APIT, SARAH T.

CASE DIGEST IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT (LG)

TOPIC: SEC. 25 -LGC
SEC. 25
Hebron vs Reyes
GR No. L-9124 (1958)

FACTS:

1. Petitioner in this case is the incumbent mayor of Carmona, Cavite while respondent is the
incumbent vice-mayor who assumed the office of the mayor upon the order of the
president. There were administrative charges filed against petitioner.
2. The office of the president undertakes directly the investigation. While the investigation
is ongoing, the president suspended the mayor until the administrative investigation
against him is terminated.
3. The Vice-mayor, respondent of this case Eulalio Reyes assumed the office of the mayor.
Reyes assumed the office of the mayor accordingly. After the termination of the hearings,
and the cases submitted for decision in the office of the president. Knowing that his term
is about to expire, petitioner filed a quo warranto proceedings against respondent.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner- municipal mayor, not be charged with disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines and may be removed or suspended directly by the President of the Philippines?

RULING: NO

Suspension or removal of public officers are always controlled by the particular law
applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitation. There is neither
statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President sweeping authority to remove
municipal officials.

SEC. 2189 provides …

The preventive suspension of a municipal officer shall not be for more than thirty days.
At the expiration of the thirty days, the suspended officer shall be reinstated in office without
prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until their completion, unless the
delay in the decision of the case is due to the fault, neglect, or request of the accused, in which
case the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of the
suspension: Provided, That the suspension of the accused may continue after the expiration of
the thirty days above mentioned in case of conviction until the Secretary of the Interior shall
otherwise direct or the case shall finally be decided by said Secretary.

In the present case, the petitioner was suspended in May 1954. The records of the
investigation by the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite, with the report of the latter, were forwarded to
the Executive Secretary since July 15, 1954. Yet, the administrative decision on the charges
against petitioner was not rendered, either before the filing of the complaint herein, on May 13,
1955, or before the expiration of petitioner's term of office, on December 31, 1955. Manifestly,
petitioner's continued, indefinite suspension cannot be reconciled with the letter and spirit of
aforementioned provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.

Section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII, of the Constitution provides: "The President shall
have control of all the executive department, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision
over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed." Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments
over which he has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by the
law.

The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(C) of the Revised
Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that
exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation by any act or conduct of any person in
the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under
his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the
President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law.
If the provisions of Section 79(C) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed
as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision
over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official
of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the
provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution.
If "general supervision over all local governments is to be construed as the same power
granted to the Department Head in section 79 (C) of the Revised Administrative Code,
then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that
of supervision. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.
If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Such in the import of the provisions of section 79 (C) of the Revised Administrative Code and 37
of Act No. 4007.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over
municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate
complaints made under oath against municipal officer for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption
or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime
involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges
touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused
either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being
the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting
the official integrity of the officer in question."
 Section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision
to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of municipalities.
If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that
vested in the Department Head by section 79(C) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such
additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by section 10(1), Article VII, of the
Constitution
Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an
inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over the supervised party. Hence, the
power of general supervision over local governments should exclude, in the strict sense, the
authority to appoint and remove local officials.
Therefore, we hold that, under the present law, the procedure prescribed in sections 2188
to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, for the suspension and removal of the municipal
officials therein referred to, is mandatory; that, in the absence of a clear and explicit provision to
the contrary, relative particularly to municipal corporations — and none has been cited to us —
said procedure is exclusive; that the executive department of the national government, in the
exercise of its general supervision over local governments, may conduct investigations with a
view to determining whether municipal officials are guilty of acts or omissions warranting the
administrative action referred to in said sections, as a means only to ascertain whether the
provincial governor and the provincial board should take such action; that the Executive may
take appropriate measures to compel the provincial governor and the provincial board to take
said action, if the same is warranted, and they failed to do so; that the provincial governor and
the provincial board may not be deprived by the Executive of the power to exercise the authority
conferred upon them in sections 2188 to 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code; that such
would be the effect of the assumption of those powers by the Executive; that said assumption of
powers would further violate section 2191 of the same code, for the authority therein vested in
the Executive is merely appellate in character; that, said assumption of powers, in the case at
bar, even exceeded those of the Provincial Governor and Provincial Board, in whom original
jurisdiction is vested by said sections 2188 to 2190, for, pursuant thereto, "the preventive
suspension of a municipal officer shall not be for more than 30 days" at the expiration of which
he shall be reinstated, unless the delay in the decision of the case is due to his fault, neglect or
request, or unless he shall have meanwhile been convicted, whereas petitioner herein was
suspended "until the final determination of the proceedings" against him, regardless of the
duration thereof and cause of the delay in its disposition; and that so much of the rule laid down
in Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior (67 Phil., 451) Villena vs. Roque (93 Phil., 363), as may
be inconsistent with the foregoing views, should be deemed, and, are hereby, reversed or
modified accordingly.
 Bito-onon vs Judge Fernandez & Quejano
GR No. 139213 (2001)

FACTS:

1. Bito-onon is the petitioner of the case and Quejano as private respondent are both elected
brgy. Captains. Both run for the position of executive vice-president of LIGA provincial
chapter, an organization composed of brgys. Which has primary purpose of determining
the representation of the Liga to the Sanggunians. Petitioner won the election.
Respondent commenced a post electoral contest in the Board of election supervisors
(BES) against petitioner which yield the same result.
 2. The DILG promulgated memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing for review of
decisions or resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of law. Unsatisfied with the
decision of the BES respondent filed a petition for review the decision of the BES to the
RTC.

3. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the petition alleging that the memorandum Circular
No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions or resolutions of the BES by the regular
courts of law is an ultra vires act and is void for being issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an exercise of
control over the Liga's internal organization. The RTC however denied petitioner’s
motion for dismissal. Hence, this instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with a
prayer of the issuance TRO and writ of injunction by petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s motion for dismissal?

RULING: YES

Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to the
power of general supervision of the President over all local government units which was
delegated to the DILG Secretary by virtue of Administrative Order No. 267 dated February 18,
1992.

The President's power of general supervision over local government units is conferred
upon him by the Constitution. The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior
officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law. “This is
distinguished from the power of control or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter.

On many occasions in the past, this court has had the opportunity to distinguish the power
of supervision from the power of control. In Taule vs. Santos,we held that the Chief Executive
wielded no more authority than that of checking whether a local government or the officers
thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments.

He cannot interfere with local governments provided that the same or its officers act
within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the
power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over
such body. Officers in control lay down the rules in the doing of an act.

If they are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or re-done
by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officers merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does
not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules
are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done to conform to the prescribed rules. He
cannot prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act.
 Does the President's power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga barangay,
which is not a local government unit?

The answer is in affirmative, in Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of
Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an association,
federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either
appointed or elected government officials.

The Local Government Code defines the LIGA ng mga barangay as an organization of all
barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the LIGA in the
Sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay
government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.

The LIGA shall have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political
subdivision levels. The municipal and city chapters of the LIGA shall be composed of the
barangay representatives of the municipal and city barangays respectively. The duly elected
presidents of the component municipal and city chapters shall constitute the provincial chapter or
the metropolitan political subdivision chapter.

The duly elected presidents of highly urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the
Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan political subdivision chapters shall constitute the
National Liga ng mga Barangay.

