Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Grarido File
Grarido File
The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bona
fide residents of Metro Manila and taxpayers and leaders in their respective
communities. They maintain that they have a common or general interest in the
preservation of the rule of law, protection of their human rights and the reign of
peace and order in their communities. They claim to represent "the citizens of
Metro Manila who have similar interests and are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before this Court."
The public respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, oppose the petition
contending inter alia that petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for
they are not the proper parties to institute the action.
2. June l9, 1987 at about l0:00 PM in Mata Street, Panday Pira Extension and San
Sebastian Street, Tondo, Manila.
4. August 11 to l3, 1987 between 11:00 PM and 2:00 AM in six blocks along
Aroma Beach up to Happy Land, Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.
5. August 19, 1987 at 9:00 PM in Herbosa Extension, Quirino Street, and Pacheco
Street, Tondo, Manila.
6. August 28, 1987 at l0:30 PM, in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan Navotas, Metro
Manila.
8. October 12, 1987 at 12:00 midnight in Apelo Cruz Compound, Quezon City.
10. October 23, 1987 at 2:30 A.M. in Sun Valley Drive, Manila International
Airport, Pasay City.
11. November 1, 1987 at 4:00 A.M. in Cordillera Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila.
12. November 3, 1987 at 5:00 A.M. in Lower Maricaban, Pasay City, Metro Manila.
According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or saturation drives" are in
critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the
subversives are hiding. The arrests range from seven (7) persons during the July
20 saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one thousand five hundred (1,500)
allegedly apprehended on November 3 during the drive at Lower Maricaban,
Pasay City. The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common
pattern of human rights abuses. In all these drives, it is alleged that the following
were committed:
7. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and
unwelcome intrusions are arrested on the spot and hauled off to
waiting vehicles that take them to detention centers where they are
interrogated and 'verified.' These arrests are all conducted without
any warrants of arrest duly issued by a judge, nor under the
conditions that will authorize warrantless arrest. Some hooded men
are used to fingerpoint suspected subversives.
9. The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point them
at the residents during these illegal operations.
11. Those who are detained for further 'verification' by the raiders
are subjected to mental and physical torture to extract confessions
and tactical information. (Rollo, pp. 2-4)
The public respondents stress two points in their Comment which was also
adopted as their Memorandum after the petition was given due course.
First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And
second, they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate
disregard for human rights are total lies.
Insofar as the legal basis for saturation drives is concerned, the respondents cite
Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which provides:
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action of
the nature described by the petitioners would be illegal and blantantly violative of
the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If the military and the police must
conduct concerted campaigns to flush out and catch criminal elements, such
drives must be consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of all the
people affected by such actions.
There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the
Chief Executive, invoked by the Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop
unabated criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist activities. The
Constitution grants to Government the power to seek and cripple subversive
movements which would bring down constituted authority and substitute a
regime where individual liberties are suppressed as a matter of policy in the name
of security of the State. However, all police actions are governed by the
limitations of the Bill of Rights. The Government cannot adopt the same
reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and of the left,
the enlargement of whose spheres of influence it is trying hard to suppress. Our
democratic institutions may still be fragile but they are not in the least bit
strengthened through violations of the constitutional protections which are their
distinguishing features.
In Roan v. Gonzales (145 SCRA 687; 690-691 [1986]), the Court stated:
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the
right to be left alone in the privacy of his own house. That right has
ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history to the mighty
English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly
subject had his own castle where he was monarch of all he surveyed.
This was his humble cottage from which he could bar his sovereign
lord and all the forces of the Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few
libertarian regimes. Their number, regrettably, continues to dwindle
against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the
fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the
past despotism. We must cherish and protect it all the more now
because it is like a prodigal son returning.
Only last year, the Court again issued this reminder in 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation v. Court of Appeals (164 SCRA 655; 660- 661 [1988]):
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rochin v. California, (342 US
165; 96 L. Ed. 183 [1952]) emphasizes clearly that police actions should not be
characterized by methods that offend a sense of justice. The court ruled:
It is significant that it is not the police action perse which is impermissible and
which should be prohibited. Rather, it is the procedure used or in the words of
the court, methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities." InBreithaupt v.
Abram (352 US 432, 1 L. Ed. 2nd 448 [1957]), the same court validated the use of
evidence, in this case blood samples involuntarily taken from the petitioner,
where there was nothing brutal or offensive in the taking. The Court stated:
Basically the distinction rests on the fact that there is nothing 'brutal'
or 'offensive' in the taking of a sample of blood when done, as in this
case, under the protective eye of a physician. To be sure, the driver
here was unconscious when the blood was taken, but the absence of
conscious consent, without more, does not necessarily render the
taking a violation of a constitutional light; and certainly the rest was
administered here would not be considered offensive by even the
most delicate. Furthermore, due process is not measured by the
yardstick of personal reaction or the sphygmogram of the most
sensitive person, but by that whole community sense of 'decency and
fairness that has been woven by common experience into the fabric
of acceptable conduct....
The individual's right to immunity from such invasion of his body was considered
as "far outweighed by the value of its deterrent effect" on the evil sought to be
avoided by the police action.
It is clear, therefore, that the nature of the affirmative relief hinges closely on the
determination of the exact facts surrounding a particular case.
The violations of human rights alleged by the petitioners are serious. If an orderly
procedure ascertains their truth, not only a writ of prohibition but criminal
prosecutions would immediately issue as a matter of course. A persistent pattern
of wholesale and gross abuse of civil liberties, as alleged in the petition, has no
place in civilized society.
On the other hand, according to the respondents, the statements made by the
petitioners are a complete lie.
Just the contrary, they had been conducted with due regard to
human rights. Not only that, they were intelligently and carefully
planned months ahead of the actual operation. They were executed
in coordination with barangay officials who pleaded with their
constituents to submit themselves voluntarily for character and
personal verification. Local and foreign correspondents, who had
joined these operations, witnessed and recorded the events that
transpired relative thereto. (After Operation Reports: November 5,
1987, Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex 13; November 24, 1987,
Annex 14). That is why in all the drives so far conducted, the alleged
victims who numbered thousands had not themselves complained.
...To our soldiers, let me say go out and fight, fight with every
assurance that I will stand by you through thick and thin to share the
blame, defend your actions, mourn the losses and enjoy with you the
final victory that I am certain will be ours.
Only feats of arms can buy us the time needed to make our economic
and social initiatives bear fruit. . . Now that the extreme Right has
been defeated, I expect greater vigor in the prosecution of the war
against the communist insurgency, even as we continue to watch our
backs against attacks from the Right. (Philippine Star, January 27,
1988, p. 1, Annex 15; emphasis supplied)
Herein lies the problem of the Court. We can only guess the truth. Everything
before us consists of allegations. According to the petitioners, more than 3,407
persons were arrested in the saturation drives covered by the petition. No
estimates are given for the drives in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas; Apelo Cruz
Compound, Pasig; and Sun Valley Drive near the Manila International Airport
area. Not one of the several thousand persons treated in the illegal and inhuman
manner described by the petitioners appears as a petitioner or has come before a
trial court to present the kind of evidence admissible in courts of justice.
Moreover, there must have been tens of thousands of nearby residents who were
inconvenienced in addition to the several thousand allegedly arrested. None of
those arrested has apparently been charged and none of those affected has
apparently complained.
The latest attempt to stage a coup d'etat where several thousand members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines sought to overthrow the present Government
introduces another aspect of the problem and illustrates quite clearly why those
directly affected by human rights violations should be the ones to institute court
actions and why evidence of what actually transpired should first be developed
before petitions are filed with this Court.
Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go
in force to the combat areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up
suspected rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion without having to
secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights. This is exactly
what happened in the White Plains Subdivision and the commercial center of
Makati during the first week of December, 1989.
The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out subversives
and criminal elements particularly because of the blatant assassinations of public
officers and police officials by elements supposedly coddled by the communities
where the "drives" were conducted.
It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents, however, that
there was no rebellion or criminal activity similar to that of the attempted coup d'
etats. There appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or
warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from
sleep were arrested. There is no strong showing that the objectives sought to be
attained by the "areal zoning" could not be achieved even as the rights of squatter
and low income families are fully protected.
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually
committed. This is so inspite of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the
thousands of residents "to submit themselves voluntarily for character and
personal verification." We cannot imagine police actions of the magnitude
described in the petitions and admitted by the respondents, being undertaken
without some undisciplined soldiers and policemen committing certain abuses.
However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and
legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt
in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent demonstrations if they
do not move in sufficient numbers. A show of force is sometimes necessary as
long as the rights of people are protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition
such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one
confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific
individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police
decide to sit down in their offices because all concerted drives where a show of
force is present are totally prohibited.
The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a taxpayers'
suit. Where not one victim complains and not one violator is properly
charged, the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court. It is basically one for
the executive departments and for trial courts. Well meaning citizens with only
second hand knowledge of the events cannot keep on indiscriminately tossing
problems of the executive, the military, and the police to the Supreme Court as if
we are the repository of all remedies for all evils. The rules of constitutional
litigation have been evolved for an orderly procedure in the vindication of rights.
They should be followed. If our policy makers sustain the contention of the
military and the police that occasional saturation drives are essential to maintain
the stability of government and to insure peace and order, clear policy guidelines
on the behavior of soldiers and policemen must not only be evolved, they should
also be enforced. A method of pinpointing human rights abuses and identifying
violators is necessary.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A high level
conference should bring together the heads of the Department of Justice,
Department of National Defense and the operating heads of affected agencies
and institutions to devise procedures for the prevention of abuses.
In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were
probably committed and could be committed during future police actions, we
have to temporarily restrain the alleged banging on walls, the kicking in of doors,
the herding of half-naked men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks,
the violation of residences even if these are humble shanties of squatters, and the
other alleged acts which are shocking to the conscience.
In the meantime, the acts violative of human rights alleged by the petitioners as
committed during the police actions are ENJOINED until such time as permanent
rules to govern such actions are promulgated.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
Mr. Justice Gutierrez and I are kindred spirits and usually find ourselves together
on the side of liberty. It saddens me that in the case at bar he is on the side of
authority.
This is not to say that liberty and authority are irreconcilable enemies. The two
must in fact co-exist, for only in a well-ordered society can rights be properly
enjoyed. Implicit in that theory, however, is the other imperative: that the highest
function of authority is to insure liberty.
While acknowledging that the military is conducting the saturation drives, the
majority practically blinks them away on mere technicalities. First, there are no
proper parties. Second, there is no proof. Therefore, the petition is dismissed.
The majority says it cannot act against the drives because no one directly affected
has complained. Such silence, if I understand the ponencia correctly, has in effect
purged the drives of all oppressiveness and washed them clean.
(The reason for the silence is fear. These raids are conducted not in the enclaves
of the rich but in the deprived communities, where the residents have no power
or influence. The parties directly aggrieved are afraid. They are the little people.
They cannot protest lest they provoke retaliation for their temerity. Their only
hope is in this Court, and we should not deny them that hope.)
The ruling that the petitioners are not proper parties is a specious pretext for
inaction. We have held that technical objections may be brushed aside where
there are constitutional questions that must be met. There are many decisions
applying this doctrine. (Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil. 603; Tolentino v. Commission
on Elections, 41 SCRA 702; Philconsa v. Jimenez, 65 SCRA 479; Edu v. Ericta, 35
SCRA 481; Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835; Lagunsad v. Court
of Appeals; 154 SCRA 199; Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208). Lozada was in fact an
aberration.
I believe that where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he
may not be directly injured. Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone
makes him a proper party. It is not only the owner of the burning house who has
the right to call the firemen. Every one has the right and responsibility to prevent
the fire from spreading even if he lives in the other block.
The majority seems to be willing to just accept the Solicitor General's assertion
that the claimed abuses are "complete lies" and leave it at that. But a blanket
denial is not enough. The evidence is there on media, in the papers and on radio
and television, That kind of evidence cannot be cavalierly dismissed as "complete
lies."
The saturation drive is not unfamiliar to us. It is like the "zona" of the Japanese
Occupation. An area was surrounded by soldiers and all residents were flushed
out of their houses and lined up, to be looked over by a person with a bag over his
head. This man pointed to suspected guerrillas, who were immediately arrested
and eventually if not instantly executed.
To be sure, there are some variations now. The most important difference is that
it is no longer 1943 and the belligerent occupation is over. There is no more war.
It is now 1990, when we are supposed to be under a free Republic and
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.
The provision is intended to protect the individual from official (and officious)
intrusions, no matter how humble his abode and however lowly his station in life.
Against the mighty forces of the government, the person's house is his castle, his
inviolate refuge and exclusive domain where he is the monarch of all he surveys.
Yet in the dead of night, armed soldiers may knock on one's door and command
him at gunpoint to come out so he and his neighbors, who have also been
rounded up, can all be placed on public examination, as in a slave market. This is
followed by the arrest and detention of those suspected of villainy, usually on the
basis only of the tattoos on their bodies or the informer's accusing finger.
Where is the search warrant or the warrant of arrest required by the Bill of
Rights? Where is the probable cause that must be determined personally by the
judge, and by no other, to justify the warrant? Where is the examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce to
establish the probable cause? Where is the particular description that must be
stated in the warrant, of the places to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized? And where, assuming all these may be dispensed with, is the admissible
exception to the rule?
Saturation drives are not among the accepted instances when a search or an
arrest may be made without warrant. They come under the concept of the fishing
expeditions stigmatized by law and doctrine. At any rate, if the majority is really
introducing the "zona" as another exception to the rule, it must not equivocate. It
must state that intention in forthright language and not in vague generalizations
that concede the wrong but deny the right.
To justify the "zona" on the basis of the recent coup attempt is, in my view, to
becloud the issue. The "zonas" complained of happened before the failed coup
and had nothing whatsoever to do with that disturbance. There was no "large
scale mutiny or actual rebellion' when the saturation drives were conducted and
there were no "combat areas" either in the places where the violations were
committed. The failed coup cannot validate the invalid "zonas' retroactively.
The ponencia says that "we cannot take judicial notice of the facts and figures
given by the petitioners regarding these saturation drives conducted by the
military and police authorities." Maybe so. But we can and should take judicial
notice of the saturation drives themselves which are not and cannot be denied by
the government.
I urge my brethren to accept the fact that those drives are per se unconstitutional.
