voltage developed across the earthing resistor by
the neutral return current. This is normally used as back up protection. It also covers the generator
bus, low voltage windingof the unit transformer and the high voltage winding of the UAT.
For faults within 10% of the generator neutral, the resulting current is not enough to operate the
relay. This shall be provided for all machines of ratings 10 MVA and above.
Requirements:
 It shall be single pole type

 Shall have independently adjustable voltage and time setting
 Shall be able to protect 95% of stator winding
 Shall be suitable for operation from broken-delta voltage transformers or neutral
grounding transformers Secondary
 Shall be insensitive to 3rd harmonic voltage
Setting guidelines
When fault occurs on the high voltage side of a generator ∆/Y step-up transformer, there is no
voltage displacement of the generator neutral due to zero sequence current. However, there is a
small capacitive coupling between primary and secondary of the generator step up transformer and
this will result in a small generator neutral voltage for an external ground fault. In the absence of
firm data from which the neutral voltage is calculated, the sensitivity of 0-95% relay is limited to
about 4-5%.
5% of the phase-to-ground voltage is the lowest trip setting recommended. In this way, 95% of
the stator winding from terminals will be protected.
Tripping time is typically from 0.5 to 1 second.
100% Stator Earth Fault Protection (64G2)
This protects the whole stator winding and the generator neutral. The relay generally operates on the
principle of frequency signal injection into the secondary of the earthing transformer, detecting
the corresponding current if an earth fault occurs. The relay is set in terms of insulation resistance.
This is normally used as the main protection.
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The 95-100% relay if separately available, may be connected for alarm and operator can take the
machineout.
Requirements:
 Shall be suitable to protect 100%) of stator winding

 Shall be insensitive to external faults, transients and inherent harmonic currents.
 Shall be based on frequency injection principle
 Shall have continuously adjustable time delay
 Relay shall base on injection principle
 Shall continuously monitor ground and injection circuit
 Shall continuously monitor injection signal and injection equipment
 Shall be in service at standstill, startup and stop
Setting guidelines
 100% stator earth fault relay (Injection Principle)

 Pick up level of the relay = 1000 ohms
 time delay –1-10 seconds
Loss of Excitation Protection (40G)

A complete loss of excitation may occur as a result of unintentional opening of the field breaker,
an open circuit or a short circuit of the main field or a fault in AVR. When a generator with
sufficient active load loses the field current, it goes out of synchronism and starts to run
asynchronously at a speed higher than the system absorbing reactive power for the excitation from
the system. Under these conditions the stator end regions and part of the rotor get over heated.
This is recommended for machines of all sizes above 10 MVA
Requirements:
 Two stage mho characteristics lying in 3rd and 4th quadrant of impedance
diagram with adjustable
 Reach and off set. Alternatively, protection based on admittance principle may
also be considered.
 Shall have an under voltage relay and/or over current relay as an additional check
 Shall have timer with adjustable range to distinguish loss of excitation from power
swings
Setting guidelines
The protection function is offset from the origin by one half of the direct transient axis reactance
X’d/2 to prevent mis operation during system disturbances and other fault conditions. The diameter
of the stage-I circle is adjusted to be equal to the direct axis synchronous reactance .
Stage I with a diameter of 1.0 pu on the machine base to trip faster with a time delay less than 0.3
seconds and sometimes with no time delay. The characteristic is adapted to the dynamic stability
limit and responds from full load down to 30% load.
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Stage II supervises the steady state stability limit of the machine and tripping is normally delayed
with a time delay from 0.5 to 1.5 seconds. This is active for low load operation of the generator
and partial field voltage failure.
Table 1-9 Recommended Protection Settings
Recommended Setting Stage I Stage II
Diameter 1 PU ( Generator Base) Xd
Offset 0.5 Xd 0.5 Xd
Time delay Zero with U/V Time delay -0.5-1.5s
Pole Slipping Protection (98G)

Pole slipping of generators with respect to the system, can be caused by a number of conditions
leading toan increase in rotor angular position beyond the generator transient stability limits. Some
of the causes of pole slipping are:
Large network disturbances
Faults on the electrical network close to the generator
Weak tie between the network and the generator (tripping of transmission lines)
Loss of generator field (field winding or excitation supply failure)
Operating the generator in an excessive under excited mode
This is recommended for machines of 100 MVA and above. For hydro machines utilities can decide
dependingon machine parameters.
Requirements:
 Shall be capable of detecting a power swing which can lead to instability in
addition to
 Shall be being able to detect an actual pole slip
 By varying size of the characteristics, it shall be possible to ensure that a trip
command is given to the
 Circuit breakers in such a way that separation of the poles occurs at a controlled
angle at any time.
Setting guidelines
Out-of-step protection relies upon impedance measurements as viewed from the generator
terminals. The measured impedance is compared to specific characteristics to detect if a power
swing is in progress. The generator is connected to the grid via a unit transformer. The critical
situation for a machine occurs when the power swing trajectory crosses into the generator or unit
transformer impedance. The out-of-step protection should not operate for power swings out in the
grid. Therefore, two zones are often used.
If the source of oscillation lies within a generator/transformer unit, the machine has to be isolated
from the network after the first slip. Forward reach of relay characteristics shall cover
generator/generator transformer. Tripping in this zone shall be in the first pole slip. The reach of
this zone is 0.7 XT.
If the source of oscillation lies outside the unit in the network, the generator should not be switched
off or at least not until several pole slips have occurred.
Low Forward Power/Reverse Power Interlock Relays (32G/37G)
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The low forward power / reverse interlock is recommended for thermal machines and reverse power
protectionmay be used for hydro machines to protect against motoring. However, recommendation
of OEM (TurbineManufacturer) needs to be taken into consideration as well.
When the steam flow through turbine is interrupted by closing the ESVs or the governor valves, the
remaining energy stored in the set is delivered to the system and the machine enters into a motoring
condition drawingpower from the system to supply its losses while keeping the turbo alternator
shaft at synchronous speed. The low forward power relay detects that the unit is motoring and
cause shutdown.
Requirements:
 Shall be single phase power measuring type

 Shall have a power setting of approximately 0.5% - 1% of rated active power of
generator unit
 Shall have independent time delay relay with setting range of 1-10 seconds and
0-20 seconds respectively on pick up
 Shall have one more common timer with a pick up setting range 5-50 seconds for
annunciation that the Turbo generator set has started motoring
 Have suitable arrangement for preventing the operation of this protection during
start up and Synchronizing of the unit
 Shall be provided with possibility of angle correction to facilitate measurement of
power accurately
Setting guidelines
Steam Turbine – 0.5-6%. With steam turbines, operation at full vacuum and zero steam input,
motoring will draw 0.5 to 3% of unit rating. A sensitive power relay is then required.
In order to override conditions of power swings due to disturbances or synchronizing, reverse
power is normally implemented with a long delay that could reach as high as 30 s.
 For Sequential Tripping Power relay pickup < 0.05 x Pn Timer tl - 2 seconds
 For Anti Motoring Tripping Power relay pickup < 0.05 x Pn Timer t2 – 20-30
seconds
Under-frequency Protection (81G)

The under frequency protection
Prevents the steam turbine and generator from exceeding the permissible operating
time at reduced frequencies
Ensures that the generating unit is separated from the network at a preset value of
frequency that is less than the final stage of system load shedding
Prevents the AVR from exciting the machine at reduced speeds when some
protective relays may not perform at all
Prevent over fluxing of the generator. The over fluxing relay is used to protect against
small over fluxing for long periods while the over voltage and under frequency relays
also protect against large over fluxing for short times
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The stator under frequency relay measures the frequency of the stator terminal voltage.
Though under frequency tripping is recommended by turbine manufactures, care should be taken
by grid operating personnel in ensuring that machines are not run at lower frequencies and instead
resort to means like load shedding in the event of overload.
Requirements:
 Shall have one alarm stage and two tripping stages

 Shall have setting of range of 45 Hz - 55 Hz with a least count of 0.1 Hz for each
stage.
 Timer for alarm stage have a range of 0.5 to 5 second with the least count of 0.5
second. Timers for
 each tripping stage shall have range of 1 to 10 seconds with the least count of 0.1
second
 Shall have under voltage blocking
Setting guidelines
The manufacturer shall provide frequency protection scheme
Inter Turn Fault Protection (95G)
Inter turn fault protection is recommended only for machines where there is a split winding and
all the six terminals are brought out on the neutral side.
For generator with split neutrals, conventional inter-turn fault protective scheme comprises a time
delayed low set over-current relay which senses the current flowing in the connection between the
neutrals of the stator winding. Alternatively, a split phase differential protection may be used.
Another option is to use transversedifferential protection. For generators with single winding, Inter-
turn protection based on zero sequence voltage drop across winding may also be used.
Requirements:
 Over current relay with time delay

 Over current relay shall have built in filters to reject higher harmonics
 Range of over current shall be selected depending on maximum spill current for
external fault
Setting guidelines
 For machines with Split winding Overcurrent relay shall be set to maximum
unbalanced current in case of External fault. Time delay 0.2 - 0.4 seconds
 For machine with non-split winding: Zero Sequence voltage drop across winding
>5% with a time delay of 0.2 - 0.4 seconds may be adopted.
• Generator Transformer & Generator Over Fluxing Protection (24 GT/24G)

Over fluxing protection is provided to safeguard the generator, generator transformer and unit
auxiliary transformer against operation at flux densities which may cause accumulative damage to
the core. Separate over fluxing protection is to be considered for generator circuit breaker scheme.
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From the fundamental equation V = 4.44 x f x n x ∅, the level of flux is proportional to the ratio
of terminal voltage to frequency (v/f). This ratio is monitored by the protective relay.
An over fluxing condition is more likely to occur while the generator is separated from the system
and the speed is allowed to drop, but it can also happen with the machine on load if the tap changer
of the generator transformer (HV side) is on a low tap position and the excitation of the generator
is manually increased. In this case the increased generator terminal voltage may cause over fluxing
tripping at nominal frequency.
The over fluxing protection operates with a time delay after which the tripping functions are
executed.
This protection must be provided for generator-transformers of size 10 MVA and above.
Requirements:
 Shall be phase to phase connected.

 Shall operate on the principle of measurement of voltage to frequency ratio.
 Shall have inverse time characteristics compatible with generator transformer
over fluxing
 Shall have withstand capability for tripping.
 Provide an independent alarm with a definite time delay of value of V/f between
100% to 130% of rated value.
 Shall have a high resetting ratio of 98% or better.
Setting guidelines
The limit curves for volts per hertz for a turbo generator and a step up generator transformer should
be joined together in the same diagram to show the overall limit that is the basis for the protection
settings. The over fluxing capability of the transformer must be checked and the characteristic
matched accordinglyfor both alarm and trip.
The over fluxing alarm stage threshold setting, V/Hz Alarm Set, can be set lower than the trip stage
setting to provide an indication that abnormal conditions are present and alert an operator to adjust
system parameters accordingly.
• Generator over Voltage Protection (59G)
An over voltage on the terminals of the generator can damage the insulation of the generator, bus
ducting, breakers, generator transformer and auxiliary equipment such as voltage transformers,
excitation transformer etc. This should be provided for machines of all sizes, hydro and thermal
Requirements:
 Shall have two separately adjustable stages

 Shall have a continuously adjustable setting range of 100 - 140% of rated voltage
 Shall have a drop off to pick up ratio greater than 95%
 Shall have a continuously variable time delay setting range of 0.5 - 5 seconds for
one relay and 2 to 20 seconds for the other relay.
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Setting guidelines
Typically, this is set around 110% of the nominal phase-phase voltage or higher. Definite–time
characteristic can be used. This allows for coordination with the voltage regulator (AVR), to allow
it to respond to a transient over voltages that do not pose a risk to the generating plant; e.g., following
load rejection where correct AVR/ Governor control occurs. The typical delay to be applied would
be 1to 3s with a longer delay being applied for the lower voltage threshold settings.
A instantaneous device may be used for extreme overvoltage (130-150%) of the nominal phase to
phase voltage. The time delay should be set to 0 s.
Stage 1 - Over voltage relay pick up - 1.15 x Vn Timers tl - 3 s
Stage 2 - Over voltage relay pick up - 1.3 x Vn Timer t2 - 0 s
• Dead Machine Protection (27/50G)

Despite existence of interlocking schemes, a number of generators have been inadvertently
energized while at stand still or on turning gear. The generator and rotor may get damaged beyond
repair under this condition. Other protective relays like loss of excitation, back up impedance,
reverse power would operatewith delays and this is not admissible. The dead machine protection
permits fast tripping.
This should be installed in switchyard panel rather than in generator panel to ensure that protection is
availableduring maintenance periods when the generator protection can be rendered inoperative by
switching off theDC supply to the panel.
This protection is recommended for all machines of size 100 MVA and above. The protection is
connected to trip generator breakers, generator transformer breaker and the HV Bus.
Unlike conventional protection schemes, which provide protection when equipment is in-service,
these schemes provide protection when equipment is out of service. Thus, great care should be
taken when implementing this protection so that dc tripping power and relay input quantities to
the scheme are not removed when the unit being protected is off-line.
Requirements:
 Shall consist of 3 high speeds over current relays of range (0.02 - 20 In) to initiate
instantaneous tripping if generator terminal voltage is below set value.
 Shall have under voltage relays of range (0.2-1 Un) to permit operation of over
current relays when voltage is low
 Shall have timers with adjustable range (0-60s) to avoid operation of protection
for nearby fault when the machine is in service.
 Shall be secure against voltage transients at closing
Setting guidelines
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Table 1-10 Recommended Relay Settings for Voltage & Current

For Weak System For Strong System
Overcurrent relay 1.25-2 pu 3-4 pu
Under voltage relay 20% to 40% rated voltage 50% to 70% of rated voltage
Activation of relay (Greater Than
More than dead time typically 3 secs
system Fault clearing time)
After voltages rises above threshold limit of Under Voltage Relay
Deactivation time
Typically, 1 sec.
6.3 GENERATOR-TRANSFORMER PROTECTION

For short circuit protection, transformer-differential relay and over-current relay connected to
different groups are recommended. For ground faults, earth fault o/c relays and restricted earth
fault relay connected to different groups are recommended.
• Generator Transformer Differential Protection (87 GT/87 T)
Requirements:
 Shall be triple pole with individual phase indication

 Shall have unrestricted instantaneous high set over current units which shall not
operate During inrush
 Shall have an adjustable or multi bias setting
 Shall have second harmonic or other inrush proof features and also shall be stable
under normal over fluxing conditions. Magnetizing inrush proof feature shall not
be achieved through any intentional time delay e.g., use of timers to block relay
operation or using disc operated relays.
 Shall have one bias winding per phase and per C.T. input
 Shall have an adjustable operating current
 Have an operating time not greater than 30 milli seconds at 5 times of setting
 Shall have facility for ratio and phase angle correction either through auxiliary
transformer or through in built provisions.
Setting guidelines
 Minimum operating current setting

 A minimum operating current setting of about 15% greater than the worst turns
ratio mismatch at the tap changer extreme should normally be selected.
 Bias setting as per manufacturer’s recommendations.
 Generator Transformer Backup Overcurrent Protection

• Generator Transformer Backup Overcurrent Protection (51 GT)
Requirements:

 Shall be of definite time over current type
 Shall have an adjustable setting range of 50-200% of rated current and 0.5-5
seconds time delay”
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OR
 Shall be of IDMT characteristic (IEC standard inverse).
 Shall have an adjustable setting range of 50-200% of rated current.
• HV winding cum Overhang Differential Protection (87 HV/87 NT)

This is a unit type protection which operates for earth faults on the generator transformer HV side
and also covers a large portion of the HV winding and the HV terminals upto the HV current
transformers. Alternately, Zone of Teed protection may be extended to include transformer HV
winding as well.
Requirements:
 Shall be triple pole type (Single pole if used as Restricted E/F Protection)
 Shall have operating time less than 30 milliseconds at 2 times setting
 Shall be high impedance or low impedance type
 Operating current shall be 0.1 - 0.4 In
 High stability against maximum through fault condition, CT saturation,
harmonics and DC transients
 Shall be provided with suitable nonlinear resistors across the relay to limit the
peak voltage to 1000 volts, in case of high impedance type
 Shall be provided with faulty phase identification
Setting guidelines
Minimum operating current setting of 10 % of power transformer rated current is used for solidly
earthed systems. If the CT transient performance of the CTs is not identical this may have to be
increased. Bias setting shall be as per manufacturer’s recommendation.
6.4 UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER PROTECTIONS

For short circuit protection, unit auxiliary transformer differential relay, overload relay for alarm
and over current relay connected to different groups are recommended. However, a utility may carry
out an applicationcheck and decide not to have a separate differential relay for UAT.
For ground faults residual O/C relay and Restricted E/F relays connected to different groups shall
be provided. The type of connection may be either current based or voltage based depending on the
groundingsystem.
• Unit Auxiliary Transformer Differential Protection (87 UAT)
This is a unit type protection covering the unit transformer and the cable connection to the unit
board.
This protection operates for phase faults, but not for single phase to earth faults as this current is
limited by the neutral earthing resistance.
The unit transformer differential relay initiates a general trip and unit shutdown.
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Requirements:
 Shall be triple pole with individual phase indication
 Shall have unrestricted instantaneous high set over current unit which shall not
operate during inrush
 Shall have an adjustable or multi bias setting
 Shall have second harmonic or other inrush proof features and also should be
stable under normal over fluxing conditions, magnetizing inrush proof feature
shall not be achieved through any intentional time delay e.g., use of timers to
block relay operation or using disc operated relays.
 Shall have one bias winding per phase and per C.T. input
 Shall have an adjustable operating current
 Shall have an operating time not greater than 30 milli seconds at 5 times of setting
 Shall have facility for ratio and phase angle correction either through auxiliary
transformer or through in built provisions.
Setting guidelines
 Minimum operating current setting
 A minimum operating current setting of about 15% greater than the worst turns
ratio mismatch at the tap changer extreme should normally be selected.
 Bias setting as per manufacturer’s recommendations.
 Unrestrained operating current setting
• Unit Transformer back up over current protection.

• Unit Auxiliary Transformer back up over current protection (51 UAT)
Requirements:
 Shall be of IDMT over current type (IEC standard inverse).
• Unit Auxiliary Transformer Backup Overcurrent Protection (50 UAT)

Requirements:
 Shall be of instantaneous over current type
• Unit Transformer Back-up Earth Fault Protection

• Unit Auxiliary Transformer Back-up Earth Fault Protection (51 NUAT)
Requirements:
 It shall be of IDMT over current type (IEC standard inverse).
 It shall have a setting rage of 10-100% of rated current and time setting range of
0.5-5 seconds
• Unit Auxiliary Transformer Restricted Earth Fault Protection (64 UAT)

Requirements:
 It shall have operating time less than 30 milli seconds at 2 times setting
 It shall be high impedance or low impedance type
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 The operating current shall be 0.1 - 0.4 In

 It shall have high stability against maximum through fault condition, CT
saturation, harmonics and DC Transients
 It shall be provided with suitable non-linear resistors across the relay to limit the
peak voltage to 1000 volts, in case of high impedance type
 It shall be provided with fault indication
Setting guidelines:
Minimum operating current setting of 10 % of power transformer rated current is used for solidly
earthed systems. If the CT transient performance of the CTs is not identical this may have to be
increased. Bias setting as per manufacturer’s recommendation
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7 PROTECTION OF TRANSMISSION LINES AND CABLES
7.1 INTRODUCTION
In protection of transmission lines dependability and security of protection are of great importance.
Any uncleared fault may create unwanted widespread tripping and lead to grid disturbances. On
the otherhand, unintended operation of protection relay and tripping of transmission line during a
stressed power system condition, may cause cascaded tripping and lead to grid
disturbances/collapse.
Transmission circuit Main protection is required to provide primary protection for the line and
clear all typeof faults on it within shortest possible time with reliability, selectivity and sensitivity.
Transmission circuit back–up protection takes care of failure of any main protection system to clear
any fault that itis expected to clear. A protection function that offers back–up for most faults may also
provide main protection for some fault conditions. However, there could be some known
limitations of the operating principles of themain protection having restrictions in relay settings
that could be applied to the main protection. Back–up protection may be provided for.
 Circuit local back–up, Substation local back–up, Remote back–up.
Two main protections could be justified on the basis of being able to keep an important
transmission circuitin service with one set of protection remaining in service while second set of
protection is taken under maintenance. Where two main protection systems are provided. It will be
possible to select mainprotection systems that cover each other’s limitations.
Overhead transmission lines and cables are exposed to various natural & man made calamities.
Some transmission lines are combination of overhead conductor & underground cables. The type
of protection signaling (tele–protection) or data communication systems required to work with the
protection systems will also influence protection scheme requirements.
7.2 OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION CIRCUITS
Physical arrangements of overhead conductor support vary depending on voltage level and cost
considerations.
The electrical parameters of resistance, reactance and capacitance are mainly influenced by the size
and typeof conductors, conductor configuration and geometry with respect to each other and with
respect to groundalong with the earth wires on top of towers
The thermal balance of electrical heat input and heat dissipation governs circuit load current
capacity. Heat inputs are from l2R losses, solar radiation and solar conduction. Heat dissipations are
through radiation and conduction, which depends on ambient temperature, wind velocity and chill
factors.
Use of correct line parameters is important for proper setting of protective relays. Calculation of
overhead line electrical parameters at nominal system frequency and line surge impedance are
usually performed using dedicated computer software. These calculations may then be verified by
carrying out measurements on final installations that could be subjected to field testing, as ground
conduction effects influence the zero sequence surge impedances. This information may then be
used by protection engineers to determine optimum relay settings.
• Ground Wires
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Ground wires are used to shield the conductors and insulators from lightning surges. The angle of
shield (angle between ground wire point to conductor point) is 300 maximums up to 220kV. For
higher voltages it is lower. The angle and number of ground wires depend upon the height of the
tower & keraunic level. Ground wire also helps in reducing the apparent.
In case the magnitude of lightning impulse is too high, there is a back flashover on the insulators.
The design of transmission line should take care of BIL of the insulators with relation to the
grounding resistance. Where the soil resistivity is high it is usual to adopt counter poise type
earthing system for tower.
7.3 UNDERGROUND TRANSMISSION CIRCUITS (CABLES)
The electrical characteristics of HV and EHV cables for underground transmission set by the
physical configuration of the conductors and the properties of the insulating media, which affect the
capacitance of the cable. The materials used and the voltage rating determines the external
diameter and the weight of a cable. Heat dissipation within a cable is predominantly through l2R
load current losses and this is normally dissipated by conduction through the dielectric to the soil in
which the cable is buried. Cooling may be enhanced by special back–fills in cable trenches.
Cable shunt capacitance per unit length is much higher than for overhead lines. Charging currents
increase with cable voltage ratings. This means that inductive shunt compensation is commonly
required for EHV cables and also for unusually long HV cables.
Cable faults are exclusively permanent faults. Consequently, automatic reclosing is not used for
underground transmission circuits. In cable circuits, faults can also occur in associated switchgear
and cable joints.
Cables do not withstand fault currents for long periods of time; consequently, they demand the use of
protection without any time delay. This is a feature of unit protection, such as current differential
protection, through pilot wires or fiber optic cables, which is often applied to cable circuits.
7.4 COMPOSITE TRANSMISSION CIRCUITS
Planning strategies and design requirements sometimes demand the creation of composite
transmission circuits. The typical composite circuit is a mix of overhead and underground circuit.
With non–homogeneous series impedance for a composite circuit, especially where cable sections
are involved, there may be some difficulty in optimum impedance settings for distance relays and
in setting optimum residual compensation for ground faults.
In some cases, planning strategy may lead to a gradual implementation of complex transmission
arrangements. With long intervals between successive stages of implementation, it is not possible
to engineer protection systems at each stage that will suit the final configuration. When such
changes take place it is required that changing, refurbishing or upgrading of protection systems
harmonizing with the power systems already in operation, be carried out.
7.5 COMPLEX TRANSMISSION CIRCUITS
The following types of lines can be classified as complex transmission circuits that often present
special protection difficulties:
• Parallel transmission lines where two or more three phase transmission circuits are
arranged on the same tower or follow the same right of way on adjacent towers.
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• Multi–terminal lines having three or more terminals with substantial generation behind
each.
• Composite lines where system elements like transformers, overhead lines or cables are
connected together without intermediate circuit breakers.
• Series Compensated lines
7.6 PARALLEL TRANSMISSION CIRCUITS
Many times, more than two circuits of same voltage or different voltage are laid on single tower
due to space constraint.
The possibility of multiple faults occurring simultaneously on more than one circuit of a
transmission networkimposes special demands on protection in terms of phase selection for single–
pole tripping, that may affect high speed single phase auto–reclosing.
With double circuit tower construction, there is relatively strong inter–circuit magnetic coupling
between conductors, which is expressed in terms of various inter–circuit mutual impedances for
the purposes of short–circuit calculations and analysis of protection performance. It is usually
acceptable to neglect the positive and negative sequence mutual impedances since they are only a
fraction of the positive sequence self–impedances. It is sometimes necessary to consider the
coupling from the positive sequence network tothe zero sequence network when setting sensitive
residual over current protections. Zero sequence mutual impedance should not be ignored, because
of its relatively high value and its possible influence on proper ground fault protection of lines.
There are some cases of circuits at different voltage levels sharing the same tower. This may lead
to inter– system faults. Despite their severity, it may be very difficult to discriminatively detect such
faults with protection functions that are dependent on voltage measurement. The appropriate phase
selection difficulties are even greater for these lines. Phase–segregated unit protection based on
current measurement is the best option for both circuits when it is economically and technically
feasible.
The main consequence of the magnetic coupling between parallel overhead lines is the
modification of the zero sequence voltage profile during a ground fault on one circuit. The zero
sequence voltage profile alongany circuit will not be entirely dependent on the zero sequence
current flowing in that circuit. Instead, it will depend on zero sequence current flowing in the
parallel circuit(s).
It is clear that protection functions based on voltage measurement are those most likely to be
affected by zero sequence mutual coupling, as detailed below:
• Directional Ground Fault Protection
Zero sequence voltage and current signals are those most commonly employed by ground fault
directional control elements. A ground fault on one circuit may cause operation of directional
ground fault protection on a partially parallel circuit due to partial zero sequence mutual coupling.
This problem does not exist for parallel circuits between common substation bus bars.
• Distance Protection Reach Accuracy
The reach of distance protection ground fault elements is adversely affected by modification of
power system zero sequence voltage profile through zero sequence mutual coupling. If zero
sequence currents flowing in parallel circuits are of similar phase to the current in the protected
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circuits, ground fault distance elements will under reach. If the currents are virtually in anti–phase,
the distance elements will tend to over reach.
The tendency for distance protection to over reach is of no consequence for distance elements,
which areintended to overreach a protected line, such as Zones 2 or 3. Any tendency to under reach can
be compensatedfor, when setting the over reach elements. Consequently, all tele–protection schemes
based on over reachingelements are suitable for protection of magnetically coupled circuits, when
set to take into account under reaching during ground faults. However, where common impedance
settings exist for phase and earth fault impedance elements, it should be noted that any compensatory
increase in distance element over reach maymake it necessary to employ current reversal guard logic
in a tele-protection scheme. Where the overreaching elements are also used to provide Zone–2 back–
up protection for end zone faults, a compensatory increase in reach may also create discrimination
problems with phase to phase fault protection for short adjacent lines.
A potentially problematic case of Zone–I overreaches to be noted is when a parallel circuit is
switched out and grounded at both terminals. In such an instance, the Zone–1 reach security margin
may be greatly reducedor it may even become negative in some applications.
One of the methods to compensate for the effect of zero sequence mutual impedance is to take zero
sequence current signal from the parallel circuit and use it to provide compensation. This technique
is not effective when parallel circuit is disconnected and grounded at both ends. For this reason,
this method is not used forprotection but used for fault location.
In general, it is not advantageous to introduce mutual compensation for distance protection
schemes. An alternative to implementing mutual compensation is to apply individual zero sequence
compensation factor for each zone of ground fault distance protection. Another option is different
groups of setting parameters fordifferent operating conditions of the double circuit line.
From the above it transpires that correct calculation of the transmission line impedance matrix
with zero sequence parameters be carried out and proved by field tests before using them in setting
the relays.
7.7 MULTI–TERMINAL TRANSMISSION CIRCUITS
Whenever a transmission circuit has three or more terminals, its protection may be subject to adverse
effects within the protected line due to the effects of in feeds. Depending on the protection
operating principle, these effects may be a cause for concern. Additional in feed can increase
impedances seen by distance relays and out feed can cause directional protection at one terminal
to identify an internal fault as external. Carrier–aided protection with efficient information links
with judicious application of correct measured and protection relays should be applied.
• Shunt Compensated Transmission Circuit
The distributed shunt capacitance of a transmission line can cause a voltage rise when load is
lower than normal (Ferranti Effect).
Switched or non–switched shunt reactors are often used to compensate for high levels of shunt
capacitance for long overhead lines or for underground cables. The shunt compensation is
invariably located at terminal substations, where it may be connected to the associated circuit by an
isolator switch or by a circuit breaker. The former option is less expensive, but it may be necessary
to de–energize the line to insert or switch–off the reactor. Sometimes shunt reactors controlled by
circuit breakers are connected to EHV bus bars. In many other cases, shunt reactors (and many
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times Static Var Compensators with inductive and capacitive compensation range) are also
connected to the tertiary windings of interconnecting autotransformers (ICT) for control of
downstream voltage profile. With expansion of power network, many times the line lengths get
shortened and intermediate stations are connected with loop in and loop out (LILO) connections.
Under such conditions the non–switched line reactors provided on the long lines are removed or
replaced by bus reactors. Under certain conditions it may be advisable to use the controlled shunt
reactor that could remain on the line for all conditions of operation. Such application could be kept
in view to provide minimum changes in reactor shifting.
Shunt compensation equipment must have its own protective gear. Where a shunt reactor is
connected to a transmission circuit only by isolator switch, its protection requires a fast and reliable
transfer–tripping scheme in order to remove remote–end fault current in feed.
When single–pole tripping and auto reclosure is applied, capacitive and inductive coupling may
delay the extinction of the secondary arc and the faulted phase voltage decay may be delayed. This is
due to resonance between shunt reactor inductance and the capacitance coupling to live phases after
the breaker is tripped. This may delay arc extinction for a transient fault and so single–pole auto
reclose dead–times may need to be extended for limiting the parameter of secondary arc current
to a practical value of about 10 amperes. A Surge Protected Neutral Reactor usually of 0.2 to 0.4
Pu ohmic value is connected between neutral of EHV shunt reactor and the ground. This requires
the ratio of zero to positive sequence impedance of shunt reactor be around 0.9 to limit the BIL of
shunt reactor to around 550 kV in a 400 kV network.
• Series Compensated Transmission Circuit
Series compensation allows higher liability to the transmission line (particularly in a long
transmission line) beyond permissible surge impedance loading.
Series compensation may also help in mitigating voltage collapse, help in optimizing load
distribution / improve quality of power supply.
Sometimes Thyristor Controlled Series Capacitor (TCSC) is used. Some of the reasons for this
could be power oscillation damping, prevention of sub synchronous resonance or load flow
control.
The protection relaying of lines provided with series compensations are quite complicated and
need to be evolved after detailed system studies.
7.8 TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT FAILURE MODES AND RATES
Transmission lines can suffer from faults due to number of reasons attributable to natural & man
induced reasons. They are described below:
• Arcing Faults
Many types of fault-inducing events result in the creation of an arcing fault between phases of a line,
between phases and tower structures or between phases and ground. Fault arcs present non–linear
fault resistance.
• Smoke Hazard
Accidental or deliberately initiated bush fires are quite common during certain seasons. Burning of
sugarcanewaste close to transmission line is one such example. Smoke from such fires may induce
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arcing faults as a consequence of air ionization. Some faults may be located across insulators or
between a pair of phases and these will not differ much in nature from those initiated by lightning.
It may often be necessary to provide high resistance ground fault protection as supplementary main
protectionin order to detect such faults, which may also act as back–up protection for solid faults
and is therefore recommended.
• Vegetation Faults
There can be many line faults to ground, which are caused by rapidly growing vegetation. Bamboo
plant is one such example. From operational experience, such faults are known to be of high
resistance. The fault presents itself as a very high resistance to earth (of the order of several kilo
Ohms). Thermal energy dissipation in the tree resistance results in a tree–length flashover. This
occurs after several seconds.
Ground fault elements of distance relays may not detect the high resistance faults and the sensitive
ground fault protection can also take care of high resistance faults due to growing vegetation.
• Forms of Overhead Line Faults
The failure rates of power lines vary from utility to utility and from year to year. The most
common typeof fault is phase to ground fault (of the order of 75% or more) and most faults
are transient in nature. Since most faults involve ground, consideration must be given to the
levels of ground fault resistancethat might be encountered for particular applications and whether
the main protection will be able to detect all such ground faults. If not, supplementary protection
may be required to cover high resistance faults. The ground fault elements of distance relays
should be supplemented by a sensitive residual over current relay.
7.9 TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
To determine the protection requirements for transmission circuits it is necessary to identify
the main protection requirements for each of the system voltage level and then to identify
application specific requirements in relation to the protected circuit which may include the
following
• Maintaining transient stability of the power system
• Maintaining operation of power station auxiliary system
• Avoiding loss of supply to bus bars
• Quality of supply
Application specific requirements may include the following:
• Protect a transformer feeder
• Protect a tapped line through a step–down transformer
• Protect a circuit with more than two terminals
• Protect a circuit in series compensated network
• Detection of broken conductors/jumpers of overhead lines.
• Detection of high resistance faults on overhead lines
Combinations of main and back–up protection systems should be used to address the main and
application specific requirements for transmission circuits.
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• Maintaining Transient Stability