Having in mind the foregoing principles, we rule that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193
of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES
with the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality.
We agree with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the
petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in
effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the National Liga Board and
adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by
the National Liga Board.

The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of

supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the
LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances,
the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local
government units of such issuances.

To monitor means "to watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the power of
supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to checking whether
the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory
enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local
affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.
 The National Liga ng mga brgy. Et al vs Hon. Paredes
GR No. 130775 (2004)

FACTS:

1. One of the petitioners in the case at bar is Davis, who was proclaimed as the president of
the national LIGA ng mga barangay. The presidency of Davis in the LIGA was contested
by one of the private respondents herein who is Mr. Rayos alleging of certain
irregularities in the election.

2. Rayos filed a quo warranto proceedings against Davis, in such proceeding the DILG
secretary filed an urgent motion that the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG), pursuant to its delegated power of general supervision, be
appointed as the Interim Caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until
such time that the new set of National Liga Officers shall have been duly elected and
assumed office.

3. RTC judge, Hon. Paredes appointed the DILG as the interim caretaker of the affairs of
Liga. The DILG appointed respondent Rayos the president of the LIGA. Hence, this
petition for certiorari by Davis.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not, the LIGA ng mga Barangay is a government organization that is

subject to the DILG Secretary’s power of supervision over local governments as the alter
ego of the President?

2. Whether or not the respondent Judge’s designation of the DILG as interim caretaker of
the Liga has invested the DILG with control over the Liga?

RULING:
 1. As to Whether or not, the LIGA ng mga Barangay is a government organization that
is subject to the DILG Secretary’s power of supervision over local governments as
the alter ego of the President, the answer is YES,

In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga
barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league or union created
by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government
officials.

The Local Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all
barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the
sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay
government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.

The rationale for making the Liga subject to DILG supervision is quite evident, whether
from the perspectives of logic or of practicality. The Liga is an aggroupment of barangays which
are in turn represented therein by their respective punong barangays.

Whether or not, the LIGA ng mga Barangay is a government organization that is subject
to the DILG Secretary’s power of supervision over local governments as the alter ego of
the President?

Representatives of the Liga sit in an ex officio capacity at the municipal, city and
provincial sanggunians. As such, they enjoy all the powers and discharge all the functions of
regular municipal councilors, city councilors or provincial board members, as the case may be.

Thus, the Liga is the vehicle through which the barangay participates in the enactment of
ordinances and formulation of policies at all the legislative local levels higher than the
sangguniang barangay, at the same time serving as the mechanism for the bottom-to-top
approach of development.

2. Whether or not the respondent Judge’s designation of the DILG as interim caretaker of
the Liga has invested the DILG with control over the Liga?

NO, when the respondent judge eventually appointed the DILG as interim caretaker to manage
and administer the affairs of the Liga, she effectively removed the management from the
National Liga Board and vested control of the Liga on the DILG. Even a cursory glance at the
DILG’s prayer for appointment as interim caretaker of the Liga "to manage and administer the
affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of National Liga officers shall have been
duly elected and assumed office" reveals that what the DILG wanted was to take control over
the Liga. Even if said "caretakership" was contemplated to last for a limited time, or only until a
new set of officers assume office, the fact remains that it was a conferment of control in
derogation of the Constitution.

With his Department already appointed as interim caretaker of the Liga, Secretary Barbers
nullified the results of the Liga elections and promulgated DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-
193 dated 11 August 1997, where he laid down the supplemental guidelines for the 1997
synchronized elections of the provincial and metropolitan chapters and for the election of the
national chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay; scheduled dates for the new provincial,
metropolitan and national chapter elections; and appointed respondent Rayos as president
of Liga-Caloocan Chapter.

These acts of the DILG went beyond the sphere of general supervision and constituted
direct interference with the political affairs, not only of the Liga, but more importantly, of
the barangay as an institution. The election of Liga officers is part of the Liga’s internal
organization, for which the latter has already provided guidelines. In succession, the DILG
assumed stewardship and jurisdiction over the Liga affairs, issued supplemental guidelines for
the election, and nullified the effects of the Liga-conducted elections. Clearly, what the DILG
wielded was the power of control which even the President does not have.

Furthermore, the DILG assumed control when it appointed respondent Rayos as president of
the Liga-Caloocan Chapter prior to the newly scheduled general Liga elections, although
petitioner David’s term had not yet expired. The DILG substituted its choice, who was Rayos,
over the choice of majority of the punong barangay of Caloocan, who was the incumbent
President, petitioner David. The latter was elected and had in fact been sitting as an ex-
officio member of the sangguniang panlungsod in accordance with the Liga Constitution and By-
Laws. Yet, the DILG extended the appointment to respondent Rayos although it was aware that
the position was the subject of a quo warranto proceeding instituted by Rayos himself, thereby
preempting the outcome of that case. It was bad enough that the DILG assumed the power of
control, it was worse when it made use of the power with evident bias and partiality.

As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay, the DILG’s authority
over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down
such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace them. In this particular
case, the most that the DILG could do was review the acts of the incumbent officers of
the Liga in the conduct of the elections to determine if they committed any violation of
the Liga’s Constitution and By-laws and its implementing rules. If the National Liga Board and
its officers had violated Liga rules, the DILG should have ordered the Liga to conduct another
election in accordance with the Liga’s own rules, but not in obeisance to DILG-dictated
guidelines. Neither had the DILG the authority to remove the incumbent officers of the Liga and
replace them, even temporarily, with unelected Liga officers.

Like the local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the
Chief Executive or his alter ego.

Topic: Sec. 26& 27

Boracay Foundation vs Province of Aklan

GR No. 196870 (2012)
FACTS:
 1. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of respondent Province approved a resolution, formally
authorizing Governor Marquez to enter into negotiations towards the possibility of
effecting self-liquidating and income-producing development and livelihood projects to
be financed through bonds, debentures, securities, collaterals, notes or other obligations
as provided under Section 299 of the Local Government Code, with the following priority
projects: (a) renovation/rehabilitation of the Caticlan/Cagban Passenger Terminal
Buildings and Jetty Ports; and (b) reclamation of a portion of Caticlan foreshore for
commercial purposes.

2. Boracay island comprises the barangays of Manoc-manoc, Balabag, and Yapak, all
within the municipality of Malay, in the province of Aklan declared as Tourist zone and
marine reserve in 1973 by PP1801.

3. On May 7, 2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of respondent Province issued

Resolution No. 2009–110, which authorized Governor Marquez to file an application to
reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan with respondent
PRA. Thereafter, Governor Marquez submitted an Environmental Performance Report
and Monitoring Program (EPRMP) to DENR-EMB RVI, which he had attached to his
letter dated September 19, 2009, as an initial step for securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC).

4. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan enacted Resolution No. 2009-299 authorizing Governor

Marquez to enter into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with respondent PRA in the
implementation of the Beach Zone Restoration and Protection Marina Development
Project, which shall reclaim a total of 40 hectares in the areas adjacent to the jetty ports at
Barangay Caticlan and Barangay Manoc-manoc. DENR-EMB RVI issued to respondent
Province ECC-R6-1003-096-7100 (the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of the Reclamation
Project to the extent of 2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the
existing jetty port.