I urge them to accept that even without proof of the hooded figure and the
personal indignities and the loss and destruction of properties and the other
excesses allegedly committed, the mere waging of the saturation drives alone is
enough to make this Court react with outraged concern.
Confronted with this clear case of oppression, we should not simply throw up our
hands and proclaim our helplessness. I submit that this Court should instead
declare categorically and emphatically that these saturation drives are violative of
human rights and individual liberty and so should be stopped immediately. While
they may be allowed in the actual theater of military operations against the
insurgents, the Court should also make it clear that Metro Manila is not such a
battleground.
The danger to our free institutions lies not only in those who openly defy the
authority of the government and violate its laws. The greater menace is in those
who, in the name of democracy, destroy the very things it stands for as in this
case and so undermine democracy itself.
Where liberty is debased into a cruel illusion, all of us are degraded and
diminished. Liberty is indivisible; it belongs to every one. We should realize that
when the bell tolls the death of liberty for one of us, "it tolls for thee" and for all
of us.
This case is another classic instance of state power colliding with individual rights.
That the State, acting through the government and its forces, has the authority to
suppress lawless violence in all its forms cannot be denied. The exercise of that
authority is justified when viewed from the standpoint of the general welfare,
because the State has the elementary and indispensable duty to insure a peaceful
life and existence for its citizens. A government that loses its capability to insure
peace and order for its citizens loses the very right to remain in power.
But, in the exercise of such authority, i.e., in the choice of the means and methods
to suppress lawless violence, the right of the individual citizen to the dignity of his
person and the sanctity of his home cannot and should not be violated, unless
there is, in a particular case, a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the State has a compelling duty to suppress or abate.
I submit that since this Court is not a trier of facts and this case involves certainty
of facts alleged by petitioners and denied by respondents — this case should be
referred to a proper trial court where the petitioners can present evidence to
support and prove the allegations they make of such brutal and inhuman conduct
on the part of military and police units.
More than the military and police checkpoints sustained by this Court as a general
proposition during abnormal times,** and which involve the right of military and
police forces to check on vehicles and pedestrians passing through certain fixed
points for the purpose of apprehending criminals and/or confiscating prohibited
articles like unlicensed firearms, the "areal target zoning" and "saturation drives",
as described in petitioners' allegations, are actual raids on private homes in
selected areas, and are thus positive assaults against the individual person and his
dignity. The individual is, as described, yanked out of his home, without any arrest
warrant, to face investigation as to his connections with lawless elements. In
short, the sanctity of the home is pulverized by military and police action. Thus,
while the checkpoint is a defensive device, on the part of government, the "areal
target zoning" or "saturation drive" is a direct assault against, an intrusion into
individual rights and liberties.
Respondents, fortunately, have branded petitioners' allegations of such brutality,
as total lies. It is indeed difficult to even contemplate that such methods
reminiscent of a "police state" can exist in a society built on a republican and
constitutional system. Respondents Must be given a chance to face their accusers
and prove that they are indeed fabricating falsehoods. But the stakes I submit, are
too high for this Court, as the guardian of individual liberties, to avoid a judicial
confrontation with the issue.
I vote, therefore, to refer this case (dispensing with normal venue requirements)
to the Executive Judge, RTC of Manila, for him —
1. to receive the evidences of all the parties, in support and in refutation of the
petitioners' allegations;
2. to decide the case expeditiously on the bases of the evidence, subject to review
by this Court;
There is only one question here: Whether or not the police actions (saturation
drives) complained of constitute a valid exercise of police power.
The fact that on twelve occasions between March and November, 1987 the
military conducted the saturation drives in question is a fact open to no question.
The Solicitor General admits that they, the saturation drives, had been done,
except that they had been done "with due regard to human rights." "Not only
that," so he states:
... they were intelligently and carefully planned months ahead of the
actual operation. They were executed in coordination with barangay
officials who pleaded with their constituents to submit themselves
voluntarily for character and personal verification. Local and foreign
correspondents, who had joined these operations, witnessed, and
reported the events that transpired relative thereto. (After Operation
Reports: November 5, 1987, Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex
13; November 24, 1987, Annex 14). That is why in all the drives so far
conducted, the alleged victims who numbered thousands had not
themselves complained.
The question, then, is purely one of law: Are the saturation drives in question
lawful and legitimate? It is also a question that is nothing novel: No, because the
arrests were not accompanied by a judicial warrant. 1
Therefore, the fact that they had been carefully planned, executed in
coordination with Tondo's barangay officials, and undertaken with due courtesy
and politeness (which I doubt), will not validate them. The lack of a warrant
makes them, per se illegal.
According to the majority, "the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including
the essential and legitimate ones . . . [w]e see nothing wrong in police making
their presence visibly felt in troubled areas . . . " 2 But the petitioners have not
come to court to "stop all police actions" but rather, the saturation drives, which
are, undoubtedly, beyond police power.
That "[a] show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are
protected and not violated 3 is a contradiction in terms. A "show of force" (by way
of saturation drives) is a violation of human rights because it is not covered by a
judicial warrant.
In all candor, I can not swallow what I find is a complete exaggeration of the
issues:
As a general rule, a peace officer can not act unless he is possessed of the proper
arrest or search warrant. The exception is when a criminal offense is unfolding
before him, in which case, action is justified and necessary. The majority would
have the exception to be simply, the general rule.
The fact of the matter is that we are not here confronted by police officers on the
beat or prowl cars on patrol. What we have and I suppose that everybody is
agreed on it- are lightning raids of homes, arbitrary confiscation of effects, and
summary arrests of persons, the very acts proscribed by the Constitution. If this is
a "show of force", it certainly has no place in a constitutional democracy.
I find allusions to the last aborted coup d'etat inapt. In that case, our men in
uniform had all the right to act amidst crimes being committed in flagrante. The
instant case is quite different. There are no offenses being committed, but rather,
police officers fishing for evidence of offenses that may have been committed, As I
said, in that event, a court warrant is indispensable.
That "the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court 5 is to me, an abdication of
judicial duty. As I indicated, the controversy is purely one of law the facts being
undisputed. Law, needless to say, is the problem of the Supreme Court, not the
Executive.
Worse, it is passing the buck. The petitioners, precisely, have a grievance to raise,
arising from abuses they pinpoint to the lower offices of the Executive (which
presumably has its imprimatur). To make it an executive problem, so I hold, is to
make the Executive judge and jury of its own acts, and hardly, a neutral arbiter.
I am also taken aback by references to "[w]ell meaning citizens with only second
hand knowledge of the events ... keep[ing] on indiscriminately tossing problems -
of the Executive, the military, and the police to the Supreme Court as if we are the
repository of all remedies for all evils." 6 First, the facts are not "second-hand",
they are undisputed:Ther had been saturation drives. Second, the petitioners have
trooped to the highest court with a legitimate grievance against the Executive
(and military).
The fact that the majority would "remand" the case to the lower courts and the
various echelons of the Executive for investigation is to admit that walls have
indeed been banged, doors kicked in, and half-naked men herded. I do not see
therefore why we can not issue a writ of prohibition as prayed for, in the midst of
these facts.
Separate Opinions
Mr. Justice Gutierrez and I are kindred spirits and usually find ourselves together
on the side of liberty. It saddens me that in the case at bar he is on the side of
authority.
This is not to say that liberty and authority are irreconcilable enemies. The two
must in fact co-exist, for only in a well-ordered society can rights be properly
enjoyed. Implicit in that theory, however, is the other imperative: that the highest
function of authority is to insure liberty.
While acknowledging that the military is conducting the saturation drives, the
majority practically blinks them away on mere technicalities. First, there are no
proper parties. Second, there is no proof Therefore, the petition is dismissed.
The majority says it cannot act against the drives because no one directly affected
has complained. Such silence, if I understand the ponencia correctly, has in effect
purged the drives of all oppressiveness and washed them clean.
(The reason for the silence is fear. These raids are conducted not in the enclaves
of the rich but in the deprived communities, where the residents have no power
or influence. The parties directly aggrieved are afraid. They are the little people.
They cannot protest lest they provoke retaliation for their temerity. Their only
hope is in this Court, and we should not deny them that hope.)
The ruling that the petitioners are not proper parties is a specious pretext for
inaction. We have held that technical objections may be brushed aside where
there are constitutional questions that must be met. There are many decisions
applying this doctrine. (Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil. 603; Tolentino v. Commission
on Elections, 41 SCRA 702; Philconsa v. Jimenez, 65 SCRA 479; Edu v. Ericta, 35
SCRA 481; Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835; Lagunsad v. Court
of Appeals; 154 SCRA 199; Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208). Lozada was in fact an
aberration.
I believe that where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he
may not be directly injured. Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone
makes him a proper party. It is not only the owner of the burning house who has
the right to call the firemen. Every one has the right and responsibility to prevent
the fire from spreading even if he lives in the other block.
The majority seems to be willing to just accept the Solicitor General's assertion
that the claimed abuses are "complete lies" and leave it at that. But a blanket
denial is not enough. The evidence is there on media, in the papers and on radio
and television, That kind of evidence cannot be cavalierly dismissed as "complete
lies."
The saturation drive is not unfamiliar to us. It is like the "zona" of the Japanese
Occupation. An area was surrounded by soldiers and all residents were flushed
out of their houses and lined up, to be looked over by a person with a bag over his
head. This man pointed to suspected guerrillas, who were immediately arrested
and eventually if not instantly executed.
To be sure, there are some variations now. The most important difference is that
it is no longer 1943 and the belligerent occupation is over. There is no more war.
It is now 1990, when we are supposed to be under a free Republic and
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.
The provision is intended to protect the individual from official (and officious)
intrusions, no matter how humble his abode and however lowly his station in life.
Against the mighty forces of the government, the person's house is his castle, his
inviolate refuge and exclusive domain where he is the monarch of all he surveys.
Yet in the dead of night, armed soldiers may knock on one's door and command
him at gunpoint to come out so he and his neighbors, who have also been
rounded up, can all be placed on public examination, as in a slave market. This is
followed by the arrest and detention of those suspected of villainy, usually on the
basis only of the tattoos on their bodies or the informer's accusing finger.
Where is the search warrant or the warrant of arrest required by the Bill of
Rights? Where is the probable cause that must be determined personally by the
judge, and by no other, to justify the warrant? Where is the examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce to
establish the probable cause? Where is the particular description that must be
stated in the warrant, of the places to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized? And where, assuming all these may be dispensed with, is the admissible
exception to the rule?
Saturation drives are not among the accepted instances when a search or an
arrest may be made without warrant. They come under the concept of the fishing
expeditions stigmatized by law and doctrine. At any rate, if the majority is really
introducing the "zona' as another exception to the rule, it must not equivocate. It
must state that intention in forthright language and not in vague generalizations
that concede the wrong but deny the right.
To justify the "zona" on the basis of the recent coup attempt is, in my view, to
becloud the issue. The "zonas' complained of happened before the failed coup
and had nothing whatsoever to do with that disturbance. There was no "large
scale mutiny or actual rebellion' when the saturation drives were conducted and
there were no "combat areas" either in the places where the violations were
committed. The failed coup cannot validate the invalid "zonas' retroactively.
The ponencia says that "we cannot take judicial notice of the facts and figures
given by the petitioners regarding these saturation drives conducted by the
military and police authorities." Maybe so. But we can and should take judicial
notice of the saturation drives themselves which are not and cannot be denied by
the government.
I urge my brethren to accept the fact that those drives are per se unconstitutional.
I urge them to accept that even without proof of the hooded figure and the
personal indignities and the loss and destruction of properties and the other
excesses allegedly committed, the mere waging of the saturation drives alone is
enough to make this Court react with outraged concern.
Confronted with this clear case of oppression, we should not simply throw up our
hands and proclaim our helplessness. I submit that this Court should instead
declare categorically and emphatically that these saturation drives are violative of
human rights and individual liberty and so should be stopped immediately. While
they may be allowed in the actual theater of military operations against the
insurgents, the Court should also make it clear that Metro Manila is not such a
battleground.
The danger to our free institutions lies not only in those who openly defy the
authority of the government and violate its laws. The greater menace is in those
who, in the name of democracy, destroy the very things it stands for as in this
case and so undermine democracy itself.
Where liberty is debased into a cruel illusion, all of us are degraded and
diminished. Liberty is indivisible; it belongs to every one. We should realize that
when the bell tolls the death of liberty for one of us, "it tolls for thee" and for all
of us.
This case is another classic instance of state power colliding with individual rights.
That the State, acting through the government and its forces, has the authority to
suppress lawless violence in all its forms cannot be denied. The exercise of that
authority is justified when viewed from the standpoint of the general welfare,
because the State has the elementary and indispensable duty to insure a peaceful
life and existence for its citizens. A government that loses its capability to insure
peace and order for its citizens loses the very right to remain in power.
But, in the exercise of such authority, i.e., in the choice of the means and methods
to suppress lawless violence, the right of the individual citizen to the dignity of his
person and the sanctity of his home cannot and should not be violated, unless
there is, in a particular case, a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the State has a compelling duty to suppress or abate.
I submit that since this Court is not a trier of facts and this case involves certainty
of facts alleged by petitioners and denied by respondents-this case should be
referred to a proper trial court where the petitioners can presentevidence to
support and prove the allegations they make of such brutal and inhuman conduct
on the part of military and police units.
More than the military and police checkpoints sustained by this Court as a general
proposition during abnormal times,** and which involve the right of military and
police forces to check on vehicles and pedestrians passing through certain fixed
points for the purpose of apprehending criminals and/or confiscating prohibited
articles like unlicensed firearms, the "areal target zoning" and "saturation drives",
as described in petitioners' allegations, are actual raids on private homes in
selected areas, and are thus positive assaults against the individual person and his
dignity. The individual is, as described, yanked out of his home, without any arrest
warrant, to face investigation as to his connections with lawless elements. In
short, the sanctity of the home is pulverized by military and police action. Thus,
while the checkpoint is a defensive device, on the part of government, the "areal
target zoning" or "saturation drive" is a direct assault against, an intrusion into
individual rights and liberties.
I vote, therefore, to refer this case (dispensing with normal venue requirements)
to the Executive Judge, RTC of Manila, for him-
1. to receive the evidences of all the parties, in support and in refutation of the
petitioners' allegations;
2. to decide the case expeditiously on the bases of the evidence, subject to review
by this Court;
There is only one question here: Whether or not the police actions (saturation
drives) complained of constitute a valid exercise of police power.
