Introduction

For much of the past century, the world economy and the world of states have been dominated by the economic
and political power and influence of the United States (US) and Western economies. For many observers, however,
the 21st century is already showing signs of a significant shift toward “emerging economies.” China has captured
the headlines with its dramatic rise to become the world’s second largest economy and is expected to soon
overtake the US to claim the top ranking (Gu, Renwick, and Xue 2018). However, emerging economies are to be
found not only in East Asia but also in South Asia, Africa, Latin America, Eurasia, and eastern Europe. This process
of change is perhaps most evident in the coming together of the brics countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa), while other economies showing significant growth and economic resilience in recent years are
regarded as potentially forming a further wave of emerging economies in Southeast Asia, Eurasia, and Central
America.

Emerging economies are widely regarded as driving global growth. Nonetheless, their role and significance are
subject to widespread debate. On the one hand are arguments that these economies offer a break with the past.
With their own histories of colonial legacy, impoverishment, conflict, and eventual political stability, recovery, and
growth, these countries, proponents claim, have a closer understanding of and empathy with the needs and
aspirations of the Global South and the billions of people in developing countries. Supporters thus believe they can
bring a new approach to critical issues such as international sustainable development. On the other hand, critics
argue that little is different in practice, with some political leaders and commentators in developing countries
labelling them as new colonialists.

Whichever school of thought one adheres to, these economies, with their growing strength, are having an
increasingly significant impact on international development as emerging powers with global reach, importance,
and influence. For some, they bring new international development voices and perspectives, perhaps distinct from
those of Western powers. Emerging powers are engaged in their own continuing development journey, wrestling
with inequities and exclusion. They are also important international development actors. This chapter explores the
development trajectories of the emerging powers and the international development implications.

The chapter seeks to develop a sound understanding of the domestic and international development issues central
to the emergence of these “economies” or “powers.” It explores the domestic development implications of their
high-speed growth and assesses their impact on trade, finance, and investment and their growing role as
international donors. The discussion begins with an analysis of China’s approach to international development
before turning to look at the brics and other emerging economies.
China’s Approach to International Development

China’s role in international development and the implications of that role are subject to intense interest and debate. China’s role is immensely controversial
and divides opinion in the global development community. Critics argue that, fundamentally, China is really no different from any other state when it comes to
fulfilling its national economic, political, and strategic interests and goals. China’s core interest is in accessing raw materials and exporting its labour and goods,
while doing little or nothing to counter human rights abuses, corruption, or structural inequalities in its trade and corporate practices. Positive commentaries,
however, are more accepting of the so-called “win-win” nature of China’s development relations in Africa and elsewhere, pointing to major infrastructural
investment improving the sinews of developing-country economies and improving daily lives through social welfare, health, and agricultural technical
assistance.

The Chinese government has responded to international criticism that it lacked a clear policy statement on international development. In an attempt to present
just such a statement and indicate its evolving thinking on this issue, the government published its first White Paper on Foreign Aid in April 2011 (mofa
2011), with a second issued in July 2014 (mofa 2014). The White Papers offer useful insight into China’s perspective on international development, which
differs significantly from Western concepts of development in ideational, even ideological, character and set out the principles of foreign aid with “Chinese
characteristics” (Box 14.1). These differences mainly derive from China’s own experiences of development and as a recipient of foreign aid. China’s official aid
expenditure statistics is also contested (Kitano and Harada 2014).

CRITICAL ISSUES
Box 14.1 Foreign Aid with Chinese Characteristics
China’s first White Paper on Foreign Aid in 2011 emphasized five principles of its foreign aid:

• helping recipient countries build up their self-development capacity;

• imposing no political conditions;
• adhering to equality, mutual benefit, and common development;
• remaining realistic while striving for the best;
• keeping pace with the times and paying attention to reform and innovation.

The 2014 White Paper re-emphasized these five aspects and added one more, “keeping promises,” an indication of China’s expressed commitment to its
overseas development projects.

The Chinese government, agencies, and enterprises have been on a steep learning curve as the country’s development assistance and technical support to its
growing number of development partners in Africa and beyond accelerates, broadens, and deepens (Zhou 2014; Gu, McCluskey, and Mushi 2015). The
formulation of China’s approach, a process that had been developing for a few years prior to the issue of the White Papers, is highly complex, involving the
legacies of China’s own historical experiences, current and anticipated national economic, political, and strategic interests and needs, and the evolving pattern of
relationships with other countries and global institutions. This is set within an overarching commitment that China’s development is peaceful and contributes to
building a harmonious world.

To some extent, China’s present policy deliberations and international development practices carry the legacy of its turbulent past. Correspondingly, China’s
understanding of “development” has differed markedly from that of many Western countries. While the general Western model is economic as well as
ideological (human rights, social welfare, democracy) (see Chapter 9), the Chinese emphasis is on “a wider remit of economic relations” (Gu, Chen, and Zhang
2014). In other words, China seeks development partnerships as embedded in the broad spectrum of economic cooperation through trade and investment
(particularly in infrastructure capacity-building), as well as in project support and provision of technical know-how. Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese
government has encouraged Chinese firms to set up overseas production facilities in Africa and on other continents through its “Going Out” strategy (Gu 2019).

