Unraveling

Unraveling mechanisms underlying gender roles in
agricultural households
A structural analysis of peasants’ behavior in Burundi
ii
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FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS

500500
iii
Jesse Willem d’An

r0600
Thesis submitted to obt

the degree of Doctum Colloquium/MA
Doctum colloquium/MA
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Promotor: Bart Cap
Academic year: 2014-2
300370300370
Contents
Preface vii
Abstract ix
1 Introduction 1
2 Theory 7
2.1 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Public production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Collective objective function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 Solving the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 Data 15
4 Estimation strategy 21
4.1 Step 1: Public production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2 Step 2: Private consumption and leisure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.3 Step 3: The sharing rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5 Results 27
5.1 Public production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.1.1 Children well-being (k) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.1.2 Public facilities (p) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.2 Private consumption and leisure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.3 The sharing rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.4 Interpretation gender roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6 Conclusion 43
Bibliography 47
Appendix 51
A.1 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
v
Preface
Twelve months ago I transferred from the Université Libre de Bruxelles to the KU
Leuven to start a new PhD with Prof. Frederic Vermeulen on the subject of collective
models of household behavior. One of the requirements however was to write a
publishable article as a thesis, which turned out to be easier said than done. Although
the data collection process started already in 2012 with a small group of academics,
one of whom was my promotor Bart Capéau, the goal set in the beginning proved to be
a long battle, which I had not foreseen. This article is the report of this long process.
Nevertheless, in my opinion, it hardly reflects the effort put into it, collecting data in
the field, cleaning the data, endlessly programming and re-programming the model,
attempts to estimate it, the hope for good results and the sadness and tiredness with
each failed attempt. Still, I am proud to present this thesis, to show that most of the
challenges have been overcome, and to defend the story this thesis aims to tell.
This thesis is ultimately based on the model and parametric specification as put
forward by Prof. Laurens Cherchye, Prof. Bram De Rock, and Prof. Frederic
Vermeulen (2012). Furthermore, the simplified estimation procedure used in this thesis
was suggested by Prof. Frederic Vermeulen. The data collection was initiated and
executed by a team of academics from the Universite Libre de Bruxelles, under the
supervision of Prof. Philip Verwimp, Prof. Bram De Rock, Prof. Ariane Szafarz, and
Prof. Marek Hudon. Additionally, this team included Bart Capéau, Katarzyna Cieslik,
Rama Lionel Ngenzebuke, and myself. Together, we developed the survey and
questionnaire, and collected the data. The data set remains at the exclusive disposal of
the members of this team.
Needless to say, I would like to thank Prof. Frederic Vermeulen for giving me the
opportunity to start a new PhD at the KU Leuven, for his supervision, feedback and
suggestions. Furthermore, I would like to thank Prof. Bram De Rock and Prof. Philip
Verwimp for taking me on the data collection team, for their supervision, and for
letting me use this exclusive source of data. Special thanks go of course out to Bart
Capéau, for his endless patience, guidance, help, insights, support and feedback during
the whole process. Without him, I would still be stuck in the labyrinth of Matlab and
Stata, and definitely would not be able to present this thesis and the story in its form
as it is today. Last but not least, I would like to thank Yael Voerman, my girlfriend,
vii
for being the perfect foundation of my life.
Leuven, 18/08/2015
Abstract
It is generally claimed that in traditional African agricultural societies, such as Burundi,

the women bear the main responsibility for taking care of the children in the household,
as well as taking care of the household itself, next to generating income (often out of
agricultural activities on the household landplots). This in contrast to the men, whose
main responsibility it is to generate income. These gender roles are presumed –without
much empirical underpinnings- to be a matter of cultural norms and tradition. In the
present contribution we focus on a sample of Burundian households in which –some-
what contrary to the claim- both partners engage in household tasks, although a gender
pattern is still apparent (i.e. the fathers spend more time on market work and leisure,
equal time on taking care of the children, and less time on household tasks). Using a
structural collective household model (Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen, 2012), which
leaves room for multiple intra-household preferences, we are able to analyse the con-
tribution of three possible factors that could explain the apparent behavioral pattern:
preferences (culture or tradition), relative technical efficiency of the partners in perform-
ing household tasks compared to generating income, and the (bargaining) power of each
of the partners in making household decisions. The model incorporates care for the
children’s well-being and public facilities, and allows to disentangle the contribution of
these three factors in a structural way. We use cross-sectional data from a larger survey
among Burundian households, from which we selected 121 couples with children. We
use a three step estimation procedure to estimate the model. We find that the factor
of bargaining power is main driving force behind the observed behavior. This power is
mainly vested in wage differences, where this ratio plays a direct role as well through the
opportunity costs of spending time on public tasks versus market work. These findings
help to increase our understanding of gender patterns in Burundi, and could therefore
aid interventions focused on changing these patterns and overcoming this development
hurdle.
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
Persistent gender roles are still a major development hurdle in most developing countries
(Sen, 1999; The World Bank, 2009; Quisumbing, 2014). Typically, women bear the main
responsibility of taking care of the house and the household (e.g. children), next to the
agricultural activities they perform (e.g. crop cultivation, farming, livestock), often on
the landplots of the household (Chazan et al., 1999). Formal women employment outside
the household is very rare in many of these societies, especially the ones based largely
on agriculture, notwithstanding the potential benefits this might bring to the individual
women and the household as a whole (e.g. empowerment, income, education, children
welfare) (Sen, 1999; Gardner and Rausser, 2011; Quisumbing, 2014). Households form
the core foundation on which political, cultural, and economic life is built in Africa
(Chazan et al., 1999). Within these households, decision-making by the members can
generally be characterized by cooperative conflict, a complex process with explicit and
implicit persuasion, agreement, patterns, etc., but with a cooperative equilibrium (Sen,
1999). Driving forces of this process are diverse, yet, the phenomenon of gender roles
is generally attributed to be the result of cultural norms and tradition (Sen, 1999; The
World Bank, 2009; The World Bank, 2012). Recently, collective models, which model
the behavior of household members in a structural way, have allowed to model these
multi-person behavioral patterns in detail. This allows one to uncover the attributing
factors explaining the observed gender behavior. By making use of the collective labor
supply model developed by Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2012; henceforth CRV),
the current contribution tests the implicit assumption of gender roles being the product
of tradition, against two alternatives, relative technical efficiency and the bargaining
power of decision-makers, in a structural approach with data from rural Burundi.
In Burundi, in line with 70 percent of all households in Africa, the typical rural
household is active in the small-scale agricultural production economy (Chazan et al.,
1999; Sen, 1999). Here too, a clear intra-household behavioral pattern emerges, a gender
pattern (Chazan et al., 1999). This forms an inviting setting to analyse the contribution
of certain mechanisms explaining these gender roles, by use of a collective labor supply
model. However, this gender pattern can be so extreme that within households either
the father or the mother (or both) withholds him- or herself from spending any time
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
on taking care of the children, or other household tasks. Regrettably, the functional
specification of the model used here (i.e. CES production technology) does not allow us
to include households which display this extreme behavior (i.e. zero time spent of one or
both of the partners on one or both of the public goods in the model). Nevertheless, by
unraveling the mechanisms underlying the behavior related to gender roles in households
with time input of both individuals on all activities within the model, a first step is taken
towards understanding the general behavior in the larger sample of peasant households.
The question of the drivers of behavior, being it within the confines of the house-
hold, being it within households characterized as agricultural, is by no means a new
question. Ample of literature has focused on this topic, from the disciplines of sociology
to psychology and economics. In fact, in economic literature one could argue allocation
(of tasks, commodities, services, etc.) is the central concept (Smith, 1776; Samuelson,
1947). Consequentially, an abundance of methods and approaches are in principle open
for selection to assess the question posed here (from behavioral economics, to public
choice or even game-theory and mechanism design). However, since two decades a new
approach to model household behavior has been gaining attention. Since the 1990s,
theoretical and empirical findings surfaced which found evidence against the use of the
unitary model. This approach modeled the household, and therefore representing all the
members of a household, with a single utility function (Alderman et al., 1995; Fortin and
Lacroix, 1997; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Cherchye and Vermeulen, 2008; Cherchye
et al., 2009). The ‘collective’ approach was introduced by Chiappori (1988; 1992; 1997),
Apps and Rees (1988), and Browning et al. (1994) as an alternative to the unitary
approach. Collective models took a radically different starting point from unitary mod-
els, in the sense that the members of the household enter the model individually with
their preferences. Many recent studies have emprically confirmed the improved ’fit’ of
collective models (i.e. model output resembles the real data) compared to other models
such as the unitary, in a multitude of household contexts involving more than one mem-
ber. Ergo, the collective approach has enriched our understanding of intra-household
behavior, decision-making and allocations.
All collective models assume Pareto efficiency, and are labeled as cooperative models.
The models assume a common objective function which is maximized through coopera-
tive behavior. Individual, increasing, and rational preferences over a set of commodities
lay at the foundation of this approach, weighted through the Pareto weights, which are in
turn determined by prices or wages and total expenditure, as well as on external factors
that do not influence individual preferences nor the budget constraint (i.e. distribution
factors). Furthermore, the latter factors play a role in the determination of the sharing
rule as well, by which the remaining household budget (after subtracting the costs of
public expenditures) is divided between or taken by the decision-makers for their own
benefit (time and private consumption). The model by CRV used in this paper exploits
these assumptions.
‘Early’ labor supply models (e.g. Chiappori, 1988; 1992) only differentiated be-
tween a limited number of activities the household members can spend their time on
within the model, respectively paid labor or leisure. Since then, one of the advances
3
of consecutive papers was to incorporate more time-use activities, like home production
(Chiappori, 1997), to make the models more conform economic reality. Another exten-
sion was parental care. Many households are made up of a (married) couple, often with
children. Children need care and attention, a time and income consuming task, which
was the starting point of the theoretical model by Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005;
henceforth BCM).
Of course, not all household or domestic tasks can be labeled as parental care. CRV
(2012) extended the model of BCM (2005) to household activities next to the care for
children’s well-being, which benefit both partners within the household (i.e. creation
of public facilities), like cooking, cleaning or shopping. This collective model therefore
distinguishes between four time-use activities: market work (this includes formal work,
as well as agricultural work, also on the landplots owned by the household), leisure time,
engendering children’s well-being, and creating public facilities. Paid labor serves as an
input for the overall budget. Leisure time is considered a private good. Engendering
children’s well-being, and creating public facilities benefit the household as a whole,
and the output is therefore considered public, the public good. Note that children
are modeled as recipients of care in the form of time and expenditures, without being
active decision-makers in the model. Next to these time-use variables, the individuals
decide in a cooperative fashion on the amount of monetary resources of the full income
to devote to public expenditures on children (e.g. school fees) and public facilities
(e.g. furniture, cooking, material), and use the remaining budget privately, of which the
claimed amount depends on the power they have over decisions (under the influence of
distribution factors).
Collective models in general have been tested and applied in numerous contexts,
providing insights into several aspects of intra-household interactions. To mention a
few: domestic production (Donni, 2008), risk sharing (Mazzocco, 2004), intertemporal
preferences (Mazzocco, 2007), indifference scales and the economies of scale of marriage
(Browning et al., 2013), elderly welfare (Cherchye et al., 2012b), and children welfare
(Blundell et al., 2005; Dunbar et al., 2013). In development contexts, amongst other
studies, Duflo (2000) used a nonparametric approach to show that benefits received from
an extension of a pension scheme towards women improve the health and nutritional sta-
tus of children, mainly the girls (indicative of separate utility functions, Pareto power and
distribution factors, although no full structural collective model was used). Mazzocco
(2007) rejects the standard unitary model when analysing intra-household commitment,
using data of poor families from Mexico involved with a cash transfer program for fe-
male heads of households. Estimating collective models in these development contexts
remains however challenging, as the data requirements to estimate them are demanding,
and difficult to come by in these contexts.
Within the realm of modeling household behavior in development contexts, collec-
tive models are not the first to enter this arena. Agricultural household models, and the
consumption smoothing and risk sharing models have each provided valuable insights
into certain behavioral aspects of household members in development countries (Schultz
and Strauss, 2008; Gardner and Rausser, 2011). The former has been attempting to
model household behavior largely in a unitary fashion, introducing the concept of in-
complete markets into models and the corresponding non-separability of the production
and consumption decisions. Key insight here is that the relative prices on the mar-
kets do not reflect production-efficiency. A household could decide to cultivate certain
crops for their own consumption use as well, which could be less profit-yielding crops,
instead of crops that would maximise their profits on the local exchange markets (hence,
the non-seperability of production and consumption decisions) (Gardner and Rausser,
2011). However, agricultural household models currently still fail to go one step fur-
ther and look inside the household, explaining for example the decision to allocate time
between public production and profit-generating work. The risk-sharing literature does
disaggregate to the individual level in households, where evidence has shown that higher
individual welfare level can be reached when household members insure idiosyncratic
risks through the fellow members. This contradicts the underlying assumption of collec-
tive models, namely Pareto efficiency of household behavior (Udry, 1990; 1994; Kurosaki
and Fafchamps, 2002; Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Schultz and Strauss, 2008). In con-
trast, Chiappori et al. (2014) do confirm full insurance in Thai villages, as well as risk
heterogeniety. But although these models do disaggregate to the intra-household level,
they generally analyse consumption levels in light of varying degrees of risk exposure
and risk-sharing (the full insurance test), leaving questions related to time allocation
unanswered.
In contrast to the previous two modeling approaches, collective models do allow to
model intra-household, public and private time allocation and consumption decisions
in a structural way, including labor decisions. This allows us to analyse the topic in
question here. Furthermore, a collective labor supply model like the one put forward by
CRV (2012) encapsulates the two empirically and theoretically most likely alternative
factors that could explain intra-household gender roles, next to tradition or culture.
Relative technical efficiency of both partners in taking care of the children and taking
care of other household tasks could dictate the responsibilities both partners should
have within the household from an efficiency perspective. Furthermore, the opportunity
costs of spending time on generating income instead of household/public tasks come
into play here as well. The ratio between the male and female wages enter the model
at various places, possibly playing a role through all three factors. In addition, the
wages and the ratio themselves could be influenced by incomplete markets, culture and
wage discrimination. Nevertheless, we assume the wages to be exogenous in the model.
Besides this technical driver, bargaining power of the father and mother could drive time
allocation decisions. This power, which is influenced by the distribution factors, allows
the partner to push the (time and consumption) allocation in their favor, towards their
preferences (Sen, 1999). We consider four factors influencing the Pareto weights: the
wage ratio, full income, and the two distribution factors, work type of the female, and
ownership of the house by the father.
Three contributions can be mentioned. First, a unique self-collected and disaggregate
data set of households in rural Burundi is presented. Second, we propose a simplified
estimation procedure with separated estimations in each stage of the representation
5
of the collective model (Chiappori, 1988; 1992). This in contrast to estimating the
whole system of equations at once through Feasible General Non-linear Least Squares
(F GN LS), as was done by CRV (2012). Finally, estimation of this model will provide
an insight into the intra-household black box of agricultural Burundian households and
will unravel the mechanisms governing the gender patterns in these households. Finding
the source of this pattern could aid a solution to this development challenge.
The cross-sectional data was collected in 2012 through a nationwide household survey,
covering all provinces and municipalities with the exception of three (safety precautions
due to conflict). Of the households consisting of a couple (with or without children), the
male and female were interviewed separately, to acquire the required individual informa-
tion on consumption and time-use. A total of 1238 households were surveyed, of which
623 were couple households. 401 of these households had children, and had no missing
data on key consumption categories. As expressed above, due to the functional specifi-
cation of the model which does not allow zero time spent on the public time allocation
categories, 121 households were selected from this sample. Of the 121 households in the
sample, both partners dedicate at least some time to market work, leisure, engendering
childrens’ well-being, and other household tasks. A gender pattern is apparent within
the households, as fathers devote more time to market work and leisure, roughly equal
time to taking care of the chidlren, and less time to other household tasks, on average,
compared to the mothers. Nevertheless, gender roles are more visible when looking at
the average values for the sample of 401 households: although time spent on market work
is roughly equal, the fathers spend more time on leisure, far less time on taking care of
the children, and less time on other household tasks. Still, the underlying mechanisms
explaing behavior patterns could remain the same for both samples, and understanding
the behavior of the smaller sample gives insights into gender role behavior in general.
Future research should commit to adapting the model and its estimation procedure, to
accommodate the households in the larger sample.
This model is estimated through a simplified procedure. In many other studies and
the orginal study by CRV (2012), the models are estimated through a system of equations
all at once, for example by means of Generalized Method of Moments (GM M ), F GN LS,
Maximum Likelihood (M L), or recently through Indirect Inference or Calibration. The
current contribution proposes a different estimation strategy. We divide the estimation
into simple, independent but consecutive steps, and use simple estimators (Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS), GM M , and Nonlinear Least Squares (N LS)) with a reduced
number of equations to estimate in every step.
Our results show that the presumptions around gender roles being the product of
solely culture need refinement. The estimates related to public production output show
that the fathers are more efficient in taking care of the children compared to the moth-
ers, and slightly more efficient in executing the other household tasks. Hence, relative
technical efficiency does play a role here, but in the opposite direction of the gender
pattern. From an efficiency point of view, the fathers should in fact devote more time
to public tasks. When it comes to culture, estimates of the preference parameters argue
that the fathers care more about taking care of the children than the mothers, and care
less about other household tasks. Ergo, gender role behavior cannot be attributed solely
to culture, although it does explain part of the behavioral patterns. Bargaining power on
the other hand plays a key role; the fathers generally have more power, allowing him to
leave his mark on decision-making, and time and consumption allocation. Nevertheless,
wages and the wage ratio play a decisive role throughout all factors. Firstly, opportunity
costs dictate that fathers (and therefore the households) should benefit from their higher
average wages by spending relatively more time on market work, more time on taking
care of the children, and equal time on other public tasks (due to efficiency reasons).
Secondly, due to the higher wages of the father, his bargaining power increases. This
allows him to spend more time on leisure, which is the private good he prefers (compared
to private consumption).
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 contains a short theoretical
summary of the model of CRV (2012) plus the functional forms used. Section 3 will
present our data. Section 4 discusses our estimation strategy, after which the results will
be presented. The final section concludes.
Chapter 2
Theory
Since the seminal papers by Chiappori (1988; 1992; 1997; 1998), Apps and Rees (1988),
and Browning et al. (1994), the collective model approach has seen a lot of progress.
The models have not only been theoretically extended (e.g. more activities modeled),
but also applied to multiple contexts. The labor supply model as introduced by BCM
(2005) and extended and applied by CRV (2012) is an example of this progress, by
enriching the model with parental care and other household tasks as time-consuming
public tasks, and by developing the identification strategy for it, before empirical testing
it on a unique dataset. Here, this collective model will be introduced in detail.
2.1 Preferences
The collective model of CRV (2012) is suited for two member groups, who behave co-
operatively, with children, each couple consisting of a father and a mother (although
the model could in theory apply to a couple of the same sex as well). Each decision
maker has his own preferences over a set of commodities, that can or cannot be jointly
produced (e.g. housing versus personal leisure). Children enter the model passively, as
they are not modelled as decision-makers. There are three goods: a Hicksian aggregate
of consumption commodities, and time of the female and male. These goods can be used
for private use, or they can be used as inputs for creating household public facilities, or
to engender children’s well-being.
In terms of notation, all variables and equations apply to a single observation unit,
which is the couple. For notational simplicity we drop the index referring to that ob-
servation unit, up to the moment where we describe the estimators we used. Private
consumption of commodities is denoted by ci (i = m, f , where m and f represent
male/father, respectively f emale/mother). Leisure is denoted by li (i = m, f ). Time
used for establishing household public facilities (cleaning, cooking, washing, installing
or repairing housing equipment, shopping, etc.) is denoted by hpi (i = m, f ), while
commodities needed to maintain these facilities (vacuum cleaner, brushes, soap, cooking
material, oven, furniture, etc.) are denoted by cp . Similarly, children’s well–being1 is as-
1
To be sure, children’s well–being here is an object of the male’s and female’s preferences, and hence
7
8 CHAPTER 2. THEORY
sumed to be dependent on mother’s and father’s time spent with children (hki (i = m, f )),
and commodities purchased for children (ck ). These ten variables constitute the main
dependent variables of the model and estimation (cm , cf , ck , cp , lm , lf , hkm , hkf , hpm , hpf ).
One of the time allocation categories on which household members can spend their
time, Ti (i = m, f ), which represents the time endowment, is formal work. Importantly,
this includes formal paid labor, as well as agricultural work on the household landplots
(an activity the mothers often engage in). Labor time is denoted by Li (i = m, f ), where
one unit of labor time is paid a wage wi (i = m, f ), which is assumed to be exogenously
given. If y denotes household non–labour income, the balanced budget constraint of the
household reads as:
X X X
ci + cj = wi Li + y (2.1)
i=m,f j=k,p i=m,f
, where the price of the Hicksian commodity is fixed, for all households the same, and
normalised to one. We denote the budget constraint as an equality, since we will assume
that the household’s objective is strictly increasing in all consumption categories.
If we add the monetary value of leisure, time spent with children, and time P spent on
establishing household facilities to both sides of equation (2.1) ( i=m,f wi (li + j=k,p hji )),
P
we end up with the full income version of the household budget equation:
hji ) =
X X X X X
ci + cj + wi (li + wi Ti + y (2.2)
i=m,f j=k,p i=m,f j=k,p i=m,f
, where we made use of the identity Ti ≡ Li + li + j=k,p hji (i = m, f ).