The fact that on twelve occasions between March and November, 1987 the
military conducted the saturation drives in question is a fact open to no question.
The Solicitor General admits that they, the saturation drives, had been done,
except that they had been done "with due regard to human rights." "Not only
that," so he states:
... they were intelligently and carefully planned months ahead of the
actual operation. They were executed in coordination with barangay
officials who pleaded with their constituents to submit themselves
voluntarily for character and personal verification. Local and foreign
correspondents, who had joined these operations, witnessed, and
reported the events that transpired relative thereto. (After Operation
Reports: November 5, 1987, Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex
13; November 24, 1987, Annex 14). That is why in all the drives so far
conducted, the alleged victims who numbered thousands had not
themselves complained.
The question, then, is purely one of law: Are the saturation drives in question
lawful and legitimate? It is also a question that is nothing novel: No, because the
arrests were not accompanied by a judicial warrant. 1
Therefore, the fact that they had been carefully planned, executed in
coordination with Tondo's barangay officials, and undertaken with due courtesy
and politeness (which I doubt), will not validate them. The lack of a warrant
makes them, per se illegal.
According to the majority, "the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including
the essential and legitimate ones . . . [w]e see nothing wrong in police making
their presence visibly felt in troubled areas . . . " 2 But the petitioners have not
come to court to "stop all police actions" but rather, the saturation drives, which
are, undoubtedly, beyond police power.
That "[a] show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are
protected and not violated 3 is a contradiction in terms. A "show of force" (by way
of saturation drives) is a violation of human rights because it is not covered by a
judicial warrant.
In all candor, I can not swallow what I find is a complete exaggeration of the
issues:
As a general rule, a peace officer can not act unless he is possessed of the proper
arrest or search warrant. The exception is when a criminal offense is unfolding
before him, in which case, action is justified and necessary. The majority would
have the exception to be simply, the general rule.
The fact of the matter is that we are not here confronted by police officers on the
beat or prowl cars on patrol. What we have and I suppose that everybody is
agreed on it- are lightning raids of homes, arbitrary confiscation of effects, and
summary arrests of persons, the very acts proscribed by the Constitution. If this is
a "show of force", it certainly has no place in a constitutional democracy.
I find allusions to the last aborted coup d'etat inapt. In that case, our men in
uniform had all the right to act amidst crimes being committed in flagrante. The
instant case is quite different. There are no offenses being committed, but rather,
police officers fishing for evidence of offenses that may have been committed, As I
said, in that event, a court warrant is indispensable.
That "the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court 5 is to me, an abdication of
judicial duty. As I indicated, the controversy is purely one of law the facts being
undisputed. Law, needless to say, is the problem of the Supreme Court, not the
Executive.
Worse, it is passing the buck. The petitioners, precisely, have a grievance to raise,
arising from abuses they pinpoint to the lower offices of the Executive (which
presumably has its imprimatur). To make it an executive problem, so I hold, is to
make the Executive judge and jury of its own acts, and hardly, a neutral arbiter.
I am also taken aback by references to "[w]ell meaning citizens with only second
hand knowledge of the events ... keep[ing] on indiscriminately tossing problems -
of the Executive, the military, and the police to the Supreme Court as if we are the
repository of all remedies for all evils." 6 First, the facts are not "second-hand",
they are undisputed:Ther had been saturation drives. Second, the petitioners have
trooped to the highest court with a legitimate grievance against the Executive
(and military).
The fact that the majority would "remand" the case to the lower courts and the
various echelons of the Executive for investigation is to admit that walls have
indeed been banged, doors kicked in, and half-naked men herded. I do not see
therefore why we can not issue a writ of prohibition as prayed for, in the midst of
these facts.
Footnotes
Padilla, J.
** Valmonte vs. Gen. de Villa, et al., G.R. No. 83988, 29 September
1989.
Sarmiento, J.
1 CONST., art III, sec. 21; People v. Burgos, No. 68955, September 4,
1986, 144 SCRA 1.
4 Supra.
6 Supra.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
FERNAN, C.J.:
Petitioners spouses Ramon Francisco and Cristina Manalo seek a review of the
decision dated August 29, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC),
now Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 06866, entitled "Ramon Francisco, et al.,
Petitioners vs. Hon. Bernardo Pardo, etc., et al., Respondents", denying due
course to their petition, thereby affirming their ejectment from the subject
premises as decreed by both the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) and the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
The facts as found by the RTC and adopted by the IAC are as follows:
Petitioners denied the existence of the grounds for ejectment. They asserted that
Antonio Chua, the previous owner of the leased property assumed the
responsibility of paying the rentals. They further stated that there was no existing
sublease but only a change of name of their auto parts business from Impala Auto
Supply to Starlet Supply Center. They likewise denied knowledge of the transfer of
ownership of the property involved from Antonio Chua, the previous owner, to
the private respondents.
The MTC, after due hearing, rendered judgment declaring petitioners to have
defaulted in the payment of the rent. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
On appeal to the RTC, the lower court's decision was affirmed with modification.
The RTC pronounced:
SO ORDERED. 3
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals also denied due course to petitioners'
petition for review. Hence, this recourse, petitioners contending that the
appellate court committed the following errors in its decision:
II
III
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEMAND
ALLEGEDLY GIVEN BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PRODUCED THE
EFFECT OF NOTIFICATION
Petitioners allege that when private respondents finally disclosed to them in July,
1982 that they, private respondents, were the new owners and lessors of the
leased premises, a confrontation occurred because of the disagreement regarding
the rate of rental. Since no agreement as to the rate of rental was arrived at, no
contract of lease was created. This being the case, petitioners aver that they could
not have violated the lease contract as there was no contract to speak of in the
first place.
Such contention is clearly fallacious. The property subject of the controversy was
sold by the former owner Antonio Chua to private respondents while the lease
was subsisting. Under Article 1676 of the New Civil Code,
In the case at bar, private respondents chose to allow the lease to continue.
Despite the change of ownership then, the contract of lease subsisted. As aptly
held by the appellate court:
Having shown the existence of the lease, all the other issues can be easily
resolved.
No error was committed by the appellate court in ruling that the failure of
petitioners to pay the rentals from July, 1982 to January, 1983 was sufficient
ground to eject them. It is a basic tenet that if the lessor raises the rent at the
expiration of the lease, the tenant has to leave if he does not pay the new
rental. 6
As held in the case of Vda. de Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 302, it is the
owner's prerogative to fix the rental for which he wishes to lease his property and
the occupant has the option of accepting the rent as fixed or negotiating with the
owner and in the event of failure to come to an agreement, to leave the property
so as not to be liable for the rental fixed and demanded by the owner.
The rent in this case was being paid monthly. The lease was therefore on a
month-to-month basis, which expires at the end of each month and at which
time, either party may opt to terminate or continue the lease under the same or
under new terms and conditions.
Petitioners' argument that no demand to vacate was given them deserves scant
consideration. As found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents' counsel
sent petitioners two (2) letters of demand, one addressed to Ramon Francisco and
the other to Cristina Manalo. These letters were returned unclaimed despite the
fact that they were properly addressed to the petitioners and despite notice given
to the addressees of the letters. In the case of Gaspay vs. Hon. Sangco, et al., L-
27826, December 18, 1967, we held that therein petitioners' claim that they were
not served with notice is belied by proof that they had refused to receive the
same. No person is entitled to profit from his wrong act of commission or
omission.
As to the issue of whether the appellate court erred in not fixing a longer period
of lease, we find no cogent reason to depart from the aforesaid court ruling.
Article 1687 of the New Civil Code empowers the courts to fix the period of lease.
Such prerogative is addressed to the court's sound judgment. 7And such discretion
was certainly judiciously exercised in the case at bar for, again, as observed by the
appellate court:
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
2 p. 25, Rollo.
5 p. 28, Rollo.
6 46 Phil. 184.
8 p. 29. Rollo
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue involved in this case is the filiation of private respondent Carmelita
de la Puerta, who claims successional lights to the estate of her alleged
grandmother.
Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a will leaving her
properties to her three surviving children, namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all
surnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her
legitime and was appointed executrix of the will. 1
The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was opposed by her
brothers, who averred that their mother was already senile at the time of the
execution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning. Moreover, some
of the properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to them
exclusively. 2
On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of First Instance of
Quezon a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta. After hearing, the petition was
granted. 5 However, the decision was appealed by Isabel to the Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, Vicente died, prompting her to move for the
dismissal of the case 6
On November 12,1982, the probate court granted the motion, declaring that it
was satisfied from the evidence at hand that Carmelita was a natural child of
Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed for her support.
The court added that "the evidence presented by the petitioner against it (was)
too weak to discredit the same. 8
On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by the respondent
court, 9 which is now in turn being challenged in this petition before us.
The petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita was not the natural child of
Vicente de la Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and
remained his wife until his death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents are Juanita
Austrial and Gloria Jordan.
Invoking the presumption of legitimacy, she argues that Carmelita was the
legitimate child of Juanita Austrial and Gloria Jordan, who were legally or
presumably married. Moreover, Carmelita could not have been a natural child of
Vicente de la Puerta because he was already married at the time of her birth in
1962.
To prove her point, Isabel presented Amado Magpantay, who testified that he
was a neighbor of Austrial and Jordan. According to him, the two were living as
husband and wife and had three children, including a girl named "Puti,"
presumably Carmelita. He said though that he was not sure if the couple was
legally married. 10
This is a factual finding that we do not see fit to disturb, absent any of those
circumstances we have laid down in a long line of decisions that will justify
reversal. 13 Among these circumstances are: (1) the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made
is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of
facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
The petitioner insists on the application of the following provisions of the Civil
Code to support her thesis that Carmelita is not the natural child of Vicente de la
Puerta but the legitimate child of Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following
the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that access was not possible;
These rules are in turn based on the presumption that Juanito and Gloria were
married at the time of Carmelita's birth in 1962, pursuant to Rule 131, Sec. 5(bb)
of the Rules of Court, providing that:
But this last-quoted presumption is merely disputable and may be refuted with
evidence to the contrary. As the Court sees it, such evidence has been sufficiently
established in the case at bar.
The cases 14 cited by the petitioner are not exactly in point because they involve
situations where the couples lived continuously as husband and wife and so could
be reasonably presumed to be married. In the case before us, there was
testimony from Vicente's own wife that her husband and Gloria lived together as
a married couple, thereby rebutting the presumption that Gloria was herself the
lawful wife of Juanita Austrial.
Such testimony would for one thing show that Juanito and Gloria did not
continuously live together as a married couple. Moreover, it is not explained why,
if he was really married to her, Juanito did not object when Gloria left the
conjugal home and started openly consorting with Vicente, and in the same
neighborhood at that. That was unnatural, to say the least. It was different with
Genoveva for she herself swore that she had separated from Vicente two years
after their marriage and had long lost interest in her husband. In fact, she even
renounced in open court any claim to Vicente's estate. 15
The presumption of marriage between Juanito and Gloria having been destroyed,
it became necessary for the petitioner to submit additional proof to show that the
two were legally married. She did not.
Turning now to the evidence required to prove the private respondent's filiation,
we reject the petitioner's contention that Article 278 of the Civil Code is not
available to Carmelita. It is error to contend that as she is not a natural child but a
spurious child (if at all) she cannot prove her status by the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or any authentic writing. On the contrary, it
has long been settled that:
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code
allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity of spurious
children under the circumstances specified in Articles 283 and 284 of
the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory
recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children.
This being so, we need not rule now on the admissibility of the private
respondent's certificate of birth as proof of her filiation. That status was
sufficiently established by the sworn testimony of Vicente de la Puerta at the
hearing of the petition for adoption on September 6, 1976, where he categorically
declared as follows:
A She is my daughter. 17
Finally, we move to the most crucial question, to wit: May Carmelita de la Puerta
claim support and successional rights to the estate of Dominga Revuelta?
The answer to the question posed must be in the negative. The first reason is that
Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and the second is that
Carmelita is a spurious child.
It is settled that —
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right to
inherit from her directly or in his own right. No right of representation was
involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon her father's death, which
came after his own mother's death. It would have been different if Vicente was
already dead when Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have inherited
from her in representation of her father Vicente, assuming the private respondent
was a lawful heir.
But herein lies the crux, for she is not. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is
barred from inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code,
which lays down the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families. This
article provides quite clearly:
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in
that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie
of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article
992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there
is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child
the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former in turn sees in
the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable
evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment. 22
Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting
from Dominga Revuelta for there would be no natural kindred ties between them
and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. As aptly pointed out by Dr.
Arturo M. Tolentino:
If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the latter
cannot represent the former in the inheritance from the parents or
ascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is not related to the
deceased in that case, because the filiation created by fiction of law
is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted. "By adoption,
the adopters can make for themselves an heir, but they cannot thus
make one for their kindred. 23
The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has
successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the estate of
Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be
filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's
estate 24 and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga Revuelta's Will.
Footnotes
3 Ibid., p. 31.
4 Ibid., p. 108.
5 Annex "E"
6 Ibid.
7 Original records, p. 7.
8 Annex "F".
12 Rollo, p. 49.
16 Pactor vs. Pestano 107 Phil. 685; Reyes vs. Zuzuarregui, 102 Phil.
346, 354; Paulino and Nieto vs. Paulino, 113 Phil. 697, 700.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
For some cause not shown in the records of this administrative case, even before
the defendant was arraigned, Criminal Case No. CU-10568 reached the Court of
Appeals (CA-G. R. SP No. 04445) which rendered a decision on October 14, 1986
directing the Presiding Judge of Branch 20 (then Judge Exaltacion A. Navarro) to
set the arraignment and trial of Silverio, Sr. "as soon as possible" (p.145,Rollo).
Instead of complying with the Appellate Court's directive, Judge Navarro
dismissed the case. On January 30, 1988, complainant filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order, and numerous other pleadings. However, on
April 16,1988, Judge Navarro retired without acting on his motion for
reconsideration.
On June 6, 1988, respondent Judge Pedro T. Garcia was appointed to the position
vacated by Judge Navarro. According to complainant, respondent Judge Garcia
also refused to act on his motion for reconsideration and on his other pleadings in
the Silverio case praying for the immediate arraignment and trial of Silverio.
Finally on August 15, 1988, Judge Garcia issued an order for the arrest of Silverio
and set his arraignment on October 18, 1988.
