REMEDIAL LAW

[ G.R. No. 210302, August 27, 2020 ]

INTEGRATED MICRO ELECTRONICS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. STANDARD INSURANCE

CO., INC., RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: Service upon domestic private juridical entity. — When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership, or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with juridical personality, service
may be made by the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-
house counsel.

FACTS: A panel of insurers, including Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard Insurance), United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) General Insurance, Co., Inc., Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation,
Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI) M/S Insurance Corporation, and Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., issued a
policy in favor of Integrated Micro Electronics, Inc. (Integrated Micro), insuring its properties against "all
risks of physical loss, destruction, or damage, including fire" for the period March 31, 2009, to March 31,
2010.

On May 24, 2009, a fire broke out at Integrated Micro's building, causing damage to its production
equipment and machinery. On May 25, 2009, Integrated Micro filed a claim for indemnity from Standard
Insurance, which was rejected on February 24, 2010, citing the cause of loss as an excluded peril.
Displeased, Integrated Micro sought reconsideration, but Standard Insurance denied it in a letter dated
April 12, 2010. Almost a year later, on April 11, 2011, Integrated Micro filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against Standard Insurance before the RTC, claiming actual damages of
US$1,117,056.84, or its peso equivalent at the time of loss, or the amount of ₱52,892,641.35.

Standard Insurance moved to dismiss the complaint for invalid service of summons, lack of cause of
action, and prescription. Allegedly, the summons was served upon the legal assistant or the secretary of
Standard Insurance's in-house counsel, not authorized to receive summons under Section 11, Rule 14 of
the 1997 Rules of Court. Additionally, Integrated Micro's cause of action was deemed prescribed, as it
filed the complaint beyond the 12-month period from the rejection of the claim.

ISSUE: Was there a valid summons when the summons was served upon the legal assistant or the
secretary of Standard Insurance's in-house counsel?

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

The service of summons upon the legal assistant of Standard Insurance's in-house counsel is improper.
Rule 14, Section 11 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides the manner of serving summons to a corporation.
The new rule specifically identifies and limits the persons to whom the service of summons must be
made.
Under the 1997 Rules of Court, when the defendant is a corporation, partnership, or association organized
under the laws of the Philippines with juridical personality, service may be made by the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

Contrary to Integrated Micro's assertion, the amendment effectively abandoned the substantial
compliance doctrine and restricted the persons authorized to receive summons for juridical entities.

NOTE: This case was resolved by applying the 1997 Rules of Court. Under AM No. 19-10-20-SC, or the
amendments to the 1997 Rules of Court, when the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association
organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel of the
corporation wherever they may be found, or in their absence or unavailability, on their secretaries. Thus,
service may now be made to the secretaries of the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
 [GR No. 241363, September 16, 2020]

TERESITA RAMOS vs. ANNABELLE ROSELL

DOCTRINE: Newly-discovered evidence may be admissible in evidence, if the offering party exercised
reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during the trial but he failed to secure it.

FACTS: This case stemmed from a letter dated June 7, 2012 of the CSC Field Office – Davao Oriental
requesting verification of Teresita B. Ramos' certificates of eligibility. On November 25, 2013, the CSC
Regional Office No. XI issued Spot Verification Report stating that Ramos declared in her Personal Data
Sheet (PDS) dated March 28, 2005 that she took the Career Service Sub-Professional Eligibility (CSSPE)
examination on April 6, 1994 in Davao City and passed with a rating of 80.03. However, the records did
not show that a career service examination was conducted on that date and that Ramos was included in
the Register of Eligibles. Instead, Ramos was issued a Barangay Official Certificate of Eligibility (BOE)
on April 26, 1994 in Davao City. On April 21, 2014, the CSC RO No. XI formally charged Ramos with
the administrative offenses of Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest, and Falsification of Official Documents.

In her Answer, Ramos admitted that she did not possess a CSSPE but only a Barangay Official Certificate
of Eligibility (BOE). She claimed that her supposed rating in the March 28, 2005 Personal Data Sheet was
already deleted when she submitted another Personal Data Sheet (substitute PDS) to the Human Resource
Management Office (HRMO) of the Municipality of Baganga. She supposedly stated in the substitute
Personal Data Sheet that she possessed a BOE, and not a CSSPE. However, she was not able to present
the same during the proceedings.

The CSC-RO found Ramos guilty of the offenses and imposed upon her the penalty of dismissal from the
service

Ramos sought reconsideration, explaining that entries in the March 28, 2005 PDS relating to her
eligibility status were made inadvertently. She reiterated that she accomplished another PDS to correct
these erroneous entries, yet, the substitute PDS was not found in her 201 files brought by the HRMO
during the hearing. On November 20, 2015, Ramos filed a motion to admit the substitute PDS as newly
discovered evidence.

The CSC RO No. XI denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution No. 15-01204 dated
December 9, 2015. The substitute PDS was not newly discovered evidence.

Ramos filed a petition for review with the CSC but the CSC affirmed the decision of CSC RO No. XI.
Ramos appealed to the CA, and the CA sustained the findings and conclusions of the CSC. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether the substitute PDS is admissible as a newly discovered evidence.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in AFFIRMATIVE.

Newly-discovered evidence may be admissible in evidence if the following requisites are present: (1) that
the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that the evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (4) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted,
would probably change the judgment. Here, the substitute PDS meets the criteria for newly discovered
evidence.

As early as in her Answer to the formal charge issued by the CSC RO No. XI, Ramos already raised the
existence of the substitute PDS claiming that she submitted a new PDS to replace the March 28, 2005
PDS. She wrote the Municipality of Baganga, Davao Oriental on October 28, 2013 to request for her 201
files, and for all her PDS submitted with the HRMO on October 20, 2014.

Unfortunately, the substitute PDS could not be found in the records of the HRMO of the Municipality of
Baganga. It was only after the CSC RO No. XI issued its Decision finding Ramos guilty of the
administrative charges, and after Ramos reiterated in her Motion for Reconsideration the existence of the
substitute PDS, that Ramos was provided by the HRMO with a copy of the substitute PDS.

In the circumstances, we are convinced that Ramos diligently searched and exerted earnest efforts to
locate the substitute PDS and produce it during the administrative hearings. Most importantly, the
substitute PDS is material evidence that if admitted, could have altered the decision of the CSC finding
her guilty of the administrative offenses.
 PERFECTO VELASQUEZ JR. vs. LISONDRA LAND INC. (GR No. 231290)

DOCTRINE: However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a
given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt
such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position - that the lower court had
jurisdiction.

FACTS: Perfecto filed a complaint for breach of contract before RTC against Lisondra Land after the
latter failed to provide the memorial park with necessary insurance coverage and to pay its share in the
realty taxes. Worse, Lisondra Land collected kickbacks from agents and gave away lots in exchange for
the service of engineers, architects, construction managers, and suppliers.

In the complaint, Lisondra sought to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction reasoned out that it
should the HLURB to hear, try, and decide the case since it involved the real estate trade and business
practices. Although Lisondra’s motion was dismissed by the RTC, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the ruling. The decision of the appellate court lapsed into finality.

Consequently, Perfecto instituted a complaint before the HLURB for the same allegations, and the
HLURB Arbiter ruled in favor of Perfecto and found that Lisondra Land violated the joint venture
agreement. Hence, it rescinded the contract between the parties. The decision was affirmed by the
HLURB Board and the Office of the President but the Court of Appeals set aside the Office of the
President’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether Lisondra Land is already estopped from questioning the HLURB’s jurisdiction.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in AFFIRMATIVE.

Estoppel operates and bars Lisondra from assailing the HLURB’s jurisdiction.

The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether
the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided
upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the
parties or by estoppel."

However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory,
such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will
not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position - that the lower court had jurisdiction.

Here, Perfecto originally filed his complaint against Lisondra Land before the RTC which, as discussed
earlier, has jurisdiction over the controversy between the parties. However, Lisondra Land claimed that
the case is within the HLURB's exclusive authority. It maintained this theory before the CA which
eventually ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Thereafter, Perfecto relied on the final and executory
decision of the appellate court and refiled the action against Lisondra Land with the HLURB. Lisondra
Land actively participated in the proceedings before the HLURB. After receiving an adverse decision,
Lisondra Land questioned the jurisdiction of the HLURB and claimed that the RTC has the authority to
hear the case. This is where estoppel operates and bars Lisondra Land from assailing the HLURB's
jurisdiction. Lisondra Land cannot now abandon the theory behind its arguments before Civil Case No.
18146, CA-G.R. SP No. 72463 and the HLURB. The Court cannot countenance Lisondra Land's act of
adopting inconsistent postures - first, by attacking the jurisdiction of the trial court and, subsequently, the
authority of the HLURB. Otherwise, the consequence is revolting as Lisondra Land would be allowed to
make a complete mockery of the judicial system. In fact, Lisondra Land's conduct had resulted in two
conflicting appellate court decisions in CA-G.R. SP No. 72463 and CA-G.R. SP No. 131359 eroding the
stability of our legal system and jurisprudence.
 [G.R. No. 228795, December 1, 2020]

Angeles vs. COA

DOCTRINE: Under Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may file a petition for
review on certiorari within thirty (30) days from notice of the Commission on Audit’s (COA’s) judgment.
The petition must show when notice of the assailed judgment or order or resolution was received, when
the motion for reconsideration was filed, and when notice of its denial was received.

FACTS: During a routine trip to the Land Bank of the Philippines, cashier Lily De Jesus and revenue
collection officer Estrellita Ramos, accompanied by municipal driver Felix Alcantara, were ambushed
after withdrawing P1,300,000.00 in payroll funds for the Municipality of San Mateo, Rizal. The officer-
in-charge municipal treasurer, Estelita Angeles (Estelita), informed the Audit Team Leader about the
incident and requested relief from accountability for the lost payroll money. However, the Adjudication
and Settlement Board denied the request for relief from accountability and found Estelita and Lily's estate
solidarily liable to pay P1,300,000.00. Estelita elevated the case to the COA through a petition for review,
contending that she exercised due diligence despite the absence of specific regulations on how to
safeguard payroll money while in transit. On April 13, 2015, the COA denied Estelita's petition. Estelita
sought reconsideration. On June 6, 2016, the COA rejected the motion for being filed out of time and for
lack of merit. In the meantime, the Court directed Estelita to provide a complete statement of material
dates to determine whether her petition is timely filed. Estelita then manifested that she received, on
August 18, 2016, the Resolution of the COA denying her motion for reconsideration and that she filed the
petition for certiorari on September 19, 2016, or within the 30-day reglementary period under Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for certiorari was belatedly filed

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

Under Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may file a petition for review on
certiorari within 30 days from notice of the COA's judgment. The reglementary period includes the time
taken to file the motion for reconsideration and is only interrupted once the motion is filed. If the motion
is denied, the party may file the petition only within the period remaining from the notice of judgment.
The aggrieved party is not granted a fresh period of 30 days. Accordingly, the petition must show when
notice of the assailed judgment or order or resolution was received, when the motion for reconsideration
was filed, and when notice of its denial was received. The rationale for requiring a complete statement of
material dates is to determine whether the petition is timely filed. Yet, Estelita merely provided the date
she received the Resolution of the COA, denying her motion for reconsideration. Estelita failed to state
the time she had been notified of the COA Decision denying her appeal and the date she filed the motion
for reconsideration. Notwithstanding, this Court can reasonably conclude that Estelita's Petition for
Certiorari was filed beyond the reglementary period. Admittedly, Estelita sought a reconsideration before
the COA, which would no longer entitle her to the full 30-day period to file a petition for certiorari unless
such a motion was filed on the same day that she received the decision denying her appeal, which did not
happen in this case. To be sure, the COA denied Estelita's motion for reconsideration because it was
belatedly filed and had no merit. As such, the petition for certiorari could have been dismissed outright
for being filed out of time.
 [G.R. No. 238203, September 3, 2020]

Ang vs CA

DOCTRINE: One who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply strictly with the requirements of
the rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The grant of any extension for
filing a Petition for Review under Rule 42 is discretionary and subject to the condition that the full
amount of the docket and lawful fees is paid before the expiration of the reglementary period.

FACTS: In 2016, Warren Gutierrez (Warren) filed an action for unlawful detainer against Spouses
Ricardo and Ligaya Ang before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Warren sold the lot on an installment basis
to Spouses Ang. They agreed that the contract should be extinguished in case of non-payment of monthly
amortizations. After giving the initial payment, however, Spouses Ang refused to settle the balance of the
purchase price despite repeated demands. In their answer, Spouses Ang moved to dismiss the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. MeTC ruled in favor of Warren and ordered Spouses Ang
to vacate the lot. It held that the complaint sufficiently alleged and proved a cause of action for unlawful
detainer. Unsuccessful at a reconsideration, Ligaya Ang elevated the case to the CA through a motion for
an extension of time to file a Petition for Review under Rule 42. The CA denied the motion for non-
payment of docket fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate docket fees were duly paid.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. One who seeks to
avail of the right to appeal must comply strictly with the requirements of the rules. Failure to do so often
leads to the loss of the right to appeal. Notably, the grant of any extension for filing a Petition for Review
under Rule 42 is discretionary and subject to the condition that the full amount of the docket and lawful
fees is paid before the expiration of the reglementary period. Indeed, the full payment of docket fees
within the prescribed period is mandatory and necessary to perfect the appeal. Corollary, the non-payment
of docket fees is a ground for dismissing the appeal. In Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals, however, we
qualified this rule and declared, first, that the failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the
reglementary period warrants only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal of the appeal and
second, that the court shall exercise its power to dismiss in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play and with a great deal of circumspection considering all attendant circumstances.

There is no specific provision in the Rules of Court prescribing the manner by which docket or appeal
fees should be paid. However, as a matter of convention, litigants invariably opt to use the postal money
order system to pay such fees for its expediency and the official nature of transactions coursed through
this system.

Ligaya failed to establish that the appellate docket fees were duly paid. Foremost, the messenger's
affidavit is insufficient to establish payment. The affidavit merely stated the reason why the messenger
opted to enclose the docket fees together with the motion for extension. Yet, there is no evidence, such as
photocopies of the money bills, to prove that the envelope containing the motion has the actual cash
payment. The affidavit is likewise suspect since it was executed only after the CA denied the motion. At
any rate, the CA had conducted an investigation and confirmed that no payment was actually remitted.
The personnel assigned to the appellate court's receiving section corroborated this finding. Moreover,
Ligaya's manifestation to pay again the docket fees is inconsistent with her claim of payment. Lastly,
Ligaya has not shown any compelling reason to warrant a liberal application of the rules. The alleged
theft is speculative. The justifications that the messenger panicked because he was unable to purchase
postal money orders and that he might not be able to file the motion on time if he would transfer to
another post office are neither convincing nor adequate to merit leniency. Ligaya's counsel could have
asked the messenger to buy postal money orders in advance instead of waiting until the last minute to file
the motion.
 [G.R. No. 217138. August 27, 2020]

VITARICH CORPORATION VS DAGMIL

DOCTRINE: The court emphasizes that it is within the discretionary power of the trial court to permit
the defendant to file an answer and be heard on the merits, even after the reglementary period for filing
the responsive pleading has expired. The rule is that the answer should be admitted when it is filed before
a declaration of default, provided there is no showing that the defendant intends to delay the proceedings
and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff.

FACTS: On January 15, 2010, Vitarich Corporation filed an action for collection of sum of money
against Femina Dagmil before RTC Branch 11 of Malolos City. Upon receipt of summons, Femina's
counsel, Atty. Nepthali Solilapsi, moved to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue. On August
17, 2010, the RTC denied the motion and directed Femina to answer the complaint. Atty. Solilapsi
received the order on November 3, 2010, but Femina did not submit any responsive pleadings. On
January 5, 2011, Vitarich sought to declare Femina in default. Meanwhile, Femina's new counsel, Atty.
Emilio Quianzon, Jr., entered his appearance and filed on January 31, 2011, a motion to admit the answer.
The case involves a petition for review on certiorari filed by Vitarich Corporation, the petitioner, against
Femina Dagmil, the respondent. The core issue in this case is the propriety of an order of default. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially granted Vitarich’s complaint and ordered Femina to pay certain
amounts. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s decision and remanded the case for
further proceedings, ordering the RTC to admit Femina’s answer.

ISSUE: Whether Femina Dagmil must be declared in default

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

The court emphasizes that it is within the discretionary power of the trial court to permit the defendant to
file an answer and be heard on the merits, even after the reglementary period for filing the responsive
pleading has expired.

Where the answer was filed beyond the reglementary period but before the defendant is declared in
default, and there is no showing that the defendant intends to delay the case, the answer should be
admitted.
 [G.R. No. 250542. October 10, 2022]

HEIRS OF PIO TEJADA AND SOLEDAD TEJADA, REPRESENTED BY PIO DOMINGO

TEJADA, PETITIONERS VS. GARRY B. HAY, IN SUBSTITUTION OF MYRNA L. HAY,
REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT GOMERCINDO* LITONG, RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: Courts allow bona fide amendments to pleadings at any stage of the proceedings and treat
motions for leave to file amended pleadings with liberality. The guiding principle is to determine cases
based on their real facts, affording complete relief to all parties while ensuring that such amendments are
not intended to delay the proceedings.

FACTS: The petitioners sought clarification and the right to assert counterclaims through a motion for
leave and to admit the attached amended answer in response to Myrna Hay's complaint for Quieting of
Title. Despite the Regional Trial Court's denial, asserting the case's advanced stages, the petitioners
contended that such a denial was erroneous, emphasizing the favorability of pleading amendments at any
stage. The Court of Appeals upheld the denial of the Regional Trial Court, stating the original answer
sufficed.

ISSUE: Whether the denial of the Motion for Leave by the RTC, affirmed by the CA, constitutes grave
abuse of discretion given the circumstances surrounding the motion and its intended purpose.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

Amendments to pleadings are favored, and the granting of leave to amend should aid in deciding the case
on its merits without undue delay. The amended answer contained crucial allegations and counterclaims,
and its admission would prevent the multiplicity of suits and provide relief to all parties involved. The
denial of the Motion for Leave was not justified, as it did not appear that the motion was made in bad
faith or with the intent to delay the proceedings. The RTC was directed to admit the amended answer and
continue with the proceedings promptly.
 [G.R. No. 204420, October 7, 2020]

Heirs of Bastida vs. Heirs of Fernandez

DOCTRINE: Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, with the expectation that
one or the other court would render a favorable disposition. It exists when the following requisites concur:
(1) the parties to the action are the same or at least representing the same interests in both actions; (2)
there is a substantial identity in the causes of action and reliefs sought, with the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (3) the result of the first action is determinative of the second in any event, regardless
of which party is successful or whether the judgment in one would amount to res judicata or constitute
litis pendentia.

FACTS: In 1955, Teofilo Bastida applied for a homestead patent for a landholding in Zamboanga City.
After Teofilo's death, his heirs continued cultivating the land. In 1959, Angel Fernandez applied for a
homestead patent for the same land that Teofilo allegedly sold to him. The heirs of Teofilo protested,
leading to a dispute.

In 1989, the DENR granted Angel's homestead application, awarding the land to his heirs. In 1998,
Teofilo's heirs discovered that the land was under CARP, and a Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) was issued to Angel's heirs. Teofilo's heirs sought to cancel the CLOA, arguing the unresolved
dispute.

In 1999, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) canceled the CLOA, citing unresolved
claims. The heirs of Angel appealed to the DARAB, which upheld the decision in 2005. The heirs of
Angel then appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which, in 2012, ruled in their favor, stating PARAD
and DARAB lacked jurisdiction and accused Teofilo's heirs of forum shopping.

Teofilo's heirs appealed, claiming DARAB's jurisdiction as the CLOA was registered. They denied forum
shopping, arguing the DENR and DARAB cases were distinct. Angel's heirs contended that DARAB
lacked authority without an agrarian dispute and accused Teofilo's heirs of forum shopping.

ISSUE: Whether Teofilo's heirs are guilty of forum shopping

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

We disagree with the CA's conclusion that the heirs of Teofilo are guilty of forum shopping. Forum
shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, with the expectation that one or the other court
would render a favorable disposition. It exists when the following requisites concur: (1) the parties to the
action are the same or at least representing the same interests in both actions; (2) there is substantial
identity in the causes of action and reliefs sought, with the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3)
the result of the first action is determinative of the second in any event, regardless of which party is
successful or whether the judgment in one would amount to res judicata or constitute litis pendentia.
Here, there is no identity in the rights asserted and relief prayed for. The pending protest with the DENR
is against the homestead application of the heirs of Angel, while the case before the DARAB is for CLOA
cancellation. Evidently, the issues require the resolution of matters within the competence of DAR
concerning the implementation of the CARP and with the DENR regarding public land applications.
More importantly, the DENR's ruling on the rightful homestead grantee will not amount to res judicata
with respect to the validity of the CLOA. Suffice it to say that a homestead grantee is not automatically a
CARP beneficiary or CLOA awardee. The DAR will still have to ascertain whether a homestead grantee
fulfilled the requirements of Section 6 of RA 6657 to retain the land.
 [GR No. 197147, February 3, 2021]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF GLORIA NOVELO

VDA. DE CEA [Diana Gozum vs. Norma Pappas]

DOCTRINE: Administrators are required to be residents, not citizens, of the Philippines.

FACTS: Diana and Norma are the legitimate children of Edmundo Cea and Gloria Novelo. Upon Gloria's
death, she left a will naming Salvio Fortuno as the executor. Salvio filed a petition for the probate of the
will and the issuance of letters testamentary to himself, claiming to be the most loyal and trusted
employee, treated as the almost son of Edmundo and Gloria.