Common requirements for circuits at primary transmission voltages are the maximum permitted fault
clearance time in order to maintain system transient stability. A single time limit is often quoted for a
particular transmission voltage level, but separate limits might be quoted for different fault types.
On the basis that most protectionarrangements rely on a single protection system to clear different
types of solid fault, a single time limit is usually used as a main design requirement.
It must be recognized that the maximum permitted fault clearance times declared for a primary
transmission system will not remain fixed. Power systems undergo constant evolution. In
particular, the changes in the location, capacity and design of generating plant that occur on most
power systems demand constant reviews by system planners of the maximum permitted fault
clearance times for existing transmission circuits. For EHV system the desired fault clearance time
of 5 cycles that include the relay time, breaker time and carrier times is generally applied. It may
be desirable for EHV lines to have a maximum total–break time ofcircuit breakers as 2 cycles (40
milliseconds) giving freedom to optimize the time of protective relay and information links.
When applying the single–failure protection design criterion, and where there is a potential
transient stability problem, a second protection system should be provided which will clear
faults within the maximum permitted time for affording transient stability of the line.
This means that the second form of protection must be circuit–local and it must have similar
operating speedand discrimination qualities to those offered by the main protection. This form of
protection is referred to as second–main protection or Main–2 protection.
7.10 TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT PROTECTION SCHEMES
Listed below are schemes that are normally applied in a major power system. Some of the main
attributes and limitations in the schemes are also listed under them which need to be examined
critically
• Distance Protection (Without signaling channel)
• Multizone Distance Protection (With Three or More Zones)
Attributes
 Affords fast tripping at both ends for about 60% of the protected line
 It offers remote back–up protection
 It offers substation back–up (Offset Z3 or reverse Z4)
 It can be phase selective
 It is suitable for transformer feeders
 It is suitable for composite circuits (lines/cables) Limitations
 It affords delayed tripping at ends of the line (for about 40% of protected line)
 Offers limited resistive fault coverage
 It is dependent on VT signals
 No detection of series faults
 Zone 1 reach problems for series compensated lines
 Lack of discrimination for faults between circuits of different voltage levels
• Distance Protection (Signal Aided)

• Accelerated Under Reach Distance Protection
Attributes
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 It affords communication independent fast tripping at both ends for about 60% of
the protected line
 It affords accelerated tripping at one end for faults in about 40% of the protected
line
 Suitable for large in–zone loads and for transformer feeders and composite
circuits (lines/cables)
Limitations
 It affords delayed tripping at ends of the line with 80% Zone 1 reach setting (for
about 40% of protected line)
 in case of communication failure
 It’s resistive fault coverage limited by Zone 1
 It is not always suitable for multi terminal lines
 Affords no detection of series faults
 There are Zone 1 reach problems for series compensated lines
 There is lack of discrimination for faults between circuits of different voltage
levels
• Permissive under Reach Distance Protection

Attributes:
 Affords fast tripping at both ends for about 60% of the protected line
 Affords accelerated tripping at one end for faults in about 40% of the protected
line
 It offers substation back–up (Offset Z3 or Z4)
 Suitable for large in–zone loads, suitable for transformer feeders and composite
circuits (lines/cables)
Limitations:
 Delayed tripping at ends of the line (for about 40% of protected line) in case of
communication
 Failure
 Resistive fault coverage is limited by Zone 1
 It is not always suitable for multi terminal lines
 Affords no detection of series faults
 Many designs can be directionally unstable for series compensated lines
 It is a Zone 1 reach problems for series compensated lines
 There is a lack of discrimination for faults between circuits of different voltage
levels
• Inter tripping under Reach Distance Protection

Attributes
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 It is communication independent and affords fast tripping at both ends for about
60% of the protected line
line
 Suitable for large in–zone loads, transformer feeders and composite circuits
(lines/cables)
 It is suitable for multi–terminal lines where all faults can be seen by Zone–1 from
at least one terminal
Limitations
communication
 Failure
 Resistive fault coverage is limited by Zone 1
 Dependent on VT signals
levels
• Permissive Overreach Distance Protection

Attributes
 Communication independent and fast tripping at both ends for about 60% of the
protected line
line
 Offers remote back–up protection
 Offers substation back–up (Offset Z3 or reverse Z4)
 Suitable for large in–zone loads, transformer feeders and composite circuits
(lines/cables)
 Suitable for multi–terminal lines where all faults can be seen by Zone–2 from all
terminals (no out feed)
Limitations
communication failure
 Resistive fault coverage limited by Zone 2
levels
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• Permissive Overreach Distance Protection with Weak in Feed logic

Attributes
 Affords communication Independent fast tripping at both ends for about 60% of
the protected line
line
 Offers substation back–up (Offset Z3 or Z4)
 Can be phase selective
 Suitable for multi–terminal lines where all faults can be seen by Zone–2 from all
terminals (no out feed)
 Open terminal signal echo logic possible
Limitations
 Delayed tripping at one end for about 40% of protected line in case of
communication failure
levels
• Blocking Overreach Distance Protection

Attributes
 Communication independent fast tripping at both ends for about 60% of the
protected line
 Communication independent tripping with small delay at one end for faults in
about 40% of the
 Protected line
 Offers substation back–up (Offset Z3 or Z4)
 Can be phase selective
 Suitable for large in–zone loads
 Suitable for transformer feeders, composite circuits (lines/cables) and multi–
terminal lines where there is no out feed for an internal fault
 Dependable scheme for use with PLC (where in–zone fault attenuates PLC)
 Suitable for series compensated lines with special designs provide directional
discrimination
Limitations
 Loss of external fault security with undetected communication failure
levels
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 Phase Comparison Protection

• Modulated Power Line Carrier Communication
Attributes
 Affords fast tripping for 100% of line
 Affords communication independent tripping
 It is suitable for transformer feeders, and composite circuits (lines/cables)
 Tripping with one weak/ open terminal
 Tripping not affected by PLC attenuation
 Not dependent on VT signal
 Can discriminate for faults between conductors at different voltage levels
Limitations
 Loss of external fault security with undetected communication failure
 No remote back–up protection
 Needs additional units for phase selection
 Not usually suitable for multi terminal lines and for transformer feeders
 Current Differential Protection

• Digital Communication
Important Features
 It is fully discriminative without time delays
 It is independent of VT signals
 Affords moderate to high resistive fault coverage
 It can be inherently phase– selective
 Variety of communications media possible
 Sophisticated supervision of communication links included in it
 It discriminatively detects faults between conductors at different voltage levels
 It is operational during single pole A/R
 Single phase tripping is possible for simultaneous faults on parallel lines
Limitations
 It is dependent on communication
 It does not inherently offer remote back–up protection
 Commissioning difficulties are likely for long lines
 Sensitivity varies with load
 Shunt capacitance may limit sensitivity
 It is unstable with large in zone loads
• Pilot Wire Communication

Important Features
 It is fully discriminative without time delays
 It is independent of VT signals
 Affords moderate to high resistive fault coverage
 It discriminatively detects faults between conductors at different voltage levels
 They are relatively low cost relays
 Single phase tripping possible for simultaneous faults on parallel lines Limitations
 No remote back–up protection is possible
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 Protection dependent on healthy pilots

 Requires metallic pilots
 Commissioning difficulties for long lines
 Application is limited to relatively short lines
 Insulation required for induced voltages in parallel and differences between
substation ground
 potentials
 Sensitivity varies with load (Biased schemes)
 Shunt capacitance may limit sensitivity
 Directional Protection
• Directional Comparison Protection (Permissive)
Important Features
 Variety of communication media possible
 It is fully discriminative with short time delays
 It is suitable for long lines
 It can be phase selective (by design)
 Affords moderate–high resistive fault coverage
 Weak–in feed / open–terminal logic possible
 Application to multi–terminal lines is possible
 Protection of parallel circuits is possible
 Discriminative detection of faults between conductors at different
voltage levels is possible
Limitations
 No remote back–up protection
 It is protection dependent on communication
 Some standard designs e.g., DEF are not universally suitable for series
compensated lines
 Pick up for external faults with no reach control elements
 Directional ground fault protection must be inhibited during single pole
dead times
• Directional Comparison Protection (Blocking)

Important Features
 Variety of communication media is possible
 It is fully discriminative with short time delays
 Affords communications independent tripping
 It is suitable for long lines
 Application to multi–terminal lines is possible
 Affords protection of parallel circuits
 It is suitable for composite circuits
 Possible application to multi–terminal lines
 Possible detection of series faults
 Some special designs are suitable for series compensated lines
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 Discriminative detection of faults between conductors at different

voltage levels
Limitations
 The security is dependent on communication
 There is no remote back–up protection
 Directional ground fault protection must be inhibited during single pole
dead times
• Protection scheme Considerations for Cable Circuit

The main features and limitations of individual protection schemes described above are mainly made
with respect to overhead or hybrid transmission circuits. For pure cable circuits, which are
generally relatively short in length, the most common and favored form of protection is current
differential protection. Here again, it should be preferably current differential protection using
dark fibers / digital communication and not pilot wires as the experience with the latter has not been
satisfactory, especially where pilots are laid in the same trench in which power cables are laid. This
is often the case in city areas where distances are more than akilometer.
The relatively low impedance of cables per unit length, together with the relatively short length
for a cable circuit has traditionally precluded the application of distance protection in view of the
low impedance settingwhich would be required for under reaching zone of protection. However,
distance relays have been applied in blocking overreaching or permissive overreach signaling
channel–aided schemes, without under reaching zones.
With the advent of modern numerical distance relays, with lower impedance setting ranges, better
accuracy at low impedance settings and with the necessary range and accuracy of neutral
impedance compensation available it is now more feasible to apply under reaching distance
protection schemes to cable circuits as short as 2 km in length.
The distance relay when applied should preferably be as other Main (Main–2) protection.
7.11 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LINE PROTECTION RELAY
 General
Based on the details given above, few general recommendations have been brought out and these
should be considered.
• The line protection relays are required to protect the line and clear all type of faults on
it within shortest possible time with reliability, selectivity and sensitivity. Provision of
independent Main–1 and Main–2 protection is important to ensure clearance of all
faults in the shortest possible time.
• With growing interconnections fast fault clearance in 220 kV lines is becoming
important to avoid grid disturbances. Therefore, it is recommended that for all 220 kV
lines Main 1 and Main 2 protections be provided.
• For 132 kV lines provision of one Main protection and directional over current and
earth fault protection as back–up protection is adequate. However, if in any given part
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of the 132kV network, is very sensitive provision of Main 2 protection should alsos be
considered here too.
• Distance relay as Main protection should always be complemented by Directional
ground protection to provide protection for high resistive line faults.
• The potential loss of system generation or the potential challenges to nuclear plant
safety systems will dictate the longest acceptable clearance times for transmission
circuit faults in the vicinity of a power station.
• Cables do not withstand fault currents for long periods of time. Unit protection should
be used as main protection and distance protection shall be used as Main–2. Differential
protection with built in back up impedance function can be used as both Main–I and
Main–II protection.
Recommendation for provisions of line protection at different voltage levels are summarized as
follows:
 765 kV, 400 kV & 220 kV Voltage Lines

There should be two independent high speed main protection schemes called Main–I and Main–
II with at least one of them being carrier aided non–switched three zone distance protection. The
other protection may be a phase segregated current differential (this may require digital
communication) phase comparison, directional comparison type or a carrier aided non–switched
distance protection. Further, if Main–I and Main– II are both distance protection schemes, then
they should be preferably of different types. However, they need not necessarily be of different
make. Both the protections should be suitable for single and three phase tripping. In addition to
above following shall also be provided:
•Two stage over–voltage protection. However, in such cases where system has grown
sufficiently or in case of short lines, utilities on their discretion may decide not to
provide this protection.
• Auto reclose relay suitable for 1ph/3ph (as required with deadline charging and synchro
check facility) reclosure.
• Sensitive IDMT directional E/F relay (standalone or as built–in function of Main–I &
Main–II relay)
 132 kV Lines
There should be at–least one carrier aided non–switched three zone distance protection scheme. In
addition to this, another non switched/switched distance scheme or directional over current and
earth fault relays shouldbe provided as back up. Main protection should be suitable for single and
three phase tripping. Additionally, auto–reclose relay suitable for 1ph /3ph (as required with dead
line charging and synchro–check facility) reclosure shall be provided. In case of both line protections
being Distance Protections, IDMT type Directional E/F relay (standalone or as built–in function of
Main–I & Main–II relay) shall also be provided additionally.
7.12 REQUIREMENTS OF PROTECTION RELAYS / FUNCTIONS
 Distance Protection : Distance Protection scheme shall have the following features:
• They will have numerical relay with at least Four independent zones
• They will be non–switched type with separate measurements for all phase to phase and
phase to ground faults. And having Career aided scheme logic like PUR, POR etc.
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• They will be capable of single and three phase tripping

• They will have directional (mho or quadrilateral or other suitably shaped)
characteristics for Zone 1, Zone 2 and Zone 3
• They shall be capable of operation for close–up three phase faults and switch on to
faults
• They shall have adjustable characteristic angle to match line angle wherever applicable
• Accuracy of better than or equal to 5% of set value for reach measurement in Zone 1
and better than or equal to 10% of set value for Zone 2 and Zone 3
• Accuracy of better than or equal to 5% of set value for time measurement of Zone 2
and Zone 3
• It shall include power swing detection feature for selectively blocking, as required.
• It shall include Out of Step trip function
• Recommended maximum operating time under given set of condition shall be as
follows:
Table 11 Relay Setting and Maximum operating times
SIR 4 15
Relay setting 10 Ohms 2 Ohms
Fault location (as % of relay setting) 60% 60%
Trip duty Contacts per phase* 4 4
Fault resistance Zero Ohms Zero Ohms
Max. Operating Times Including trip relays 45 ms for all faults 45 ms for 3-phase faults 60 ms for
(if any) and with CVT other faults
The line protection relays shall be suitable for use with capacitive voltage transformers having
passive damping and transient response as per IEC 186/ IEC61869.
 Directional Comparison Protection:

They will have following features
• It shall be a unit system of protection
• They shall be directional comparison type suitable for operation with one signaling
channel, e.g., PLCC
• They shall have high speed fault detection based on principles like detection of post
fault travelling wave,
• Super imposed components, etc.
• They shall have high sensitivity for all types of faults
• They shall be suitable for 1 and 3 phase tripping
• They shall not be affected by heavy load transfer, power swings, CT saturation, CVT
transients, VT fuse failure, line charging currents, distorted primary currents and
voltages, external switching activities sudden power reversal, zero sequence, mutual
coupling, shunt reactor “in–zone” switching etc. and lightning strokes
 Phase Segregated Line Differential Protection:

This type of protection system will have following features
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• The relay shall be all digital multi microprocessor based, designed for use with modern
digital telecommunication system multiplexer conforming to ITU–T (CCITT)
specifications and Fibre Optic medium.
• Each phase current shall be separately evaluated at both ends for both amplitude and
phase.
• It shall be suitable for single phase tripping and auto reclosing.
• The message transmitted by the relay to other end shall include information on currents,
supervision information, CT saturation detection, synchronization of terminals etc.
• The communication delay shall be continuously measured and automatically
compensated for in the differential measurement.
• Suitable programmable evaluation algorithm will be provided to ensure proper security
and dependability of the message.
• The relay shall have communication port for remote monitoring, programming and
control.
• The sampling frequency for analog signals shall be minimum 2 kHz. Filtering and
measuring techniques shall be used to ensure correct performance during all operating
and transient conditions.
 Phase Comparison Protection:

This type of protection system shall have the following features
• It shall be Current phase comparison type.
• It shall be suitable for operation with one signal channel.
• It shall have high sensitivity for all types of faults.
• It shall be capable of single and three pole tripping.
• It shall have facility for blocking/permissive trip modes
• It shall have facility for direct transfer tripping
• It shall have comprehensive alarm and test facilities
• It shall not be affected by heavy load transfer, power swings, CT saturation, CT phase
errors, Propagation delays, Capacitance current etc., as is typical of unit protections.
 Over Voltage Protection

The relay shall have following features:
• Shall have a high drop off to pick up ratio.
• Shall have adjustable setting range for voltage and time
• Shall have two stages
• Shall low set stage shall monitor any one phase to phase voltage and shall have
associated timer
• Shall high set stage shall monitor all three phases to phase voltage and shall have
associated timer
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7.13 TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT PROTECTION SETTING CRITERIA:

UNCOMPENSATED TRANSMISSION LINES
Guideline for protection setting for both uncompensated and series compensated lines are given
hereunder;
 Main Distance Relay Zone–1 Reach Setting

Zone–1: To be set to cover 80% of protected line length. Set zero sequence compensation factor
KN as (Z0 – Z1) / 3Z1.
Where:
Z1 = Positive sequence impedance of the protected line Z0 = Zero sequence impedance of the
protected line
 Zone–2 Reach Setting

Zone–2: To be set to cover minimum 120% of length of principle line section. However, in case
of double circuit lines 150% coverage must be provided to take care of under reaching due to
mutual coupling effect.Set KN as (Z0 – Z1) / 3Z1.
The 150% setting is arrived at by considering an expected under reach of about 30% when both
lines are in parallel and a margin of 20%. The degree of under reach can be calculated using
equation:
𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
+ 𝑘𝑘0 ∆𝑍𝑍 =
1 1 + 𝑘𝑘0
Where
K0M = Z0M/ 3Z1
(𝑍𝑍0 − 𝑍𝑍1 )
and K 0 =
3𝑍𝑍1
 Zone–3 Reach Setting

Zone–3 distance protection can offer time–delayed remote back–up protection for an adjacent
transmission circuit. To achieve this, Zone–3 distance elements must be set according to the
following criteria where possible.
Zone–3 should overreach the remote terminal of the longest adjacent line by an acceptable margin
(typically20% of highest impedance seen) for all fault conditions.
Set KN as (Z0 – Z1) / 3Z1.
However, in such case where Zone–3 reach is set to enter into next lower voltage level, Zone–3
timing shall be coordinated with the back–up protection (Directional over current and earth fault
relay) of power transformer. Where such coordination cannot be realized, it is recommended to
carry out simulation studies for relay reach & time coordination and suitable solution may be
devised. Some of the typical solution can be like application of back up distance protection for
power transformer, duplicated protection for downstream 220kV feeders or special protection
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scheme logic. Similar issues, if encountered for Zone–2 reach setting, should also be addressed in
the above manner.
 Resistive Reach Setting

For phase to ground faults, resistive reach should be set to give maximum coverage considering
fault resistance, arc resistance & tower footing resistance. It has been considered that ground fault
would not beresponsive to line loading.
For Zone–1 resistive reach, attention has to be given to any limitations indicated by manufacturer
in respect of resistive setting vis–a–vis reactance setting to avoid overreach due to remote in–feed.
In case of phase to phase fault, resistive reach should be set to provide coverage against all types
of anticipated phase to phase faults subject to check of possibility against load point encroachment
considering minimum expected voltage and maximum load expected during short time emergency
system condition.
In absence of credible data regarding minimum voltage and maximum load expected for a line
during emergency system condition, following criteria may be considered for deciding load point
encroachment:
Maximum load current (Imax) may be considered as 1.5 times the thermal rating of the line or 1.5
times the associated bay equipment current rating (the minimum of the bay equipment individual
rating) whichever is lower. (Caution: The rating considered is approximately 15minutes rating of
the transmission facility).
Minimum voltage (Vmin) to be considered as 0.85pu (85%).
 Zone–2 Timer Setting

A Zone–2 timing of 0.35 seconds (considering LBB time of 200 m Sec, CB open time of 60ms,
resetting time of 30ms and safety margin of 60ms) is recommended. However, if a long line is
followed by a short line, then a higher setting (typically 0.6 second) may be adopted on long line to
avoid indiscriminate trippingthrough Zone–2 operation on both lines.
For special cases, following shall be the guiding philosophy:
Since Zone–2 distance protection is set to overreach the circuit it is intended to protect, it will also
be responsive to faults within adjacent power system circuit. For this reason, the time delay for
Zone–2 back–up protection must be set to coordinate with clearance of adjacent circuit faults,
within reach, by the intendedmain protection or by breaker fail protection.
The following formula would be the basis for determining the minimum acceptable Zone–2 time
setting:
TZ2 > tMA + tCB+ tZ2reset + ts
Where:
tZ2 = Required Zone–2 time delay
tMA = Operating time of slowest adjacent circuit main protection or Circuit Local back–up for faults
within
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Zone–2 reach
tCB = Associated adjacent circuit breaker clearance time
tZ2reset = Resetting time of Zone–2 impedance element with load current present tS = Safety margin
for tolerance (e.g., 50 to 100ms)
Unequal lengths of transmission circuit can make it difficult to meet the Zone–2 secondary reach
setting criterion. In such cases it will be necessary to coordinate Zone–2 with longer time delay.
The time tMA in equation must be the adjacent circuit Zone–2 protection operating time.
 Zone–3 Timer Setting

Zone–3 timer should be set so as to provide discrimination with the operating time of relays
provided in subsequent sections with which Zone–3 reach of relay being set, overlaps. Typical
recommended Zone–3 time is 0.8 to 1.0 second.
For Special cases, where co–ordination between long and short lines is required, following
formula would be the basis for determining the minimum acceptable Zone–3 time setting:
tz3 > tMA + tCB+ tz3reset + ts
Where:
tZ3 = Required Zone–3 time delay
tMA = Operating time of slowest adjacent circuit local back–up protection tCB = Associated adjacent
circuit breaker clearance time
tZ3reset = Resetting time of Zone–3 impedance element with load current present tS = Safety margin
for tolerance (e.g., 50 to 100milliseconds)
 Zone–4 Substation Local Back up Protection

Zone–3 distance protection is usually targeted to provide only remote back–up protection. In such a
case, the distance relay may be provided with an additional zone of reverse–looking protection
(e.g. Zone–4) to offersubstation–local back–up protection. The criterion for setting Zone–4 reverse
reach would be as under.
The Zone–4 reverse reach must adequately cover expected levels of apparent bus bar fault
resistance, when allowing for multiple in feeds from other circuits. For this reason, its resistive
reach setting is to be kept identical to Zone–3 resistive reach setting.
With a reverse reach setting of less than the Zone–1 reach of distance protection for the shortest line
connected to the local bus bar, the Zone–4 time delay would only need to co–ordinate with bus bar
main protection fault clearance and with Zone–1 fault clearance for lines out of the same
substation. For this reason this can beset according to the Zone–2 time setting guidelines.
 Directional Phase Overcurrent Protection

Directional phase over current relays are still being used as back–up protection for 220 kV
transmission lines by many utilities. In view of time coordination issues and increased fault
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clearance time in the event of failure of main distance protection, it is recommended that for all 220
kV lines also main–1 and main–2 protections similar to 400 kV lines be provided.
 Directional Ground Overcurrent Protection

The ground over current threshold should be set to ensure detection of all ground faults, but above
any continuous residual current under normal system operation. Continuous residual current may
arise becauseof following:
• Unbalanced series impedances of transposed transmission circuits
• Unbalanced shunt capacitance of transmission circuits.
• Third harmonic current circulation.
Various types of directional elements may be employed to control operation of ground over current
(zero sequence over current) protection response. The most common approach is to employ Phase
angle differencebetween Zero sequence voltage and current since the relaying signals can easily
be derived by summingphase current signals and by summing phase voltage signals from a suitable
voltage transformer.
 Power Swing Blocking and OOS Function

Large interconnected systems are more susceptible to Power Swings in comparison to the erstwhile
smallerstand–alone systems. Inter–area Power Swings can be set up even due to some event in far
flung locations in the system. During the tenure of such swings, outage of any system element may
aggravate the situation and can lead to instability (loss of synchronism). It is hence extremely
important that unwanted tripping of transmission elements need to be prevented, under these
conditions. Distance protection relays demand special consideration under such a situation, being
susceptible to undesirable mis–operation during Power swings which may be recoverable or
irrecoverable power swings.
Following figure shows the trajectory of the swing impedance in the R–X plane, along with the
Zone–1 fault detection characteristic, during a recoverable Power Swing and an irrecoverable
Power Swing, as seen by the distance relay, located at the electrical center of the system. While
the distance relay trips for irrecoverable swings may be acceptable to some extent, tripping in the
case of a recoverable swing will besimply unacceptable. Unfortunately, the Power swing detection
techniques themselves cannot distinguish between the two. Thus, there is no option but to block
distance relay from tripping in either case, if undesirable tripping is to be positively avoided.
Having blocked distance relays from tripping on Power Swing, it is required that the line must be
tripped in the case of irrecoverable Power Swing (Instability). This can be positively achieved by
the introduction of Out Of Step (OOS) relaying. In the conventional relaying technology, this
would have required the use of a twin blinder type Pole Slip protection. In the state of the
art numerical relays this option is readily achievable, by detecting the opposite ‘sign’ of the
‘Resistance’ as the impedance trajectory enters and leaves the Power swing detection
characteristic. In the event of an irrecoverable swing (loss of synchronism), the impedance
trajectory entering the detection characteristic from the positive resistance side, will exit on the
negative resistance side and vice–versa. In the case of recoverable swings, on the other hand,
the ‘sign’ of the ‘Resistance’ at entry and exit will remain the same.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 166

Figure 27 Power Swing Impedance Trajectory
The above philosophy is simple but it is difficult to implement it in a large power system because
of the complexity of the system and the different operating conditions that must be studied. There
are a number of options one can select in implementing power–swing protection in their system.
Designing the power system protection to avoid or preclude cascade tripping is a requirement of
modern day power system.Below we list two possible options:
 Placement of OOS Trip Systems

Out of step tripping protection (Standalone relay or built–in function of Main relay) shall be
provided on all the selected lines. The locations where it is desired to split the system on out of
step condition shall be decided based on system studies.
The selection of network locations for placement of OOS systems can best be obtained through
transient stability studies covering many possible operating conditions. Based on these system
studies, It is recommended to exercise the first two option given above.
 Line Overvoltage Protection

• For 400kV Lines
Low set stage (Stage–I) may be set in the range of 110% – 112% (typically 110%) with a time delay of
5 seconds. High set stage (Stage–II) may be set in the range 140% – 150% with a time delay of
100milliseconds.
• For 765 kV Lines
Low set stage (Stage–I) may be set in the range of 106% – 109% (typically 108%) with a time delay of
5 seconds.High set stage (Stage–II) may be set in the range 140% – 150% with a time delay of
100milliseconds.
However, for over voltage Stage–I protection, a time grading of 1 to 3 seconds may be provided
between overvoltage relays of double circuit lines. Grading on overvoltage tripping for various lines
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 167

emanating from astation may be considered and same can be achieved using voltage as well as time
grading. Longest timed delay should be checked with expected operating time of Over–fluxing
relay of the transformer to ensure disconnection of line before tripping of transformer.
It is desirable to have Drop–off to pick–up ratio of overvoltage relay better than 97% (Considering
limitation of various manufacturers relay on this aspect).
 Line Differential Protection

Many transmission lines are now having OPGW or separate optic fiber laid for the communication.
Where ever such facilities are available, it is recommended to have the line differential protection as
Main–I protection with distance protection as backup (built–in Main relay or standalone). Main–II
protection shall continue to bedistance protection. For cables and composite lines, line differential
protection with built in distance back up shall be applied as Main–I protection and distance relay as
Main–II protection. Auto–recloser shall be blocked for faults in the cables. For very short lines,
Both Main protections can be Line differential protection with distance protection as backup
(built–in Main relay or standalone).
7.14 TRANSMISSION CIRCUIT PROTECTION SETTING CRITERIA:

SERIES COMPENSATEDTRANSMISSION LINES
There are phenomenon’s associated with the protection of Series compensated lines which require
special attention and the same have been discussed in detail in Chapter on Protection of Series
Compensated lines.
 SETTING DOCUMENT FOR MULTIFUNCTION IED

The numerical terminals referred as IED (Intelligent electronic device) contain apart from main
protection functions several other protection & supervision functions which may or may not be
used for a particular application. Many of these functions are having default settings which may
not be suitable and may lead tomal operations. Thus, It is important that the recommended setting
document should contain all the settings for all functions that are used and clearly indicate the
functions not used (to be Blocked / Disabled). This shall be followed not only for Line protection
IEDs but also for other IEDs like Generator, Transformer, Reactor, Bus bar protection and Control
functions.
It is also recommended that graphical representation of distance relay zones on R–X plane
including phase selection, load encroachment & power swing characteristics should be done
showing exact setting calculated.
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8 AUTO–RECLOSING
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The auto–reclosing of circuit breaker and the power lines is a generally accepted practice these
days. Reports from different parts of the world show that in certain networks in regions subject to
a high lightning intensity only about 5 per cent of the faults are permanent. Auto–reclosing
Therefore, provides significant advantages. Outage time will be short compared to where station
personnel have to re–energize the lines after a fault. Additionally, ininterconnected networks, auto–
reclosing helps in maintaining system stability under transient.
Following different arrangements of auto–reclosing is possible:
• High speed single pole reclosing (HSAR)
• High speed three pole reclosing (HTAR)
• Delayed three pole reclosing (DAR)
• DAR with dead line (DL) and synchronism check (SC)
• HTAR with DL and SC
• HTAR with parallel line check (PC)
In case of HSAR and HTAR without check, the two ends can be reclosed at about the same instant.
In case of DAR and HTAR with DL and SC the C.B. at one end recloses first after the set dead
time and with a check of dead line condition. After a successful line re–energization from one end
the voltage, phase angle and possibly frequency on the line and station side are compared. At
acceptable synchronous in–phase conditions the C.B. at the second end is reclosed.
The typical A/R cycle for a transient fault is given in Figure 28:
Figure 28 A/R cycle for a transient fault
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The typical A/R cycle for a permanent fault is given in Figure 29:
Figure 29 Typical A/R cycle for a permanent fault

Above figures explain some of the basic parameters of an auto–reclose function like Dead time,
Reclaim time & number of shots of A/R function, fault duration, deionization time, arcing time &
opening time of circuit breaker.
8.2 BASIC PARAMETERS OF AN AUTORECLOSE SCHEME
 The Fault Duration

It is the time delay between the fault instant and the moment when the CB is opened and arcing is
extinguished.
 Dead Time
The dead time of A/R function is the time delay between the moment when the A/R function is
started and the moment when the A/R relay (IED) closes its output contact and energizes the
closing coil of the CB.
The dead time setting should be sufficient to allow for complete deionization of the arc to prevent
re–strike of the arc on closing.
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 Reclaim Time
The reclaim time of A/R function is the time delay following the moment when the A/R
functions issues the reclosing command and the moment when the A/R function resets, and it is
ready for a new reclosing cycle. The reclaim time should be sufficiently long to allow the CB
operating mechanism to reset and to prepare for another reclosing cycle.
 The Number of Shots

A/R operating cycle that provides only one reclosing command is referred to as “Single–shot”.
Whereas A/R operating cycle that provides a sequence of reclosing commands, is referred as
“Multi–shot”. Single–shot A/R mode is normally applied to transmission lines. Thus, it prevents
repeated reclosing on to fault with relatively high current levels that may endanger system stability.
Multi–shot A/R mode is more common on sub–transmission and distribution level where there is low
probability of losing system stability.
 Closing Pulse Duration

The closing command pulse duration allows the CB to properly energize its internal relays and
execute the command. Common settings are 0.1 to 0.2s.
 Operating Mode – Single Phase Auto Reclosing

Single–phase tripping is the most common in the power system. The advantages are related to the
fact that this type of tripping allows power transfer over the two remaining phases and has a lower
impact on stability. One of the disadvantages is that more complex protection is required in order
to distinguish between single–phase–to–ground and multiphase faults. However, modern numerical
relays (IEDs) easily seal with this problem without additional hardware. IEDs provide AR
initiation signal to AR function only in case of single phase trip on single phase to ground fault
condition.
In single–pole (only) operating mode, AR is allowed only for single–phase–to–ground faults, and
multi–phasefaults result in a final three–pole trip. Thus, both ends of the transmission line remain
connected by two phases improving system stability. However, the induced voltage from the other
two energized phases and certain environmental conditions could lead to a continued secondary
arc, resulting in a failure of the AR cycle. Hence, setting of single–pole dead times on long
transmission lines requires some attention to manage such conditions if transmission line is not
having line reactor with neutral grounding reactor (NGR).
An example of single – phase single shot AR cycle is shown below for a successful reclosing
with dead time of one second.
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Figure 30 An example of single – phase single shot AR cycle for a successful reclosing
 Operating Mode – Three Phase

In this operating mode, any fault type results in a three–pole trip, which is then followed by AR
which may be either rapid AR (RAR) without any check conditions, or delayed AR (DAR) which
may be subject to dead– line or synchro–check conditions. Where AR with synchro–check is
applied, one end of the line must first reclose either rapidly without any check condition, or subject
to a dead–line condition. With the line voltagere–established, the remaining line–ends may be
reclosed with synchro–check. This may require staggered dead–time settings between ends;
however, where a separate synchronization timer is available, uniform dead–time settings may be
applied.
An example of a synchro–check supervised three–pole AR is shown in Figure 31.:
Figure 31 Synchro check supervised auto reclosing
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 Other Important Requirements of AR Function

• Prepare Three Phase Trip
In single or two–pole tripping applications, it may be necessary, in certain circumstances, to trip
three–pole.The “prepare three pole trips” condition forces all trips to issue as three–pole trips. For
permanent faults, the time of release of the conditions, in some AR functions, simultaneous with
the close command of the last programmed shot. If the device tripping function does not have a
facility to trip three– pole for evolving faults, then the AR function can help by releasing the
condition for a short while after the protection trip gets reset.
• CB Ready Condition
The AR function requires a fast open–close–open (O–C–O) operating cycle of the CB and
Therefore, the operating mechanism must be ready for such a duty. In the event of the mechanism
not being ready, the AR cycle should be blocked and protection functions should issue final three–
pole trip commands because an AR cycle cannot be completed. The “CB ready” condition is
dependent on the operating mechanism and could indicate a pressure within the limits for a
hydraulic mechanism, or a charged close spring for a spring operating mechanism. Normally AR
ready status of the CB is indicated by the CB by means of a binary signal that is monitored by AR
function.
• CB Close/Open Positions
CB position is monitored at the start of AR cycle by AR function and the position of CB contacts
is critical for the operating logic of the AR function. The CB position indication is given by the
CB’s auxiliary contactsand in many applications it is used to block AR or to start the AR dead time.
If the three poles of the CB are opened for more than a certain time then, Usually, , the AR function
is blocked and the CB is deemed to be out–of–service to avoid an unwanted AR close command.
In this case, the discrimination time should avoidAR blocking during the three–pole dead time for
three–pole AR. Some IEDs use the three–poles–closed indication to enable the AR cycle rather than
using the three–poles open indication. In the case of single–pole (only) AR, if the CB opens more
than one pole, then a three–pole trip is forced and the AR cycle is blocked, based on the position of
the CB.
• AR Block Condition
Several other functions of the protection scheme require blocking of the AR function. Protection
functions that should block AR are given here under:
Bus Bar protection trip.
Breaker failure trip.
Line trip on Switch on to fault (SOTF)
Direct transfer trip receives
Complete carrier failure of tele–protection scheme.
Manual CB close command
Over voltage trip
Line reactor trip of Non–Switched line reactor
Circuit Breaker problems
Zone–2/3 of distance protection
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8.3 REQUIREMENTS
The auto reclosing function shall have following features
 It shall have single phase and/or three phase reclosing facilities.