An additional factor is that of institutional policy-making. China’s foreign aid policy and implementation responsibilities are spread across four agencies: the
China International Development Cooperation Agency (cidca), the Ministry of Finance (mof), the Ministry of Commerce (mofcom), and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (mofa). cidca was established in 2018 in an effort to address bureaucratic fragmentation, with a mandate to oversee, plan, coordinate, and evaluate
foreign aid in line with China’s foreign policy. The institutional infrastructure includes various agencies engaged in the “development” domain (Gu and Carey,
2019). These include the financial agencies such as the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank); various administrative units at the provincial and municipal
levels of government; state-owned enterprises and the rapidly growing legion of private firms operating in developing countries; and peak industry associations
such as the China–Africa Business Council and bilateral friendship associations exercising their networking influence (Chinese–African People’s Friendship
Association 2015).

Critics, such as former Nigerian Central Bank Governor Lamido Sanusi, view the relationship as more “zero-sum” than “win-win” (Sanusi 2013). Here, the
primary motivation for China’s renewed interest in Africa is said to be its intensifying need for energy and raw materials and for access to Africa’s markets for
its manufactured products. Critical headlines question China’s attitude toward African states accused of human rights violations and corruption. But criticisms
are also much broader and include the use of imported Chinese workers; poor labour and environmental practices; the undercutting of local firms; a weak
commitment by many Chinese firms to corporate social responsibility; and a poor record in knowledge and skills transfers. It is argued that China’s growing
presence puts at risk all the advances in “good governance” made by the international donor community in recent decades (Mwiti 2015).

The role of the Chinese state as the central driving force and coordinating agency behind this increased presence has come under particular scrutiny as China’s
presence in Africa has grown (Li and Farah 2013; Piketty and Goldhammer 2014; Gu et al. 2018; Stückelberger 2015; Strauss and Saavedra 2009; Bräutigam
2009; Taylor 2009; He 2007). Recently, more attention and recognition has been paid to the diverse range of agencies involved and the lack of coordination
between the Chinese state, business, and other organizations operating in Africa. This suggests that the argument that the Chinese state essentially directs
Chinese business investment in Africa is overstated (Gu et al. 2016).

China has been using diverse means to build relations with developing states, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, through direct cooperation with
the African Union (au), the African Development Bank (afdb), and other regional banks (Gu et al. 2014). China’s leaders have conducted intensive and
extensive diplomacy over the past three decades, undertaking numerous tours of Africa. It is notable that the first official overseas tour of President Xi
(incumbent since 2012) was to Africa. A successful platform has proved to be the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (focac), established in 2000 to advance
partnerships between the African Union and China. As Lan Xue notes, referring to the 2014 focac meeting: “The forum has also become an important platform
in extending ‘summit diplomacy’ to ‘people diplomacy’ through the involvement of ngos and business people” (Xue 2014, 40).
PH O TO 1 4 . 1 China’s president Xi Jinping (front centre) meets African leaders, including the presidents of South Africa (Cyril Ramaphosa), Egypt (Abdel
Fattah al-Sisi), Kenya (Uhuru Kenyatta), Togo (Faure Gnassingbe), Malawi (Arthur Peter Mutharika), Sierre Leone (Julius Maada Bio), and Liberia (George Weah),
at the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in Beijing, China, in 2018. HOW HWEE YOUNG/AFP via Getty Images

China is not a new donor, but its objectives, mechanisms, and levels of finance have changed significantly. Over the course of its own development experience,
its international cooperation has evolved from the ideologically motivated foreign aid of the Mao era to a more pragmatic and flexible strategy involving aid,
trade, and Chinese companies “going out” (Shambaugh 2014). China’s leadership has called for the establishment of new multilateral institutions and the
deployment of a comprehensive development strategy more reflective of the changing global economic landscape and emerging economies.

Africa and China are central to each other’s development cooperation, combining economic, political, strategic, and cultural interests. China is Africa’s largest
trading partner. The value of China-Africa trade in 2018 was US$185 billion, up from US$155 billion in 2017. In 2018, the largest exporter to China from Africa
was Angola, followed by South Africa and the Republic of Congo. In 2018, South Africa was the largest buyer of Chinese goods, followed by Nigeria and Egypt
(China Africa Research Initiative, www.sais-cari.org/data-china-africa-trade).

The China Africa Fund, run by the China Development Bank to invest in firms in Africa, was injected an extra US$2 billion to take its total capitalization to
US$5 billion by 2015 (China Daily 2015). In 2014, the afdb approved the creation of an Africa Growing Together Fund (agtf), a US$2-billion trust fund created
by China to enable the bank to respond to the growing needs of its regional member countries and private-sector clients (afdb 2014).
New Development Thinking and Institutions

Key initiatives by China are the Belt and Road Initiative (bri) and establishment of the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (aiib). The importance of these initiatives is not solely economic and financial; it is also political,
representing the first major step by China in acting upon its discontent with the failure to reform the existing global
economic and political system (see Chapter 10).