Norma filed an opposition and sought the disallowance of the will and Salvio’s appointment as
administrator, asserting that Diana was not Edmundo’s daughter. However, the RTC found that Norma
cannot be the administratrix since she is an American citizen and a non-resident of the country; instead,
Salvio was held to be the most suited for the position.

Upon reconsideration by the RTC, Norma was appointed administrator without considering any
citizenship or residential issues attached to Norma, given her demonstrated familiarity with the various
assets of the estate.

ISSUE: Whether the citizenship of Norma matters in satisfaction of her appointment as the estate
administrator.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the NEGATIVE.

The Rules of Court do not mention foreign citizenship as a ground for incompetence to be an
administrator. The Supreme Court emphasized that Rule 78, Section 1, requires residency in the
Philippines, not Filipino citizenship. Thus, the RTC did not err in appointing Norma as the administratrix
of the estate in compliance with the provision.

Norma has resided in the Philippines since 2003, specifically in Canman, Camarines Sur. Salvio admitted
the fact that Norma started living within the Nordia Complex, was always present at the proceedings, and
vowed to remain until the resolution of the case.
 [GR No. 232053, July 16, 2020]

REPUBLIC vs. ANNABELLE ONTUCA

DOCTRINE: The term "substantial" means something that is important or essential, while clerical or
typographical error refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work that is harmless and
innocuous.

FACTS: Annabelle Ontuca y Peleño gave birth to her daughter, Zsanine. The midwife, Corazon Carebeo,
assisted Annabelle in her birth, volunteering herself to register Zsanine’s birth before the Parañaque Civil
Registrar. After the midwife delivered the birth certificate to Annabelle, the latter was dismayed to see
erroneous entries in the said document - the name Mary was added to her first name, her middle name
was misspelled, and the date and place of her marriage were included, despite the fact that she was not
married. Annabelle appeared as the informant who signed and accomplished the form.

To correct the said entries, Annabelle filed a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court before the
RTC, and upon careful evaluation, the petition was granted. However, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), representing the appellant herein, argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to hear the case because
the errors are clerical and can be corrected through administrative proceedings under RA 9048, and some
changes in the said birth certificate, like the date and place of marriage, are substantial.

However, the RTC denied the motion.

ISSUE: Whether Annabelle's contested name is a clerical error, and her marital status is a substantial
error.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

Ordinarily, the term "substantial" means consisting of or relating to substance or something that is
important or essential. In relation to the change or correction of an entry in the birth certificate, substantial
refers to that which establishes or affects the substantive right of the person on whose behalf the change
or correction is being sought.

While clerical or typographical error refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing, or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such
as a misspelled name or misspelled place of birth, a mistake in the entry of the day and month in the date
of birth, or the sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding
and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing records.

Guided by this principle, the correction of Annabelle's middle name from "PALIÑO" to "PELEÑO"
involves clerical or typographical error. It merely rectified the erroneous spelling through the substitution
of the letters "A" and "I" in "PALIÑO" with the letter "E," so it will read as "PELEÑO." To be sure,
Annabelle's Unified Multi-Purpose ID shows that her middle name is spelled as "PELEÑO."
Similarly, the error in Annabelle's first name is clerical that will neither affect nor prejudice her
substantial rights. Annabelle's postal ID and passport satisfactorily show that her first name is
"ANNABELLE" and not "MARY ANNABELLE." Verily, by referring to Annabelle's existing records,
or documents, the innocuous errors in her first name and middle name may be corrected under RA No.
9048, as amended.

Meanwhile, the correction of the date and place of the parent's marriage from "May 25, 1999 at Occ.
Mindoro" to "NOT MARRIED" is substantial since it will alter the child's status from legitimate to
illegitimate. To be sure, the correction of entries in the civil register pertaining to citizenship, legitimacy
of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage involves substantial alterations, which may be
corrected, and the true facts established, provide the parties aggrieved by the error to avail themselves of
the appropriate adversary proceedings.

Here, Annabelle correctly filed a petition for cancellation and/or correction of the entries before the RTC
under Rule 108.

Nevertheless, we find that Annabelle failed to observe the required procedures under Rule 108.

The rules require two sets of notices to potential oppositors – one given to persons named in the petition
and another served to persons who are not named in the petition, but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties.

Impleading and notifying only the local civil registrar and the publication of the petition are not sufficient
compliance with the procedural requirements. The interested or affected parties must also be impleaded
and notified of the petition.

Nonetheless, there are instances when the subsequent publication of a notice of hearing may cure the
failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties, such as when: (a) earnest efforts were made
by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties; (b) the parties themselves initiated the
corrections proceedings; (c) there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested
parties; or (d) when a party is inadvertently left out.

None of these exceptions, however, are present in this case. There was no earnest effort on the part of
Annabelle to bring to court the OSG, the child's father, and siblings, if any, and other parties who may
have an interest in the petition. Also, these indispensable parties are not the ones who initiated the
proceedings, and Annabelle cannot possibly claim that she was not aware, actually or presumptively, as to
the existence or whereabouts of these interested parties. Lastly, it does not appear that the indispensable
parties were inadvertently and unintentionally left out when Annabelle filed the petition. In sum, the
failure to strictly comply with the requirements under Rule 108 renders the proceedings void for the
correction of substantial errors.

The Supreme Court, however, sustained the correction of Annabelle's first name and middle name under
Rule 108. Ideally, Annabelle should have filed the petition for correction with the local civil registrar
under RA No. 9048, as amended, and only when the petition is denied can the RTC take cognizance of
the case. In any case, RA No. 9048, as amended, did not divest the trial courts of jurisdiction over
petitions for correction of clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate. To be sure, the local civil
registrars' administrative authority to change or correct similar errors is only primary but not exclusive.
The regular courts maintain the authority to make judicial corrections of entries in the civil registry.

Ideally, the petitioner should have filed the petition for correction with the local civil registrar under RA
No. 9048, as amended, and only when the petition is denied can the RTC take cognizance of the case. In
any case, RA No. 9048, as amended, did not divest the trial courts of jurisdiction over petitions for
correction of clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate. To be sure, the local civil registrars'
administrative authority to change or correct similar errors is only primary but not exclusive. The
regular courts maintain the authority to make judicial corrections of entries in the civil registry.
Moreover, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction is not absolute and may be dispensed with
for reasons of equity. Thus, it will be more prudent for all persons similarly situated to allow the
filing of a single petition under Rule 108, rather than two separate petitions before the RTC and the
local civil registrar. This will avoid multiplicity of suits and further litigation between the parties, which
is offensive to the orderly administration of justice.
 [G.R. No. 233068. November 9, 2020.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MERLE M. MALIGAYA, also known as

"MERLY M. MALIGAYA-SARMIENTO", respondent.

DOCTRINE: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, contesting the Regional Trial Court's (RTC)
Decision dated December 14, 2016, in Special Proceedings No. NC-2016-2599, which permitted the
rectification of entries in the birth certificate concerning the first name and date of birth.

FACTS: In 2016, Merly Maligaya initiated a petition (Special Proceedings No. NC-2016-2599) in the
RTC under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to rectify entries in her birth certificate. The requested
modifications included changing her first name from "MERLE" to "MERLY" and her birth date from
"February 15, 1959," to "November 26, 1958." Merly supported her plea with original and certified
documents, prompting the RTC to declare the petition valid and order its publication for three weeks in a
widely circulated newspaper.

On December 14, 2016, the RTC granted Merly's petition, sanctioning the corrections. Subsequently, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sought reconsideration, contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction
to amend Merly's first name. The OSG proposed that clerical errors be addressed through administrative
procedures outlined in Republic Act (RA) No. 9048, as amended by RA No. 10172. Concerning Merly's
birth date, the OSG asserted non-compliance with Rule 108's requirements.

Merly maintained that Rule 108 was the appropriate avenue for both corrections, refuting the need for
separate petitions to prevent unwarranted delays. She argued that the amendments were clerical, rendering
strict adherence to Rule 108 unnecessary. Merly also claimed that the publication of the petition rectified
the omission of indispensable parties. The RTC rejected the OSG's motion, leading to the present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had the authority to grant the corrections sought by
Merly Maligaya

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

Rule 108 applies when the person is seeking to correct clerical and innocuous mistakes in his or her
documents with the civil register. It also governs the correction of substantial errors affecting the civil
status, citizenship, and nationality of a person. As such, the proceedings may either be summary, if the
correction pertains to clerical mistakes, or adversary, if it involves substantial errors. Also, the petition
must be filed before the RTC which sets a hearing and directs the publication of its order in a newspaper
of general circulation. Afterwards, the RTC may grant or dismiss the petition and serve a copy of its
judgment to the Civil Registrar.

In 2012, RA No. 9048 was amended by RA No. 10172, expanding the authority of local civil registrars
and the Consul General to make changes in the day and month in the date of birth, as well as in the
recorded sex of a person, when it is patently clear that there was a typographical error or mistake in the
entry.
Applying these precepts, we now determine whether the errors that Merly seeks to correct in her birth
certificate are substantial or clerical. Ordinarily, the term "substantial" means consisting of or relating to
substance, or something that is important or essential. In relation to change or correction of an entry in the
birth certificate, substantial refers to that which establishes, or affects the substantive right of the person
on whose behalf the change or correction is being sought. Thus, changes which may affect the civil status
from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, civil status, or citizenship of a person are substantial in
character.

Here, the correction of Merly's first name from "MERLE" to "MERLY" refers to a clerical or
typographical error. It merely rectified the erroneous spelling through the substitution of the second letter
"E" in "MERLE" with the letter "Y," so it will read as "MERLY." To be sure, the documentary evidence
satisfactorily show that Merly's first name is not "MERLE" as incorrectly indicated in her birth certificate.
More importantly, the correction will neither affect nor prejudice any substantial rights. The innocuous
errors in Merly's first name may be corrected or changed under , we ruled that the correction of
petitioner's misspelled first name from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" involves only a clerical mistake.

Meanwhile, the correction of Merly's date of birth is substantial because changing the month, day and
year from "February 15, 1959" to "November 26, 1958" will alter her age. As discussed earlier, the law
expressly provides that the correction of clerical or typographical error must not involve a change in the
age of the petitioner. Otherwise, the petition must be denied. The law's unmistakable intent is to
characterize the correction of age as substantial that necessitates a judicial order. Indeed, the age of a
person is a matter of public concern and an essential component of one's status in law. A change in a
person's date of birth, in which an alteration in his age is a necessary consequence, significantly affects
his status with regard to matters, such as marriage and family relations, obligations and contracts, and the
exercise of legal rights. Corollarily, the substantial error in Merly's date of birth may be corrected only
through the appropriate adversary proceedings. Thus, Merly correctly filed a petition for cancellation
and/or correction of the entries before the RTC under Rule 108.

Under Sec. 3 of Rule 108, when cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.

Verily, the rules require two sets of notices to potential oppositors one is given to persons named in the
petition and another served to persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties. Consequently, the petition for a substantial correction must
implead the civil registrar and other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be
affected. In this case, Merly only impleaded the local civil registrar but not her parents who are in the best
position to establish the correct date of her birth as well as her siblings, if any.

Also, the phrase "and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" in the
title of the petition and the publication of the petition are not sufficient notice to all interested parties.

Impleading and notifying only the local civil registrar and the publication of the petition are not sufficient
compliance with the procedural requirements. However, the subsequent publication of a notice of hearing
may cure the failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties, such as when: (a) earnest
efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties; (b) the parties
themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; (c) there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the
existence of the interested parties; or (d) when a party is inadvertently left out.

Thus, the ruling of the RTC with respect to the correction of first name from "MERLE" to "MERLY" is
AFFIRMED. On the other hand, the correction of date of birth from "February 15, 1959" to "November
26, 1958" is SET ASIDE.

NOTE: In Santos v. Republic, 2021, the Supreme Court ruled that Rule 108 is not the proper remedy to
correct clerical errors in the first name of the petitioner. A petition under RA No. 9048, as amended, is the
proper remedy. However, in Republic v. Ontuca, J. Lopez, and Republic v. Maligaya, J. Lopez, the
Supreme Court ordered the correction of a clerical error in the first name of the petitioner for the orderly
administration of justice and to avoid multiplicity of suits.
 [G.R. No. 221384, November 9, 2020]

Galacgac vs. Bautista

DOCTRINE: The Court may dismiss a complaint for unlawful detainer based on lack of cause of action
if the plaintiff's supposed act of tolerance is not present right from the start of the defendant's possession.

FACTS: In 2012, Benigno M. Galacgac filed a case for unlawful detainer against Reynaldo Bautista over
a 180-square meter portion of Lot No. 10973 in Laoag City. Benigno claimed that in 1993, the heirs of
Ines Mariano had partitioned and adjudicated the disputed land in his favor as compensation for his legal
services in a civil case involving the property. He allowed Cirila Dannug-Martin, Maxima Dannug-
Dannug, Arcadia Dannug-Pedro, and Isabel Dannug-Bulos, who were heirs of Ines Mariano, to occupy
the land. Still, Reynaldo, who was Saturnino Bautista's son and the caretaker, started constructing a house
of solid materials without Benigno's permission. Benigno sent demand letters to Reynaldo, but Reynaldo
claimed ownership and argued that the adjudication to Benigno was void. The Municipal Trial Court
dismissed the case, stating that Reynaldo's authority to possess the land came from the heirs of Ines
Mariano, not Benigno. Benigno appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which ruled favorably. The
RTC held that Reynaldo could not challenge the partition's validity because he was not a party to it and
that Benigno had a better right as the land was adjudicated to him before Reynaldo's purchase. Reynaldo
then appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reinstated the MTCC's decision. The CA found that
Benigno had failed to prove that Reynaldo's possession was based on his tolerance and that Reynaldo's
possession was in the concept of ownership. As a result, the CA upheld the dismissal of the complaint for
unlawful detainer. Marvin, who had been substituted for Benigno after his death, appealed this decision to
the Supreme Court, arguing that Benigno had alleged and proved the elements of an action for unlawful
detainer.

ISSUE: Whether the claimant, Benigno M. Galacgac (and later his heir, Marvin A. Galacgac), can
successfully pursue an action for unlawful detainer against Reynaldo Bautista.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

A complaint for unlawful detainer must sufficiently allege and prove the following key jurisdictional
facts, namely: (1) initially, possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by the
tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the
defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) after that, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year
from the last demand on the defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.

Specifically, a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's permission or tolerance, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment may be filed against him. However, in ejectment cases of
this kind, it is essential that the plaintiff's supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from
the start of the possession, which is later sought to be recovered. This is where Benigno's cause of action
fails.
The facts proved do not sustain the alleged cause of action. As such, the complaint may be dismissed for
lack of cause of action, which is usually made after questions of fact have been resolved based on the
evidence presented. Here, we fully agree with the conclusions of the CA and the MTCC in dismissing the
complaint since evidence wants to establish Benigno's supposed permission or tolerance from the time
Reynaldo started occupying the property. It is dangerous to deprive Reynaldo of possession over the land
by means of a summary proceeding just because Benigno used the word "tolerance" without sufficient
allegations or evidence to support it. As early as the 1960s, in Sarona v. Villegas, this Court explained
that a case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance must definitely establish its existence from the start of
possession. Otherwise, a claim for forcible entry can mask itself as an action for unlawful detainer and
permit it to be filed beyond the required one-year prescription period from the time of forcible entry. A
close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view that such tolerance
must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered to categorize a cause of action as
unlawful detainer — not forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine.
For two reasons: First, forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the possessor's right. Violating
that right authorizes the speedy redress — in the inferior Court — provided for in the rules. If one year
from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before the suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy,
and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior Court. Second, if a
forcible entry action in the inferior Court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result
may well be that no action of forcible entry can really be prescribed. No matter how long such defendant
is in physical possession, the plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior Court — upon
a plea of tolerance to prevent the prescription from setting in — and summarily throw him out of the land.
Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature and that the one-year time bar to the suit is but
in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.
 [G.R. No. 229274, June 16, 2021]

DBP VS LBP

DOCTRINE: Just compensation must be valued at the time of the taking or when the landowner was
deprived of the use and benefit of the property. Further, interest may be awarded in favor of the
landowner in case of delay in payment.

FACTS: The subject of this case is a parcel of land in Barangay Duhat, Bocaue, Bulacan, registered in
the name of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-144547, with an area of 2,225 square meters (sq.m.). This land was originally owned by Spouses
Angel Armando and Remedios Martin (Spouses Angel and Remedios) under TCT No. 39413(M). In
1979, Spouses Angel and Remedios mortgaged this property to DBP to obtain loans, amounting to an
aggregate of P400,000.00. Upon default in payment, the property was foreclosed in 1990. DBP acquired
the property as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale. Sometime in 1998, a 1,567-sq.m. portion of the
property was placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) pursuant to Republic
Act (RA) No. 6657. The matter was then forwarded to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD). In the summary proceeding before the PARAD, DBP argued that the property does not fall
under the coverage of RA No. 6657 because some portions are residential and not devoted to agriculture,
nor is it tenanted agricultural land. DBP appealed to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). In a
decision dated December 10, 2007, the DARAB affirmed the PARAD ruling. DBP then filed a Petition
for Determination of Just Compensation before the RTC of Malolos. DBP's MR was denied in an order.
Undaunted by another setback, DBP appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC decision dated December 10,
2013, should be affirmed in its entirety.

ISSUE: What are the guidelines that the trial courts must observe in determining just compensation

RULING: We emphasize at the outset the well-settled rule that the determination of just compensation is
a judicial function vested with the RTC as SAC, not with administrative agencies. In the exercise of such
a function, the RTC must work within the parameters set by governing law and rules.

We note that the determination of the veracity of the figures used and the applicability or inapplicability
of the factors under Section 17 of RA No. 6657 in computing the just compensation necessitates the
reception of further evidence for the court to have its own judicious determination of just compensation
and for the proper imposition of interest, if at all. Since these are purely factual matters and this Court is
not a trier of facts, a remand of this case to the RTC as a SAC is in order. To this end, the RTC is directed
to observe the guidelines in its judicial determination of just compensation:

1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of the taking or the time when the landowner was
deprived of the use and benefit of the property. Hence, the evidence to be presented by the parties before
the RTC for the valuation of the property taken must be based on the values prevalent on such time of
taking for similar agricultural lands.

2. The RTC must consider the factors specified in Section 17 of RA No. 6657, as amended and translated
into the applicable DAR formula before its further amendment by RA No. 9700. It is well to point out that
the LBP, in this case, received the Claim Folder in 1998 or long before the passage of RA No. 9700 on
July 1, 2009. DAR AO No. 02, series of 2009, implementing RA No. 9700, expressly declared that "all
Claim Folders received by LBP prior to July 1, 2009 shall be valued in accordance with Section 17 of
[RA] No. 6657 prior to its amendment by [RA] No. 9700." The RTC is reminded, however, that while it
should take into account the applicable DAR formula, it may depart from it upon an explanation that its
strict application is not warranted.

3. Interest may be awarded, as may be warranted by the circumstances of the case, based on the
applicable DAR formula and prevailing jurisprudence. When there is delay in payment, the Court has
allowed the imposition of the governing legal interest rate upon the just compensation as finally
determined by the court from the date of the taking until fully paid because the compensation due to the
landowner is deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State.
 [GR No. 238462, May 12, 2021]

ELENA R. QUIAMBAO vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

DOCTRINE: The bank cannot validly foreclose a mortgage based on non-payment of the unsecured
PNs.

FACTS: Elena filed a petition to annul the mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure. This was after the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) over the parcel of land, mortgaged as security for a loan, was
transferred to the name of China Banking Corporation. The Real Estate Mortgage (REM) was amended
several times to increase the loan to ₱1,770,000 on April 29, 1993, ₱2,600,000 on April 28, 1995, and ₱4
million on April 29, 1997. The amendments contained a blanket mortgage clause stating that the REM
would secure the payment of obligations already incurred or which may be subsequently incurred. The
petition filed by Elena aimed to argue that the REM only covered the loan secured on April 3, 1990, and
its amendments, but not her succeeding loans for ₱5 million, which were manifested through eight
Promissory Notes (PNs). The RTC granted Elena's petition, stating that the eight Promissory Notes
cannot be the basis for the foreclosure proceedings initiated by China Banking Corporation, but this was
reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals (CA), which held that the REM was intended to secure all
succeeding obligations of Elena in view of the blanket mortgage clause.

ISSUE: Whether the non-payment of the unsecured Promissory Notes (PNs) can be used as the basis for
foreclosure.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

In a contract of adhesion, one imposes a ready-made contract on the other, whose sole participation is
either to accept or reject the agreement. China Banking Corporation drafted and prepared the standard
forms to which Elena and her common-law husband and business partner affixed their signatures.

Elena signed the amendments to the REM in blank. The eight PNs failed to allude to Elena’s liability
under the latest amendment to the REM dated April 29, 1997, as those PNs did not even make any
reference as security to the REM itself. China Banking Corporation did not adduce any evidence proving
that the REM and its amendments secure these obligations, and its loan assistant categorically testified
that one of the PNs was not subject to the REM. Further, Elena and her husband have not finished their
college degrees, respectively.

Thus, they cannot be expected to understand all the technicalities and foresee the legal implications of the
transactions despite their business experience; specifically, they lacked the adeptness to fully comprehend
the effects of the amendment to the REM.
 [G.R. No. 219511, December 02, 2020]

Collado vs Dela Vega

DOCTRINE: An acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) when the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt, as only a preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2) when the
court declares that the accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in nature; and (3) when the civil
liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act for which the accused was acquitted.

FACTS: Eduardo M. Dela Vega invested in Victoria B. Collado's stock business with the promise of a
7.225% monthly interest rate. Eduardo provided an initial cash amount of P100,000 and later additional
funds. However, he did not receive any stock certificates, and when he demanded a return on his
investments, Victoria issued checks that were dishonored.