5. Respondent Province deemed it necessary to conduct a series of what it calls

"information-education campaigns," which provided the venue for interaction and
dialogue with the public, particularly the Barangay and Municipal officials of the
Municipality of Malay, the residents of Barangay Caticlan and Boracay,

6. Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the
Writ of Continuing Mandamus against respondents Province of Aklan, DENR and PRA.
On June 7, 2011, this Court issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
and ordered the respondents to file their respective comments to the petition

ISSUE: Whether or not there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the
project?

RULING: NO.
 The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government agencies in
the maintenance of ecological balance, and requires them to secure prior public consultation and
approval of local government units for the projects described therein.

In the case before us, the national agency involved is respondent PRA. Even if the project
proponent is the local government of Aklan, it is respondent PRA which authorized the
reclamation, being the exclusive agency of the government to undertake reclamation nationwide.
Hence, it was necessary for respondent Province to go through respondent PRA and to execute a
MOA, wherein respondent PRA’s authority to reclaim was delegated to respondent Province.
Respondent DENR-EMB RVI, regional office of the DENR, is also a national government
institution which is tasked with the issuance of the ECC that is a prerequisite to projects covered
by environmental laws such as the one at bar.

This project can be classified as a national project that affects the environmental and ecological
balance of local communities, and is covered by the requirements found in the Local
Government Code.

Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. -
It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation
authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may
cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land,
rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local
government units, nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the
goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the community in
terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to
prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.

Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by

government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are
complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That
occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless
appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.

Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects
and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that:
(1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of
non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may
eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects or
programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality
where these will be implemented. Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by the
introduction of lotto in the province of Laguna.

During the oral arguments held on September 13, 2011, it was established that this project as
described above falls under Section 26 because the commercial establishments to be built on
phase 1, as described in the EPRMP quoted above, could cause pollution as it could generate
garbage, sewage, and possible toxic fuel discharge.

(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and
other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural
resources products and of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and
such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes,
or of ecological imbalance; [Section 447 (1)(vi)]

(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of
the municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying land
within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code, enacting
integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan,
subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in
populous centers; and regulating the construction, repair or modification of buildings within said
fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of this Code; [Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]

(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic
services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said
services and facilities providing for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation
of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest
development projects and, subject to existing laws, establishing and providing for the
maintenance, repair and operation of an efficient waterworks system to supply water for the
inhabitants and purifying the source of the water supply; regulating the construction,
maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the purity and
quantity of the water supply of the municipality and, for this purpose, extending the coverage of
appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said water supply and within
one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or
watershed used in connection with the water service; and regulating the consumption, use or
wastage of water." [Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]

Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented: prior consultation with the affected local communities, and prior approval of
the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the
project’s implementation is illegal.

Based on the above, therefore, prior consultations and prior approval are required by law to have
been conducted and secured by the respondent Province. Accordingly, the information
dissemination conducted months after the ECC had already been issued was insufficient to
comply with this requirement under the Local Government Code. Had they been conducted
properly, the prior public consultation should have considered the ecological or environmental
concerns of the stakeholders and studied measures alternative to the project, to avoid or
minimize adverse environmental impact or damage. In fact, respondent Province once tried to
obtain the favorable endorsement of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay, but this was denied by the
latter.

Braga vs Hon. Abaya

GR No. 223076 (2016)

FACTS:
1. Sasa Wharf was pegged for privatization under the PPP scheme in 2011. On April 10,
2015, the DOTC published an invitation to pre-qualify and bid for the Project. On March
15, 2016, the petitioners - all stakeholders from Davao City and Samal, Davao del Norte -
filed this Urgent Petition for a Writ of Continuing Mandamus and/or Writ of Kalikasan.
2. The project is allegedly being carried out without the necessary Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) or Environmental Impact Statements required under
Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1586 and P.D. 1151. And the project also allegedly failed
 to conduct local consultation and to secure prior sanggunian approval as required by the
Local Government Code.

ISSUE: WON the SC should issue the writ of continuing mandamus is warranted in view of
lack of prior consultation?

RULING: NO, the petition is premature.

The IRR of the EIS System simply designates the responsible party as the proponent.
Ordinarily, the proponent is easy to identify - it is the natural or juridical person intending
to implement the project. But who are the proponents in PPP Projects which are a
collaborative effort between the government and the private sector?

Republic Act No. 6957 as amended by R.A. 7718, commonly known as the Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law, identifies the proponent in a PPP project as "the private
sector entity which shall have contractual responsibility for the project"Accordingly,
there is yet no project proponent responsible for the EIS and the ECC until the bidding
process has concluded and the contract has been awarded.

Considering that the Project is still in the bidding stage, the petition or continuing
mandamus to compel the respondents to submit an EIS and secure an ECC is premature.
It is also misplaced because the public respondents DO NOT have the duty to submit the
EIS or secure an ECC.

The LGC requires the lead agency to conduct local consultation and secure the approval
of the concerned sanggunian prior to the implementation of the project.

The issuance of the ECC does not exempt the project from compliance with other
relevant laws. The LGC, in particular, requires the government agency authorizing the
project to conduct local consultation and secure prior consent for ecologically impactful
projects:

Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. -
It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or -controlled
corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of any project or
program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of nonrenewable resources, loss of
crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with
the local government units, nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and
explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the
community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be
undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.

Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be

implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c)
and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is
obtained: Provided, that occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not
be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution.
The duty to consult the concerned local government units and the stakeholders belongs to the
national government agency or GOCC authorizing or involved in the planning and
implementation of the project - not the private sector proponent. In this case, this refers to the
DOTC.

The LGC does not prohibit the agency from acting through a medium such as the project
proponent. In fact, the required consultation under the LGC may overlap with the consultation
prescribed under the EIS System. Both are intended to measure a project's social acceptability
and secure the community's approval before the project's implementation.

However, the agency is responsible for ensuring that: (1) the concerned LGUs and stakeholders
have been thoroughly and truthfully informed of the objectives of the program and its ecological
impact on the community; so that (2) the community, through their sanggunian, can intelligently
give their approval to socially acceptable projects and reject the unacceptable ones. These
requirements must be complied with befor the project is implemented.

But when does implementation begin?

The BOT Law defines the proponent as the private sector entity with the contractual
responsibility over the project. The contract to a project is executed between the concerned
agency and the winning bidder within seven (7) days from the latter's receipt of the notice from
the agency that all conditions stated in the Notice of Award have been complied with.Upon the
signing of the contract, the winning bidder becomes the project proponent. Within another 7 days
from the date of approval or signing of the contract by the head of the Agency, the agency will
isjsue a "Notice to Commence Implementation" to the proponent.[37] Interestingly enough, even
this does not signal the start of the implementation stage.

Upon receipt of the Notice, the proponent is required to prepare detailed engineering designs and
plans based on the prescribed minimum design and performance standards and specifications in
the bid/tender documents.[38] The agency shall review the detailed engineering designs in terms
of its compliance with the prescribed standards and specification the designs are found
acceptable, the agency shall approve them incorporation in the contract to be signed by the
proponent and the agency.[39]

The proponent shall construct the project based on the design and performance standards and
specifications in the detailed engineering design. [40] The signing of the finalized contract
incorporating the detailed engineering design is the reckoning point when implementation can
begin. This is the start of the Construction Stage.