P
Similar to CRV (2012), we observe the complete intrahousehold consumption allo-
cation in the data, cm , cf , ck , cp . The income allocation of the household (as well as
its size), depends on the individual preferences of the father and the mother and their
bargaining positions within the household. The individual preferences of the father and
mother are represented by the utility function:
νi = ui (ci , li , U k (ck , hkm , hkf ; sk ), U p (cp , hpm , hpf ; sp )) (2.3)
Preferences are therefore defined over four arguments, private consumption ci (i =

m, f ), leisure li (i = m, f ), taking care of the children U k , and public household facilities
U p . The function ui (ci , li , U k , U p ) is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable,
strictly increasing, and strongly concave in all its arguments. The subutility functions
U k and U p are assumed to be twice continuously differentiable in all their arguments,
strictly increasing, and concave in its arguments cj , hjm , and hjf (j = k, p). sj (j = k, p)
represent the production shifters, which will be discussed in the following section, along
with the functional forms of the subutility functions U k and U p .
it is children’s well-being as assessed by parents which is meant here, rather than children’s well–being
per se.
2.2. PUBLIC PRODUCTION 9
2.2 Public production

As for the functional forms of the level of public facilities U p and children’s well–being U k ,
these are assumed to be produced according to a CES–production technology (j = k, p):
  σj
σ j −1
σ j −1 σ j −1
γij (hji )
X
Uj =  σj + γcj (cj ) σj  (2.4)
i=m,f
, where σ j ∈ [0, ∞] (j = k, p) is a measure of the degree to which commodities,

and male’s and female’s time are substitutable as inputs in this production process.
The factors γlj (l = f, m, c) (j = k, p) are input distribution parameters, reflecting
the relative input
P l intensity of the production process. By way of normalisation, it is
j
imposed that l=f,m,c γl = 1 (j = k, p), In the application, the substitution elasticity
σ j will be allowed to be household specific. The substitution elasticity can be made
depended on production shifters, sj (j = k, p). These exogenous variables are defined as
variables that affect individual preferences only through (at least one) of the household
production technologies, but do not affect the household’s budget set. An example of a
production shifter is the mean age of the children: if this would have a positive effect on
σ j (j = k, p), then the time input of both partners is less substitutable when the children
are in the early stages of their life (e.g. breastfeeding can only be given by the mother).
Additionally, we suggest a simple technique to make γlj (l = f, m, c) (j = k, p) depended
on production shifters as well, an extension of the original estimation by CRV (2012).
In case σ j = 1, the production process is of the Cobb-Douglas type, and γlj (l = f, m, c)
(j = k, p) is a measure of factor l’s share in the total production cost of that public good,
when the allocation of inputs was made efficiently, that is, in a cost minimising way.
2.3 Collective objective function

The bargaining positions of the Ppartners depend on their wages, wi (i = m, f ), household
full income Y (defined as Y := i=m,f wi Ti + yi ), and a vector of distribution factors z.
Assuming the partners choose Pareto efficient intrahousehold allocations, the collective
objective is to solve the following maximisation problem:
max λm (wm , wf , Y, z)νm (cm , lm , U k , U p )

cm ,cf ,ck ,cp ,l k k p p k p
m ,lf ,hm ,hf ,hm ,hf ,U ,U
(2.5)
+(1 − λm (wm , wf , Y, z))νf (cf , lf , U k , U p )
subject to
hji ) =
X X X X X
ci + cj + wi (li + wi Ti + y (2.6)
i=m,f j=k,p i=m,f j=k,p i=m,f
10 CHAPTER 2. THEORY
  σj
σ j −1
σ j −1 σ j −1
γij (hji )
X
Uj =  σj + γcj (cj ) σj  with j = k, p (2.7)
i=m,f
where λm (wm , wf , Y, z) ∈ (0, 1) is the spouse m’s Pareto or bargaining weight. The
distribution factors2 play an important and facilitating role in the identification of the
current model developed by CRV (2012), identifying preferences from the bargaining
weights. The distribution factors are defined as variables which neither affect preferences,
nor the budget constraint of the household, but only the bargaining position of the
members (see Bourguignon, Browning, and Chiappori (2009) for more detail).
2.4 Solving the model