Eduardo filed estafa charges against Victoria, accusing her of misappropriating the invested funds. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) acquitted Victoria on reasonable doubt, stating that there was no
preponderant evidence to prove her guilt or civil liability. Eduardo then appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA) to recover civil liability. The CA reversed the RTC's decision, finding Victoria liable to pay
Eduardo P2,905,000. The CA based its decision on the deposit slips and Victoria's acknowledgment of
receiving money from Eduardo for investment in her stock business.

Victoria filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, arguing that the CA should not have
overturned the RTC's findings. She claimed that the funds were meant for investment with no guarantee
of profit, and various business risks should be considered. Eduardo argued that there was preponderant
evidence to establish Victoria's civil liability.

ISSUE: Whether sufficient evidence exists to hold the accused civilly liable despite acquittal

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

As a rule, every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. However, an acquittal will not bar a civil
action in the following cases: (1) when the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, as only preponderant
evidence is necessary in civil cases; (2) when the court declares that the accused's liability is not criminal
but only civil in nature; and (3) when the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the
criminal act for which the accused was acquitted. Here, the RTC acquitted Collado because her guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, any civil liability survived because only preponderant
evidence is necessary to establish it.

Notably, however, the RTC did not explain the facts as to why it exonerated Collado from civil liability.
It also did not mention that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not at all exist.
The RTC simply stated in the dispositive portion of the decision that there was no preponderant evidence
to prove Victoria's civil liability. In contrast, the CA reviewed the testimonial and documentary evidence
to support its conclusion that Victoria is liable to pay Eduardo P2,905,000.00. Based on the evidence that
unfolded below, there was no doubt that a business dealing transpired between Dela Vega and Collado.
Per Collado's testimony, she flatly conceded that she nodded to Dela Vega's offer of investment due to
Manuel's guarantee.

Apart from the foregoing testimonial evidence, the prosecution likewise established that Dela Vega had
deposited an aggregate amount of P2,905,000.00 to the bank account of the accused in Equitable Bank
Accounts No. 0341000297, 0229008048, 009101001346, as reflected on the Equitable Bank [deposit]
slips, and these [deposit] slips were formally offered by the prosecution without objection on the part of
the accused. x x x. The admission in judicio on the part of the accused was further fortified when
Collado's counsel did not refute Dela Vega's claim on the demand letter dated October 13, 1998, which
requested the accused to return the amount Dela Vega invested in her business. In lieu of an outright
denial of the receipt of money, the defense merely objected to its admission on the basis of secondary
evidence.

Also, there was an extra-judicial admission on the part of the accused when she explicitly admitted in her
counter-affidavit that the private complainant gave her money under the agreement that she could invest it
in any manner she saw fit, as long as it would earn profits. The prosecution formally offered this counter-
affidavit of the accused, but the accused did not adequately refute it. Thus, there was ample foundation for
the appellee's civil liability to the extent of P2,905,000.00 in favor of private complainant-appellant Dela
Vega, as demonstrated by the deposit slips. However, with respect to the US$82,000.00, the prosecution
failed to fortify its claim with sufficient evidence.
 [ G.R. No. 236618, August 27, 2020 ]

JCLV REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. PHIL GALICIA

MANGALI, RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: A private complainant cannot question the order granting the demurrer to evidence in a
criminal case absent grave abuse of discretion or denial of due process. The interest of the offended party
is limited only to the civil aspect of the case.

FACTS: Phil Mangali (Mangali) and Jerry Alba (Alba) faced charges of robbery against JCLV Realty &
Development Corporation (JCLV Realty) before the Regional Trial Court. Allegedly, Mangali and Alba
removed JCLV Realty's electric facilities with intent to gain and intimidation against persons. After the
prosecution rested its case, Mangali filed a demurrer to evidence, claiming the prosecution failed to
establish intent to gain and ownership of the metering instruments by JCLV Realty. The RTC granted the
demurrer, dismissing the case for lack of evidence.

JCLV Realty elevated the case to the CA through a special civil action for certiorari, arguing errors in the
RTC's decision. The CA dismissed the petition, stating that JCLV Realty lacked the standing to question
the dismissal of the criminal case. The authority to represent the state in criminal proceedings lies solely
with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), not the private complainant, who can appeal only the civil
aspect of the case.

Mangali contended that JCLV Realty has no legal standing to file certiorari proceedings without the
OSG's consent or conformity.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

In any criminal case, only the OSG may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, or represent the people or State before the Supreme Court and the CA. This is explicitly
provided under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book III of the 1987 Administrative Code of the
Philippines. The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of
the criminal action is the State and not the private complainant. The interest of the private offended party
is restricted only to civil liability.

In this case, we find that JCLV Realty was not deprived of due process. JCLV Realty participated in the
proceedings, presented evidence, and opposed the demurrer. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed the case on a ground not raised in the demurrer, i.e., the prosecution's failure
to positively identify the accused. The identity of the offender is indispensably entwined with the
commission of the crime. The first duty of the prosecution is to establish the identity of the criminal, for
even if the commission of the crime can be proven, there can be no conviction without proof of the
identity of the criminal. On the other hand, a demurrer to evidence challenges the sufficiency of the whole
evidence to sustain a verdict. In granting the demurrer, the RTC considered the entirety of the prosecution
evidence but found it insufficient to establish the identity of the accused.

Thus, JCLV Realty cannot question the order granting the demurrer to evidence in a criminal case. Its
interest is limited only to the civil aspect of the case.
 [GR No. 247611, January 13, 2021]

PEOPLE vs. JANET LIM-NAPOLES

DOCTRINE: Bail is accorded to a person in the custody of the law who may be allowed provisional
liberty upon filing a security to guarantee his or her appearance before any court.

FACTS: The Sandiganbayan rendered their decision convicting Richard Cambe and Janet Lim Napoles
related to the utilization of Senator Bong Revilla’s Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF),
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, dated December 7, 2018.

Being at risk of contracting COVID-19 inside the prison due to her diabetes, she filed a motion to bail,
saying that she is entitled to be provisionally released on humanitarian grounds, invoking the rulings laid
down in De La Rama and Enrile.

Further, she raised the standards provided in the Nelson Mandela Rules for the release of persons
deprived of liberty (PDLs) in times of public health emergencies.

ISSUE: Whether Napoloes can be provisionally released on humanitarian grounds due to the risk of
contracting COVID-19.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

In De La Rama, the Court found that Francisco C. De La Rama was "actually suffering from a minimal,
early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis" which may progress
into "advance stages when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail [.]" In Enrile, the Court
considered Former Senator Enrile's advanced age and ill health to require special medical attention. He
was already more than 70 years old at the time of the alleged commission of the offense. He was also
suffering from uncontrolled hypertension, arrhythmia, coronary calcifications associated with coronary
artery disease, and exacerbations of Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrome (ACOS), among others. Further,
the Court ruled that Enrile's political and social standing and his immediate surrender to the authorities
indicate that he was not a flight risk.

Both De La Rama and Enrile are exceptional, if not isolated cases, wherein the Court considered the
special and compelling circumstances of the accused who needed continuing medication to preserve their
health throughout the criminal proceedings, and to guarantee their appearance in court. Their continued
incarceration were shown to be injurious to their health, or endanger their life. The Court ratiocinated that
to deny them bail would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.

In contrast, Napoles resorted to this Court and alleged that she is at risk of contracting COVID-19 because
she is suffering from diabetes, as shown by an unauthenticated medical certificate signed by her
physician. However, even assuming that she is indeed suffering from diabetes, that, in itself, is not
sufficient to grant her provisional liberty, post-conviction.

Towards this end, we echo Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta's position in Almonte v. People, thus: At
this juncture, we stress that unless there is clear showing that petitioners are actually suffering from a
medical condition that requires immediate and specialized attention outside of their current confinement
— as, for instance, an actual and proven exposure to or infection with the novel coronavirus — they
must remain in custody and isolation incidental to the crimes with which they were charged, or for which
they are being tried or serving sentence. Only then can there be an actual controversy and a proper
invocation of humanitarian and equity considerations that is ripe for this Court to determine.
 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(GR No. 218052)

DOCTRINE: The perfection of an appeal within the period permitted by the law is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional.

FACTS: The NPC implemented the calendar year 2009 Performance Incentive Benefits (PIB) for 2009
through NPC Circular No. 2009-58 dated December 21, 2009, approving the incentive amount of
₱327,272,424.91. However, the NPC Audit Team issued a Notice of Suspension requiring the NPC to
explain why PIB should not be disallowed in an audit since such grants lacked prior approval of the
President as required under Administrative Order No. 103.

In explanation, NPC stated that the grant was based on the successful privatization of several power
plants, the very satisfactory ratings of the corporate scorecard, and the implementation of the
organization’s right-sizing in 2010. But the COA Audit Team disallowed such grants due to a lack of
presidential approval and for being extravagant. Such disallowance was affirmed by COA CGS Cluster 3
- Public Utilities, and it was appealed before the COA Proper.

However, the COA Proper dismissed the Petition for Review for being filed out of time, finding that the
Petition was filed beyond the reglementary period of 6 months. Hence, the decision is final and executory.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COA erred in dismissing the appeal for being filed beyond the reglementary
period.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the NEGATIVE.

According to the records, the NPC received the Notice of Disallowance (ND) dated October 23, 2012,
and the petitioners filed an appeal before the COA CGS on April 11, 2013. That is, 170 days had already
lapsed from the required 180-day period when the petitioners filed their appeal.

Thus, it became necessary for the petitioners to file a petition for review before the COA Proper within 10
days of the receipt of an adverse decision. They received the CGS’s decision dated March 14, 2004, and
filed the pleading on March 26, 2004, or 12 days after the receipt of the CGS’s decision. Clearly, the
Petition for Review was filed beyond the 180-day reglementary period of appeal as provided by the 2009
Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA. Thus, the ruling will be final and executory.

Nevertheless, even though the petitioners prayed for the exercise of liberality in the application of
procedural rules on the ground that the period to file an appeal has not yet commenced because the ND
has not yet been served to the individual persons involved; this must be dismissed.
 REPUBLIC vs. EULALIA T. MANEJA

(GR No. 209052)

DOCTRINE: There can be no execution until and unless the judgment has become final and executory.

FACTS: Lyn Cutamora filed a complaint against Maneja, alleging that the latter failed to deliver the
check representing the amount of the salary loan that Cutamora authorized Maneja to process on her
behalf. Subsequently, the Civil Service Commission Regional Office (CSCRO) filed a charge for
dishonesty against Maneja. The CSCRO found her guilty of dishonesty and initially imposed the penalty
of dismissal. However, the CSC Proper modified the penalty to simple dishonesty and a three-month
suspension. Notably, the CSC granted Maneja’s claim for back wages. The Department of Education
argued that the grant of back wages had no basis since Maneja was not exonerated; she voluntarily
stopped working and never reported to her office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maneja is entitled to back wages.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the AFFIRMATIVE. There is a crucial difference in the
authority that imposed Maneja's dismissal from service, as this decision was made by the CSCRO X. This
distinction is material because it determines the legality of the immediate execution. The decision of the
CSCRO was not yet final and executory since Maneja timely filed her appeal and motion for
reconsideration. Despite the pendency of the appeal, Maneja’s dismissal from service was still
implemented, and the execution of the decision was premature, as this case had not yet attained finality
and was still subject to review by the CSC.

The Court cited the case of Abella in reaching this decision, where it disfavored the argument that the
respondent is not entitled to the payment of back wages considering that she was not completely
exonerated. Thus, the separation of the employee before the decision of the Civil Service Commission
had become final was evidently premature, rendering the payment of the salaries corresponding to the
period where Maneja was suspended deemed proper. Therefore, Maneja is still entitled to back wages
since the decision is not yet final and executory.
 CHARNNEL SHANE THOMAS vs. RACHEL TRONO, REPUBLIC

(GR No. 241032)

DOCTRINE: Due process requires that those with an interest in the subject matter in litigation be
notified and afforded an opportunity to defend their interests.

FACTS: Alphonso cohabited with Jocelyn C. Ledres and had a daughter, Charnel, the petitioner herein.
Previously, Alphonso was married to Rachel, the respondent herein, but their marriage was declared void
ab initio by the Court due to bigamous marriage with Nancy. The decision was not yet final as the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to furnish a copy of the decision, denying them the opportunity to
make a perfect appeal.

The RTC granted the OSG’s motion to reconsider and reversed its ruling on the nullity of the marriage
between Alphonso and Rachel as valid and subsisting. This triggered Charnnel to file a petition for
annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the ground of the denial of due process of law.
However, the CA dismissed the petition. She asserted that she was not allowed to participate in the
proceedings for reconsideration before the RTC. Moreover, she never received a copy of the motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not Charnnel was deprived of her right to due process.

RULING: The Supreme Court favored the AFFIRMATIVE. Being an heir of Alphonso, Charnnel is
vested with the legal standing to assail the marriage of Alphonso and Rachel by seeking the annulment of
the RTC in a declaration that Alphonso and Rachel were validly married. The death of the party does not
distinguish the action for a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, as the deceased
may have heirs with legal standing to assail the void marriage.

In addition, the CA overlooked the fact that the OSG’s motion for reconsideration was belatedly filed.
The OSG received the 1997 decision of the RTC on March 8, 2011, and perfected their motion for
reconsideration on March 23, 2011, a long time beyond the 15-day reglementary period. Thus, it rendered
the decision final and executory, and in effect, the RTC had already lost its jurisdiction over the case and
could no longer alter or reverse the 1997 decision.
 KAIZEN BUILDERS, INC. (FORMERLY KNOWN AS MEGALOPOLIS PROPERTIES, INC.)
AND CECILLE F. APOSTOL, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HEIRS OF
OFELIA URSAIS, RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINES: It is the policy of the courts to consolidate cases involving similar parties and affecting
closely related subject matters. The purpose of this rule is to settle the issues expeditiously and to avoid
the multiplicity of suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions.

A corporate rehabilitation case is a special proceeding in rem where the basic issues concern the viability
and desirability of continuing the business operations of the distressed corporation. The purpose is to
enable the company to gain a new lease on life and allow its creditors to be paid their claims out of its
earnings. The rationale is to resuscitate businesses in financial distress because assets are often more
valuable when well maintained than they would be when liquidated.

FACTS: In 2004, Ofelia Ursais (Ofelia) purchased a house and lot from Kaizen Builders, Inc. (formerly
Megalopolis Properties, Inc.) in Baguio City. Subsequent transactions led to a dispute, and Ofelia filed a
complaint for a sum of money against Kaizen Builders and its CEO, Cecille F. Apostol (Cecille), in 2011.

Kaizen Builders and Cecille moved to consolidate the case with rehabilitation proceedings, but the CA
denied the motion. They filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, alleging grave abuse of discretion
in denying consolidation and sought suspension of proceedings during the rehabilitation case.

ISSUES: Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for
consolidation.

RULING: The policy of the courts is to consolidate cases with similar parties and closely related subject
matters to settle issues promptly and avoid conflicting decisions. The petitions involve similar parties and
common legal questions, necessitating consolidation.

Corporate rehabilitation is a special proceeding in rem, focused on the viability of the distressed
corporation. Sections 16 and 17 of RA No. 10142 authorize the rehabilitation court to issue a
Commencement Order with a Stay Order, suspending actions for claim enforcement. Kaizen Builders
filed for rehabilitation, and the court issued a Commencement Order during the appeal in CA-G.R. CV
No. 102330.

Despite the Commencement Order's suspension effect, the CA proceeded with the case and rendered
judgment. The Supreme Court found grave abuse of discretion, emphasizing the mandatory stay of
proceedings pending the rehabilitation case. The CA's actions disregarded the policy to encourage
resolution of claims collectively. The CA's Resolution and decision are void, and with findings
warranting the grant of the petition for certiorari and prohibition, there is no need to decide the petition
for review in G.R. No. 247647 without a valid judgment.
 CIR VS COMELEC (MAY 2021)

DOCTRINE: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies states that every opportunity must
be given to the administrative body to resolve the matter and exhaust all options for a resolution under the
remedy provided by statute before bringing an action in or resorting to the courts of justice.

FACTS: COMELEC entered into a contract with Smartmatic and Avante for the lease, with the option to
purchase electronic voting machines, relative to the conduct of the August 2008 ARMM Election. The
COMELEC did not impose or withhold EWT on payments to Smartmatic and Avante, believing that the
procurement of election materials and equipment is free from taxes and import duties. The COMELEC
received an assessment notice assessing it for deficiency in EWT. The COMELEC interposed an
administrative appeal to the CIR, which was denied. The COMELEC filed a petition for review with the
CTA. The CTA Division agreed with the CIR's position that the COMELEC's duty as a withholding agent
on income payments to its suppliers is distinct from its exemption from the payment of duties and taxes
on the purchase, lease, rent, or acquisition of election materials and equipment from local or foreign
sources. The CTA Division stressed that the COMELEC's exemption refers only to direct taxes. Here, the
deficiency assessment arose from COMELEC's failure to withhold EWT on the lease contract payments
to its suppliers. CTA En Banc upheld the deficiency basic Expanded Withholding Tax (EWT) assessment
against the COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether the CTA has jurisdiction to decide the dispute between the COMELEC and the BIR.

RULING: Yes, the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction to decide the dispute between the
COMELEC and the BIR on the deficiency tax assessment. The present case involves a constitutional
office, the COMELEC, which is not under the executive department. The COMELEC, being a
constitutional office independent of the three branches of the government, is not required to go through
the procedure prescribed in PD No. 242 and EO No. 292.
 THOMAS VS TRONO (MARCH 2021)

DOCTRINE: Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the grounds for annulment of judgment
are: (1) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence, however, recognizes a third ground -
denial of due process of law. This is the principle of the immutability of judgment. In the interest of
society as a whole, litigation must come to an end except if there are: (1) corrections of clerical errors; (2)
so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision, rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
None of these exceptions exist in this case. Finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected, or motion for reconsideration, or a new trial is
filed. The trial court need not even pronounce its finality, as the same becomes final by operation of law.

FACTS: Charnnel Thomas, an heir of Alphonso Thomas, filed a petition for the annulment of judgment
with the Court of Appeals (CA) on September 13, 2017, on the ground of denial of due process of law.
Alphonso, an American citizen, was married to Rachel Trono on October 7, 1984. The couple begot a
son, Earl James Thomas, born on August 14, 1985. Upon Alphonso's petition for the declaration of
nullity, his marriage to Rachel was declared void ab initio in a decision on August 22, 1997, by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140. The RTC held that the marriage was a bigamous
marriage since Alphonso was still married to Nancy Thomas, an American citizen. In the course of the
trial, Alphonso and Rachel agreed that the properties they acquired during the marriage would go to
Rachel and Earl.

Relying on the dissolution of his marriage with Rachel, Alphonso cohabited with Jocelyn C. Ledres. On
August 21, 1998, Jocelyn gave birth to their child, Charnnel. On July 22, 2007, out of their desire to make
their union legal and binding and to legitimize the status of their child, Alphonso and Jocelyn got married
in Makati City. Alphonso died on February 12, 2011. To settle his affairs, Jocelyn requested certified true
copies of the August 22, 1997, decision, its certificate of finality, and the entry of judgment from the
RTC, believing in good faith that the judgment had already attained finality after the lapse of 13 years
since it was rendered. As a result of the request, the Branch Clerk of Court purportedly discovered that the
Republic, through the OSG, was not furnished a copy of the August 22, 1997, decision. The RTC, instead
of granting Jocelyn's request, furnished the OSG with a copy of the decision and gave it 15 days from
receipt to perfect an appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration. The decision was received by the OSG
on March 8, 2011. The OSG sought reconsideration on March 28, 2011, for the August 22, 1997,
decision, contending that Alphonso's marriage to Nancy was not proven by competent evidence, that it
was not furnished with copies of the orders and processes, and that the case proceeded without a
definitive determination that no collusion existed between the parties. The RTC then ordered Alphonso to
file a comment or opposition within 15 days of notice.

Jocelyn, through her counsel, filed a Manifestation and Special Appearance to the RTC. Jocelyn likewise
alleged that there is a presumption of regularity behind the August 22, 1997, decision and that Alphonso's
marriage to Nancy was proven by competent evidence. The RTC granted the OSG's motion in an order
dated June 28, 2011, reversing its August 22, 1997, decision and ruled that the marriage between
Alphonso and Rachel is valid and subsisting. The RTC no longer had jurisdiction to rule upon the OSG's
belated MR because the August 22, 1997, decision had already attained finality.
The CA, in its October 10, 2017, Resolution, dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment. Although
the Order, dated June 28, 2011, was issued 14 years after the rendition of the August 22, 1997, decision,
the RTC retained jurisdiction because the decision had not yet attained finality due to the failure to
furnish the OSG a copy. The CA ruled that Charnnel was not denied due process because of the directive
for Alphonso to file a comment or opposition to the motion for reconsideration; in fact, her mother,
Jocelyn, filed a Manifestation and Special Appearance. Charnnel sought reconsideration, but this was
denied.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature
that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting and only if the judgment, final order, or
final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic
fraud.

RULING: The Supreme Court Second Division ruled that courts cannot be expected to deprive persons
of their rights to due process while at the same time being considered to be acting within their
jurisdiction. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the grounds for annulment of judgment are:
(1) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence, however, recognizes a third ground - denial
of due process of law.

The case of Charnnel, as Alphonso’s heir, is vested with the legal standing to assail the marriage of
Alphonso and Rachel by seeking the annulment of the RTC's Order dated June 28, 2011. As borne by the
records, Charnnel was neither made a party to the proceedings nor was she duly notified of the case. Also,
she was a minor at the time the RTC granted the OSG's motion. While Jocelyn was able to file a
Manifestation and Special Appearance on the OSG's motion for reconsideration, this should not bind,
much less prejudice, Charnnel's perusal of it readily shows that Charnnel's interests as Alphonso's heir
were not directly raised and threshed out in this pleading. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to
depriving a then innocent child, now rightfully asserting her rights, of due process of law.