The Sasa Wharf Modernization Project has not yet reached the construction stage. The bidding
process had not even been concluded when ithe present petition was filed. On this account,
the petition is also premature for the purpose of compelling the respondents to comply with
Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC.
The purpose of a writ of continuing mandamus is to compel the respondent to perform his duties
under the law. This remedy is available When any government agency, instrumentality, or
officer unlawfully neglects a Specific legal duty in connection with the enforcement or
violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation, or a right therein, unlawfully excludes
another from the use or enjoyment of such right and :here is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The writ cannot be resorted to when the respondent is not the person obliged to perform the duty
under the law (as is the case under the EIS System) or when the period for the respondent to
perform its legal duty has not yet expired (as is. the case with the consultation requirements of
the LGC). Accordingly, we cannot issue a writ of continuing mandamus.

Carpio vs Executive Secretary

GR No. 96409 (1992)

FACTS:

1. The Congress enacted RA 6975 establishing the Philippine National Police under the
Department of Interior and Local Government. Petition a concerned citizen and a tax
payer questioned the constitutionality of the said act as derogation of the power of the
National Police Commission by limiting its power "to administrative control" over the
Philippine National Police (PNP), thus, "control" remained with the Department
Secretary under whom both the National Police Commission and the PNP were
placed. The petitioner contended that it runs counter with Article XVI, sec. 6 of 1987
Constitution which provides that “the State shall establish and maintain one police force,
which stall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and
controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the
police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act 6975 is unconstitutional?

RULING: NO

The presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over
all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by us, in the
landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, to mean "the power of [the President] to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter." It is said to be at the very "heart of
the meaning of Chief Executive."

"Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency” states that as the President cannot be expected
to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some
of them to his Cabinet members. Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a
single executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law
to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."

The President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the
Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive department."

Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the
reorganized Department of Interior and Local Government is merely an administrative
realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry,
local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created
under the assailed Act, 24 the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national
government.

Such organizational set-up does not detract from the mandate of the Constitution
that the national police force shall be administered and controlled by a national police
commission as at any rate, and in fact, the Act in question adequately provides for
administration and control at the commission level.

Moreover, Petitioner further asserts that in manifest derogation of the power of control
of the NAPOLCOM over the PNP, RA 6975 vested the power to choose the PNP
Provincial Director and the Chiefs of Police in the Governors and Mayors, respectively;
the power of "operational supervision and control" over police units in city and municipal
mayors; in the Civil Service Commission, participation in appointments to the positions
of Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director-General as well as the administration of
qualifying entrance examinations; disciplinary powers over PNP members in the
"People's Law Enforcement Boards" and in city and municipal mayors. Once more, we
find no real controversy upon the foregoing assertions.

It would appear then that by vesting in the local executives the power to choose the officers in
question, the Act went beyond the bounds of the Constitution's intent.

Under the questioned provisions, which read as follows:

D. PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL EXECUTIVES IN THE ADMINISTRATION

OF THE PNP.

Sec. 51. Powers of Local Government Officials over the PNP Units or Forces.
 Governors and mayors shall be deputized as representatives of the Commission in
their respective territorial jurisdictions. As such, the local executives shall
discharge the following functions:

a.) Provincial Governor

The provincial governor shall choose the provincial director from a list of three
(3) eligibles recommended by the PNP Regional Director.

4) City and municipal mayors shall have the following authority over the PNP
units in their respective jurisdictions:

i.) Authority to choose the chief of police from a list of five (5) eligibles
recommended by the Provincial Police Director

The Solicitor General holds that "there is no usurpation of the power of control of the
NAPOLCOM under Section 51 because under this very same provision, it is clear that the local
executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM.As such deputies, they are
answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their functions under that
section. Thus, unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts are valid and binding as
acts of the NAPOLCOM." It is significant to note that the local officials, as NAPOLCOM
representatives, will choose the officers concerned from a list of eligibles (those who meet the
general qualifications for appointment to the PNP) to be recommended by PNP officials.

The same holding is true with respect to the contention on the operational supervision and
control exercised by the local officials. Those officials would simply be acting as representatives
of the Commission.

HISTORY OF PNP

During the Commonwealth period, we had the Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus of
the Philippine Ground Force (PGF), now the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The PC
was made part of the PGF but its administrative, supervisory and directional control was handled
by the then Department of the Interior. After the war, it remained as the "National Police" under
the Department of National Defense, as a major service component of the AFP.

Later, the Integration Act of 1975 created the Integrated National Police (INP) under the Office
of the President, with the PC as the nucleus, and the local police forces as the civilian
components. The PC-INP was headed by the PC Chief who, as concurrent Director-General of
the INP, exercised command functions over the INP.

The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) exercised administrative control and

supervision while the local executives exercised operational supervision and direction over the
INP units assigned within their respective localities.
 The set-up whereby the INP was placed under the command of the military component,
which is the PC, severely eroded the INP's civilian character and the multiplicity in the
governance of the PC-INP resulted in inefficient police service. Moreover, the integration of the
national police forces with the PC also resulted in inequities since the military component had
superior benefits and privileges

The Constitutional Commission of 1986 was fully aware of the structural errors that beset the
system. Thus, Com. Teodulo C. Natividad explained that: The basic tenet of a modern police
organization is to remove it from the military.

PNP NOT INCLUDED IN THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF POWER OF THE

PRESIDENT; ONLY AFP
It thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely gives
muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national police force does not fall under the
Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. This is necessarily so since the police force, not
being integrated with the military, is not a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a
civilian agency of the government, it properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the
President of the power of executive control.

Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers.

It simply provides for the transition period or process during which the national police would
gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under
this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here
state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a
member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-
Chief provision "represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other
functions are clearly civil in nature." 31 His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is
consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that "civilian authority is, at all
times, supreme over the military."
 Andaya vs RTC
GR No. 126661 (1999)

FACTS:

1. Jose Andaya-the petitioner in this case, submitted a list of 5 recommendees to the Mayor
for the appoint in the position of Police City Director. The Mayor did not choose among
the recommendees because the name of P/chief inspector Sarmiento was not included
therein.
2. Due to the refusal of the petitioner to include Sarmiento in the list ,the Mayor of Cebu
City filed a complaint for declaratory relief with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction and temporary restraining order against P/Chief Supt. Jose S. Andaya and
Edgardo L. Inciong, Regional Director, National Police Commission before the RTC.
The RTC ordered Andaya to include Sarmiento in the list of recommendees. Hence,
Andaya appealed to the SC by certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor of Cebu City may require the Regional Director, Regional
Police Command No. 7, to include the mayor's protégé in the list of five (5) eligibles to be
recommended by the Regional Police Director to the mayor from which the mayor shall choose
the City Director, City Police Command (chief of police) City of Cebu.

RULING: NO
The National Police Commission has issued Memorandum Circular No. 95-04, dated
January 12, 1995, for the implementation of Republic Act No. 6975. Republic Act No. 6975,
Section 51, gives authority to the mayor of Cebu City to choose the chief of police from a list of
five (5) eligibles recommended by the Regional Director, Regional Police Command No. 7. It
provides that among the qualifications for chief of police of highly urbanized cities are (1)
completion of the Officers' Senior Executive Course (OSEC) and (2) holding the rank of Police
Superintendent. The mayor of Cebu City submits that Memorandum Circular No. 95-04 of the
National Police Commission prescribing such additional qualifications is not valid as it
contravenes the law.