 It shall have a continuously variable single phase dead time.
 It shall have continuously variable three phase dead time for three phase reclosing.
 It shall have continuously variable reclaim time.
 It should incorporate a facility of selecting single phase/three phase/single and three phase
auto–reclose and non–auto reclosure modes.
 It should have facilities for selecting check synchronizing or dead line charging features.
 It should be of high speed single shot type
 It should have suitable relays for SC and DLC and should be included in the overall auto–
reclose scheme if three phase reclosing is provided.
 It should allow sequential reclosing of breakers in one and half breaker or double breaker
arrangement.
8.4 SETTING GUIDELINES
 Dead Time
Auto–reclosing requires a dead time which exceeds the de–ionizing time. The time required for
the de– ionizing of the fault path depends on several factors including the arcing time, fault duration,
wind conditions, circuit voltage, capacitive coupling to adjacent conductors, etc. The circuit
voltage is the factor having the predominating influence on the de–ionizing time. Single phase
dead time of 1.0 sec. is recommended for 765 kV, 400 kV and 220 kV system.
 Reclaim Time
The reclaim time is the time during which a new start of the auto–reclosing equipment is blocked. If
reclosing shot has been carried out and the line is energized and a new fault occurs before the reclaim
time has elapsed, the auto–reclosing equipment is blocked and a signal for definite tripping of the
breaker is obtained. After the reclaim time has elapsed, the auto–reclosing equipment returns to the
starting position and a new reclosingsequence can occur. The reclaim time must not be set to such
a low value that the intended operating cycle of the breaker is exceeded, when two fault incidents
occur close together. If the breaker is closed manually, the auto–reclosing equipment is blocked
and cannot start again until the reclaim time has elapsed.
For the breaker to be used for auto–reclosing, it is essential that it has the operating mechanism and
breakingcapacity necessary for it to be able to perform the auto–reclosing sequences required.
 Circuit Breaker Requirement

According to IEC Publication 56.2, a breaker must be capable of withstanding the following
operating cycle with full rated breaking current:
0 + 0.3 s + CO + 3 min + CO
The recommended operating cycle at 765 kV, 400 kV and 220 kV are as per the IEC standard.
Therefore, reclaim time should be set considering the time delay required by CB between two CO
operations.
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8.5 APPLICATION NOTES

Fast simultaneous tripping of the breakers at both ends of a faulty line is essential for successful
auto– reclosing. Therefore, availability of protection signaling equipment is a pre–requisite.
Some protections start auto–reclosing and others block.
 Protections which Start A/R

• Main–I and Main–II line protections.
 Protections which Block A/R

• Breaker Fail Relay
• Line Reactor Protections
• O/V Protection
• Received Direct Transfer trip signals
• Busbar Protection
• Zone 2/3 of Distance Protection
• Carrier Fail Conditions
• Circuit Breaker Problems.
When a reclosing relay receives start and block A/R impulse simultaneously, block signal dominates.
Similarly,if it receives ‘start’ for 1–phase fault immediately followed by multi–phase fault the later
one dominates over the previous one.
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9 PROTECTION OF POWER TRANSFORMERS
Autotransformer and two winding transformers with different voltage ratios & ratings are
deployed in the power system. The common ratios are 765/400 kV, 400/220/132 kV,
220/132/110/66 kV, 330/110/60 kV etc. The ratings vary from 5 MVA to 500 MVA. Being a most
important & capital intensive equipment, it needs to be well protected.
9.1 TRANSFORMER DESIGN
The magnetic circuit plays a key role in transformer protection because it influences the excitation
current. In steady state, the excitation current contains odd harmonics. During energization or
faults, the excitation current may become unbalanced and contain large amounts of even
harmonics.
Due to passage of current, heat is generated in the windings. The oil in the transformer dissipates
the heat through circulation from bottom to top by various modes (ONAN, ONAF, AFOF etc.).
This top oil temperature is Usually, measured and monitored. In addition, the winding temperature
is monitored to limit insulation deterioration. The highest temperature occurs just inside the
insulation on the conductor. The point with the highest temperature is referred to as the hot spot.
Another heating source is the eddy current losses in the core.
Fault currents quickly increase the winding temperature. Transformers must withstand fault
currents for a given time. Axial and radial forces are generated on the windings due to these currents,
which may damage the insulation. The first current peak of fault current causes the maximum
forces, which determines the withstand limit of the transformer.
9.2 TYPICAL TRANSFORMER ARRANGEMENTS
The transformer can be a directly connected to the load with a single source (No bus) or through
a bus to the load, or from line bus to the load (secondary bus). The protection system will depend
upon the connection of transformer.
9.3 FAILURE RATES OF POWER TRANSFORMER
If properly maintained and monitored, the power transformer is able to perform without any
failure. However, failure analysis done by various utilities indicates that around 50% failure is due
to troubles in windings followed by 20% due to tap changing mechanism. Therefore, it is essential
to provide protection to the transformer involving winding and the tap changer mechanism.
9.4 TRANSFORMER PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
Based on types of failures, basic design of the transformer and the requirements of the power
system, the protective relaying schemes must meet the following main requirements:
 Maintain transient stability of the power system.

 Prevent unwanted operation by load currents or by inrush currents or OLTC operation.
 Maintain required quality of power
 Provide for maintenance of protective equipment with primary equipment energized by
providing two groups of protections
The protection system must satisfy the following requirements specific to the transmission
transformer:
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 176

 Protection for internal tank faults to ground or to alternate phases.

 Protection for external tank faults to ground or to alternate phases.
 Protection for internal partial winding or turn–to–turn faults.
 Restrict top oil temperature to maximum temperature limit
 Restrict winding temperature to maximum temperature limit
 Protect against failure of a switching device
 Restrict overload as per thermal capability of the transformer
 Provide for Tertiary winding protections over voltages caused due to transferred lightning
surges or
 Switching surges from high voltage sides.
 Provide protection of winding insulation by suitably dimensioned surge arresters
 Protection from over–excitation of transformer core
One of the key problems in security of a transmission transformer is tripping during a through
fault current flow. In many cases, this means that the faulted element (Usually, a transmission line)
will be properly tripped by the protection provided for it, failing which the backup protection of
the transmission transformer will trip the transformer. This common mode failure where both line
and transformer get disconnected can bedisastrous to a single contingency designed power system.
Turn–to–turn faults challenge the dependability of the transformer protection. The fault current is
high, and sometimes very high, but the changes in the phase currents may be less than 10% of the
rated current.
Maintaining the quality of the power supply for sensitive industrial customers as well as for general
customers is an important aspect of transformer protection. The transformer can withstand a very
long duration of low magnitude through fault current but even this may cause severe problems for
motor driven industrial processes, unless the fault is cleared in a short number of cycles with due
care for additional reactive power support.
It is required that the protection schemes meet redundancy requirements to provide protection
during outage of any one relay for maintenance. Normally this is done by dividing the protections
in two groups A and B that are not exactly similar but provide redundant protection groups.
Further, It is not advisable to keep main and back up protection functions in a single relay
hardware.
9.5 PROTECTION SCHEMES
The main types of transformer protections and their advantages/disadvantages are described here
under
 Transformer Differential Protection

Differential protection is the most commonly applied protection for power transformers. The
principle of Differential Protection is based on Kirchhoff’s law (Sum of currents flowing through
a node is zero), i.e., the current into the Transformer is equal to the currents flowing out of the
Transformer.
In practical case, the following considerations are needed to make the Transformer Differential
Protection Relay, highly reliable:
• CT polarity
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 177

• CT Ratio mismatch as the CT ratios do not exactly match the Transformer Voltage ratios
• Difference in CT characteristic due to different CT manufacturer’s CT.
• Vector grouping of the Transformer
• CT remanence
• Inrush current during charging of the Transformer (Predominant 2nd harmonic and of
significant value flowing in only from the energized side of the Transformer while the
other winding currents are zero)
• Over excitation of the Transformer (Significant current of predominantly 5th harmonic).
There are mainly two types of differential relays.
• Low impedance or Percentage biased differential relay with harmonic restraint (2nd and
5th harmonic restraint), and
• High impedance differential relay.
High impedance differential relay inherently requires identical CT (matching CT ratio, accuracy
etc.) on all sides of Transformer which is not a limitation for Low impedance (percentage Bias)
differential relay. Hence, Percentage bias differential relay with dual slope and harmonic restraint
feature is most commonly used as Differential protection for multi–winding transformer. The
simplicity of comparing current into all terminals ofthe transformer gives the differential relay very
high reliability.
In case of percentage biased differential relays, zero sequence component filtering to be applied
to avoid false operation on external faults because of transformer neutral grounding falling in the
differential protected zone. The removed zero sequence component, however, makes the
transformer differential relay less sensitive but it is considered acceptable.
With present day numerical relays, it is possible to achieve CT ratio & Vector group matching in
the relay software itself, without the use of external Auxiliary CTs. Also, the relays are provided
with Inrush restraint features during Transformer charging as well as during over excitation
conditions.
Flexible bias characteristics of a bias differential relay is illustrated below. The relay provides to
take care of CT remanence, accuracy errors, difference currents due to change in Transformer taps
andCT saturation during through fault.
First Slope S1 represents the threshold sensitivity at low current taking into account sensitivity at low
current, CT remanence – This slope is generally set around 10% and generally takes care up to
20% Transformer load. In case of differential relay with only two slopes, this slope is considered
as zero.
Second Slope S2 is set higher than S1 to take care of max. Current mismatch for Transformer tap
changeoperations as well as CT transformation errors – This slope is generally set between 15% to
25% as per the requirement and takes care of transformer load from 20 to 150%.
Slope S3 is to take care of through fault condition when differential current can occur due to CT
saturation.Setting is generally around 60% to 80% for currents higher than transformer continuous
rating.
For the differential relay operation, the following equation is used:
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ID > Set Value
ID/IR > Set Slope
Consider Aph (2 Winding Transformer)

ID = |IA1 + IA2|
IR = |IA1| + |IA2 |, some manufacturers use IR = 0.5 [|IA1| + |IA2 |] and some use IR Maximum of |IA1| &
|IA2 |
Where A1 is current is Transformer winding 1 (Or High side) and A2 is current in Transformer winding
2 (Or Low side)
It is desirable to follow the operating philosophy recommended by relay manufacturer
Figure 32 Bias differential relay characteristic
• Harmonic Restrain Feature Requirement in Bias Differential Relay

Magnetizing inrush current in the transformer defies the basic principal of differential relaying
since the magnetizing branch of the transformer can have a very low impedance without a
transformer fault. Current produced by magnetizing inrush can reach many times the transformer
rated current, and these currents appear in the differential relay. The inrush current duration can
range from few cycles up to many seconds. Magnetizing current inrush can also be caused by any
abrupt change of magnetizing voltage. Such transient includes the occurrences of a fault, the
removal of the fault or change of character of the fault and out of phase synchronizing. A typical
waveform during the inrush current is given below:
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Figure 33 waveform during the inrush current
Inrush current consists of predominantly second harmonics. Many times, the harmonic current
may not appear in all the phases, and hence Cross block feature (Harmonic block in all three phases
on detection of harmonics in any of the phases) shall be enabled.
Over excitation also manifests itself into production of odd harmonics in the transformer current.
Since thethird & other triple harmonics are normally cancelled by the delta tertiary winding, Fifth
harmonic restrain is used in the differential protection. Hence, both second and fifth harmonics
restrain feature is recommendedfor EHV transformers.
Figure 34 Typical Differential protection scheme for Dy11 Transformer (using external vector group correction)
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Figure 35 Typical Differential protection scheme for Dy11 Transformer (Vector group correction inside numerical
relay)
The differential relay protection does an excellent job of meeting a large number of the protective
relaying requirements but must be combined with other protective devices to provide full
transformer protection.
 Restricted Earth Fault (REF) Protection
Zero– sequence differential relays (Restricted earth fault relay) provide best protection against
phase–to– ground faults in wye connected transformers connected to solidly grounded systems or
resistance grounded transformers. The vector sum of residual current and the neutral currents are
utilized to energize the relay. The relay discriminates faults in the transformer zone (Total zero
sequence flowing in the relay) from the faults outside the transformer protection zone (Practically
no zero sequence current in the relay). These relays are more sensitive than the transformer
differential relays in detecting faults that involve part of the transformer winding and ground.
Restricted Earth Fault relay can be (a) High Impedance Type or (b) Low Impedance or Biased
differential type:
• High Impedance REF
The high impedance restricted earth fault protection is similar to the high impedance differential
protection of busbars. Its application to a delta–wye transformer for detecting faults on the wye
winding is shown below; it is assumed in this application that the ratio of the line CTs and the
neutral CT are the same. The relay (87 G) in this application is a high–impedance overcurrent
relay. The flow of zero–sequence currents shown in this figure are for an external fault. It is
obvious that there is no current in the relay because it circulates between the phase and neutral
CTs. If the faulted phase CT saturates, it acts like a short circuit for the flow of currents in the
secondary circuit as shown below and the current out of the neutral CT divides among the relay
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 181

and the saturated CT. Since the impedance of the relay is substantially high compared to the leads
to the saturated CT, most of the output of the neutral CT is routed through the saturated CT and
very little current flows in the relay.
Figure 36 Restricted earth fault protection using a high impedance relay
Figure 37 REF high impedance relay, Current flow with one saturated CT
REF protection picks up current (IREF) is normally taken as ten percent of Full load current (IFL).
Value of stabilizing resistor (RSTAB) is obtained by dividing stabilizing voltage (VSTAB) by pick–up
current. Stabilizing voltage
VSTAB = IF x (RCT + 2RL);
R =V /I
STAB STAB REF
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Where: IF = Maximum through fault current, RCT = CT resistance, RL = CT circuit lead resistance
Low Impedance (Biased) REF

The Low Impedance REF is in a way similar to Transformer Biased Differential Relay.
For Numerical REF relay, Relay Manufacturers use different methodology depending on the
Algorithm for detection & operation for Ground fault within the protected zone. Few of the
calculation of the Operating current (ID0) & the Restraint Current (IR0) is detailed below:
Method 1
The Operating (Differential) current, ID0 = |3I01 + 3I02 + 3I03|
Restraint Current, IR0 = Max {|3I01|, |3I02|, |3I02|}
3I01, 3I02, 3I03 are the Zero sequence currents on the HV, LV & Neutral side of the Transformers
as the case may be.
Method 2
ID0 = |k1Σ[IA+IB+IC] +k2IN|
IR0 = |k1Σ[IA+IB+IC] | OR ½ [k1max (|IA|, |IB|, |IC|) + k2|IN|] ----------------------- k1 and k2 are constants
For the REF to operate, the following equation should be satisfied
ID0 > ID Set
IDO/IR0 > SD, the Set slope.
ID0 = Operating or Differential Zero Sequence Current
IR0 = Zero Sequence Restraint Current
IR = Restraint Current Setting for start of Slope SD
Figure 38 REF Slope Characteristic
In Low Impedance REF, the Phase side & Neutral CT ratios can be different. The Ratio
Compensation will be performed inside the relay.
Additionally, the following requirements will be addressed for the proper operation of the relay:
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Directionality of 3I01, 3I02 with respect to Transformer Neutral current 3I03 (Whether
they are in phase or in opposite directions)
In the event of one CT saturation which will result in differential current, condition
1 will decide whether the fault in the REF zone or otherwise.
Figure 39 Low Impedance REF (Numerical) relay
Typical Differential & REF protection scheme using Numerical Relay is shown below. Ratio
matching, Vector group compensation & Zero sequence compensation is done internally in the
relay software.
• Local Distance Relay Protection

Distance relays can be used as primary protection or as backup protection for the transformer. It
consists of a multi–zone impedance relay on the HV side or on LV side of the transformer looking
into the transformer as shown in figure
Figure 40 Distance Relay Protection
The main advantages of the distance relay are; it provides backup for remote faults and protection
for fault withstand. It also provides overlapping protection with the bus protective zones by its
reverse zone. This can be beneficial if the bus protection is not duplicated and failure of bus
protection to operate results in delayed clearance of fault by over current relays on the other side
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of the transformer. It must be noted that the distance relays cannot provide sensitive ground fault
protection.
• Directional and Non–Directional Phase Over Current Protection
The phase over current protection is a very inexpensive, simple and reliable scheme for fault
detection and is used for transformer protection applications. It can provide limited overload
protection but cannot provide instantaneous protection for all internal faults. It can also provide
backup protection for bus bars.
An additional high set unit is also Usually, provided. The instantaneous elements help in providing
high–speed clearance of terminal faults, heavy current faults that threaten system stability.
Numerical over current relays provide upgraded performance for transformer backup protection.
The digital filters remove the DC component and harmonics from the inrush current. Numerical
backup over current relayscan Therefore, be set much more sensitive than conventional types and
are recommended to be used.
The need for directional overcurrent relays arises depending on the specific requirement. Figure 41
belowexplains the requirement. Both the Transformers have overcurrent on the HV as well as on
the LV side. If the sources on both HV & LV are strong, the fault current ID = IC + IE + IF will
be much greater than IC. Inthis case selectivity can be achieved with non–directional inverse time
relays. If the source on the LV side ofthe transformer is weak, IE & IF would be small making ID
≈ IC, selectivity will not be achieved unless the LV relays are directional overcurrent relays.
Figure 41 Directional Overcurrent protection application
• Ground Fault Protection

Various ground fault protections used are described below. Generally, these protections are meant to
provide the grounded winding with a low sensitivity ground fault protection only. They do not
provide other types of protection.
• Directional or Non–Directional Earth Fault Relay
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This type of protection is also specific to transformers with at least one directly grounded or
resistance grounded winding. The protection is specialized to protect for winding faults to
ground. The connections of the over current units can be only in the neutral, or in the residual
phase.
The sensitivity to the harmonic and inrush currents can be one of the main problems with backup
ground over current relays. Settings must be able to allow inrush, which Usually, means
desensitizing the backup relay. Static relays that do not have filter for these harmonics Usually,
can have problems.
• Zero Sequence Over Current Relays
Zero–sequence over current relays provide protection against internal phase–to–ground faults. The
neutral current or the residual current may energize the over current relay. The setting may be
much lower than the rated phase current but time delay is required. Harmonic restraint may be
required to obtain sensitive settings. An additional high set unit is also Usually, provided.
• Zero Sequence Over Voltage Relays
Zero sequence over voltage relays provide protection against phase–to–ground faults in
transformers connected to non–effectively grounded systems or for delta connected tertiary
windings. The open delta voltage energizes the relay. A filter to reject third harmonics may be
necessary for application in delta connected tertiary winding.
• Tank Ground Fault Protection
The tank ground fault protection or tank leakage protection is a ground–connected relay, which is connected in series
with the main tank ground. The tank is insulated from ground except for one path which a current transformer around
it has connected to the tank ground relay. The relay will see any current flowing from the tank to the ground such
as bushing failures, winding to tank failures, and core to winding failures. Since minimum current flows through
this path during normal operation it can beset very sensitive. The problem with this protection is that it requires
a single path to ground through at most 1 ohm resistance. This creates a high voltage to remote earth from the
transformer tank during ground faults, which may cause safety problems. The path can easily be shorted out by
inadvertent control or metallic paths to the transformer case. Also, care must be taken to prevent maloperation from
transformer tank capacitance currents.
• Over Excitation Protection
This is a specialized protective relaying application. No other relay provides adequate over–
excitation protection of the transformer core. Damage to the core laminations can occur if an
excitation larger than the Volts/Hertz rating of the transformer is reached. The flux in a transformer
is directly proportional to theratio of applied voltage and its frequency. Either the absolute values
or percentage values of the voltage and frequency can be used for calculating flux. The flux is more
than the rated value if V/f is more than one per unit. Transformer manufacturers give a limiting
curve [V/f = F (t)] for each transformer. Typical curve for two types of Transformers is shown
below:
Excessive flux density (Over fluxing) arises principally from the following system conditions:
• high system voltage
• low system frequency
• geomagnetic disturbances
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Figure 42 Permissive over fluxing in two power transformers
Geomagnetic disturbances may result in over fluxing without the V/f threshold being exceeded,
which do not warrant the Transformer to be disconnected (Tripped). Modern day differential relays
provide a 5th harmonic detection/restraint feature, which can be used to detect such a condition, as
levels of this harmonic rise under over fluxing conditions.
Reason (a) & (b) or combination of both leads to a higher flux in the core resulting in higher
magnetizing currents. This happens due to the non-linear magnetizing characteristics of the core.
The core flux increases and the magnetic losses increase for either of conditions (a) & (b).
Most transformers are rated for continuous operation at 1.1 V/f. Beyond this value, depending on
the transformer V/f limiting curve, the required setting can be adopted in the relay.
 Mechanical Type Fault Detectors (Buchholz, Oil Level Indicators, Pressure Relief Devices
forTransformer & OLTC Chamber)
Transformer Buchholz protection, OLTC Buchholz Protection, Pressure Relief devices, etc., fall
in this class of protections. They are all designed to provide protection for low magnitude internal
faults like turn–to–turn faults. These types of faults are not covered by any of the other protection
schemes. In addition to this specialized protection, they all provide some limited protection for
insulation failure faults inside the transformer tank.
• Buchholz Relay
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The gas accumulator relay (Buchholz Relay) operates on pressure accumulated due to sudden oil
or gas surge. It also operates due to long–term accumulation of gasses associated with overheating
of various parts of the transformer conductor and insulation systems. This will detect faults in their
early incipient stages and prevent significant damage.
Figure 43 Buchholz Relay
Two ball–shaped floats and two glass–enclosed reed switches are visible inside this cutaway (view
of a Buchholz relay)
Large quantities of gas are produced when an arc due to an electrical fault occurs in the
transformer. The gas surges up towards the conservator tank and on its way, it drops two hinged
floats, one at the top and other at the bottom in the chamber. Each float is accompanied by a
mercury switch. The mercury switch on the upper float is connected to an alarm circuit and that
on the lower float is connected to an external trip via Trip relay.
Most recent designs of Buchholz relays are equipped with facilities for collecting samples of the
accumulated gases so that they may be analyzed and the nature of fault may be estimated. A
provision for injecting dry air in the Buchholz relay is also made so that the operation of the relay
may be tested.
• Pressure relief device (PRD)
The transformer tank filled with cooling liquid is a container subject to internal pressure and has
to be provided with one or more safety valves suitably calibrated for the maximum allowed
pressure (This depends on the design of the Transformer Tank), so that overpressure caused by
internal faults can be instantaneously relieved through the valves, Thus, avoiding greater damages
such as the deformation or even the burst of the tank and the spraying of hot oil with subsequent
fire risks. It is necessary to protect the transformer tank with a suitable equipment capable of
almost instantaneously discharging overpressure already at the development, before the structure
integrity is damaged, PRD provides just this function.
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 Overload Protections (Oil Temperature, Winding Temperature Relays for Transformer and
for OLTC, Overload Relays Current and/or Thermal Replica Based)
Thermal stress due to heat accumulation causes insulation damage in Transformers. Heat produced
in the Transformers due to Transformer core & copper losses ages the Transformer winding
insulation. The heat emanating from the Transformer core & winding is transferred to the oil which
in turn heats up and can cause decomposition as well reduction of its dielectric strength. Even
though various ways and means are provided to cool the oil, due to high ambient temperature
coupled with over loading, may cause shooting of the oil temperature.
• Oil Temperature Sensors
The top oil temperature sensors can detect overheating. The temperature limit settings vary from utility to utility and
also depend upon manufacturer’s recommendations. Typical settings are 95°C for alarm and 100°C for trip. Because
of the heating and cooling requirements of a power transformer some specialized temperature protection is required
to provide protection over the full range of operating limits of the transformer. To provide for temperature protection
a sensor is Usually, provided to indicate top oil temperature. The power transformers have a large thermal heat sink
and can withstand overloads for certain limited time. Selective protection, monitoring and load management are
considered necessary.
• Winding Temperature Sensors

Winding temperature sensors can detect overheating. The temperature limit settings vary from
utility to utility and also depend upon manufacturer’s recommendations. Typical settings are
100°C for alarm and 105°C for trip. To simulate the winding temperature, a resistor sized to
approximate the heating in the transformer winding at full load, is used. The resistor is fed by a
current transformer from one of the phase currents. To add oil temperature, the top oil is circulated
in to a well within the resistor. This combined heating of the resistor from transformer current and
top oil, is used to simulate the winding temperature.
Sensors (presently adopted) techniques is to measure the temperatures directly. Direct
measurement sensors are placed in the windings at locations where the highest temperature is
expected to occur. The sensors are connected to the measurement device that is mounted outside
the tank through a hole in the tank wall with liquid–tight optical connectors. Accurate placement
of sensors depends on the ability to predict sites where the hottest spot is likely to occur.
Optical probe: Optical probes are widely used for temperature measurement. They have fast
response times and are very accurate. Most optical probes that have been used inside transformers
can be divided into two types, intrinsic fiber optic sensors and extrinsic fiber optic sensors. In both
types, the fiber optic probe is constructed of appropriate materials that allow the probe to be
installed directly inside the transformer tank and into the transformer windings. Generally, this is
best done during initial construction of the transformer or during major winding renovations.
• Overload Relays
Current based Overload Function
It is also a practice to use a simple over current relay with a time delay arranged to give alarm to
warn the operator of any overloading of the transformer. Some features such as, adaptive
protection settings that take into account winter and summer transformer loadings, may not be
possible based purely on current measurement. Sometimes economic consideration, before the
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advent of numerical protection, necessitates measurement of only one phase current to detect
overload.
Thermal Overload Function
The use of Numerical Relays and the facility to monitor the winding temperature of all the
windings, make Thermal Overload Relays a superior Back up Protection compared to Plain
Current Overload relays. The Transformer Thermal content (θ) is a function of Transformer
Thermal Time Constant (τ) and Transformer Load Current (I). The Thermal image is created in
the relay and the Thermal content is continuously monitored. The Alarm & Trip setting of the
Thermal content θ can be set inthe relay.
Some features such as, adaptive protection settings that take into account winter and summer
transformer loadings, automatic load shedding and early warning for possible overload tripping is
achieved by Thermal overload function.
9.6 TRANSFORMER PROTECTION SCHEME:
To ensure redundancy and to eliminate common mode protection failure, protection scheme is
divided in two parts namely Group–A (fed from station DC–A) and Group–B (fed from Station DC–
B) protection scheme. Further, Main & Backup protection functions are kept is separate relay
hardware. To improve reliability, Alarm & trip signals of a particular mechanical protection i.e.,
OTI, WTI, Bucholtz etc. are wired separatelyto Group–A & Group–B protection scheme.
When the Group–A and Group–B protection scheme have identical protection functions, they are
Usually, calledas Main–I and Main–II protection scheme. In this case, It is not essential to have
separate hardware for Main and backup protection functions. However, due to multi–breaker
arrangement associated with transformers at transmission substations, Main–I & Main–II scheme
is normally difficult to implement for want of requirednumbers of analog input channels in a relay.
Typical classification of Protection function in Group–A & Group–B scheme is given below:
 Group–A Protection Scheme

Differential protection for high magnitude internal faults
Backup directional Over current or impedance protection
Over fluxing protection
Buchholz gas–accumulator relay for low current turn–to–turn faults
Top oil temperature sensor for over temperature protection Neutral or residual over current
protection, if provided
Sudden pressure (rate of rise) relay, if provided
 Group–B Protection Schemes

Restricted earth fault protection
Backup Directional over current and earth fault relays
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Over fluxing protection

Pressure relay (PRV)
Winding temperature sensor for over temperature protection
OLTC Buchholz gas relay, if applicable
The non-directional over current relays are used when they could be coordinated with the over
current protection on connecting lines. Coordination requirements Usually, require the clearing
times to be longer than the other types of backup protection. Directional over current relay
improves the co–ordination by being set to look through the transformer impedance. For this
reason, they are normally used for all interconnecting transformers. When applied on both sides
of the transformer, the current levels where coordination with line relaying is required is limited
by the transformer impedance which greatly improves the tripping times for higher current faults
in the transformer.
There are a number of general problems with backup relay viz., the sensitivity to the harmonic
and inrush currents. Setting must be able to allow inrush, which Usually, means de–sensitizing the
backup relay. Numerical relays can filter harmonics and DC offset currents from the inrush and
Therefore, may be preferred. In case of issues related to coordination of Transformer backup
overcurrent protection with the overlapping backup distance zone–3 of the line distance relays, it
is recommended to use backup impedance relay fortransformer protection.
Recommendations for provision of protective function & scheme for transformers of 765kV, 400
kV and 220 kV class are as follows:
 Differential Protection Requirements

• Should have triple pole with individual phase indication
• Should have unrestrained instantaneous high set over–current units which should not
operate during Inrush.
• Should have an adjustable and/or multi bias setting
• Should have second harmonic or other inrush proof features and also should be stable
under normal over fluxing conditions. Magnetizing inrush proof feature shall not be
achieved through any intentional time delay e.g., use of timers to block relay operation
or using disc operated relays.
• Should have one bias winding per phase and per C.T. input
• Should have an adjustable operating current with minimum operating setting of 15%
• Should have an operating time not greater than 30 milli seconds at 5 times of rated current
 Setting Guidelines
• Minimum Operating Current Setting
A minimum operating current setting of about 15% to 20% of rated full load current (i.e., 0.15 to
0.2pu), which is greater than the worst turns ratio mismatch at the tap changer extreme should
normally be selected.
• Bias Setting
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Bias setting should be normally done as per manufacturer’s recommendations. This is due to the
fact that algorithm used by each manufacturer is different.
• Unrestrained Operating Current Setting
This is to provide instantaneous tripping in the event of severe internal faults and it is not blocked
for magnetizing inrush or transient over fluxing conditions. It should be set above the anticipated
level of inrush current. A setting of 10 Pu is typically acceptable for most of the standard power
transformer applications.
Harmonic Restrain Setting:
This is to provide blocking to differential protection operation on detection of second harmonic & fifth
harmonic. Typical settings for the second and fifth harmonic restrain levels are 15% and 25%
respectively.
• Over fluxing Protection
Requirements
 Should operate on the principle of Voltage to frequency ratio and shall be phase
to phase connected
 Should have inverse time characteristics, matching with transformer over
fluxing withstand capability curve
 Should provide an independent ‘alarm’ with the time delay continuously adjustable
between 0.1 to 6.0 secondsat values of ‘v/f’ between 100% to 130% of rated values
 Tripping time shall be governed by ‘v/f’ Versus time characteristics of the relay
 Should have a set of characteristics for various time multiplier settings. The
maximum operating time of therelay shall not exceed 3 seconds and 1.5 seconds at
‘v/f’ values of 1.4 and 1.5 times, the rated values, respectively.
 Should have an accuracy of operating time, better than ±10%
 Should have a resetting ratio of 97% or better.
Setting Guidelines
For transformers, the established standard IEC 60076–1 states that a transformer should be in
continuous service without damage if the volt per hertz is below 1.05 per unit.
The over fluxing capability of the transformer must be checked and the characteristic matched
accordingly
for both alarm and trip.
The over fluxing alarm stage threshold setting, V/Hz Alarm Set, can be set lower than the trip stage
setting to provide an indication that abnormal conditions are present and alert an operator to take
corrective measures accordingly.
 REF Protection Requirements