The accused filed a motion for postponement which the complainant opposed.
Nevertheless, Judge Garcia granted Silverio's motion, and made it appear in his
order that there had been no objection by the complainant. The latter filed two
manifestations and memoranda objecting to the judge's statement in the order of
October 18, 1988.
Attorney Raul H. Sesbreño has charged respondent Judge Pedro T. Garcia with the
following misfeasances:
1. Neglect of duty — for delay in acting on the complainant's pleadings praying for
the arrest and arraignment of Silverio;
3. Oppression — for warning the complainant in his Order of November 29, 1988
that the complainant would be declared in contempt of court if he repeats the
allegedly offensive language he used in his two Manifestations/Memoranda dated
October 19,1988, without giving complainant an opportunity to explain that the
language in his pleadings was not insolent, disrespectful, nor contemptuous; and
In his comment on the verified complaint, respondent Judge explained that when
he assumed the position of Presiding Judge of Branch 20 on June 6, 1988, his
predecessor had previously issued an Order on March 30, 1988, deferring action
on all motions and pleadings in the case "pending on whatever action the Court of
Appeals may take on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the private
respondent." (p. 30, Rollo.) On June 20, 1988, he called complainant's attention to
that order of Judge Navarro. He explained that the delay in resolving
complainant's motions could not be helped because "the entire records of the
above-entitled case is still with the Court of Appeals in Manila" (Annex A of
Respondent's Answer).
In his order dated June 27, 1988, respondent Judge remarked that the
complainant's Urgent Motion dated June 26, 1988 was "highly litigious" meaning
hostile and provocative (p. 54, Rollo).
Upon receipt of the records from the Court of Appeals, Judge Garcia issued on
August 15, 1988 a warrant for the arrest of Silverio and his co-defendant (Exh. E,
Respondent's Answer).
Silverio posted bail. The case was set for arraignment on October 18, 1988.
Instead of appearing in court on the scheduled date, Silverio, through his counsel,
Atty. Reyes, asked for postponement on account of his heart condition.
The transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearing on October 18, 1988
records the following exchanges on the defendant's motion for postponement:
ATTY. REYES:
ATTY. SESBREÑO
The prosecution, your Honor, has filed the opposition to that motion
today, October 18, and in that opposition, we aver that up to today, I
have not been furnished with a copy of said motion, so that the 3-day
prior notice as required in Rule 15 of the Rules of Court has not been
complied, and therefore, that motion is just a mere scrap of paper,
and should be denied for failure to comply with the requirements. It
is very clear in the medical certificate that accused Silverio is not
confined in a hospital, and he is a walking patient. Considering that
he is a walking patient, there is no reason, no valid reason, for him
why he cannot attend to this arraignment, your Honor. He can come
to court just to listen to the reading of the information, which activity
is not strenuous. It will not strain him physically. There is no record
that he is hospitalized. He can walk and can move around, and there
is no impossibility to attend the arraignment. As stated in our
opposition, your honor, accused Silverio has filed cases against the
PNB for the recovery of his Delta Motors Corporation and also
against the Securities and Exchange Commission and a bank for the
rehabilitation of Philfinance. In all these cases, he never complained
that he is sick. Only in this case, your Honor, that he complained that
he is sick, and this case has been filed in 1985 yet, or more than three
(3) years ago, and he has not been arraigned yet. So, this is another
dilatory tactic, your Honor.
COURT:
ATTY. REYES:
COURT:
ATTY. REYES:
Well, at any rate, we can have the next setting on another date, your
Honor.
ATTY. SESBREÑO:
If that is the condition that the accused can only come if he gets
clearance from his doctor, then there is no assurance, your Honor,
that we can have the arraignment.
COURT:
Yes, but in the meanwhile, we give the benefit of the doubt for the
sickness of the accused in this case. In the sense of fairness and good
judgment, we will give him the chance to recuperate at least, if he is
really sick. It will be unchristian to order him to come here if he is
really sick. He might die on the way.
ATTY. SESBREÑO:
ATTY. SESBREÑO:
COURT:
The Court do not look with favor to the accused in this case, but
because according to the words of Atty. Reyes that he is not taking
responsibility of advising his client to come for the arraignment, so
we will just give him at least the chance to appear for the
arraignment.
So, when shall be the most reasonable time? Will it be next month?
For purposes of arraignment.
ATTY. SESBREÑO:
COURT:
ATTY. REYES:
COURT:
Here?
ATTY. REYES:
ATTY. SESBREÑO:
COURT:
Who?
ATTY. SESBREÑO:
COURT:
ATTY. REYES:
ATTY. SESBREÑO:
But the bond has expired. The 30-day period has expired and the
bonding company was ordered to produce the accused and to
explain why the bond should not be confiscated.
COURT:
ATTY. SESBREÑO:
May I suggest within one month, your Honor, the arraignment be set
within one month, to conform with the rules.
COURT:
ATTY. SESBREÑO:
In view of the suggestion of the Court, I may accede. (pp. 3-12, t.s.n.,
October 18, 1988; pp. 74-83, Rollo; italics supplied.)
The order of the Court dated October 18, 1988 reads as follows:
Postponements are left to the sound discretion of the court. The fact that the
postponement exceeded one month from October 18, 1988 was not such a grave
abuse of discretion as to call for disciplinary action against respondent Judge, it
appearing that there was a good reason for resetting the arraignment of the
accused on December 7, 1988 because he (Silverio) would be appearing in
another sala on that date. He would have to make only one trip to Cebu for the
two cases. The postponement of less than two months was a reasonable period.
On August 15, 1988, or two months after Judge Garcia took over from Judge
Navarro, he issued a warrant for the arrest of Silverio. He clearly acted with
reasonable promptitude, but since the accused has not been arraigned up to this
time, there is reason for Attorney Sesbreño's complaint that the court has not
acted with determination and resourcefulness to foil the dilatory maneuvers of
the accused and his lawyers.
The charge of dishonesty or serious misconduct against Judge Garcia is not worth
considering as it is hypothetical, i.e., if respondent Judge stated in his certificates
of service for the months of May and/or June, 1988 that no motions were
pending resolution in his sala. Complainant did not even attempt to present a
shred of evidence to prove this charge.
To think that one has the absolute monopoly of legal knowledge and
virtue is downright officious and a pretension of the highest
magnitude. They say, in heaven one can not find a saint who was
never humble here on earth.
Without further digging into the intricacies and insolent words, which
are self-evident and self-explanatory, the Court hereby warns him
not to repeat using words of the same import and meaning,
otherwise the Court will be constrained to cite him for contempt of
court in order to protect and enforce its dignity and honor as well as
the majesty of the law. (pp. 23 & 23-A, Rollo.)
More than once in the past, we had occasion to admonish judges not to be onion-
skinned when confronted by dissatisfied lawyers or litigants. Their power to
punish for contempt is not a bludgeon to be used for the purpose of exacting
silent submission to their rulings and orders however questionable or unjust they
may be. It should be used only to protect and vindicate the dignity and authority
of the court (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271). Courts should
exercise their power to punish for contempt on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, on the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea of
punishment (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778; People vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil.
265; Gamboa vs. Teodoro, L-4893, May 13, 1952; People vs. Rivera, L-364, May
26, 1952; In re Lozano, 54 Phil. 801).
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
II
III
Hence, this appeal presents the issue of whether or not the quantum of evidence
sufficient to render a judgment of guilt beyond reasonable doubt has been met.
The facts for the prosecution are stated by the Solicitor General in his Brief for the
Appellee as follows:
Appellant tried to escape, but Sgt. Aladano held him by his waist. The
team swooped down on appellant. They introduced themselves as
members of the NARCOM.
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant has a different version of the facts as
follows:
... [O]n September 11, 1985 between the hours of five and six in the
evening, defendant-appellant was having a snack in a store near their
house when all of the sudden, a group of men, introducing
themselves as NARCOM agents, arrested him for allegedly selling
marijuana fruit tops. After he was handcuffed, he saw a red car with
three men on board which suddenly stopped behind him. Two men
alighted from the car and approached him. One of them, whom he
later identified as Lt. Lavares, placed dried marijuana leaves on his
pocket, while a policeman from Las Piñas, a certain Pat. Antonio,
demanded money from him in exchange for his release. Since
accused-appellant failed to produce any money, he was then brought
to Camp Crame in Quezon City,
At Camp Crame, he was brought to the Office of the NARCOM and
led into a room where he was interrogated by an investigator in
civilian clothes. Inside said room was a table, on top of which were
marijuana leaves wrapped in an empty pack of Philip Morris
cigarettes (Exhs. "H" and "H-1"). The said marijuana leaves were not
the same one (sic) which was placed on his pocket earlier that day.
During the trial, the witnesses for the prosecution included Lt. Leonardo Lavares,
head of the buy-bust operation, Sgt. Aladano the poseur-buyer, Chemical
Engineer Isidra de Guzman of the PC Crime Laboratory who conducted the
physical examination of the defendant-appellant to determine the presence of
ultra-violet powder on his person and Lt. Tita Advincula, Forensic Chemist of the
PC-INP Crime Laboratory who examined the specimen submitted to her, in
connection with this case containing two foils of dried leaves.
xxxxxxxxx
Findings:
Findings:
After trial, the defendant-appellant was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as charged.
In resolving the issue of whether or not the degree of proof required in criminal
cases has been met, the credibility of witnesses who appeared in court becomes a
foremost matter. On credibility, it is an oft-repeated rule that this Court will not
disturb the findings of the trial judge unless he has plainly overlooked certain
facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case
(see People v. Jose Pirreras, G.R. No. 63462, November 6, 1989 and People v.
Eduardo Paco y Tamayo, G.R. No. 76893, February 27,1989)
We find the above allegation devoid of merit. The inconsistencies pointed out by
the defendant-appellant are too minor to affect the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses who are law enforcers presumed to have regularly performed their
duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary. (People v. Lamberto
Borja y Martinez, G.R. No. 71838, February 26, 1990, citing People v. Patog, 144
SCRA 429 [1986]; People v. Said Sariol y Muhamading, G.R. No. 83809, June 22,
1989 citing People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988]; People v. Boholst 152 SCRA
263 [1987] citing People v. Gamayon, 121 SCRA 642 [1983]; People v. Campana,
124 SCRA 271 [1983]; People v. Rosas, 149 SCRA 464 [1987]) With respect to the
alleged improbabilities, they are grounded on fanciful conjectures and
speculations which cannot topple the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Thus,
we are constrained to give credence to the witnesses of the prosecution who had
proven beyond reasonable doubt every essential element of the crime of which
defendant- appellant was charged. After all, "proof beyond reasonable doubt" is
defined under Rule 133, section 2 of the Rules of Court as follows:
... Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of
proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced and mind.
In the instant case, there is clear proof that the defendant-appellant was caught
in flagrante delicto, i.e., in the very act of selling and delivering dried marijuana
fruiting tops, a prohibited drug under Article I, section 2, subsections (e) and (i) of
the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179. Prosecution
witnesses Sgt. Aladano and Lt. Lavares competently narrated the pertinent details
attendant to the crime of which the trial court convicted the defendant-appellant
who was positively identified as the perpetrator by the said witnesses.
Furthermore, corroborative evidence was offered by the prosecution through the
testimonies of the chemical engineer and forensic chemist of the PC Crime
Laboratory.
The defense of having been framed-up was not satisfactorily proved by convincing
evidence. Like alibi, it is a weak defense that is easy to concoct but difficult to
prove (See People v. Sergio Nabinat y Asag, G.R. No. 84392, February 7, 1990). It
is difficult to believe that the NARCOM agents who did not know the appellant
and whom the appellant did not know would suddenly pounce upon a completely
unknown and innocent person taking a merienda and not only plant marijuana in
his clothes but also forcibly rub ultraviolet powder on his hands while he was
relieving himself in the toilet at Camp Crame. During the cross-examination of the
defendant-appellant, he made the following declarations:
FISCAL:
A. Yes sir.
A. No sir.
A. Yes sir.
Q. You did not file any complaint against the man who
put this powder which according to you is against your
will
COURT:
ATTY. GARIN:
FISCAL:
ATTY. GARIN:
FISCAL:
ATTY. GARIN:
FISCAL:
ATTY. GARIN:
FISCAL:
COURT:
Sustain. Reform.
ATTY. GARIN:
A. No sir.
Q. Your wife?
A. No sir.
ATTY. GARIN:
In the absence of any motive shown on the part of the NARCOM agents to
implicate the defendant-appellant and considering the foregoing evidence for the
prosecution, we agree with the trial court's assessment that the presumption of
innocence in favor of the defendant-appellant has been overcome.
The argument that the Narcotics Command cannot organize a team and send it
from Camp Crame to Las Piñas in a period of two hours has no merit. The
NARCOM's main function is to stem the traffic in prohibited drugs and catch and
prosecute violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act. By the very nature of its work,
NARCOM should have agents on duty all the time and ready to rush wherever
they are needed. Two hours is not too short for this purpose.
According to the appellant, the fact that he trusted the barangay captain who
introduced the buyers to him shows that the captain must have acted as
middleman in other drug transactions. Assuming this to be true, we fail to see
how it proves that the appellant is innocent. In truth, familiarity and trust do not
arise solely from joint participation in illegal acts. Mr. dela Cruz was not only a
leading member of the Pulang-lupa community but he was also the appellant's
relative. It simply did not occur to the appellant that dela Cruz was against his
drug dealing activities to the extent of turning him in to the authorities;
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
Bautista, Picazo, Buyco, Tan & Fider for Benigno Toda, Jr. Belo, Abiera &
Associates for petitioner Rose Marie Tuason Toda.
REGALADO, J.:
These consolidated cases seek a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on January 29,1987 1 in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 06675 and 07936, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
4. Setting aside the order of the lower court directing the annotation
of lien on the property of Benigno Toda, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
Benigno Toda, Jr. (Benigno for brevity) and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda (Rose Marie
for brevity) were married on June 9, 1951 and were blessed with two children.
Individual differences and the alleged infidelity of Benigno, however, marred the
conjugal union thereby prompting Rose Marie to file on December 18, 1979 in the
former Court of First Instance of Rizal, 2 as Civil Case No. 35566, a petition for
termination of conjugal partnership for alleged mismanagement and dissipation
of conjugal funds against Benigno.