Under Republic Act No. 6975, Section 51, the mayor of Cebu City shall be deputized as
representative of the Commission (National Police Commission) in his territorial jurisdiction and
as such the mayor shall have authority to choose the chief of police from a list of five (5)
eligibles recommended by the Police Regional Director. The City Police Station of Cebu City is
under the direct command and control of the PNP Regional Director, Regional Police Command
No. 7, and is equivalent to a provincial office.
Then, the Regional Director, Regional Police Command No. 7 appoints the officer
selected by the mayor as the City Director, City Police Command (chief of police) Cebu City. It
is the prerogative of the Regional Police Director to name the five (5) eligibles from a pool of
eligible officers screened by the Senior Officers Promotion and Selection Board, Headquarters,
Philippine National Police, Camp Crame, Quezon City, without interference from local
executives.
In case of disagreement between the Regional Police Director and the Mayor, the
question shall be elevated to the Regional Director, National Police Commission, who shall
resolve the issue within five (5) working days from receipt and whose decision on the choice of
the Chief of Police shall be final and executory. As deputy of the Commission, the authority of
the mayor is very limited. In reality, he has no power of appointment; he has only the limited
power of selecting one from among the list of five eligibles to be named the chief of police.
Actually, the power to appoint the chief of police of Cebu City is vested in the Regional
Director, Regional Police Command No. 7. Much less may the mayor require the Regional
Director, Regional Police Command, to include the name of any officer, no matter how qualified,
in the list of five to be submitted to the mayor. The purpose is to enhance police professionalism
and to isolate the police service from political domination.
The trial court erred in granting preliminary injunction that effectively restrained the
Regional Director, Regional Police Command, Region 7, from performing his statutory function.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 18, 1996, is contrary to law and thus void.
Similarly, the lower court's decision sustaining the City Mayor's position suffers from the same
legal infirmity.

Frivaldo vs COMELEC
GR No. 120295 (1996)

FACTS:

1. Frivaldo filed his COC for governor of Sorsogon. Lee petitioned the COMELEC for the
disqualification of Frivaldo alleging that he is not qualified due to lack of citizenship
requirement upon filing his COC. The COMELEC left the petition unacted, and so the
election push thru and Frivaldo garnered the most votes while Lee as the second highest.
2. Lee filed a petition in the COMELEC for his proclamation as the governor of Sorsogon.
The COMELEC granted the petition. Frivaldo comes to the COMELEC that he has
already taken an oath of allegiance to the Philippines and has regained his citizenship by
repatriation under PD725, and Frivaldo likewise sought his proclamation as the governor
of the province of Sorsogon. The COMELEC proclaimed Frivaldo as the governor.
3. Lee’s MR was denied by the COMELEC and so Lee appealed to the SC alleging that the
citizen requirement is a continuing requirement that must be possessed at the time of
filing the candidacy.

ISSUE: WON Frivaldo lack the citizen requirement to qualify for the office of governor of
Sorsogon?

RULING: NO.

Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be: a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election; able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. In
addition, "candidates for the position of governor must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age
on election day.

From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time
when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of
at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty
three years of age on election day).

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public

office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no
alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country
or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only
upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin.

Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day the term of
office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified to be
proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of
said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is
the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications
consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as
distinguished from liberal) construction.

Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE

OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the time of
election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally,
such qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence
-- should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the
time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this
Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship
requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e.,
persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but
instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.

But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument to
the effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for
that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring
the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered
voter". And, under the law a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo
could not have been a voter -- much less a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the
time of such registration.

The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the
law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the
requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE
qualification. The law abhors a redundancy.

It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification

distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands
to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from
"citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered
as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected."

It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to
be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration not the actual
voting is the core of this "qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second
requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to
govern -- and not anywhere else.

Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized and Lee has not disputed that he
"was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as
valid by judicial declaration. In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995.

His counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter
of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his
eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he
was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8, 1995."

It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.

There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date
of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code gives any voter, presumably including the
defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a
candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest
before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications
enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be
availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at
such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And
since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo
was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon
of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably
garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such oath had
already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer
ineligible.

To remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of
Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
 Under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the
statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or
private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by
reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They
operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo, on
the other hand, says that curative statutes are
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations (and)
are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils . By
their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to correct
errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise
ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."

On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes
of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance
of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of
a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.

A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a
new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly
recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of
repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and
who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino
woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenshi ." because "such provision of the
new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said
constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women -- the right to re-
acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to
P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of
other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former
Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but
with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the
simplified procedure of repatriation.

The Solicitor General44 argues:

By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA
342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing
laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and
curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
 In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing
naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are
allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the
difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship by naturalization.

Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal
aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and
curative.

In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that
the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective
operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly
appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof. It is obvious to the
Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not
otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that
citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of
abode, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the
Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be
given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed
as to make it effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the
statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied
although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right
or violate some constitutional guaranty."46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not
specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.

At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit
Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino
citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August
17, 1994?

While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American
citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive
effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be
deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason
for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law
should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came
into being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling
them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such
legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more
reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and
transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his
application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show
a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage
or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to
his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual
obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.

Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now
be deemed mooted by his repatriation.

Case No. 2

GR No. 86564 (1989)

Labo vs COMELEC

FACTS:
Labo run for the position of Mayor in Baguio City. It was Labo who garnered the most
votes during the election. But After Labo is proclaimed as the winner, a petition for quo warranto
was filed in the COMELEC against him by his rival in the position who gained the second
highest vote during the election, Lardizabal, alleging that Labo lack the citizenship requirement.
Before the COMELEC can act upon the petition, Labo sought from the SC to enjoin the
COMELEC to inquire into his citizenship contending that said petition for quo warranto was
filed beyond the reglemetary period provided in the Election omnibus code. As Sec. 253 of
omnibus election code provides that petition for quo warranto is filed within 10 days after the
proclamation of the result of the election. Labo was proclaimed on January 20,1988. The petition
for quo warranto was filed on January 26, 1988. But the docket fees paid was paid only on Feb.
10, 1988. And as such the petition was only deemed filed on Feb. 10, 1988 which is outside the
reglementary period for filing a quo warranto proceedings.
ISSUE: WON the petition for quo warranto is dismissable in view of it being untimely filed?

RULING: NO.
The requirement of citizenship as a qualification for public office can be so demeaned.
What is worse is that it is regarded as an even less important consideration than the reglementary
period the petitioner insists upon.

The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should not
frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous
majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead over the second-placer was
only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that locality could not have, even
unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution.
The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of
Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege
over their countrymen.

The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief
that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot
nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost
but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was
disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.

AS TO THE PETITIONER OF QUO WARRANTO

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio city.

It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental Idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election.

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to
vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in
the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as
stray, void or meaningless.

GR No. 137329 (2000)

Torayno vs COMELEC

FACTS:

Emano is served 3 terms as Governor of Misamis Oriental. On his 3 rd term Emano resided
for 2 yrs and 5 months in Cagayan De Oro City. After his term, he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Cagayan De Oro City. Torayno, a
resident of Cagayan De Oro filed a petition for disqualification of Emano in the COMELEC due
to lack of 1 yr. residency requirement. Toryano alleged that Emano’s service of 3 terms as
governor of Misamis bolsters the fact that he has not satisfied the 1 yr. residency requirement to
run as mayor of Cagayan De Oro City. The COMELEC left the petition unacted. And so, the
election pushed thru and Emano won the election. After his proclamation, Torayno commenced a
petition for quo warranto against Emano. The COMELEC denied the petition. And so, Torayno
elevated his case to the SC.