 It shall be single pole
 It shall have an operating current sensitivity of at least 10% of nominal current
 It shall be tuned to the system frequency
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 It shall have a suitable non–linear resistor to limit the peak voltage during in–zone
faults in case of high Impedance type
 It shall be high or low impedance principle type
• Setting Guidelines
Minimum Operating Current
Minimum operating current setting of 10% of power transformer rated current is used for solidly
earthed systems. If the CT transient performance of the CTs is not identical, this may have to be
increased. Stability can be improved by selecting Stabilizing voltage (in turn stabilizing resistance)
with sufficient security margin i.e., normally 150% of the calculated value.
 Backup Overcurrent Protection Relay and Earth Fault Protection Scheme with High Set
feature (on HV Side and IV Side)
• Requirements
Shall have three over current and one earth fault element(s) which shall be either
independent or composite unit(s).
The scheme shall include necessary VT fuse failure relays for alarm purposes
Over current relay shall
 have directional IDMT characteristic with a definite minimum time of 3.0 seconds
at 10 times
 Setting and have a variable setting range of 50–200% of rated current.
 have low transient, over reach high set instantaneous unit of continuously variable
setting range
 500–2000 % of rated current.
 Have a characteristic angle of 30/45 degree lead.
Earth fault relay shall
 have directional IDMT characteristic with a definite minimum time of 3.0 seconds
at 10 times
 Setting and have a variable setting range of 20–80% of rated current
 have low transient, over reach high set instantaneous unit of continuously variable
setting range
 200–800 % of rated current.
 have a characteristic angle of 45/60 degree lag
 include necessary separate interposing voltage transformers or have internal
feature in the relay
 for open delta voltage to the relay
The current setting of the backup O/C relay shall be set above the expected maximum load current
so as to allow possible overload on account of loss of one of the parallel transformers. The first
stage can provide backup protection for faults on the transformer and the system. It should be
coordinated with downstream protection to provide discrimination for system faults. Normally,
the pickup of the time delayed overcurrent element is set to 125–150% of the maximum MVA
rating to allow overloading of the transformer accordingto IEEE Std. C37.91–2000.
The current setting of the backup E/F relay shall be set above the expected maximum load current
unbalance. Normally, Pick up setting of 10% of rated full load current is recommended for
Transformer in transmissionsystem. The time setting has to be coordinated with other back up
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protections on the downstream side (2nd or 3rd Zone of distance relay) using relay coordination
tools.
 Overload Alarm Relay

• Requirements
It shall be of single pole type
It shall be of definite time overcurrent type
It shall have a continuously variable current range of 50–200% of rated current and
continuously variable timer setting range of 1–10 sec.
It shall have a drop off to pick up ratio of 95% or better
Overload relay shall be set at 110% of rated current with delay of 5 seconds. This shall be
connected to give only alarm and not for tripping.
• Tertiary Winding Protection
There are variations in the practices adopted for bringing out the tertiary terminals of ICTs.
Therefore, depending upon the type of connections, adequate protection scheme may be adopted in
consultation with themanufacturer of the transformer. In case, tertiary winding CT is not connected to
Transformer differential relay, it is covered in the transformer overall differential protection zone
for faults in tertiary to certain extent.
• Backup Impedance Relay
If required to provide coordination between the overlapping line distance backup Zone–3
protection and Transformer back up protection, Backup impedance relay shall be provided.
Normally, Backup impedance function available in any of the transformer protection IED can be
utilized. The setting should take care of the transformer inrush & other transients.
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10 PROTECTION OF SHUNT REACTORS
10.1 INTRODUCTION
Shunt reactors are used to compensate for capacitive shunt reactance of transmission lines and
cables. They absorb reactive power especially during over voltage conditions and Thus, help
maintaining system voltage within limits. There are two main types of shunt reactors, dry air–core
type and oil–filled air–core and gapped–core types.
The oil–immersed shunt reactors are generally Y–connected with a solidly grounded or impedance–
grounded neutral and connected without any controlling circuit breaker directly to either ends of
the EHV lines.
The dry type reactors or oil–filled reactors of 11 kV or 33 kV ratings are normally ungrounded star,
connected through controlling circuit breakers of suitable TRV ratings to the tertiary of Inter–
connecting transformer (ICT) of 400 kV / 220 kV ratio purely for reactive power consumption to
control the voltage profile during light load conditions. However, air core reactors are widely used
in SVC or Statcom applications where they are connected at medium voltage levels.
10.2 SHUNT REACTOR PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
Protection requirements for shunt reactors fall into five areas: high magnitude phase–to–phase
faults, low magnitude phase to ground faults, turn–to–turn faults, and other miscellaneous failures.
High magnitude phase faults in shunt reactors are required to be cleared based on the same criteria
used for the primary equipment supplying the reactor. For the tertiary supplied reactor the fault
withstand of the transformer must be considered the limit for the clearance time. The tertiary
winding is quite sensitive to phase–to–phase or 3-phase faults. As such efforts should be made to
ensure that tertiary does not suffersuch faults.
The single phase to ground fault in the system external to tertiary terminals shall normally be of
very low fault current amplitude. Such faults must, however, be detected and isolated to ensure
that this does not lead to phase–to–phase or three phase faults. The detection of turn–to–turn fault
in the shunt reactor is rathertricky and cannot be detected by conventional differential protection.
The gas pressure increases or rate of gas generation or the fall in reactor impedance gives a better
indication and criteria for such protection.
The reactors, whether non–switched type provided on lines or switched type on bus bars or on
tertiary of the transformers, play a very important role to control the over–voltages on switching or
on load rejection orfor enabling black–start of the network or for controlling the voltage profile of
both the up–stream or down– stream system.
The protective relaying schemes for the shunt reactors should meet the following key
requirements.
 Maintain transient fault and voltage stability of the power system

 Prevent unnecessary false tripping of the transmission reactor during critical load periods
 Maintain required quality of supply
 Provide for maintenance of protective equipment with primary equipment energized by
providing two groups of protections.
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For smooth control of voltage profile during peak and off peak hours frequent switching of shunt
reactors provided on the bus bars or on transformer tertiary will be required and the system should
not fail on account of such frequent operation of shunt reactors. The tough duty of circuit breakers
for control of switched shunt reactors with good margin in TRV requirements and switching cycle
should be recognized.
The provision of Group–A and Group–B Protection system for the Shunt Reactors must meet the
same criteria as provided for the line and transformers.
The protection system must satisfy the following types of faults specific to the Shunt Reactors:
 Protection against internal phase to ground or phase to phase faults

 Protection against external tank faults to ground or phase to phase faults
 Protection against internal partial winding or turn–to–turn faults
 Restrict top oil temperature to maximum allowable value
 Prevent rupture of reactor tank during internal fault
 Provide for failure of an interrupting device
The switching device TRV should match with specific requirement of reactor current switching.
The knee– point voltage of shunt reactor and that linearity selected should match with the
requirement of the system where the reactor is located for adequate protection against over voltage
and consequent overloads.
The protection schemes generally adopted are as follows:
Differential relay for phase to phase and phase to ground faults
Impedance relay for turn to turn faults and backup protection or phase and
ground over current relay
 Ground fault protection by Restricted earth fault, or Neutral displacement relay
 Mechanical type fault detectors (Buchholz, Oil level indicators, Pressure relief
devices)
 Oil temperature and winding temperature relays
 Peak–to–peak amplitude of vibration and tank monitoring
 Reactor Differential Protection
Differential protection is the most commonly applied protection for Shunt reactors. Generally, the
differential relays provide quick clearance of phase–to–phase and ground faults.
 Impedance Relay
Impedance relays are used as primary protection or as backup protection for the reactor. It is also
used for detecting turn–to–turn faults within the reactor. Such relays also monitor the faults inside
the reactor at some good percentage of winding faults. Turn–to–turn faults inside reactor winding
may not change the through current of the reactor but the impedance values change drastically up
to at least 50% of impedance of the reactor. It consists of a single or preferably a two–zone
impedance relay on the high side of the reactor looking into the reactor. The impedance relay
provides high speed tripping in the Zone–1 protection and slower speed tripping in Zone–2.
 Phase Over Current Protection
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The phase over current protection is a very simple and reliable scheme for fault detection and is
used for some reactor protection applications as a backup protection. The setting must be high
enough to prevent inrush currents from causing unwanted operation. When used it should have
both instantaneous and time delayed elements. The instantaneous elements help in providing high
speed clearance of heavy current faults which threaten system stability.
 Ground Fault Protection

The ground fault protection within the shunt reactor is best provided by simple conventional
Restricted Earth Fault (REF) relay selected and set on the same philosophy as for transformer
REF. For tertiary connected reactors neutral over voltage relays are used. Sometimes a ground
over current relay is used as a backup protection when phase overcurrent protection is provided.
• Restricted Earth Fault Relay
Zero–sequence differential relays (Restricted earth fault relay) provide protection against phase–
to–ground faults in shunt reactors supplied from solidly grounded systems. Generally, this
protection is also provided for EHV shunt reactor with Neutral Grounding reactor connected
between star point of shunt reactor and ground.
• Ground Overcurrent Relay
The ground over current protection is a very inexpensive, simple, and reliable scheme for fault
detection and is used for some reactor protection applications as a backup protection for phase–to–
ground faults. This is used in conjunction with phase over current relay. When used it should have
both instantaneous and timedelayed elements. The sensitivity to the harmonic and inrush currents
is one of the main problems with backup ground over current relays. Settings must be able to allow
inrush, which Usually, means desensitizing the backup relay.
 Mechanical Type Fault Detectors (Buchholz, Oil Level Indicators, Pressure Relief
Devices)
These relays to be provided on shunt reactors of medium to high capacity are quite similar to those
provided on power transformers.
 Over Excitation Relay

The over voltage relays provided on the line or on transformers take good care of shunt reactor over–
excitation. It should However, be noted that shunt reactors are most required during over voltages
as they control and limit the over voltages, even control the runaway voltage levels by providing
more short time reactive power to system when subjected to over voltages. Any tripping of the
reactor during overvoltage condition would only worsen the situation.
 Top Oil and Winding over Temperature Protection

The protections provided on shunt reactors are exactly similar to that provided on power
transformers and criteria for selection and setting should Therefore, be the same. For higher
reliability duplicating of the initiatingcontacts is sometimes done and may be considered on case–
to–case basis depending upon then location and size of shunt reactors and voltage class.
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10.4 TYPICAL MAIN–1 PROTECTION SCHEMES (GROUP A)

Protection schemes for the reactor bank must provide for full protection during fault conditions. In
addition,backup protection should be provided when the potential for a failure to trip exists.
Typical Main–1 scheme consists of:
 Differential protection for high magnitude internal faults

 Over current or impedance relay for through fault withstand protection
 Buchholz gas–accumulator relay or sudden pressure relay for low current turn–to–turn
faults
 Top oil or winding over temperature protection for temperature protection
 Neutral over current protection or Neutral over voltage relay as ground fault protection
10.5 MAIN–2 AND BACK UP PROTECTION SCHEMES (GROUP B)
A true Main–2 protection scheme is Usually, not provided. The main reason is the low probability
of a relay failure during a protected event. Given the present record of reactor protection this seems
to be adequate to provide necessary reliability. But as operating requirements change and single
contingency limits are pressed the level of Main–2 protection may need to be re–evaluated in
future.
For the direct connected oil–immersed reactors typical Main–2 protection consists of:
 Restricted earth–fault protection, high impedance type, covering the neutral reactor as well
as the main reactor.
 Sudden pressure or gas accumulator relay for limited turn–to–turn faults.
 The backup protection is provided with Impedance relay set with a time delay between 0.7
to 1.0 second and an impedance setting of 60% of the reactor impedance
Or
 Instantaneous and time delayed over current for phase and ground
The neutral reactor is not stressed under normal conditions and is normally protected only by
Buchholz relayin the Main–1 protection scheme, and oil temperature in the Main–2 scheme.
10.6 REQUIREMENTS AND SETTING GUIDE LINES
Recommendations for provision of protection and monitoring equipment for Reactors are as
follows
 Differential Protection
• Requirements
It shall be triple pole type
It shall have an operating current sensitivity of at least 10% of nominal current
It shall be tuned to system frequency (for high imp. Relay)
It shall have operating time not greater than 30 ms at 5 times of setting in case of
High Imp. relay
It shall have suitable non–linear resistors to limit peak voltage during in–zone faults in
case of high impedance type
It shall be high or low impedance type
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 Restricted Earth–fault Protection

• Requirements
It shall be single pole
It shall have an operating current sensitively of at least 10% of nominal current
It shall be tuned to system frequency
It shall have suitable non–linear resistors to limit peak voltage during in–zone faults
It shall be high or low impedance type
 Backup Protection Relay (Impedance Type)

• Requirements
It shall be triple pole type
It shall have one or two zones
It shall be single step polarized ‘mho’ or impedance distance relay suitable for
measuring phase to ground and phase to phase faults.
It shall have a characteristic angle between 600–800
It shall have a suitable range for covering 60% of reactor impedance
The settings of the under impedance–zone should account for:
Possible system dynamic temporary overvoltage
Shunt reactor inrush current (reduced reactor impedance)
Above the turn to turn shorted reactance
Temporary overvoltage in the system may cause the reactor to operate in the nonlinear area. The
current in the nonlinear area of the B–H curve will increase and will necessarily affect the apparent
reactor reactance as measured by the distance protection. This reactance will naturally be lower
than the rated reactor reactance.
 Backup Protection Relay (Overcurrent /Earth fault O/C Type)

• Requirements
It shall be a single stage definite time 3-pole, overcurrent relay with adjustable
current and
It shall be connected for 2 O/C and 1 E/F connection and shall be non-directional
with high reset ratio
and low transient overreach
• Phase overcurrent protection – Time delayed overcurrent (51 / I>, t)
The overcurrent threshold for the time delayed overcurrent function should account for normal
system operation. In this regard, the current threshold must be set above the maximum reactor
current as a result of temporary system overvoltage or the voltage rise in healthy phases during a
single phase to earth fault in the connected grid. This voltage will rarely exceed 1.3 per unit in
systems with solidly earthed neutral. A settingof 1.5 times rated reactor current should normally
be sufficient to override these temporary over voltages.
• Phase overcurrent protection – Instantaneous overcurrent (50)
The overcurrent threshold for the instantaneous overcurrent function must set above the shunt
reactor inrush currents. A typical conservative setting for analog instantaneous overcurrent
protection is 6 times rated current of the shunt reactor. For modern numerical protections using
Discrete Fourier Filter (DFF) and thereby only extracts the RMS value of the fundamental
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component a more sensitive setting is possible based on manufacturers recommendation. This

filter effectively suppresses the DC component and higher harmonic components in the input
quantity. For instance, and according to some relay manufacturers, an adequate setting of 2.5 times
rated current with a time delay of 0.1s for this function could be applied to the function of shunt
reactors.
• Earth fault overcurrent protection
During a phase to ground fault located close to the neutral point, the currents on the terminal side
will be practically the same as before the fault. However, due to the so called transformer effect
the current in the common neutral point (and in neutral side of the affected phase) will increase to
a large magnitude. This phase to earth fault would, therefore, be easily detected by an earth fault
protection located on the neutral point side but not by the terminal side earth fault protection. During
a phase to earth fault on the terminal sideof the reactor (i.e., on bushing), the fault current measured
on the terminal side will have a large magnitudewhile the earth fault current in reactor neutral point
will have a moderate magnitude. In this situation, one of the reactor windings is practically short–
circuited. The resulting unbalance current that appears in the neutral point will typically have a
value of approximately 1 per unit. This phase to earth fault would Therefore, be easily detected
both by an earth fault protection located on the terminal side and also by the earth fault protection
located on the neutral side. If both protections are initiated, then the location of the fault will be
easier to determine.
Earth fault overcurrent protection located on the neutral side is the preferred method for the
following reasons:
It provides adequate and sensitive ground fault detection for faults near the neutral
side of the reactor.
It provides adequate back up coverage in case of failure of primary protection
(differential).
10.7 ENGINEERING GUIDELINES
No duplication of reactor protections needs to be done but the protections and monitors shall be
divided in two group viz. Group A and Group B.
Given below one possible way of grouping these protections
Table 12 Ways of Grouping Protections
Group A Group B
Reactor differential relay Buchholz trip
Reactor back up impedance relay
Reactor REF relay
Oil temperature trip Winding temperature trip
Pressure relief trip Oil level high/low trip, Fire protection
trip
Buchholz alarm / Winding Temp Oil Temp. Alarm
alarm
Group A and Group B. protection shall be connected to separate DC Source/separately fused

supplies and DC sources shall be supervised
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Both Group A and Group B protections shall give out trip impulses to main breaker and also block
auto reclosing where they are directly connected to the line they should also trip remote end CB.
The impedance or overcurrent backup protection may not be able to detect inter–turn fault in the
reactor, for which the buchholz may be the only answer, unless the number of turns involved is very
high. Manufacturers of reactor and relays may be consulted in this regard.
10.8 APPLICATION NOTES
Some important application notes connected with the reactor are listed below.
It may be noted that the connection of Restricted Earth Fault protection on the neutral side
shall be from residually connected bushing CTs (in case of bus reactor) or from the
ground side CT in the neutral grounding reactor (for line shunt reactor). The latter is to
ensure that the protection covers the neutral earthing reactor as well in the protected
zone.
 The impedance or overcurrent backup protection may not be able to detect inter–turn fault
in the reactor, for which the Buchholz protection may be the only answer, unless the
number of turns involved is very high. Manufacturers of reactor and relays may be
consulted in this regard.
 Buchholz and sudden pressure relays are dependable for internal reactor faults but have
shown a tendency to operate undesired if exposed to vibrations. Design improvements
have reduced their tendency to mal operate but have not totally eliminated the security
problem. The Buchholz relay has a significant higher security rating than the sudden
pressure relays and this type should be the preferred solution for conservator type shunt
reactors.
 Unwanted tripping of Buchholz, PRD or sudden pressure relays are also attributable to
ingress of moisture in their terminal boxes during rainy season. Adequate sealing measures
must be taken to avoid such spurious tripping.
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11 PROTECTION OF BUSBAR
11.1 INTRODUCTION
Busbars are the node points of a substation and the power system which handles large quantity of
power is handled. Some busbars have often been left without dedicated local protection, since
the occurrence of faults in the bus–zone is commonly considered as being of low probability, and
the fear of unwanted operation has outweighed its advantages. The unplanned or nonselective
outage of the busbar can lead to the loss of power supply to a widespread area. The effect of a
fault within a bus zone can be far more damaging than faults on other items of lower voltage level.
The failure to clear a bus fault can lead to outage of a complete substation, considerable equipment
damage and system instability.
In the case lower voltage level where no local busbar protection is employed, bus–zone faults would
be cleared by the backup or system protection. However, for higher transmission voltages where
security of supply is important and fault current levels are high, the non–discriminative fault
clearance and relatively slow clearance times will not be acceptable.
Where local busbar protection is employed, the zone of protection will include switching devices (bus
selector, bus section disconnects, circuit breakers, grounding switches), parts of the CT on the bus
side of the coreused for busbar protection, other connecting parts of the bus etc.
Busbar protection is expected to detect and clear all shunt faults i.e., phase to ground and phase–
to–phase faults within the assigned busbar zone bounded by the respective locations of the current
transformers. Faults can be caused by the flashover due to external causes, e.g., dropping of wires
by birds, electrocution of birds and monkeys etc.
Although a number of methods of busbar protection are available, all are unit protection schemes.
Backup protection is provided either by duplicating the local scheme, thereby preserving fast fault
clearance, or byreverse zone of line distance protection, or by time delayed distance relays in the
remote stations, or by directional backup over current relays.
Some of the factors considered while designing the busbar protections scheme are security,
dependability, speed, sensitivity, selectivity, flexibility and cost of the scheme.
11.2 TYPICAL BUSBAR ARRANGEMENTS
Substations are either air–insulated (AIS) or metal–clad. Metal–clad switchgear is nowadays
mainly gas– insulated (GIS) using SF6, as the insulating medium. There are various types of
substation construction. This depends partly on the busbar arrangement as well as other specific
considerations such as the available space. The busbars in air–insulated substations are either made
from ACSR conductors or for higher current levels from tubing made of aluminum. SF6 gas–
insulated switchgear may house all three phases together in a 3–phase enclosure, or for voltage
levels above, typically 132kV, separately in single–phase enclosures. In the latter case the faults
in the bus–zone can only be ground faults.
The most common bus bar arrangementsare as follows:
 Single bus – single breaker (also with bus–section circuit breakers)

 Double bus – single breaker
 Double bus – double breaker
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 Main and transfer bus (one or several main buses)

 Double bus – one and a half breaker
 Ring busbar / four–breaker mesh
11.3 LOCATION OF CURRENT TRANSFORMERS
The location of a current transformer in relation to its circuit breakers in a station partly determines
the limits of protected zone and all the breakers falling within this zone must be tripped in the
event of a fault.
Usually, the CT is located after the circuit breaker in order to cover faults in the breaker and the
bay equipment by the busbar protection. In this case, faults between the CT and the circuit breaker
will be detected by the busbar protection. After tripping of the circuit breakers associated with the
measurement zone, the fault will continue to be fed from the remote end of the feeder. Further
tripping is required in order to clear the fault. Usually, this is through circuit breaker failure
protection relay (LBB) initiating remote trip, or in its absence by backup protection. In the case of
a line feeder, for example, a transfer trip command is sent to the remote station to open the circuit
breaker at that end of the line and to block auto reclosure.
If the circuit breaker is situated on the feeder side of current transformers, faults between the
breaker and CT will be outside the measurement zone of the busbar protection. Such a fault must
Therefore, be cleared by the protection system of that feeder and appropriate arrangements to trip
the other circuit breakers connected to the busbar Usually, by a circuit breaker–failure protection
relay.
CT after Breaker CT on Feeder side

Figure 44 Location of Current transformer in feeder
In double busbars scheme with bus coupler, the CTs are located on both sides of bus section breaker,
which facilitates overlapping of the two zones of protection and avoid blind zone. However, it is
also common to provide CT on only one side of the circuit breaker to reduce costs. In such cases,
the fault between the CTand the circuit breaker will have to be cleared by breaker fail relay.
11.4 BUSBAR PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
A busbar protection must be capable of clearing all phase to ground faults, and also phase–to–
phase faults. The short–circuit levels of busbar are often very high; therefore, busbar fault clearance
times are required to be as short as possible.
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The protection must remain stable during through–faults (outside the bus–zone) especially in the
case of CT saturation and switching operations. Due to the high ratio of through–faults to bus
faults, busbar protectionis called upon to stabilize many more times than it has to operate.
Busbars are divided into zones, the boundaries of which are defined by the disconnectors or circuit
breakers and their associated current transformers. Each zone, therefore, requires an independent
zone of protection so that fault clearance is selective. This means only those circuit breakers
defining the boundary of the protected zone are tripped.
Information regarding the position of bus selection isolators is taken from their auxiliary contacts
and used in a logic, which ensures that the correct currents are combined for each zone of
measurement and the correct breakers are tripped in case of a fault in that zone.
To avoid malfunctioning of the scheme during on–load circuit switching from one bus to another,
the isolatorauxiliary contacts should ‘make before’ and ‘break after’ the main contacts during the
isolator making and breaking operation respectively. The position of the isolator making must be
stored in case auxiliary contact voltage supply fails. Such arrangements require very sturdy and
reliable isolator contacts. Now with numerical relays replica of such auxiliary contacts can be
provided in the scheme more accurately and reliably.
For busbars of strategic importance at 220 kV, 400 kV and 765 kV levels, a dedicated busbar
protection is provided. These busbar protection schemes can generally be categorized as high–
impedance, low–impedance and moderate–impedance (effectively a combination of plain
circulating current and biased differential scheme) and now numerical busbar protection schemes.
High Impedance Circulating Current Protection
High impedance busbar protection is widely used due to its simplicity and inherent through–fault
stability during CT saturation. In the case of CT saturation caused by high through–fault current,
the CT secondaryimpedance is reduced to the resistance of its secondary winding. The value of the
stabilizing resistor is chosen such that the voltage drop across the relay circuit is insufficient to
operate the relay for faults outside the protection zone.
If CT secondary switching is applied, a check zone measurement connected to separate CT cores is
Usually, added. The check zone measurement is an overall measurement taken over the whole
substation and is, bydefinition, independent of the isolator’s positions and auxiliary contacts. A trip
command is only given when both discriminating and check systems operate.
An advantage of this scheme over low and moderate impedance scheme is that the primary operating
current can be set much below the circuit load resulting in a high sensitivity.
Disadvantages of this scheme are that the relay setting must take the CT secondary winding and
wiring resistances into account, which must be kept low, and the CT knee point voltage must be
known and is generally required to be high. All CTs should have the same ratio (no turn correction)
and should be of the same type and performance (low stray impedance and of class PS or TPS).
Furthermore, the stability of theprotection is dependent on the fault level.
For the above reasons high–impedance busbar protection is not recommended when CT ratios are
different and for complex busbar arrangements.
 Moderate Impedance Protection
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Many of the limitations of high impedance protection can be overcome using moderate impedance
protection, which is a combination of the normal high–impedance and stabilized differential
schemes. Although heavy through fault currents may produce a differential current that exceeds the
differential pick–up setting, the stabilizing current prevents tripping.
 Low Impedance Protection

Low impedance protection are the schemes that do not employ a stabilizing resistor but utilize
current directly from the CTs. A number of different measurement principles are employed in low
impedance schemes.
 Current Differential Protection

This type of protection is also known as current comparison with current restraint, biased or
percentage differential relaying. The operating current is the phasor sum of all feeder currents and
the restraint current is the arithmetic sum. A trip command is given when the operating current is
greater than its pick–up level and the stabilizing factor, the ratio of operating current to restraint
current, exceeds its setting (typically 0.7 to 0.9).
In the case where CT ratios differ, the currents have to be balanced by using interposing CT. In
newer numerical protection equipment this is accomplished internally.
Depending upon the architecture, the low impedance busbar scheme is categorized into,
Centralized busbar protection scheme
Decentralized (Distributed) busbar protection scheme
• Centralized Busbar Scheme

In a numerical centralized busbar solution, the cables for CT, Isolator and breaker are wired
up to the bus bar protection panel. The tripping is routed from busbar panel to respective feeder
protection panel.
Advantages of centralized busbar scheme are:
 Reduction in cost
 Reduction in space
 Less hardware required
Disadvantages of centralized busbar solution

Increased cabling (Not recommended for Kiosk based substation architecture)
Difficult to test, upgrade and maintain once the substation is energized
Individual bay cannot be taken out of service
Limited number of zones
• Decentralized Busbar Scheme

In a numerical decentralized busbar solution, the cables for CT, Isolator and breaker are wired up
to the respective bay units installed in respective feeder protection panel. The tripping of central
unit (for bus fault)is routed through fiber optic panel to respective feeder protection panel.
Advantages of decentralized busbar solutions are as follows:
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 Reduction in inter panel wiring (simple engineering)

 Easy to test, upgrade and maintain, even if the substation is in energized
condition
 Individual bay can be taken out of service
 Support higher numbers of differential zones
The disadvantages of decentralized schemes are as follows:

 High cost
 More hardware involved (More no of IED’s)
Due to non-availability of outages, relay testing is not possible many times.