The Belt and Road Initiative

The bri (also referred to as One Belt, One Road or obor) is China’s flagship initiative. It comprises a land-based
Silk Road Economic Belt (sreb) and a sea-based 21st-century Maritime Silk Road (msr). The initiative was born in
September and October 2013 during President Xi’s tours of Central Asia and Southeast Asia. The sreb includes
countries situated on the original Silk Road through Central Asia, West Asia, the Middle East, and Europe as well as
countries beyond in South Asia and Southeast Asia. The initiative envisages the integration of the region into a
cohesive economic area, which involves investing in infrastructure, widening cultural exchanges, and increasing
trade (Renwick, Gu, and Gong 2018). The msr is intended to complement the sreb by building partnerships and
collaborative relations with countries in Southeast Asia, Oceania, and North Africa as the “Road” traverses the
South China Sea, South Pacific, and Indian Ocean.

By early 2020, 143 countries had signed up to the bri (Belt and Road Portal, n.d.). In March 2019, Italy became
the first G7 power to sign up to the initiative (Bindi 2019), joining 15 other smaller European states. Two Belt and
Road Forums (brfs) have been held since 2013. At the first brf, China created a list of deliverables that included
“76 items comprising more than 270 concrete results in five key areas, namely policy, infrastructure, trade,
financial and people-to-people connectivity” (Xinhua 2017a). The first brf in 2017 was celebrated as a diplomatic
success: 130 countries were present, including “delegates from the United States, Japan, South Korea and North
Korea” (Gong 2017). It allowed other countries to better understand the bri’s development strategy and identify
potential opportunities (Gong 2017; Renwick, Gu, and Gong 2018; Sen, Leach, and Gu 2019). By the second brf in
2019, however, China recognized concerns that had been raised by salient projects such as the Hambanota port in
Sri Lanka. Despite feasibility studies that ranked the Hambanota port as unprofitable, former Sri Lankan president
Mahinda Rajapaksa arranged a vast new port development project with the China Harbor Engineering Company,
one of the largest soes in Beijing, in an infrastructure-lacking rural area of Sri Lanka. When Rajapaksa was voted
out of office, the new Sri Lankan government struggled to make payments on debts to China that now account for
almost 6 per cent of Sri Lanka’s gdp. That pressured the country into negotiations that would allow China control
over the port and 15,000 acres of land around it for 99 years. Sri Lanka’s financial dependency is paired with
security concerns, since the port could be used for future military or strategic uses accentuating China’s rivalry
with India directly off its shores (Abi-Habib 2018; Ondaatjie and Sirimanne 2019; Wignaraja et al. 2020).

Although the second brf saw deals worth US$64 billion signed, the flourishing of trade, and the creation of more
than 80 special economic zones and high-tech parks, China still faces practical issues of implementation (Rana and
Ji 2019). Countries such as Pakistan, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and Maldives had sought to renegotiate, cancel, or
scale-down bri projects over concerns of debt, corruption, and high costs (Rana and Ji 2019). In recognition of
these concerns, Xi adopted what Rana and Ji (2019) termed “bri 2.0,” with a strengthened emphasis on (i)
multilateralism in terms of consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits, (ii) open, clean, green cooperation,
and (iii) the following of international/participating countries norms as well as the need to ensure fiscal
sustainability (Xi 2019).

In President Xi Jinping’s view, the sreb and msr “will promote the trade and investment between China and the
countries along the routes, promote the connectivity and new-type industrialisation of countries along the routes,
and promote the common development of all countries as well as the peoples’ joint enjoyment of the fruits of
development” (mofa 2015). This remains the core of the bri even as China makes adjustments in its cooperation
with participating countries. Correspondingly, China has invested about US$1.1trillion in bri infrastructure
investment through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (aiib), the Silk Road Fund, and the New
Development Bank thus far (Xinhua 2018) and looks toward global investors to help fill a funding gap between
commitments and investment.

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

The aiib emerged from an idea first put forward by China in 2013 (Table 14.1). This led to discussions and the
formal launch of the proposal in Beijing in October 2014, with the Articles of Agreement signed in late June 2015.
The bank was created to provide much-needed investment in infrastructure capacity in the Asia-Pacific region in
response to the identified critical need for large-scale investment in many Asia-Pacific countries. According to the
McKinsey Global Institute, the projected global investment for 2015–30 is around US$57.3 trillion (Wall Street
Journal 2015). The founding of the aiib also grew from China’s assessment that the heavy dominance of the US
and Japan in the Asian Development Bank (adb) and the lack of progress on reform meant that an alternative
financial institution was needed.

TAB LE 1 4 . 1 Historical and Projected Annual Growth Rates of GNP per capita (2005 US$PPP)

2008–2017 2018–2022 2023–2030

World 1.7 2.4 2.5

US 0.7 1.4 1.3
Europe 0.6 1.5 1.8
Other Developed Economies 0.8 1.2 1.4

BRICS 5.4 4.7 4.5

Other Emerging Economies 1.1 2.8 2.8
Developing Economies 2.6 2.5 2.9

Source: McKinley 2018. Calculated from CAM World Databank and Baseline Scenario.