ISSUE: whether private respondent had duly established his residence in Cagayan de Oro City
at least one year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections to qualify him to run for the mayorship
thereof?

RULING: YES
The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is Section 39 of the Local Government Code
(LGC) of 1991, which provides for the qualifications of local elective officials, as follows: "SEC.
39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."

Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which
they seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a
"stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter from [seeking] an elective office to serve that community." 19 Such
provision is aimed at excluding outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable circumstances
existing in that community for electoral gain." 20 Establishing residence in a community merely to
meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the
assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. This purpose
is "best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or
who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice.

In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and his family had actually been
residing in Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in
1973. Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis
Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the seat of the provincial government was
located. In June 1997, he also registered as voter of the same city. Based on our ruling
in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan
de Oro City for a period of time sufficient to qualify him to run for public office therein.
Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of Emano in his choice of
residence.

We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire that officials of districts or
localities be acquainted not only with the metes and bounds of their constituencies but, more
important, with the constituents themselves -- their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for
growth and development, and all matters vital to their common welfare. The requisite period
would give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with their desired constituencies, and
likewise for the electorate to evaluate the former's qualifications and fitness for the offices they
seek.

In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of herein private respondent in
Cagayan de Oro City is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of
mayor and for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners' very
legalistic, academic and technical approach to the residence requirement does not satisfy this
simple, practical and common-sense rationale for the residence requirement.

ON THE ISSUE OF LOCUS STANDI: PETITIONER IS MERE CITIZEN

Under the Rules of Court, a quo warranto may be brought only by (1) the solicitor
general or (2) a public prosecutor or (3) a person claiming to be entitled to the public office or
position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. 9 A reading of the Rules shows that
petitioners, none of whom qualify under any of the above three categories, are without legal
standing to bring this suit.
However, the present Petition finds its root in two separate cases filed before the Comelec: (1)
SPC 98-298 for disqualification and (2) EPC 98-62 for quo warranto. Under our election laws
and the Comelec Rules of Procedure, any voter may file a petition to disqualify a candidate on
grounds provided by law,10 or to contest the election of a city officer on the ground of
ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic.11 The petitioners herein, being "duly-registered voters"
of Cagayan de Oro City, therefore satisfy the requirement of said laws and rules.
 GR No. 151914 (2002)
Coquilla vs COMELEC

FACTS:

Coquilla was born and grew up in Oras, Samar until he left the county and went to US
and serve marines. Coquilla became a permanent resident of US. During his stay on US, Coquilla
used to visit Philippines for vacation. When he came back to the Philippines he filed his
candidacy for Mayor of Oras, Samar. His rival for the position filed a petiton to the COMELEC
for the cancellation of his COC alleging that Coquilla has not satisfied the 1 yr residency
requirement and that Conquilla made a misrepresentation on his COC making it appear that he is
residing in Oras, Samar for 2 yrs when his stay on the place is in just 6 months. The petition was
belatedly acted by the COMELEC, the election pushed thru and Coquilla garnered most of the
votes. After Coquilla toke oath of his office, COMELEC rendered a decision on the petition
previously filed cancelling the COC of Conquilla. Hence, this petition for certiorari to the SC
assailing the order of the COMELEC cancelling his COC.

ISSUE: WON petitioner Coquilla is a resident of Oras, Samar 1 yr. before the election?

RULING: NO

whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the
elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy. We find that he
had not.

First, §39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:

Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a

registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
any other local language or dialect. (Emphasis added)

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to

"dwelling" or "habitation,"21 but rather to "domicile" or legal residence,22 that is, "the place
where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."23 A
domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s
parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile
(domicile of choice).24

In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen
after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he
reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the
Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a
resident alien.

Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title
8, §1427(a) of the United States Code provides:

Requirements of naturalization. – Residence

(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless
such applicant, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his application for
naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five years
immediately preceding the date of filing his petition has been physically present therein
for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided within the State or
within the district of the Service in the United States in which the applicant filed the
application for at least three months, (2) has resided continuously within the United
States from the date of the application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3)
during all the period referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good
moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and
well-disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.

In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a
"greencard," which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment
of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country
result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.

Nor can petitioner contend that he was "compelled to adopt American citizenship" only by
reason of his service in the U.S. armed forces. It is noteworthy that petitioner was repatriated not
under R.A. No. 2630, which applies to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine
citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, but under R.A.
No. 8171, which, as earlier mentioned, provides for the repatriation of, among others, natural-
born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. In any
event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad , he lost his Philippine citizenship
and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on
November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.

Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country in
1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a
Community Tax Certificate in that year and by "constantly declaring" to his townmates of his
intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. The status of
being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the status
of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires
Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under §13 of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus
waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by
naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case he waives
not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.

In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioner’s status when he entered the country on
October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the statement
"Philippine Immigration [–] Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on
August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the added inscription "good for one year stay." Under §2 of R.A.
No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes a former
Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the
Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a "visa-free entry to the Philippines for a
period of one (1) year" (§3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on
the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for
one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a
non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines
under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras,
Eastern, Samar.

Petitioner invokes the ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections in support of his contention
that the residency requirement in §39(a) of the Local Government Code includes the residency of
one who is not a citizen of the Philippines. Residency, however, was not an issue in that case and
this Court did not make any ruling on the issue now at bar. The question in Frivaldo was
whether petitioner, who took his oath of repatriation on the same day that his term as governor of
Sorsogon began on June 30, 1995, complied with the citizenship requirement under §39(a). It
was held that he had, because citizenship may be possessed even on the day the candidate
assumes office. But in the case of residency, as already noted, §39(a) of the Local Government
Code requires that the candidate must have been a resident of the municipality "for at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election."

Nor can petitioner invoke this Court’s ruling in Bengzon III v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. What the Court held in that case was that, upon repatriation, a former
natural-born Filipino is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen.

Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar
in January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because §117 of the Omnibus
Election Code requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and
in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election. As held in Nuval v. Guray however, registration as a voter does not bar
the filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidate’s lack of residency.
 Papandayan Jr. vs COMELEC
GR No. 147909 (2002)

FACTS:

1. In the May 14, 2001 elections, three candidates ran for the position of mayor of Tubaran,
Lanao del Sur, namely: petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan, Jr., respondent Fahida P. Balt,
 who was the incumbent mayor seeking reelection, and Maiko Hassan Bantuas.
Respondent Balt sought the disqualification of petitioner in SPC Case No. 01-114 of the
COMELEC, alleging that petitioner was not a resident of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran,
Lanao del Sur but a permanent resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.
2. The COMELEC (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-114 declared petitioner to be
disqualified and ordered his name to be stricken off the list of candidates and all votes
cast in his favor not to be counted but considered as stray votes
3. On May 14, 2001, elections were held in Tubaran. Petitioner was among those voted by
the electorate for the position of municipal mayor. On May 15, 2001, he received a
telegram from the COMELEC notifying him of the resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the
COMELEC en banc which denied his motion for reconsideration. On May 17, 2001, he
filed the present petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to annul the resolution, of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), disqualifying petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan,
Jr. as a candidate for municipal mayor of the Municipality of Tubaran, Province of Lanao
del Sur.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the name of the
petitioner stricken off the list of candidates for mayor of Tubaran?