• Phase Comparison Protection
The measuring principle for phase comparison protection is based on the assumption that the feeder
currents are phase coincident during a busbar fault. The duration of phase coincidence of all feeder
currents is checked for positive and negative half–cycles. In addition, the non–coincidence is used
as a blocking signal. The differential current can also be included in the phase comparison, thereby
further improving stability. The pick–up level is set above the load current.
• Gas Density Detectors in GIS Switchgear
Gas density detectors are normally used to activate alarm under low gas density conditions. These
are used for protection purpose by providing several levels of detecting SF6 gas density. Stage 1
gives alarm when SF6 pressure comes below a certain value. When gas density falls further (Stage
2), it may not be possibleto extinguish an arc in the SF6 gas in the event of a fault. Therefore, in
such case a trip command is sent to that circuit breaker. In stage 3 where the SF6 gas density is so
low that it is unsafe even to trip the circuit breaker, a trip signal (Zone Trip) is sent to the adjacent
breakers and to the remote station (inter trip).
• Supervision and Alarm Functions
The correct operation of busbar protection employed in complex busbar arrangements relies on the
protection having a faithful reproduction of the station configuration. If this is not the case, false
tripping or unselectivetripping can occur. For this reason, the position of the bus selectors is ideally
given by the combination of two auxiliary contacts, one reporting “isolator open’, the other “isolator
closed’. For conventional busbar scheme, the voltage from these two contacts were supervised by
an auxiliary relay and a timer combination to ensure that an alarm is raised, if the isolator does not
reach its end position or a wire from the auxiliary contacts becomes detached.
Protection schemes using differential current as the operating quantity also use it to supervise the
current transformer secondary circuits. The corresponding alarm can also be used to block the
protection.
11.6 BACKUP PROTECTION
It is possible to provide backup protection of busbars by duplicating the dedicated protection or
by using elements of line protections like reverse zone of local distance protections or Zone-2 of
remote end protections.
 Duplication of Local Busbar Protection
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For substations of high strategic importance or where the bus arrangements are complex, the
complete bus bar protection can be fully duplicated. This is the preferred approach at bulk EHV
transmission voltage levels.
In cases where the burn–through time of SF6 switchgear is considered to be shorter than the
tripping time from remote backup protection, then also the local busbar protection must be
duplicated.
Duplicated protections invariably employ separate DC circuits and CT cores. They send trip
impulses to separate trip coils and use separate isolator position auxiliary contacts. Cross tripping
of both trip coils is also done.
 System Protection
Where clearance time and selectivity requirements are not critical, busbars can be protected by
overreaching (Zone–2) element of distance relays in the remote stations. Tripping is, therefore, at
the remote stations, thereby disconnecting more transmission lines and loads than is actually
necessary, and tripping times are typically from 350 to 650 mS.
For the majority of substations, especially those at lower transmission voltage levels, backup
protection is provided by the system protection, i.e., remote–end distance relay overreaching
elements (2nd zone). A reverse looking element of the local distance relay may be arranged to
provide substation local backup protection.
Where the main busbar protection is provided by the 2nd zone elements of distance relays (i.e.,
when no busbar protection is provided), backup protection can be considered as being provided
by the 3rd zone elements of distance relays in the more remote stations.
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12 LOCAL BREAKER BACKUP PROTECTION
12.1 INTRODUCTION
Circuit breakers interrupt the fault current when it receives a trip command from the protection
system that has detected the abnormality or power system fault. But the circuit breaker is also
vulnerable to faults and can fail to open and break the fault current. These can then cause
abnormalities inthe power system.
It is Therefore, necessary to distinguish between two sets of reliability data for circuit breakers.
Firstly, the number of power system faults that a circuit breaker clears and secondly, the
probability when the circuit breaker fails to clear the fault or fails to follow the command to open.
These two aspects are often put together.
12.2 TYPES OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS
The circuit breaker type is identified by the type of dielectric media used to interrupt the fault or
load current. The types of dielectrics used for the EHV circuit breakers are Oil, Air and SF6 gas.
Vacuum circuit breakers are used mainly in medium voltage applications. SF6 circuit breakers are
of the most recent technology and have been used extensively since 1975 in the transmission
networks. Almost all the breakers in IndianEHV transmission system are SF6 circuit breakers.
The operating mechanisms used are either pneumatic, hydraulic, spring charged or their
combinations.
12.3 REQUIREMENTS OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS
For protection purposes the circuit breaker shall have the following requirements:
 Operating time
 Breaking capacity
 Stuck breaker probability
 Operating sequence /duty cycle
For the design purpose, the following requirements are relevant:
 Circuit breaker trip coil burden
 Circuit breaker auxiliary switch contacts to give position indications to the
protection system
12.4 RELIABILITY OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS
It is important to know the failure rate probability of a circuit breaker to fail to open (stuck breaker)
and interrupt the fault current.
Table below shows probabilities of circuit breaker not opening on command or not breaking the
current, during manual or automatic opening to perform switching or to remove a fault. This could
be considered as stuck breaker probability. The probability has decreased from 0.95 to 0.24 stuck
breakers per 10000 commands between 1974 & 77 and 1988 & 91.
Table 1-13 Survey Data on Probability of Circuit Breaker to Open or Break
System Voltage[kV] Probability of failure to open or break per 10000 commands
First Enquiry Second Enquiry
63–100 0.18 0.077
100–200 0.93 0.204
200–300 1.49 0.300
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300–500 3.80 0.637

500 9.95 0.842
All Voltages 0.95 0.240
The CIGRE surveys indicate that the stuck breaker probability is quite low and the improvement
in designs of operating mechanism and devices would in future further improve the statistics of
stuck breakers.
It is necessary that the utilities maintain the circuit breaker performance data through appropriate
fault reporting procedure and maintenance of records of circuit breaker operation. This will be
useful in planning backup protection and other actions pertaining to circuit breaker performance
and maintenance.
12.5 DUPLICATION OF TRIP COILS
Most modern EHV systems have duplicated main protections as a standard feature and the
requirement of circuit breakers to have two trip coils. The speed of operation of circuit breaker
will dictate the wattage of trip coils and type of trip coil arrangements. A larger wattage may not
be desirable from security point of view. The trip current to the trip coil will be disconnected by
the reliable auxiliary contact of circuit breakers.
12.6 CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
There is always a risk, that a circuit breaker may fail to obey the trip command given by protective
relays. It would be possible to assure successful operation of the circuit breaker to interrupt the
load or fault current, by the duplicate trip coil operation.
It is to be seen that in the entire substation all the substation elements except the circuit breaker
could be duplicated to ensure successful operation through backup operation provided by the
redundant system. As such breaker backup is provided through the use of the local breaker backup
protection to give trip commands to adjacent breakers and breakers at the remote end. This is
Usually, done through trip logic provided in bus bar protection, which trips all the breakers
connected on the bus in the substation to which the stuck breaker is connected. Circuit breaker
failure protection is used to detect when circuit breakers fail to open or break. The breaker failure
protection belongs to the backup protections because it needs some time delay to detect a breaker
failure and is therefore, a delayed protection.
The probability of breaker failure is no doubt quite low. Therefore, the breaker failure must possess
extreme security to avoid mal operation when the breaker operates correctly. At the same time,
the breaker failure protection must be very fast to reduce the backup fault clearance time. Finally,
the breaker failure protection must be very dependable to clear the fault in case of breaker failure.
Several grid failures in India and abroad leading to blackouts have taken place due to
malfunctioning of Local breaker backup protection.
 The Basic Principle

The block diagram shown below, gives the flow diagram for breaker failure protection. Any circuit
breaker failure protection works as follows. The main protection issues a single–pole or three–
pole trip command to one or more circuit breakers. At the same time, the main protection starts
and primes the associated circuit–breaker failure protection system in one or more phases in all
these circuit breakers. At this point, the main protection issues a trip command to the breaker
controlling the faulty circuit. In the event of stuck breaker not following the command, the LBB
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relay already primed with fault current still flowing, issues a command to the trip relay logic in bus
bar protection for removing all the breakers on the bus. Thereis one fault detector per phase. A fault
detector comprises a single–phase over current relay and may use information from the auxiliary
contacts of the breaker. The fault detector may use several criteria to detect a breaker failure. The
most obvious criterion is that the phase current is higher than a predetermined value. There is one
timer per phase or a common timer for the three phases in each breaker failure protection. Thetimer
starts when the main protection operates and starts the breaker failure protection. The setting of
the timer should allow the breaker to open and interrupt the fault current. The breaker failure
protection operates when the timer has operated and the fault detector has identified a breaker
failure.
However, there could be a case of stuck breaker not being removed when the circuit current is
quite low and the LBB could not be primed. The operation of a Buchholz relay when a faulty
transformer is energizedfrom one terminal only is one such example. In such case the current may
be far below the operating valueof the fault detector. Tripping of a generating unit from a reverse
power relay is another case. The current may be as low as 1% of rated current and well below the
operating value of the fault detector. In such cases the best option is that the fault detector should
be provided with information from auxiliary contacts of circuit breaker, in addition to the current
criterion. This will help detect breaker–failures accompanied with low currents. Information from
auxiliary contacts of circuit breaker without any other criterion will not provide reliable fault
detection.
Figure 45 Flow diagram for breaker fail protection
 Setting of the Timer
The backup fault clearance time depends on the setting of the timer in the breaker failure protection
and the operating time of the backup circuit breakers. The setting of the timer must be longer than
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the total interruption time of the main breaker plus the decision time for the fault detector. Figure
below illustrates the makeup of the total backup fault clearance time
Figure 46 Total Backup fault clearance time

One may plan and operate the power system to avoid transient instability at shunt faults with a
stuck breaker. The backup fault clearance time then determines the transfer capability of the
transmissionnetwork. This means that it is very important to have a fast breaker failure protection.
It is desirable that the backup fault clearance time is shorter than the operating time of the remote
protections. This is a requirement in case of multi bus bar substations. Advantages of the expensive
bus bar configuration will be lost, if Zone–2 of the distance protection in the remote substations
operates faster than the breaker failure
It is also possible to use one delay for single–phase faults and a shorter delay for multi–phase
faults. This is done to avoid transient instability at multi–phase faults in combination with a stuck
breaker. The critical fault clearance time is much longer for single–phase faults than for multi–
phase faults. Some utilities allow bus tripping in the event of breaker fail, in 120 ms for multi–
phase faults and in240 ms for ground faults.
For single–phase faults, single–pole tripping and auto reclosing as well as three–pole tripping and auto
reclosing are practiced by many utilities. It should be noted that the use of single–pole tripping
and reclosing gives higher value of critical fault clearance time in comparison with the use of three–
pole tripping and reclosing on single–phase faults. It may However, be noted that the dead time of
high speed single phase auto–reclosurewill be of the order of 1 to 1.5 second in order to ensure
successful de–ionization of secondary arc in the event of multiple lightning strokes on the line.
 Fault Detector
It is necessary to use a fault detector with short and consistent decision time to obtain a short backup
fault clearance time.
The main requirements upon the fault detector are as follows. The fault detector must have:
• A very high security
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• A short and consistent operating time

• A high pick up to drop off ratio
• A lower setting than any protection that starts the breaker failure protection
The fault detector is, therefore, the most important part of the breaker failure protection. The fault
detector must satisfy stringent requirements under very adverse conditions. They include fault
current with large DC offset and saturated current transformers.
Usually, the fault detector uses an instantaneous over current relay. It is, however, not necessary
that the over current relay distinguishes between fault current and load current. This is the task of the
main protection and it controls the starting of the breaker failure protection. The over current relay
checks whether current is flowing on the line when the timer has operated.
The current detector should have short reset time of the order of 3 to 4 ms. The reset time can be
much longer when a saturated current transformer energizes the over current relay. The secondary
current of the current transformer will not drop to zero immediately when the circuit breaker
interrupts the primary current.The current transformer generates a DC current when the flux decays
from the saturation flux to the remnant flux.
Thus, the requirements of the current relay can be summarized as under
• A very high security,
• A short and consistent operating time
• Short resetting time
• High reset ratio
• Insensitive to the dc component in the secondary current
• Insensitive to CT saturation
• A lower setting than any protection that starts the breaker failure protection
12.7 TRIPPING SCHEMES
The breaker failure protection shall trip the adjacent breakers on the bus bars when it has detected
that a breaker has failed to open or break. The adjacent breakers must then open and interrupt the
fault current through the command of bus bar protection.
Human errors during preventive maintenance or fault tracing result in unwanted operation of the
breaker failure protection. It is possible to design the breaker failure protection to have two steps.
 The first step re–trips its own circuit breaker

 The second step has a longer delay and trips the adjacent circuit breakers, if the breaker
failure protection does not reset after the re–trip of the breaker.
12.8 TRIP COIL AND CLOSE COIL SUPERVISION
Open circuiting of the trip coil or closing coil will result in failure of breaker to isolate the fault,
or failures to auto reclose subsequent to a transient fault. In view of this, continuous supervision of
trip coils and closing coils should be provided. Open circuit faults in the close or trip coil or
discontinuity in the tripping or closingcircuit, should give alarm for the operator. It is common
practice to provide supervision of trip coils with provision to get alarm in the EHV/UHV system.
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12.9 RECOMMENDATIONS
Following few recommendations are given for LBB protection
 It is recommended that the utilities maintain the circuit breaker performance data, which
will be useful in planning backup protection and other actions pertaining to circuit breaker
performance and maintenance.
 Plan and operate the power system to avoid transient instability at shunt faults with a stuck
breaker. The backup fault clearance time then determines the power transfer capability of
the transmission network. This means that it is very important to have a fast breaker failure
protection.
 It is desirable that the backup fault clearance time is shorter than the operating time of the
remote protections. One would lose the advantages with the expensive bus bar
configuration, if Zone–2 of the distance protection in the remote substations operates faster
than the breaker failure protection.
 It should be possible to use one delay for single–phase faults and a shorter delay for multi–
phase faults in the breaker fail protection. This is done to avoid transient instability during
multi–phase faults in combination with a stuck breaker.
 For operation of Buchholz protection, an additional criterion from breaker auxiliary contact
may be
 provided.
 Another requirement on the breaker failure relay is for lines employing single–phase auto
reclosing. The current relays should be started on a single–phase basis from the trip relays
for proper operation.
 The Breaker failure function has extremely high requirements on the security against
unnecessary tripping and duplication will mean an increased dependability but the security
will decrease. As the risk of breaker failure statistically is very low and the security aspect
is more important. The BFR function is only provided in one of the systems, normally in
the Group A protection system. The practice of giving DC changeover to BFR relay when
a single BFR is used is common these days as it adds to the reliability & availability
 It is a good practice to use breaker failure protection provided in a separate hardware than
the one used for main protection, when a multifunction numerical protective relay is used
for line, transformer, reactor etc. This will help avoid losing breaker fail protection function
when main protection fails. Thus, it can be separate stand–alone relay or provided in bay
controller or as part of bus bar protection.
 For 132kV substations too, it is recommended that breaker failure protection be provided
since any failure of circuit breaker to open may create wide spread disturbance.
Recommendations for providing LBB protection at different voltage levels are as follows:
 Requirements
LBB protection shall have following features:
• Shall have short operation and drop off times.
• Shall have three phase current elements with facility for phase wise initiation.
• Shall have current setting range such that these can be set at minimum 100 mA for
line and 50 mA for generators (for 1A CT Secondary).
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•Shall have two timers with adjustable setting: timer t1 for re-trip and timer t2 for backup
trip.
 Setting Guide Lines
Current level detectors should be set as sensitive as the main protections. A general setting of 0.1
A is recommended for Lines and Transformers. However, in case of existing schemes associated
with lines having single phase auto reclosure and where phase wise initiation is not available, it is
recommended that 2-Ph + 1 E/F element may be used with phase element set above maximum
expected load current while E/F element may be set sensitively.
Zone 2 time of the distance relay must be set higher than the time of operation of LBB relay to
avoid any risk of premature tripping of the surrounding remote end breakers of the lines by the
distance relay back up zone (Zone–2) in the event of a successful LBB relay trip.
Guidelines for settings of timer for re trip and for Back up trip are given below.
Timer t1: This is re-trip time delay.
To avoid any risk of a premature tripping command by the breaker failure protection, the minimum
setting of the timer t1 must be longer than the maximum time required for a successful main
protection trip plus themaximum reset time of the overcurrent function.
Therefore, minimum time for timer t1 should be greater than Maximum operating time of main
circuit breaker + Fault detector reset time + Timer errors + Safety margin.
Timer t2: This is backup trip time delay.
Minimum time for timer t2 should be greater than t1 + Maximum operating time of main circuit
breaker + Fault detector reset time + Timer errors + Safety margin.
Only if the above guidelines for the minimum settings of the breaker failure timers are strictly
observed, is the correct operation of the breaker failure protection is assured.
Generally, timer setting of 100 mS for re trip, and timer setting of 200 mS for back up trip has
been found tobe adequate.
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13 PROTECTION OF FACTS (FSC AND TCSC)
13.1 GENERAL ON SERIES COMPENSATION (FSC & TCSC)

Series compensation is a device (normally capacitor bank) inserted in series with thepower system.
In high voltage transmission system, Capacitors are installed in series of the transmission line
(which is largely inductive) to achieve the following:
 Increase of transmission capability of long transmission line

 Reduction of transmission angle, increase of system stability
 Influence on power flow in parallel transmission lines
 Reduction of line voltage drop
 Limitation of load dependent voltage drops
 Damping of power oscillation by means of variable series compensation
This fixed percentage of series compensation can be anywhere from 20% to 80% of the line
impedance.
Series compensation is mainly of two types:
 Fixed series compensation (FSC)
 Thyristor controlled series compensation (TCSC)
 Fixed Series Capacitor Banks
A Series Capacitor Bank (SC) is connected in series with a transmission circuit,and it is exposed to
the same current–stresses and voltage–stresses as the transmission circuit itself. The voltage stress
may additionally be divided to two types:
• Series voltage stress (especially during faults and abnormal conditions)
• Shunt voltage stress.
The SC–equipment needs to be designed for these stresses. The different current– stresses and
associated voltage–stresses for which the SC needs to be designed which are as under.
• The normal current
• The maximum continuous current
• The 30 min. overload current
• The 5–10 sec. swing current
• Fault currents (essentially power frequency)
• Low frequency (below power frequency) oscillation currents
• Traveling wave current surges
The design of a capacitor for the currents and the associated voltages, is Usually, astraight forward
task. High swing currents, usually require special consideration (see below). Travelling wave
surges give no excess voltages across the capacitor due to the short duration of the lightning or
switching surge.However, the transient capacitor voltages associated with item. Fault current or low
frequency may be substantial and would generallyexceed the inherent short time voltage capability
of a capacitor unit. To design the capacitor for these high voltage stresses would result in a
completely uneconomical design.
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Since the capacitor is sensitive also to short duration over voltages, the technical/economical
solution is to provide the SC with a fast–acting primary overvoltage protection. Traditionally the
primary overvoltage protection comprised a self–triggered (voltage triggered) spark gap firmly
connected across the terminals of the capacitor (single gap scheme). The spark gap had a spark–
over time of some hundred microseconds.
A bypass switch is connected in parallel with the gap. The gap was extinguished by closing the
bypass switch. A current limiting damping circuit (XL) is used to limit the capacitor discharge
current upon gap spark–over or bypass switch closing. Thus, the SC is provided with a bypass
circuit. The drawback of this simple bypass circuit is the relatively long recovery time of the spark
gap after it had operated, typically 400 – 600 ms depending on the magnitude of the through fault
current. The consequence was that the reinsertion time of the SC after external fault clearing was
400 – 600 ms.
Figure 47 MOV (gapless) Figure 48 Single Gap
Figure 49 Dual gap Figure 50 MOV + bypass gap
The single gap scheme is improved in steps. In order to reduce the reinsertion time of the SC
following clearing of an external fault, two spark gaps with different settings are used (dual gap
scheme, Figure 49). With the dual gap scheme, the reinsertion time after external fault clearing
was reduced to 60 ms, using an ordinary circuit breaker as “reinsertion switch”.
The next step is to use a metal oxide varistor as overvoltage protection for an SC (gapless MOV
scheme, Figure 50 or MOV scheme with a bypass gap). With the MOV scheme, the reinsertion
time after external fault clearing was reduced to zero, provided that the MOV is not bypassed for
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external faults. Note that the bypass gap, which is designed as a forced triggered spark gap, is used
for fast bypassing ofthe MOV for internal faults.
It is important to note that the primary overvoltage protection also protects the capacitor from the
overvoltage that occurs when the capacitor is inserted or reinserted by opening of the bypass
switch. The current at capacitor insertion/reinsertion is called the insertion/reinsertion current and
is defined in the standards for SC. This current may be added to the list above, since it has a
decisive influence on the design of the SC.
 TCSC Banks
A thyristor controlled series capacitor allows continuous control of the series capacitor reactance.
This is achieved by adding current through the capacitor via the parallel thyristor valve path as
shown below.
Figure 51 Thyristor controlled series capacitor
The main circuit of the TCSC consists of a capacitor bank and a thyristor controlled inductive branch
connected in parallel. The capacitor bank may have a value of e.g., 10…30Ω/phase and a rated
continuous current of 1500…3000 A. The capacitor bank for each phase is mounted on a platform
providing full insulation towards ground. The thyristor valve contains a string of series connected
high power thyristors with a maximum total blocking voltage in the range of hundreds of kV. The
inductor is an air–core reactor with a few mH inductance.
The required operating range of a TCSC, i.e., the achievable apparent reactance as a function of
the line current depends on the application.
The apparent impedance of the TCSC (the impedance seen by the power system) can typically be
increased to up to 3 times the physical impedance of the capacitor. This high apparent reactance will
mainly be used for damping of power oscillations. During continuous valve bypass the TCSC
represents an inductive impedance of about 20 % of the capacitor impedance. Both operation in
capacitive boost mode and valve bypass mode can be used for damping of power swings. The
utilization of valve bypass increases the dynamic range of the TCSC and improves its effectiveness
in power oscillation damping.
13.2 PROTECTION OF CAPACITOR ELEMENTS AND UNITS
Series capacitors are normally protected by conventional methods used for protection of power
capacitor elements. Fuse protection, capacitor overload protection and platform protection are
discussed below. Internal or external fuses are the primary protection of elements and units for
series capacitors. Normally, modern series capacitors are split into a certain number of legs
containing capacitor cans in series–parallel combination to form a H–configuration or two parallel
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strings. The unbalance protection must be coordinated with the capacitor fuses.
The technology of the protection and control equipment used on series capacitors has changed
over the years. The advancements in fiber optic communications technology have minimized the use
of protection and control electronics on the platform. The relocation of protection and control
equipment from the platform to the ground level has minimized the level of exposure to electrical
environmental problems. However, some electronic equipment will continue to exist on the
platform and must perform properly.
 Externally Fused Capacitors

Externally fused capacitors provide visual of fuse operation for faster maintenance and achieve
protection for dielectric failure, lead failures, internal bushing failures, and bushing flashovers.
The fuse operation at a failure within the capacitor elements removes the entire unit from service.
The removal of the faulted capacitor unit from the series capacitor upon the operation of an
external fuse fulfils an additional desired overvoltage protection requirement for the remaining
capacitor units and minimizes the probability of case rupture.
 Internally Fused Capacitors

For internally fused capacitor elements, the scheme offers the possibility of allowing failure of internal
capacitor elements without affecting the overall expected life of the capacitors, and the removal
from service of the remaining capacitor elements in this case is not required. The arrangement also
offers lower parallel energy discharge in case of faults and provides compact can (container) size
and simplicity in the design. On the other hand, internally fused capacitors provide protection for
capacitor elements only within the capacitor sections. Connections between the elements and the
bushing are not protected. Moreover, lack of visual indication of fuse operation results in longer
maintenance. Faults external to the protected capacitor sections will result in the de–energization of
the entire series capacitor.
13.3 PROTECTION OF SERIES CAPACITOR BANKS
The main components of protection of series capacitor banks are shown in Figures below.
Figure 52 Typical connection diagram for FSC
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Figure 53 Typical connection diagram for TCSC
Description of the components shown in above two figures are : 01– Capacitor, 02–Metal Oxide
Resistor (Varistor – MOV), 03–Bypass spark gap, 04–Bypass switch, 05–Reactor, 06–Linear
resistor with gap, 07– Current Transformer, 08–Platform, 09– Isolating disconnector, 10–Bypass
disconnector, 11–Earth switch, 12–Thyristor.
The MOV provides protection against overvoltage’s caused by high through current due to
transmission line faults. These overvoltage’s may persist until the fault is cleared by opening of
the line circuit breakers of the faulted circuit element. Modern series capacitor banks use highly
non–linear Metal Oxide Varistors (MOV) to limit the voltage across the series capacitor to a
desired protective level. This protective level typically ranges between 2.0 and 2.5 per unit, based
on the voltage drop at the rated bank current.
 Capacitor Unbalance Protection

The capacitor unbalance protection monitors the status of the capacitor bank by measuring the
current flowingin the branch of the bridge connection (H–bridge) or the differential current between
the two branches. Changes in the capacitor bank caused by failed elements or capacitor bushing
flashovers result in an increased valueof measured capacitor unbalance current.
A capacitor unbalance protection normally has three different setting levels and time delay levels:
• Alarm
• Low set bypass level
• High set bypass level
The alarm level and the low bypass level are set as the ratio between the unbalance current and the
capacitorcurrent (line current). The high set bypass level is normally only related to the unbalance
current.
 Capacitor Overload Protection
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The series capacitor bank is designed to withstand short time overloads, without damage.
However, with occasional peak loads, the overload might be relatively prolonged and of such
magnitude that it could result in degradation of the series capacitor units. Therefore, the capacitor
current is monitored continuously by a capacitor overload protection with inverse time
characteristic. The start level is always related to the rated series capacitor current (ICN).
 MOV Overload Protection

The object of this protection is to protect the MOV from high energy injection overload as well as
thermal overload. The protection initiates triggering of the forced triggered spark gap and the
closing of the bypass switch simultaneously. A typical MOV overload protection has three stages.
• Short time MOV energy protection
• High MOV current protection
• High MOV temperature protection
 MOV High Current Protection

The purpose of the MOV high current protection is to reduce unnecessary energy absorption for heavy
internal faults. The setting should be above the maximum external fault current. Triggering of the
spark gap and/or initiation of closure of the bypass switch is instantaneous based upon current
magnitude. Reinsertion of the faulted phases follows a short time later (could be made within the
dead time of the auto reclosing cycle or after successful auto reclosing, depending on the utility
practice).
 MOV Failure Protection

The purpose of the MOV failure protection is to bypass the series capacitor in case of a faulty
MOV. If a MOV unit fails, the line current will pass through the MOV. One possible
implementation of a MOV failure protection is to use the ratio between the MOV current and the
line current and order a series capacitor bypass if a pre–set ratio is exceeded. Another possible
implementation of an MOV failure protection is to arrange an MOV current unbalance
measurement. A bypass and permanent lockout of the series capacitor is given at protection
operation.
 Spark Gap Protection

The purpose of the spark gap protection is to detect any unwanted spark over of the spark gap. This
is done by continuously measuring the spark gap current. The protection will issue a close order to
the bypass switch and also cause a permanent lockout of the SC.
 Trigger Circuit Supervision

The purpose of this protection is to detect faults in the spark gap trigger circuit. The trigger circuit
comprises three main components:
• A trigger capacitor
• A trigger transformer
• A thyristor switch
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In case of redundant systems, faults in both systems simultaneously will result in a bypass order
and a permanent lockout of the series capacitor. Fault in one of the systems will result in an
alarm.
 Sub–harmonic Protection
A series capacitor in a power transmission network may, during certain conditions together with
energizing of unloaded transformers or reactors, cause sub–harmonic oscillations of such
amplitude and frequency that disturbances in the network arise. The purpose of the protection is
to bypass the series capacitor, if such sub–harmonic disturbances occur. A typical protection uses
notch–filters to suppress the fundamental frequency component. The operation of this protection
is always 3–phase.
 Capacitor Discharge Function

The purpose of this function is to discharge the series capacitor via the bypass circuit when the
transmissionline circuit breakers are opened, either deliberately or in conjunction with an internal
line fault. When an internal line fault occurs, the line is disconnected by the line circuit breakers.
This means that a DC voltage will remain on the series capacitor and may give the
following consequence:
• Delay of secondary arc extinction at the fault location. This can happen if the line reactors
and series capacitors are located in such way that a line reactor, a part of the line, the series
capacitor and the earth fault form a closed loop. Discharging the capacitor with a close
operation of the bypass switchcan mitigate this problem if it exists.
• Increased transient recovery voltage (TRV) stresses on line circuit breakers. The
voltage across the series capacitor may be added to the system voltage across the line
circuit breaker at opening. If the resulting TRV stress on the line circuit breakers is too
high, the problem can be mitigated by discharging (by–passing) the series capacitor
before opening the line circuit breakers.
• If any of the line protections related to the series compensated line issues a trip order to its
line circuit breaker, a bypass order will be issued to the series capacitor. A typical
implementation of the protection uses two input signals from the line protection:
• Transmission line de–energized
• Line trip
13.4 ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR TCSC BANKS
 Thyristor Overvoltage Protection

The purpose of the thyristor overvoltage protection is to prevent the thyristor valve from blocking
in situations that can cause too high a voltage across the thyristor valve. The protection can either
be implemented as an indirect thyristor valve overvoltage protection that uses the thyristor current
derivative or a direct overvoltage protection that uses the voltage across the thyristors. The
protection orders thyristor firing, send a close order to the bypass switch and issues a permanent
lockout of the TCSC.
 Capacitor DC–voltage Protection
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The purpose of the capacitor DC–voltage is to bypass the TCSC if there is a sustained DC
component in the capacitor voltage. The protection is normally line current compensated, i.e. it
utilizes the ratio between thecapacitor DC voltage and the line current. In order to avoid undesired
protective action due to difficulties in the ratio calculation the protection is disabled if the line
current drops below the release level. The protective action is a mechanical bypass and a permanent
lockout of the TCSC.
 TCSC Low Line Current Supervision

In addition to the conventional line current supervision that prevents series capacitor reinsertion
during transmission line fault conditions, the TCSC line current supervision also supervises low
line current. A TCSC cannot remain operating in capacitive boost mode when the line current
becomes very low, typically in the range of one tenth of the rated line current.
When the line current is low, the corresponding fundamental power frequency component of the
inserted capacitor voltage is also low. In this condition the power flow in the line depends very
little on whether the series capacitor is inserted or bypassed. However, e.g., from a sub–
synchronous resonance (SSR) point of view, it may be important that the operating mode of the
TCSC is well defined, either in bypass mode or blocking mode.
 Requirements on the Power Supply

For any series capacitor installation, the following platform power supply considerations are
important:
•Adequate performance during very low line current and voltage conditions; power
supplies must besecure and not cause a spurious by–pass of the bank. Consider e.g., the
simultaneous energization of the power transmission line and the series capacitor and
let us assume that there is an earthing clamp somewhere on one of the platforms.
• For a condition when the series capacitor is energized on the faulted transmission line,
the start–up time for the current and voltage based supplies must be negligible so as not
to impair the duty cycleor protection operating speed requirements.
• Adequate shielding and de–coupling of power supply circuits from the primary system
is important, especially for those circuits used to provide power for spark gap firing
circuits.
• Cold weather performance, both while the series capacitor is in service and while the
series capacitor
• is disconnected from the transmission line for a long period of time.
• Reduce the component count for platform power supply related equipment without
sacrificing dependability and security e.g. eliminating the requirement for batteries and
battery chargers where possible.
 Current Transformer Supply
Many installations use line current based power supplies driven by CTs operable down to line
currents of less than 10% of the rated line current. There must be current on the line before the
power supply will turn on. It is dependable for faults with high currents but not if the line is open
circuited or for low line currents. A current transformer supply uses a small core CT, with a
thyristor crowbar to short the secondary when the power supply capacitor is charged to a suitable
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level. The CT must operate over a wide range. The thyristor must be capable of handling the
maximum ring down current for a series capacitor fault.
 CVT Supply
A CVT supply provides a voltage with the energized, independent of the line current. It is sometimes
referred to as an inverted CVT supply since the base unit is mounted at the platform level. Some
installations include a ground mounted base unit as a voltage signal for protection and control
purposes. The disadvantage of this scheme is that the power supply is unreliable during close–in
shunt faults.
 Battery Supply
To combat problems of poor power supply performance when the line current drops below the
power supply threshold or the series capacitor is isolated for an extended period of time, platform
batteries may be provided. Batteries would be charged from a CT or from a CVT supplies
discussed above. The battery is sized considering cold weather performance, permissible platform
power weight and size, and desired performance for the specified outage interval. The routine
maintenance of the battery requires a series capacitor outage, which will affect the availability
factor.
13.5 SIGNAL TRANSMISSION
The information from the platform on line potential can be sent to ground level by various
methods. The currents could be obtained using conventional iron core CTs. For voltage levels
above 100kV the cost for such solutions is high. Usually, the information is sent to ground potential
via fiber optics. Signals from lowvoltage CTs mounted on the platform can be multiplexed (and)
or sent, individually via optical fibers, down to ground level using various methods of modulation
or digital transmission protocol. Other direct measuring methods are available. Some optical CTs
use a fiber optic from the platform to the ground level and send alaser pulse up to provide energy
to the electronics coding at the current level and sending it back down via the same fiber. At the
platform an iron CT can be used, since the insulation requirement is not a problem in this case.
A second method of getting the current information down from the platform would be to use the
Faraday effect on an optical CT. This requires two fibers per CT. A polarized light signal is sent
up from the groundlevel and the magnetic field shifts the light. The angular shift of the light is a
measure of the instantaneous current.
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14 BASICS FOR DESIGNING PROTECTION SCHEMESBASED ON IEC 61850

STANDARD
14.1 INTRODUCTION
IEC 61850 is the international standard applicable to substation automation systems (SAS) that
defines the communication between intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) in the substation, and the
related system requirements. The standard defines and offers much more than only a protocol. It
provides:
 Standardized object oriented data models for primary plant and IED functions within the
substation.
 Standardized communication services (the methods used to access and exchange data)
 Standardized formats for configuration files –the Substation Configuration Language
(SCL).
 Requirements for system engineering processes and tools) Peer–to–peer (e.g. IED–to–
IED) communication.
 Definition of conformance testing) Process Bus.
The standard currently includes mapping of data onto Ethernet. Using Ethernet in the substation
offers many advantages, most significantly including:
 High–speed data rates (currently 100 Mbit/s)

 Multiple client/server connections
 Ethernet is an open standard and widely used
 Fiber Ethernet is suited to the substation environment as it is not susceptible to EMI. IEC
61850 offers a full automation and communication solution for the substation.
The IEC 61850 international standard for communications in substations brings a new era in the
development of substations. It affects not only the design of the substation protection, monitoring
and control system, but also the design of the substation secondary circuits. High–speed peer–to–
peer communications using GOOSE messages and Sampled Analogue Values (SAV) allow
development of distributed applications based on status, current and voltage values communicated
between devices connected to the substation local area network.
IEC 61850 is a promising toolbox for communication inside a substation and outside of the
substation in the forthcoming years. It is expected to progressively replace the existing protocols
and facilitate inter– operability between vendors.
Fast automation scheme is one of the main benefits expected from the IEC 61850. One aim is initially
to replacethe conventional wiring between devices. New protection schemes will appear that are
not easily feasible with the conventional technology. This might be within a substation or between
substations. It is essential not only to identify the communication requirements, but also the
capability of the subscribing devices to be configured with the right logic. Such arrangement
minimizes the hardware needs between IEDs since many hardwired signals can be replaced by
communication messages.
Logical dataflow needs to be analyzed carefully in order to avoid a bottleneck on the Ethernet
network. GOOSE messages, used to transmit peer–to–peer data are continuously repeated, so just
subscribing to anydata might consume too many resources for fast automation.
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Interoperability between protective IEDs from different vendors in the substation becomes a
necessity in order to achieve substation level interlocking, protection and control functions, and
improve the efficiency/ use of microprocessor based relay applications. This is possible because of
the integration of microprocessor–based devices (particularly protective relays) into complex
transmission substation schemes or even System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS). Protection
functions based on exchange of signals between multiple protection devices exist today in the
form of wiring between outputs and inputs of the different IEDs.
14.2 HISTORY
The industry’s experiences have demonstrated the need and the opportunity for developing
standard communication protocols, which would support interoperability of IEDs from different
vendors. Interoperability in this case is the ability to operate on the same network or
communication path sharing information and commands.
The IEC 61850 standard was based partly on UCA2.0, a substation automation concept developed
in the USA under EPRI. In 1997, IEEE/EPRI and IEC TC57 decided to merge both standards to
provide a globaland unique substation automation solution. The IEC 61850 standard was first issued
in 2004 and comprising 14 parts. Edition 2 of the IEC 61850 standard has been released in 2010.
14.3 CONCEPTS
As seen in Figure below, it enables integration of all protection, control, measurement and
monitoring functions within a substation. In order to allow a free allocation of functions to IEDs,
interoperability is provided between functions to be performed in a substation but residing in
equipment (physical devices) from different suppliers. The functions may be split physically into
parts performed in different IEDs but communicating with each other (distributed function).
Therefore, the communication behavior of such parts called logical nodes (LN) supports the
requested interoperability of the IEDs. The functions (application functions) of a SAS are control
and supervision, as well as protection and monitoring of the primary equipment and of the grid.
Other functions (system functions) are related to the system itself, for example supervision of the
communication.
The IEC 61850 standard defines the information and information exchange in a way that it is
independent of a concrete implementation (i.e., it uses abstract models). The standard also uses the
concept of virtualization. Only those details that are required to provide interoperability of devices
are defined inthe IEC 61850 series.
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Figure 54 Basic Concept of Architecture of Protection System as per IEC 61850