The aiib builds upon the structure of existing multilateral development banks (mdbs), like the World Bank or the
adb, but adapts to their shortcomings. The aiib shares hierarchy structures with mdbs but integrates different
power distributions to the conventional mdb model in which donors hold preponderant influence. The aiib adds
expanded power to the Board of Governors to flexibly respond to changes over time. The Board of Directors serves
on a part-time, non-resident basis, and the president’s power is limited to two terms. The open, transparent, and
merit-based selection of the president and vice president provides new legal standards. The aiib provides
mechanisms to allow greater voice for regional and smaller members. The voting structure is less tied to
shareholding than other mdbs because votes for all members and Founding Member Votes for founders reduce the
impact of shareholding (Lichtenstein 2018).

A New York Times report (2014) alleged that US officials lobbied against the bank’s creation and denounced it as
an intentional strategy to undermine traditional financial institutions dominated by the US and to increase China’s
soft power in Southeast Asia where territorial disputes have, periodically, soured relations (Perlez 2014). The
Trump administration has similarly declined to join the bank, passing the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act to
counter Chinese influence in Asia Pacific (Saha 2020), as well as launching the Blue Dot Network to “certify
infrastructure projects that demonstrate and uphold global infrastructure principles” (US Department of State
n.d.).

IMPORTANT CONCEPTS
Box 14.2 The AIIB’s Achievements
 • The aiib counts 76 regional and non-regional members, as well as 26 prospective members (Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank 2020). The bank accounts for 78 per cent of the global population, 63 per
cent of global gdp, and 75 per cent of carbon emissions worldwide (Alexander 2019).
• The bank has received Triple A credit ratings from the three major credit ranking agencies as testament
to its governance frameworks, risk management capacities, and financial portfolio.
• Its first global bond was issued in 2019 at US$2.5 billion, on par with World Bank prices.
• The bank’s charter has several provisions that allow for the Board of Governors to adapt to changing
circumstances, building in flexibility into the institution.
• The aiib has been praised for its operational efficiency, lending more than US$8 billion in three years to
18 member countries for 46 projects. Projects so far have been focused on the transport and energy
sectors, but the bank hopes to expand into renewable energy as well as sectors such as water, digital
infrastructure, and sustainable cities.
Source: G.T. Chin 2019.

Scholars, the Chinese government, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and former US President
Barack Obama, however, have argued that the aiib should not be seen as competition to other development
initiatives but should be viewed as an opportunity for cooperation (Li and He 2015). Infrastructure needs cannot
be filled solely by the aiib, and thus, cooperation and complementarity with existing institutions are key to the
bank’s effectiveness. Nonetheless, the bank is not just about development finance but is the first real attempt by
the Chinese government to institutionalize its financial power globally (Griffith-Jones et al. 2016). The aiib will not
necessarily transform development finance, but it will transform multilateral engagement and global governance.
China and the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

The brics economies have particular characteristics warranting specific attention in international development. Beginning from a dialogue process in 2006, the
organization and its members have evolved to be important actors. In 2001, Jim O’Neill, then the head of Global Economic Research at Goldman Sachs, coined
the acronym “bric” as a convenient collective term and play on words to describe the four economies he was analyzing in his research paper (O’Neill 2001). As
political impetus for a grouping of these economies, later to be joined by South Africa, the bric acronym gained political and institutional currency. brics has
steadily established itself as an important organization on the international stage.

Commonalities and Differences

The brics countries have a number of commonalities and convergences in their approaches to the “development agenda.” In terms of commonalities, all the
brics members have extensive territories and significant populations and were recording impressive gdp growth rates at the time of the group’s founding (see
Figure 14.1). They accept the idea that the state has a legitimate and important role to play in domestic and international development. Each, with the
exception of the Russian Federation, would classify itself as a developing country. Other shared characteristics include the recent experience of conflict,
poverty, and inequalities; the implementation of successful reforms, resulting in economic recovery and eventual growth and political stability; increasing global
influence based in part on their regional dominance; and recent efforts to establish themselves as new sources of international development assistance and
cooperation (Renwick and Gu 2020). The brics members have also committed to a collective process of institutionalizing their cooperation.