It is a well-established rule that a judgment, once it has attained finality, can never be altered, amended, or
modified, even if the alteration, amendment, or modification is to correct an erroneous judgment. This is
the principle of the immutability of judgments—to put an end to what would be endless litigation. In the
interest of society as a whole, litigation must come to an end. But this tenet admits several exceptions: (1)
the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries, which cause no prejudice to any
party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision,
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, none of which exists in this case.

There is no need for any judicial declaration or performance of an act before the finality takes effect. The
finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is
perfected, or motion for reconsideration, or a new trial is filed. The trial court need not even pronounce
the finality of the order, as the same becomes final by operation of law. The trial court, in fact, could not
even validly entertain a motion for reconsideration filed after the lapse of the period for taking an appeal.
It is of no moment that the opposing party failed to object to the timeliness of the motion for
reconsideration. Thereafter, the court loses jurisdiction over the case, and not even an appellate court
would have the power to review a judgment that has acquired finality.
 VELASQUEZ JR. VS LISONDRA (AUGUST 2020)

DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be waived or acquired through consent or
estoppel. However, a party may be estopped from challenging jurisdiction if they actively participated in
the proceedings before a court or tribunal without raising the issue of jurisdiction.

FACTS: This case involves a dispute between Perfecto Velasquez, Jr. and Lisondra Land, Incorporated
over a joint venture agreement to develop a memorial park. Lisondra Land failed to secure the necessary
permits, provide insurance coverage, and pay taxes, and also engaged in unsound real estate business
practices. Perfecto filed a complaint for breach of contract, which was initially dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals later set aside the dismissal and ordered the case to be heard by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). The HLURB ruled in favor of Perfecto, ordering the
rescission of the joint venture agreement, transfer of management to Perfecto, and payment of fines and
damages by Lisondra Land. Lisondra Land appealed to the Office of the President, which affirmed the
HLURB’s decision. However, in a subsequent petition, the Court of Appeals set aside the Office of the
President’s decision and dismissed Perfecto’s complaint, stating that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over
the case. Perfecto filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, arguing that Lisondra Land is
estopped from challenging the HLURB’s jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether Lisondra Land is estopped from challenging the HLURB’s jurisdiction.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that while the HLURB does not have jurisdiction over the case,
Lisondra Land is estopped from raising this issue due to its previous arguments before the lower courts
and the HLURB. The court also found Lisondra Land guilty of unsound real estate business practices and
ordered the payment of fines and damages.
 CIR vs East Asia Utilities

DOCTRINE: Forum shopping occurs when the following elements are present: (a) identity of parties, or
at least parties representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
sought, with the relief being based on the same facts; and (c) a judgment rendered in one case would
amount to res judicata in the other.

FACTS: The CIR issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) and a Formal Letter of Demand,
assessing East Asia Utilities for deficiency income tax, which was based on the disallowance of certain
costs and expenses claimed by the company. East Asia Utilities objected to the assessment and filed a
protest. After several proceedings, the CTA Division reduced the deficiency income tax assessment from
the initial amount to a reduced sum of P612,406.94. The reduction was based on the CTA Division's
interpretation of Revenue Regulations allowing the deduction of certain costs and expenses from East
Asia Utilities' gross income. The CIR, represented by the BIR's Litigation Division, appealed the CTA
Division's decision to the CTA En Banc. The CTA En Banc upheld the CTA Division's findings and
conclusion, affirming the reduced deficiency income tax assessment.

ISSUE: Whether the CIR engaged in willful and deliberate forum shopping.

RULING: No. The CIR is not guilty of forum shopping.

Forum shopping involves the filing of multiple lawsuits in different courts, either simultaneously or
successively, involving the same parties, seeking the courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or
grant the same or substantially identical reliefs, assuming that one or another court would provide a
favorable disposition. The elements of forum shopping include: (a) identity of parties, or at least parties
representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief sought, with the
relief being based on the same facts; and (c) a judgment rendered in one case would amount to res
judicata in the other case.

In this case, the CIR filed a motion for an extension of time to file a petition for review in relation to the
Decision dated February 3, 2016, of the CTA En Banc in CTA EB No. 1207. The case was docketed as
G.R. No. 222824. Additionally, the CIR filed a motion for reconsideration of the same Decision before
the CTA En Banc. There is indeed an identity of parties in both cases—the CIR, although represented by
two different agencies, the OSG and the BIR.

However, there is no identity of rights asserted. G.R. No. 222824 pertains to a request for an extension of
time to file a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, while the motion filed with the CTA
En Banc seeks reconsideration of the Decision dated February 3, 2016. Although both motions pertain to
the same Decision of the CTA En Banc in CTA EB No. 1207, the CIR is asserting different rights.
Moreover, a judgment rendered in G.R. No. 222824 would not amount to res judicata since the resolution
would be limited to granting or denying the motion for an extension, while the resolution of the CTA En
Banc on the CIR's motion for reconsideration would not result in res judicata for G.R. No. 222824.
Furthermore, the records indicate that the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion dated March 21, 2016,
informing the Court of a pending motion for reconsideration filed by the BIR's Litigation Division with
the CTA En Banc. As a result, G.R. No. 222824 was declared closed and terminated.
 CSC vs Dampilag

DOCTRINE: In administrative proceedings, the quantum of evidence required is only substantial, or

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.

FACTS: In 2014, an anonymous complaint was filed alleging that Hilario J. Dampilag committed an
examination irregularity. The complaint was based on disparities between Dampilag's facial features and
signatures in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) for a 1996 exam and his Personal Data Sheet (PDS). After an
investigation, Dampilag was charged with Serious Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents, and
Grave Misconduct. Dampilag argued that he inadvertently submitted the wrong photograph and that
handwriting variations were normal over time. He was found guilty of two counts of Serious Dishonesty
by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Dampilag's appeals were denied, but the Court of Appeals (CA)
later reversed the decision, citing minor discrepancies in his signature. The CSC then appealed to the
Supreme Court.

The CSC argued that the CA's decision was erroneous, as substantial disparities existed between
Dampilag's signatures in the PSP and PDS. Dampilag maintained that the differences were insignificant
and that he tended to change his signature style over time.

ISSUE: Whether or not the disparities between Dampilag's PSP and PDS, along with the submission of
the wrong photograph, amount to a serious breach of honesty and integrity in the context of a civil service
examination.

RULING: Yes. In fine, we hold that the evidence presented before the CSC sufficiently proves that
Dampilag is guilty of the offenses charged against him. In administrative proceedings, the quantum of
evidence required is only substantial, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine
otherwise. Here, the records bear more than substantial evidence to support a finding of guilt against
Dampilag.

Dishonesty means the concealment or distortion of the truth in a matter of fact relevant to one's office or
connected with the performance of his duty. It is "a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."

For dishonesty to be considered serious, the presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in
Section 3 of CSC Resolution No. 06-0538 must be present. In this case, Dampilag falsified the PDS, an
official document, by misrepresenting that he passed the December 1, 1996 CSPE when he did not. In
addition, he devised and conspired with someone to impersonate him and take the December 1, 1996,
CSPE for and on his behalf. More importantly, Dampilag has been benefiting from the passing result in
the said examination. Clearly, Dampilag committed two counts of serious dishonesty under Sections 3(e)
and (g) of CSC Resolution No. 06-0538, respectively. Dampilag is also liable for the falsification of
official documents. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the duly accomplished form of the Civil
Service is an official document of the Commission. Dampilag falsified his PDS accomplished on March
3, 1999, when he indicated therein that he took and passed the CSPE on December 1, 1996, in Baguio
City, with a rating of 81.89%, when in truth and fact, somebody took the examination for him.

Moreover, under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, Series of 1991, any "act which includes the
procurement and/or use of fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving of assistance to ensure the
commission or procurement of the same, cheating, collusion, impersonation, or any other anomalous act
which amounts to any violation of the Civil Service examination has been categorized as a grave offense
of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service." Verily, by
colluding and conspiring with someone to impersonate him in taking the December 1, 1996, CSPE and
making an untruthful statement in his PDS of his civil service eligibility, Dampilag is liable for grave
misconduct. Section 50 of CSC Resolution No. 1101502, or the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, provides that if the respondent is found guilty of two or more
charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge, and
the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances. Under Section 46, the offenses of serious
dishonesty, falsification of official documents, and grave misconduct are all punishable by the penalty of
dismissal from the service.

In view of Dampilag's misrepresentation in the PDS that he took and passed the CSPE on December 1,
1996, and collusion with someone to take the December 1, 1996, CSPE for and on his behalf, this Court
finds Dampilag administratively liable for two counts of serious dishonesty, falsification of official
documents, and grave misconduct. He is meted the penalty of dismissal with the accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, disqualification
from re-employment in the government service, and a bar from taking civil service examinations.
 [G.R. No. 199972. August 15, 2022]

LEILA M. DE LIMA, IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, JESSE M. ROBREDO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND ALL PERSONS ACTING
UNDER THEIR CONTROL AND DIRECTION, INCLUDING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER SPECIAL 5TH
DIVISION, AND MERIDIEN VISTA GAMING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 206118]

GAMES AND AMUSEMENTS BOARD (GAB), PETITIONER, VS. MERIDIEN VISTA GAMING
CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: The resolution of two legal cases: G.R. No. 199972, a Petition for Certiorari filed by Leila
M. De Lima and the late Jesse M. Robredo challenging certain resolutions of the Court of Appeals; and
G.R. No. 206118, a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the Games and Amusement Board
contesting specific resolutions of the Court of Appeals. The former is filed under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court, while the latter is under Rule 45.

FACTS: The Cagayan Economic Zone Authority (CEZA) initially gave Meridien Vista Gaming
Corporation (Meridien) a license to operate games, including jai alai, in the Cagayan Special Economic
Zone and Freeport (CSEZFP) and set up betting stations. However, the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) later informed CEZA that it couldn't regulate jai alai without a legislative
franchise. As a result, CEZA revoked the license, leading to a legal battle. Meridien challenged the
revocation in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, and the court ruled in Meridien's favor. However,
CEZA requested relief from the judgment. Eventually, the Supreme Court granted relief and instructed
the Court of Appeals (CA) to consider CEZA's mandamus on appeal.

Meanwhile, the Games and Amusement Board (GAB) investigated reports of jai alai betting stations
operated by Meridien without a permit. GAB issued a Cease-and-Desist Order (CDO), so Meridien filed a
complaint against GAB to stop it. The RTC granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) and later a writ
of preliminary injunction, but GAB appealed to the CA, which ultimately reversed the RTC decision and
dismissed Meridien's complaint.

In a different case, the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) issued DOJ Opinion No. 24, stating that Meridien could
only operate off-frontons within the CSEZFP under the CEZA license. The DOJ and DILG then issued a
joint memorandum instructing the denial of Meridien's off-front business permits. Meridien challenged
this in the CA, which issued a TRO and later a writ of preliminary injunction to pause the implementation
of the Joint Memorandum until a related Supreme Court case is resolved. The legal issues revolve around
the authority of CEZA, GAB, and the SOJ in regulating Meridien's jai alai operations, both inside and
outside the CSEZFP, resulting in various court proceedings and decisions.
ISSUE: In G.R. No. 199972:

Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the WPI, holding in abeyance the
resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 120236 until this Court's resolution of G.R. No. 194962; and
Whether the CA has jurisdiction to resolve the main case.

In G.R. No. 206118:

Whether the CA erred in clarifying that the CDO covers off-frontons only; and
Whether the CA erred in qualifying that GAB lacked regulatory authority inside the CSEZFP.

RULING: The Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 199972 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals' Resolutions dated September 20, 2011, and November 14, 2011, in CA-G.R. SP No. 120236 are
nullified and set aside. As a result, the contested Writ of Preliminary Injunction is lifted, and the Court of
Appeals is directed to resolve the case as soon as possible. The Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R.
No. 206118 is denied. The Court of Appeals' decisions dated August 18, 2011, September 11, 2012, and
March 5, 2013, in CA-G.R. SP No. 119842 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that the
pronouncement on the regulatory authority of the Games and Amusement Board is set aside for lack of
jurisdiction.
 [G.R. No. 190517. July 27, 2022]

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., PETITIONER, VS. RADIO PHILIPPINES

NETWORK, INC., INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING CORP., AND BANAHAW
BROADCASTING CORPORATION, THRU THE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS,
RESPONDENTS

DOCTRINE: All disputes between the parties are considered resolved and addressed at the moment a
judgment is rendered final; further action is limited to directing the execution of the decision.

FACTS: The RTC issued a judgment requiring Traders Royal Bank and Security Bank and Trust
Company to pay damages to RPN, IBC, and BBC. Traders Royal appealed to the CA and later to the SC,
but both courts upheld the liability. The SC's decision became final in April 2003. RPN, IBC, and BBC
filed motions for a writ of execution and subpoena, which the RTC granted. However, Metrobank
reported that the escrow fund was depleted. The RTC then issued an order of execution to enforce the
judgment against Traders Royal's assets, including the escrow fund and properties covered by a Purchase
and Sale Agreement with BankCom. Metrobank filed a motion to quash the subpoena, questioning the
RTC's jurisdiction, but the RTC upheld the execution order, stating that the escrow fund could be used to
satisfy the award. BankCom and Metrobank challenged the RTC's order by filing petitions for certiorari
with the CA. The CA, however, dismissed the petitions, finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in ordering the execution against the escrow fund.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC acted properly in ordering the execution of the judgment against the escrow
fund.

RULING: The RTC's order of execution is partly meritorious. Once a judgment becomes final, the RTC
has the authority to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment. However, the RTC should have
followed the prescribed manner of execution as provided in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The execution of a money judgment should begin with a demand for immediate payment from the
judgment debtor. If the judgment debtor cannot pay the obligation, the executing officer may then levy on
the debtor's personal or real properties in a manner prescribed by the rules. The garnishment of debts and
credits belonging to the judgment debtor is also allowed. In this case, the RTC deviated from the proper
manner of execution by including the escrow fund in the order without first demanding immediate
payment from the judgment debtor. The RTC should have served a notice on Metrobank, and only after
Traders Royal failed to pay the obligation could the escrow fund be levied upon. Therefore, the RTC's
order of execution against the escrow fund should be modified to comply with the prescribed manner of
execution under the rules.
 [G.R. No. 256177. June 27, 2022]

PIONEER INSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. THE INSURANCE

COMPANY, SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO CLEARWATER INSURANCE COMPANY,
RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: The court addresses Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation's Petition for Review on
Certiorari, challenging the Court of Appeals' decision dated June 19, 2020, and resolution dated February
24, 2021, in CA-G.R. SP No. 149206.

FACTS: Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation, a local non-life insurance firm, contests the Court of
Appeals' affirmation of the Regional Trial Court's validation of an arbitral award in favor of Clearwater
Insurance Company. Clearwater, an international entity, filed a 2016 petition seeking confirmation and
execution of an arbitral award resulting from a 1973 agreement. This agreement involved Pioneer
assuming Clearwater's obligations in specific reinsurance agreements. Clearwater claimed that Pioneer
failed to settle outstanding amounts, leading to arbitration in New York. Pioneer did not participate, and
in 2013, the arbitral panel issued a final award instructing Pioneer to pay Clearwater $344,991.68.

Pioneer raised various procedural and substantive issues, including a lack of evidence supporting
Clearwater's claim, prescription of the cause of action, and jurisdictional concerns. However, both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals dismissed Pioneer's arguments, confirming and enforcing the arbitral
award. Pioneer appealed to the Court of Appeals, challenging the verification of Clearwater's petition and
the correctness of confirming the arbitral award. The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's decision,
asserting that Clearwater substantially met the requirements and that Pioneer failed to demonstrate that
enforcing the award would breach public policy. Undeterred, Pioneer submitted a motion for
reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals rejected. Pioneer persists in seeking the dismissal of
Clearwater's petition due to procedural lapses and alleges a violation of public policy regarding the
prescription of Clearwater's cause of action. TIG Insurance, Clearwater's successor, argues that
Clearwater's petition adhered to proper verification and certification against forum shopping. They argue
that Pioneer cannot raise the prescription issue now, as it should have been addressed during arbitration.
TIG Insurance underscores that confirming and enforcing the arbitral award aligns with public policy in
the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the Regional Trial Court's validation of an
arbitral award in favor of Clearwater Insurance Company. Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation
challenges the decision, citing procedural and substantive issues such as a lack of evidence, prescription,
and jurisdictional concerns.

RULING: The petition is without merit. The Court's discretionary review of the Court of Appeals (CA)
decision, guided by the Special ADR Rules, is permissible only under specific circumstances. These rules
outline grounds for review, such as the failure to apply prescribed standards, sustaining a final decision
without jurisdiction, neglecting rules resulting in prejudice, and committing significant errors that exceed
jurisdiction. The review's scope is confined to legal errors and excludes factual inquiries.

Pioneer failed to raise specific grounds for review or draw analogies to such grounds. This absence of
argumentation may result in the petition's dismissal. Moreover, the CA's assessment of Clearwater's
compliance with verification and certification against forum shopping aligns with the Special ADR Rules,
particularly Rules 1.4 and 1.5, mandating these requirements for initiating pleadings.

The enforcement of the final award is determined not to breach public policy, as per Rule 13.4(b)(ii) of
the Special ADR Rules. The court can reject the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award
only when it violates public policy. The court's narrow approach emphasizes that not every legal violation
constitutes a breach of public policy. Pioneer's contentions on prescription and public policy lack
validation, as Pioneer fails to demonstrate the illegality or immorality of the award or establish harm to
the public or societal interests.

The petition is dismissed, confirming the CA's decision and upholding the acknowledgment, validation,
and enforcement of the United States Board of Arbitrators' Final Award dated April 25, 2013, without
addressing attorney's fees and costs of the suit.
 [ G.R. No. 244374. February 15, 2022 ]

PUREGOLD PRICE CLUB, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND RENATO M.
CRUZ, JR., RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE: The court emphasizes that procedural rules should not be regarded as insignificant
technical details that can be disregarded at the discretion of a party for their convenience.

FACTS: On January 16, 2013, Puregold Price Club, Inc. (PPCI) employed Renato M. Cruz, Jr. as a
probationary store head, and on July 16, 2013, he was appointed as a store officer/manager at Puregold
Extra Ampid in San Mateo, Rizal. Renato was in charge of activating and deactivating the Intruder Alarm
System (IAS) in the branch's treasury office. In case of an intruder, the IAS would notify Renato and two
other officers, with Renato being the principal officer expected to respond owing to his proximity to the
branch.

The IAS sounded an intruder alarm on March 16, 2015, at 1:23 a.m., alerting Renato and the two other
officers. However, none of them responded, prompting the security guard to issue additional alarms and
warnings. Renato came at 5:13 a.m., identified no intruder, and turned off the alarm. He also grabbed
some plastic pails from the store. After PPCI served him a notice to explain, conducted an administrative
hearing, and terminated his employment, Renato filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor
Arbiter (LA). The LA ruled in favor of Renato, ordering PPCI to pay back wages and separation pay.
PPCI contested the decision, claiming improper service of summons, and the case proceeded through the
NLRC, Court of Appeals (CA), and eventually the Supreme Court, with conflicting arguments about the
validity of Renato's dismissal and the jurisdiction of the LA over PPCI.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals made a mistake in accepting Renato's certiorari petition even
though it was filed beyond the stipulated 60-day period and considered untimely.

RULING: The Supreme Court granted PPCI's petition, holding that the CA erred in giving due course to
Renato's petition for certiorari filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period. The Court emphasized that
petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from notice of judgment or from the
order denying a motion for reconsideration, and no extension is allowed unless under exceptional or
meritorious circumstances. The Court also reiterated the importance of adhering to procedural rules to
maintain the efficiency of the judicial system.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. TERESITA I. SALINAS,
RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: The recorded date of submission for a court pleading sent via registered mail is confirmed
by either the date stamped on the envelope or the date specified in the registry receipt.

FACTS: Teresita I. Salinas, the respondent, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage based
on psychological incompetence. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition, but the Republic of
the Philippines (petitioner) filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. To submit an appeal, the
Republic has until August 19, 2015. It was sent to the RTC by registered mail in a package that was
marked with the date "October 5, 2015." The RTC dismissed the appeal because it was filed too late. The
Republic stated that the Notice of Appeal was filed on time, citing an Inner Registered Sack Bill and a
Postmaster Certification. The denial of the Notice of Appeal was upheld by the RTC and CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when
it denied the Republic's Notice of Appeal for being filed late.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the date of filing a pleading can be established through the post
office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt. However, in this particular case, the Republic of the
Philippines was unable to provide adequate evidence to support the timeliness of its Notice of Appeal.
The Inner Registered Sack Bill and postmaster's certification were not deemed sufficient proof of the
filing date. As a result, the Court affirmed the denial of the Notice of Appeal, considering it filed late.
Consequently, the petition lacked merit and was rejected by the Supreme Court.
 SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION,Petitioner versus CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE
BAIS~ INC., Respondent.

G.R. No. 253821

DOCTRINE: The distinction between pure questions of law and factual issues is crucial in determining
the appropriate legal remedies for the aggrieved party.