This maximization problem can be solved in two steps (CRV, 2012). First, assume a
given level of public facilities and children’s well–being, Ū j (j = k, p), and that the share
in the cost of establishing these levels has been determined, that is φi (i = m, f ), which
represents the share of spouse i in full income (hence full income as a distribution factor)
after subtracting the total cost of establishing these levels ofPthe publicP facilities and
children’s well–being (Ū ), is given. This total cost is equal to j=k,p (c + i=m,f wi hji ),
j j
resulting in i=m,f φi = i=m,f wi Ti +y − j=k,p (cj + i=m,f wi hji ). On the basis of φi

P P P P
(i = m, f ) we can calculate the variable ρi (i = m, f ), which equals φi − wi Ti (i = m, f ).
This variable represents the share of spouse i in non-labor income y, after subtracting
the total cost of establishing a given level of the public facilities and children’s well-
being. These ρi ’s are usually negative since the cost of the public provisions usually
exceed household non–labour income. Given this, each spouse i (i = m, f ) can solve the
following maximisation problem:
max νi (li , ci , U¯k , U¯p ) (2.8)

li ,ci
subject to
ci + wi li = wi Ti + ρi (2.9)
This gives the optimal amount of leisure and private consumption for a given level
j
of U (j = k, p) and ρi (i = m, f ). Using these optimal amounts, which are a function of
wi ,wi Ti + ρi ,U k and U p , in the utility function νi , gives the conditional indirect utility
function, υi (wi , wi Ti + ρi , U k , U p ) (i = m, f ). Using Roy’s identity, we can derive the
Marshallian conditional demand for leisure, (li (i = m, f )), and private consumption, (ci
(i = m, f )), from this function as follows: Ti − li∗ = ∂ν i /∂wi ∗ ∗
∂vi /∂ρi , and ci = wi (Ti − li ) + ρi
(i = m, f ).
2
Do not confound these distribution factors with the distribution parameters (denoted by γlj (l =
f, m, c) (j = k, p) in the equations relating inputs to the establishment of public facilities and children’s
well–being.
2.4. SOLVING THE MODEL 11
We can than replace the direct utility functions νi (i = m, f ) by their conditional

indirect counterpart υi (i = m, f ) in the collective objective function of the maximization
problem. This allows us to find the optimal values of ρi (i = m, f ) and U j (j = k, p), by
solving the following problem:
max λm (wm , wf , Y, z)υm (wm Tm + ρm , wm , U k , U p ) (2.10)

ρm ,ρf ,ck ,cp ,hkm ,hkf ,hpm ,hpf ,U k ,U p
+ (1 − λm (wm , wf , Y, z))υf (wf Tf + ρf , wf , U k , U p )
subject to
(wi hji )) = y
X X X
ρi + (cj + (2.11)
i=m,f j=k,p i=m,f
  σj
σ j −1
σ j −1 σ j −1
γij (hji )
X
Uj =  σj + γcj (cj ) σj  with j = k, p (2.12)
i=m,f
For future reference, it might be observed that the optimal solution for the production
of public facilities and children’s well-being should obey cost minimizing allocation of
inputs, that is, the allocation of inputs should obey the following cost minimisation
(j = k, p) (i = m, f ):
(wi hji )
X
min cj + (2.13)
hji ,cj i=m,f
subject to:
  σj
σ j −1
σ j −1 σ j −1
γij (hji )
X
Uj =  σj + γcj (cj ) σj  (2.14)
i=m,f
The dual to these problems, central in the estimation strategy (see section (4.1)), is
(j = k, p):
  σj
σ j −1
σ j −1 σ j −1
γij (hji )
X
max  σj + γcj (cj ) σj  (2.15)
hji ,cj i=m,f
subject to:
(wi hji ) = E¯j

X
cj + (2.16)
i=m,f
where E¯j is the expenditure level on inputs for establishing the public facilities or
children’s well-being.
The solution to the dual of the cost minimization problem of public and children
welfare can be reformulated to (j = k, p) (i = m, f ):
j j
wi hji (γij )σ wi1−σ
= (2.17)
E¯j 1−σ j j σ j
(γi ) + (γcj )σj
P
i=m,f wi
j
cj (γic )σ
= (2.18)
(γi ) + (γcj )σj
P
i=m,f wi
In turn, these equations can be rewritten in the following way (j = k, p):

!σj
j
wf γm hjm
= (2.19)
wm γfj hjf
These equations help to shed light on the opportunity costs of generating income
versus spending time on public tasks, linking the wage ratio and marginal rates of sub-
stitution with the time invested in taking care of the children and other household tasks.
From the maximization problem defined in equations (2.10), (2.11), and (2.12), we
can also derive the relative share of spouse i in full household income, after subtracting
the cost of inputs for establishing the optimal level of public facilities and children’s
well–being. This equals:
φm λm (wm , wf , Y, z)/(wm )βm

:= (2.20)
φm + φf λm (wm , wf , Y, z)/(wm )βm + (1 − λf (wm , wf , Y, z))/(wf )βf
In order to guarantee that 1 ≥ λm (wm , wf , Y, z) ≥ 0, we impose the following func-

tional form for the Pareto weights:
exp(λ0 + λ1 wm /wf + λ2 Y + λ′ z)
λm (wm , wf , y, z) = (2.21)
1 + exp(λ0 + λ1 wm /wf + λ2 Y + λ′ z)
, with z the vector of distribution factors, and wm /wf (the wage ratio) and Y (full
income) influencing the Pareto weight as well.
Next, let spouse i’s (i = m, f ) preferences be such that the indirect utility function,
conditional on household public facilities and children’s well–being, and given the amount
of resources (s)he has available, that is φi = wi Ti + ρi (i = m, f ), has the following
functional form (i = m, f ):
j
ln(wi Ti + ρi ) − ln(wi ) · (αi0 + αi1 · agei + j
P
k p j=k,p αi ln U )
υi (wi Ti + ρi , wi , U , U ) =
(wi )βi
(2.22)
Applying Roy’s identity as suggested above, yields the following conditional optimal
expenditure share of private consumption in full private expenditures (i = m, f ):
2.4. SOLVING THE MODEL 13
 
ci X j
= 1 − αi0 + αi1 · agei + αi ln U j  (1 − βi ln wi ) − βi ln φi (2.23)
φi
j=k,p
, where agei (i = m, f ) is the taste shifter associated with changing preferences as

the partners become older, captured by the parameter αi1 (i = m, f ). The conditional
optimal expenditure share of leisure in full private expenditures is then (i = m, f ):
 
wi li  0
αij ln U j  (1 − βi ln wi ) + βi ln φi
X
= αi + αi1 · agei + (2.24)
φi
j=k,p
All three mechanisms can be found in these equations. In section 4 we will discuss
our strategy to estimate the model.
Chapter 3
Data
The collective household model as presented will be applied to a unique, cross-sectional

dataset collected in rural Burundi stemming from 2012. It was collected complemen-
tary to a larger panel survey. As a result, the datasets share certain general parts of
the questionnaire, like family composition/identification modules, health, employment,
education, assets, etc. However, we could not exploit the panel structure here, as the
questionnaire modules to obtain the specific data required to estimate the model were
only added to the questionnaire in 2012. Purpose of collection of the original survey was
to obtain data related to conflict on the household level, whereby conflict modules were
added to the questionnaire next to the general social survey modules. The panel dataset
covered 1238 observations since 1998 (with households as the observational unit), in-
cluding split-offs from original households (e.g. when children leave the parental home).
Initially, villages were selected randomly, whereby every household would be interviewed
within the administrative border of that village. All pronvinces were included in the
randomization, with the exception of three. The capital Bujumbura was not included,
as households there are non-rural. Furthermore, two provinces were excluded due to
ongoing violent conflict during some of the years of data collection. Nevertheless, the
sample represents typical agricultural households in Burundi.
To gather the required information, two key modules were added to this question-
naire. As six of the ten dependent variables concern time-use variables, a time-use
module was added to the questionnaire. This module was largely based on the time-use
module used to collect the data for the original estimation by CRV (2012), although
somewhat adapted to the local Burundian context (e.g. obligatory communal work ev-
ery Saturday). As highlighted by CRV (2012), these questions can be informative and
suffer less from infrequency problems associated with diary-based surveys (Browing and
Gortz, 2006). Moreover, this method to collect time-use data is less time consuming and
costly, as the individuals in remote Burundian households only have to be physically
visited and interviewed once.
Each individual was asked to report how many days he or she would consider normal
working days per week, as well as resting days, adding up to seven. Then, he or she was
asked to report for both a typical working day as a resting day, the time spent on four
15
16 CHAPTER 3. DATA
main categories, adding up to 24 hours (work outside of the household, domestic work,
leisure, and sleep). These four categories were split up in more specific catergories. For
the main category of working outside the household, these were (1) working on own farm
and/or land (including livestock), (2) for pay (business, job, etc.), (3) communal labor,
and (4) other. For domestic work these were (1) cooking/food preparation, (2) cleaning
(3) taking care of the children, and (4) other. Leisure was split up into eating, attending
church, attending celebrations, going to a bar, and other. The time spent on market work
of both individuals, Li (i = m, f ), were obtained by adding up the categories working
on own land and formal work. Total time spent on children by both individuals, hkm , hkf ,
were directly obtained from the category taking care of children. Time spent on other
household tasks equal the total time spent on the category domestic work, minus the
category taking care of the children (hpm , hpf ). Finally, leisure time, lm , lf , was directly
reported in the first categorization. In contrast to standard practice, we opted to not give
every individual in the sample the same time endowment, Ti (i = m, f ). The endowment
was constructed by subtracting the obligatory communul work and sleep from the total
hours per week, as somewhat arguably, individuals do not choose these time allocations.
Next to the time-use module, a more detailed consumption section was added to
the questionnaire. These questions nevertheless share many similarities with questions
normally posed in surveys with respect to individual and household expenditures. Once
over, the survey method of data collection chosen here outweighs the use of diary meth-
ods due to practical and cost issues. As CRV (2012), based on Browning, Crossley, and
Weber (2003), state, this method does provide useful insights on individual consump-
tion, although more noise is picked up as compared to the diary method. A first question
that was posed to the interviewee considered consumption of a total number of 34 typical
Burundese consumption goods, consumed over the last 7 days, by the whole household.
This concerned a number of agricultural food items, such as patatoes, rice, bananas,
sugar, salt, milk, honey, etc., but also alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks, and tobacco.
Local units measured the amount consumed by the interviewee, with the reported mar-
ket price in Burundian Francs as a price reference (1 EUR=1,713.52 BIF, 18/08/2015
exchange rate). The reported quantities were then converted to monetary units. A
similar procedure was followed for other categories of consumption, such as clothing,
equipment, telephone, fuel, pleasure, education etc. (although here the consumption
period was one year or two weeks, as these expenditures occur less frequent than food
expenditures). These numbers were then divided by 52 or 2, to obtain expenditures
during the same time spell as for the other consumption goods.
To obtain the required detailed information on consumption per husband and wife,
as well as expenditures on goods and services related to children and other public goods
and services, we posed a series of questions through which the shares of consumption for
the individual members were captured (exclusive goods). These shares were multiplied
with the expenditures, yielding the private consumption shares. The main categories
with which the private shares were determined and multiplied were expenses on food,
traditional alcohol, industrial alcohol, lemonade, and tobacco. For the public good of
children, a similar procedure was followed, multiplying the shares of suns and daugh-
17
ters with the expenditures on food and beverages, plus schooling expenditures. For the
other public good, this procedure was followed by use of expenditures on restaurants,
telephone costs, traveling, fuel, mail, pleasure, health, hygiene, wood, candles, matches,
gasoline, and batteries. This resulted in the four consumption related dependent vari-
ables, cm , cf , ck , cp .
In contrast to common practice of household surveying in development countries,
the husband and the wife were interviewed individually and separately. Specifically, the
questionnaire consisted of a common part, a male and a female part. The common part
would be answered only by the women, as we assumed that females would generally be
most knowledgeable of all individuals within the household concerning questions such as
the health status of all members, education, financial shocks, land, livestock, financial
networks and transactions, etc. Furthermore, considering the traditional structure of
agriculturale societies in rural Burundi, often the men would during the day leave the
house to work outside, while the women stay in or around the house. Practicality there-
fore dictated that the common or core section of the questionnaire would be answered in
first instance by the female within the household, and if not available, by the male. After
the common part, the male and female if available would be asked to answer questions
individually and separately. These interviews would be conducted by someone of the
same sex as the interviewee, and the interviewers would make sure the male and female
would not be able to hear each other’s answers (opportunity to cross-check the data).
The following sample selection procedure was applied to the available 1238 house-
holds in the sample. As the collective household model applied in this paper is suited
for households consisting of two decision-makers, a male and a female, only households
consisting of couples were considered. This resulted in a potential number of households
of 623. Next, this collective model innovates by specifically including the well-being of
children as public task in the structural model, hence, only couples with children were
selected. Furthermore, some households had missing data on the allocation of consump-
tion goods, which left the potential number at 401 households. Additionally, and very
crucial to the particular sample used in this study, many of the remaining couples re-
ported no time input in taking care of the children, and/or the other public tasks, by
one of the decision-makers or both. These households were excluded as well. Reason for
this is the use of the CES production technology for the two public goods k and p as
presented in the previous section. This functional form cannot be used in case of zero
time input, as the CES technology with substitution elasticities between 0 and 1 (corners
of 0 and 1 included) can never generate these observations as optimum. As a result, for
elasticities of substitution between 0 and 1, the CES equations are not defined in the
point where time input to a good is 0 (for leisure this is not a problem, as this time input
is not modelled through a CES production technology). In addition, omitting the cou-
ple households with data missing on the input variables (e.g. age, production shifters,
distribution factors) as well as households with extreme outliers on the consumption
variables, a total of 121 households remained. As stated in the introduction, this is a
somewhat atypical sub-sample of the larger sample population, although gender roles
are still observable. To see this, we will present the summary statistics on the sample of
18 CHAPTER 3. DATA
121 households, as well as on the sample of 401 households.