F I G U R E 1 4 . 1 Average GDP Per Capita for Emerging Economies and the Rest of the World Note: Selected regions, difference in growth rate (10-year averages) of gdp
per person (at purchasing power parity). Source: The Economist (2014). Calculated from imf database. “Emerging-market dreams of rich-world incomes meet reality”.
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2019/08/01/emerging-market-dreams-of-rich-world-incomes-meet-reality. Accessed 29 Feb. 2020.
PH O TO 1 4 . 2 From left to right, China’s President Xi Jinping, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and
South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa meet at the 11th brics leaders summit, in Brasilia, Brazil, in 2019. Photo by Alexei Druzhinin\TASS via Getty Images

There is a common belief in the importance of South–South cooperation. First, it is seen by the brics members to be supplemental to North–South
relations, facilitating triangular development cooperation strategies and projects between a traditional donor, an emerging donor in the South, and a
beneficiary country in the South. Triangular technical cooperation, defined by Brazil as establishing agreements with both developed and developing countries
“to acquire and disseminate knowledge applied to social and economic development” (Brazilian Cooperation Agency, n.d.), is a growing component of the
emerging architecture of international development promoted by emerging economies such as Brazil and China. China, for example, works with the UK
government on development projects in Africa. The Accra Agenda for Action called for further development of triangular cooperation. In response, various
organizations and groupings such as ecosoc, the G8, the undp, and the oecd-dac have held conferences on triangular development cooperation.

Second, South–South cooperation is regarded as vitally important in its own right, providing an important framework and trajectory for developing countries,
emerging economies, and brics. South–South cooperation emphasizes development partnerships, and the brics grouping stresses that brics are “partners,” not
“donors.” The principles of South–South cooperation have been very important in framing how some of the brics (particularly India and Brazil) define
themselves as development cooperation providers.

IMPORTANT CONCEPTS
Box 14.3 What Is BRICS?

• brics is a dialogue and cooperation platform among member states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).
• brics started active life in 2009 as bric with Brazil, Russia, India, and China and saw South Africa join the group in 2010.
• The grouping accounts for 30 per cent of global land, 42 per cent of global population, 23 per cent of the world’s gross domestic product (gdp), 18 per
cent of global merchandise trade.
• The group holds annual brics summits, rotating through the membership (11 meetings have been held between 2009 and 2019).
• brics countries have increased their share of global gdp threefold between 2000 and 2015.
Source: BRICS: What Is BRICS? BRICS Brasil 2019. http://brics2019.itamaraty.gov.br/en/about-brics/what-is-brics.

In terms of differences, the brics members bring to the grouping very different geographies, histories, cultures, and values as well as different political systems
and economic systems. One major difference in political terms, quite evidently, centers on “political democracy” (see Chapter 17). While India is widely
recognized as the world’s largest political democracy grounded in a pluralistic, multi-party, representative governmental system, Brazil, Russia, and South
Africa have laboured to establish equivalent systems in recent decades, with Brazil and South Africa both stressing the importance of democratization in their
development pathways at home and internationally. China, on the other hand, interprets democracy quite distinctly, retaining the paramount and “vanguard”
role of the Communist Party as central to the political and social system, both constitutionally and in practice, while promoting a market economy. This
diversity gives rise to very different approaches to the role and purpose of civil society and non-governmental organizations, as well as to issues of
transparency and accountability and civil and human rights. Such domestic issues overflow into international development practices ranging from human rights
to corporate social responsibility and the promotion of good governance.

History plays an interesting and important contemporary role. For example, Brazil’s initial steps in building development cooperation with states in sub-
Saharan Africa reflected a shared experience of Portuguese colonialism and the linguistic and cultural legacies that have remained within the Lusophone
countries. This pattern is also evident in China’s relations with African development. China’s own experience of Portuguese colonialism, on the island of Macao,
provided China with a legitimate basis with which to establish a “Macao Hub” through which to promote, support, and consolidate its relations with Lusophone
countries in Africa and Latin America. Brazil’s approach has also drawn upon the historical roots with Africa originating in the European colonial slave trade
from Africa, offering Brazil an important theme of shared history and familial roots by which to foster and legitimize its development role in Africa within the
South–South cooperation and dialogue framework.

The volume of the provision of development assistance also varies, reflecting various factors such as annual rates of growth and changing government, policy,
and budget priorities. The economic recession and sluggish recovery in Brazil, shifting domestic priorities, and an increasingly commercial character to its
development cooperation seem to suggest a drawing-back in its assistance. Other countries, notably India and China, appear to be committed to increasing
their assistance provision despite a slowing of their own growth rates (see Figure 14.1). Meanwhile, Russia’s renewed development interest in Africa through
initiatives ranging from bilateral military cooperation agreements to nuclear energy deals has drawn attention to international politics (Farand 2019). While the
declaration of the inaugural Russia-Africa summit in 2019 mentioned “the use of renewable energy sources and implementation of joint projects in civil nuclear
energy,” it also proposed the continuation of “mutually beneficial cooperation in the oil and gas industry” (Mpungose 2019). Russia’s interest in oil and gas
exploration in Africa—as well as its interest in the use of traditional methods of energy generation considering its extensive domestic endowments (Besenyõ
2019, 137)—hollows out brics’s environmental and climate change commitments. However, this interest in African oil and gas exploration may decline at least
in the short to middle term because of global supply gluts and demand stymied by covid-19–related travel restrictions.

Institutionalizing BRICS
Is the breadth of issues tackled and the work involved increasing the body of gained infrastructure? brics members already have more than 20 institutionalized
forms of cooperation, from yearly summits to working groups, addressing international information security, health care, agriculture, science, and technology.
Major policy initiatives such as the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (cra) and the New Development Bank (ndb) are not only key organizational bodies but are
widely regarded as a statement of intent by the brics countries to establish substantial alternative financial agencies to those of the imf and World Bank and to
the Western economies.