FACTS: This case involves Sugar Order Nos. 1, 1-A, and 3 Series of 2017-2018 issued by the Sugar
Regulatory Administration (SRA). Central Azucarera De Bais, Inc. (Central Azucarera) challenged the
legality of these orders through a Petition for Declaratory Relief, arguing that they exceeded the SRA's
authority. The SRA contended that the orders were valid and fell within its regulatory jurisdiction. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the orders null and void, citing that ethanol producers are not part of
the sugar industry and that the regulation of ethanol producers falls under the Department of Energy
(DOE). The SRA appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which dismissed the appeal as an improper
remedy, reasoning that the issues involved were purely legal in nature. The SRA's motion for
reconsideration was also denied.

ISSUE: Whether the questions raised in the CA appeal pertain to factual matters that require the
presentation and examination of evidence, or if they are purely legal questions that should have been
addressed through a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

RULING: Motion to dismiss the appeal is granted, and the instant appeal is dismissed as an ineffective
remedy. As a result, [Central Azucarera's] Motion to Defer Submission of Appellee's Memorandum
Pending Resolution of Motion to Dismiss is denied, for it is moot.
 SPS. MARIANO & RAQUEL CORDERO vs. LEONILA OCTAVIO
(GR No. 241385)
DOCTRINE: The courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement
of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just
disposition of his cause.

FACTS: The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) ruled in favor of Leonila in the ejectment case filed
against the Spouses Cordero and ordered the latter to vacate the premises. This decision was affirmed by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA).

The Spouses sought to invoke substantial compliance with rules requiring the statement of material dates
as they claimed that the failure to state the date of receipt of the decision from the RTC does not warrant
any dismissal of their petition for review.

The CA denied Spouses Cordero's motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was filed one day late.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rigid application of technicalities cannot prevail at the expense of a just
resolution of the case.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in THE NEGATIVE.

The Court has allowed several cases to proceed in the broader interest of justice despite procedural
defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Here, there exists a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave
injustice to the Spouses Cordero, which is not commensurate with their failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure. The circumstances obtained in this case merit the liberal application of the rule in
the interest of fair play.

The Spouses Cordero received the Order on July 11, 2017, and timely filed the petition for review to the
CA on July 26, 2017, or within the 15-day reglementary period. As such, the Spouses Cordero are
deemed to have substantially complied with the rules. The failure to indicate the date when they received
the other orders and resolutions may be dispensed with in the interest of justice.

Spouses Cordero complied with the requirement of attaching copies of the judgments and orders of the
trial courts. Moreover, these attachments are already sufficient to enable the CA to pass upon the assigned
errors and to resolve the appeal even without the pleadings and other portions of the records. To be sure,
the assailed decisions of the trial courts substantially summarized the contents of the omitted records.
 SPS. CATALINO & ANITA POBLETE vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND
MORTGAGE BANK
(GR No. 228620)

DOCTRINE: The Court is vested with the inherent authority to effect the necessary consequence of the
judgment. However, it should be limited to explaining a vague or equivocal part of the judgment which
hampers its proper and full execution.

FACTS: The RTC ordered Sps. Villaroman to surrender the titles to Sps. Poblete, but the former failed to
comply until they learned that Villaroman mortgaged the lots to Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank. As their failure to pay their pending debts, the bank foreclosed the mortgage and later sold the said
properties to BF Citiland Corporation. Thus, the Sps. Poblete filed an action vs. Villaroman, Banco
Filipino, BF Citiland, and Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City to annul the mortgage and foreclosure sale.

The RTC denied the complaint for the lack of merit but was reversed by the Court of Appeals, ruling that
the Sps. Poblete are entitled to the lots and declared that the mortgage between Villaroman and Banco
Filipino was void since it was not approved by the HLURB.

As the Poblete moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, of which was granted by the but the original
writ is incomplete since it did not order the bank to surrender and transfer the certificate of title in their
names. In Feb 2014, the RTC denied the motion, citing that an order of execution cannot vary the terms of
the judgment and a party declared as an owner is not automatically granted the title over the property. As
the aggrieved party appealed before the Court of Appeals, the latter appellate court dismissed the petition
and ruled that the execution must substantially conform to the judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the trial court declaring Sps. Poblete as owners of the lots became
final and executory.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in THE AFFIRMATIVE.

The courts cannot modify the judgment to correct perceived errors of law or fact. Public policy and sound
practice dictate that every litigation must come to an end at the risk of occasional errors. This is the
doctrine of immutability of a final judgment. The rule, however, is subject to well-known exceptions,
namely, the correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries, void judgments, and supervening events of
which those exemptions are not present in this case.

Here, the Order to surrender and transfer the certificates of title is deemed implied from the Decision
declaring Spouses Poblete as owners of the lots and ordering Banco Filipino to refrain from committing
acts of dispossession. The fact that it was not mentioned in the dispositive portion is of no moment. A
judgment is not confined to what appears on its face but extends as well to those necessary to carry out
the Decision into effect. Banco Filipino has no right over the properties. It should not be permitted to
retain the titles over the lots on the basis of a void transaction. Otherwise, it would unjustly deprive
Spouses Poblete of their right as owners to register the lots in their names and subject them to threats of
dispossession.
 VITARICH CORPORATION vs. FEMINA DAGMIL (GR No. 217138)

DOCTRINE: It is the avowed policy of the law to accord both parties every opportunity to pursue and
defend their cases openly and to relegate technicalities to the background in the interest of substantial
justice.

FACTS: Vitarich Corporation filed an action for a sum of money against Femina before the RTC of
Malolos City, Bulacan, and the latter trial court granted the complaint, ordering Femina to pay Vitarich.

Before the adverse ruling, Femina’s counsel moved to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue,
which the RTC denied, directing the respondent to answer the complaint. However, despite the court’s
order, Femina failed to submit any responsive pleading. Upon the entrance of Femina’s new counsel, a
motion to admit an answer was filed alongside his entry of appearance, but the RTC denied it.

A petition for relief from judgment was filed due to Femina’s former counsel's excusable negligence—
specifically, the former counsel was burdened with health issues and seldom reported to his office,
making it difficult for Femina to correspond with him. Further, Femina filed a motion for a new trial but
was denied by the RTC, citing that Femina is bound by the actions of her counsel.

However, the RTC’s denial was set aside and reversed by the Court of Appeals after finding abuse of its
discretion in rendering judgment by default despite several remedies resorted to by the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of default is not proper.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in NEGATIVE.

Foremost, Femina moved to admit her answer before she was declared in default. To be sure, there is no
showing that Femina intended to delay the proceedings. As the CA aptly held, Femina availed herself of
several post-judgment remedies, which evinced her desire to file an answer and to establish her defenses.
More importantly, Vitarich did not suffer any damage. It appears that Femina's counsel received the
notice to file an answer on November 3, 2010, and had 15 days or until November 18, 2010, to comply.
Yet, Vitarich moved to declare Femina in default only on January 5, 2011, or 48 days from the expiration
of the reglementary period. The only conclusion is that Vitarich has not been prejudiced by the delay.
Otherwise, Vitarich would not have been lenient and opted to wait that long before invoking its right.

With this, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in rendering the judgment in default, as they could have
rectified the palpable error by lifting the order of default, admitting Femina’s answer, and considering the
case. Still, they unceremoniously discarded the compelling circumstances that resulted in the violation of
Femina’s right to present evidence.

This rendered the order of default and judgment of default void.

 LABOR LAW

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) vs. DAISY B. PANGA-

VEGA

(GR No. 22236)

DOCTRINE: The paramount consideration of RA 9710 is the empowerment of women.

FACTS: Atty. Daisy Panga-Vega, Secretary of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET),
requested authority to avail of a 15-day leave on the dates February 7–11, 14–28, and 21–25, but not to
exceed 2 months, to undergo hysterectomy—a surgery that seeks to remove the uterus. The HRET
approved her request.

After availing herself of the special leave, Atty. Panga-Vega informed the tribunal that she was resuming
her duties, presenting a medical certificate stating that there was no contraindication to resume light to
moderate activities, and another one indicating her fitness to work.

However, the HRET directed her to consume her 2-month special leave to prolong rest following her
procedure and in view of a pending investigation into alleged tampering with one minute of the meetings,
which could subject her to more stress. Her reconsideration was denied, leading her to file an appeal
before the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

The CSC granted Atty. Panga-Vega's appeal, ruling that she only needed to present a medical certificate
attesting to her physical fitness to return to work and not exhaust the full leave. Despite HRET's
reconsideration and appeal, the CSC and the Court of Appeals denied such requests, respectively.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Panga complied with the requirements imposed by the laws and pertinent
rules.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the NEGATIVE. Atty. Panga-Vega's return to work does not
require the entire special leave applied for to be consumed, as long as certain conditions are satisfied
under RA No. 9710 (Magna Carta for Women) and CSC guidelines.

Total hysterectomy is classified as a major surgical procedure that requires a maximum period of
recuperation of two months and a minimum of three weeks under CSC guidelines. Before returning to
work, Atty. Panga-Vega must present a medical certificate signed by her attending surgeon, stating that
she is physically fit to assume the duties of her position as Secretary of the HRET.

At this point, she has satisfied the provisions requiring her return to work after her surgery.
 FREDDIE B. LAURENTE vs. HELENAR CONST. & JOEL ARGARIN

(GR No. 243812)

DOCTRINE: What determines regular employment is not an employment contract, written or otherwise,
but the nature of the job.

FACTS: Freddie is a regular employee of Helenar Constructions and performs work necessary and
desirable for the construction business of the respondent, a construction company owned by Joel Argarin.
Freddie worked on various projects from 2012 until he terminated his services in November 2014.

Previously, in October 2014, the foreman from the respondent required him to sign a labor contract for a
period of three (3) months, with a clause stating that his employment would be renewable "depending on
the evaluation of the site engineer and foreman," which Freddie refused to sign due to concerns about
violating his security of tenure. Consequently, the project-in-charge barred Freedie from entering the
construction site, claiming he was not a regular employee.

The Labor Arbiter found that Freedie was illegally dismissed and ruled him a regular employee, not a
project employee, entitled to back wages, separation pay, service incentive pay, and 13th-month pay.
However, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed this decision, stating that William
was the true employer of Freedie, not the respondent construction company.

Aggrieved, the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the NLRC’s ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not Freedie is a regular employee of Helenar Constructions.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the AFFIRMATIVE.

As provided in Art. 280 of the Labor Code, employment shall be deemed regular where the employee has
been engaged to perform activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer. Being a painter, Freddie is tasked with preparing, sanding, and painting various construction
works, and the nature of his job required him to perform these activities deemed necessary in the usual
business of respondents, who are principally engaged in the construction business. Indeed, his continuous
rehiring for different projects from 2012 to 2014 attests to the desirability of his services. There is no
substantial evidence that Freedie was adequately informed of his status as a project employee at the time
of his engagements and was not fully apprised of the duration and scope of the projects. Worse, Freddie
has no employment contracts for his past projects in 2012.
 OSCAR ORTIZ vs. FOREVER RICHSONS TRADING CORP.

(GR No. 238289)

DOCTRINE: In labor-contracting, there is no contracting and no contractor; it is only the employer’s

representatives who gather and supply people for the employer.

FACTS: Oscar was hired by Forever Richsons and signed a 5-month employment contract with
Workpool Manpower Services. He continued to work for the respondents despite his contract having
already expired. He claimed that he was a regular employee of the respondents since he served them for 2
years after the expiration of his 5-month contract, performing tasks that were necessary and desirable to
the respondent’s business of plywood manufacturing and marketing. He was illegally dismissed after he
refused to sign a new 5-month employment contract, blank vouchers, and papers. The Labor Arbiter (LA)
dismissed Oscar’s complaint for his failure to indicate Workpool Manpower as an indispensable party.
The decision of LA was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and the Court of
Appeals (CA) maintained that Workpool Manpower is Oscar’s direct employer. He argued that Workpool
Manpower is a labor-only contractor. The respondents exercised control and supervision over his work
and paid his wages, including his contributions to the Social Security System, Pag-IBIG Fund, and
PhilHealth.

ISSUE: Whether or not Workpool Manpower is Oscar’s direct employer.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the NEGATIVE. Article 106 of the Labor Code defines
labor-only contracting as an arrangement where a person who does not have substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, machines, or work premises, among others, supplies workers
to an employer to perform activities that are directly related to the principal business of the employer.
Oscar started working for the respondents when he applied for a job directly and signed his employment
contract within the premises of the respondents. The contract he signed with Workpool Manpower as an
employer does not have a leg to stand since it was not presented as evidence. In this situation, the
contractor simply becomes an agent of the principal and then controls the results as well as the means and
manner of achieving the desired results. Evidently, Workpool Manpower is a mere supplier of labor who
had no sufficient capitalization and equipment to undertake the production and manufacture of plywood
as independent activities, separate from the trade and business of the respondents, and had no control and
supervision over the contracted personnel.
 PAL MARITIME CORPORATION vs. DARWIN D. DALISAY

(GR No. 218115)

DOCTRINE: The falsity or non-disclosure of the truth must be for a malicious purpose or coupled with
the intent to deceive and profit from deception.

FACTS: Darwin filed a complaint against PAL Maritime and Norwest Management for permanent and
total disability benefits, sickness allowance, damages, and attorney’s fees before the Labor Arbiter.
Darwin sought medical attention after experiencing sharp and intense pain in his lower back while lifting
heavy provisions during his duty as a seaman, and upon diagnosis, he was declared unfit to work. He filed
a claim for permanent and total disability benefits, but his medical treatment was discontinued due to the
malicious concealment of a pre-existing illness. During his application for shipboard employment,
Darwin was declared fit to work and had no history of any ailment other than having undergone a certain
operation.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, stating that Darwin’s fraudulent concealment of previous
ailments disqualified him from claiming any benefits. However, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision, believing that Darwin’s failure to disclose his condition was
due to his honest belief that he was already healed and his current ailment was work-related. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the NLRC’s decision with modifications.

ISSUE: Whether or not Darwin is still entitled to sickness and related benefits.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in NEGATIVE. Section 20(E) of POEA-SEC provides that a
seafarer who knowingly conceals and does not disclose past medical conditions, disability, and history in
the pre-employment medical examination constitutes fraudulent misrepresentation and shall disqualify
him from any compensation and benefits. The facts that Darwin knowingly concealed his pre-existing
illness affecting his spine and that he is disqualified from claiming disability benefits are immutable and
should not be disturbed. Thus, the issue of the propriety of the award of sickness allowance and attorney’s
fees is decided.

The Supreme Court rejects the CA’s reasons for granting the sickness allowance to Darwin, stating that
despite his misrepresentation and concealment, he underwent and passed the required PEME, was
declared fit to work, and was allowed to work by the petitioner herein. This contradicts the very language
of the application as provided in the state provision. Thus, including the sickness allowance, his benefits
were denied.
 ABELARDO SALAZAR vs. ALBINA SIMBAJON, ET AL.

(GR No. 202374)

DOCTRINE: The posting of an appeal bond is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional.

FACTS: The respondents filed a complaint for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal, underpayment of
salary, and non-payment of benefits against the petitioner before the Labor Arbiter. Allegedly, the
restaurant employed the respondents in various capacities. After the respondents formed a union, they
were allegedly harassed, and the management informed them of the business closure due to bankruptcy, a
claim the respondents disputed.

Abelardo denied an employment relationship with Simbajon et al. and asserted that he was merely the
lessor of the business premises. The Labor Arbiter, however, held Lucia, Quirino, and him to be solidarily
liable for the aggrieved employees, stating that the lease contracts were inconclusive to disavow any
employment relationship.

Abelardo posted a cash bond of P500,000 when he appealed before the NLRC. Later, he moved to reduce
the bond and posted a surety bond of P3,100,000, seeking substitution of the existing cash bond, which
was granted by the NLRC, along with his removal from liability due to the absence of substantial
evidence of an employer-employee relationship.

However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC, citing the non-perfection of the
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abelardo complied with the bond requirement to perfect his appeal.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the AFFIRMATIVE. Appeals involving monetary awards are
perfected only upon compliance with requisites, including the payment of appeal fees, filing of a
Memorandum of Appeal, and payment of the required cash or surety bond. The purpose of posting cash
or a surety bond is to ensure that employees receive the monetary award if they prevail and to discourage
employers from using the appeal to delay or evade their obligation to satisfy the judgment.

Records revealed that Abelardo received the LA's decision on March 23, 2007, and had 10 days until
April 2, 2007, to file an appeal. On March 30, Abelardo appeared and moved to reduce the bond,
depositing a cashier’s check for P500,000 in favor of the respondent employee. On the last day of the
appeal period, he posted a surety bond of P3.1 million, totaling the monetary award of P3,600,000 within
the reglementary period.
 REGGIE ZONIO vs. 1st QUANTUM LEAP SECURITY AGENCY AND ROMULO Q. PAR

(GR No. 224944)

DOCTRINE: In claims for overtime pay and premium pay for holidays and rest days, the burden is
shifted to the employee, as these are not incurred in the normal course of business.

FACTS: Zonio was hired as a security guard by the 1st Quantum Leap Security Agency, owned and
managed by Romulo Q. Par. Zonio filed a complaint against respondents for illegal suspension,
underpayment of salary and 13th-month pay, non-payment of overtime and holiday pay, holiday and rest
day premium pay, service incentive leave pay, night differential pay, reimbursement of cash bond, and
miscellaneous fees. Before filing the complaint against the employers, Zonio and his colleagues received
a memorandum suspending them for a month for sleeping while on duty, with no formal investigation.
Upon their return to work, the respondents refused to accept them. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Zonio
failed to substantiate his claim for payment of overtime and holiday pay, holiday and rest day premium
pay, night shift differential pay, and salary differential pay for the three-year period. As he elevated the
case before the NLRC, the latter modified the ruling, stating that Zonio is entitled to overtime and holiday
pay, rest day premium pays, and night shift differential pays. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the
modification.

ISSUE: Whether or not Zonio is entitled to the contested monetary claims.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the AFFIRMATIVE. Zonio submitted a photocopy of the
entire logbook, which showed the dates and shifts when he reported for work. However, the logbook does
not indicate whether Zonio worked on holidays or during his rest days. Thus, his claim for holiday and
rest day premiums was denied for lack of factual basis. However, the entire logbook showed that Zonio
worked 12-hour shifts, so he was entitled to overtime pay since he performed duties beyond 8 hours a
day, and he is entitled to night differential as he works from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. based on the logbook
presented. Although those entries are not verified and countersigned by the respondents, the entries in the
logbook are prima facie evidence for Zonio’s claim for overtime and night differential pay.
 [G.R. No. 229429, November 9, 2020]

NOEL M. MANRIQUE, PETITIONER, VS. DELTA EARTHMOVING, INC., ED ANYAYAHAN,

AND IAN HANSEN, RESPONDENTS

DOCTRINE: In terminating managerial employees based on a loss of trust and confidence, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required. The mere existence of a basis for believing that such an employee has
breached the trust of their employer is enough. This degree of proof differs from that of a rank-and-file
employee, which requires proof of involvement in the alleged events, and mere uncorroborated assertions
by the employer will be insufficient. Despite the less stringent degree of proof involving managerial
employees, jurisprudence is firm that loss of trust and confidence as a ground for dismissal has never been
intended to afford an occasion for abuse due to its subjective nature. The grounds for dismissal must be
genuine, not a mere afterthought intended to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith.

FACTS: The case stemmed from a complaint [4] for illegal dismissal, seeking reinstatement with full
backwages and benefits, non-payment of salary and wages, 13th-month pay, vacation leave and sick leave
credits, moral, exemplary, and nominal damages, and attorney's fees filed by Noel M. Manrique
(Manrique) against Delta Earthmoving, Inc. (Delta Earth), Ed Anyayahan (Anyayahan), and Ian Hansen
(Hansen). On January 2, 2013, Delta Earth hired Manrique as Assistant Vice President for Mining
Services to oversee the company's human resources department and handle various administrative
functions. As required, he reported to the mine site located at Didipio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya. Later in
June 2013, the company assigned him to work as Officer-in-Charge of the Oceana Gold Philippines,
Inc.—Didipio Gold Project—to assist in the operations while his immediate supervisor, Hansen, was on a
roster break. On December 29, 2013, Manrique claimed that he was instructed to pack his things and not
report back to work. Hansen told him that the head office of Delta Earth had decided to terminate him. On
January 6, 2014, he went to the head office in Quezon City to verify, and Anyayahan, who is the
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, confirmed the termination of his employment.
Manrique was asked to tender a voluntary resignation, but he refused. Instead, he filed the present
complaint.

ISSUE: Whether substantial evidence exists to establish a loss of trust and confidence as a valid ground
for dismissal

RULING: In terminating managerial employees based on a loss of trust and confidence, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required. The mere existence of a basis for believing that such an employee has
breached the trust of their employer is enough. This degree of proof differs from that of a rank-and-file
employee, which requires proof of involvement in the alleged events, and mere uncorroborated assertions
by the employer will be insufficient. Despite the less stringent degree of proof involving managerial
employees, jurisprudence is firm that a loss of trust and confidence as a ground for dismissal has never
been intended to afford an occasion for abuse due to its subjective nature. It must be genuine, not a mere
afterthought intended to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith. In this case, the LA quickly identified
several markers of bad faith on the part of Delta Earth, which made Manrique's dismissal questionable.
 [G.R. No. 240882, September 16, 2020]

WILFREDO T. MARIANO, PETITIONER, VS. G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT AND/OR

VIRGILIO FLORIDA, JR., RESPONDENTS

DOCTRINE: Dismissal from employment has two facets: first, the legality of the act of dismissal, which
constitutes substantive due process; and second, the legality of the manner of dismissal, which constitutes
procedural due process. The burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the disciplinary action
was made for a lawful cause or that the termination of employment was valid.

FACTS: The controversy stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of wages for two
round trips and the 13th month, refund of a cash bond, damages, and attorney's fees filed by Mariano and
Francisco C. Arellano against G.V. Florida Transport and its owner, Virgilio Florida, Jr. Only Mariano
filed the instant petition before this Court.