In table 3.1 (sample 121 households) and 3.2 (sample 401 households) the descriptives
can be found. For the sample of 121 households, the mothers report higher private
expenditures than fathers, respectively 36398 BIF and 33938 BIF on average. When it
comes to public expenditures, most of the total income goes to the children, which is a
higher amount than both the private expenditures of the male and female on average
(69693 BIF). Other public expenditures are relatively low. As an issue often encountered
with micro-data stemming from surveys in development countries, large fluctuations in
the data on the core variables are visible. Although some of the outliers for the core
variables related to consumption were already deleted through the selection procedure,
the standard deviations of private consumption for the male and female remain high,
respectively 71613 BIF and 75458 BIF. When looking at the time-use variables, mothers
spend less time on leisure as compared to the fathers, less time on market work, slighty
more or roughly equal time on taking care of the children, and more time on other public
tasks, on average. Furthermore, both partners spend most of their day on market work
(54.60 hours per week for the fathers, versus 50.32 hours for the mothers), followed by
other public tasks, leisure and only then children. The little time spent on taking care
of the children stands in contrast to the relatively high expenditures on children. It
appears then that either parental care is not important, with the children taking care of
themselves or are cared for by other people (perhaps grandparents), or parental care is
simply not given to them notwithstanding the need.
Clearly, gender roles are apparent in this particular sample; mothers work less, spend
less time on leisure, and more time on the public tasks. This pattern is even more visible
in the sample of 401 households (table (3.2)). Although market labor stays roughly the
same, the fathers spend even more time on leisure, far less time on taking care of the
children, and less time on other household tasks (although the ratio between mother
and father time spent on household tasks stays roughly the same). Clearly, the zero
time input observations in this sample lower the averages somewhat. Moreover, private
expenditures cm and cf are much higher in the larger sample, although the mothers
still spend more privately than the fathers. Nevertheless, similar patterns are visible in
both samples, with the exception of time spent on taking care of the children, which is
far lower in the larger sample, and equally important, now less for fathers compared to
mothers. Hence, the sample used in this study is somewhat atypical.
Next to the dependent variables, wages are very low. These have been constructed
through either the reported wage rate of formal work, or the wage rate individuals would
have obtained if working formally, estimated by the individuals themselves. Although
these estimates could be biased, the labor market is relatively straightforward and close
to the individuals in the sense that only relatively few formal jobs are available, for
which the wage rate is relatively transparent. The households have on average 3,54
children, with a mean age of 8,06. The variable work type of the mother, which will
serve as a distribution factor, was constructed through a dummy variable indicating 0 if
the mother reported to work in non-cashcrop agriculture, and 1 otherwise. The variable
father’s ownership house indicates 1 when the house was obtained by the father (through
19
for example inheritance, or acquisition).
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics 121 Burundian households
Father (m) Mother (f ) Household

Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Expenditures (in BIF/week)
Private expenditures (ci ) 33938 71613 36398 75458
Expenditures on children (ck ) 69693 162178
Other public expenditures (cp ) 13481 26054
Full income 232914 316484
Time use (in hours/week)
Market labor (Li ) 54.60 10.97 50.32 8.86
Leisure (li ) 20.69 10.93 14.43 8.69
Child care (hki ) 8.53 6.03 8.96 4.01
Other domestic work (hpi ) 21.32 10.14 30.74 7.05
Socioeconomic variables
Age 41.34 13.12 34.68 9.94
Wage rate (avg. daily wage (24 h)) 13782 8974 9377 7747
Absolute age difference 6.78 8.13
Number of children 3.55 1.88
Mean age of children 8.06 5.78
Work type mother 0.36 0.48
Father’s ownership house 0.38 0.49
20 CHAPTER 3. DATA
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics 401 Burundian households
Father (m) Mother (f ) Household

Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Expenditures (in BIF/week)
Private expenditures (ci ) 43681 83194 46035 87632
Expenditures on children (ck ) 77934 153311
Other public expenditures (cp ) 37623 49635
Full income 248819 321090
Time use (in hours/week)
Market labor (Li ) 54.51 15.61 51.19 10.87
Leisure (li ) 24.77 13.44 14.21 9.40
Child care (hki ) 2.88 5.25 6.38 4.81
Other domestic work (hpi ) 18.47 12.70 28.41 8.54
Socioeconomic variables
Age 42.41 12.74 36.52 11.16
Wage rate (avg. daily wage (24 h)) 13411 11126 8583 7604
Absolute age difference 6.34 6.80
Number of children 3.70 1.77
Mean age of children 8.82 6.00
Work type mother 0.39 0.49
Father’s ownership house 0.36 0.48
Chapter 4
Estimation strategy
For the 121 observations or households in the dataset, all ten dependent variables are
observed (cm , cf , ck , cp , lm , lf , hkm , hkf , hpm , hpf ) and non-zero. Furthermore, we observe the
wages, wi (i = m, f ), time endowments, Ti (i = m, f ), household non-labour income, y,
household full income, Y , the taste shifter agei (i = m, f ), the production shifters, sj
(j = k, p), and the distribution factors z. Combining these elements, we also observe
disposable full income, φi ≡ wi li + ci (i = m, f ), and the expenditures on inputs E¯j ≡
P j j
i=m,f wi hi + c (j = k, p).
One of the main equations to estimate is equation (2.23). Notice with this equation
that by definition, φcii + wφiili ≡ 1, so that we can, without loss of generality, estimate the
preference parameters of spouse i by estimating only one of the two demand equations,
leisure (equation (2.24)) or private consumption (equation (2.23)) share in the total
expenditures on both goods.
Two complications arise when estimating equation (2.23). First, U j (j = k, p) is not
observed. Secondly, the estimated U j (j = k, p) as well as φi (i = m, f ) are clearly
endogenous, which might cause bias in the coefficient estimates if simply N LS would be
used. Both issues are resolved by our proposed simplified estimation procedure, following
the two stage representation of the model presented in the parametric specification in
section two. An additional third step insures we obtain estimates to all the parameters,
in which we take the estimates from the private side estimation and plug them into a
derivation of the maximization problem (2.10), (2.11), and (2.12). This supplies us with
the estimates of the parameters related to the distribution factors. The next section will
discuss every individual step in detail.
4.1 Step 1: Public production

First issue is to provide estimates for U j (j = k, p). This will also provide insights into
the parameters governing the public production side of the model, and will enable us to
shed some light on the central research question of this paper. As a reminder, observe
that the solution to the dual of the cost minimization problem of public and children
welfare can be reformulated to (j = k, p) (i = m, f ):
21
22 CHAPTER 4. ESTIMATION STRATEGY
j j
wi hji (γij )σ wi1−σ
= (4.1)
(γi ) + (γic )σj
P
i=m,f wi
j
cj (γic )σ
= (4.2)
(γi ) + (γic )σj
P
i=m,f wi
Next, let qj (j = k, p) be the 2N –vector composed of the 121 elements of ln hjf −ln cj
(j = k, p), and the 121 elements of ln hjm − ln cj (j = k, p). Similarly, let ln w be
the 2N –vector of the 121 observations on the log of female wages, ln wf , and the 121
observations of the log of male wages, ln wm , and dm the 2N – vector which contains a
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the corresponding element of qj (j = k, p)
applies to an observation of a male, and is zero otherwise. By making use of equations
(4.1) and (4.2) above and these definitions, we obtain the following linear single equation
regression model for each j = k, p:
qjni = ψ0j + ψ1j dm,ni − σ j ln wni (4.3)
, where the subscript ni refers to an element of the corresponding vectors, that

refers to spouse i (i = m, f ) of household n. This equation imposes the cross equations
restrictions which are implied by the original system of equations (4.1 & 4.2) (j = k, p).
Furthermore, it contains next to the parameters exclusively observable and exogenous
variables. Hence, this can be estimated by OLS, and estimates of γ j := (γlj ; l = f, m, c),
for j = k, p, can be obtained as follows:
 j j 
bj +ψ
ψ bj
exp ψc ψ
c0 c0
j
/ 1 + exp cj + exp 0
cj
1
σ σ j σ
 
 
j j bj +ψbj
j
 ψb +ψ b ψ
c0 ψ 
γ
b = exp 0
cj
1
/ 1 + exp cj + exp 0
cj
1  (4.4)
σ
j σ σ
 
 
j j
ψ0 +ψ1
1/ 1 + exp ψc
 c0 b b 
j
+ exp cj
σ σ
j j
, where ψc0 , ψ bj (j = k, p) represent the OLS estimates of regression equation
c1 and σ
(4.3).
Production shifters play a key role in the identification of the model (CRV, 2012),
in the sense that at least one production shifter needs to be of impact for the model
to be nonparametrically indentified (this in contrast to being parametrically identified,
which it is regardless of the production shifters and distribution factors). The produc-
tion shifters can be introduced in two ways. Firstly, these production shifters can be
brought in through the input distribution parameters γlj (l = f, m, c) (j = k, p), a minor
contribution of the current paper. This can be done in a linear way. Denote the produc-
tion shifters that (might) affect the input distribution parameters by sγj (j = k, p), and
4.1. STEP 1: PUBLIC PRODUCTION 23
let sγj ,ni be the value of these variables for spouse i (i = m, f ) in household n.1 Then,
we obtain the following single equation regression model, which is still linear and can be
therefore be estimated by OLS (j = k, p):
qjni = ψ0j + ψ1j dm,ni + (1-dm,ni ) · s ′ γj ,nf ψ2j + dm,ni · s ′ γj ,nm ψ3j − σ j ln wni (4.5)
Denoting the estimated parameters by a hat, an estimate of γ j (j = k, p) for a

household n with spouses nf and nm , now reduces to (j = k, p):
 ! ! !! 
c ′ c ′ c c ′
ψ0j +sγj ,n ψ2j ψ0j +sγj ,n ψ2j ψ0j +ψ1j +sγj ,nm ψ3j
c c c
f f
 exp cj / 1 + exp cj + exp cj 
 σ σ σ 
 ! ! !! 
c c ′ c ′ c c ′
ψ0j +ψ1j +sγj ,nm ψ3j ψ0j +sγj ,n ψ2j ψ0j +ψ1j +sγj ,nm ψ3j
 c c c 
bj,n
γ =  exp / 1 + exp f
+ exp
 
cj cj cj 
 σ σ σ 
 ! !! 
c ′ c c ′
ψ0j +sγj ,n ψ2j ψ0j +ψ1j +sγj ,nm ψ3j
 c c 
f
1/ 1 + exp + exp
 
cj σ cj σ
(4.6)
Secondly, production shifters can be introduced through the elasticity of substitution
(additional to production shifters introduced through the input distribution
parameters).2 Let sσj denote the set of production shifters that affect the elasticity
of substitution. The the elasticity of substitution cannot differ across spouses, so the
variables in sσj are at the household level, and have a common effect in the regression
equation for both spouses belonging to the same household. Let the specific value sσj
takes for a household n with spouses nm and nf be denoted by sσj ,n . The regression
equation then becomes (j = k, p):

qjni = ψ0j + ψ1j dm,ni + (1-dm,ni ) · s ′ γj ,nf ψ2j + dm,ni · s ′ γj ,nm ψ3j − σ0j + sσ′ j ,n σ j1 ln wni
(4.7)
j j
Replacing σb (j = k, p) by σbn (j = k, p) in equation (4.6), gives a new estimator of
the household specific distribution parameters.
Next, by plugging the predicted values in
σ j
  c n
j
σ
c j
n −1 σ
c j
n −1
σ
c n −1
bnj (hji ) cj (cj , hj , hj ; γ