From its first summit in Russia, the central focus of brics has been to tackle what the group’s leaders hold to be the exclusivity of a Western club of global
financial and political institutions, effectively favouring non- brics economies and their enterprises, marginalizing the brics countries and other emerging
economies and their firms. The Joint Statement of the brics Countries’ Leaders called for a “greater voice and representation in international financial
institutions, and their heads and senior leadership should be appointed through an open, transparent, and merit-based selection process” (brics 2009).
Reflecting these concerns, the leaders agreed to create a Business Council and to work toward establishing their own joint financial institutions. This dialogue
eventually led to the cra and to the 2014 ndb agreement that came into force in July 2015. The group also operates a brics Banking Forum and brics Exchanges
Alliance. Reisen (2015, 6) argues that:

The establishment of brics-led mdbs will be beneficial for global development to the extent that it helps cover some of the current infrastructure financing gaps. The new
banks organize a “voice” for emdcs [economically more developed countries] and rebalance representation of the non-oecd countries in multilateral development lending.
This is likely to speed up reform even in the established multilateral organizations. Competition is building for the existing Bretton Woods system.

IMPORTANT CONCEPTS
Box 14.4 The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA)
The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (cra), established in 2015 by brics member nations Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, is a self-managed
financial structure set up to provide support through mutual liquidity and precautionary instruments in response to actual or potential short-term balance of
payments pressures. Every member contributes by reserving a specific sum as an insurance against possible crisis events, like major capital drain. The cra
is coordinated as a fund and structured as a financial safety net for the brics members to strengthen their financial stability and to complement existing global
financial and monetary organizations. The cra is not connected to the imf to avoid policy conditionalities in events of need (Griffith-Jones 2014; The
Economic Times 2016). However, the cra is in its purpose and operation often compared with the imf and emerged in an urgency from frustration “over the
non-materialization of reforms in the imf that had long been promised but blocked by the United States until late 2015” (Würdemann 2018, 570). While the
cra is not yet fully finalized, implemented, and used, it can in a long-term scenario provide a viable alternative to the imf for brics.

Unsurprisingly, given the interwoven nature of the international institutional architecture, the agenda of the brics is not solely about economic and financial
institutional reform but also reform of the United Nations.

The expectations regarding the economic performance and relative weight of the brics countries in the global economy have been high, and their average
annual growth rates largely met these expectations in the decade through to 2011. Since 2010, however, there has been a slowdown in their growth rates, with
Brazil and Russia most affected. Significant strides have been made in reducing poverty, improving health care and education, and providing employment with
dignity. Nevertheless, these economies still face substantial development challenges, reflected in their low gdp per capita and by the fact that they are both
recipients and providers of development assistance. Despite this, the brics are a pivotal component in the global economic system, and much rests on their
continued performance.

In terms of international development cooperation, the brics have established a declaratory commitment to addressing issues of peace, poverty, and access to
health care and education for all, as well as to making sure that global economic growth and sustainable development are an inclusive process. For example, the
first bric summit called for greater international action to deal with the global food crisis. Nonetheless, up to 2019, the majority of actions were taken directly by
brics members rather than collectively through the organization.

The Strategy for brics Economic Partnership was agreed at the 2015 Ufa summit. The strategy aims to increase “economic growth and competitiveness of the
brics economies in the global arena” (brics 2015). Priority areas of cooperation include:

1. trade and investment

2. manufacturing and minerals processing
3. energy
4. agricultural cooperation
5. science, technology and innovation
 6. financial cooperation
7. connectivity (institutional, physical, and people-to-people)
8. ict cooperation (brics 2015)

The type of global economic reformation that brics seeks is achieved by working within the current international system. More specifically, brics countries “will
continue to develop cooperation within the un system as well as with other international economic organisations … [to] safeguard the interests of brics countries
as well as other emerging and developing economies” (brics 2015). The strategy is expected to be reviewed in 2020.

The New Development Bank (NDB)

The process of formulating a distinctive brics approach to international sustainable development is one that might be said to have begun with the 2012 proposal
for a brics development bank. The stated aim of the ndb is to “mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in brics and other
emerging economies and developing countries.” The primary function of the ndb is to provide lending (up to an approved limit of US$34 billion annually) for
projects. The ndb’s focus on infrastructure reflects a widely acknowledged critical need in developing economies for infrastructural investment to support
sustainable development and growth (Kasahara 2020).

However, whether the ndb can successfully overcome the hegemony of current international financial structures remain to be seen. Firstly, the Chinese
economy has been slowing down from double-digit growth to a target rate of 6 per cent as it restructures its economy to become more sustainable (Zhang and
Chen 2017, 1–2). Second, the 2020 outbreak of covid-19 also impacted the Chinese economy, with the imf downgrading its previous forecast for China’s gdp
growth to 5.6 per cent (Frankel 2020). As a global supply-chain hub, China’s extensive quarantine measures and dampened economic activity due to the
effects of the outbreak had a knock-on effect for the brics and the global economy. This health crisis exacerbated the adverse economic impact of the China and
the US “trade war” spurred by US administration accusations of protectionism and unfair trade (Lee 2020).