After hearings were held, the parties in order to avoid further "disagreeable
proceedings," filed on April 1, 1981 a joint petition forjudicial approval of
dissolution of conjugal partnership under Article 191 of the Civil Code, docketed
as Special Proceeding No. 9478, 3 which was consolidated with the aforesaid civil
case. This petition which was signed by the parties on March 30, 1981, embodied
a compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares in the
conjugal partnership assets and dismissing with prejudice the said Civil Case No.
35566, CA-G.R. No. 11123-SP of the Court of Appeals and G.R. No. 56121 of this
Court. The said petition and the compromise agreement therein were approved
by the trial court in its order of June 9, 1981.4
Thereafter, several orders were issued by the lower court pertaining to the
interpretation and implementation of the compromise agreement, as follows:
at the rates stipulated in the compromise agreement from date of at the rates
stipulated in the compromise agreement from date of demand by Rose Marie. 9
(7) Jewelry.
(10) Two shares with two lots in Valley Golf & Country
Club.
(d) Petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. shall assume the payment of all
conjugal obligations, petitioner Rose Marie Tuason Toda representing
and warranting that she has no pending obligation or incurred no
obligation chargeable to the conjugal partnership except those listed
in Annex 'A' hereof.
(f) With the signing of this document, Civil Case No. 35566 of this
same Court, CA-G.R. No. 11123-SP and SC-G.R. No. L-56121 shall be
deemed dismissed with prejudice as between the parties hereto. 10
(c) enjoining the parties to comply with the terms and conditions of
the aforesaid agreement. 11
Ironically, the said agreement failed to fully subserve the intended amicable
settlement of all the disputes of the spouses. Instead, as lamented by the counsel
of one of them, the compromise agreement which was designed to terminate a
litigation spawned two new petitions, with each party initiating one against the
other. Thus, illustrative of the saying that a solution which creates another
problem is no solution, the contradictory interpretations placed by the parties on
some provisions of the agreement resulted in appeals to respondent court and,
eventually, the present recourse to us.
Benigno appealed from the aforestated orders of the trial court of November 20,
1981, June 2, 1982, December 9, 1982, March 1, 1983 and March 14, 1983
containing the directives hereinbefore respectively set out. The same were
disposed of by the Court of Appeals as explained at the start of this decision.
2. In setting aside the order of the lower court dated June 2, 1981
directing Benigno to pay interest of eighteen percent and non-
payment penalty of five percent; and
On the other hand, Benigno contends in his present petition before us that:
The award of cash dividends basically depends on the date of effectivity of the
compromise agreement as this will determine whether the same is conjugal
property or separate property of the spouses.
We are in agreement with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the
compromise agreement became effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it
was approved by the trial court, and not on March 30,1981 when it was signed by
the parties. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, 14 "(i)n the absence of an express
declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order."
Hence, the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the
contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving
the same. It, therefore, becomes effective on y upon judicial approval, without
which it is void. 15 Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides that
the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of
separation of property.
With respect to the amount of P360,095.12 which Benigrio deducted from the P2
million supposed to be paid to Rose Marie, it is not clear from the records where
said amount came from. The Court of Appeals, in holding that it is conjugal and
therefore belongs to Benigno, presumed it to be in the nature of cash dividends
declared prior to the approval of the compromise agreement by reason of the fact
that the amount was deducted by Benigno from the P2 million which he paid on
April 14,1981. While no sufficient proof was adduced to conclusively explain such
deduction, there exists the legal presumption that all property of the marriage
belongs to the conjugal partnership absent any proof that it is the exclusive
property of either spouse. 16 Since Rose Marie failed to prove that the amount
forms part of her paraphernal property, it is presumed to be conjugal property.
Consequently, Benigno is entitled to the said amount of P360,095.12, hence he
rightfully deducted the same from the amount due to Rose Marie.
The issue regarding the annotation of the lien on Benigno's properties has been
mooted by our resolution dated Aprjl 3, 1989 wherein, at his instance, we ordered
the cancellation thereof upon his posting of the corresponding bond. In our
resolution of February 26, 1990, we noted Benigno's comphance, approved the
bond he filed, and ordered the cancellation of the hens annotated on the
certificates of title of the propertiesinvolved.
Likewise, the order denying the motion to inhibit Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera
has become academic considering that she no longer presides over the court
where the case was filed. Besides, as correctly explained by respondent court, the
groundfor inhibition raised by Benigno is not valid it being merely on the basis of
the judge having acquired knowledge of the facts surrounding the agreement of
the parties, hence she would be a material witness to the issue of the true
agreement which is contested by the parties. However, those facts came to the
knowledge of the judge in the course of her efforts to effect a compromise
between parties and are also known to the parties.This is not a ground for
disqualification; on the contrary, said, acts of the judge were in accord with the
rule encouraging compromises in litigations, especially between members of the
same family.
Anent the tax savings of P4,623,982.24 obtained by Benigno, we hold that this
forms part of the P40 million allocated to Rose Marie under paragraph 4 (b) (1) of
the compromise agreement.We give credit to the ratiocination thereon of the
trial court as quoted with approval by respondent court:
The records show that petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. paid only
Pl,125,152.48 in estate taxes, although the amount stated in the m
Compromise Agreement was P15,749,135.32. The balance of
P4,623,929.24 is now being claimed by both parties as aforestated. In
the opinion of this court, the pertinent terms of the Agreement as
quoted, are clear and do not require any interpretation. In brief,
under, the Agreement, petitioner Rose Marie T. Toda is adjudicated
the fixed sum of P40 million, to be paid as follows: (a) Payment by
petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. of the estate taxes, interests and
penalties thereon, pertaining to the estate of the late Manuel
Tuason, Jr. in the amount of Pl5,749,135.32 as of March 31, 1982; (b)
P2 million within 30 days after signing of the Agreement; (c) the
balance within six months after date of signing of the Agreement.
This Court notes that the amount of taxes, interests and penalties is
fixed at P15,749,135.32 and this figure was provided by Benigno
Toda, Jr. There is no provision as contended by petitioner Benigno
Toda, Jr. that the amount was only an assumed liability and that he
could attempt to reduce it by suit or compromise. It is clear that if
the amount of P4,623,929.24 is to be credited to Benigno Toda, Jr.
then the P40 million which petitioner Rose Marie T. Toda is to receive
would be short by that amount. This Court is also of the opinion that
under the Agreement, petitioner Benigno Toda, Jr. was constituted as
agent to pay to the government the liability of the estate of the late
Manuel Tuason, Jr. in the fixed amount of P15,749,135.32 and if he
was able to secure a reduction thereof, then he should deliver to his
principal such reduction...17
We do not believe that Benigno was denied due process when the trial court
resolved the motion of Rose Marie for the payment of P4,623,982.24 without the
benefit of a hearing. The records disclose that the hearing thereon was postponed
twice at the instance of Benigno, which prompted the court to thereafter consider
the motion submitted for resolution on the basis of the allegations therein and
the answer filed by counsel for both parties. Benigno cannot now be heard to
claim that he was deprived of his day in court. Furthermore, respondent court
correctly held that the issue involved was more of a question of interpretation of
a contract rather than a determination of facts. Benigno failed to make a plausible
showing that the supposed evidence he had intended to present, if any, would
not be merely collateral matters.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
5 Ibid., 85-98.
6 Ibid., 102-105.
7 Ibid., 62.
8 Ibid., 122-125.
9 Ibid.,110-115.
10 Ibid., 69-73.
11 Ibid., 73.
12 Ibid., 22.
15 Lacson vs. Lacson, et al., 24 SCRA 837 (1968); see also Tolentino,
Civil Code, Vol. 1, 1987 Ed., 487.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Whether the contract of lease is for a definite or indefinite period of time and the
applicability of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 20 and Batas Pambansa
Bilang 25 are the issues in this case.
In March 1964 and December 1964 petitioner and private respondent Rev. Father
Jose Torralba Sy, entered into separate contracts of lease over two apartments
located at 913-E and 193-F Josefina Street, Sampaloc, Manila, with the common
provision covering its duration as follows:
To hold the same for one month from the (15th day of March, 1964
for Apt. No. 913-E and lst day of January, 1964 for Apt. No. 913- F)
and so on from month to month at a rent of TWO HUNDRED PESOS
(P200.00), Philippine Currency, per month, payable in advance on the
first TEN (10) days of each calendar month, until the lease shall
terminate, which termination shall be determined by either party
giving FIVE (5) days notice in writing. 1
It was further stipulated in the two contracts that "in case the lessee shall
continuously withhold possession of the apartments after he or she has been
properly notified of the termination of his or her right to occupy the same, the
lessor shall be entitled to collect P400.00 every month or fraction thereof, as
reasonable compensation for the use of the place and as damages."
Private respondent removed the portion separating the two apartments and
converted the same principally for use as a Buddhist chapel.
While it may be conceded arguendo that for being used as a place for
worship, the premises may not necessarily be considered as
commercial for purposes of ruling out the applicability of Presidential
Decree No. 20 dated October 12, 1972, which freezes rates of rentals
of dwelling unit at their present levels when the same do not exceed
P300.00 per month, it is equally true that the same will, as it does,
not fall within the protective mantle of the decree.
Thus if the leased apartment units are used principally for purposes
of religious worship, the incidental fact that Father Sy and/or his
family live therein will not include them in that class of tenants
favored by the emergency law on housing (Morales vs. Zamora, 31
Phil. 204). In such case, the matter of regulating the monthly rentals
become conventional between him and the URC. This should not be
understood to mean, however, that the latter is free to demand an
arbitrary amount. Equity and justice require that both parties
observe reasonable terms and conditions in bringing about a mutual
covenant.
Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the City Court of
Manila on March 7, 1977. After the issues were joined and the trial on the merits,
a decision was rendered on February 16, 1981 dismissing the complaint and
counter-claim without pronouncement as to costs. Both parties asked for a
reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied. Hence, both parties
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, wherein in due course a
decision was rendered on December 28, 1981 affirming the judgment of the City
Court with the modification finding private respondent entitled to moral damages
in the amount of P4,000.00, exemplary damage ages in the amount of P2,000.00
and attorney's fees of P2,000.00 and the costs of the suit. A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the trial court in an order of
February 25, 1982.
Hence, a petition for review was filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals,
wherein after the issues were joined, a decision was rendered on October 7, 1982
dismissing the petition with costs against petitioner. 6 A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner of the decision was denied in a resolution of
November 17, 1982.
A reading of the two contracts of lease entered into between petitioner and
private respondent hereinabove reproduced show that its period is from month
to month and that the lease may be terminated when either party gives a 5 days
notice in writing.
In Rantael vs. CA, 7 involving a similar contract of lease between the parties this
Court found that a lease on a month to month basis expires after the last day of
the 30th day period repeating the same cycle of the 30-day period until either
party express their prerogative under their agreement to terminate the same.
The only difference between Rantael and the present case is that in the former
the parties may terminate the agreement upon 30 days notice while in this case,
the agreement is that the termination by either party may be upon 5 days notice.
Such difference is of no moment. And such agreement is binding and is the law
between the parties.
Since the lease agreement in question is for a definite period it follows that
petitioner has a right to judicially eject private respondent from the premises as
an exception to the general rule provided for in Section 4 of P.D. No. 20 which
provides as follows:
Moreover, under Section of 5(f) of B.P. Blg. 25 one of the grounds for ejectment is
the expiration of the period of a written lease contract. In this case, because of
the failure of the private respondent to pay the increased rental demanded by
petitioner, petitioner elected to terminate the contract and asked the private
respondent to vacate the premises. A lease contract may be terminated at the
end of any month, which shall be deemed terminated upon the refusal to pay the
increased monthly rental demanded by the petitioner, provided the same is not
exhorbitant. 8
Further, there is no question in this case that the two apartments subject of
litigation if not a greater portion thereof is not used by private respondent as his
residence but for a Buddhist Temple. Thus, it is with more reason that this lease
agreement does not fall within the protective mantle of the provision of P.D. No.
20 and B.P. No. 25 which covers only dwelling units.
Lastly, considering that during the pendency of this appeal, the private
respondent died on August 23, 1987, thus the said lease agreements were
effectively terminated by the death of private respondent who is the lessee of the
premises in question.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 7, 1982 and its Resolution dated November 17, 1982 are hereby reversed
and set aside and another judgment is hereby rendered ordering private
respondent and/or his heirs or successors-in-interest to immediately vacate the
premises of the property in question and to pay the unpaid rentals thereof of
P1,000.00 a month for the two apartments until they vacate the premises, with
costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
2 Exhibit A-2.
3 Exhibit B.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The petition for certiorari alleges a single ground for the allowance of the writ, to
wit:
The petitioner is the recruitment agent that shipped the private respondent,
Emmanuel Abellaneda, to the Middle East to serve for a period of six (6) months
as a seaman on the vessel of its foreign principal, the Seatrans Offshore Ltd. After
his contract was preterminated, he sued for his unpaid wages. The facts, as
alleged in the pleadings and summarized in the decision of the POEA, are as
follows:
The complainant in his complaint-affidavit alleged that sometime in
May, 1986, he applied for overseas work with respondent Blue
Manila, Inc. On September 16, 1986, he was sent to Bahrain to board
the vessel 'GRAY-VANGUARD' as AB/Oiler at the agreed basic salary
of US$335 per month for a period of six (6) months with a further
understanding that he will receive a war zone bonus at 100% of his
basic salary plus overtime pay. On October 3, 1986, the vessel
actually entered the war zone until November 10, 1986. On said
date, the principal SEATRANS OFFSHORE LTD. informed the crew that
its lease over the vessel had expired, hence, the crewmembers
disembarked at Kharg Island, Iran where complainant was offered
the same job to work with the vessel MV 'SEATRANS 23' leased by
the same principal. Complainant accepted the offer and on
November 11, 1986, he embarked and commenced working thereon
with the sole purpose of completing the remaining portion of his
contract. However, from the time he started working, he was not
paid his salary and other benefits due him. This prompted him to get
cash advances for his family's sustenance in the Philippines allegedly
amounting to $512.48. For the same reason, complainant voluntarily
decided to disembark on January 28, 1987 at Bahrain. While therein,
he demanded from the Operations Manager of Seatrans, Mr. Horst
Jager, his long overdue salaries and other benefits covering the
period from November 11, 1986 to January 28, 1987. However,
instead of giving in to complainant's just and valid claims, Mr. Jager
charged him for simulated offenses for which complainant was
incarcerated from 8:00 P.M. of January 28, 1987 until 10:00 A.M. of
the next day. After representation with the Immigration Office in
Bahrain, Mr. Jager promised that complainant shall receive his entire
salary in Manila giving him a letter dated January 29, 1987 (attached
as Annex 'A' of the complaint) addressed to Capt. Mangabat to
evidence said promise. However, in Manila, Capt. Mangabat refused
to pay said claim for alleging that the money has not been remitted
yet. Despite repeated demands for payment Capt. Mangabat still
refused to pay complainant's claim saying that the latter was no
longer entitled to receive his claim considering that respondent has
paid for his plane fare and his replacement.