X j j
bj = 
U γ σ
bn bnc (cj )
+γ σ
bn  := U m f bn , σ
j
bnj ) (4.8)
i=m,f
1
The observation unit is a spouse here, but it might well be that some of these variables are at the
household level. That is, some elements of sγj (j = k, p) might have the same value for each of the
spouses belonging to same household.
2
We did experiment with imposing σj to be positive by use of an exponential function, but this
yielded no results.
, we obtain the predicted values for the children well-being and the level of public
facilities Ub j (j = k, p).
In the original model by CRV (2012), the public goods are produced through a CES-
production technology which forms the foundation of the estimation method presented
above. Of course, a special case of a CES-production function is the Cobb-Douglas case,
where σ j = 1. This simplifies this exposition drastically. By simply adding ln wni to
both side of equation (4.3), we obtain (ln hji + ln wi ) − ln cj = ψ0j + ψ1j dm,ni + (1 −
σ j ) ln wni , (i = m, f ) (j = k, p), through which we can impose σ j to be 1. Equation
(4.3) could now be rewritten as
Ωjni = ψ0j + ψ1j dm,ni (4.9)

, where the subscript ni refers to an element of the corresponding vectors, that
refers to spouse i (i = m, f ) of household n, and Ωj is the 2N –vector composed of
the 121 elements of (ln hji + ln wi ) − ln cj , (i = m, f ) (j = k, p). The esimates of
γ j := (γlj ; l = f, m, c), for j = k, p, can now be obtained as follows:
 
exp ψb0j / 1 + exp ψb0j + exp ψb0j + ψb1j
 
bj =  exp ψb0j + ψb1j / 1 + exp ψb0j + exp ψb0j + ψb1j
γ (4.10)
 

 
1/ 1 + exp ψbj + exp ψbj + ψbj
0 0 1
Turning to the Cobb-Douglas case does not limit the possibility of the use of produc-
tion shifters. These can still be brought in through the input distribution parameters γlj
(l = f, m, c) (j = k, p), by use of equation (4.6) adapted to the Cobb-Douglas case.
4.2 Step 2: Private consumption and leisure

Having resolved the first estimation issue of the unobserved U j (j = k, p), we will now
focus on the endogeneity of disposable full income, φi (i = m, f ), and the endogeneity
of the estimated U b j in the previous step (equation (4.8)). The endogeneity issue of the
latter comes from the fact that U b j is a function of hj and cj (i = m, f ) (j = k, p),
i
while these variables are determined through the model themselves. With the predicted
ln Ubj (cj , hjm , hjf ; γ
bnj , σ
bnj ) (j = k, p) from the previous estimation step, equation (2.23)
becomes (i = m, f ), (j = k, p):
 
ci X j
= 1 − αi0 + αi1 · agei + αi ln Ubj (cj , hjm , hjf ; γ
bnj , σ
bnj ) (1 − βi ln wi ) − βi ln φi
φi
j=k,p
(4.11)
Here, theoretical consistency dictates that the parameters αij are negative (CRV,
2012). The restriction in fact follows from equation (2.22), imposing that a higher U j
(j = k, p) has a positive effect on utility. We impose this condition on the estimation
process by using αij = −exp(α̃ij ), with α̃ij estimated for i = m, f , and j = k, p.
4.3. STEP 3: THE SHARING RULE 25
The natural way to try to impede the endogeneity bias of φi and ln Ubj (cj , hjm , hjf ;
bnj , σ
γ bnj ) is by using an instrumental variable estimator (IV ). In this model, the production
shifters, sj (j = k, p), and the distribution factors, z, turn out to be natural candidates
as instruments. Indeed, both are assumed to be exogenous to the model. Further-
more, the production shifters are, by definition, determinants of ln U j (cj , hj , hj ; γ j
bnj )
m f bn , σ
d
(j = k, p), while the distribution factors, assumed to be exogenous to the model as
well, are by definition determinants of the share in the remaining full household in-
come after subtracting the cost of inputs for establishing public facilities and children’s
well-being, that is, of φi (i = m, f ). Therefore, estimation by GMM would overcome
this challenge (a more elaborate exposition on the GMM estimator can be found in the
appendix). To instrument φi , we will use the instruments of the wage ratio (wm /wf ),
full income (Y ) 3 , and the distribution factors work type of the mother, and fathers’
ownership of the house. To instrument ln Ubj (cj , hjm , hjf ; γ
bnj , σ
bnj ), we will use the instru-
ments of the absolute age difference, the number of children, and the mean age of the
children. Hence, a typical row of the instrument matrix would now be composed of
(1, agei , ln wm , ln wf , wm /wf , Y, W orktypemother, F athers′ ownershiphouse, abs(agem −
agef ), numberof children, meanagechildren), for (j = k, p). This strategy yields robust
results.
4.3 Step 3: The sharing rule

Through equation (2.20) the relative share of spouse i in full household income, after
subtracting the cost of inputs for establishing the optimal level of public facilities and
children’s well–being, was derived.
In combination with the functional form to guarantee that 1 ≥ λm (wm , wf , Y, z) ≥ 0
(equation (2.21)), we can rewrite equation (2.20) to arrive at the following non-linear
regression equations:
φm 1
= bGM M (4.12)
φm + φf 1 + exp[−(exp(λ0 + λ1 wm /wf + λ2 Y + λ′ z)] (wm )bGM M
m
(wf ) f
φf 1
= bGM M
(4.13)
φm + φf (w ) f
1 + exp(exp(λ0 + λ1 wm /wf + λ2 Y + λ′ z)) f bGM M
(wm ) m
Once over, this system of two equations satisfies adding–up, and all the right hand
side variables are exogenous to the model. Therefore the parameters (λ0 , λ1 , λ2 , λ′ )
could consistently be estimated by applying N LS to one of these two equations. The
3 P
We have defined this variable as Y := i=m,f wi Ti + yi , which is in theory an exogenous variable.
In practice however, it is constructed by the sum of all expenditures plus the monetary values of leisure,
and time spent on the two public tasks, which includes many endogenous variables. Although we do
acknowledge this shortcoming, future research should focus on finding a solution for this problem.
contribution of these estimates is threefold: firstly, in order for the model to be identified,
at least one of the distribution factors should have a (significant) impact on the relative
shares. Secondly, the estimates tell us the effect of the distribution factors on the relative
shares. Finally, through equation (2.21), we can get an idea of the overall Pareto weight
of the father and mother. Of course, interpreting the levels of the Pareto weights has
to be done with the necessary caution, as a monotonic transformation of the utility
functions in main collective objective function (equations (2.5), (2.6), (2.7)) does also
change the pareto weight, λi .
This final step concludes the exhibition on the estimation strategy. All parameters
can be estimated with this strategy, of which the results will be presented in the next
section, as well as the interpretation of these estimation results with respect to the
mechanisms of gender patterns.
Chapter 5
Results
Following the three step estimation procedure discussed in the previous section, this
section will discuss the results of the regressions conducted in every step. This will be
done in a nested fashion, to present the choices made in a logical sequence resulting in
a final specification with the final results.
5.1 Public production

Recall that qj (j = k, p) is a 2N –vector composed of the 121 elements of ln hjf − ln cj ,
and N elements of ln hjm − ln cj (j = k, p). Following this definition, the sample of 121
households was split up and appended into 242 observations/decision-makers (male and
female). In the first step of public production, we aim to estimate
qj ,ni = ψ0j + ψ1j dm,ni − σ j ln wni (5.1)
, in case we choose the CES functional form, and if we impose the Cobb-Douglas
functional form,
Ωj ,ni = ψ0j + ψ1j dm,ni (5.2)

, where the left hand side is altered to ln wi + ln hji −ln cj , in the estimations defined
as Ω j (see equation (4.3), (4.9) and (4.10) and the corresponding text for more details).
Production shifters can be introduced additionally through the γlj (l = f, m, c)(j = k, p)
(equation (4.5)), and the substitution elasticities sσj (equation (4.7)), when the public
goods are produced through a CES production technology, and a simplified version of
equation (4.5) if of the Cobb-Douglas case.
In the original model by CRV (2012), both public goods are produced through a CES
production technology. In the next subsections, we will present which functional forms
(Cobb-Douglas or CES) ‘fit’ the Burundian data best. We will start with the children
well-being side k.
27
28 CHAPTER 5. RESULTS
5.1.1 Children well-being (k)

Table (5.1) presents the results of the Cobb-Douglas estimation. To interpret these
k is 0.1491, γ k
results, with these parameters (as obtained through equation (4.10)) γm f
0.1238, and γck 0.7271.
Table 5.1: Step 1: Cobb-Douglas, dep. var. Ω k , by OLS
Variable Coefficient
Std. Err.
ψ0k -1.77013∗∗
0.18800
ψ1k 0.18574
0.26587
N 242
Adj R2 -0.0021
F (1,240) .488060
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Estimating this public good through the CES functional form leaving σ k as a pa-
rameter to be estimated revealed unusable values for the γlk (l = f, m, c) (zero for
both partners) and σ k (one), which remained after attempts of introducing production
shifters. Furthermore, continuing on the CES path resulted in many observations for
which the σ k would be estimated negative, which is theoretically useless. Hence, we opt
for the Cobb-Douglas functional form in which the substitution elasticity σ k is fixed to
1.
Next, a production shifter is introduced. As the Cobb-Douglas functional form was
chosen, shifters can logically only be introduced through the γlk (l = f, m, c). Following
the original estimation by CRV (2012), we introduce the number of children in the
household (nk ) as shifter. Table (5.2) shows the results.
The variable ψ3k represents dm,ni · nk , while the variable ψ2k represents (1-dm,ni ) · nk
as in equation (4.5) for the CES functional form. The coefficients of both variables
are negative (although not significant), and roughly the same. This implies that the
production technology with every additional child becomes more consumption intensive
(i.e. ck increases) and less time intensive. There is a limit to the amount of time parents
(can) invest in their children, even when more children are born. Furthermore, it could
be that the children take care of each other, a not unrealistic hypothesis considering
Burundi’s reality. As γlk (l = f, m, c) are now household-specific, we will report the
averages and the standard deviations of these parameters. With these estimates, γm k is
k k
0.15107 (SD 0.02847), γf 0.12577 (SD 0.02498), and γc 0.72317 (SD 0.05344). The value
of the F-test is 4.98041 here (critical F-value 3.88083), with a p-value of 0.02657 (with
nk introduced as production shifter as the unrestricted model, Cobb-Douglas estimated
Table 5.2: Step 1: Cobb-Douglas, nk production shifter, dep. var. Ω k , by OLS
Std. Err.
ψ0k -1.19965∗∗
0.40020
ψ1k 0.16147
0.56597
ψ2k (nk ) -0.16053

0.09959
ψ3k (nk ) -0.15370

0.09959
N 242
Adj R2 0.0102
F (3,238) 1.82484
without the restricted), which provides evidence to reject the Cobb-Douglas specification
without the production shifter. However, the coefficients around the production shifter
for both the mother and father were not found to be significant. Nevertheless, the F-test
reveals a better model fit and it therefore reveals the production shifter does have an
impact in the unrestricted model, which is important for the identification of the model.
Adding other or additional production shifters, such as the mean age of the children,
the absolute age difference, or the number of children squared revealed no improvement
to the adjusted R-squared, and/or significant coefficients. Therefore, this specification
was chosen as the final specification to incorporate in the second step concerning care
for the children’s well-being.
To get more intuition behind these results, the marginal rate of substitution of the
father’s time in terms of the mother’s time, in the point where they both spend equal
time on the well-being of children (so evaluated along the 45 degree line), is γm /γf ,
here 0.15107/0.12577=1.20116. In other words, to maintain the same level of U k , the
mother needs to spend 1.20116 time-units more when the father spends one time-unit
less on taking care of the children. Hence, one extra time unit spent on the well-being
of children by the father benefits U k more than by the mother, for an equal amount of
time spent on taking care of the children (so when hkm equals hkf ).
5.1.2 Public facilities (p)