ISSUE: Whether the complainant may be awarded his money claims despite the dismissal being for a just
cause.

RULING: The procedural flaws notwithstanding, especially considering that this is a labor case, the ends
of substantial justice would be better served by relaxing the application of technical rules of procedure.
Technicalities should not be permitted to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights
and obligations of the parties. This Court reiterates that where the ends of substantial justice would be
better served, the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed.

Dismissal from employment has two facets: first, the legality of the act of dismissal, which constitutes
substantive due process; and second, the legality of the manner of dismissal, which constitutes procedural
due process. The burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the disciplinary action was made
for a lawful cause or that the termination of employment was valid. In administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings, the quantum of evidence required is substantial evidence, or "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Thus, unsubstantiated suspicions,
accusations, and conclusions of the employer do not provide legal justification for dismissing the
employee.

As for the substantive aspect, respondents terminated Mariano's employment on the grounds of serious
misconduct. For serious misconduct to be a just cause for dismissal, the concurrence of the following
elements is required: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the
employee's duties, showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer;
and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent.

The general rule is that the one who pleads for payment has the burden of proving it. When the employee
alleges non-payment, the burden rests on the employer to prove payment rather than on the employee to
prove non-payment. The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records,
remittances, and other similar documents are not in the possession of the employee but are in the custody
and control of the employer. Here, respondents failed to disprove non-payment of wages for two round
trips by presenting cash vouchers or documentary proofs that Mariano did not report for work or drive his
assigned bus.

Thus, Mariano is entitled to his claim for unpaid wages in the amount of P6,800.00, equivalent to two
round trips. As regards the 13th month pay, an employee who has resigned or whose services were
terminated at any time before the payment of the 13th month pay is entitled to this monetary benefit in
proportion to the length of time he worked during the year, reckoned from the time he started working
during the calendar year up to the time of his resignation or termination from the service. Considering that
Mariano was terminated in June 2015 and there is no evidence that the amount was paid, we sustain the
proportionate 13th month pay awarded by the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, in the amount of P3,150.00.
Legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on the total monetary award from the finality of this
decision until full payment.
 [G.R. No. 229372, August 27, 2020]

MARYVILLE MANILA, INC., PETITIONER, VS. LLOYD C. ESPINOSA, RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: The obligation imposed by the mandatory reporting requirement under Section 20(B)(3) of
the 1996 POEA-SEC is not solely on the seafarer. It requires the employer to likewise act on the report,
and in this sense, it partakes of the nature of a reciprocal obligation.

FACTS: On September 12, 2010, Maryville Manila, Inc. (Maryville Manila), a local manning agency
acting for and on behalf of its principal, Maryville Maritime, Inc. (Maryville Maritime), deployed Lloyd
Espinosa (Lloyd) as a seafarer on board the vessel M/V Renuar. From December 11, 2010, to April 23,
2011, Somali pirates held the vessel and its entire crew hostage. Lloyd was repatriated on May 5, 2011.
On January 10, 2012, Maryville Manila re-hired Lloyd to work on board M/V Iron Manolis for a period
of nine months. However, Lloyd was repatriated after seven months, on August 29, 2012. Lloyd filed a
complaint for total and permanent disability benefits against Maryville Manila and Maryville Maritime
before the labor arbiter (LA). Lloyd alleged that he was repatriated after suffering flashbacks of the
hostage incident and experiencing a mental breakdown. Yet, Maryville Manila refused to provide him
with medical assistance upon his arrival in the Philippines. This work-related and work-aggravated
condition rendered him permanently incapacitated to work as a seafarer. On the other hand, Maryville
Manila and Maryville Maritime claimed that Lloyd voluntarily disembarked from the vessel without any
medical incident or accident. Moreover, Lloyd did not immediately report to the company-designated
physician after his repatriation. It was only in July 2013 that Lloyd visited Maryville Manila, asking for
another employment contract.

ISSUE: Is there a reasonable link between the seafarer's illnesses and the nature of work?

RULING: While the mandatory reporting requirement obliges the seafarer to be present for the post-
employment medical examination, which must be conducted within three (3) working days upon the
seafarer's return, it also poses the employer with the implied obligation to conduct a meaningful and
timely examination of the seafarer. Using the foregoing as a baseline, it could thus be concluded that,
first, as between the Petitioner and the Private Respondents' contrasting claims, the Petitioner's positive
assertion that he sought but was refused a medical examination is entitled to more weight than the Private
Respondents' bare denial, and second, the lack of a post-medical examination in this case cannot be used
to defeat the respondent's [Petitioner, in this case] claim since the failure to subject the seafarer to this
requirement was not due to the seafarer's fault but to the inadvertence or deliberate refusal of petitioners
[Private Respondents, in this case]. Needless to say, the time-honored rule that, in controversies between
a laborer and his employer, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence should be resolved in the
former's favor in consonance with the avowed policy of the state to give maximum aid and protection to
labor finds application at the bench.
 ABRENICA ET AL VS COA (SEPTEMBER 2021)

DOCTRINE: There is no dispute that our public health workers are entitled to hazard allowances under
Section 21 of RA No. 7305. The computation of the hazard allowance due should, in turn, be based on the
corresponding basic salary attached to the position of the employee concerned.

FACTS: Petitioners are employees of San Lazaro Hospital (SLH) with salary grades (SG) 20 to 26. From
January to June 2009, they received hazard allowances pegged at ₱4,989.75 per month. This rate was,
however, found to be not in accordance with Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7305, otherwise
known as "The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers," and Section 7.1.5.a, Rule XV of its revised
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), which prescribe hazard allowances to be proportional to the
employee's monthly salary. Thus, an aggregate amount of ₱1,094,188.98, representing those paid beyond
five percent (5%) of the health workers' basic salaries, was disallowed in Notice of Disallowance (ND)
No. 09-006-101MDS-(09) dated November 23, 2009. They argued that the hazard pay was given pursuant
to Department of Health (DOH) Administrative Order (AO) No. 2006-0011 dated May 16, 2006, which
fixed the payment of hazard pay to public health workers with SG 20 and above at ₱4,989.75. They
asserted an honest belief that they were entitled to the hazard benefits received because they occupy
positions and/or work in an area classified as high-risk.

ISSUE: Whether the amount of hazard pay given beyond the minimum rate prescribed by RA No. 7305
was validly disallowed.

RULING: The amounts of hazard pay that exceeded the minimum rate prescribed under Section 21 of
RA No. 7305 were properly disallowed. The COA Proper committed no grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the disallowance based on the governing law (RA No. 7305), the New Civil Code, and a
prevailing Court pronouncement. Absent any semblance of grave abuse of discretion, due deference to the
COA's constitutional mandate, as well as the limitations on the scope of inquiry in petitions under Rules
64 and 65 of the Rules of Court. Verily, without any valid implementing policy on the rate of the hazard
pay that conforms with the provisions of RA No. 7305 from the DOH and other concerned agencies, the
COA Proper cannot be faulted for applying the minimum rate prescribed under Section 21 of the law. The
resulting overpayments of hazard pay are computed by applying the minimum rate under RA No. 7305.
 BACABAC VS NYK FIL SHIPMANAGEMENT (JULY 2021)

DOCTRINE: It is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the
employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the
establishment or, at the very least, the aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had.

FACTS: This case involves a seafarer, Joemar Bacabac, who filed a complaint against his employer,
NYK-FIL Shipmanagement, Inc., and NYK Shipmanagement Pte. Ltd., for disability benefits and
sickness allowance. Joemar claimed that he contracted an illness during his employment, and it was work-
related. The company physician, however, declared that the illness was not work-related. The labor arbiter
initially awarded Joemar disability benefits and sickness allowance, but the decision was reversed by the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Joemar
appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s insistence that he is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits
and sickness allowance since he contracted his illness during the effectivity of his employment contract
and is presumed work-related is meritorious.

RULING: The petition is meritorious. In resolving claims for disability benefits, the court integrates the
POEA-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) with every agreement between a seafarer and his
employer. If the seafarer suffers from an illness or injury during the term of the contract, the illness is
disputably presumed to be work-related, unless it is listed as an occupational disease. The burden is on the
employer to prove that the illness is not work-related.
 BLUE MANILA INC. VS JAMIAS (JANUARY 2021)

DOCTRINE: Under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard

Employment Contract (SEC), a seafarer may claim disability benefits for an injury or illness that
manifests during the term of their contract. If the illness or injury falls under the first scenario, the
employer is liable for medical treatment and sickness allowance. The employer’s obligation to provide
medical attention extends to all existing illnesses complained of or diagnosed during the mandatory pre-
employment medical examination (PEME).

FACTS: This case involves a dispute between Blue Manila, Inc. and/or Ocean Wide Crew Manila, Inc.
(petitioners) and Antonio R. Jamias (respondent) regarding the compensability of Jamias’ back ailment.
Jamias worked as a cook for the petitioners and claimed that he developed a back ailment while
performing his duties on board the vessel. He was medically repatriated and underwent surgery for an
umbilical hernia, but his back pain persisted. The panel of voluntary arbitrators awarded disability
benefits to Jamias, but the Court of Appeals set aside the award and ordered a re-evaluation by a third
doctor. The petitioners argue that Jamias’ back ailment is not work-related and that the third doctor’s
evaluation is unnecessary. Jamias, on the other hand, maintains that his back ailment is compensable and
that he is entitled to disability benefits.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits

RULING: The court ruled that the evaluation made by the company-designated physician fell short of the
parameters laid down by law and jurisprudence. At any rate, as already discussed, the unceremonious
issuance of the fit-to-work certification to Jamias is a complete abdication of the company-designated
physician's statutory obligation to give a complete and definite medical assessment of the seafarer's
medical condition. The law now steps in and considers these lapses as equivalent to a declaration of
permanent and total disability in favor of the seafarer. The Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators is thus correct
in ruling that Jamias is rightfully entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.
 DOEHLE-PHILMAN MANNING VS GATCHALIAN (FEBRUARY 2021)

DOCTRINE: A seafarer’s entitlement to disability benefits is governed by medical findings as well as by

law and contract. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract
(POEA-SEC) provides the mechanism and procedure for claiming disability benefits. The company-
designated doctor’s assessment of the seafarer’s fitness to work or disability grading prevails, unless the
seafarer contests it and seeks a second opinion from a doctor of his choice. If there is a disagreement
between the findings of two doctors, the parties may jointly refer the matter to a third doctor, whose
decision is final and binding.

FACTS: This case involves a seafarer, Jose N. Gatchalian Jr., who filed a claim for disability benefits
and sickness allowance against his employer, Doehle-Philman Manning Agency, Inc., Doehle (IOM)
Limited, and Captain Manolo T. Gacutan. Jose had been working as a chief cook for Doehle-Philman
since 2002. In 2006, he experienced intense pain in his right knee and was diagnosed with a tear in his
medical meniscus. He underwent surgery and was declared fit to work by the company-designated doctor.
However, Jose filed a complaint for disability benefits based on a later diagnosis of traumatic arthritis.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed Jose’s complaint but awarded him financial assistance. The NLRC affirmed
the decision with modifications, deleting the financial assistance award. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
granted Jose’s claim for permanent total disability benefits and sickness allowance. The petitioners,
Doehle-Philman, Doehle (IOM) Limited, and Captain Gacutan, filed a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in reversing the NLRC's finding that Jose was properly declared fit to
work.

RULING: The petition is meritorious. The principle that this Court is not a trier of facts applies with
greater force in labor cases. The question of whether the seafarer was properly declared fit to work is one
of fact; hence, it is beyond the ambit of this Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari. Also,
we are aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review—not a review on appeal—of the NLRC decision
challenged before it. This means that our task is only to examine whether the CA correctly determined the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
 DORELCO EMPLOYEES UNION VS DON ORESTES ROMUALDEZ ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE (MARCH 2021)

DOCTRINE: Under Article 276 of the Labor Code, the award or decision of a voluntary arbitrator
becomes final and executory after 10 calendar days from notice. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides
that an appeal from the judgment or final orders of voluntary arbitrators must be made within 15 days
from notice. The court has clarified that the 10-day period in Article 276 is for filing a motion for
reconsideration, while the 15-day period in Rule 43 is for appealing to the CA.

FACTS: This case involves the timeliness of an appeal from a voluntary arbitrator’s decision. The
Dorelco Employees Union-ALU-TUCP (Union) and Don Orestes Romualdez Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(Company) submitted a dispute regarding salary adjustments for rank and file employees to arbitration.
Some employees retired and were required to sign quitclaims to receive their retirement benefits. The
voluntary arbitrator ruled in favor of the employees, ordering the company to pay salary increases. The
company paid the retired employees who did not sign quitclaims, but the union sought arbitration for the
retired employees who signed quitclaims. The voluntary arbitrator ruled against the retired employees
who signed quitclaims. The union appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) but was dismissed
for being filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period. The union argues that the proper period to appeal
should be 15 days from the denial of the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the petition was filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period.

RULING: The petition is meritorious. The 10-day period stated in Article 276 should be understood as
the period within which the party adversely affected by the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of
Arbitrators may file a motion for reconsideration. Only after the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration may the aggrieved party appeal to the CA by filing the petition for review under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court within 15 days from notice pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 43.
 DUSOL VS LAZO (JANUARY 2021)

DOCTRINE: The existence of an employer-employee relationship is determined by considering the

elements of selection and engagement, payment of wages, power of dismissal, and the employer’s power
to control the employee’s conduct. The sharing of profits does not establish a partnership if the amounts
received are in the nature of wages. Control over the employee’s conduct, not only as to the result of the
work but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it, is a crucial factor in determining an
employment relationship.

FACTS: This case involves a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of benefits, a claim for
damages, and attorney’s fees filed by Pedro and Maricel Dusol against Emmarck Lazo, the owner of
Ralco Beach. Pedro worked as the caretaker of the beach resort, while Maricel was employed to manage
the store. They claimed that they were employees of Emmarck and were illegally dismissed when he
decided to lease out the beach resort. The Labor Arbiter dismissed their complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
but the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of Pedro and Maricel, declaring
them as employees, and their dismissal as illegal. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
NLRC’s decision, ruling that Pedro and Maricel filed a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether Pedro and Maricel are employees of Emmarck.

RULING: We find merit in Pedro and Maricel's petition. It is undisputed that Pedro and Maricel rendered
their services at Ralco Beach and received compensation sourced from rentals and sales of the resort.
Emmarck had the power to control their conduct in the performance of their duties. The existence of
control is manifestly shown by Emmarck's express admission that he left the entire business operation of
the resort to Pedro and Maricel. While Pedro and Maricel are, to a large extent, allowed to carry out their
respective duties as caretaker and storekeeper on their own, this does not negate the existence of control.
It was Emmarck himself who gave Pedro and Maricel immense flexibility in the performance of their
duties. This, alone, clearly shows that Emmarck had control over the conduct of Pedro and Maricel in
performing their duties.
 VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS PHILS VS MARGIN (SEPTEMBER 2020)

DOCTRINE: In an illegal dismissal case, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the
dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. The employer must also observe procedural due process,
which includes giving the employee notice and an opportunity to be heard.

FACTS: This case involves a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages filed by respondent Laurence
C. Margin against petitioner Verizon Communications Philippines, Inc. Laurence alleged that he was
hired by Verizon as a network engineer and that he went on sick leave due to pulmonary tuberculosis. He
notified his supervisor of his illness but was later terminated by Verizon. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the
complaint, ruling that Laurence’s absence was unauthorized and constituted abandonment of work.
However, the NLRC reversed the decision and held that Laurence was illegally dismissed. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the NLRC’s ruling. Verizon filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether Laurence C. Margin was illegally dismissed.

RULING: The court ruled that in an illegal dismissal case, the employer has the burden of proving that
an employee's dismissal from service was for a just or authorized cause. Otherwise, the employer's failure
will result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. Verizon validly dismissed Laurence for excessive
absenteeism sanctioned under its company policies. Laurence's absence was unauthorized because of his
failure to notify his supervisor of the nature of his illness and the intended length of his leave of absence.
Conversely, the NLRC and the CA ruled that under Verizon's policies, an employee is not required to
submit proof of illness while he is on sick leave. It is sufficient that Laurence was able to notify his
supervisor that he was diagnosed with tuberculosis before his absence. Thus, the question of whether
Laurence was illegally dismissed is a question of fact, the determination of which entails an evaluation of
the evidence on record.
 Bicol Isarog Transport System, Inc., v. Relucio

DOCTRINE: In order to effect a valid dismissal on the ground of just cause, the employer must
substantially comply with the following standards of due process: (a) a first written notice—containing
the specific cause or grounds for termination under Article 297 of the Labor Code, and company policies,
if any; a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as the basis for the charge; and a
directive to submit a written explanation within a reasonable period; (b) after serving the first notice, the
employer should afford the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend themselves; and (c)
after determining that termination of employment is justified, the employer shall serve the employee a
written notice of termination indicating that all circumstances involving the charge against the employee
have been considered, and the grounds have been established to justify the severance of their
employment.

FACTS: Roy Radasa Relucio filed a complaint against Bicol Isarog Transport System, Inc., Jose Marco
Hernandez Del Pilar, and Geraldo D. Abano involving various labor-related issues such as illegal
dismissal, illegal suspension, underpayment of salaries/wages, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay,
13th-month pay, non-payment of overtime pay, night shift differential, illegal deductions (donation and
cash bond), and moral and exemplary damages. Relucio claimed that he began working as a bus driver for
Bicol Isarog on April 11, 2011. He asserted that on March 30, 2013, he was unlawfully dismissed when
Bicol Isarog's officers suspended him without valid reasons or due process. He also alleged that he did not
receive the benefits of ECOLA, PAG-1BIG, and Philhealth during his employment, and his salary was
below the mandated levels.

ISSUE: Whether or not Relucio was dismissed for just cause and in compliance with the requirements of
due process.

RULING: No. The burden of proving that the termination of an employee was for a just or authorized
cause lies with the employer. If the employer fails to meet this burden, the conclusion would be that the
dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. To discharge this burden, the employer must present
substantial evidence, which is the amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion and not based on mere surmises or conjectures.

In particular, insubordination, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee, necessitates the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful,
meaning characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; (2) the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which the employee had
been engaged to discharge.

Here, Relucio was given specific instructions by the OIC for Operations in Masbate not to proceed with
his trip to Manila on March 28, 2013, since he only had five passengers. The OIC reminded Relucio that
transferring passengers to another bus with more passengers is a policy to save operational costs.
However, he insisted on pursuing his trip. After that, Relucio was ordered to report to the Operations
Manager of Bicol Isarog upon arriving in Manila. But when Relucio reached Manila on March 29, 2013,
he failed to abide by the summons. Through a text message, Relucio was directed to go to the Human
Resource (HR) Department on April 1, 2013. Again, he did not heed the directive, prompting Bicol Isarog
to issue Memorandum Circular No. BITSI-PM-2013-145, which served as notice of Relucio's infraction
and order to submit his explanation. The order not to continue with the trip is reasonable, lawful, made
known to Relucio, and pertained to his duty as a bus driver of Bicol Isarog. Relucio did not deny nor offer
any explanation for his disobedience. Thus, there is just cause to terminate his employment.

However, in order to effect a valid dismissal on the ground of just cause, the employer must substantially
comply with the following standards of due process: (a) a first written notice—containing the specific
cause or grounds for termination under Article 297 of the Labor Code, and company policies, if any; a
detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as the basis for the charge; and a directive
to submit a written explanation within a reasonable period; (b) after serving the first notice, the employer
should afford the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend themselves; and (c) after
determining that termination of employment is justified, the employer shall serve the employee a written
notice of termination indicating that all circumstances involving the charge against the employee have
been considered, and the grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment.

Here, the memoranda issued by Bicol Isarog never reached Relucio. Although the first notice to explain
was served at the last known address of Relucio, consistent with the requirements of the implementing
rules and regulations of the Labor Code, Bicol Isarog's HR Manager, Roberto Cabilao, discovered that
Relucio was no longer residing at the given address. Yet, to feign compliance with the rules, Cabilao
returned to the same address to deliver the second memorandum/notice to explain. Notably, the notice of
termination was only given by Bicol Isarog to Relucio during the Single Entry Approach conference
before the DOLE-NCR. Clearly, there was no substantial compliance with the dictates of procedural due
process in the dismissal of Relucio.
 Fil Expat Placement Agency vs. Cudal Lee

DOCTRINE: The employee is considered to have been illegally terminated because he or she is forced to
relinquish the job due to the employer's unfair or unreasonable treatment. The test of constructive
dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up
his position under the circumstances.

FACTS: Maria Antoniette Cudal Lee (referred to as "Maria Antoniette") filed a complaint against Fil-
Expat Placement Agency, Inc. (Fil-Expat) and Thanaya Al-Yaqoot Medical Specialist (Thanaya Al-
Yaqoot) before a labor arbiter (LA). Fil-Expat initially hired Maria Antoniette as an orthodontist
specialist to work in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on behalf of Thanaya Al-Yaqoot. However, a dispute
arose regarding her employment, leading to her repatriation.

Maria Antoniette alleged that she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic that would declare only
half of her stipulated salary to the Saudi Arabian government for insurance purposes. She hesitated but
eventually signed the document with a different signature. Her employer then repeatedly pressured her to
execute a new employment contract, subjected her to harassment, gave her additional duties, threatened to
deduct her salary, and even made sexual advances. She also suffered a severe allergic reaction to latex
surgical gloves. As a result, she was repatriated in June 2016.

