Case Name and Citation

R v Taj [2018] EWCA Crim 1743, [2019] 2 WLR 380, [2019] QB 655

Court and Judges

Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Sir Brian Leveson P, Gross, Davis LJJ, Haddon-Cave J and
Sir Peter Openshaw (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of Appeal)

Parties

Appellant: Simon Taj, Respondent: Regina

Material facts

The defendant (D) pulled over to assist the victim (V), whose car had broken down.

After finding numerous electrical equipment and wires in the victim’s car boot, D suspected
V was involved in terrorist activity and subsequently contacted the police.

Irrespective of the affirmation from the police that V was not a terrorist, the defendant
attacked the victim with a tyre lever, grievously injuring him.

D sought to rely on s 76 (4)(b) of the CJIA, however he was deprived of the defence as no
evidence suggested he was intoxicated at the time of the offence, which made D mistakenly
believe V was a terrorist.

D, however, could have been in a state of mistaken belief due to voluntary intoxication
induced psychosis.

The trial judge ruled that the phrase “attributable to intoxication” in s. 76(5) could
encompass situations in which D could be “disordered in intellect” even when there were no
intoxicants in his system.

Self-defence was withdrawn from the jury and D was convicted with attempted murder.

Question of law/issues

The issues before the court are:

(i) Could the defendant rely on self-defence as stated in s.76 (2) Criminal Justice and
Immigration Act 2008 (CJIA)?
 (ii) If it was self-defence, was it necessary for the defendant to use force to defend
himself and was the degree of force used by the defendant against the victim
reasonable in such circumstances?
(iii) If D did hold a particular belief that V was a terrorist, was it genuine? And if so,
could the D rely on s. 76(3)?
(iv) Whether the defendant, due to his history of drug and alcohol abuse, was
intoxicated, or due to the presence of remaining substances in his system,
entered a substance-induced paranoia during the time of the events.

Decision

The appeal against conviction was dismissed. Application for leave to appeal against
sentence refused.

Detailed reasons for the decision

A strong bench of the court dismissed the appeal. In regards whether the defendant can rely
on mistaken belief attributing to self-defence, the court viewed that the phrase in s. 76(5) “a
mistaken belief attributable to intoxication” includes being in “a mistaken state of mind
immediately and proximately consequent upon earlier drink or drug-taking, so that even
though the person concerned is not drunk or intoxicated at the time, the short-term effects
can be shown to have triggered subsequent episodes of eg paranoia”.

It was argued by Mr Abbas Lakha for the defendant that D was in fact suffering from
psychosis due to past voluntary intoxication at the time of the offence, causing him to
genuinely believe that V was a terrorist. Mr Lakha also claimed that this case alike R v Harris,
D was paranoid when he attacked the victim, and while the paranoia was not long-lasting,
he was still suffering from an illness which could provide a defence of insanity. Mr Lakha
further submitted a medical report from Dr Reid stating while uncertain that prior voluntary
intoxication might contribute to the severity of D’s illness, it was possible that he was
paranoid due to the absence of the intoxicants during the offence. However, the court ruled
this evidence as insufficient for grounds of an appeal due to its vague conclusion, thus
distinguishing this case from Harris.
The court then also applied the Majewski rule, which established that voluntary intoxication
is not to be used as defence to crimes requiring only basic intent as it goes against the
purposes of criminal law. The mens rea element is already satisfied by the reckless
behaviour of being intoxicated. In this case, D, assumed to be in a voluntary intoxication
induced psychosis, cannot rely on the defence as intoxication is not an excuse for criminal
conduct.

Alternatively, in this abnormal case, it was revealed that there was no reasonable basis for
D’s response, unlike in the case of Oye which Mr McGuinness of the respondent referenced.
The court held that the degree of force exerted by D as self-defence was unreasonable. It
was ruled that D’s paranoia is not to be considered as the law requires an objective standard
of reasonableness, and there was no reasonable basis for the actions of D. Although there
may have been genuine belief, D could not rely on s. 76(3) and hence, he is to be convicted.

Ratio decidendi

The interpretation of s. 76(5) of the CJIA suggests that D cannot rely on “mistaken belief
attributable to intoxication that was voluntarily induced” as self-defence.

The phrase “attributable to intoxication” encompasses situations in which D, although not

having intoxicants present in his system, could still be presumed as if he was drunk.

The absence of intoxicants in his system could have triggered episodes of paranoia due to
long term voluntary intoxication. However, this does not extend to long-term mental illness
precipitated by substance abuse.