RULING: YES.
With due regard for the expertise of the COMELEC, we find the evidence to be
insufficient to sustain its resolution. We agree with the Solicitor General, to the contrary, that
petitioner has duly proven that, although he was formerly a resident of the Municipality of
Bayang, he later transferred residence to Tangcal in the Municipality of Tubaran as shown by his
actual and physical presence therein for 10 years prior to the May 14, 2001 elections.

Section 39 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides:

Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a

registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panglungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
any other language or dialect.

Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in resolving the issue of whether or
not a candidate has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions. The principle
of animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an "intention to return"
to the place where he seeks to be elected. Corollary to this is a determination whether there has
been an "abandonment" of his former residence which signifies an intention to depart therefrom.
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the
Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan on the ground that respondent’s immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted
an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder,
which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the
absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988,
respondent was held to be disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).

In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the 2nd District of Northern Samar. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld his election against claims that he was not a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.

In sustaining the ruling of the HRET, this Court, citing Faypon v. Quirino applied the
concept of animus revertendi or "intent to return," stating that his absence from his residence in
order to pursue studies or practice his profession as a certified public accountant in Manila or his
registration as a voter other than in the place where he was elected did not constitute loss of
residence. The fact that respondent made periodical journeys to his home province in Laoang
revealed that he always had animus revertendi.

In Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larrazabal v. Commission on Elections, it was

explained that the determination of a person’s legal residence or domicile largely depends upon
the intention that may be inferred from his acts, activities, and utterances. In that case, petitioner
Adelina Larrazabal, who had obtained the highest number of votes in the local elections of
February 1, 1988 and who had thus been proclaimed as the duly elected governor, was
disqualified by the COMELEC for lack of residence and registration qualifications, not being a
resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte.

The COMELEC ruled that the attempt of petitioner Larrazabal to change her residence
one year before the election by registering at Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to run for the
position of governor of the province of Leyte was proof that she considered herself a resident of
Ormoc City. This Court affirmed the ruling of the COMELEC and held that petitioner Larrazabal
had established her residence in Ormoc City, not in Kananga, Leyte, from 1975 up to the time
that she ran for the position of Provincial Governor of Leyte on February 1, 1988. There was no
evidence to show that she and her husband maintained separate residences, i.e., she at Kananga,
Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City. The fact that she occasionally visited Kananga, Leyte
through the years did not signify an intention to continue her residence after leaving that place.

In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, the Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are
synonymous. The term "residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that p place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In that case, petitioner Philip G.
Romualdez established his residence during the early 1980’s in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

It was held that the sudden departure from the country of petitioner, because of the EDSA
People’s Power Revolution of 1986, to go into self-exile in the United States until favorable
conditions had been established, was not voluntary so as to constitute an abandonment of
residence. The Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must
concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there,
and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for
an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

The record shows that when petitioner and his wife Raida Guina Dimaporo got married in 1990,
they resided in Tangcal, Tubaran. From then on, there was manifest intention on the part of
petitioner to reside in Tubaran, which he deemed to be the place of his conjugal abode with his
wife.

The fact that he and his wife transferred residence from Bayang to Tubaran shows that petitioner
was relinquishing his former place of residence in Bayang and that he intended Tubaran to be his
place of domicile. Although petitioner worked as a private secretary of the mayor of Bayang, he
went home to Tubaran everyday after work. This is proof of animus manendi.

Further, the evidence shows that in the May 11, 1998 election, petitioner was registered as a
voter in Tubaran and that in fact he filed his certificate of candidacy although he later withdrew
the same. In the May 8, 1999 registration of voters, he was again registered as a voter in Precinct
No. 28-A of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran.

In addition, the following bolster petitioners’ claim that since 1990 he has been a resident of
Tubaran: (a) the continuous verification of household members in Tubaran conducted by the
election officer showed that petitioner and his wife were members of household No. 13 in
Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran; (b) petitioner co-owned an agricultural land in Tubaran; and (c)
Hadji Bashir Ayonga and Samoranao Sarip retracted their previous affidavits which they had
earlier executed and said that they did not understand the contents thereof and did not know that
the affidavits would be used in a disqualification case against petitioner.

Indeed, it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the Constitution’s residency qualification requirement.
 Jalover vs Osmeña
GR No. 209286 (2014)

FACTS:

1. Osmeña filed his COC for the position of mayor in Toledo City, petitioner in this case
Jalover, filed a petition for disqualification against Osmeña for making
misrepresentations in his COC as Osmena lacked the residency requirement.
2. Petitioner alleged in his petition that Osmena lacked the residency requirement as he does
not have realty in Toledo and he is rarely seen in Toledo.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
COMELEC division dismissed the petition for disqualification – residency requirement
satisfied
COMELEC en banc -Not required to build a house, rented is enough to build establish
domicile
Petition for certiorari to SC – dismissed the petition

ISSUE: WON Osmeña lack the residency qualification?

RULING: NO
MATERIAL FACT CONCEALED OR MISREPRESENTED
The false representation that these provisions mention pertains to a material fact, not to a mere
innocuous mistake. This is emphasized by the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate
who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he
or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. Obviously, these facts are those that
refer to a candidate’s qualifications for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and
residence

ACCOMPANIED BY AN INTENTION TO DECEIVE

Separate from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must
consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be made with the intention to deceive the
electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for public office.

RESIDENCE
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with
conduct indicative of this intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but
also a declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode.

As the COMELEC aptly found, Osmeña had sufficiently established by substantial evidence his
residence in Toledo City, Cebu. As early as April 24, 2006, Osmeña applied for the transfer of
his voter’s registration record to Toledo City, which was granted on April 24, 2012.70 Osmeña
likewise purchased a parcel of land in Ibo, Toledo City in 1995 and commenced the construction
of an improvement, which would eventually serve as his residence since 2004. Osmeña even
acquired another parcel of land in Das, Toledo City in December 2011 and transferred his
headquarters to Poblacion and Bato, Toledo City as early as 2011. The existence of Osmeña’s
headquarters in Bato, Toledo City, was even confirmed by the Mr. Orlando PamaCasia, witness
for the petitioners. Finally, Osmeña has always maintained profound political and socio-civic
linkages in Toledo City—a fact that the petitioners never disputed.

The petitioners, in the present case, largely rely on statements that Osmeña was "hardly seen" in
Toledo City, Cebu to support their claim of error of jurisdiction. These affidavits, however,
deserve little consideration and loudly speak of their inherent weakness as evidence.

The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days
a week, tofulfill the residency requirement. In Fernandez v. House Electoral Tribunal, 77 we ruled
that the "fact that a few barangay health workers attested that they had failed to see petitioner
whenever they allegedly made the rounds in Villa de Toledo is of no moment, especially
considering thatthere were witnesses (including petitioner's neighbors in Villa de Toledo) that
were in turn presented by petitioner to prove that he was actually a resident of Villa de Toledo, in
the address he stated in his COC. x x x It may be that whenever these health workers do their
rounds petitioner was out of the house to attend to his own employment or business."

Under the circumstances, the evidence submitted by the petitioners do not conclusively prove
that Osmeña did not in fact reside in Toledo City for at least the year before election day; most
especially since the sworn statements of some Toledo City residents attesting that they never saw
Osmeña inToledo City were controverted by similar sworn statements by other ToledoCity
residents who claimed that Osmeña resided in Toledo City.