14.4 INTEROPERABILITY
A major benefit of IEC 61850 is interoperability. IEC 61850 standardizes the data model and services
required to interface with substation IEDs. This responds to the utilities’ desire of having easier
integration for different vendors’ products, i.e. interoperability. It means that data is accessed in the
same manner in different IEDs from either the same or different IED vendors, even though, the
protection algorithms of different vendors’ IED types remain different.
14.5 THE DATA MODEL
To ease understanding, the data model of any IEC 61850 IED can be viewed as a hierarchy of
information. The categories and naming of this information are standardized in the IEC 61850
specification. The levels of this hierarchy can be described as follows:
 Physical Device
It identifies the actual IED within a system.
 Logical Device
It identifies groups of related Logical Nodes within the Physical Device. The allocation of Logical
Nodes tospecific Logical Devices is not defined in the standard.
 Logical Node
It identifies the major functional areas within the IEC 61850 data model. Logical Nodes are
instantiated in an IED or computer using prefix characters and/or an instance number.
 Common Data Class

A Common Data Class is a composite set of data attributes, defined by the standard to relate to
substationapplications. In particular, it specifies common data classes for:
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Figure 55 Common Data Classes of Information

• Status information
• Measured information
• Controllable status information
• Controllable analogue set point information
• Status settings,
• Analogue settings.
• Specifies the data attribute types used in these common data classes.
 Data Attribute: -
This is the actual data (measurement value, status, description, etc.). The data model for a server
is described in the Model Implementation Conformance Statement (MICS) document.
 The Communication services: -

The communication services are the methods used to access and exchange data throughout the
system. The IEC 61850 standard defines the services for the following functions.
 Client –server associations: -

It permits communication to be established between a client and a server.
 Data model interaction: -

It permits retrieval of data model information (allows self–description of an IED) and allows
writing of data values (for example for IED configuration).
 Dataset: -
It permits the grouping of data and data attributes. Used for direct access, GOOSE and for
reporting and logging.
 Control: -
It describes the services to control, for example, devices. Direct and Select before Operate control
types are specified.
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 Generic Substation Event (GSE): -

It supports a fast and reliable system–wide distribution of input and output data values; peer–to–peer
exchange of IED binary status information, for example, a trip signal. The GOOSE messages are not
command signals.They are multicast reports of the change of state of a protection element used in
a distributed protection scheme.
 Tripping model in IEC 61850 : -

Depending on the protection scheme, one or more protection functions can operate on a Circuit
Breaker. All operate signals coming from protection LN are combined to a trip command in one
protection trip conditioning LN (PTRC). PTRC handles the trip signal conditioning (minimum
trip command duration, single/three–pole decision, etc.).
 Transmission of Sampled Values : -

Fast and cyclic transfer of sampled analogue values, for example, from instrument transformers.
 Time Synchronization : -
It provides the time base for the device and system, using SNTP.
 File Transfer : -
It defines the exchange of large data blocks such as disturbance record files.
The communication services for a client or server (or publisher or subscriber) are described in the
Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS) document.
14.6 IEC 61850 BASIC ARCHITECTURE
IEC 61850 Standard introduces a view of a substation automation system comprising three
hierarchical levels (station, bay and process), and hence two levels of communication network
connecting these hierarchical levels – the station bus and the process bus.
A simplified diagram with the communications architecture of an IEC 61850 Substation and
Process Bus based substation automation system is shown in
Figure 56 Communication Architecture of IEC 61850 (Substation & Processed Bus)
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The Merging Units (MU) interfacing with conventional or non–conventional instrument

transformers multicast sets of measured sampled values (currents and voltages) to multiple IEDs in
the substation over the substationlocal area network.
A “Process Bus” normally will support services defined in IEC 61850–9–2 for sampled analogue
values but may also provide information such as the status of breakers and switches and possibly
trip commands through an input/output unit (I/OU) using the services defined in IEC 61850–8–1.
In some cases, the MergingUnit and the Input/output unit can be combined in a single device.
The IEDs interface with the process bus via the Ethernet network and make decisions regarding
fault detection, faulted phase selection and protection elements operation etc., and can take action
based on their functionality. This is typically to operate their IED outputs in order to trip a breaker
or to initiate some other protection or control function (e.g., BF Breaker Failure or AR Auto–
Reclose functions).
Interaction between different IEDs and the clients in the IEC 61850 based protection systems is
achieved based on the exchange of communication messages over the “Station Bus”
Figure 57 Interaction between different IEDs & Clients (IEC 61850 - Station Bus)
A Proxy Server is a network entity located between a client application and one or multiple physical
devices, and acts as a client/server.
For Client–Server communication, the data model of each physical device can be re–created by
the proxy server to serve the transmitted information (e.g., when a device that is not IEC 61850
compliant is to be integrated). For GOOSE and SAV, the messages are published by the proxy
server with the same format as from the physical device. A separate logical device is used to
represent every legacy device.
Logical Devices enable the building of proxy servers, in such a way that Logical Devices are –
from a functional point of view – transparent. Each Logical Device can be identified independently
of its location (whether in a separate physical device connected to the network or in a proxy
server).
Parts 8–1 and 9–2 of the IEC 61850 Standard specify exchanging time–critical and non–time–
critical data through local–area networks (LAN) using ISO/IEC 8802–3 frames over 10/100TX or
100FX physical media i.e. Ethernet.
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14.7 PERFORMANCE
Performance of the communication is discussed in Part 5 of the IEC 61850 standard. Part 5 defines
both performance classes and message types and states the maximum transfer times applicable to
each.
For protection, Part 5 defines three performance classes: (a) Performance class P1 applies typically
to a distribution bay or to bays where low requirements can be accepted. (b) Performance class P2
applies typically to a transmission bay or if not otherwise specified by the customer. (c)
Performance class P3 applies typically to a transmission bay with top performance synchronizing
feature and breaker differential. Part 5 defines various message types:
 Type 1A Fast messages for “Trip”

 Type 1B Fast messages for …“Close”, “Reclose order”, “Start”, “Stop”, “Block”,
“Unblock”, “Trigger”, “Release”
 Type 2 – Medium speed messages
 Type 3 – Low speed messages
 Type 4 – Raw data messages
 Type 5 – File transfer functions
 Type 6 – Time synchronization messages
 Type 7 – Command messages with access control
14.8 APPLICATIONS
Most applications to date have concentrated on client server data exchange for substation
automation purposes. Applications of GOOSE have been limited by the opportunities to retrofit
and user confidence in replacing hardwired solutions with communication–based solutions. There
are today some pilots or advanced projects to demonstrate the use of Process Bus IEC 61850–9–
2. Nevertheless, some valuable experience is being gained both in GOOSE and SAV schemes.
 Modelling of Multifunctional IEDs in IEC 61850

The modelling of complex multifunctional IEDs from different vendors that are also part of
distributed functions requires the definition of basic elements that can function by themselves or
communicate with each other. These communications can be between the elements within the
same physical device or in the case of distributed functions (such as substation protection schemes)
between multiple devices over the substation local area network. The basic functional elements
defined in IEC 61850 are the Logical Nodes. A Logical Node is “the smallest part of a function
that exchanges data”. It is an object that is defined by its data and methods and when instantiated,
it becomes a Logical Node Object. Multiple instances of different logical nodes become
components of different protection, control, monitoring and other functions in a substation
automation system.
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Figure 58 Basics for Designing Protection Schemes

Logical nodes are grouped in logical devices, Usually, to represent specific functions that are part
of a server. Sometimes if the IED has a more complex hierarchy, it is necessary to introduce
intermediate layers in the model – sub–functions.
Figure 59 Intermediate Layers in the Model Sub-Functions of IED

The above–described IED functional hierarchy needs to be appropriately represented based on the
modelling hierarchy presented in Part 7 of IEC 61850.
 Configuration Language
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An IEC 61850 based Substation Automation System is described using the Substation Configuration
Language (SCL). SCL is based on the extensible Markup Language (XML) and allows the
exchange of configuration data between different tools, possibly from different manufacturers.
Depending on the purpose of the SCLfile, four types are distinguished:
• IED configuration description (.icd file): provides LN capability and data–model
of an IED not yet used in any application;
• System Specification Description (.ssd file): consists in the single line diagram and
the LN requirementsonly on a functional point of view;
• Substation Configuration Description (.scd file): defines all the specific
substation automation system details, from the communication to the LN
allocation – which IED performs which function;
• Configured IED Description (.cid file): is the part of .scd file concerning a
specific IED. From this file the IED configuration tool can get the necessary
parameters that are needed to make the device work in the system (e.g. address,
name values assigned according to the specific project names).
Figure.60 IED Configuration Language

14.9 CYBER SECURITY
A critical aspect to look at when cyber security is deployed to comply with national requirements
such as and international requirements, is to identify the critical assets and critical cyber assets in
a substation.
Typical critical assets and critical cyber assets are all the hardware and software installed in a
substation which would affect the reliability or operability of the substation and consequently the
power system if oneof them is compromised or destroyed.
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Typically, a physical security perimeter and an electronic security perimeter are defined to protect
all critical assets and critical cyber assets in a substation. The physical security perimeter could be
the wall or the fence of the substation.
The access points in the substation automation architecture are:
• Ethernet Links to SCADA,
• Ethernet links to configuration and maintenance software,
• Serial links to SCADA
It is important to emphasize that IEC 61850 was initially designed for communication within the
substation. When IEC 61850 is used outside the substation, then there are further issues to be
considered.
14.10 SECURITY TOOLS
Having sound TCP/IP protocol stack implementations is desirable to mitigate security problems. In
addition to it, there are tools that may help the administrator handle security issues. Some of these
tools are brieflydescribed in the following paragraphs:
Vulnerability scanners work at different layers of the OSI reference model. Many of them have
a client–server structure. They scan all the ports of a system, searching for open ports and using
known exploits to see how vulnerable the system is. This in fact is the same approach that attackers
use. New vulnerabilities are found and their corresponding exploit developed almost every day.
Therefore, scanners will require updating their vulnerability databases, which is Usually, done
via Internet (some tools require a subscription fee).
An Intrusions detection system, often called IDS, looks for intrusion attempts in the systems. An
IDS can use different information sources, a network IDS analyses network traffic to detect
intrusion attempts while a host based IDS uses the system logs of a host. An attack detection
engine will process the data and will register, alert and/or react in accordance to a predefined
strategy. Like vulnerability scanners, they keep a database with attack patterns that can be updated
from the Internet.
Networks monitoring tools analyses and make reports of the captured data. They are composed
by a set of modules and scripts that capture network activity data and format the information to be
stored and displayed on screen or printed. They can generate graphs that can be used in web sites
to show the network traffic in real time.
Layer 2 packet filters can act as layer 2 firewalls and also permit MAC address translation. They
are included in the standard Linux kernel since version 2.4 and may be present in some
“traditional” firewall systems too. There are also ARP traffic filters that set rule tables to filter
ARP packets. These tables can be configured and modified in the Linux kernel.
There are many layers 3 and 4 packet filters. Some of them are software tools to be installed in
PC like machines while others are special purpose devices. They Usually, perform Network
Address Translation and have logging capabilities too. They can intercept and manipulate network
packets.
Honey pots and honey nets are software pieces or devices that attract attackers as they pretend to
be vulnerable systems. They are tools that allow administrators to gather information about the
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attackers and their techniques. They can also distract attackers from relevant real services and alert
administrators about such situations.
Security Effective Architecture for IEC 61850 substations
Working Group 15 of Technical Committee 57 of the International Electro technical Commission
(IEC) develops standards for end–to–end cyber–security of the electric system, in particular for the
communication protocols defined within TC 57. No general key management system has been
specified, but related design choices for security mechanisms partly define key management
aspects.
Security measures in IEC 62351 include SSL/TLS with specific parameters for TCP/IP profiles,
electronic certificates for MMS profiles, challenge–response authentication for 60870–5
profiles, digital signatures for 61850 profiles.
Message monitoring of IEC 61850 GOOSE and Samples Analogue Values
GOOSE messages in IEC 61850 contain data objects that if properly used by the subscribing IED
can significantly reduce the probability for a successful cyber-attack. By monitoring the state and
sequence numbers in the message, the subscribing IED can detect messages from a remote
intruder that are out of order or duplicated due to the latency caused by the Internet transmission
from a remote location. The same applies to sampled values messages but in this case the criterion
for monitoring is the sample counternumber.
14.11 BENEFITS OF IEC 61850
In an open market, power transmission and distribution network operators need to run the power
systems reliably and efficiently at minimum operating cost. There is a world–wide incentive to
achieve these operational objectives by taking advantage of the capability of substation automation
systems. It becomes important that there is only one standard protocol moving to the future so as
to allow the elimination of the diversity of protocols that exist today.
 Reduction in Costs
One important goal for the utilities today is to improve efficiency and, therefore, to cut costs wherever
possible. However, this must not endanger the safety and reliability of the grid performance and
by no means lowerthe grid transmission capacity or availability.
The use of IEC 61850 can lead to a reduction in both capital expenditure and the costs associated
with asset maintenance. This goal can be achieved by one or more out of the following.
• By making use of signaling through process and station busses within a substation, the
amount and complexity of wiring can be considerably reduced leading to significant cost
savings.
• The application of non–conventional instrument transformers such as Optical CTs/PTs
could bring further cost benefits as they are lightweight and easy to maintain.
• Furthermore, any subsequent modifications to schemes involving connections between
IEDs will also become less expensive as changes to hardwiring will be minimized.
• The costs associated with primary equipment outages on e.g. heavily used transmission
circuits can be significant and any reduction in their duration or frequency would be of
value to utilities. Outages are sometimes necessary due to a requirement to modify certain
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aspects of the protection installed for a feeder. This is particularly the case if changes are
required to the wiring involving measurement transformers and one or more relays. If it
is permissible to continue to operate a circuit with one of the main schemes out of service,
the use of a process bus to send sampled values representing the secondary circuit
measurements will permit other schemes to continue to reliably function without
interference as secondary wiring is not disturbed. Moreover, another relay could
potentially be brought into service if required to meet specific company operating
regulations.
• The use of a common international standard also opens up the substation automation
market to more competition – potentially giving the user a larger selection of IEDs,
suppliers and system integrators. It also allows users to avoid common mode failures by
using different vendor equipment.
• Through the WAN, it will be possible to more easily get hold of any equipment data. This
applies for non–time critical data (disturbance records, event reports, setting parameters,
etc.). Better use of data will lead to improvements in asset management and a reduction
in device count … assuming that is it is correctly integrated with asset databases!
 Higher Performance
The major advantage of IEC 61850 is the interoperability of IEDs’ of different manufacturers and the
elimination of gateways. The absence of gateways means less equipment, no unnecessary
communication delays and no additional errors caused by protocol conversions. The use of
Ethernet communications for all the substation automation functions means standardized and
simpler cabling in comparison with the use of serial communications. This is an advantage in project
execution, equipment installation and equipment testing.
Process bus implementation gives further advantages by using non–conventional CT instrument
transformers are also not affected by CT saturation and the opening of secondary CT circuit
conditions like the conventional ones.
 Simplifying Engineering
IEC 61850 defines also the Substation Configuration description Language (SCL) which allows
the configuration of an automation system to be defined and the setting of the standardized
parameter of IEDs from different manufacturers to be fixed by the user or any of the manufacturers
involved.
Using IEC 61850, it is expected to reduce project time, simplify system integration with all related
engineeringand reduce maintenance and, after a time, probably also training efforts
 Flexibility
IEC 61850 offers solutions to the abovementioned requirements. It provides interoperability of
equipment from different manufacturers and leads to minimum change solutions for
interoperability of equipment from different generations. It covers all the automation functions in
substations. A communication can exist within the Station Level or the Bay Level, and can also
exist between two levels, for example between the Bay Level and the Process Level.
IEC 61850 does not specify any mandatory system topology, the use of both station bus and
process bus at the same time, or if station and process bus should be separated or not.
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If non–conventional CTs can easily be constructed to have better accuracy than conventional ones
and if they can be made more flexible, e.g. by introducing a programmable ratio, this will also be
of advantage.
Process bus can be used also with conventional instrument transformers, as the merging units can be
madeto interface with either new technology or conventional equipment.
 Reliability
The reliability of station signaling in a communication system is improved compared to the
hardwired systems as the communication system can be continuously monitored and an alarm can
be given immediately when some problems occur in the communication system. In hardwired
systems less problems can be automaticallydetected as for example trip circuit supervision.
IEC 61850 is a standard which covers the communications at all the three levels of equipment in a
substation,namely at Station Level, Bay Level and Process Level. Other communication protocols
such as DNP3, Modbus, etc. cover the communications at only one or two of these three levels
because most standards were developed for specific purposes.
Such advantages are as follows:
• IEC 61850 specifies high speed communication based on GOOSE message (time critical
data) and use of report by exception rather than polling as used in master–slave serial
communication protocols. For this it uses publisher / subscriber and client / server
mechanisms respectively.
• The Ethernet topology also allows to have more than one client which eases the
implementation of redundancy in comparison with a master/slave architecture.
• In case of failure of one client or server, the IEC 61850 communication between the other
clients and servers is not affected which is not the case of a conventional master–slave
communication architecture.
• The use of multicasting (i.e. one device sending a message simultaneously to several
devices inside one logical LAN–segment) improves the performance of time–critical
messages (GOOSE messages). It reduces network message traffic and communication time
by eliminating the need to repeat messages to each individual device sequentially.
• TCP/IP is the transmission control protocol of the Internet. IEC 61850 facilitates data
transfer through public or private data networks by using TCP/IP also. Data of other
protocols based on Ethernet and TCP/IP, such as web–services data for remote
maintenance, can be transmitted in parallel via the same communication infrastructure.
• Any changes in communication technology in the future will cause minimum changes in
the abstract models and services and may require mapping to a new profile.
• In IEC 61850, the data model is clearly defined and is also easy to extend without losing
the interoperability.
• The IEC 61850 defines a series of data names and associated rules for extension (Logical
Nodes and their attributes) that avoid the interpretation between the different projects
actors and facilitate the integration of the different components of the system as well as
the integration of the system with its environment (primary devices, remote control).
• Unlike legacy protocols such as Modbus, IEC 61850 devices can self–describe
themselves to client applications without any manual configuration of the data objects.
Self–description facilitates automatic configuration.
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• Unlike legacy protocols, IEC 61850 specifies a standard configuration language based on
XML and using the Logical Nodes described above. This allows to formally exchange
configuration data between system tools and avoids the manual association of data
references between tools.
• Time sync methodologies such as SNTP are a key component of IEC 61850. SNTP time
synchronization accuracy in the range of 1 ms is sufficient for event reporting but not for
process bus. Development of an IEEE 1588 profile is on–going and will allow time sync
over Ethernet in future IEC 61850 based substation, ensuring a time synchronization
accuracy better than 1 microsecond.
• The transmission rate of 100 Mbits/s allows fast data transfer, for example faster
disturbance recorder extraction than serial protocol can do.
• IEC 61850 uniquely provides data with a quality attribute and a time stamp which
improves the reliability of information as such as validity (good, invalid, reserved,
questionable) and test.
• In conventional substation automation systems, data concentrators and protocol gateways
are required between different IED’s, HMI and RTU. With IEC 61850 and substation
LAN, all data is transmitted in one standard format and such data concentrators and
protocol gateways are only needed for SCADA communication links.
• IEC 61850 provides a standardized reporting capability that will be invaluable in the
development of automated analysis and diagnostic tools.
14.12 CHALLENGES IN IEC 61850 IMPLEMENTATION
Since the release of the new IEC 61850 standards in 2004, many utilities consider the
implementation of IEC 61850 station bus to replace the existing hardwired protection and control
schemes as for example CB failure initiation/trip, bus blocking scheme, A/R scheme, load
shedding, automatic restoration, control interlocking, etc.
However, the main obstacles and barriers for the acceptance of IEC 61850 and its wide spread
implementation/ application could be summarized as follows:
 Needs for more skilled personnel,

 Needs of new tools to support IEC 61850 implementation for engineering, testing and
maintenance,
 Lifetime need of additional electronic components, for example switches, merging unit,
etc.,
 Doubts in GOOSE signal reliability and security,
 Some substation IEDs are still using legacy protocols which can represent a significant
investment,
Despite many of the Challenges IEC 61850 offers many incentives as follows:
 Brings new possibilities of information sharing and exchanging between devices and
applications in the substation,
 The wide range of services and detailed models can make it acceptable as a worldwide
communication standard in power system application,
 Monitoring of the GOOSE messages (copper wired signals are not!) and LAN devices,
 Easier to design, maintain and expand with the right tools,
 Live testing can be made without outage,
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 Improve self–monitoring of the complete substation automation IEDs and system,

14.13 REQUIREMENTS FOR NETWORK COMMUNICATION AND PROCESSING
A networked communications system can be leveraged to support rather sophisticated capabilities,
such as the ability of a system to continue operation in spite of failures.
When implementing a protection scheme based on IEC 61850, it is important to check what
happens when any system component, for example IEDs, merging unit, a switch or a fiber fail:
 Is a contingency mode of operation feasible, whereby the scheme operation can continue,
even with acceptable degradation? What would this require in terms of programming and
wiring?
 If any system component fails, what are the consequences need to be examined. They are
listed below
• Are too many critical resources associated with the same IED?
• Is distributing them among several IED the right approach?
• Can critical functionality be replicated in two IEDs, so that it is still available if one
of the IEDs fails?
14.14 SPECIFYING IEC 61850 BASED PROTECTION SCHEMES
The general procedures for specifying IEC 61850 protection schemes consist of the following
steps:
 Determine functional requirements based on:

• the layout of the substation from an electrical point of view
• the identification of the types of equipment,
• the identification of the protection and control philosophy,
• The performance requirements,
• The identification of what data is available or required.
• The consideration of protection schemes – identify what events will cause what actions
by what equipment,
• Information flow requirement
• Determination of information security requirements and contingency operation.
 Users will determine which logical nodes and data are needed for which applications.
 Check availability of required IEC 61850 logical nodes and data in the approved devices.
 Develop IEC 61850 data exchanges within the substation.
 Data to be exchanged between devices and applications to be defined such as GOOSE
based messages, Samples Analogue Value messages, and Client / Server messages.
These steps define explicitly what IEC 61850 data items are sent, where, and under what conditions
within the substation. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the actual data exchanges are clearly
defined:
• The maximum transfer and response time,
• The maximum size of messages,
• Security,
• Availability
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14.15 GOOSE FOR IEC 61850 IMPLEMENTATION

The use of GOOSE messages provides high–speed communication mechanisms between IEDs,
Thus, enabling the implementation of substation level protection, interlocking or distributed
control systems. The GOOSE service model defined in the standard provides a possibility for a
fast and reliable exchange of data between IEDs.
GOOSE Publishing
Figure 61 Goose Publishing
Each GOOSE message carries StNum and SqNum parameters (shown in the standard section
15.2.3.1, part 7–2, Ed1). StNum indicates the change of a GoCB data set value. SqNum indicates
the message sequence for the same data values. Any new data change in the data set will cause the
GOOSE publisher to increment StNum, reset SqNum and change the repeat time interval to T1.
By establishing a proper relationship between the fast repetition of messages following a change
of data set value and cyclic stable repetition intervals, the GOOSE message flow in the network
can be decreasedwhile achieving high speed and reliability levels.
 GOOSE Subscribing and Processing

The subscriber needs a mechanism to deal with the GOOSE messages. Besides the data content in
the GOOSE message, it also contains additional information, such as the two parameters of StNum
and SqNum. Based on these two parameters, the subscriber can be aware if the current GOOSE
message contains new data or not, which can help it to filter GOOSE messages, saving time and
processing resources for the subscriber.
 GOOSE Performance
One of the important differences between IEC 61850 and other communication protocols is the
introduction of high–speed peer–to–peer communications defined as IEC GOOSE (Generic
Object Oriented Station Event). These messages are used for the exchange of a wide range of
possible common data organized by a DATA SET.
The peer–to–peer communications in an integrated substation protection and control system are
based on what is defined as a GSE. This is a Generic Substation Event (GSE) and it is based upon
the asynchronous reporting of an IED’s functional elements status to other peer devices enrolled
to receive it during the configuration stages of the substation integration process. It is used to
replace the hard–wired control signal exchange between IED’s, as seen in the previous sections,
for interlocking and protection purposes and, consequently, is
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 Comparison between the performance of hard wired and GOOSE based accelerated
schemes
Numerous tests performed by different IED manufacturers and test companies show that GOOSE
based distributed applications consistently outperform hard wired schemes with the same
functionality. This maylook strange at the beginning, but as can be seen from the careful analysis
of the factors that determine the overall operating time of a distributed protection function, it is
what should be expected.
If we consider that the breaker tripping and the communications exchange between the two ends
of the protected line is performed in the same manner by the IEDs in both cases, we will have to
analyze the time from the operation of the directional element in the sending relay and the resulting
detection of the operation of the opto input of the tele-protection IED at the sending end of the
line, as well as the time from the receiving of the accelerating signal and the resulting detection of
it by the relay at the receiving end.
In the conventional hard wired scheme this will include the operating time of two output relays
(each about 3 ms) plus the two detections of the energization of opto inputs (depending on the
availability or lack of filtering and the scanning of the opto inputs this time for each can be from
2 to 8 ms).
If we assume an average time of opto input with filtering of about 5 ms, the total time at each end
for the hard wired interface between the relay and tele-protection IED will be about 8 ms, giving
us a total of about 16 ms for both ends.
If we look at the time between the directional element output and the communication device
detection of the GOOSE message, according to IEC 61850 it should be less than 4 ms at each end
of the line, giving us a total of about 8 ms for both ends. When we compare the two solutions, we
see that the GOOSE basedscheme will be about 8 ms (half a cycle at 60 Hz) faster than the hard–
wired equivalent.
14.16 TOPOLOGY CONSIDERATIONS
Parts 8–1 and 9–2 of the IEC 61850 Standard specify exchanging time–critical and non–time–
critical data through local–area networks (LAN) using ISO/IEC 8802–3 frames over 10/100TX or
100FX physical media. Ethernet based technology is flexible and with its devices is able to connect
via different communication systems. Communication links are possible between different
substations located in different geographical locations over a Wide Area Network (WAN). The
Standard does not define how the physical network is built for Ethernet based station or process
bus and in this chapter, a few simple examples are given.
Modern Ethernet systems are switched networks where network devices such as Ethernet switches
have knowledge of connected devices and Therefore, are able to route the unicast messages (in
IEC 61850 typically reports and controls) in a Point–To–Point manner without distributing the
traffic to all nodes in network. GOOSE and SAV are based on Ethernet Multicast messages and
these types of messages are forwarded within a subnet simultaneously to all its nodes.
Redundancy of communication in IEC 61850 based systems is not required by the standard, but it
is often used as it increases the availability of the applications themselves, and so may also be
specified by the customer or end user. It especially improves the safety when using GOOSE
services between IEDs, as failures in communication links are not tolerated when using GOOSE
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for protection purposes. Even though the first edition of the standard does not include any selected
technology, the second edition does reference IEC 62439 that serves to reference and define some
different methods of redundancy.
 Station Bus Topologies

• Star Topology
Star Network is the basic Ethernet topology in today’s switched networks. All devices are
connected with single point–to–point links to switch and network devices routes the traffic
between IEDs in substation. This type of topology is straightforward as it uses only standard
ethernet functionality and it does not necessarilyneed any configuration.
Figure 62 Ethernet Topology (Star Network)
If a substation is large and consists of several IEDs and switches, the backbone connections
between Ethernet switches can be made redundant using a mesh or ring. IEDs have one link to
Ethernet station bus. In this topology, switches typically require management possibilities and
support of redundancy protocol,
• Loop Topologies
This is a network topology in which each device acts as a repeater with two communication ports,
one for data input and the other for data output. The devices are then daisy–chained to form the
loop. Management functions and a redundancy protocol e.g. RSTP are needed to manage the
network loop and reroute paths in disturbance situations. IEDs need to be able to forward Ethernet
traffic from one port to another if the traffic is not dedicated to it. The loop topology requires an
Ethernet switch to logically open one point in the network, to inhibit the circulating of Ethernet
messaging in network.
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Figure 63 Loop Topology

The new IEC 62439 gives some performance comparison between the different redundancy
methods / protocols. While designing an IEC 61850 based protection scheme, such considerations
should be taken into account to ensure the required performance of the protection scheme.
Table 1-14 IEC 62439 Standard
Prime Redundancy End node
Protocol Solution Networktopology Recovery time fault or repair
loss protocol attachment
Within the >30 s typical not
IP IP routing Yes Single Single meshed
network deterministic
IEEE Within the >20 s typical not
STP Yes Single Single meshed
802.1D:1998 network deterministic
IEEE Within the
RSTP Yes Single Single meshed >2 s typical not deterministic
802.1D:2004 network
IEC S2439, In the end Single and Connected, 1 s worst case for 512 end
CRP Yes
Clause 7 nodes double Doubly meshed nodes
IEC 62439, Within the 200 ms worst case for 50
MRP Yes Single Ring
Clause 5 network switches
IEC 62439, in the end Connected. 4,8 ms worst case for 500 end
BRP Yes Double
Clause 8 nodes Doubly meshed nodes
IEC 62439, in the end Independent
PRP No Double 0s
Clause 6 nodes double meshed
Process Bus Topologies

Typically, in today’s systems the process bus is separated from the station bus. As the process bus
is alsobased on Ethernet technology, any of the topologies mentioned in this chapter could be used.
Issues to be considered carefully for the process bus include reliability and availability, time
synchronization, and testing. The process bus may have a different topology to the station bus.
Process bus traffic could also be sent in the same physical network as station bus traffic, Thus,
forming a single unified network for all substation data.
14.17 ENGINEERING TOOLS
Engineering tools include tools that allow the integration of documentation generated from the
conception of an installation during the engineering stage (plans, manuals, etc) for the duration of its
life. These tools should also integrate intermediate stages of modifications and extensions, and also
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facilitate the commissioning and maintenance of protection and control systems. Basically,
engineering tools should cover the followingissues:
 Integration of protection and control systems’ information

 Integration of electrical, electromechanical and civil systems
 Protection logic and settings management
 Control logic and settings management
 Configuration, execution and documentation of commissioning and maintenance tests
 Integration with protection management systems
 SCADA configurations management
Therefore, several types of tools may be considered for the management of the configuration of
the IEDs of a given substation. An initial classification of the type of tool could be:
 Standard Tools:
These are tools for modifying any function of the IED that has been modeled as an IEC 61850
function. These tools are, or are based on, SCL editors and MMS clients.
 Proprietary Tools:
These are tools provided by each vendor and are required for editing the proprietary part of a device
configuration. Ideally, the objective should be to reduce the need of these proprietary tools to a
minimum.
Moreover, and depending on the different needs of modification, we may distinguish between
three fundamental types of tools:
 Parameterization Tools:
These are tools for “online” change and change management, basically the IED settings.
 Configuration Tools:
These are tools for the implementation and management of “offline” changes. They can also be
classified in two types:
 System level:
These can be used for the complete engineering of one or several substations. This type of tool
works with and outputs SCD files.
• IED level:
Simpler tools, optimized to facilitate maintenance and oriented to modifications at the IED level.
This type of tool can import ICD and SCD files and outputs CID files. This may be the same tool
as for parameterization of the IED.
 Testing Tools:
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These are tools for both control and protection maintenance personnel and engineeringpersonnel, and
facilitate the tests on the IED, client and server, allowing simulating equipment and performing
automations. This type of tools can be divided into:
• Oriented towards IED testing:
These are tools that allow automating the tests of the functionality of the IEDs. This may include,
analysis e.g. spying and monitoring, Performance evaluation and Simulation
• Oriented towards Client testing:
These are server emulation tools, which allow testing the behavior of station level clients, such as
station computers and gateways.
14.18 TESTING AND MAINTENANCE
In order to properly define the methods for testing of complex IEC 61850 substation automation
systems itis important to properly define what a system definition is and to consider what existing
methods for system testing are known. Complex systems are not specific to only the electric power
systems domain. They exist in industry, communications, computing and many other fields.
Software development can be considered for the development of complex systems that exchange
information between different functional modules.
Depending on the complexity of the system, its components can be simple functional elements,
subsystems or a combination of the two. A subsystem is then defined as a set of elements, which
is a system itself, and also a part of the whole system. In the substation protection and automation
domain we can consider different functions performed by the system as subsystems
System Testing
System testing is testing conducted on a complete, integrated substation automation system,
subsystem or distributed function. Its goal is to evaluate the system’s compliance with its specified
requirements.
When we do commission or maintenance testing we assume that the individual functional
elements are operating properly, especially if there are no alarms in any of the IEDs that are
included in the system test. In this case a top–down approach is suitable, since we are interested in
the overall performance of thetested system function and not in the behavior of the components of
the system.
Functional Testing
The purpose of functional element testing is to determine if the tested element has the expected
behavior under different realistic test conditions. The functional elements in system testing are
considered units, i.e. the smallest testable parts of any system.
System testing looks at the overall performance of the system from an external observer point of
view. Bottom–up or top–down testing methods can be used depending on the type of test
performed. It is important to clearly identify the system or function boundary that will define the
requirements for simulation by the test system and monitoring the behavior of the function under
test.
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Figure 64 Functional Element Testing
Figure 65Testing of IEC 61850 Systems