The labor arbiter initially found Fil-Expat and Thanaya Al-Yaqoot guilty of breach of contract and
constructive dismissal, ordering them to pay various amounts to Maria Antoniette. However, the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) later reversed these findings, stating that there was no contract
substitution or constructive dismissal. The NLRC argued that the purpose of requiring a new employment
contract was to comply with a foreign law requirement and did not intend to prejudice the worker. The
NLRC found no evidence that Maria Antoniette's continued employment was made impossible,
unreasonable, or unlikely, and there was no discrimination or mistreatment.

Maria Antoniette appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), and on May 27, 2019, the CA reinstated the
labor judge's decision. It found substantial evidence of the employer attempting to force Maria Antoniette
into signing a new contract and that she had been subjected to verbal and psychological abuse when she
refused. The CA stressed the need to penalize contract substitution attempts and found Maria Antoniette's
repatriation justified due to intolerable working conditions. Fil-Expat's request for reconsideration was
denied.

As a result, Fil-Expat sought recourse to the higher court.

ISSUE: Whether or not substantial evidence exists to establish constructive dismissal.

RULING: Yes. The law recognizes situations wherein the employee must leave his or her work to protect
one's rights from the coercive acts of the employer. The employee is considered to have been illegally
terminated because he or she is forced to relinquish the job due to the employer's unfair or unreasonable
treatment. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position
would have felt compelled to give up his position under the circumstances. In this case, we find that
Maria Antoniette was constructively dismissed. Despite the seeming benevolence of the foreign employer
in providing housing accommodation and other benefits to its medical employees, the evidence shows
that Maria Antoniette was singled out and verbally intimidated after she refused to sign the second
employment contract.

Fil-Expat tried to simply brush aside Maria Antoniette's complaint, saying that she was being overly
sensitive given that Arab people are known for their loud voices. This is absurd, if not downright
insulting. Surely, OFWs, especially the medical professionals working abroad, could discern a loud voice
from abusive language. As the CA succinctly held:

Further aggravating the foreign employer's intent to commit contract substitution, the petitioner was made
to suffer verbal and psychological abuse and threats from her employers on account of her refusal to sign
the new employment contract. As narrated in detail by the petitioner, she was threatened by her employer,
Dr. Mohammad Al-Qarni, that "she would see hell" if she informed the Philippine embassy about the
situation she was in. She was also threatened that her salary would be reduced as a penalty for her refusal
to sign the new contract. The petitioner was also constantly harassed and pressured into signing the new
employment contract, even in the middle of work. She was humiliated in front of her co-workers and her
employer's relatives and friends. Her foreign employer also showed no concern when she reported that
she was suffering from a severe allergic reaction to latex surgical gloves, causing her hands to swell and
have blisters. Such oppressive working conditions had even impelled the petitioner to seek assistance
from the Philippine Embassy and Consulate Officials in Saudi Arabia and the media regarding her
situation.

Taken together, these circumstances were sufficient indications of the foreign employer's bad faith,
hostility, and disdain toward Maria Antoniette. While there was no formal termination of her services,
Maria Antoniette's continued employment was rendered unlikely and unbearable, amounting to
constructive dismissal. She was left without any option except to quit her job.
 Home Credit Mutual Building and Loan Association v. Prudente

DOCTRINE: As a rule, "practice" or "custom" is not a source of a legally demandable or enforceable

right. In labor cases, however, benefits that were voluntarily given by the employer and ripened into
company practice are considered rights and are subject to the non-diminution rule. To be considered a
company practice, the employer must consistently and deliberately grant the benefit over a long period of
time. It requires an indubitable showing that the employer agreed to continue giving the benefit, knowing
fully well that the employee is not covered by any provision of law or agreement for its payment. The
burden to establish that the benefit has ripened into a company practice rests with the employee.

FACTS: In 1997, Rollette Prudente received her first service vehicle from the Home Credit Mutual
Building and Loan Association, eventually purchasing it at its depreciated value. In 2003 and 2008, she
acquired a second and third service vehicle through similar arrangements. However, in 2009, Home
Credit introduced a new cost-sharing scheme, requiring Rollette to pay more than P550,000.00 and
shoulder 40% of the acquisition price for the third vehicle.

Rollette filed a complaint against Home Credit, alleging a violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code on
non-diminution of benefits. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint, stating that the specific
details of the vehicle grant were subject to management prerogative. The National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) affirmed the LA's decision.

Unsatisfied, Rollette appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the labor tribunals' findings.
The CA held that the car plan had evolved into a company practice, and Home Credit couldn't withdraw
or reduce the benefit unilaterally. The court ruled that the new cost-sharing scheme diminished Rollette's
benefits, ordering Home Credit to provide the full car benefit without diminution and awarding damages.
Home Credit appealed, seeking reconsideration, but was denied. The case is now before the Supreme
Court for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not an employer violated the rule on non-diminution of benefits when it adopted a
cost-sharing scheme in its car plan for employees.

RULING: No. Generally, employees have a vested right over existing benefits that the employer
voluntarily granted them. These benefits cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued, or eliminated,
consistent with the constitutional mandate to protect workers' rights and promote their welfare. Apropos is
Article 100 of the Labor Code, viz.:

ART. 100. Prohibition against Elimination or Diminution of Benefits. - Nothing in this Book shall be
construed to eliminate or in any way diminish supplements or other employee benefits being enjoyed at
the time of the promulgation of this Code.

Clearly, the non-diminution rule applies only if the benefit is based on an express policy, a written
contract, or has ripened into a practice.15 In this case, Rollette's claim that the car plan was part of her
hiring package was unsubstantiated. Admittedly, Home Credit had no existing car plan at the time
Rollette was hired. Rollette's employment contract does not even contain any express provision on her
entitlement to a service vehicle at the total company cost.16 Therefore, it is incongruous for the CA to
conclude that the grant of a service vehicle was part of Rollette's hiring package.

Similarly, the car plan has not ripened into a company practice. As a rule, "practice" or "custom" is not a
source of a legally demandable or enforceable right. In labor cases, however, benefits that were
voluntarily given by the employer and ripened into a company practice are considered rights and are
subject to the non-diminution rule. To be considered a company practice, the benefit must be consistently
and deliberately granted by the employer over a long period of time. It requires an indubitable showing
that the employer agreed to continue giving the benefit, knowing fully well that the employee is not
covered by any provision of law or agreement for its payment. The burden to establish that the benefit has
ripened into a company practice rests with the employee.

Here, the labor tribunals correctly held that Home Credit's act of giving service vehicles to Rollette had
been a company practice - but not as to the non-participation aspect. There was no substantial evidence to
prove that the car plan at full company cost had ripened into a company practice. Notably, the only time
Rollette was given a service vehicle fully paid for by the company was for her first car. The company
already imposed a maximum limit of P660,000.00 for the second vehicle, but Rollette never questioned
this. She willingly paid for the equity in excess of said limit. Thus, the elements of consistency and
deliberateness are not present.

At this point, we emphasize that any employee benefit enjoyed cannot be reduced and discontinued.
Otherwise, the constitutional mandate to afford full protection to labor is offended. But, even as the law is
solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are
management prerogatives, like the adoption of a new car plan with a new cost-sharing scheme, including
a reduced maximum limit. The free will of managements to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its
purpose cannot be denied, especially in this case wherein Home Credit is willing to give one hand by
providing a service vehicle to Rollette, but she wanted to grab the entire arm.
 [G.R. No. 252720, August 22, 2022]

RICO PALIC CONJUSTA, PETITIONER, VS. PPI HOLDINGS, INC. (FORMERLY

PHILIPPINE PIZZA, INC.), JORGE L. ARANETA (OWNER), ATALIAN GLOBAL SERVICES
(FORMERLY CONSOLIDATED BUILDING MAINTENANCE, INC./CBMI), AND JUAN
MANOLO ORTAÑEZ (OWNER), RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE: Previous declarations about a company being an independent job contractor can't solely
determine its status in another case. Each case needs its own assessment to decide if the entity is a
genuine job contractor or a labor-only contractor.

FACTS: This case involves Rico Palic Conjusta, who initially worked as a messenger for PPI Holdings,
Inc. (PPI). His employment was later transferred to a manpower agency and eventually to Consolidated
Buildings Maintenance, Inc. (CBMI). Upon the termination of his services, Conjusta filed an illegal
dismissal case against PPI, CBMI, and their owners. The Labor Arbiter originally ruled in favor of
Conjusta, finding that he was unlawfully dismissed and ordering PPI to pay monetary compensation.
However, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) declared CBMI a labor-only contractor and
upheld Conjusta's regular employee status with PPI. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed
the NLRC's decision, recognizing CBMI as a legitimate job contractor. Despite this, the CA maintained
the finding of illegal dismissal and directed CBMI to reinstate Conjusta.

ISSUE: Whether the CA made an error in deciding that CBMI was a legitimate employment contractor
and, consequently, Conjusta's direct employer. Whether PPI and CBMI are entitled to responsibility for
the monetary awards.

RULING: The petition for certiorari is granted. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated October 30, 2019,
and Resolution dated March 6, 2020, in CA-G.R. SP No. 158667 are modified. Consolidated Building
Maintenance, Inc. is categorized as a labor-only contractor, and Rico Palic Conjusta's employer is PPI
Holdings, Inc. The National Labor Relations Commission's Decision of May 31, 2018, and Resolution
dated August 31, 2018, in NLRC LAC No. 01-000394-18 are reinstated.
 [G.R. No. 220657. March 16, 2022]

CELESTINO M. JUNIO, PETITIONER, VS. PACIFIC OCEAN MANNING, INC., MEGA

CHEMICAL TANKER, AND ERLINDA S. AZUCENA, RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE: According to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard

Employment Contract (SEC), a seafarer is eligible for disability benefits if the injury or illness is work-
related and occurred during the employment contract period. Additionally, the seafarer must undergo a
post-employment medical examination within three days as a mandatory reporting requirement. This case
pertains to the disability benefits of an employee who suffered injury and other medical conditions while
working on board.

FACTS: The petitioner, Celestino M. Junio, filed for disability benefits after working for 16 years at
Pacific Manning Inc. On January 24, 2011, he entered a nine-month employment contract as a fitter
onboard at MCT Monte Rosa. Before his deployment, he underwent a pre-employment medical
examination and was found eligible to work; thus, he went on board at MCT Monte Rosa. On June 15,
2011, while Celestino was overhauling the engine and fixing the hydraulic machine, the hose accidentally
detached and hit his left eye. He reported the incident to the chief engineer, but he was denied a medical
examination because the vessel was about to leave for the next port. On September 11, 2011, Celestino
collapsed while changing the fuel injector in the engine room; his supervisor issued an Accident/Incident
Report, and the captain referred him to an offshore physician, Dr. Daniel Jenkins III (Dr. Jenkins). On
September 15, 2011, he underwent an MRI of his brain, which was centered on his left eye. Dr. Jose F.
Sotomayor later revealed that he has various medical conditions. Dr. Jenkins indicated in the health
insurance that Celestino's illnesses aren’t work-related. On September 21, 2011, he was repatriated to
report to the office of Pacific Manning for two days upon arrival. Celestino requested medical debriefing
but was not referred by a company-designated physician. He later asked for this again, but was utterly
ignored by the Pacific Manager. This prompted him to file a case against Pacific Manning, Mega Tanker,
and Erlinda S. Azucene (Pacific Manning’s President/Manager) for disability benefits, sickness
allowance, attorney’s fees, and damages. Two months after the complaint, he went to Dr. May S. Donato-
Tan (Dr. Tan), who diagnosed him with trauma to the left eye and other various medical conditions. Dr.
Tan advised him to consult an ophthalmologist and a cardiologist, and Dr. Tan also concluded that
Celestino was unfit to work as a seaman. The Labor Arbiter initially dismissed Celestino's complaint due
to his failure to comply with the three-day mandatory reporting requirement. He later appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the decision and awarded him total permanent
disability benefits. Subsequently, respondents filed for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the NLRC’s ruling and reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Celestino is entitled to disability benefits. Even if he didn't comply with the
three-day mandatory reporting requirement, his medical condition is considered work-related.

RULING: The Court found that Celestino was medically repatriated due to a work-related injury and
complied with the mandatory reporting requirement within two days of repatriation. The decision dated
January 5, 2015, and the resolution dated August 26, 2015, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No.
130892 are reversed, and the decision dated March 27, 2013, of the National Relation Commission in
NLRC LAC No.OFW (M) 11-000007-13 is reinstated, granting Celestino USD 60,000.00 permanent
disability relief and USD 2,792.00 for sickness allowance plus 10 percent for attorney’s fees. This was
reinstated with the modification that Pacific Ocean Manning Inc., represented by its President/Manager
Erlinda S. Azucena and Mega Chemical tanker are ordered to pay interest of the monetary award of 6%
per annum until the finality of the resolution is fully paid.
LOUE B. MUTIA, PETITIONER, VS. C.F. SHARP CREW MGT., INC., NORWEGIAN CRUISE
LINES, M/V NORWEGIAN JADE, AND JUAN JOSE P. ROCHA, RESPONDENTS

DOCTRINE: Seafarers' concealment of pre-existing illnesses bars their claim for disability benefits.
Section 20 of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract
(POEA-SEC) applies if the seafarer suffers from a pre-existing condition or injury. Intentionally
concealing the injury or disease and concealing a pre-existing illness or injury must have a causal or
reasonable connection with the illness or injury suffered during the seafarer’s contract. In the absence of
the conditions mentioned above, employers remain liable for work-related injury or disease to their
workers.

FACTS: In September 2013, petitioner Luoe Mutia (Mutia) was hired as an assistant cook by the
respondents, C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. (C.F. Sharp), on behalf of its foreign principal,
respondent Norwegian Cruise Lines (NCL). Mutia's duty was to prepare meals for the passengers and
crews of the M/V Norwegian Jade. The employment contract was covered by a Collective Bargaining
Agreement, which granted an employee a maximum benefit of US$100,000.00 in case of disability
resulting in job loss. Before boarding, Mutia underwent a pre-employment medical examination (PEME),
which included an ear trouble and deafness test. Mutia marked "no" for ear trouble, but the test result
showed mild hearing loss, and he was still found fit to work.

On October 13, 2013, Mutia was transferring 50 kg of chicken meat when the trolley suddenly moved,
causing him to snap his back, feel weak, and fall to the floor. After the incident, he experienced lower
back pain, but his request for an examination was denied. On another occasion, Mutia accidentally
dropped one kilo of chicken into boiling corn soup, resulting in splashing toward his eyes and face,
causing him to fall face-down to the floor. He was brought to the Slovenian Clinic, and later to the
Croatian Hospital due to severe lower back pain. Mutia was repatriated to the Philippines on November 4,
2013, and referred to Shiphealth, Inc. for an initial evaluation. He underwent an MRI that showed L5-L6
desiccation with an annular rear and was referred to an orthopedic surgeon for physical therapy.

On November 14, 2013, Mutia was admitted to the hospital to examine his eye problem. He underwent an
MRI that showed "normal orbits with no intraorbital mass lesion and optic nerve thickening or abnormal
enhancements." He was later diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and blurred vision after a series of check-
ups from December 18, 2013, to March 2014. Despite therapy, he still complained of lower back pain,
and when his MRI results were not conveyed, respondents C.F. Sharp and NCL stopped paying for
Mutia's treatment. On April 14, Mutia filed a claim for disability benefits at the Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration (OWWA), which was later confirmed and certified on April 2, 2014. On July 9,
2014, Mutia complained about permanent total disability benefits, exemplary damages, benefits, and
attorney’s fees in the Labor Arbiter against his employers.

ISSUE: Whether there is material concealment of pre-existing illness as contemplated by the 2010
POEA-SEC and whether Section 20(E) of the POEA-SEC is applicable because Mutia failed to disclose
his prior ear illness (acute otitis media), an unrelated illness to his present claim for disability benefits, in
the PEME.
RULING: The 2010 POEA-SEC's Section 20(E) is only relevant if the seafarer's current medical
condition is connected to the concealed sickness or injury, according to the court's ruling in favor of
Mutia. The court determined that Section 20(E) did not apply to Mutia since his current medical concerns
were unconnected to his previous ear infection. The court stressed that there must be fraud involved in the
concealment and an intention to deceive and benefit from that deceit. In this instance, there is no
indication that Mutia intended to profit from the concealment because his current medical concerns and
previous ear infection are unconnected. Mutia is, therefore, eligible for payments for permanent, complete
disability. With a revision imposing lawful interest of 6% on the monetary awards until they were
completely paid, the court restored the Labor Arbiter's decision.
 [ G.R. No. 251150. March 16, 2022 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. REGINA WENDELINA

BEGINO Y ROGERO A.K.A "WENG FABULAR" A.K.A "REGINA BEGINO" AND DARWIN
AREVALO Y TOMAS (AT LARGE), ACCUSED, REGINA WENDELINA BEGINO Y ROGERO
A.K.A "WENG FABULAR" A.K.A "REGINA BEGINO" ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DOCTRINE: Illegal large-scale recruiting, as described by Republic Act No. 8042, occurs when the
perpetrator lacks the requisite authorization, engages in prohibited actions, and recruits three or more
people, causing significant damage to the victims.

FACTS: In September 2011, Milagros received a phone call informing her about overseas job interviews
conducted by Regina and Darwin. Milagros met them and paid various fees for employment in Canada,
including processing fees, terminal fees, and a surety bond. Milagros introduced her nieces, Maelene and
Geraldine, and her friend Gloria to Regina and Darwin, who also paid fees for promised employment
opportunities. However, none of them were able to leave for Canada, and they were not refunded their
money. Regina was arrested for illegal recruitment, and she was charged with large-scale illegal
recruitment and multiple counts of estafa.

ISSUE: Whether the elements of large-scale illegal recruitment were proven to justify Regina's
conviction.

RULING: The appeal has been rejected. The prosecution successfully proved that the accused conducted
recruitment activities without a proper license and victimized three or more individuals. The accused
accepted fees, promised employment, but failed to follow through. It was not disputed that the accused
lacked authority for recruitment activities. The testimonies of the complainants were considered
trustworthy and adequate evidence to establish the crime. As a result, the conviction for engaging in
extensive illegal recruitment is affirmed.
ABELARDO SALAZAR, PETITIONER, VS. ALBINA SIMBAJON, GEMMA MAGAHIS,
REBECCA OBOZA, MARILOU MARCELINO, FLORIAN EMPREMIADO, JOEBANE
ASOMBRADO, ARNOLD LIGOY LIGOY, RAUL GALONIA, LITO ESPEJON, MARINO
GAMALONG, MELODY CAGNAYO, WILMA TAN, ANALYN CAGNAYO, ANNALIZA
ALIWAG, AND TIRSO LIGOY LIGOY, RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE: The appeal bond in legal cases involving monetary awards is mandatory and jurisdictional.
This case includes allegations of unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries, non-
payment of wages, alleged harassment, and termination of employees upon forming a union. It also
involves Labor Case Article 233.

FACTS: A group of employees, including Albina Simbajon, filed a case against Q.S.O. Disco Pub and
Restaurant and/or Abelardo Salazar (Abelardo), Quirino Ortega (Quirino), and Lucia Bayang (Lucia). The
workers complained about unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries, and non-
payment of benefits. Before the complaint, they were hired by the disco pub and restaurant as lady
keepers, waitresses, receptionists, dispatchers, bus boys, DJs, entertainers, and cooks; they worked for
years in the said disco pub and restaurant. The management began harassing workers when they formed a
union on June 30, 2006. Lucia informed them about the last day of business due to bankruptcy; the
workers were not convinced by it. Seeing that the business is financially stable and they are just using it
as a reason to terminate the workers, the workers now filed a complaint. On the other hand, Abelardo
denied employment relationships with the workers; he argued that he was merely a lessor of where the
business operated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abelardo is liable between the employment relationship of the employees and the
appeal bond requirement in labor cases that existed with the complaint.

RULING: The Labor Arbiter held Abelardo, Lucia, and Quirino solidarity liable for Simbajon et al. for
illegal dismissal and money claims amounting to P3,683,394.45. Abelardo appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), which exonerated Abelardo from liability while the other respondents,
Quirino Ortega and Lucia Bayang, were granted joint liability to pay P890,398.22 as computed and 10%
in attorney fees. Upon unsuccessful reconsideration, Simbajon et al. elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals. When they were in a court of appeals, which granted an employee petition, Abelardo could have
perfected his appeal due to a discrepancy in the bond posted. Abelardo appealed, and the court evaluated
the case and rejected the employees' claim of the employment relationship, which has substantial
evidence to establish the fourfold test: (1) selection of the engagement of the employee to hire, (2)
payment of wages, (3) power to dismiss, and (4) power to control the employee. The petition is granted,
and the Court of Appeals decision dated December 29, 2011, in CA-C.R SP NO. 112399 is reversed.
 [ G.R. No. 227655. April 27, 2022 ]

SKANFIL MARITIME SERVICES, INC., AND/OR CROWN SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC.,

AND/OR JOSE MARIO C. BUNAG, PETITIONERS, VS. ALMARIO M. CENTENO,
RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: The Court addresses the petition through certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Skanfil Maritime Services, Inc. (Skanfil), Crown Shipmanagement, Inc., and Jose Mario C. Bunag
challenge the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued on July 27, 2016, and its Resolution dated
October 14, 2016, in CA-G.R. SP No. 144697.

FACTS: On September 26, 2013, Almario fell from a seven-step ladder while performing the job.
Almario lost consciousness and profusely bled at the back of the head. The crew administered first aid
and brought Almario to a hospital in Japan. There, Almario underwent an x-ray and a computed
tomography scan. Almario was diagnosed with a blunt head injury, a blunt back injury, a lacerated scalp
wound, and a brain concussion. On October 2, 2013, Almario was repatriated to the Philippines. In the
latter part, Dr. Magtira declared that Almario lost his pre-injury capacity and is permanently unfit to
resume sea duties. On July 14, 2014, Almario filed a complaint against Skanfil for permanent disability
benefits.