Similarly, the fact that Osmeña has no registered property under his name does not belie his
actual residence in Toledo City because property ownership is not among the qualifications
required of candidates for local election. It is enough that he should livein the locality, even in a
rented house or that of a friend or relative. To use ownership of property in the district as the
determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can
establish compliance with the residency requirement. In Perez v. COMELEC, we sustained the
COMELEC when it considered as evidence tending to establish a candidate’s domicile of choice
the mere lease (rather than ownership) of an apartment by a candidate in the same province
where he ran for the position of governor.

Nonetheless, we wish to remind that COC defects beyond matters of form and that involve
material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC mandatory
requirements before elections are considered merely directory after the people shall have spoken.
Where a material COC misrepresentation under of this made, thereby violating both our election
and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the
Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of
elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the
other, we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the electorate’s will.

In the instant case, with the conclusion that Osmeña did not commit any material
misrepresentation in his COC, we see no reason in this case to appeal to the primacy of the
electorate’s will. Wecannot deny, however, that the people of Toledo City have spoken in an
election where residency qualification had been squarely raised and their voice has erased any
doubt about their verdict on Osmeña’s qualifications.
 Matugas vs COMELEC
GR No. 151944 (2004)

FACTS:

On 28 February 28 2001, Private Respondent Robert Lyndon Barbers filed his certificate of
candidacy as governor of Surigao del Norte for 2001 elections. Petitioner Ernesto T. Matugas,
who is also a candidate for governor, filed with COMELEC a Petition to Disqualify Barbers as
candidate.

His main contention is that Barbers is not a Filipino citizen. To support his claim, Matugas
presented the following documents:

1. Photocopy of a letter-request of a certain Jesus Agana, a “confidential agent” of the

Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), addressed to one George Clarke, purportedly of
the United States Embassy regarding the US citizenship of Barbers;
2. A notation on the letter request allegedly made by George Clarke, stating that Barbers
was naturalized on 11 October 1991;
3. Photocopy of a Certification from the BID containing Barbers' travel records and
indicating in some documents that he is American;
4. Certification from the Office of the Solicitor General's Special Committee on
Naturalization stating that there is no pending petition by, or grant of repatriation to, Barbers.
Meanwhile, Barbers won the gubernatorial race on 17 May 2001. Matugas then filed a Motion
for Suspension/Annulment of Proclamation of Barbers. However, Barbers was proclaimed the
duly elected governor of Surigao del Norte on 28 May 2001.

COMELEC then dismissed the Petition to Disqualify. It found “little or no probative value” in
the notation of George Clarke to Agana’s letter-request.While noting that the BID certification
involving the travel records of Barbers stated that he was an American, it held that there is no
other independent evidence to justify Matugas's claim that Barbers has renounced his allegiance
to the Philippines.

Matugas filed a Motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Supreme Court, and presented the following additional documents:

1. Photocopy of a document purportedly coming from the US Dirstrict Court of California

showing the Naturalization of Barbers signed by its Deputy Clerk;
2. Photocopy of a purported Authentication attached to the previous document coming from
the Philippine Consul in Los Angeles, California stating the following: "The annexed document
is an Information of Naturalization Re: Robert Lyndon Barbers executed by United States
District Court, Central District of California."
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Admit Original
Documents, appending the originals of the above documents.

Issue: W/N Barbers should have been disqualified.

Ruling: No.

One who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Matugas did not overcome his burden of
presenting substantial evidence with the documents he presented.

For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private. Public
documents include the written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country. The record of such public documents may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record.

If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the attested copy should be accompanied by a
certificate that such officer has custody thereof. Said certificate may be made by a secretary of
the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.

The grant of United States citizenship by naturalization is an official act of the United States.
The document containing the record of this act is a public document, so this document can only
be evidenced by its official publication or a copy duly attested by the officer having legal
custody thereof.

The George Clarke's notation in the letter-request of Jesus Agana is neither an official
publication of the document that contains the record of private respondent’s naturalization, nor a
copy attested by the officer who has legal custody of the record. Matugas also did not show if
Clarke is the officer charged with the custody of such record.

Furthermore, Matugas only presented photocopies of the letter-request and notation, as well as
the BID certification, in contravention of the above-cited rule.

In any case, the BID certification contains inconsistent entries regarding the “nationality” of
Barbers. While some entries indicate that he is “American,” other entries state that he is
“Filipino.”

The new documents presented in the Petition for Certiorari cannot also be admitted in evidence.
In this case, the Authentication executed the Philippine Consul in Los Angeles does not state that
the Deputy Clerk who signed the document has the custody of the document being authenticated.

Lastly, the Petitioner's calls to consider alleged new evidence not presented before the
COMELEC is clearly beyond the the Supreme Courts’ certiorari powers. Doing so would be
tantamount to holding a new investigation.

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and it cannot be asked to substitute its own judgment
and discretion for that of the COMELEC.

The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question may not be raised for the first time on
appeal,and documents forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court will not be
considered in disposing of the issues of an action. Piecemeal presentation of evidence is simply
not in accord with orderly justice.

The same rules apply with greater force in certiorari proceedings. It would be absurd to hold
COMELEC guilty of grave abuse of discretion for not considering evidence not presented before
it. The patent unfairness of Matugas’s plea militates against the admission and consideration of
the subject documents.

Caballero vs COMELEC
GR No. 209835 (2015)

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr.were both candidates for the
mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013
elections.
Private respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy
alleging that the latter made a false representation when he declared in his COC that he was
eligible to run for Mayor despite being a Canadian citizen and a nonresident thereof.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC he took an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on and
became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to

Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation

before a Notary Public in Batanes on 2012.
On 2013 COMELEC issued a Resolution finding that petitioner made a material
misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu within
one year prior to the election.
It found that while petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had taken
his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and had validly renounced his Canadian citizenship, he
failed to comply with the other requirements provided under RA No. 9225 for those seeking
elective office, i.e., persons who renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply with the
one year residency requirement provided for under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.
Elections were subsequently held and petitioner won over private respondent was proclaimed
Mayor.Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC canceling his COC.
Private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation.COMELEC En Banc denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution. Private respondent took
his Oath of Office claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile.
He was born and baptized in Uyugan.He was a registered voter and had exercised his right of
suffrage and even built his house therein. He also contends that he usually comes back to
Uyugan. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling his
COC.

Issues:
Whether or not petitioner had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1) year
before the elections held on May 13, 2013 as he represented in his COC. What is the effect of
petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or
domicile?
Ruling:
We are not persuaded .RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can
re-acquire or... retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law.
The law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino.
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.
Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign
citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of
which he is also a citizen.
However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public office,
residency in the Philippines becomes material. The Government Code requires that the candidate
must be a resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately
preceding the election day.
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it
could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in
Canada and became a Canadian citizen. Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent
resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship.
Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his
domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from
work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.
[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no
automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile.
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not
automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after
becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as
his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time, he made it as such.
Petitioner failed to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period
of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections the period from September 13,
2012 to May 12, 2013 was even less than the one-year residency required by law.
We concluded that material representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for
elective office, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification
necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code.
Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible.
We, therefore, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in canceling
petitioner's COC for material misrepresentation.