Testing of IEC 61850 Systems
The method for testing of both types of systems is proposed based on the following order of
system components tests:
 Testing of IEC 61850 protocol compliance of the individual components of the system
 Testing of Merging Units
 Testing of IEC 61850 compliant IEDs
 Testing of bay level distributed applications
 Testing of substation level distributed applications It is assumed that all components of the
system have already passed conformance testing, i.e. that IEC 61850 with all its models
and services is properly implemented.
The test system Configuration Tool reads the information regarding all IEDs, communication
configuration and substation description sections. This information is in a file with .SCD extension
(for Substation Configuration Description) and is used to configure the set of tests to be performed.
The overall functionality of any IEC 61850 compliant device is available in a file that describes its
capabilities. This file has an extension .ICD for IED Capability Description.
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The IED configuration tool sends to the IED information on its instantiation within a Substation
Automation System (SAS) project. The communication section of the file contains the current
address of the IED. The substation section related to this IED may be present and then shall have
name values assigned accordingto the project specific names. This file has an extension .CID (for
Configured IED Description).
The simulation tool requirements will also be different depending on the type of function being
tested. For example, if the tested function is based on RMS values or phasor measurements, the
simulation tool may include a sequence of steps with the analogue values in each of the steps
defined as Phasors with their magnitude and phase angle. Based on these configuration parameters
the simulation tool will generate the sine waveforms to be applied as analogue signals or in a digital
format to the tested components or systems.
If the functions under test are designed to detect transient conditions or operate based on sub–
cycle set of samples from the waveform, an electromagnetic transient’s simulation will be more
appropriate.
The Virtual Merging Unit simulator should support sampling rates as agreed in IEC 61850 9–2
LE. For protection applications the simulator should send 80 samples / cycle in 80 messages/cycle.
Each messagecontains one sample of the three phase currents and voltages (WYE class).
Virtual IED simulator is used to represent components of the system that are not available at the
time of testing, for example during factory acceptance testing. During the testing this module send
GOOSE messages that the function or Sub–function under test uses as inputs that determine its
behavior under the test conditions applied.
The fifth component of the testing system is a tool that can simulate network traffic, remote and local
operatoror system engineer.
Test Evaluation Tool includes the monitoring functions used to evaluate the performance of the
tested elements within a distributed sampled analogue value based system. Such evaluation tool
requires multiple evaluation submodules that are targeted towards the specifics of the function
being tested.
Reporting Tool will generate the test reports based on a user defined format and the outputs from
thesimulation and evaluation tools.
Functional testing of IEC 61850–9–2 Based Merging Units
Since Merging Units are an essential component of any IEC 61850 process bus based application,
they have to be tested to ensure that they provide the required sampled measured values. The
currents and voltages applied to the Merging Unit will be based on current and voltage waveforms
produced from the network simulator in order to simulate different system conditions, such as high
current faults or low currentminimum load conditions.
At the same time the Test Evaluation tool will need to receive the sampled analogue values from
the tested merging unit and compare the individual sampled values from the Merging Unit with the
samples coming from the network simulator.
It is necessary to analyze the phase (time) and magnitude differences of the individual samples and
compare these to the calibration specifications of the MU. Proper documentation and reporting is
required in the same manner as meter testing is performed today.
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Figure 66 Functional Testing of Merging Units
Functional testing of IEC 61850 GOOSE Based IEDs

The testing of different functions in IEDs that are based on publishing and subscription of GOOSE
messages can be achieved in a way similar to the testing of conventional hardwired devices. The
difference is that in this case there may be no hard wiring between the test device and the tested
IED for status signals. The test devices needs to be configured as a GOOSE publisher to simulate
different signals required by the test object for the testing, as well as it needs to be a GOOSE
subscriber in order to receive messages from thetest object and evaluate its performance.
Figure 67 Functional Testing of Goose Based IEDs
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Functional testing of IEC 61850–9–2 Based IEDs

The testing of different functions in IEDs that are based on sampled measured values can be
achieved in a couple of different ways depending on the requirements of the specific test. One
approach is acceptablewhen testing the IED only, while another can be used if the testing includes
the complete MU/IED system. The difference is that in the first case there is no hard wiring
between the test device and the tested IED – i.e. the test system can be communications based
only.
The key component of this module is the Merging Unit simulator described earlier in the paper. It
will have totake the waveforms generated from the Network Simulator and then format them in the
required 80 samples/ cycle and multicast the individual sampled values to the LAN 80 times per
cycle (e.g. 80 messages/cycle).
The test system needs to subscribe to and monitor the GOOSE messages received from the tested
IED that represent the operation of the tested functional elements in order to determine if the
devices operatedas required. If the tested device has relay outputs as well, they will have to be
wired into the test device and their operation (time tag) will be compared with the received
GOOSE messages to determine if the performance of communications based solutions is
analogous to the hard–wired case.
Figure 68 Functional Testing IEC 61850 - 9 - 2 Based IEDs
Functional testing of Distributed Applications

The testing of distributed bay and substation level functions that are based on communications
only will be similar functionally to the testing of individual IEDs. The main difference is that in
this case there will be multiple test devices with virtual simulators or analog outputs. The
simulation of the substation and system environment required for the functional testing of bay and
system level functions will require the simulation of multiple merging units (IEC 61850 9–2
interface) and other IEDs (IEC 61850 8–1 interface).
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The evaluation of the performance of the distributed functions is based on the subscription of the
test system components to the GOOSE messages from the different IEDs participating in the tested
distributed applications
Figure 69 Functional Testing of Distributed Applications
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15 PROTECTION OF ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS WITH RENEWABLE

ENERGY RESOURCES
15.1 INTRODUCTION
As a general practice protection concepts for electrical systems are designed and implemented to
provide protection against electrical hazards, prevent damage to installations and limit stress on
equipment. Specific requirements for protection systems are selectivity, speed and sensitivity.
With an increasing number of distributed energy resources.
The usage of Renewable energy Resources (RE) in utilities in India is expected to increase
significantly. The renewable energy injections are generally at medium voltage levels or sub
transmission levels. The level with rooftop solar and net metering concepts becoming realityin next
few years. The existing distribution systems or sub transmission level have been generally designed
for unidirectional power flows, and feeders are opened and locked out for any fault within system.
The progressive increase in penetration levels and generator sizes, as well as the fluctuating nature of
power and its dispersed locations pose a number of technical challenges for the DNO/TSO relating
to:
 Stability
 Voltage profile and voltage transients
 Congestion
 Losses
 Fault Ride Through (FRT) capability
 Short circuit levels
 Power Quality
 Control and monitoring
 Protection co–ordination
 Islanding Detection
 Synchronization
 Balancing of active and reactive power (reserve requirements)
Utilities have to start operation of distribution systems with RE as a way to improve the reliability
of the power system however, the difference between short circuit levels for cases where the
distribution system is connected to the RE system may vary. This may result in malfunctioning of
over current (OC) protection or other protection schemes. In addition, the operation of renewable
on–grid and off–grid changes the short circuit level and Thus, may impact overall protection
schemes. The contribution varies with the technology adopted for e.g. Wind turbines contribute
less current when their internal protection is activated but if crowbar protection is not available
the fault feeding ability of WTGs increases. Similarly, the wind turbines use different technologies
and each has different impacts on fault feeding capabilities. The WTGs based upon induction
generators and excitation system had huge capability to both absorb and inject reactive power and
feed fault current due to inherent rotating inertia available. With the support of power electronics
the present generation of WTGs has been developed on totally new concepts. The new generation
wind turbines mainly used two technologies (i) Double fed Induction generators (DFIG) and (ii)
Full converter–inverter variable speed synchronous generators. For DFIGs only 70% capability is
available as rotating inertia that too have much faster control due to power electronics and balance
through complete power electronics. Thus, the fault feeding capabilityof DFIGs is much less than
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equivalent wind turbine. The variable speed synchronous machines have 100% connection with two
levels of power electronics and the fault feeding depends much upon the circuit response and the
conversion–inversion power electronic components. These do not contribute much to the fault
levels. The solar inverters also do not contribute as much fault current as conventional synchronous
generation systems.
15.2 BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
The system source impedances are going to increase with RE. This leads to lower fault current and
poorvoltage regulation and higher voltage unbalance. Source of power will be more but source of
current for faults will be far less. The power sources will be hugely distributed Therefore,
protections coordination will be very difficult. A coordinated protection with remote ends and
islanding can be achieved only by seamless integration of protection, communication and control
devices over wide area network. Huge investment in secured and reliable communication
(SCADA system) in dedicated corridor will be required. Broadly a paradigm shift in protection
philosophy will be required.
Generally, the short circuit current contribution of RE differs from these “conventional” energy
resources in many ways:
 The location of RE is different, i.e. distributed rather than central. Thus, short circuit
contributions from RES originate from directions not necessarily considered in
conventional protection schemes. This issue is similar to unexpected load flows under
normal conditions and can result in phenomena such as “blinding” or “sympathetic
tripping”.
 Many RES are not directly connected synchronous or asynchronous machines, but coupled
to the network via inverters. The magnitude of the short circuit current of these inverters
is Usually, limited to values not much higher than the nominal current to protect the
inverter itself. Accordingly, the short circuit capacity of grids dominated by inverter
current sources is significantly lower than that of grids with rotating machines of the same
rating.
 The lower short circuit contribution is also connected to a different time characteristic of
the short circuit current. While rotating machines behave like a voltage source under short
circuit conditions, inverters act more like a current source limited to nominal current, and
the time characteristic of the current determined by the control scheme of the inverter.
 The capability to operate during and after faults in the system has not been a strong
requirement for decentralized generation on the contrary, it was and is often required that
RES immediately disconnect under faulty grid conditions so that the well–established
protection schemes can be maintained. However, with a growing number of RE and an
increasing importance of RE to provide short circuit capacity both during and after the
fault, the Fault Ride through (FRT) capability is of major concern.
 Some RE generation connected to low voltage level especially the rooftops may be mostly
hidden to the network operator. If the amount of hidden LV RE injection is high, its impact
to LV level protection and safety may be critical.
15.3 PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
 System Considerations
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A proper understanding of the characteristics of the power system, including steady state and dynamic
system performance, is essential in ensuring the correct arrangement of protection and control of
the RES/Utility interface. A selection of appropriate protection and control philosophy is
determined by factors such as:
•Electrical characteristics of the network at the connection point (fault level, network
structure, etc.).
• Voltage profile and power transfer capability at the connection point.
• Type of connection to the network (radial/tapped, dedicated or non–dedicated line, etc.).
• The prospective fault current contribution from the RES to the utility network and vice
versa.
• The dynamic response of the RE units to the utility network faults
• Disturbances and the ability of the RE units to maintain stability on loss of the utility
connection.
• Backup protection policy of the utility network at connection point (clearance time
requirements).
• Auto–reclosing policy on the utility network.
• Co–ordination requirements with the utility protection.
• Grounding arrangement of the RE projects when operated in an islanded
 Dynamic Response of Generation Sources
The generating plant is defined as stable in steady state if, following a small disturbance, the system
returns to the stable steady state operating condition. Small disturbances arise frequently as a result
of:
• Load fluctuations
• Switching operations
• Un–damped power oscillations which result in sustained voltage and power swings.
Generating units are transiently stable if, following a large system disturbance, each generating unit
settles to a new steady state operating condition. Large system disturbances arise following a
severe or close up electrical faults as a result of major load or generation loss. During severe
electrical faults the output of thegenerating unit can be substantially smaller than the mechanical
input from the prime mover and the rotor will accelerate and start to swing against the system.
Provided the fault is cleared quickly, the generating unit controllers respond rapidly and adequate
network connections are maintained following the fault, the oscillations are damped and the stability
can be maintained. If the swing is not contained, large cyclic power exchangeswill occur between
generating units and the network, potentially resulting in damage to the generating units, mal
operation of protection systems and unacceptable voltage depressions in the utility supply
network. It has to be appreciated that the RE generating plant should be considered an integral
part of the overall transmission or distribution system to which it is connected. The design of the
system should aim to maintainsystem stability and prevent the loss of synchronism of generating
plant under all operating conditions.
Generating plant which does become unstable should be rapidly disconnected from the network.
Protection equipment provided for the disconnection of generating plant should, however, be
designed to ensure that unnecessary tripping does not occur for conditions of transiently stable
operation. In the event that system stability studies show a risk of instability, suitable protection
should be provided to detect the condition and disconnect the RE generating unit(s) from the utility
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network. This may be achieved either by tripping thegenerating plant, or by tripping the interface
circuit breaker(s) and retaining islanded operation of the RE plant. In bigger plant the tripping of
RES is not desirable and DERs are required to stay connected to thesystem.
 Power Electronics Interfaced Machine

Power electronics can be used as an interface for a wide variety of energy sources. They convert
the DC energy for connection to the AC system or decouple small rotating machines from the
network and Thus, provide more flexibility in terms of machine rotational speed and efficiency of
energy capture (e.g. wind). The power electronic interfaces shall fast control of active and
reactive power as well as voltage regulation, which can potentially enhance the operation of a
weak remote network or support intentional islanding.
The fault behavior and capability of the inverter is a function of the control design and the size of
the power electronic components. Normally, the fault current from inverter based RES can be up
to two or three times the inverter’s full load current for one cycle or less. But by far it lot depends
upon the output filter component values. In a highly optimized solutions, there can be as low as 1.2
to 1.3pu only for a very short period of 0.06 – 0.25 cycles. This is within the transient or maximum
sub transient period for synchronous generators and such currents would have little impact on the
operation of traditional over current relays. Therefore, during grid–connected mode there is no
defined impact on the existing protection strategies due to the variation in fault current contribution.
There may be a problem with inverter’s internal protection reacting too quickly and too sensitively
to faults on the network; in some cases, a network fault could lead to unnecessary tripping of many
inverters and, in an islanded system, this could have severe consequences.
 Requirements of Fault Ride through Capability

The wind penetration has increased, generators have been required to remain stable and connected
to the network when faults occur on the transmission network. Otherwise, the power system would
be exposed to a great loss of generation with the consequent danger of the systemfrequency dropping
too rapidly and load shedding becoming necessary. A generator shall remain connected without
tripping to the system during external faults when system voltage measured at the HV terminals of
thenetwork transformer, remains above the corresponding curve.
Under voltage protection should be set to meet the requirements.
The detailed requirements of voltage level and duration of the fault shall be defined and need to be
coordinated with local grid voltage settings. The generators should not consume reactive power
during and after faults or doit under restricted conditions.
 Dynamic Performance of Wind Turbines

The main factors potentially having an impact on transient stability are:
• Wind power plants are constructed at locations with a good wind resource and are
Usually, integrated through radial connections, which is not necessarily favorable from
the perspective of grid voltage control.
• Power flows are considerably different in the presence of a high wind or no wind
conditions.
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• Wind turbines are relatively weakly coupled to the system because they are Usually,
connected to lower voltage levels (sub transmission and distribution systems) compared
to the conventional power plants.
• The intermittent nature of wind power is not seen to be relevant to transient stability,
but because of limited predictability of wind speed, systems with high amounts of wind
power Usually, require higher spinning reserve than conventional power systems.
• Wind generators do not contribute to the system inertia as conventional generators so
the frequency fluctuations after disturbances or with loss of generation are greater when
there is a high proportion of wind power generation.
• It is possible to assess the impact of the three main wind turbine types on power system
dynamics
• and stability in a qualitative sense by analyzing their properties.
• Squirrel–cage induction generators used in constant–speed turbines cause significant
power and torque fluctuations but offer good inertial contribution. They can lead to
voltage and rotor–speed instability. During a fault, they accelerate due to the unbalance
between mechanical power extracted from the wind and electrical power supplied to the
grid. During voltage restoration, they consume high amounts of reactive power,
impeding voltage restoration. This eventually leads to voltage and rotor–speed
instability. Voltage recovery process, squirrel–cage induction generators tend to slow
down voltage restoration. In such cases capacitor banks are normally used for reactive
power control. (However, such generators are now not used in grid)
• Doubly Fed Induction Generators (DFIG) became popular from last 4–5 years have
little impact on the transient stability performance of the system. They are capable of
providing sufficient reactive power support and voltage control.
• Full converter generators have even less impact on the transient stability performance
of the system than the DFIG. The converter’s fast control of active and reactive power
or of the AC voltage at the generator terminals can provide reactive power to the
network both during steady–state conditions as well as during disturbances. Although
full converter generators can potentially be beneficial for system operation and stability
(for example contributing to system frequency regulation), the full extent of the added
benefits is not sufficiently understood at the moment.
With variable–speed turbines, the sensitivity of the power electronic devices to over currents caused
by system faults can have serious consequences for the stability of the power system. When the
penetration level of variable–speed turbines in the system is high and they are all set to disconnect
at relatively small voltage drops, this could lead to a large generation deficit. To prevent this, now
grid companies and transmission system operators facing a high contribution of wind power in
their control area are currently proposing and demanding Low Voltage Ride through and
manufacturers are implementing new solutions to reduce the sensitivity of variable–speed wind
turbines to grid voltage.
 Inverter Converter Based Short Circuit Contribution

As the solar generation and more and more full controlled low speed synchronous wind generators will
increasethe use of convertors and invertors in the distribution grid will become a trend. The fault
current contribution of RES is strongly technology dependent. Distributed generators based on
rotating generators (conventional synchronous or induction machine) will produce a relatively high
current during a fault (a current level of about 200 to 400% of nominal current in a few cycles after
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the fault inception); while generators interfaced through power electronics will limit the RES current
magnitude to a maximum of 1 to 2 p.u. during the fault. Therefore, coordination problems during
normal operation are less likely with RES interfaced through inverters and with a strong main
substation. Voltage support by converter–coupled generation for unbalanced faults (single–
phase–to–ground, phase–to–phase, and two–phase–to–ground) differs from the “expected” voltage
support of directly–coupled synchronous generators in terms of magnitude and unbalance. This is
because the converters involved are often current–controlled voltage sources whose contribution
is, in most cases, balanced by control design and as required by current grid codes, resulting in
positive–sequence contributions only. RE units coupled by full converters allow injecting
negative–sequence current if required. This behavior would make the fault detection easier.
Negative–sequence control of the RES as described it allows for reduction of the overvoltage in
the healthy phases and increase of the unbalanced current for easier fault detection. It can be
expected that the future grid codes will specify asymmetrical current injection. Furthermore, strict
over–current limits are applied in order to protect the converters. These limits can reach 1.3 pu for
stator reactive current and 0.4 pu for the line side converter reactive current. State–of–the–art
balanced fast voltagecontrol of converter coupled generation for unbalanced faults might impact
network protection, either by hindering fault detection/clearance (impact on sensitivity of the
protective system) or by triggering undesired disconnection of the generation (impact on security
of the protective system) due to:
• Small resulting short–circuit phase currents
• Reduced short–circuit power of the network which leads to deeper voltage dips in
faulted phases
• Overvoltage in healthy (non–faulted) phases.
As a result the need for secure operation of the power system, provided by protection based on three–
phase over and under–voltage, over–current, distance (impedance, angle) and differential
protection relays or any combination of those, then state–of–the–art balanced fast voltage control
of converter–coupled generation for unbalanced faults requires further investigation and
implementation.
A further difference between conventional networks and RE connected networks is the behavior of
the fault transient. For instance, different transients generated by inverter controllers could affect
some relays, e.g. the direction determination. Short circuit calculation programs normally use
traditional generator models, with a voltage source behind impedance.
 Power Flow, Short–circuit Power and Fault Current

Turbines based on the doubly fed induction generator (DFIG) also contribute to the fault current.
However, due to the sensitivity of power electronics to rotor over currents, they are quickly
disconnected when a fault is detected. The ability to support the grid in case of voltage dips is an
area that is now well developed and is being incorporated in the machines and grid codes. The
protection method is often based on the so–called crowbar protection. During severe voltage dips
due to grid faults, the rotor side power electronic converteris quickly disconnected from the grid
in order to protect it against possible large current peaks during such events. In order to achieve
this, the three–phase rotor winding is short circuited via the crowbar switch and consequently the
DFIG generator behaves like a normal SCIG generator. For limiting the rotor current and for
influencing the speed torque characteristic of the machine, the rotor can preferably be bypassed
through impedance. The crowbar is released in a short time Usually, before the fault clearance.
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The units have Thus, the capability to provide reactive power support to the system during
sustained faults and contribute to thevoltage recovery of the system.
Wind turbines with a direct–drive generator (full converter) and other converter based generation
such as PV have a limited capacity to contribute to the fault current because the power electronic
components of the converter are normally not capable of supplying a fault current. The short–
circuit current is Usually, limited to 10–20% above the rated current and converters are
normally equipped with under–voltage relays and over–current limiting in case of disturbances
on the distribution system. Therefore, they are quickly disconnected in case of a fault. However,
recent designs offer ride through capability, which is achieved by applying specific control
strategies to the inverter so that the converter fault current can be limited in a controlled way.
RE leads to fundamental changes in power flows, which requires re–consideration in voltage
profile and voltage stability. Under certain circumstances of Wind generation, the power flow may
change quite suddenly due to wind shifts. Additionally, the direction of short–circuit currents may
change in case of very large wind plants causing non–selective tripping and different transient
phenomena can be observed. At transmissionlevel less problems regarding power flow and short–
circuit current patterns are expected as transmission grids are predominantly used to connect large
generators. Short–circuit currents are normally much higherand faults are cleared much faster than
in distribution networks.
 System Grounding
The HV transmission system shall be solidly grounded. Accordingly, RE connections tothe system
are generally grounded.
15.4 UNGROUNDED MV CONNECTION
The ungrounded MV system is generally not a preferred option as it increases the cable rating from
U0/ UE to UE/UE which increases the cost of vast cabling networks. The MV system is grounded by
zigzag transformers. The RES are generally located in areas of very high ground resistivity and
hence the selection of impedance for grounding transformer should be done carefully to facilitate
the ground return current flow during fault conditions. It ensures very high impedance in Zero
sequence isolation between RES and Grid ensures.
15.5 SOLIDLY GROUNDED MV & HV CONNECTION
Grounded transformer connection in MV system and the HV transmission system keeps to potential
rise underlimits. No isolation between Grid and RES, e.g. RES faults can be seen by the utility grid.
Few spurious trappings due to poor selectivity characteristics of relaying system are unavoidable.
The discriminatory fasttripping from the utility end of the transmission system also does not damage
the system. This is appropriate considering that transmission equipment ratings (e.g.: surge
arresters) are sized for grounded operation. The selection may perform poor from harmonic
mitigation point of view and the harmonic injects into the grid needs to be monitored carefully.
No isolation for third harmonics.
15.6 SOLIDLY GROUNDED MV AND DELTA HV
In many instances the installations will be HV delta, LV grounded star. This connection may be
satisfactory for loads but may present overvoltage problems as discussed above. If ungrounded
operation is to be considered, studies need to be performed to determine whether resizing of surge
arresters or other equipment needs to be made. The conditions of remote end tripping with RE
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connected create lot of high voltage disturbances. This ensures Zero sequence isolation between
RES and Grid ensures no fault current in–feed from utility side for RE winding faults.
Three possible scenarios of grounding are shown below
Figure 70 Various Grounding Methods
15.7 PROTECTION OF THE RES INTERCONNECTION

The protection of RE interconnection is generally requirements imposed by the grid utilities. It
detect faults within the RE plant that can be fed by the utility system or abnormal operating
conditions that lead to voltage or frequency excursion out of statutory limits. The issues include
the reduction of protection reach and sensitivity, coordination problems, automatic reclosing
voltage supervision, check synchronizing and out of step protection.
Besides conventional over current protection, neutral voltage displacement (NVD) protection is
required as a backup earth fault protection. When it comes to the RES and its interface protection,
however, it is the RES owner’s responsibility. In addition to standard generator protection, the
RES owner must ensure that islanding detection is applied.
 Interface Protection
Firstly, interface protection considers those protection elements which are applied for a RE
installation at the utility/RE interface to provide coverage for RE faults that may be fed by the
utility system. Such protection has to be provided for RES but for any load connected to the utility
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grid. The interface protection in case of RE plant should also include detection of abnormal voltage
or frequency conditions caused either by the utility or by an out of range operation of the RE.
The interfaces include the following protection functions:
• Over current relays (51–51N) to protect against overloads and short–circuits inside the
RE installation. Depending on the size of the transformer, short–circuit protection may
be assumed by a transformer differential relay.
• Over and Under–frequency relays (81O–81U), which disconnect the plant under
unstable conditions of the network and prevent undesirable islanded operation and self–
excitation of the generator.
• Over and of Under–voltage relays (59, 27), which prevent the islanded operation of the
generator with an abnormal voltage or a malfunction the electronics There can be
several instances when an under voltage is detected but should not cause disconnection
of the generator, such as a fault outside the protective zone; a fault on adjacent lines or
even remote lines; increased loading and power swings. To maintain stability and
reliability of the power supply, and to reduce the chances of nuisance RES tripping, a
two–stage under voltage strategy is recommended for all LV and HV connected
generation. Conversely, to meet Fault–Ride–Through (FRT) capability requirements a
single stage of delayed under voltage is applied in some cases.
• Over voltage conditions are Usually, more hazardous compared to under voltage
conditions. Hence, the time delay settings for over voltage relays are shorter.
• The interface protection must be coordinated with the remote utility protection.
Coordination means:
• Fully selective clearing – the RES protection will clear all faults in the owner installation
before the utility’s relaying initiates tripping for such faults.
• Simultaneous clearing – the RE plant protection will clear all faults in the owner’s
installation coincidentally with utility clearing of such faults.
The protection scheme is shown below
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Figure 71 Interface Protection
 Line Protection
Line protection is required to remove the RE plant in–feed to transmission line faults. Line
protection requirements are driven by:
• Transformer connections of the RE
• Transmission line relaying practices for the utility grid
• Critical fault clearance time
• Form of connection to the RE (tapped connection or radial circuit)
• Size of RE plant and main transformer
Generally, the RE plants are radial connected from the utility. There may be exceptional cases
when the RE plants are given connection by making the LILO arrangement in existing
Transmission networks.
15.8 TRANSFORMER CONNECTIONS
The primary consideration is whether the main power transformer is a source of zero sequence current
or not. The HV star – LV delta connection delivers ground fault current to the utility for transmission
phase–to ground faults. The logical protection choices with this transformer connection would
include residually connected ground over current relays and ground distance protection.
Occasionally, an HV delta – LV grounded star connection is used. For this situation neither ground
over current detection nor ground distance protectionwill work. Typically, the HV VT open delta
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secondary voltage should be measured. This will detect the zero sequence voltage for a single phase
to ground fault on the transmission system.
 Frequency Operating Range

The generators, including wind farms, are required generally capable of operating continuously at
full power output between 47.5 Hz and 52.5 Hz.
15.9 PROTECTION OF DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WITH RENEWABLE ENERGY
RESOURCES
The massive integration of RES into the distribution network is the bidirectionality of fault
currents. This implies the need to develop more complex protection systems on the distribution
network, which are able to deal with several contributions to fault current.
All protection schemes where RES are involved must be checked. There must be a large enough
fault current to start the relevant protective devices:
• in all situations, e.g. low wind or sun
• other methods for starting protection must be considered.
• HV neutral displacement voltage protection: additional decoupling protection in order
to avoid the risk of islanding in case of phase faults at HV level.
• islanding detection (tale–decoupling): detection of the opening of the MV feeder and
communication
• to the RES facility decoupling protection
• directional phase protection: protection which detects the sense of the fault current, in
order to locate the fault and avoid unintentional tripping (i.e. when the fault occurs on
another MV feeder)
• The protection against faults occurring within the installation
• The disconnection of the RES facility from the network when a MV network fault
occurs.
The scheme is described below
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Figure 72 Protection of Distribution System with RE Resources
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16 DISTURBANCE RECORDER, ALARMS AND EVENT LOGGING
16.1 INTRODUCTION
Disturbance Recorders
Recording devices from the first ink chart recorders to the digital recording equipment available
today. Modern digital equipment has the capability to monitor a larger number of analog and binary
inputs that could not be monitored in the earlier disturbance recording devices. The introduction of
microprocessor relays provided another method of disturbance recording. The capability of
modern numerical microprocessor relays have quick analysis of events and faults and is valuable
tool for operational decisions subsequent to an event.
Digital Fault Recorder (DFR) – records instantaneous values (waveforms) of current and voltages,
sampled many times per cycle, for time periods on the order of a second. DFR may also record
computed quantities, specifically developed for the purpose of analyzing system protection
operations and circuit breaker performance.
Sequence–of–Events Recorder (SER) – records sequence and time–of–day of digital events, such
as contact operations. Developed for the purpose of analyzing operations of control and protection
systems.
Dynamic Swing Recorder (DSR) – records frequency, phase angle, and or rms values of power
system quantities such as voltage magnitude, current, MW, MVAR, etc., sampled or calculated
many times per second, e.g., 6 to 60 samples per second or more. Record duration is generally on
the order of a minute or more. Developed for the purpose of analyzing complex power system
events and for recording the dynamicresponse of power systems to disturbances.
Trend Recorder (TR) – A long term recorder of the system parameters of interest.
Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) – Device that records phasor quantities and accurately
references them to a standard time signal. (See IEEE Standard 1344–2006 for more details).
16.2 TYPES OF DISTURBANCES
There are four types of disturbance or event records as follows:
Transient – These are very short in duration and typically include faults that are cleared
immediately by circuit breaker operation. These events are generally no longer than 8 cycles for
high speed clearing and 16 cycles for sequential line clearing. These events are Usually, analyzed
to determine correct protection operation, fault location, or verification of system model
parameters.
Short Term – These generally include all other time–delayed fault clearing and reclosing events
where thesystem operation (stability) is not affected. These events are typically 20 to 70 cycles in
length but may be longer if multiple protection operations are required to clear the fault. These
events are Usually, analyzed to determine correct protection operation, fault location or
verification of system model parameters.
Long Term – These include those events that affect system stability such as power swings,
frequency variations and abnormal voltage problems. These events are Usually, analyzed to
determine causes of incorrect system operations. Data management techniques are employed to
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process a number of samples and record the value for the parameter of interest. Record length
parameters may be defined.
Steady State – There are steady state disturbances where system operation is not threatened, but
powerquality is affected. This may include harmonics or subharmonics produced by the load and/or
the interaction between power system’s components. Depending upon the type of phenomena
being analyzed, higher sample rates may be required to capture the events and data of interest.
Record length parameters may be defined.
16.3 DISTURBANCE RECORDING CONSIDERATIONS
Protective relays monitor current(s) and voltage(s) to make decisions based on the settings to clear
faults on the power system by opening associated protection equipment. The microprocessor relay
is also capable of recording the fault and event data.
The uses of disturbance recording equipment are:
• The specific event to capture
• The available data sources; analog and binary
• Required sampling rate to capture desired events
• Application of triggers necessary to capture the desired event
• The storage capacity of each device.
• Communication method associated with each recording device.
• Frequency of record retrieval necessary to minimize losing records.
• Time synchronization
 High Speed Recording
High–speed recording is used to capture the individual samples of the currents and voltages
measured by thedevice with a sampling frequency high enough to display power system faults and
transients. A recording is typically initiated when the magnitude of an analog quantity increases
above or decreases below a specific value. High–speed recording is used to capture transient events,
which are short in duration, with the recorder record length typically set for one to two seconds.
Sampling frequency is important when selecting a high– speed recording device.
High–speed recording is available in disturbance recorders, and microprocessor based protective
relays.
Microprocessor based protective relays with recording capabilities are being used for fault
analysis. Theserecords provide valuable information about the protective functions of the relay.
A Figure of transient event captured by high–speed recording, indicating analog voltage and
current waveforms and the change of state information for selected equipment operations as
signified by a contact transition is given below:
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Figure 73 Transient Event Captured by High Speed Recording

16.4 TYPES OF RECORDS
 Fault Recorder (FR)

A fault recorder typically contains directly measured analog channels, as well as event or binary
channels. This allows the recorder to capture the time sequence of analog power system quantities,
along with breaker contacts, logic state changes, event contacts, etc. The recorders typically
include calculated analog quantities and logic functions to ensure pertinent power system
information is captured during an event. Triggering to start the capture of data can typically be
directly based on changes in analog quantities, digital inputs, or logic.
Information from fault recorders can be used to confirm the occurrence of a fault, determine the
duration ofa fault, measure the magnitude of fault quantities of current and voltage, determine the
location of a fault, define the nature or type of fault, assess performance of relays, and assess circuit
breaker performance. The fault recorder records can often recognize faults due to lightning strikes,
insulator contamination, tree faults, restrikes and other common faults causes, from their
distinctive “signature” ona fault record.
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Triggering of the fault recorder may be by internal triggering measurements, contact inputs and
the status of the contact inputs.
 Sequence of Event Recorder (SER)