Are the BRICS Members Really Different?

The central question raised about brics concerns the extent to which this group represents a new and different approach to international relations and
international sustainable development. The answer involves both the principles upon which brics operates and what it actually does in practice. In terms of the
shared or common principles or values of brics, these are noted in the Ufa Declaration issued at the end of the seventh summit in July 2015 in Russia as follows:

principles of openness, solidarity, equality and mutual understanding, inclusiveness and mutually beneficial cooperation. We agreed to step up coordinated efforts in
responding to emerging challenges, ensuring peace and security, promoting development in a sustainable way, addressing poverty eradication, inequality and unemployment
for the benefit of our peoples and the international community. We confirmed our intention to further enhance the collective role of our countries in international affairs. (Ufa
Declaration 2015)

China’s President Xi Jinping’s speech to the seventh brics summit in Ufa, Russia, in July 2015 set out his vision of an approach emphasizing the need for
developing countries to take on more responsibility for their own development while brics provides assistance in meeting critical capacity-building needs and
promotes further South–South cooperation. In President Xi’s view, “The brics nations should also establish a new type of global development partnership, urge
the developed countries to shoulder their due responsibilities, and help developing countries improve their self-development capability, so as to narrow the
North–South gap, intensify South–South cooperation and seek self-improvement through cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit and win-win.” Brazil’s
approach also stresses the importance of working within the principles and practices of South–South cooperation “as it enhances general interchange;
generates, disseminates and applies technical knowledge; builds human resource capacity; and, mainly, strengthens institutions in all nations involved”
(Brazilian Cooperation Agency, n.d.).

What does this mean in practice for international sustainable development? The emphasis is less on the traditional or established idea of “foreign aid,” a term
and practice believed by the brics and other emerging economies to carry connotations of an unequal relationship based on donors and recipients (see Chapter
9). This is particularly salient for these economies because they are, in various ways, recipients of aid as well as contributors. Their approach, therefore, is to
move away from the “donor–recipient” aid relationship to form development “partnerships.” It also means that while humanitarian assistance and welfare
“aid” are still components of their relationships with developing countries, the substantial weight is on capacity-building for self-help through infrastructural
investment and project work, knowledge and skills transfers through partnerships, and self-development.

The Principle of Non-intervention

A core brics principle is non-intervention in the domestic affairs of their partners, retaining the values of mutuality and equality of relations. This principle, of
course, is highly controversial and is a focus of pointed criticism from the established, “traditional” Western donors and institutions, which emphasize making
assistance contingent on a list of domestic reforms. The principle has a long history, however, including the famous Bandung Conference of newly independent
and non-aligned states that met in 1954, with a prime contributor to the declaration from that conference being Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, who introduced
China’s own Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence into the conference debate and final document, principles that remain part of the political position of China
and many developing countries today. Yet, while the brics countries generally adhere to this principle of non-intervention in their common approach to
international development, it is also a source of differentiation between them, most notably with respect to South Africa and Brazil. The South African
government and the ruling African National Congress place significant importance on human rights and democracy. Brazil, for its part, also identifies democracy
as a key value and principle in international development, as does India. India, Brazil, and South Africa have established their own grouping, ibsa, that makes a
particular point of their shared commitment to democracy.

IMPORTANT CONCEPTS
Box 14.5 BRICS New Development Bank (NDB)

• The ndb is a multilateral development bank operated by the brics states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) with an initial capitalization of
US$50 billion, rising to an eventual US$100 billion.
• The ndb is headquartered in Shanghai, with an Africa Regional Center established in Johannesburg, South Africa.
• The purpose of the ndb is to “mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in brics and other emerging economies and
developing countries.”
 • Each participant country holds an equal number of shares and equal voting rights, and none of the countries will have veto power.

• The brics members state that the ndb is not intended to challenge or replace institutions such as the imf and World Bank but to support and supplement
the work of these organizations. Some observers see the ndb and the same-sized Contingent Reserve Arrangement (cra) as “institutions that aim to
be both competitor and antithesis to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund” (Pizzi 2015).
• India’s K.V. Kamath served as its inaugural president until 2020. His successor, former Brazilian Deputy Economics Minister Marcos Troyjo, was
chosen at the end of May, with his term in office beginning on 7 July 2020.

Growing Multilateralism
The development approach of the respective brics partners shows that they share a number of characteristics, such as regularizing processes of consultation
with partners. Much of this is undertaken on a bilateral basis, but there are signs of growing multilateralism, for example, in the focac and the themes of
“Unlocking Africa’s potential: brics and Africa Cooperation on Infrastructure” and “brics and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and
Industrialization” at meetings between brics and African leaders before and after the fifth brics summit in Durban, respectively.