The POEA ascertained that the amount of $1,451.22 was the cost of airfare for
both complainant and his replacement. Hence, it concluded that complainant's
airfare was half of that amount, or $725.64 (p. 50, Rollo.)
After computing the unpaid wages due Abellaneda as well as the cash advances
he had received from his employer, the POEA rendered judgment ordering
respondent to pay to complainant the following amounts, to wit:
It may be observed that in computing the amount due Abellaneda, the POEA
failed to deduct the airfare of US$725.64 which his employer paid for his return
trip to Manila. Instead, the POEA erroneously ordered the petitioner to pay him
the airfare (US$725.64) of his replacement, as if Abellaneda (instead of the
petitioner) had advanced the cost of said airline ticket.
In its appeal to the NLRC, the petitioner failed to notice this error in the decision
(p. 46, Rollo). It assailed only that part of the decision holding it solidarily liable
with its foreign principal for the money judgment in favor of Abellaneda. It argued
that:
2. It is error to state that the joint and solidary liability of the local
agent and the foreign principal is well-settled in this jurisdiction. (p.
53, Rollo.)
Upon the affirmance in toto of the POEA decision by the NLRC (p. 65, Rollo), the
petitioner filed this petition for certiorari pointing out the inconsistency between
paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the POEA decision and the finding in the
body of the decision that since "complainant (Abellaneda *) out of his volition
unilaterally preterminated his contract of employment, ..., it is only equitable that
respondent (now petitioner *) deduct the repatriation expenses from the
complainant's salary. However, it is unfounded to deduct the airfare ticket of
complainant's replacement from his salary" in accordance with Sec. H (4), Part II
of the Standard Format which provides that "the seaman when discharged shall
not be liable for the transportation cost of his replacement." (pp. 48-49, Rollo.)
The Solicitor General in his comment on the petition admits an error in the
dispositive portion of the POEA's decision. He says:
... petitioner should not have been ordered to pay private
respondent the sum of US$725.64 since the latter did not spend for
the transportation of his replacement nor was the amount reflected
as a deduction from his gross salary receivable. In the same manner,
the cost of the ticket for private respondent himself was not
reflected as a deduction from his salary receivable. Since petitioner
spent for the return ticket of private respondent, the amount must
be allowed as additional deduction from private respondent's unpaid
salary so that petitioner may be refunded of the amount spent for
the return ticket of private respondent as ruled by the POEA. (pp. 97-
98, Rollo.)
He argues, however, that since the error was not raised by the petitioner in its
appeal to the NLRC, the error is deemed waived. Errors of judgment may not be
reviewed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 (Hermogenes vs. Amores, 111
SCRA 658). Appeal is the proper remedy.
While the rule is that — "No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the
subject matter will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and
properly argued in the brief," the exception to the rule is: "save as the court, at its
option, may notice plain errors not specified, and also clerical errors" (Sec. 7, Rule
51, Rules of Court).
The mathematical error in the POEA decision is a plain error which this Court may
correct (Sec. 7, Rule 51, Rules of Court). To overlook it would be inconsistent with
substantial justice, for it would permit a party to unjustly profit from a mistake or
inadvertence of another or others, the POEA and the petitioner in this case. It
would also put a premium on a technicality contrary to the spirit and purpose of
the Labor Code (Art. 221, Labor Code).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The dispositive part of the
decision of the POEA and the NLRC in Case No. M-87-06-525 is hereby modified as
follows:
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
FELICIANO, J.:
To protect its interests, Mobil Employees Association ("MEA"), with whom MOPI-
Luzon had an existing Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") covering the
period from 1 May 1982 to 30 April 1985, inquired about the impending sale in
talking to officials of MOPI. The latter were then non-commital as no definite
agreement had as yet been reached. The negotiations on the proposed sale were
taking place off-shore, i.e., between two (2) foreign corporations, Mobil Pet and
Caltex Pet, outside the Philippines. The sale of Mobil Pet's 40% interest in BRC
was made one of the conditions precedent to the perfection of the sale of MOPI.
Finally, approval by Philippine government agencies such as the Board of
Investments and the Central Bank of the projected sale had yet to be obtained.
On 3 August 1983, the Philippine National Oil Company ("PNOC"), owner of sixty
percent (60%) interest in BRC signified its intention to buy all of Mobil Pet's
interest in BRC. Thus, on the same date, officials of MOPI issued a memorandum
circular addressed to all their employees regarding the conclusion of the sale
negotiations and eventually, the cessation of MOPI's business operation on 31
August 1983.
In a letter dated 5 August 1983, MOPI's President, J.P. Bailleaux informed all the
employees that on 31 August 1983 their employment with the company would
cease as a result of MOPI's withdrawal from business. Mr. Bailleaux however,
assured them that they would be paid compensation up to or until 5 September
1983; that they would be given separation pay equivalent to 2.25 months basic
salary as of 31 August 1983 for every year of service; and that their unused
vacation leave for the current year would be paid in cash. Simultaneously, notices
of MOPI's withdrawal from business were also sent to the then Ministry of Labor
and Employment ("MOLE") and its regional offices in places where MOPI had
branches.
Upon conclusion of the contract of sale between Mobil Pet and Caltex Pet, on 31
August 1983, 1 the latter caused MOPI's dissolution by appropriate filings with the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in Manila. All the employees
separated from the service, 467 of them, were paid a total of P5,646,817.73
including loans waived, pursuant to the revised termination package. Some of
these employees were hired, on a contractual basis, to wind up MOPI's affairs, by
a newly formed subsidiary of Mobil Pet, Mobil Philippines, Inc. ("MPI").
On 31 August 1983, MEA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice ("ULP"), illegal
lay-off and separation benefits against MOPI with the National Labor Relations
Commission ("NLRC"), National Capital Region. The complaint was later on
amended to include Mobil Philippines, Inc. ("MPI"), Mobil Pet, Caltex Pet and all
the members of their respective Boards of Directors as respondents. Still later,
another amendment to the complaint was filed to include as additional petitioner
Inter-Island Labor Organization ("ILO"), with whom MOPI-Iloilo had a CBA for the
period from 1 May 1982 to 31 May 1985. Finally, a supplementary mental
complaint was filed charging respondents with another count of ULP, i.e., failure
of the latter to check-off and pay petitioners' union dues for September, 1983.
In a resolution of the NLRC Second Division dated 6 April 1987, petitioners' appeal
from the decision of the Labor Arbiter was dismissed for lack of merit.
In the present Petition for Certiorari, petitioners claim that private respondents
committed acts constituting unfair labor practices. These acts, in their allegations,
were:
(c) the dissolution of MOPI and the creation of MPI were done to
circumvent the CBA agreements between MOPI and petitioner MEA
on the one hand and MOPI and petitioner ILO on the other hand; and
The relevant provisions in the CBAs invoked by petitioners are identical and read
as follows:
EFFECTIVITY
Examination of the CBA provisions entitled "Effectivity " shows that the written
notice to terminate that is required to be given by either party to the other
relates to notice to terminate the CBA at the end of the original three-year period
or any subsequent year thereafter, in the absence of which written notice, the
duration of the CBA would be automatically extended for one (1) year periods.
What is involved in the instant Petition is not, however, the termination of the
CBA itself, considering that the sale by Mobil Pet of its wholly owned subsidiary
MOPI to Caltex Pet took place in 1983, in the middle of original period of the
CBAs. It appears to the Court that the applicable provision is Article II, Section 1,
quoted above. Under Article II, Section 1, in cases of termination of services of
employees, the company is required to comply with the provisions of the Labor
Code and its implementing Rules and Regulations and, "time and circumstances
permitting" and "whenever possible," management should enlist the support of
the unions in actions affecting the vital interests of the bargainable (i.e., member)
employees. It may be well to add that, since actual notice was given to all of
MOPI's employees, including, of course, the employees who were members of
petitioner unions, such notice may also be regarded as effectively the notice to
the unions contemplated by the CBA provision on "Effectivity."
Under Article 284 above, three (3) requirements may be seen to be established in
respect of cessation of business operations of an employer company not due to
business reverses, namely:
The final argument of petitioner unions need not detain us for long. Having validly
ceased to operate as of 31 August 1983, the duty of MOPI to cheek off and turn
over to petitioners union dues from their members for September 1983, or until
the expiration of the CBA in accordance with its terms, also ceased. In respect of
alleged interference by MOPI with the rights of petitioners' members to self-
organization, petitioners have not adduced any compelling reason for overturning
the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that MOPI had not interferred or
encroached upon such right. Petitioner MEA admitted that it had not been denied
the use of the company conference room. Indeed, this matter appears to us to be
a de minimis affair.
We conclude that petitioners have failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or
any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in rendering its
decision dated 6 April 1987.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
2 Rollo, p. 107.
3 See Article 284 (now Article 283) of the Labor Code dealing with
closing or cessation of operation of the company not due to serious
business losses.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
CRUZ, J.:
On June 30, 1986, the bodies of three men were found in a wooded area in
barangay Tuaco, Basud, Camarines Norte. The corpses were in a state of
decomposition and bore various contusions, stab and bullet wounds, and other
injuries indicating foul play. The victims were later positively identified as
Alexander Sy, Augusto Gabo and Frisco Marcellana.
In due time, an information for robbery with multiple homicide was filed against
Adolfo Quiñones, Alfredo Aban, Zaldy Civico, Ronilo Canaba, Amado Conda, Jr.,
Santiago Solarte, Armando Buitre and one John Doe. 1
On their arraignment on November 13, 1986, Quiñones, Canaba, Aban, Civico and
Conda pleaded not guilty. On November 20, 1986, Conda, Canaba, and Quiñones
withdrew their plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty. 2 On April 1, 1986,
Conda was allowed to withdraw his former plea of guilty and substitute the same
With not guilty. 3 Solarte escaped and is presently at large while Buitre was killed
in an encounter with the Manila police. 4
Judge Luis D. Dictado of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte
directed the prosecution to present evidence also against Quiñones and Canaba
despite their plea of guilty, which they maintained even after being informed of
its possible consequences, including the death penalty. After trial, judgment was
rendered convicting all the accused (except Solarte, who had not yet been
arrested, and Buitre). 5
The evidence for the prosecution established that the three victims were riding in
a dark blue Mitsubishi car at about seven o'clock in the evening of June 27 or 28,
1986, when they were intercepted along the Maharlika Highway in the above-
named barangay by the accused, who had placed sacks on the road to block the
way. The three were taken to the nearby woods where they were
killed. 6 According to his brother, Napoleon, Alexander Sy was at that time
carrying P300,000.00, representing the weekly collections of his business, a
necklace with pendant worth P20,000.00, a P10,000.00 diamond ring, and a
licensed .22 caliber handgun. 7 All this, together with the other articles belonging
to the victims, were taken by the accused, who also used the car in fleeing to
Sapang Palay, where it was recovered without the stereo and the spare tire. 8
The first to be picked up for questioning was Conda, who implicated the other
accused and led a police team to the house of Sonny Tabalan, where Solarte was
hiding, Inexplicably, Conda and Solarte both escaped. However, the police found
in Tabalan's house one live grenade, one .38 caliber pistol, a defective air rifle
with magazine, and a wooden rifle which he said had been brought there by
Solarte and Quiñones. In separate extra-judicial statements, 9 both Quiñones and
Canaba identified these weapons as the ones used in the commission of the
crime. 10
Testifying for the prosecution, Francisco Bariuan declared that on July 7, 1986,
Solarte came to his house and asked him to pawn a watch for P300.00. Solarte
returned the following day with Canaba and Conda. They were carrying guns and
a grenade. Solarte informed him that they were the ones who, together with
Buitre, Quiñones and Aban, had killed Sy and his companions. He and Solarte left
later to hire jeep and Canaba and Conda stayed behind, warning him that they
would blow up his house if he squealed on them. 11
But the case for the prosecution really depended on the statements of the
accused themselves, principally Quiñones and Canaba. Both were informed of
their constitutional rights before their investigation and were actually assisted by
Atty. Santiago Ceneta when they gave their separate confessions. 12 Both
confessed to the crime charged and narrated in detail their participation in its
commission.
Quiñones later testified that he had been subjected to torture to force him to
admit the killing and robbery, 13 but as the trial judge noted, no proof of such
coercion was ever presented in court. Moreover, the witness' narration of the
commission of the offense substantially jibed with the testimony of the other
accused, thus negating the suspicion that it had been merely concocted.
Understandably, Quiñones sought to minimize his participation in this crime by
claiming that he stayed in the car when the three victims were forcibly taken to
the woods where they were robbed and slain. 14 This is another indication that the
had not been manhandled into signing the confession.
lt is important to note that when asked at the trial if he was affirming his extra-
judicial statement, he categorically said he was, 15 thus in effect reiterating his
detailed account of the conduct of the several accused, including their escape to
Manila in the stolen car and their distribution of the loot among themselves. This
was now a judicial confession. Interestingly, Quiñones also admitted to two other
hold-ups and his membership in another gang of robbers headed by one Kapitan
Mitra, an unnecessary embellishment that lent further credence to his
confession. 16
Conda also gave an extra-judicial confession, but this was not made with the
assistance of counsel and so must be rejected. It is totally worthless and
inadmissible against him. Such a confession is anathema in a free society. It was
not recognized even during the era of martial law under the 1973 Constitution as
interpreted by the Court in People v. Galit. 18 And it is also scorned under the
present Constitution, which is more deeply committed to the protection of the
rights of the accused.
The Court is satisfied that the evidence against the accused is sufficient to justify
their conviction. The declarations of the prosecution witnesses — and more so of
defendants Quiñones and Canaba, both of whom had pleaded guilty — are telling
enough to toll their guilt. The seized weapons and the other exhibits offer strong
corroboration that has not been refuted. The state of the cadavers — of the
swollen scrotums and the protruding tongues — tell a tale of their own of the
defendants' perverted ruthlessness.