A Sequence of Event Recorder’s function is to gather and time tag operational data from substation
equipment (e.g., relays, circuit breakers, transformers), control schemes (manual and automatic) as
they react to a system event. This series of sequential, individual events can be from a switching
operation, fault, or mis– operation. This data allows the chain of events to be studied for the cause
(or causes) of the mis–operationand the linkages between individual actions and effects.
Time tagging has improved with the widespread use of Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) and
Universal Time Code (UTC).
 Fault Locator (FL)

DRs can calculate and output fault location details similar to the function of Numerical IEDs.
16.5 PHASOR MEASUREMENT UNIT (PMU)
 Introduction to Synchrophasor Measurement (PMU) Functionality

A Phasor measurement unit (PMU) measures the electrical waves on an electricity grid to
determine the health of the power system.
A phasor is a complex number that represents both the magnitude and phase angle of the sine
waves found in electricity. Phasor measurements that occur at the same time are called a “synchro
phasors”, as are the PMU devices that allow their measurement. In typical applications, phasor
measurement units aresampled from widely dispersed locations in the power system network and
synchronized from the commontime source of a Global Positioning System (GPS) Radio Clock.
Synchrophasor technology provides atool for system operators and planners to measure the state
of the electrical system and helps in the grid management. Synchro phasors measure voltages and
currents, at diverse locations on a power grid, and can output accurately time–stamped voltage and
current phasors. Because these phasors are truly synchronized, synchronized comparison of two
quantities in real time is possible. These comparisons can be used to assess system conditions. The
technology has the potential to change the economics of power system & the way we operate them.
For example, by understanding the limits of stability of the multiple interconnected systems &
ensuring the optimized power transfer over the existing networks thereby resulting in cost savings.
A phasor network consists of phasor measurement units (PMUs) dispersed throughout the
electricity system, Phasor Data Concentrators (PDC) to collect the information and a SCADA
system at the central control facility. Such a network is used in Wide Area Measurement Systems
(WAMS). The complete network requires rapid data transfer within the frequency of sampling of
the phasor data. GPS time stamping can provide a theoretical accuracy of synchronization better
than 1mico second “Clocks need to be accurate to ± 500 nanoseconds to provide the one
microsecond time standard needed by each device performing synchro phasor measurement & is
possible with IRIG–B Time code synchronization. PMUs must deliver between 10 and 50
synchronous reports (frames) per second depending on the application. The PDC correlates the data
and controls and monitors the PMUs. At the central control facility, the real time Wide Area
Monitoring & Measurements System presents system wide data and visualization in real time.
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Applications of PMU
 Provide early warning for potential unstable conditions in the power system, through
power system automation as in Smart Grids.
 Load Shedding & Other load control techniques such as demand response mechanisms
to managea power system. (i.e. Directing power where it is needed in real–time)
 Increase the reliability of the power grid by detecting faults early, allowing for
isolation of operative system, and the prevention of power outages.
 Intelligent islanding to maximize customer continuity.
 Increase power quality by precise analysis and automated correction of sources of
system degradation.
 Improve system planning through real–time state estimation.
 Wide Area measurement and control, in very wide area super grids, regional
transmission networks,and local distribution grids.
Standard
The IEEE 1344 standard for synchrophasors 1995 and reaffirmed in 2001. In 2005, it was replaced
by IEEE Standard C37.118–2005, which was a complete revision and dealt with issues concerning
use of PMU’s in electric power systems.
16.6 PROTECTIVE RELAYS WITH FAULT DISTURBANCE RECORDING AND
EVENT RECORDING
Numerical digital relays can also generate sequence of events based on their individual relay
elements and digital or contact inputs. They may also be programmed to recognize and record
events in situations wherethey do not initiate a trip.
Time synchronization of all the relays, and other recording devices, is a significant, gathering and
combining all data from these individual sources is a manual activity. There are likely also
differences in the triggering method, sampling rate, and record length to consider.
Triggering of the recording function within the relay is programmable and based on the internal
measuring elements within the device. Typically, these records are limited to the “zone of
protection” associated with the device.
16.7 TIME SYNCHRONIZATION
There are two common ways of synchronizing various devices to the same GPS clock source:
 Synchronization over direct connection

 Network synchronization
Synchronization of IEDs utilizing a direct connection requires each device to have a GPS or IRIG–
B communications port in order to connect it to the master clock. Having a permanently connected
GPS/IRIG–Bsource provides an accurate reference for the device’s internal clock
The GPS clocks with accuracies of 1 microsecond are standard.
The network synchronization method eliminates the problem of dedicated interconnection with
the masterclock by allowing the individual device’s internal time clock to be synchronized over the
substation LAN with the network time–synch master using the methods specified by the protocol.
This method However, introduces a potential error due to the processing delays within the LAN.
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16.8 PROCESSING
 Sampling Rate
The sampling rate of the recording device impacts the accuracy of the data captured for later
analysis. The sampling rate also affects the performance of the analog and digital filters, and the
input magnetics, of the recording device. DFRs typically use a sampling rate of 64–128
samples/cycle, with some devices permittingsampling rates of up to 384 samples/cycle.
 Triggering Methods
Triggers cause a disturbance recorder to capture waveforms for specific power system conditions.
Recordingevents may be triggered by changes in measured analog values, calculated analog values,
Rate of change of analog values, internal logic statements, operation of protection elements, or by
the change in state of an external input. Triggers typically include both a threshold setting to
indicate an operating condition to start arecording, and a time delay setting to ensure this event is
truly a power system condition to record.
Triggers can also be caused by subscribing to GOOSE signals in Disturbance Recorder with IEC
61850–8–1Station Bus Protocol Compliance
 Storage
There are a variety of methods for storing data on recording devices, retrieving data from recording
devices,and storing this data for the system. Consideration needs to be given to the type and size of
memory at the recording device and at a central archiving location. The type of memory may
impact the decision on the power supply for the recorder, and the size of the memory may dictate
the retrieval method and timing.
Disturbance recorder memory is designed to store records on the recorder, to give users adequate
time toretrieve the records. Writing records to memory uses one of two methods. One method is
to use a first–in, first–out buffer. Once the memory is full, the recorder begins over writing the
oldest records as new triggers occur. The second method is to stop writing to memory, once the
memory is full. This method requires the issuing of storage limit alarms and requires users to
manually remove stored records to permit the creationof records on new triggers. DRs tend to allow
user choice between methods.
 Records Extraction
Data retrieval from recording devices can be performed locally, by directly communicating to the
device while in the substation, or remotely, by using telecommunications access to the device from
a central location.
 Comtrade
COMTRADE defines a common format for the data files and exchange medium needed for the
interchangeof various types of faults, test, and simulation data.
The COMTRADE standard C37.111 defines a format for files containing transient waveform and
event datacollected from power systems or power system models. The need to compress the file size
to maximize storage capabilities of the device, and to reduce the transmission time when retrieving
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records from the device, and to ensure the reliable transmission of data. The COMTRADE format
is intended to provide an easily interpretable form for use in exchanging data.
16.9 DISTURBANCE RECORD AND RECORDED SIGNALS
To facilitate the Fault Analysis/System Disturbance Analysis and verify the Protection System
performance, the following inputs are Usually, connected to the Disturbance Recorders.
 Three phase currents and voltages of each bay (Additional derived channels like residual
current/ Voltage and sequence quantities are calculated from the measured
currents/Voltages)
 Digital inputs in the form of contacts from the Substation Equipments like Circuit
Breakers, Isolators, Main/Auxiliary contacts, Pilot channels (Carrier send/Receive, Direct
Trip send/Receive etc.)
 Goose virtual Inputs
Table 15 Showing typical comparative specification of DRs and Numerical relays (IED)
Description Typical Recorder Typical Relay
Sampling Rate 32–384 samples/Cycle 4–96 Samples/Cycle
CDR (Continuous
Yes No
Digital Recording)
Record Quantity Very High Limited
Harmonics Typically, till 100th Typically, till 16th
Recorder Memory
Typically, over 3Gb Limited
Size
Frequency Response 23.06KHz 3.6KHz
V, I, P, Q, f, Z, I1, I2, I0, V1, V2, V0,
Summations, dv/dt, dp/dt, dq/dt, df/ V, I, f, Z, I1, I2, I0, V1, V2,
Trigger Options dt, THD, Harmonics (All spectrum), V0, df/dt, THD, Harmonics,
Extension inputs, Relay activation External inputs
etc.
Analog Channels 0–144 0–12
Digital Channels 0–288 0–30
PQ Monitoring Yes No
Record Length
• Pre–Trigger 60 Cycles 10 Cycles
• Post–Trigger 1800 Cycles 30 Cycles
Record Length
(Swing)
60 Secs 30 Secs
• Pre–Trigger
1800 Secs 120 Secs
• Post–Trigger
Recording:
• Edge type Yes Yes (Typical) Comparatively
• Duration type Yes
less No
• Record Extension Yes
• Transient Yes Yes
• Swing Yes No (To very limited)
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PMU Channels 10 (Minimum) 2

16.10 RECOMMENDED DIGITAL SIGNALS (TYPICAL) & TRIGGER OPTIONS FOR
DRS
 Recommended Digital signals

All Trip signals from the Line protection (Main–1, Main–2, Back up), Reactor Protection, Stub
Protection, Transformer Protection (Group I/Group II)/Bus Section Protection Trip/Bus Coupler
Protection Trip, Generator trip etc. as applicable.
All Trip Relay Operations
All Carrier Send/Receive/Direct Trip Send/Receive signals (Main–1 & Main–2/Channel A/B as
the case maybe)
 All CB LBB Trip signal
 Bus Protection Trip Signal
 O/V Stage I/Stage II, tapped from all Line VT/CVT, Bus VT/CVT
 All CB, Line & Bus disconnector Status in the Substation
 GOOSE Virtual Inputs
Note: The above are general requirement, modification in choosing digital signals for a particular
Substation depend upon site requirement.
 Recommended Trigger Options

All Trip signals and recommended trip signals as per site requirement.
All Analog Trigger signals (Including sequence & derived signals) or recommended analog trigger
signals as per site requirement.
16.11 APPLICATION OF DISTRUBANCE RECORDERS:
To analyze events, the Stand–alone Fault recorders offer superior alternative compared to the
Relayrecord information, in terms of time taken and logical conclusion.
Analysis of Faults/Disturbances of the following requiring Fault Recorders:
 Disturbance/Shutdown in a Substation due to mal operation in remote station or multiple
remote Substations
 Events that affect system stability such as power swings, frequency variations and
abnormal voltageproblems.
 Response of the Generators (Excitation system, Governor, AVR, PSS etc.) for faults &
abnormal system conditions in the Transmission network.
 Mechanical disturbances in a Generating plant which can cause instability in the Power
System
 Long term slow disturbance which may be transmitted from far away Substation
 Major disturbance causing blackouts
 Quality of Power (In terms of Harmonic content & distortion) from Renewable energy
source, HVDClink flowing into a Substation.
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 Analysis of Generator, Transformer, Circuit Breaker performance by knowing the

through fault current flow from them for faults (Since Fault recorder triggering will
capture all the bay details in a substation).
 Complete Fault Records of major events captured in the Fault Recorder (Sampled at much
higher sampling rate compared to relays) converted to COMTRADE form will be good
tool to play back and analyze Relay performance.
16.12 PROPOSALS
 All substations of 132kV or above voltage level shall have Disturbance recorder on each
line feeders.
 Disturbance recorder as built–in feature of Protection relay (IED) shall be acceptable.
 In view of the transients associated with the 765 kV networks, dedicated Standalone
disturbance recorder shall be provided on each line feeder of 765 kV substations. This is
in addition to the DR function built–in the line protection relay (IED)
 For Transformer feeders, Disturbance recorder function as built in function of
Transformer Protection relay (IED) shall be provided.
 Sequential event record shall be available as part of modern day IEC61850 substation
automation system.
 PMU may be installed on all important EHV links and preferably on all 400 kV, 765 KV
lines.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 270

17 VALIDATION, ACCEPTANCE AND FIELD TESTINGTECHNIQUES FOR

TESTING OF PROTECTION RELAYS
17.1 INTRODUCTION
Modern numerical relays and systems can have a large number of integrated functions and impose
additional test requirements over older, more traditional and simpler static and electromechanical
relays. Modern test equipment is much more sophisticated and higher functionality software driven,
enabling much faster and comprehensive testing.
17.2 FACTORY ACCEPTANCE TESTS (FAT)
Factory Acceptance Tests are done at the factory to make sure that requirements are met as specified.
These tests are part of the customer inspection plan where the product quality and performance can
be validated in front of customer/user. FAT helps in correcting short comings in the product before
dispatch.
Prerequisites before conducting FAT as listed below;
 FAT document
 Approved drawing and Layout (especially in case of relay along with C&R
panels/Automation system) and technical specifications
 I/O lists and control circuit drawing
 Instruction manual & Catalogue
 Application software
17.3 SAT/COMMISSIONING TESTS
Site acceptance tests / commissioning tests are performed before the protection scheme is put into
service at site/field. These tests are designed to prove that a particular protection scheme has been
installed correctly prior to taking it in service.
It involves all aspects linked with the specific use of the relay: verification of all inputs and outputs
(also alarms), verification of application conformance, verification of the protection functioning,
breaker control schemes & logics functioning, communication scheme functioning. Testing at this
stage provide the base line data for trouble shooting & periodic maintenance stage.
There are two test methods during commissioning stage;
Primary injection: High current is injected to primary side of the CT. Test carried out covers CT,
conductors, relay and circuit breaker circuitry. Primary side of CT/CVT require to be disconnect
from rest of the network during test. This verifies full functional integrity including CT/PT circuits.
Secondary injection: Relay is disconnected from CT/CVT/CB and the stepped down current
(secondary current) is directly injected to relay. Therefore, no need the primary side of CT to be
disconnected from therest of the system. This verifies the functionalities of the relay and scheme.
Tests to be conduct during commissioning stage: Primary Injection test, CT polarity check, station
battery healthiness check, Secondary injection test (protection function test, programmable logic
test used for tripping/closing circuit/interlocks, protection scheme stability check, integrated
scheme test inclusive of trial tripping of CB, LED indicators & Metering parameter, event &
disturbance recording checks etc.), IEC61850interoperability test, SCADA communication etc.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 271

Prerequisites for conducting SAT as listed below;

 Commissioning check list & format
 Electrical scheme
 Catalogue & Manuals for relay/circuit breaker operation etc.
 Application software
17.4 PERIODIC MAINTENANCE TESTS
Periodic tests are the tests performed on the protection at specific intervals during its lifetime. The
test objective is to verify of the scheme performance, verification of the supervision system,
verification of the setting conformance and verification of those components that are not
supervised. It may include Visual inspection, Spot test of protection function and its calibration,
digital input & output checks, LED operation & pushbutton checks etc.
17.5 APPLICATION TESTS
Application tests are carried out at discretion of user and it is the user’s decision to perform a
customized test. They depend on many user–specific parameters: the type of network, network
operation and reliability requirements (protection demands).
The user generally requests these tests and the results are application dependent (i.e. Verification
of Protection Setting based on power system conditions). Sometimes, the user/customer used to call
Dynamictests on power system scenarios.
Sometimes, this test can also be conducted as a part of trouble shooting subsequent to an incident
This kind of test comes in to effect after a power system disturbance had occurred and relay acted
in an undesired manner. This may include mal operation of relays or equipment during fault
condition.
Type Tests on Relays and relevant standards;
The objectives of type tests can be divided in three main parts;
 Hardware Type Tests as per relevant standards

 Test of all hardware modules and the complete device
 Accuracy tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
 Functional tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
 Environmental tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
 Surge and Immunity tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
 Insulation tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
 Thermal and mechanical durability tests as per IEC60255 / C37.90
 Functional Type Tests
Test of one function independent from other functions
• Individual Protection functions (Detail testing of each and every parameter and block)
• Control functions (Detail testing of each function block)
• Communication functions (front communication / rear communication, protocol
verifications)
• Data acquisition functions
• Measurement functions (Front HMI / Through application software)
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 272

• Programmable scheme logic

 System Type Tests
• Test of the protection device as black box in case of realistic network situations
(Application tests)
• Test of the accuracy of the measurement system in case of transient phenomena
• Test of the real–time behavior depending on different microprocessor load situations
• Test with steady state and dynamic faults (Application tests).
• Test with faults superimposed by transient phenomena (Application tests
17.6 METHODS TO TEST PROTECTION DEVICES
 Testing Equipment Required for Secondary Injection Tests

A good set of testing equipment and relay tools are important. Computerized relay testing kits are
available that can do the steady state, dynamic & transient testing of relays. Normally, the
computerized relay test kit should have 4 Voltages & 6 Currents outputs (Analogue outputs) to
conduct test for protection functions. 3 Voltages and 3 Currents use for three phase injection and 6
Currents use for three phase differential relaytesting purpose.
Figure 74 Secondary Injection Test

Computerized relay testing kit should have capability to conduct automated testing and validate
the relay in effective way. Amplifiers should have capability to inject the current without
distortion. There are basic capabilities to have in computerized relay testing kit;
• AUTO/MANUAL RAMPING for Pick up and Dropout test of various protection
functions
• State sequence / State simulation for Dynamic state testing and operating time test of
various protection functions. It should have a capability to simulate DC OFFSET in state
sequence
• Test module for Directional/non directional over current characteristic operating time of
curve. Forward/ reverse Directional fault test
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 273

•Test module for differential protection relay testing (pick up test/slope test/harmonic
blocking test/ stability test etc.)
• Test module for distance protection relay testing (zone reach test, zone time test, power
swing test, SOTF test, Auto reclose test etc.)
• Test module for transient testing (Playback software/module to replay
waveform).Playback software should have capability to replay six currents for three
phase differential relay testing.
 Test Records
A complete record should be kept/manage of all test data and observations made during tests and
inspections,including identifying numbers of test equipment used. Test records can be store either
in soft form or hardform. It can also stored in some application software (Database management
software) in proper way.
17.7 RECOMMENDATION OF BEFORE START TO TEST RELAYING SCHEME
BY USING COMPUTERIZED RELAY TESTING KIT
•Prepare proper and adequate test plan for each function to be under test
•Ensure the correct wiring of CT and VT inputs to relay
•Ensure voltage of auxiliary power supply of relay
•Ensure the correct wiring of trip or other signals, used in scheme
•Test procedure/plan can be prepared by vender/user/customer as per their time schedule
and practice, but in general, methods to test protection devices can be identified:
 Steady State Testing
Steady state testing simulates protection devices using voltages and currents represented by sine
variablesusing the fundamental frequency of the electrical power network only. One signal/phasor
(either voltage or current) shall be varying at time. Amplitude and phase angle of voltages and
currents are defined for a fixed test period. Different test periods can be combined to a test
sequence. Steady state tests consist typically of pre–fault, fault and post fault periods.
Points to be noted
• Voltages and currents are calculated as sine variables only without transient signal
components.
• A sudden change of amplitudes will be realized using an absolute amplitude shift.
• A sudden change of phases will be realized using an absolute phase shift.
• The DC–component is calculated based on a mathematical equation, but not as the result
of a network simulation.
• No transient signal components can be used e.g. for ground faults in insulated or Peterson
coil grounded networks.
It is not mandatory to do automated tests, but still it is recommended several benefits that to do with
automated tests against manual tests by using computerized relay testing kit. It can be stated that
steady state tests calculate voltages and currents using linear ramp. Such equations cannot take
into account the transient behavior of electrical power networks.
Steady state tests can be used to test the behavior of the protection device e.g. accuracy of
pickup/dropout tests, operating time test, etc. But transient phenomena cannot be taken into
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 274

account. On this point of viewsteady state tests are only a poor representation of electrical power
networks.
Steady state testing can be applied for production tests, FAT, SAT/Commissioning tests, Periodic
maintenance tests, Functional type tests etc.
Steady state testing can be conducted by using Ramping module in modern computerized relay test
kits.
 Dynamic Steady State Testing

Dynamic Steady state testing simulate protection devices using voltages and currents represented
by sine variables using the fundamental frequency of the electrical power network. Both the
signals/phasors (voltage & current) are varying at simultaneously on fundamental frequency.
Number of power system states can becreated sequentially and evaluate performance of protection
relay.
Evolving Faults
Performance of protection relay is very important, if evolving faults occurs in EHV lines. Sometimes,
it can beoperated in wrong manner or sometimes it may not detect faults if the relay algorithms do not
properly work. Evolving faults (shown in below figure) can be simulated on relay by using
dynamic state simulation.
Figure 75 Pre–fault, Fault & Post fault condition applied for Dynamic steady state tests
Dynamic state testing can be applied for Application tests (i.e. power swing test, steady state fault
current apply to relay and check performance, Evolving faults, Power system scenario on
fundamental frequency etc.), Functional type tests & Commissioning Tests.
Dynamic state testing can be conducted by using State sequence/State simulation module or Steady
state power system model (simulate faults on fundamental frequency) in modern computerized
relay test kits
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 275

Points to be noted for Dynamic state Testing

• Voltages and currents are calculated as sine variables only without transient signal
components.
• A sudden change of amplitudes will be realized using an absolute amplitude shift.
• A sudden change of phases will be realized using an absolute phase shift.
• The DC–component is calculated based on a mathematical equation, but not as the result
of a network simulation.
• No transient signal components can be used e.g. for ground faults in insulated or
Peterson coil grounded networks.
 Transient Testing (Dynamic Testing)
Transient testing is based on network simulation systems. It simulates fundamental and non–
fundamental components simultaneously based on network configurations. A network simulation
system calculates voltages and currents by solving the differential equations of the electrical
network. This method takes into account the dynamic characteristic of the electrical network.
Transient phenomena e.g. mutual coupling are taken into account, too.
• Voltages and currents contain transient signal components
• Amplitudes and phases will be changed continuously on fundamental and non–
fundamental frequency.
• Voltages and currents depend on the characteristic of the electrical power network.
A transient testing consists of voltages and currents using components of the power frequency and
high order frequencies experienced during system operating conditions. The signals used in these
tests can be calculated analyzing computer models of a electrical power systems using
electromagnetic transient analysis programs (i.e. ATP/EMTP/PSCAD/RTDS).
Different dynamic network and fault situations can be simulated depending on the structure of
model of the electrical network like:
• Networks with Two Infeeds
• CT Saturation with Hysteresis and Remanence
• Capacitive Voltage Transformers (CVT)
• Transformers with Over fluxing, Saturation, etc.
• Evolving Faults
• High Impedance Faults
• Faults with Arc Resistance
• EHV Lines with Series Compensation
• Underground Cables
Transient testing shall be conducted in following methods;
By using network simulation program (i.e. ATP/EMTP/PSCAD/RTDS etc.)
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 276

Figure 76 Transient Testing

Transient testing can be applied for System type tests, Application tests (i.e. specially in case
where the relay wrong operate on disturbance and need to verify it’s performance) & Relay
development tests (i.e. to develop relay internal algorithms).
Further the dynamic/transient testing can be carried by following way;
Open loop automated relay testing: Open loop automated testing is widely popular and shall be
done by using computerized relay testing kit along with their application software. Open loop
testing can be use for production tests, FAT, SAT, periodic maintenance tests, application tests,
functional type tests & system type tests. Manufacturer & user can validate protection relay on
various power system scenarios with the help of electromagnetic transient program
(EMTP/ATP/PSCAD). Such types of application testing are also known asdynamic/transient testing
of relay.
Close loop automated relay testing by using RTDS: Close loop real time digital simulator testing
(dynamic/ transient testing) is also one of the fastest ways to evaluate the protection relays on
various power system scenarios. More than 50 nos. of contingencies on protection relays shall be
simulating faster by using RTDS. It is also call it as an application test. Functional and System type
tests (refer type tests section) shall be done effectively faster by using close loop RTDS testing. It
uses high speed processors to solve system performance equations, advancing time by a few
microseconds in each iteration.
 APPLICATION NOTES
• All protection relays, IEDs used shall have valid type test reports as per relevant
standards.
• Dynamic RTDS test shall be specified as type test for Line distance relay, transformer
differential relay.
• Relay Functional tests shall be carried out as Routine / production tests.
• As part of Pre–commissioning tests, all relay functional test & scheme checks shall be
carried out at site.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 277

• During operation stage, routine testing of Main protection relays shall be carried out
one year after commissioning and thereafter every four year or as and when some
maloperation is suspected.
• Typical functional test details of some relays are given in Appendix.
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 278

Appendix–A
Example for tests to validate distance protection relay scheme at site/field:
User/Customer can conduct tests in their way but some of the following tests can be conducted at
site;
 Physical inspection
 Ensure voltage of auxiliary power supply of relay
 Ensure correct wiring of CT and VT inputs to relay through primary or secondary
injection test
 Ensure correct wiring of Inputs, Outputs and Interlocks to relay. Ensure closing and
tripping circuit
 according to engineering scheme
 Check Metering parameters (Voltages & Currents, Symmetrical components, Power
etc.)
 Zone reach tests on 50Hz frequency
 Zone time tests on 50Hz frequency
 Zone reach tests on 50Hz frequency and Auxiliary power supply 70% of rated
 Zone time tests on 50Hz frequency and Auxiliary power supply 120% of rated
 Zone reach tests on off nominal frequency (i.e. 47.5Hz to 52.5Hz)
 Zone time tests on off nominal frequency (i.e. 47.5Hz to 52.5Hz)
 Zone reach tests on SIR=1 and SIR=5
 Zone time tests on SIR=1 and SIR=5
 Power swing detection and blocking zone test
 Power swing detection and tripping test
 Switch on to fault test
 Auto reclose test
 Load encroachment and zone blocking test
 VT supervision test (i.e. Verify conditions like real VTS, real under voltage of network,
under voltageduring faults, distance zone blocking when VT fuse failed etc.)
 Broken conductor test
 PUTT/POTT scheme test
 Back up protection (Directional phase & ground over current) test
 Time delay/System protection (Over voltage) test (i.e. pickup/dropout test, time test)
 Verification of Distance protection scheme logic (i.e. inputs/outputs/LEDs/pushbutton,
communicationscheme etc.)
 Dynamic/Application tests (i.e. Create line model and simulate faults–
AN/BN/CN/AB/BC/CA/ABC/ Cross country faults etc in EMTP, Play disturbance
recorded file)
 Disturbance recording test (i.e. remove internal battery and see DR is available in
relay or erase!,Analogue and digital channel recording, Analysis functions etc.)
 Event recording in proper way (i.e. proper tagging of sequence of events etc)
 Fault recording on HMI display in proper way (i.e. Zone1 trip on AN fault etc.)
 IEC61850 interoperability test
 Check communication with SCADA
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 279

Appendix–B
Example for tests to validate differential protection relay scheme at site/field:
site;
 Ensure the correct wiring of CT and VT inputs to relays through primary or secondary
injection test. Do CT polarity test to ensure the correct operation of differential
protection
 Ensure correct wiring of Inputs, Outputs and Interlocks to relay. Ensure closing and
tripping circuit according to engineering scheme
 Check Metering parameters (Voltages & Currents, Symmetrical components, Power,
Restrain and Differential Currents etc.)
 Differential element – Winding pick up & Dropout tests on 50Hz frequency
 Operating time test on 50Hz frequency
 Restrain characteristic (Slope characteristic) test
 2nd & 5th Harmonic blocking test
 Stability test (External faults and Internal faults create through power system model)
 On load verification of stability (i.e. charge transformer & take 10 to 20% loads and
check restrain / differential currents)
 High set (Unrestrained) Differential element – Pick up & Dropout tests
 High set (Unrestrained) Differential element – Operating time test
 Over fluxing test
 REF function – Pick up & Dropout test
 REF function – Operating time test
 REF function – Slope characteristic test
 REF function – Stability test on secondary circuit
 Back up protection (Phase & ground over current) test for each winding
 Time delay protection (Over voltage) test (i.e. pickup/dropout test, time test)
 Verification of Differential/REF protection scheme logic (i.e. Primary injection,
stability test on primary, inputs/outputs/LEDs/pushbutton, Inter–trips etc.)
 Dynamic/Application tests (i.e. Create line & transformer model and simulate faults–
AN/BN/CN/AB/ BC/CA/ABC in zone/out zone faults etc in EMTP, Play disturbance
recorded file)
 Disturbance recording test (i.e. remove internal battery and see DR is available in relay
or erase!, Analogue and digital channel recording, Analysis functions etc.)
 Fault recording on HMI display in proper way (i.e. Differential trip on A phase etc.)
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 280

Figure 77 Differential Protection Relay Testing
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 281

Appendix–C
Example for tests to validate feeder protection relay at site/field:
site;
 Check Metering parameters (Voltages & Currents, Symmetrical components, Power,
Restrain and Differential Currents etc.)
 Directional/Non–directional over current pick up & Dropout test on 50Hz frequency
 Directional test for Directional over current function
 Directional/Non–directional over current minimum operating time test
 Directional/Non–directional over current operating time test according to IEC/IEEE
inverse curve
 Over voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
 Over voltage function – Operating time test
 Zero sequence over voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
 Zero sequence over voltage function – Operating time test
 Negative sequence over voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
 Negative sequence over voltage function – Operating time test
 Under voltage function – Pick up & Dropout test
 Under voltage function – Operating time test
 Under frequency function – Pick up & Dropout test
 Under frequency function – Operating time test
 Over frequency function – Pick up & Dropout test
 Over frequency function – Operating time test
 Directional power function – Pick up & Dropout test
 Directional power function – Operating time test
 Broken conductor function – Pick up & Dropout test
 Broken conductor function – Operating time test
 Negative sequence over current function – Pick & Dropout test
 Negative sequence over current function – Operating time test according to inverse
curve, if inverse curve set for this function in relay
 Zero sequence over current function – Pick up & Dropout test
 (27) Zero sequence over current function – Operating time test
 Verification of over current protection scheme logic (i.e. Relay co–ordination
verification test, inputs/ outputs/LEDs/pushbutton, Inter–trips etc.)
 Dynamic/Application tests (i.e. Create line/underground cable feeder model and
simulate faults–AN/ BN/CN/AB/BC/CA/ABC faults etc in EMTP, Play disturbance
recorded file)
 Disturbance recording test (i.e. remove internal battery and see DR is available in relay
or erase!, Analogue and digital channel recording, Analysis functions etc.)
 Fault recording on HMI display in proper way (i.e. I> trip on A phase etc.)
Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 282

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Consultancy Services for EEP

Engineering Office Capacity Building

POWER PROTECTION SYSTEM

Document No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00

Project TiTeam Lead e:

Client Contact Name: Mr. Tesfaye Tilaye

Document Production / Approval Record

Checked by Mr. Antonio Comelli Project Manager

Approved by Mr. Antonio Comelli Project Manager

Document Review Record

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page i

1 PROTECTION STUDY SECTION I ...............................................................................................................1

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page ii

3.6 SUBSTATION LOCAL BACK UP PROTECTION ...........................................................................106

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page iii

7.12 REQUIREMENTS OF PROTECTION RELAYS / FUNCTIONS ....................................................160

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page iv

12.2 TYPES OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS......................................................................................................208

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page v

15.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................250

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page vi

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page vii

Figure 45 Flow diagram for breaker fail protection .................................................................................................210

Table 1 : Activities flow - Protection Study. ................................................................................................................3

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page viii

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page ix

1 PROTECTION STUDY SECTION I

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 1

1.2 INPUT AND OUTPUT DEFINITION

1.2.1.2 Customer requirement & interaction, site visit as required

1.2.1.4 Data base

1.2.1.6 Short circuit study in approved software to establish initial conditions

1.2.1.7 Legal requirement

1.2.1.8 Updated software

1.2.1.10Technical interface with other department

1.2.1.11Input from technical experts.

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 2

1.2.2.2 Fault current sensed by relay in Amperes

1.2.2.3 Relay setting

1.2.2.4 Relay co-ordination curves

1.2.2.7 Protection SLD with results

Table 1 : Activities flow - Protection Study.

Activity Input Detailed Description Output Responsibility Records

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 3

Activity Input Detailed Description Output Responsibility Records

Relay co-ordination study to

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 4

Activity Input Detailed Description Output Responsibility Records

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 5

Activity Input Detailed Description Output Responsibility Records

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 6

1.2.4 PROTECTION STUDIES OUTPUT

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 7

1.3.1 OVER CURRENT AND EARTH FAULT CO-ORDINATION STUDY

1.3.1.1 Data collection

1.3.1.2 Requirement for protection study

a) Critical clearance time of all the generators in the vicinity

1.3.1.3 Data base for coordination study

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 8

- Plug setting range

1.3.1.4 Relay coordination study

Relay placed on Transformer primary:

Doc. No. 1795-S-TS-E-2400-00 Page 9

 Earth DT setting (Te>>): Instantaneous (0.05 second).