Following a similar procedure as in the previous section, for the p public good the
CES functional form appeared to give better results (in terms of realistic values for γlp
(l = f, m, c) and σ p ). Table (5.5) presents the results (note that the dependent variable
is now the default qp,ni from equation (4.3)). Nevertheless, a similar issue as on the
p
k-side occurs: γm is 0.00126 , γfk 0.00745, and γck 0.99128.
Table 5.3: Step 1: CES, dep. var. qp,ni , by OLS
Std. Err.
ψ0p -1.12924∗∗
0.27553
ψ1p -0.40981∗
0.16505
wni -0.23092†
0.12427
N 242
Adj R2 0.0463
F (2,239) 6.84361
Next, production shifters are introduced. Choosing for the CES functional form
allows us to introduce the production shifter both through the input distribution pa-
rameters γlp (l = f, m, c), as well as through the substitution elasticity σ p .1 We consider
three production shifters here: the absolute age difference between the mother and fa-
ther, the number of children, and the mean age of the children. Introducing these shifters
through γ’s solely (equation (4.5)) once over resulted in values for γip (i = m, f ) of ap-
proximately zero. Hence, in table (5.4) we present the results of introducing the shifters
both through γ’s and σ (see equation (4.7)).
σ1 is the variable corresponding to the production shifter absolute age difference, σ2
to the number of children, and σ3 the mean age of the children. Futhermore, ψ3p (1 ) is
the ψ3p corresponding to the production shifter absolute age difference for the fathers,
ψ3p (2 ) to the number of children, and ψ3p (3 ) to the mean age of the children. Similarly,
ψ2p (1 ,2 ,3 ) correspond to the production shifters for the mothers. Here, γm
p
is 0.04090 (SD
p p p
0.11842), γf 0.04004 (SD 0.07022), and γc 0.91907 (SD 0.17031). σ becomes 0.28072
(SD 0.19133). Testing this specification against the previous restricted specification
reveals an F-value of 0.63908, with a corresponding p-value of 0.76301. Therefore, the
1
It would be possible to introduce the production shifters solely through σ p . However, an issue in this
specification is that the γ’s indirectly also become dependent on the production shifters, even though
these are only introduced through the substitution elasticity. To see this, notice that to obtain the values
for the γ’s, the ψ’s need to be divided by the estimated σ’s (see for example equation (4.6)). This is not
a problem when the σ’s are constant, such as in equation (4.5) and (4.6). Nevertheless, when the σ’s are
allowed to vary with the production shifters, they become household specific as in equation (4.7), and
correspondingly, the γ’s also become dependent on the shifters, by dividing the ψ’s by the estimated σ’s.
Table 5.4: Step 1: CES, dep. var. qp,ni = ln hpi − ln cp , by OLS, 3 production shifters
through γ’s and σ
Parameters Coefficient
Std. Err.
ψ0p -1.29012†
0.65512
ψ1p -0.72103†
0.42004
σ0p 0.14331
0.28529
σ1p (Absolute age difference) -0.00678

0.02271
σ2p (nk ) -0.02566

0.07473
σ3p (Mean age of children) 0.03408

0.02711
ψ2p (1 ) (Absolute age difference) 0.00337

0.05204
ψ2p (2 ) (nk ) -0.00253

0.19929
ψ2p (3 ) (Mean age of children) 0.07003

0.06412
ψ3p (1 ) (Absolute age difference) 0.00207

0.04390
ψ3p (2 ) (nk ) -0.01683

0.16654
ψ3p (3 ) (Mean age of children) 0.03624

0.05243
N 242
Adj R2 0.0331
evidence points in the direction of choosing the specification without production shifters.
Nevertheless, weighing this against the values for the γ’s we would then have to use, we
opt for the estimation and results as presented in table (5.4).
None of the estimates related to the production shifters turn out significant, which
makes interpretation of the estimates less reliable. Nevertheless, we can with this in mind
evaluate whether the signs of the results follow intuition. The elasticity of substitution
decreases when the age difference and the number of children increase, and the elasticity
increases with the mean age of the children increasing. This is not counterintuitive, as a
higher age difference between the partners could mean one of the partners is not able to
perform the same public tasks as the other any longer, by which their time inputs would
as a result be less substitutable. Less intuitive is the number of children decreasing the
elasticity of substitution. Perhaps the partners will specialise more in terms of public
activities they perform with the number of children increasing. The mean age of the
children on the other hand causes the elasticity of substitution to increase, making the
inputs more substitutable. Younger children need specific care and attention which
requires specific tasks, like cleaning, or cooking. These tasks are not easily substitutable
with consumption expenses. On the other hand, when the children are older, time and
consumption input become more substitutable for creating public facilities.
More difficult to interpret are the estimates of the γ’s related to the shifters. The
production technology for public good p becomes more time intensive with respect to
increases in the age difference and the mean age of the children, and less time intensive
with an increase of the number of children. The latter argument follows the hypothesis
that more children could mean the children are taking over tasks of the parents, which
would mean they have to devote less time to the production of this public good. And
as noted before, there is a limit to time. The opposite holds for the remaining two pro-
duction shifters, the absolute age difference and the mean age of the children, whereby
increases in these shifters would cause them to put more time into the production tech-
nology. An hypothesis here could be that children at higher ages already start to take
care of the livestock of the household or help in agricultural activities, leaving the public
tasks to be done by the parents.
With these values for the γ’s, the marginal rate of substitution at the point where
hpm equals hpf , is 0.04090/0.04004=1.02134. Hence, the mother needs to put in 1.02134
time-units when the father spends one time-unit less on the other public good, in order
to maintain the same level of U p . This value for the marginal rate of substitution is lower
than the value of 1.20116 for the production of children well-being. The substitution
elasticity of 0.28072 is rather low, which means the time-inputs of the father and mother
in general are not mutually substitutable.
5.2 Private consumption and leisure
Recall that the equation to estimate in this step 2 is (i = m, f ):

5.2. PRIVATE CONSUMPTION AND LEISURE 33
 
ci X j
j (cj , hj , hj ; γ
= 1 − αi0 + αi1 · agei + αi ln U
d
m f bn , σ
j
bnj ) (1 − βi ln wi ) − βi ln φi
φi
j=k,p
(5.3)
Table (5.5) and (5.6) show the results, respectively for the dependent variables φcmm
c
and φff . Note that the estimated parameters would be the same if we had used the
corresponding expression for leisure (equation (2.24)) to establish the estimations.
Table 5.5: Step 2: dep. var φcm

m
, by GM M (instruments absolute age difference, number
of children, mean age of children, wage ratio, full income, work type of the mother, and
father’s ownership of the house)
Std. Err.
α0m -1.87067
2.55022
α1m 2.33095∗
1.08143
k
α̃m 0.11631
0.18046
p
α̃m 0.06264
0.61577
βm 0.08972∗∗
0.00201
N 121
Firstly, related to the positive coefficient of α1m , note from equations (2.23) and
(2.24) that the effect of age on private consumption is opposite to the effect on leisure.
Furthermore, the coefficient of α1m has to be multiplied with the term (1 − βm ln wm ).
Hence, the sign of this term is key. As it is individual specific, it varies with ln wm .
The wages are normalized to always be greater than one, and the maximum ln wm is
10.61. Hence, in combination with the positive βm , the term (1 − βm ln wm ) is always
greater than zero for all fathers. This means older fathers have a relatively more intense
preference for leisure compared to private consumption, than younger fathers, in line
with intuition.
Already touched upon when interpreting the α1m estimate, the positive and significant
βm indicates that leisure is considered as a luxury good for the father (as the income
elasticity of leisure is ∂ ln lm /∂ ln φm = 1 + wm lβmm/φm , which is always greater than one
for all fathers, given the positive values of all the variables and parameters). This means
the budget share of leisure (as compared to private consumption) will increase with
income increasing, for all fathers, but not for all fathers to the same extent (again, it
is individual-specific). Furthermore, the estimates of α1m and βm turn out significant,
which makes these interpretations more trustworthy.
The estimates of α̃m k and α̃p show that both public goods have an impact on the
m
leisure and private consumption of the father. Hence private consumption and leisure
are nonseparable from U k and U p , though the effect is not estimated with significance.
c
Table 5.6: Step 2: dep. var φff , by GM M (instruments absolute age difference, number
of children, mean age of children, wage ratio, full income, work type of the mother, and
father’s ownership of the house)
Std. Err.
α0f -2.72460
2.32397
α1f 2.33216∗
1.05023
α̃fk -0.20817
0.24719
α̃fp 0.39168
0.51805
βf 0.08662∗∗
0.00425
N 121
On the mother’s side, α1f tells us that older mothers have relatively more intense
preferences for leisure compared to consumption than younger mothers, similar to the
fathers (as (1 − βf ln wf ) is also positive for all mothers). Moreover, mothers consider
leisure to be a luxury good as well (the income elasticity of leisure for the mothers
is always greater than one, although again individual specific), devoting more budget
share proportionally more to leisure than to private consumption when income increases.
Only these two parameters are estimated significantly. With respect to the other (non-
significant) estimates in the table, both domestic goods have an impact on the leisure
and private consumption of the mother, and are therefore nonseparable from U k and U p
for the mothers as well.
However, the above concerns the impact of producing public facilities on private
consumption and leisure. Important here as well is the marginal rate of substitution
5.3. THE SHARING RULE 35
between public facilities, children’s well-being and private (full) expenditures. By making
use of equation (2.22), given that wages are normalized to always be greater than one,
this is defined as (i = m, f ) (j = k, p):
d φi ∂vi (φi ,wi ,U k ,U p )/∂U j φi ln(wi )αji

d U j v φ ,w ,U k ,U p =V̄
= − ∂v = Uj (5.4)
i( i i ) i (φi ,wi ,U k ,U p )/∂φi
This reflects the amount of private full expenditures (on private consumption or
leisure) one wants to give up in exchange for an increase of the level of public facilities,
respectively children’s well-being, with one unit, while keeping total utility constant.2
Easier to interpret however is to express this in proportional terms. This gives the
percentage decrease in the value of private goods (private consumption and leisure) one
wants to accept in exchange for a one percentage increase in the level of public facilities,
respectively children’s well-being. It is defined as (j = k, p):
d ln(φi )
d ln(U j ) v φ ,w ,U k ,U p =V̄
= ln (wi ) αij (5.5)
i( i i )
The larger this measure is in absolute terms, the more intense are preferences for that
public good. In combination with the values of αij (i = m, f ) (j = k, p) estimated through
k equals -1.12334, αk equals -0.81207, αp equals -1.06464, and αp equals -
the α̃ij (αm f m f
1.47946), we obtain the following percentages. Fathers are willing to give up -10.70673
percent of their private consumption and leisure in exchange for a one percentage increase
in the level children’s well-being, given average wages and average time spent on leisure
of the partners. Similarly, the mothers are only willing to give up -7.42720 percent
here. Hence, fathers are willing to give up more for increases in the public good k,
indicating that they care more about children’s well-being than the mothers. This picture
is reversed for the other public good: fathers are only willing to give up -10.14724
percent, while mothers would trade -13.53120 percent of their private full expenditures
for a one percentage increase in the level of public facilities. This interpretation adds
to the explanation of the observed behavioral pattern, as mothers have a more intense
preference for U p and fathers for U k . Hence, mothers invest more time in U p than the
fathers.
5.3 The sharing rule

The only parameters that remain to be determined are the coefficients related to the
instruments of the wage ratio, and full income, and the distribution factors, the work
type of the mother, and fathers’ ownership of the house. By making use of the GM M
estimates of βm and βf from the previous step, we estimate the following non-linear
equation through N LS:
2
The sum of these marginal rates of substitution is equal to the cost of producing one unit of the
public good, the Samuelson condition.
φm 1
= bGM M (5.6)
φm + φf 1 + exp[−(exp(λ0 + λ1 wm /wf + λ2 Y + λ′ z)] (wm )bGM M
m
(wf ) f
φf 1
= bGM M
(5.7)
φm + φf (wf ) f
1 + exp(exp(λ0 + λ1 wm /wf + λ2 Y + λ′ z)) GM M
(wm )bm
Table (5.7) shows the results.
Table 5.7: Step 3: dep. var φmφ+φ

m
f
, by N LS (instruments wage ratio, full income, work
type of the mother, and father’s ownership of the house)
Std. Err.
λ0 -0.03674
0.09420
λ1 (Wage ratio) 0.32686∗∗