In addition, the brics members are responding individually to the increased importance of international development by restructuring their international
development bureaucracies. In China, international development has taken time to become absorbed into the political agenda. It has taken hold with extensive
deliberation over what international assistance means and the form it should take, with the establishment of new research and policy centres and with the
publication of the two White Papers on Foreign Aid. India’s growing development cooperation was consolidated through the creation in 2012 of the
Development Partnership Administration (dpa). The dpa, organized in three divisions that cover project appraisal and lines of credit, capacity-building and
disaster relief, and project implementation, reaches out to countries throughout Asia as well as in Africa and Latin America (Government of India, n.d.). South
Africa has a new coordinating agency, the South African Development Partnership Agency (sadpa), under the Department of International Relations and
Cooperation (dirco). dirco has also presented a new foreign service bill to better manage government officials abroad (dirco 2019, 22). Brazil’s commitment to
international development cooperation has been dependent on its domestic politics. The Lula government that was in power between 2003 and 2011 expanded
South-South development cooperation but following governments appear to have retreated from that commitment (Marcondes and Mawdsley 2017). In
particular, current Brazilian President Bolsonaro espouses a nationalistic and commercial rhetoric that may see Brazil retreating further from non-economic
related aspects of cooperation (Kyburz 2018).

Overall, the brics and a number of other emerging economies are making an increasing contribution to international development by providing much-needed
investment, technical know-how, knowledge, and skills, as well as financial and broader economic and political support. To date, their role remains
comparatively small compared to developed economies, but they are catching up rapidly. Many of these economies offer to developing-country partners a
common history of colonial or semi-colonial experiences, relatively recent independence, poverty and inequality, and conflict, while also presenting recent
histories of successful reform, stability, and growth that are attractive to development partners. Adherence to the principle of non-interference is controversial,
particularly with regard to claims of human rights violations in or, as is often alleged, by partner states. However, along with an unwillingness to travel the path
of conditionality for assistance—such as structural reforms, principles of non-interference, equality, and mutuality—and a continuing acceptance of the
importance of a role for the state in promoting development (see Chapter 8), all offer a tantalizing alternative to the established sources of development
assistance (Li et al. 2014).

CRITICAL ISSUES
Box 14.6 COVID-19, China, and Developing Economies
The Chinese government stated that, by 5 May 2020, it had offered covid-19 aid to more than 150 countries and four international organizations (Xinhua
2020a; 2020b). This included personal protective equipment (ppe), innovative monitoring and tracking software, vaccine knowledge-sharing, dispatch of
medical teams, and suspension of debt repayments due from 77 developing countries from 1 May 2020. This was in addition to the Chinese government’s
pledge of US$50 million to the World Health Organization. China’s assistance encountered criticism over sub-standard ppe supplies, question marks over
the expertise of medical personnel sent from China, and claims that China’s aid was driven by strategic and political interest to further its global influence
rather than motivated primarily by humanitarian commitment. The Chinese government’s introduction of a new security law for Hong Kong in late May 2020
served to exacerbate international tensions while diverting attention away from international covid-19 cooperation. The criticisms were rejected firmly by
Chinese officials. What does the covid-19 experience tell us about China’s development? After the problems of the initial local official response, the
nationally driven action of lockdowns of whole cities, transport, and international travel proved effective and has led the government to claim it has shown the
world a new model to global health emergencies.
Conclusion/Summary

Global development has reached a critical turning point. Prior to the onset of the covid-19 pandemic emergency,
there were concerns growing over whether the sdgs could be achieved by 2030. In addition to achieving middle-
income status, several recipient countries are also emerging donors. The emerging economies were widely seen to
be integral to the delivery of the sdgs. However, the slowdown of their economies, particularly that of China and
Brazil, brings up questions of financial viability. The emerging economies as development partners have influenced
changes in the structures, agencies, and processes of global sustainable development and in provision of
development assistance (Gu and Kintano 2018). Recognition of differences in perspectives remains central to
future successful aid cooperation. Western donors and external partners must take these differentiated political
roles into consideration in order to effectively pursue initiatives such as trilateral development cooperation. This
point resonates with the wider themes of development addressed in this book—for example, new thinking and
practice, the role of the private sector and the post-2015 international institutional development architecture, and
the implications of the arrival of these new development actors for development practice. The question of what
kind of development cooperation we are going to see in the future arises. The emerging economies and the new
perspectives, approaches, and institutions they are bringing with them will need to be recognized because they
form an important part of the global partnership. This is particularly pertinent, given the covid-19 pandemic and
its economic and development implications. This chapter has critiqued the growing importance and role of China
and the emerging economies in international development. It has explained the distinctive perspectives and
approaches of these new development actors, the innovations they are introducing, and the key issues and debates
surrounding their expanding involvement. For the student reader, the chapter’s learning outcomes lie in gaining a
greater knowledge and understanding of current development thinking and practice.
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LIST OF KEY TERMS

Belt and Road Initiative (bri)

One Belt, One Road
people-to-people
South–South cooperation
triangular development cooperation
White Paper on Foreign Aid