By contrast, the defense was practically one of mere denial. Even the claimed
maltreatment of Quiñones has not been established.
It is clear from the evidence on record that there was a conspiracy among the
perpetrators of the crime to rob and slay. A conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. This need not be established by direct evidence but may be proven
through the series of acts done by each of the accused in pursuance of the
common unlawful purpose. 21
Proof of conspiracy in the case at bar was supplied, paradoxically enough, mainly
by defendants Quiñones and Canaba themselves. From the time they blocked the
road to waylay their prey to the killing and robbing in the woods, to the
distribution of the loot and their escape in the stolen car, all the accused were
acting in concert and in accordance with their common plan.
It is argued that Civico and Aban were not part of the conspiracy and that
Quiñones himself categorically said so in answer to a question from the
prosecution. Interpreting this merely as a gesture of loyalty or perhaps goodwill
or charity toward his fellow criminals, we dismiss it as a falsity. On the other hand,
Civico himself admitted his own participation in the offense, and in his sworn
confession (which he affirmed in court) also implicated Aban. And there is also
Bariuan's testimony that Aban was one of the armed group, including the other
accused, that went to his house on July 8, 1986, and talked of their commission of
the crime. These declarations are enough to place the two defendants within the
conspiracy together with the other defendants.
In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and every one of the conspirators is
guilty with the others in equal degree. Hence, every member of the group that
perpetrated the killing and robbery of the three victims must suffer the same
penalty prescribed by law even if they had different modes of participation in the
commission of the crime. 22
The trial judge found all the accused guilty as charged and sentenced each of
them to serve the triplepenalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of P380,000.00 to the heirs of Alexander
Sy, P50,000.00 to the heirs of Augusta Gabo, and P50,000.00 to the heirs of Frisco
Marcellana. The firearms were also confiscated in favor of the State.
The Court finds that the accused were incorrectly charged with robbery with
multiple homicide and so were also incorrectly sentenced by the trial court. The
reason is that there is no crime of robbery with multiple homicide under the
Revised Penal Code. The charge should have been for robbery with homicide only
regardless of the fact that three persons were killed in the commission of the
robbery. In this special complex crime, the number of persons killed is immaterial
and does not increase the penalty prescribed in Article 294 of the said Code. As
held in People v. Cabuena: 23
But it was error to sentence the appellants to three life
imprisonments each as if 3 separate crimes had been committed. The
complex crime of robbery with homicide is not to be multiplied with
the number of persons killed. As was said by this Court in People vs.
Madrid (88 Phil. 1), "the general concept of this crime does not limit
the taking of human life to one single victim making the slaying of
human being in excess of that number punishable as separate
individual offense or offenses. All the homicides or murders are
merged in the composite, integrated whole that is robbery with
homicide so long as the killings were perpetrated by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery.
The civil indemnity for each of the three victims is reduced to P30,000.00, to be
paid to their respective heirs. The heirs of Alexander Sy are also awarded the
additional sum P330,000.00, representing the value of the articles taken from him
by the accused.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 6.
3 Ibid., p. 178.
4 Rollo, p. 53.
5 Ibid., p. 18.
6 Records, p. 39.
14 Records, p. 29.
19 Records, p. 9.
23 98 Phil. 919.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court 1 involving the
probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New
York, U. S.A., on November 10, 1980, naming private respondent Rowena
Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision, we upheld the appointment of
Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs.
Vitug's) widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from
the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to
the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate in the sum of
P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed were personal funds. As found by
the Court of Appeals, 2 the alleged advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for the
payment of estate tax, P518,834.27 as deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99 as
"increment thereto." 3 According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the sums of
P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of
America, Makati, Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that
the same funds withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal
partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no
ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure to include the
sums in question for inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the
estate." 4
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the
same through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank
on June 19, 1970. The agreement provides:
We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN
NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred
to as the BANK), that all money now or hereafter deposited by us or
any or either of us with the BANK in our joint savings current account
shall be the property of all or both of us and shall be payable to and
collectible or withdrawable by either or any of us during our lifetime,
and after the death of either or any of us shall belong to and be the
sole property of the survivor or survivors, and shall be payable to and
collectible or withdrawable by such survivor or survivors.
We further agree with each other and the BANK that the receipt or
check of either, any or all of us during our lifetime, or the receipt or
check of the survivor or survivors, for any payment or withdrawal
made for our above-mentioned account shall be valid and sufficient
release and discharge of the BANK for such payment or withdrawal. 5
The trial courts 6 upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion to
sell some of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be used to
pay the personal funds of Romarico Vitug in the total sum of P667,731.66 ... ." 7
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the
herein private respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement
constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did not comply with the formalities
of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code," 8 and secondly,
assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under
the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code. 9
In his petition, Vitug, the surviving spouse, assails the appellate court's ruling on
the strength of our decisions in Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust
Co. 11 and Macam v. Gatmaitan 12 in which we sustained the validity of
"survivorship agreements" and considering them as aleatory contracts. 13
The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should
be embodied in a will. A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable
and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and
declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death." 14 In other words,
the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. 15 In this case, the monies
subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In
the case relied on, Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co., 16 we rejected claims that
a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one party's separate properties in
favor of the other, but simply, their joint holdings:
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it
must be presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of
the marita. relations. 20
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons,
because it was to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a
donation between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse's
own properties to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the
conjugal partnership, as held by the Court of Appeals, 21 by "mere
stipulation" 22 and that it is no "cloak" 23 to circumvent the law on conjugal
property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest
conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more
commonly denominated in banking parlance as an "and/or" account. In the case
at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-038, they
merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did
not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been
sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the funds were conjugal, it can
not be said that one spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or her
deposits in the money pool.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her
husband, the latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts
under savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the
respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by Mrs.
Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate property of
petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court, dated June 29,
1987, and its resolution, dated February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1 Corona v. Court of Appeals, No. 59821, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA
316.
3 Rollo, 21.
4 Id., 22.
5 Id.
7 Rollo, 23.
8 Id., 26.
10 Rollo, 28-29.
16 Supra.
17 Supra., 547.
18 Supra.
19 Supra., 190-191.
22 Id.
23 Id.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for appellant Danilo Dela Cruz.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The Trial Court decided * that the three accused, Danilo DE LA CRUZ y Ruado,
Romeo SALVADOR y Mendoza, and Dantes BELOSO y de Castro, had "conspired to
steal away as they in fact stole and carried away the TELSTAR of ANTHONY
Banzon"; held them "liable as principals by direct participation" for the crime of
Carnapping with Homicide; and sentenced them as follows:
Challenging their conviction, the three accused interposed the present appeal.
However, during the pendency hereof, Danilo DE LA CRUZ withdrew his appeal on
1 December 1989. This appeal is thus confined to Dantes BELOSO and Romeo
SALVADOR.
Inside the Centrum office ANTHONY and BELOSO discussed the price of the car,
which ANTHONY fixed at P188,000.00. BELOSO then advised ANTHONY to wait for
Danilo DE LA CRUZ to arrive as he would be the one to decide whether or not to
buy the car. After a while, DE LA CRUZ arrived and BELOSO introduced ANTHONY
to the former. At around 1:00 P.M., DE LA CRUZ and ANTHONY left the office to
go to the former's house. ANTHONY brought with him an envelope containing the
certificate of registration, official receipt, and other papers pertaining to the car
(pp. 9-12, TSN, 9 October 1985). When they arrived at the house, SALVADOR was
already there.
SALVADOR recounted in his Sworn Statement (Exhibit "B ") that DE LA CRUZ had
told him to have some snacks at a nearby "lugawan" while he and ANTHONY
talked. When SALVADOR returned, he saw DE LA CRUZ and ANTHONY seated near
the dining table. SALVADOR then went to the comfort room and while inside, he
heard a shot. When he got out, he found ANTHONY sprawled on the floor, the
latter's head bathed in his own blood, and saw DE LA CRUZ holding a gun (pp.
640-641, Records).
Strangely enough, the dyphenylamine paraffin tests done on DE LA CRUZ on 6
December 1984 showed negative results (Exhibit N") while those on BELOSO and
SALVADOR proved positive (Exhibits "O" and P The paraffin casts on the latter two
were taken on 7 December, which were then sealed and preserved until the
actual testing on 11 December 1984.
Continuing with the facts — at around 3:00 P.M., Dantes BELOSO, who was at the
Centrum office, received a call from DE LA CRUZ, who instructed him to proceed
to his (DE LA CRUZ) house at Obrero Street, Makati, Metro Manila. On BELOSO
called for DE LA CRUZ, who came out and handed to him the key of the Telstar. DE
LA CRUZ instructed BELOSO to drive for SALVADOR who did not know how to
drive. BELOSO then boarded the car and waited for SALVADOR who came out of
the house some 15 to 20 minutes later. In his Affidavit (Exhibit "C-11 "), BELOSO
recounted that SALVADOR related to him that he had seen a dead man in the
house of DE LA CRUZ but that they were to keep it to themselves because he
(SALVADOR) was seared of DE LA CRUZ. SALVADOR then showed to BELOSO a
phone number of a certain Mr. Hernandez who was interested in buying the car.
After driving a short distance, BELOSO stopped at a telephone booth to call
Hernandez to ask for the latter's address. They then started to look for the place
but failed to locate it. Since BELOSO was already hungry, he parked the car at the
Brunch Restaurant in front of UERM and took his snack thereat while SALVADOR
took a taxi and proceeded to Hernandez (p. 13-16, TSN, 9 October 1985).
SALVADOR was able to reach Hernandez' place at about 4:00 P.M. Rodolfo
Hernandez recalled during the trial that SALVADOR introduced himself as
ANTHONY Banzon and offered to sell a car, which was parked at a nearby Caltex
station. They proceeded to the station to look at the car. Hernandez then looked
at the certificate of registration of the car in the name of ANTHONY Banzon and
the residence certificate presented to him by SALVADOR, which was also in the
name of ANTHONY Banzon. Believing that SALVADOR was really ANTHONY
Banzon, Hernandez then suggested that they go to the actual buyer at the
Metropolitan Pawnshop at P. Campa Street, Sampaloc, Metro Manila, leaving
BELOSO at the UERM. At the pawnshop, they met Hernandez' contact, Patrolman
Rosauro de la Rosa, who is the brother of the owner of the pawnshop. Again,
SALVADOR introduced himself as ANTHONY Banzon, the owner of the car and
offered to sell it for P130,000.00. Hernandez then left the pawnshop (pp. 85-95,
TSN, 1 March 1985; pp. 4-13, TSN, 8 March 1985).
During the negotiation, Pat. de la Rosa became suspicious that the car had been
stolen because of the low price of P130,000.00, and when told that he would be
paid the next day, SALVADOR insisted that if possible, the former pay P100,000.00
in advance as he was in need of money very badly. On top of that, when Pat. de la
Rosa declined to pay immediately, SALVADOR left the car behind. Pat. de la Rosa
then reported his suspicions to Sgt. Reynaldo Roldan of the Quezon City Police
(pp. 8-19, TSN, 8 March 1985). Sgt. Roldan forthwith dispatched Pfc. Damaso
Osma, Pat. Edgardo de Leon, Pat. Anthony Name and Pat. Justiniano Estrella, Jr.,
to P. Campa Street (pp. 95-96, TSN, 27 February 1985; p. 4, TSN, 25 March 1985).
Meanwhile, at around 9:00 P.M. of the same day, Cynthia Juarez a boarder of the
house of DE LA CRUZ, reported to Pfc. Evelio Bactad of the Makati Police that
when she arrived at the boarding house she found it unlocked but with the lights
on and a dead man in the kitchen. The house is located at Obrero Street, Makati,
Metro Manila. Bactad proceeded to the place to conduct an investigation and
there found a lifeless body of a man, a already in the state of rigor mortis with a
gunshot wound on the forehead, and an empty super.38 caliber shell about two
feet away from the left side of his body (pp. 14-21, TSN, 25 February 1985).
Cynthia Juarez mistakenly identified the body to be that of her landlord Danilo DE
LA CRUZ.
At about 2:00 A.M. of 6 December 1984, a male person went to the same Makati
police station to report that his house has been ransacked by someone. He
introduced himself as Danilo DE LA CRUZ. Pfc. Bactad, perplexed as to the identity
of the dead body, held DE LA CRUZ for further questioning (pp. 14-25, TSN, 25
February 1985). Pfc. Bactad then coordinated with the Quezon City Police anti-
carnapping unit, which had given notice that they had apprehended two persons,
Romeo SALVADOR and Dantes BELOSO. These two were later turned over to the
Makati Police Precinct. Pfc. Bactad was subsequently able to straighten out the
identity of the victim to be ANTHONY Banzon (pp. 22-27 and 95, TSN, ibid.).
Sgt. Reynaldo Roldan, a Quezon City policeman, who was called by Pat. de la Rosa
to report the latter's suspicion about a carnapped vehicle, interrogated BELOSO
and SALVADOR and elicited their modus operandi as follows: 1) blank residence
certificates were secured and kept by the three accused; 2) their "business" of
buying of cars was advertised in the newspapers; 3) the ads yielding fruitful
results, prospective sellers would be asked about their respective certificates of
registration and other documents; 4) when the portion for the signature of the
owner is found to be blank, the accused would pretend to test the car, demand
the certificate of registration, and fill in the signature space with their own
signature; 5) present the same certificate of registration bearing their own
signature, along with the residence certificate supplied by DE LA CRUZ which is
made to coincide with the name and signature appearing in the certificate of
registration, to the prospective buyers; and 6) pretend to test the car although, in
fact, just waiting for the opportunity to leave the owner of the car behind so that
the accused could dispose of the same in the meantime.
All accused, on the other hand, profess innocence. BELOSO claims that he was
merely hired to man the office at Centrum Condominium; that he had nothing to
do with the carnapping of ANTHONY'S vehicle; that he went to the house of DE LA
CRUZ at about 3:00 P.M. of 5 December 1984, but was not allowed to enter the
same; and that while he was by the gate, he was given the key of ANTHONY's car
by DE LA CRUZ to drive for SALVADOR who did not know how to drive; that, in
turn, the registration papers of the car and other documents were handed to
SALVADOR with specific instructions to bring the vehicle to the prospective buyer,
Hernandez.