0.04185
λ2 (Full income) 0.00000∗∗

0.00000
λ3 (Work type of the mother) -0.09393

0.08215
λ4 (House ownership of the father) -0.11000

0.08664
N 121
Adj R2 0.9707
To start with the significantly estimated parameters, the coefficient of the wage ratio
is relatively large and positive. This tells us that the private share of the father increases
considerably with increases in the wage ratio. Secondly, the parameter related to full
income is estimated with significance. Although the effect appears small and therefore
negligible (in fact it is −3.79 × 10−7 ), one has to consider that full income is a large
number (232914 BIF). Therefore, it stills has an impact. The coefficients with respect
to the two distribution factors are not significantly estimated, which casts some doubt
on the nonparametric identification of the model (i.e. at least one of the distribution
factors needs to be of (significant) impact). Nevertheless, the negative sign of λ3 tells
us the private share of the father decreases with the variable work type of the mother.
In other words, when the mother engages in work other than non cashcrop agriculture
(e.g. formal work, cultivating cashcrops), her bargaining power increases resulting in a
5.4. INTERPRETATION GENDER ROLES 37
lower share of the private goods in the model for the father. Surprisingly, the coefficient
of the parameter related to the distribution factor house ownership of the father turns
out negative as well. Although speculative, it could be that fathers that own the house
spend more time on the public good U p , and as a result, insist slightly less on a higher
share in full private expenditures. The R-squared of the model is high, explaining a
large fraction of the variation in the dependent variable φmφ+φ m
f
Through equation (2.21), we can interpret what the instruments and the distribution
factors actually mean for the Pareto weights of the partners. As a reminder, recall that
interpreting the levels of the Pareto weights has to be done with the necessary caution, as
a monotonic transformation of the utility functions in main collective objective function
(equations (2.5), (2.6), (2.7)) does also change the pareto weight, λi (i = m, f ). Hence,
even when a different utility function is used, represeting the same preferences (i.e. a
positive monotonic transformation), the levels of λi (i = m, f ) will change, though the
solution to the model, the optimum, will stay the same. Nevertheless, in case one accepts
the functional form of the utility function as a good representation of the terms on which
the bargaining process is taking place, then the levels of λi (i = m, f ) give a sense of
the overall power of the partners. More concretely, only when all four instruments come
into play, does the scale of the Pareto weight tip to the mother (with a Pareto weight of
0.44012). In all other cases, the fathers will on average have more power than the mothers
in the household. The estimate related to the average wage level ratio reveals that in the
majority of households this factor will have a large impact on the Pareto weight, giving
the fathers a Pareto weight of 0.57202. Therefore, in many of the households within this
sample, the decision-making power lays somewhat with the fathers. Nevertheless, the
reliability of this conclusion can be questioned.
5.4 Interpretation gender roles

As the model and all the parameters have been estimated, we turn to the implications
of the combined parameter values and therefore the model to answer the main research
question: are the gender roles in these Burundian households the result of culture,
bargaining power, or relative technical production efficieny? Again, as a reminder, the
sample used for this analysis concerns a somewhat atypical sample in the sense that all
fathers and mothers have reported to spend at least some time on both public goods.
Nevertheless, a gender pattern is observable. Gender roles as defined by Sen (1999)
imply women to be more responsible than the men for household tasks and taking care
of the children as compared to their contribution to market work, while the men’s main
responsibility is to generate income.
Culture, bargaining power, and technical efficieny are expressed in the model in the
following way; culture or preferences are represented by the α’s and the β’s, bargaining
power can be found through the λ’s, and technical production efficiency through the γ’s.
All these parameters have been obtained through the 3 individual estimation steps. How-
ever, given the complexity of the model, interpreting the magnitudes of all the parameters
is no easy task. Recall that the system estimated by CRV (2012) consists of ten main
equations, one for every dependent variable (cm , cf , lm , lf , hkm , hkf , hpm , hpf , ck , cp ), which
are modelled through functions of observable variables (wm , wf , Y, s, z), and where the
estimated parameters through the main and auxiliary equations represent the underly-
ing structural model consisting of individual preferences of the father and mother, their
bargaining power, and the household’s production technologies. Although the estima-
tion strategy is different in the current study with different dependent variables in the
consecutive steps etc., the model is exactly similar. Therefore, the parameters of these
three spheres show the underlying structure and mechanisms with respect to dependent
variables related to time spent on the well-being of children and the other public good
as well, and consequently the underlying mechanisms of the phenomenon gender roles.
In table (5.11) an overview of the structural estimation results is presented.
To start with the estimates on the preferences or tradition, a number of findings
stand out. First of all, α0m is higher than α0f , showing fathers care more about leisure (as
compared to private consumption) than mothers, which might help to explain the higher
observed time allocation to leisure of fathers. Furthermore, the positive βi (i = m, f )
indicate that additional budget to full private expenditures goes proportionately more
to leisure than to private consumption, and even more so for fathers than for mothers.
Combined with the fact that both parents have a relatively more intense preference
for leisure when of older age, the estimates on the preference parameters appear to
explain at least part of the observed behavioral pattern with respect to leisure (given
fathers are on average older than the mothers). More importantly here are however
the marginal rates of substitution between public facilities, children’s well-being and
private (full) expenditures for both partners. By applying equation (5.5), the fathers
appear to be willing to give up more of their share in full private expenditures than the
mothers for a higher level of children’s well-being, given average wages and time spent
on leisure (approximately -11 percent versus -8 percent). This pattern is reversed for
public facilities (approximately -9 percent versus -14 percent), indicating that fathers
care more than mothers about children’s well-being, and less about public facilities. As
the descriptives reveal that fathers spend approximately equal time on taking care of the
children, but less time on public facilities as compared to the mothers, the estimates on
the preferences seem to suggest that this is at least partly due to their preferences and
impact on utility of the levels of the public goods. Hence, our results show that for this
sample the tradition or culture is for fathers to care more about children’s well-being
and less about other household tasks, as compared to the mothers. This result therefore
runs counter to the common presumption that gender role behavior is due to the fact
that fathers, as they accomplish these tasks less than the mothers, simply do not care
about the children’s well-being and public facilities.
Secondly, we look at the estimates reflecting technical efficiency, γm k , γ k , γ p , and γ p .
f m f
k k
To start with γm and γf , and as noted in section (5.1.1), the marginal rate of substitution
of the father’s time in terms of the mother’s time, in the point where they both spend
equal time on the well-being of children, is 1.20116. Hence, the father appears to be
more effiicient in taking care of the children, as the mother needs to spend 1.20116 time-
units more when the father spends one time-unit less on taking care of the children. A
Table 5.8: Overview structural estimation results
Std. Err.
α0m -1.87067
2.55022
α1m 2.33095∗
1.08143
k
α̃m 0.11631
0.18046
p
α̃m 0.06264
0.61577
βm 0.08972∗∗
0.00201
α0f -2.72460
2.32397
α1f 2.33216∗
1.05023
α̃fk -0.20817
0.24719
α̃fp 0.39168
0.51805
βf 0.08662∗∗
0.00425
k
γm 0.15107
-
γfk 0.12577
-
γck 0.72317
-
p
γm 0.04089
-
γfp 0.04004
-
γcp 0.91907
-
σk 1
Cobb-Douglas
σp 0.28072
-
λ0 -0.03674
0.09420
λ1 (Wage ratio) 0.32686∗∗
0.04185
λ2 (Full income) 0.00000∗∗
0.00000
λ3 (Work type of the mother) -0.09393
0.08215
λ4 (House ownership of the father) -0.11000
0.08664
somewhat similar picture emerges on the U p side, where the marginal rate of substitution
of the father’s time in terms of the mother’s time is 1.02134, at the point where hpm equals
hpf . Therefore fathers appear to be slightly more or equally efficient when it comes to
the production of pulic facilities. Summing up, relative efficiency does play in explaining
the behavioral pattern of the households in this sample, yet, if this would be the only
factor explaining behavior, the fathers would in fact spend more time on public tasks
than the mothers, as they are more efficient.
Hence, only one of the original three factors remain to explain gender role behavior
observed within these households, bargaining power. Once over, if one accepts the
functional form of the utility function as a good representation of the terms on which
the bargaining process is taking place, then the estimates on the Pareto weights reveal
that in the majority of households, the father has slightly more bargaining power than
the mother. This result can largely be attributed to average wage difference between the
fathers and mothers (as observable in the summary statitics). As a result, the preferences
of the father will on average prevail somewhat over the preferences of the mother. As
the fathers prefer to spend time on leisure, we see fathers to allocate more time to this
private good.
Nevertheless, the proposed factors influencing the gender roles only partly explain
the observed behavioral pattern. Wages play a key role throughout all three factors
and equations, which has until now only been visible through the bargaining power
argument (and somewhat through the culture argument). Although our results show
that fathers are more efficient when it comes to taking care of the children and producing
public facilities, we have to consider the opportunity costs of this time allocation as well.
Spending time on market work allows the fathers to benefit from the higher wage rate.
As a result, both partners have to determine cooperatively how to allocate or balance
their time over all activities (i.e. market work, leisure, children’s well-being, public
facilities) in an optimal way, related to the marginal rates of substitution. Equation
(2.19) allows us to assess this. By making use of this equation, we obtain the values
of 0.81725 on the children side, and 0.90287 for the p domestic good. These values tell
us that the mother will on average dedicate more time to the creation of the domestic
goods than the father, as it is more opportune for the father to generate income at the
much higher wage rate and to spend less time on the production of the domestic goods,
even though he is the more efficient producer. Remarkable is however the lower value
on the children side compared to the public facilities side; the pattern observed through
the summary statistics would suggest the reverse of these values (i.e. for the value on
the children side to be higher than on the public facilities side, although still lower than
one). This could be due to the fact that these are aggregated results, in contrast to
the model predictions which are household specific. Therefore, this inequality could be
satisfied for every household individually, but not when aggregated over all households.
Nevertheless, opportunity costs through the wage gap add to the story on the observed
gender role pattern.
Addtionaly, the wage ratio enters equations (4.12) and (4.13) not only as distribution
factor (thereby increasing his Pareto weight and therefore his share in the total private
βm
wm
expenditures), but also through the ratio β . This effect runs opposite to the bar-
wf f
gaining effect, in fact decreasing the father’s share in the total private expenditures (if
both βm and βf are greater than zero). This counter effect will be larger when βm > βf
(given that ln wm are normalized to always be greater than one), which is only mildly
the case. Furthermore, leisure of the father is more expensive than of the mother, as
the opportunity costs for the father are higher considering his higher wage. Hence, it is
more efficient from a utility maximizing perspective to give some additional budget to
the mother instead of the father, and this effect increases to the extent that βm > βf .
In other words, the private share of the father is somewhat lowered, as both partners
know that the father will spend additional budget to the expensive good of leisure (more
intensly than the mother, as βm > βf ). As a result, a higher overall welfare level can be
more efficiently reached when giving the father a little less private share as he normally
would obtain, solely on the basis of his increased Pareto weight or bargaining power
through the wage difference. Notwithstanding this countereffect, the effect of the wage
ratio through the bargaining position will dominate, considering the exponential in the
function.
In short, the observed gender pattern cannot be explained by tradition (as the father
is willing to give up a large part of his private share for a higher level of public goods),
nor by relative technical efficiency (as the father is the more effcient producer for both
public goods). Bargaining power and the wage difference (and the combination of these)
can explain why fathers spend more time on market work than the mothers, spend equal
time on taking care of the children, less time on pulbic tasks, and addtionally, more
on leisure. However, one has to keep in mind that many parameters are not estimated
significantly, which is perhaps not strange considering the small sample used in the
current study. Nothwithstanding this limitation, a story on the underlying mechanisms
does emerge from the parameters.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In the current contribution we analysed the pattern of gender roles in rural Burundian
households in a structural way. This intra-household pattern, in which the women have
a greater responsibility than the men for taking care of public tasks such as cooking,
cleaning, and for taking care of the children, next to their agricultural market activities,
and the men devote less time to these public tasks and more time to formal labor activ-
ities to generate income, is still very apparent in rural Burundi. Although many studies
acknowledge this pattern, they generally simply attribute the gender role behavior to
culture. This study has challenged this presumption by analysing the contribution of
three possible factors that could explain the gender pattern; culture, tradition and pref-
erences, bargaining power, and relative technical efficiency in taking care of the children
and other public tasks compared to generating income on the labor market.
To test these mechanisms, we utilize the collective labor supply model of CRV (2012).
In this structural model, which is applicable to households consisting of a couple plus
children, the parents’ individual preferences do not only depend on private consumption
of market goods and leisure, but also on the production of public goods. These public
goods are the output of combining goods bought on the market with spouses’ time. Two
domestic goods are incorporated in the model, taking care of the children’s well-being,
and other household tasks. This model allows us to disentangle the contribution of the
three mechanisms in a structural way.
We applied the model to new and unique data collected in rural Burundi with de-
tailed disaggregate information on time-use of the father and mother, as well as the
intrahousehold allocation of all expenditures. We have selected a sample of 121 Bu-
rundian households with children in which both partners allocate at least some time to
taking care of the children and other hosuehold tasks. This is somewhat atypical, as
in over twothirds of all households in the total sample (401 households) either one of
the partners or both did not engage in taking care of the children and/or household
tasks. Nevertheless, in both samples (the sample used and the total sample) a gender
pattern is observable (although stronger in 401 sample due to zero time inputs): the
fathers spend more time on market work, more time on leisure, less time on taking care
of the children (although this is roughly equal in the selected sample), and less time
43
44 CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
on other household tasks. Our estimation strategy consisted of three independent and
consecutive steps. Firstly, the levels of public production were estimated by OLS, using
a Cobb-Douglas production technology for taking care of the children’s well-being, and
CES for the other public good. Production shifters (absolute age difference, number of
children, and the mean age of the children) were introduced as required for identification.
Secondly, private consumption and leisure were estimated through GM M . Endogene-
ity concerns of independent variables were resolved through the use of the production
shifters and distribution factors as instruments (the wage ratio, full income, the type of
work of the mother, and ownership of the house by the father). Finally, the effects of the
instruments and the distribution factors on the private relative shares were estimated
through N LS.
Our results show that all three mechanisms play a role in understanding the observed
behavioral pattern within the sample of Burundian households, although not always
contributing to the observed gender pattern. One extra time unit spent on children by
the father benefits the level of children well-being (in terms of time and expenditures)
more than one extra time unit spent on children by the mother, for an equal amount
of time spent on children (marginal rate of substitution of 1.20116). The same story
holds for the other domestic good, although the marginal rate of substitution between
the father and mother is much lower here (marginal rate of substitution of 1.02134).
Therefore, relative technical efficiency cannot explain why fathers spend less time on
pulbic tasks and children than the mothers. Evidence on the preferences or culture
show that, in contrary perhaps to the dominant culture, the fathers in this sample
care more about children’s well-being than mothers (i.e. have more intense preferences
towards this public good), and less about other household tasks. To increase the level of
children’s well-being and public facilities with one percent, the father is willing to give
up respectively 11 percent and 9 percent of his amount of private full expenditures (as
apposed to respectively 8 and 14 percent for the mother). Both these factors could help
to explain though why fathers allocate less time to public facilities than the mothers,
but roughly equal time to taking care of the children.
What does explain the gender pattern in these households is the bargaining power
of the fathers, mainly through the wage ratio. As fathers earn on average more than
mothers, this factor has a significant impact on the private share of the father. Although
caution is necessary with interpreting the level of the Pareto weight due to the fact that
a monotonic transformation of the utility functions in main collective objective function
also changes the Pareto weight (but not the solution to the model), in the majority of
households the father has a higher Pareto weight than the mother (0.57202). This allows
the fathers to let their preferences prevail somewhat in household decision-making, and
consequently spend their increased private share more on leisure as they prefer.
Additionally, wages play two complementary roles. As the wage ratio benefits the
father, opportunity costs dictate the father to spend more time on generating income,
and equal time on public tasks and more time on taking care of the children, as compared
to the mother. Moreover, the wage ratio plays an additonal role in the determination
of the private shares of the father, in fact running counter to the effect of his higher
45
bargaining power due to the wage ratio. This effect limits his private share somewhat,
as a higher welfare level can be reached more efficiently by giving additional budget to
the mothers instead of to the fathers, as fathers tend to spend it more on ’expensive’
leisure (time valued in terms of wages), while mother prefer to spend more of their share
on private consumption. In short, all hypothesized factors contribute to the observed
behavior within the sample, while bargaining power and the wage difference explain
most of the observed gender pattern. Hence, these results disprove the presumption
that gender roles can simply be attributed to the tradition of fathers caring less about
taking care of the children and public tasks than the mothers, or at least for this sample.
A limitation of this study is that the sample is not only small, it is also atypical.
Most of the couples with children in the orginal sample exhibited stronger gender pat-
terns, in which one of the partners or both reported zero time input on some of the
time related dependent variables. The model in its current form cannot include these
households, as the use of the CES production technology for the two public goods k and
p does not permit zero time inputs. The CES production technology with substitution
elasticities between 0 and 1 (corners of 0 and 1 included) can never generate these ob-
servations as optimum. Future research should therefore focus on adapting the model
towards incorporating these more common households, thereby increasing the sample
size, to test whether these mechanisms are of equal importance in the larger, more gen-
eral sample. This would increase the generality of these collective labor supply models.
The sample size also has its effects on the estimations, in which certain parameters were
not estimated significantly. Particularly worrisome could be the non-significance of one
of the distribution factors here, as at least one of the these factors needs to be of (sig-
nificant) impact for the model to be identified. Furthermore, the difficulties faced with
the estimation of public production in terms of the production shifters and functional
forms leaves room for improvement, to say the least. Nevertheless, by unraveling the
mechanisms underlying the gender role behavior related to gender roles of the atypical
sample used in this study, a first step is taken towards structurally understanding the
behavior of the Burundian peasant households in general.
46 CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
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Appendix A
A.1 Appendix
In step 2 of the estimation strategy (section 4.2) we use the GM M estimator to estimate
the conditional optimal expenditure share of private consumption in full private expen-
ditures, by use of equation ((2.23), (4.11), or (5.3), which are exactly the same). In this
appendix, this estimator will be discussed in more detail (following Hayashi (2000)), as
the central equation of the current contribution is estimated with it.
Denote the vector of 121 observations on the dependent variable of equation (2.23),
that is of φcii , by y. Let X be the N ×l–matrix of explanatory variables, that is each row x′n
(with n = 1, 2, ..., N ) contains the values of the explanatory variables for an observation
′ j j j j j j
n : xn = (1, agei , wi , φi , ln Ub c , hm , hf ; γ bn , for (j = k, p). The matrix X should
bn , σ
consist of independent columns, thus its rank is equal to l. The g-vector βi contains the
parameters to be estimated, that is βi = (αi0 , αi1 , αik , αip , βi )′ (i = m, f ). Furthermore,
the N × q-matrix Z contain on each row z′n the values of the full set of instruments
(i.e. exogenous explanatory variables plus the instruments) for an observation n(n =
1, 2, ..., N ) : z′n = (1, agei , wi , s′ , d′ )n , where s’ contains all the production shifters for
both domestic goods (k & p) (if some of these variables occur in both processes, they will
only be retained once in z’), and where d’ contains all the distribution factors (elsewhere
the distribtion factors are denoted by z, but to not to confound these with the z’, we
use d’ here). Assume that the total number of elements of z’, q, is larger than or
equal to g (respectively overidentified or just identified), the number of parameters to
be estimated. The matrix Z should also have independent columns, or rank equal to q.
Finally, f(X; βi ) is the N -vector of the right side of equation (2.23) for each observation
n (n = 1, 2, ..., N ), and the vector of disturbance terms is ε(βi ) = y − f(X; βi ). The
non-linear IV -estimator is then defined as a set of values for βi such that the q moment
conditions are:
E{Z′ ε(βi )} = 0 (A.1)