For his part, SALVADOR claims that he was merely called by DE LA CRUZ to go to
the latter's house to assist BELOSO in the sale of the car. He denies having been a
long acquaintance of either DE LA CRUZ or BELOSO. He claims that on 5 December
1984 DE LA CRUZ instructed him to go to the Royal Beauty Parlor between 10:00
and 11:00 A.M., which he did. After waiting for some ten (10) to fifteen (15)
minutes, DE LA CRUZ arrived on board a taxi cab. They proceeded to DE LA CRUZ's
house. Arriving thereat and finding it closed, they went to Lugawan sa Makati for
a snack. After eating, they returned to DE LA CRUZ's house around 12:00 noon. A
few minutes later, Elmer Mabunga, driver of DE LA CRUZ arrived (pp. 14-15, TSN,
March 5, 1986). At 12:30 P.M., the three of them left the house. Elmer rode in a
jeepney while they took a taxi. DE LA CRUZ dropped him off at the Royal Beauty
Parlor while DE LA CRUZ proceeded to Centrum Condominium. He was instructed
by DE LA CRUZ to wait from 2:00 to 2:30 P.M. after which he should go back to
the house. At around 3:00 P.M., he went back and after calling DE LA CRUZ'name,
the latter came out of the house, opened the first door, and told him to wait for
BELOSO. At around 3:20 to 3:30 P.M., BELOSO arrived. From here on, the
testimonies of BELOSO and SALVADOR are substantially similar in that they were
given the keys of the car and some documents and told to go to a certain
Hernandez, a prospective buyer.
Both BELOSO and SALVADOR are in unison in claiming that their statements,
marked as Exhibits "B" for SALVADOR, and "C" and "K" for BELOSO, are
inadmissible in evidence as the same were extracted by force and without the
presence of counsel.
The Trial Court gave no credence to the exculpatory allegations of BELOSO and
SALVADOR and convicted them, as well as DE LA CRUZ, of Carnapping with
Homicide. Hence, this appeal, filed originally by all three accused.
Appellants BELOSO and SALVADOR ascribe the following errors to the Trial Court:
By Dantes BELOSO:
II. The Lower Court, with due respect, gravely erred in holding that
the three (3) accused conspired in stealing the car subject of this
case.
III. The Lower Court again, with due respect, gravely erred in applying
the case of People vs. Mangulabnan, et al. in concluding that the
three (3) accused are liable in the death of Anthony Banzon and that
Beloso could have been present at the time the victim was shot.
IV. The Court a quo gravely erred in ruling that all the accused
conspired in the killing of Anthony Banzon and Beloso 'could have
been inside the house and was present at the time Banzon was shot'
because if he were not present, 'he could have been found negative
of gun powder nitrates.
By Romeo SALVADOR:
It may, indeed, be that Judge Phinney C. Araquil, who penned the Trial Court
Decision, had not heard the case at all, the trial having been conducted by then
Judge Jesus M. Elbinias, who was elevated to the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless,
the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were extant and
complete and there was no impediment for Judge Araquil to have decided the
case. It is not unusual for a Judge who did not try a case to decide it on the basis
of the record (People vs. Escalante, L-37147, 22 August 1984, 131 SCRA 237). The
fact that the Judge who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the
judgment and that for that reason the latter did not have the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the
records of the case does not render the judgment erroneous (Co Tao vs. Court of
Appeals, 101 Phil. 188 [1957]).
The rest of the assigned errors center on the findings of conspiracy and guilt by
the Trial Court and may be considered jointly.
The three accused had known one another some time before December 1984 at
relatively different periods. Before Pfc. Bactad at the police station, BELOSO and
SALVADOR identified DE LA CRUZ as an "associate" although the latter denied it
(p.29, TSN, 25 February 1985,). BELOSO had been hired through DE LA CRUZ to
man the office at Centrum Condominium, Perez Street, Legazpi Village, Makati.
On 4 December 1984, they had gotten together at the Kool King Restaurant at
Pasong Tamo, Makati, to discuss a "car deal" to be consummated the next day.
Dantes BELOSO, masquerading for Mike Garcia, had caused an advertisement to
be published in the 28 and 29 November issues of the Bulletin Today. On the
same dates, BELOSO had rented an office space at the Centrum Condominium
under the name of said Garcia for the two days mentioned, and again on 5
December 1984 at P50.00 per hour, complete with staff facilities. BELOSO held
himself out as in the business of buying cars. The victim, ANTHONY, responded to
the ad, went to said office and offered to sell his Telstar, Model '83. Posing again
as Mike Garcia, BELOSO called ANTHONY's house at around 9:00 A.M. on 5
December 1984 and informed the latter's mother that he was the buyer of the
car. When ANTHONY went to the Centrum office, BELOSO told ANTHONY to wait
for DE LA CRUZ. Upon the latter's arrival, he had a talk with ANTHONY. DE LA
ORTIZ made sure that ANTHONY's certificate of registration, official receipt and
other pertinent papers of the Telstar were in order (pp. 9-12, TSN, October 9,
1985). ANTHONY and DE LA CRUZ then proceeded to the latter's house at Barrio
Obrero, Makati.
What of the killing of ANTHONY? There is no question that he was killed "in the
commission of the carnapping" (Sec. 14, RA 6539). It is clear from the evidence as
well that he was killed in the house of DE LA CRUZ between 1:30 and 2:00 P.M. on
5 December 1984 (Brief, Danilo de la Cruz, p. 19). It was at that house where
ANTHONY was found dead by a boarder by the name of Cynthia Juarez at around
9:00 P.M. of the same date. DE LA CRUZ tried to camouflage the killing by
ostensibly reporting to the police that his place had been ransacked and that a
person had been killed. As Pat. Bactad testified, however, when he and a police
team went to the house, belongings therein were found wrapped and ready to be
transferred.
BELOSO claims that he was sent for by DE LA CRUZ from the Centrum office only
at 3:00 P.M. on 5 December 1984 and was not, therefore, at the DE LA CRUZ
residence at the time the killing was perpetrated in the nearly afternoon of that
date. Similarly SALVADOR claims that he went to the DE LA CRUZ house only at
3:00 P.M. and when he did he was merely at the gate and did not enter the
house. Consequently they conclude that neither of them can be held culpable for
ANTHONY'S death.
Those denial, however, cannot prevail over the physical evidence that BELOSO
and SALVADOR were found positive for nitrates, which means that they were
within the vicinity when the gun was fired.
The fact that DE LA CRUZ was negative for powder burns, although he was tagged
by SALVADOR as the triggerman, can only mean that he knew hoe to sufficiently
protect himself, a knowledge that must have been derived form his stint as an
officer of the Philippine Army.
The identical claims of BELOSO and SALVADOR that they were heavy smokers, of
about 3 packs of Marlboro cigarretes a day, which accounts for the pressent of
nitrate in both their right and left hands, is contradicted by the testimony of the
forensic chemist that nitrates produced by cigarrete smoking have different
characteristics form those caused by powder burns.
BELOSO's and SALVADOR's complicity in the kiling is, therefore, established not by
any of the extradujicial confesions (Exhibits "B", "C" and "K") but by the physical
evidence on record. So that, even if those sworns statements are declared
inadmissible for having been given without the presence of the counsel, their
culpability is borne out by the evidence indefendent of the same.
That the respective participations of BELOSO and SALVADOR in the kiling is not
claercut is of no moment:
Moreover, conspiracy having been adequately proven, all the conspirators are
liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation
because in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. The degree of
actual participation by each of the conspirators is immaterial (People vs. Loreno,
G.R. No. 54414, 9 July 1984, 130 SCRA 311). As conspirators, each is equally
responsible for the acts of their co-conspirators.
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. — Any person who is found guilty of
carnapping, as this term is defined in Section two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and
not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons,
or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,
when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of
life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver
or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the
commission of the carnapping (Sec. 14, ibid.).
In this case, the owner of the carnapped vehicle was killed in the commission of
the carnapping obviously to gain possession of the car, its registration certificate
and other pertinent papers, get the owner out of the way, and thus facilitate its
sale to a third party, in keeping with the modus operandi of the perpetrators.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the alleged holographic will of one
Melecio Labrador isdated, as provided for in Article 810 2 of the New Civil Code.
The antecedent and relevant facts are as follows: On June 10, 1972, Melecio
Labrador died in the Municipality of Iba, province of Zambales, where he was
residing, leaving behind a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1916 under Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1652, and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica,
Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed
Labrador, and a holographic will.
On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs),
Enrica Labrador and Cristobal Labrador, filed in the court a quo a petition for the
probate docketed as Special Proceeding No. 922-I of the alleged holographic will
of the late Melecio Labrador.
Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio
and Jesus, for the annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a
parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by devise from their
father Melecio Labrador under a holographic will executed on March 17, 1968,
the complaint for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-I, being premised on
the fact that the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.
After both parties had rested and submitted their respective evidence, the trial
court rendered a joint decision dated February 28, 1985, allowing the probate of
the holographic will and declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute sale. The
court a quo had also directed the respondents (the defendants in Civil Case No.
934-I) to reimburse to the petitioners the sum of P5,000.00 representing the
redemption price for the property paid by the plaintiff-petitioner Sagrado with
legal interest thereon from December 20, 1976, when it was paid to vendee a
retro.
Respondents appealed the joint decision to the Court of Appeals, which on March
10, 1988 modified said joint decision of the court a quo by denying the allowance
of the probate of the will for being undated and reversing the order of
reimbursement. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision
was denied by the Court of Appeals, in the resolution of June 13, 1988. Hence,
this petition.
II
The alleged undated holographic will written in Ilocano translated into English, is
quoted as follows:
I — First Page
II — Second Page
And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the
partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said
fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year
1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be
followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than
MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.
And that referring to the other places of property, where the said
property is located, the same being the fruits of our earnings of the
two mothers of my children, there shall be equal portion of each
share among themselves, and or to be benefitted with all those
property, which property we have been able to acquire.
That in order that there shall be basis of the truth of this writing
(WILL) which I am here hereof manifesting of the truth and of the
fruits of our labor which their two mothers, I am signing my signature
below hereof, and that this is what should be complied with, by all
the brothers and sisters, the children of their two mothers —
JULIANA QUINTERO PILARISA and CASIANA AQUINO VILLANUEVA
Your father who made this writing (WILL), and he is, MELECIO
LABRADOR y RALUTIN (p. 46, Rollo)
The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is really dated,
although the date is not in its usual place, is impressed with merit.
The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance
with Article 810. It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second
page of the holographic will, viz:
And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the
partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said
fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year
1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be
followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than
MELECIO LABRADOR, their father. (emphasis supplied) (p. 46, Rollo)
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in
the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed
in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the subject will.
Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the testator
and his beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves about "the
partitioning and assigning the respective assignments of the said fishpond," and
was not the date of execution of the holographic will; hence, the will is more of an
"agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries thereof to the prejudice
of other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was thus a failure to comply
with Article 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a person is permitted,
with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the
disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death."
Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the
execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the
paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an agreement but a
unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was executing
was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the
testator's instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was
fully aware of the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of the
character of the testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his
estate.
Anent the second issue of finding the reimbursement of the P5,000 representing
the redemption price as erroneous, respondent court's conclusion is incorrect.
When private respondents sold the property (fishpond) with right to repurchase
to Navat for P5,000, they were actually selling property belonging to another and
which they had no authority to sell, rendering such sale null and void. Petitioners,
thus "redeemed" the property from Navat for P5,000, to immediately regain
possession of the property for its disposition in accordance with the will.
Petitioners therefore deserve to be reimbursed the P5,000.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 10,
1988 is hereby REVERSED. The holographic will of Melecio Labrador is APPROVED
and ALLOWED probate. The private respondents are directed to REIMBURSE the
petitioners the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
GANCAYCO, J.:
The authority of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to review the actions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the investigation and prosecution of
election offenses filed in said court is the center of controversy of this petition.
On January 14, 1988 the COMELEC received a report-complaint from Atty. Lauron
E. Quilatan, Election Registrar of Toledo City, against private respondents for
alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC directed Atty.
Manuel Oyson, Jr., Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu, to conduct the
preliminary investigation of the case.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition wherein the
following issues are raised:
(a) Whether or not the respondent Court has the power or authority
to order the Commission on Elections through its Regional Election
Director of Region VII or its Law Department to conduct a
reinvestigation of Criminal Cases Nos. TCS-1220 to TCS-1234;
(b) Whether or not the respondent court in issuing its disputed order
dated April 5,1990 gravely usurped the functions of the Honorable
Supreme Court, the sole authority that has the power to review on
certiorari, decisions, orders, resolutions or instructions of the
Commission on Elections; and
(c) Whether or not the respondent Court has the power or authority
to order the Comelec Law Department to furnish said respondent the
records of preliminary investigation of the above criminal cases for
purposes of determining a probable cause. 3
On the other hand, the respondents contend that since the cases were filed in
court by the COMELEC as a public prosecutor, and not in the exercise of its power
to decide election contests, the trial court has authority to order a reinvestigation.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions
affecting elections, including determination of the number and
location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.
Section 52, Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881)
provides among the powers and functions of the COMELEC as follows-
However, under Section 2(6), of Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC
may "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and
malpractices." Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC,
through its duly authorized legal officers, "have the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and
to prosecute the same."
Section 268 of the same Code provides that: "The regional trial courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings
for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register
or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or
municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other
criminal cases."
From the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code,
it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC
to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the
power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the
preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable
under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through
its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an
election offense and upon a prima faciefinding of a probable cause, files the
information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the
case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to
the approval of the court. 12 The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the
case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court. 13
The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial
court requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation in this case and to submit to the
court the record of the preliminary investigation on the ground that only this
Court may review its actions is certainly untenable.
One last word. The petition is brought in the name of the People of the
Philippines. Only the Solicitor General can represent the People of the Philippines
in this proceeding. 15 In the least, the consent of the Office of the Solicitor General
should have been secured by the COMELEC before the filing of this petition. On
this account alone, the petition should be dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
3 Pages 2 to 3, Rollo.
10 Id., paragraph (7). See also Cruz, Philippine Political Law 1987
Edition, pages 287 to 297.
13 Ibid.
l5 City Fiscal of Tacloban vs. Espina, 166 SCRA 614, 616 to 617 (1988).