are best approximated. Since there are only g ≤ q parameters (the system is overi-
dentified), these q moment conditions cannot generally be satisfied all exactly when
g < q. Therefore, the non-linear IV -estimator is defined by minimising the following
criterion function:
51
52 APPENDIX A.
(ε(bi ))′ Z(Z′ Z)−1 Z′ ε(bi ) (A.2)

with respect to bi . Thus the non-linear IV -estimator bi,IV equals;
bi,IV := arg min(ε(bi ))′ Z(Z′ Z)−1 Z′ ε(bi ) (A.3)

bi
The class of generalised method of moments (GM M ) estimators generalises this

idea by specifying a more general criterion function:
(ε(bi ))′ ZWZ′ ε(bi ) (A.4)

where the weighting matrix, W, could in principle be any positive definite matrix.
In the IV -case, the weighting matrix is up to a constant equal to the inverse of the
covariance matrix of the empirical counter part of the q moment conditions, that is
Z′ ε(βi ), assuming that the elements of the vector of disturbance terms are identically and
independently distributed. It is possible to relax the identical distribution assumption.
Define ὲ(βi ) as the diagonal N × N –matrix IN ε(βi ), and define Wt as:
Wt := (Z′ ὲ(bi,t−1 )ὲ(bi,t−1 )Z)−1 (A.5)

Now, by starting from bi,0 := bi,IV , we could then iteratively define:
bi,t := arg min(ε(bi ))′ ZWt Z′ ε(bi ) (A.6)

bi
Upon convergence, an instance of the class of GM M -estimators is:
bi,GM M := lim bi,t (A.7)

t→∞
This estimator is implemented through the default GM M -routine in ST AT A.

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Unraveling

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Unraveling mechanisms underlying gender roles in

FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS

Jesse Willem d’An

Thesis submitted to obt

Promotor: Bart Cap

Academic year: 2014-2

It is generally claimed that in traditional African agricultural societies, such as Burundi,

, where we made use of the identity Ti ≡ Li + li + j=k,p hji (i = m, f ).

νi = ui (ci , li , U k (ck , hkm , hkf ; sk ), U p (cp , hpm , hpf ; sp )) (2.3)

Preferences are therefore defined over four arguments, private consumption ci (i =

2.2 Public production

, where σ j ∈ [0, ∞] (j = k, p) is a measure of the degree to which commodities,

2.3 Collective objective function

max λm (wm , wf , Y, z)νm (cm , lm , U k , U p )

2.4 Solving the model

resulting in i=m,f φi = i=m,f wi Ti +y − j=k,p (cj + i=m,f wi hji ). On the basis of φi

max νi (li , ci , U¯k , U¯p ) (2.8)

We can than replace the direct utility functions νi (i = m, f ) by their conditional

max λm (wm , wf , Y, z)υm (wm Tm + ρm , wm , U k , U p ) (2.10)

+ (1 − λm (wm , wf , Y, z))υf (wf Tf + ρf , wf , U k , U p )

(wi hji ) = E¯j

In turn, these equations can be rewritten in the following way (j = k, p):

φm λm (wm , wf , Y, z)/(wm )βm

In order to guarantee that 1 ≥ λm (wm , wf , Y, z) ≥ 0, we impose the following func-

, where agei (i = m, f ) is the taste shifter associated with changing preferences as

The collective household model as presented will be applied to a unique, cross-sectional

121 households, as well as on the sample of 401 households.

for example inheritance, or acquisition).

Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics 121 Burundian households

Father (m) Mother (f ) Household

Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics 401 Burundian households

Father (m) Mother (f ) Household

4.1 Step 1: Public production

qjni = ψ0j + ψ1j dm,ni − σ j ln wni (4.3)

, where the subscript ni refers to an element of the corresponding vectors, that

Denoting the estimated parameters by a hat, an estimate of γ j (j = k, p) for a

bnj (hji ) cj (cj , hj , hj ; γ

Ωjni = ψ0j + ψ1j dm,ni (4.9)

4.2 Step 2: Private consumption and leisure

4.3 Step 3: The sharing rule

5.1 Public production

qj ,ni = ψ0j + ψ1j dm,ni − σ j ln wni (5.1)

Ωj ,ni = ψ0j + ψ1j dm,ni (5.2)

5.1.1 Children well-being (k)

Table 5.1: Step 1: Cobb-Douglas, dep. var. Ω k , by OLS

Table 5.2: Step 1: Cobb-Douglas, nk production shifter, dep. var. Ω k , by OLS

ψ2k (nk ) -0.16053

ψ3k (nk ) -0.15370

5.1.2 Public facilities (p)

Table 5.3: Step 1: CES, dep. var. qp,ni , by OLS

σ1p (Absolute age difference) -0.00678

σ2p (nk ) -0.02566

σ3p (Mean age of children) 0.03408

ψ2p (1 ) (Absolute age difference) 0.00337

ψ2p (2 ) (nk ) -0.00253

ψ2p (3 ) (Mean age of children) 0.07003

ψ3p (1 ) (Absolute age difference) 0.00207

ψ3p (2 ) (nk ) -0.01683

ψ3p (3 ) (Mean age of children) 0.03624

5.2 Private consumption and leisure

Recall that the equation to estimate in this step 2 is (i = m, f ):

Table 5.5: Step 2: dep. var φcm

d φi ∂vi (φi ,wi ,U k ,U p )/∂U j φi ln(wi )αji

5.3 The sharing rule