ISSUES: Whether or not Almario is entitled to permanent total disability benefits, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees; and whether the CBA provision awarding a higher amount of disability
benefits is applicable.

RULING: The petition is denied. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated July 27, 2016, and Resolution
dated October 14, 2016, in CA-G.R. SP No. 144697 are affirmed with modification. Almario was
medically repatriated on October 2, 2013, and submitted for a post-medical examination by the company-
designated physicians. Dr. Hao-Quan and Dr. Lim initially examined Almario and referred him to other
specialists to address specific concerns. Almario was referred to Dr. Sumpio (a neurosurgeon) and Dr.
Chuasuan (an orthopedic surgeon) because he sustained head and back injuries. The specialists treated
Almario, prescribed medications, and assisted in rehabilitation. Following the cases of Elburg and
Pastrana, the company-designated physicians must issue a final and valid medical assessment within 120
days reckoned from October 2, 2013, or the date when Almario was repatriated. The company-designated
physicians had until January 30, 2014, to issue the assessment unless there was a justifiable reason to
extend the period. Otherwise, Almario's disability must be deemed permanent and total.
 U R EMPLOYED INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND PAMELA T. MIGUEL,
PETITIONERS, VS. MIKE A. PINMILIW, MURPHY P. PACYA, SIMON M. BASTOG, AND
RYAN D. AYOCHOK, RESPONDENTS.
DOCTRINE: The case involves the interpretation and application of the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipino Act of 1995, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 10022. The law aims to improve the
standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas
Filipinos in distress. This includes the right to claim actual, moral, exemplary, and any form of damages
that occurred during the employer-employee relationship involving Filipino workers in overseas
deployment.

FACTS: Mike A. Pinmiliw, Murphy P. Pacya, Simon M. Bastog, and Ryan D. Ayochok, the respondents
in the case, were hired by UREIC as construction workers in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia, with a
contract duration of two years and a basic salary of RM800.00. Upon arrival, the respondents experienced
working beyond regular hours without pay and faced unsafe living and working conditions. Subsequently,
they discovered that they only had tourist visas, and their employers were hiding them from the
authorities. Although UREIC assured the respondents of repatriation on September 15, 2011, they were
only sent home sometime in November 2011, during which their food supply was cut off. The
respondents filed a complaint, alleging illegal dismissal and money claims against UREIC and Pamela
Miguel as the administrator.

ISSUE: Whether UREIC and Pamela Miguel are liable for the money claims and unlawful dismissal
raised by the respondents.

RULING: The court found substantial evidence supported by the factual record. Consequently, the
workers were entitled to receive reimbursement for their placement fees, back wages until the conclusion
of their employment contracts, damages, and attorney's fees. However, their claims regarding overtime
pay and illegal deductions were not substantiated and lacked merit. The petition for the case was denied,
and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 29, 2015, was affirmed with modification. The labor
arbiters were instructed to award the respondents back wages, a refund of placement fees and damages,
and a refund of the deduction from respondent Pinmiliw's salary. Additionally, the labor arbiters were to
award attorneys' fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award, which should accrue interest at a
rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality until the award is fully paid.
 URC v UNIVERSAL CORPORATION, ROBINA Versus ROBERTO DE GUZMAN
MAGLALANG,

G.R. No. 255864

DOCTRINE: This Court addresses Universal Robina Corporation's (URC) Petition for Review on
Certiorari, which challenges the Court of Appeals' decisions in CA-G.R. SP No. 155421, dated September
15, 2020, and February 8, 2021.

FACTS: Roberto, employed as a machine operator at Universal Robina Corporation (URC), asserted that
he was unfairly terminated following an incident where he unintentionally took a company-owned alcohol
bottle, resulting in charges of qualified theft. Despite reaching a compromise agreement with URC,
Roberto was not reinstated by the company. Initially, the Labor Arbiter dismissed his illegal dismissal
case but mandated URC to settle his financial claims. Although the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) upheld his termination, the Court of Appeals (CA) later declared it unlawful, emphasizing the
minimal value of the item and the absence of a position of trust. Consequently, the CA awarded Roberto
separation pay and backwages. URC contended the validity of the dismissal, citing serious misconduct,
while Roberto argued that the compromise agreement did not prohibit him from pursuing labor-related
claims.

ISSUE: Whether or not Roberto's dismissal from Universal Robina Corporation based on charges of
qualified theft constitutes valid termination, given the circumstances surrounding the incident, the
subsequent compromise agreement, and the contrasting decisions of the Labor Arbiter, National Labor
Relations Commission, and Court of Appeals.

RULING: The petition is partially granted. The Court upholds the Court of Appeals' Decision dated
September 15, 2020, and Resolution dated February 8, 2021, in CA-G.R. SP No. 155421 with a
modification: the removal of the awards for backwages and attorney's fees. The case is referred back to
the Labor Arbiter for the calculation of separation pay owed to Roberto De Guzman Maglalang, covering
the period from his employment on November 17, 1997, to the date of his unjust dismissal. The payment
is subject to legal interest at a rate of six (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until the full
settlement.
 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL) -versus- FREDERICK YANEZ,

G.R. No. 214662

DOCTRINE: In this case, Philippine Airlines Inc. (PAL) questions the validity of the Court of Appeals
(CA) decision that declared Frederick Yañez's suspension invalid. The CA ruled that PAL failed to follow
the specific procedures outlined in the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 (RA No. 7877) when
charging Yañez with sexual harassment. The court noted that PAL lacked rules and regulations for
investigating sexual harassment cases and failed to provide the relevant code of discipline in the
administrative charge. The court further emphasized that any policy or rule created by PAL must be in
consonance with the law and cannot stand on its own.

FACTS: On May 7, 2008, Yanez, who is a supervisor in the PAL Passenger Handling Division, received
a notice summarizing an alleged incident between him and a flight attendant named Nova Sarte. Sarte
claimed that Yanez had touched her inappropriately on multiple occasions, including inserting his hand in
her armpit, pressing her arm and breast, and barging into the lavatory while she was inside. Yanez denied
these charges and stated that he tapped Sarte's shoulder to get her attention, but she ignored him. Yanez
was then formally charged with violating PAL's Revised Code of Discipline on Sexual Harassment.
Despite being urged to apologize, Yanez refused and insisted he did nothing wrong.

An administrative hearing was scheduled, but Yanez requested a transfer of venue to Mactan, Cebu.
However, due to the location of committee members and participants, the hearing proceeded in Pasay
City. Yanez refused to testify and walked out of the conference in Mactan. After the investigation, Yanez
was found liable for violating PAL's Code of Discipline, and he was recommended a three-month
suspension. PAL adopted the recommendation, and Yanez filed a complaint against PAL for illegal
suspension.

The labor arbiter declared the suspension valid and reasonable, stating that Yanez had been given
opportunities to present his side but refused to testify during the hearings. The National Labor Relations
Commission affirmed the decision, stating that PAL had the right to impose disciplinary measures based
on its findings and the recommendation of the investigating committee. Yanez appealed to the Court of
Appeals, claiming that PAL failed to follow the proper procedure and denied his right to due process. The
Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC's findings, stating that PAL should have followed the procedure
outlined in the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995. The court noted that PAL did not have specific rules
and regulations for investigating sexual harassment cases and failed to provide the relevant code of
discipline in the administrative charge. The court also found that PAL's sexual harassment policy did not
sufficiently comply with the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not PAL followed the correct procedure and met the standards of RA No. 7877 in
accusing Yaez of sexual harassment and suspending him.

RULING: The Court of Appeals (CA) erred in reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) regarding the validity of Frederick Yañez's suspension. The CA's role is limited to
determining whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion. In this case, the NLRC did not
abuse its discretion in affirming the findings of the labor arbiter.

PAL followed due process in the proceedings against Yañez. He was informed of the charges against him
and given the opportunity to respond. Despite being given multiple chances to attend the hearings, Yañez
refused to participate. Due process was not violated, as Yañez had the opportunity to be heard but chose
not to exercise it.

PAL complied with the requirements of RA No. 7877 in investigating the sexual harassment complaint
against Yañez. The definition of sexual harassment under the law does not solely rely on the "demand,
request, or requirement of a sexual favor" but also considers actions that create a hostile or offensive
environment. PAL had a committee specifically created to investigate cases of sexual harassment, and the
committee followed the procedures set forth by the law.

Moreover, the imposition of a three-month suspension as a disciplinary measure is valid if done in good
faith and in compliance with applicable laws and rules. PAL established its compliance, and therefore, the
NLRC's decision to uphold Yañez's suspension is proper.

Thus, the Court grants the petition, reverses the CA's decision, and reinstates the NLRC's ruling. Yañez's
three-month suspension is legal, and his claims for salary during the suspension period and damages are
dismissed.
 NOEL MANRIQUE vs. DELTA EARTHMOVING INC.

(GR No. 229429)

DOCTRINE: In terminating managerial employees based on the loss of trust and confidence, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is not required.

FACTS: In January 2013, Noel was hired as an assistant vice president for Mining Service by Delta Earth
to oversee the company’s human resources department and perform other administrative functions. In
June, he was assigned to work as the Officer-in-Charge of Oceana Gold Philippines to assist in the
operations. However, in December, he claimed that he was instructed to pack his things and not report
back to work.

In January 2014, he confirmed the termination of his employment and refused to voluntarily resign
despite instructions to do so. Hence, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and reinstatement with full
back wages and benefits. The respondent company defended that Noel was validly dismissed due to poor
performance, resulting in a loss of trust and confidence. However, the Labor Arbiter found otherwise. His
ruling was reversed and set aside by the NLRC, which was eventually affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Noel insisted that there was no competent evidence to prove the alleged loss of trust and confidence, as he
was not even apprised of his superior's dissatisfaction with his performance.

ISSUE: Whether or not Noel was dismissed illegally on the grounds of loss of trust and confidence.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. To justify a valid dismissal based on
the loss of trust and confidence, two conditions must be satisfied: 1) the employee concerned must be
holding a position of trust and confidence, and 2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust
and confidence.

In this case, the first requisite is present, but the second requisite is considered questionable. This Court
ruled that there was bad faith on the part of Delta Earth in dismissing Noel. First, the date of evaluation
and the period covered are not indicated. Second, the one who conducted the evaluation is not competent
to conduct the same. Third, a copy of the evaluation was not given to the complainant.

If the allegations were true about his poor performance, the respondent company should have instead
submitted records of the complainant's delayed castings, billings, budget, and the resulting prejudice to
the company. Hence, no poor performance, gross negligence, and inefficiency rendered no basis for the
alleged loss of trust and confidence in the complainant.
 PHILIPPINE NAVY GOLF CLUB, ET AL vs. MERARDO C. ABAYA

(GR No. 229429)

DOCTRINE: The exclusionary clause applies only to areas that are being used or earmarked for public
or quasi-public purposes.

FACTS: The Philippine Navy developed a part of the village into a golf course, managed by the
Philippine Navy Golf Club. The DENR awarded the lots to former military officers, the respondents in
this case. Abaya, et al., filed an accion reinvindicatoria against the Philippine Navy and its Golf Club
before the RTC, claiming that land developed as a golf course is not included in the alienable and
disposable lots in the AFP Officer’s Village.

The RTC granted the complaint and ordered the petitioners to turnover the lots to Abaya, et al. The
decision of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the lots are being used for public or quasi-public purposes.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the NEGATIVE.

The lands in the Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation are inalienable and cannot be disposed of by
sale or other modes of transfer. Upon the Proclamation issued by former President Diosdado Macapagal,
declaring the same as AFP Officer’s Village to be disposed of, except in favor of the Government or any
of its branches or agencies, all lands disposed of under the issued proclamation shall not be subject to
alienation and encumbrance for a term of 10 years from the issuance of the title in the case of sale, or
execution of the contract in the case of lease, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of said period: but the improvements on the land may be mortgaged to
qualified persons, associations, or corporations.

Notably, the exclusionary clause applies only to areas that are being used or earmarked for public or
quasi-public purposes. Here, the golf course does not yet exist at the time when the proclamation was
issued in 1965. The golf course was developed only in 1976. As such, the empty land, on which the golf
course now stands, remains part of the alienable and disposable public land of the AFP Officers' Village.
The exclusionary clause cannot comprehend the golf course, which is nonexistent at the time the
proclamation was issued. There is no basis to identify whether the empty land is being used for public or
quasi-public purposes. Moreover, no subsequent law or proclamation earmarked the land for the
construction of the golf course. To be sure, the Philippine Navy and any of its officers are not vested with
the power to classify and re-classify lands of public domain. At most, the subsequent development of the
golf course was a unilateral decision on the part of the Philippine Navy, which is not ratified by any
proclamation from the President. The exclusionary clause cannot be used to shield the land on which the
golf course stands against the actual purpose for which it was allotted - the housing of the AFP officers
and veterans, who meritoriously served and protected our country. Corollarily, the Philippine Navy and
the Golf Club cannot deprive Abaya, et al., of the enjoyment of the lands awarded to them.
TRANS-GLOBAL MARITIME AGENCY AND/OR GOODWOOD SHIP MANAGEMENT,
AND/OR ROBERT ESTANIEL vs. MAGNO UTANES (GR No. 236498)

DOCTRINE: A seafarer who knowingly conceals a pre-existing illness or condition in the Pre-
Employment Medical Examination (PEME) shall be liable for misrepresentation and disqualified from
any compensation and benefits.

FACTS: Magno Utanes filed a complaint for disability benefits and medical expenses after experiencing
cardio pains and complications during his work as an Oiler on board. He was hired by the petitioner
agency on behalf of its foreign principal, Goodwood Ship Management, for a period of 9 months. Prior to
his employment, he was declared fit for sea duty during the medical examination and allowed to board the
vessel until he complained of back and chest pains, difficulty breathing, and easy fatigability. The
company doctors tested him and diagnosed him with coronary artery disease, rendering him permanently
and totally unfit to work as a seaman.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Utanes, awarding him total and permanent disability benefits. This
decision was affirmed by the NLRC and eventually, the Court of Appeals, as Utanes’s illness occurred
within the duration of his contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not Utanes is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits and his other
monetary claims because of the deliberate concealment of his coronary artery disease.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

Section 20, paragraph E of the POEA-SEC clearly provides that "[a] seafarer who knowingly conceals a
pre-existing illness or condition in the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) shall be liable for
misrepresentation and disqualified from any compensation and benefits, x x x." The rule seeks to penalize
seafarers who conceal information to pass the pre-employment medical examination.

Here, Utanes indicated in his medical examination that he was not suffering from any medical condition
likely to be aggravated by service at sea or may render him unfit for sea service. However, the company-
designated doctor revealed that he has a history of coronary artery disease for which he underwent
percutaneous coronary heart artery. This concealment disqualified him from disability benefits.

The Pre-Employment Medical Examination is nothing more than a summary examination of the seafarer's
physiological condition and is just enough for the employer to determine his fitness for the nature of the
work for which he is to be employed. Since it is not exploratory, its failure to reveal or uncover Utanes'
ailments cannot shield him from the consequences of his deliberate concealment. The "fit to work"
declaration in the PEME cannot be conclusive proof to show that he was free from any ailment prior to
his deployment.
 JULIAN TUPPIL ET AL vs. LBP SERVICE CORP. (GR No. 228407)

DOCTRINE: Contracts of employment for a fixed period terminate on their own at the end of such a
period.

FACTS: Julian and others filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against LBP Services before the Labor
Arbiter. They were deployed as janitors, messengers, and utility persons as the respondents entered into a
manpower services agreement with the Land Bank of the Philippines. However, as the contract expired
between the respondent and the bank, this resulted in the recall of the affected employees, including the
petitioner herein, who eventually resigned.

Tuppil et al alleged that they are regular employees performing services necessary and desirable to LBP
Service’s business, while the latter countered that the workers were supposed to be reassigned but they
opted to resign.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the petitioners are fixed-term contract
employees and there is no evidence that LBP Service terminated contracts. Mostly, notice of recall did not
amount to the termination of services. The decision was affirmed by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were illegally dismissed.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the NEGATIVE.

Article 280 of the Labor Code does not proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period,
provided the same is entered into by the parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure being
brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstance vitiating consent. It does not
necessarily follow that where the duties of the employee consist of activities usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties are forbidden from agreeing on a period of
time for the performance of such activities. There is thus nothing essentially contradictory between a
definite period of employment and the nature of the employee's duties.

The claims of Tuppil, et al. that they are regular employees are untenable. The fact that an employee is
engaged to perform activities that are necessary and desirable in the usual business of the employer does
not prohibit the fixing of employment for a definite period.

Verily, there was no illegal dismissal when Tuppil, et al. and Borja, et al.'s services were terminated after
the contract between LBP Service and Land Bank expired. There was even no need for a notice of
termination because they knew exactly when their contracts would end.

They were supposed to be reassigned or deployed to other clients, but they opted not to wait for such and
submitted their resignation letters. Therefore, no illegal dismissal occurred.
 VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs.

LAURENCE C. MARGIN (GR No. 216599)

DOCTRINE: The employer has the burden of proving that an employee's dismissal from service was for
a just or authorized cause.

FACTS: Margin was hired by Verizon as a network engineer, and sometime in January 2012, he noticed
a decline in his health, experiencing constant nausea, difficulty in breathing, colds, and coughs with spots
of blood. Upon examination, he was diagnosed with pneumonia.

He informed his manager, Joseph, about his condition, did not report for work to recuperate, and went to
Guimaras Island for quarantine. Later, he received a notice to explain, and upon calling his manager,
learned about the termination of his employment, prompting him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal
and damages.

Verizon stated in defense that although Laurence sent a text message notifying his supervisor of his
absence, he did not indicate the duration of his leave. Furthermore, Laurence was unresponsive to
communication efforts from his manager, who requested the submission of a medical certificate.
Laurence admitted his mistake for the unauthorized absence.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, but on appeal to the NLRC, the petition was granted,
reversing and setting aside the LA’s decision, citing Laurence's illegal dismissal due to the petitioner’s
failure to show just cause and failure to afford him an opportunity to be heard before dismissal. The
NLRC's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether Laurence was validly dismissed because of his deliberate violation of company rules on
unauthorized absences and excessive absenteeism.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in NEGATIVE.

Under Verizon’s rules, an authorized absence due to sickness requires the employee to send a notice to his
manager four hours before his shift, with a reasonable description of his illness, and to submit proof of
illness on his return date.

In this case, Laurence sent a text message to his manager, informing him of his absence due to a medical
condition requiring medication and quarantine, as it was a contagious disease. Joseph did not deny having
received such a text from Laurence. Thus, it is essentially correct that Laurence’s failure to submit proof
of his illness did not render his absence unauthorized, and Verizon failed to afford him the opportunity to
submit his medical certificate and other documents to prove his condition.

Therefore, the penalty of dismissal in Verizon’s policy on excessive absenteeism is too harsh. Employers
are bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of their employees, and dismissals must not be
arbitrary and capricious.
 POLITICAL LAW

MRM ASSET HOLDINGS 2, INC vs. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK

(GR No. 202761)

DOCTRINE: Courts generally decline jurisdiction or dismiss cases on the ground of mootness.

FACTS: During the pendency of corporate rehabilitation proceedings facilitated by Standard Chartered
Bank (SCB), the petitioner acquired an indirect equity interest in PI Two without the knowledge of the
respondent and Metrobank, the parties in the proceedings. The respondent filed a manifestation and
motion to prohibit the MRM from interfering in the affairs and management of PI Two, which was
eventually granted by the RTC of Makati City.

Disagreement arose between PI Two and SCB regarding the collateral given by Lehman Brothers
Holdings, Inc. (LBHI), as PI Two alleged that SCB concealed its possession of the collateral and the
status of its claim in the US bankruptcy case filed by LBHI in New York.

The Rehabilitation Court (RC) ordered the SBC to be removed from the Management Committee
(ManCom) due to a lack of trustworthiness and suspended payments to the SBC, as granted by the
MRM’s motion dated September 26, 2011. SCB appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA) and found
that the Rehabilitation Court erred in removing SCB’s representative in ManCom and surrendering the
collaterals to PI Two.

During the pendency of this case, the RC dissolved the ManCom because the creation of MC is no longer
available, and LBHI filed an adversary complaint and Claim Objections against SCB before the
bankruptcy court. Thus, the petition was dismissed for reasons of being moot and academic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for having become moot and academic.

RULING: The Supreme Court responded in the AFFIRMATIVE.

Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground of mootness. This is
because the judgment will not serve any purpose or have any practical legal effect since it cannot be
enforced.

The dissolution of the ManCom, the removal of SCB as a creditor in the Rehabilitation Plan, and the
eventual termination of the rehabilitation proceedings make the issues with regard to SCB’s
representation obviously moot.

Furthermore, the issue of the surrender of collaterals was mooted by the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals, which recognized the sale or transfer of the pledged collaterals to LCPI pursuant to the
Stipulation, Agreement, and Order, as there is no more collateral in SCB’s possession to surrender.

While the Court may pass upon issues, albeit supervening events that rendered the petition moot and
academic, it does so only when there is a grave abuse of the Constitution.
 JUAN NGALOB, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(GR No. 238882)

DOCTRINE: The basic rule is that the burden of proving the validity or legality of the grant of
allowance, benefits, or compensation lies with the government agency or entity granting them or the
employee claiming them.

FACTS: Two Notices of Disallowance (ND) were issued disallowing the ₱1.095 million incentive to
compensate the Regional Development Council-Cordillera Administrative Region (RDC-CAR) officials
and secretariats for their ―extra work‖ in implementing the RDC-CAR Work Program on Development
and Autonomy and the incentive amount of 1,080 M, both for lack of legal basis. As Ngalob appealed, he
explained that under the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2007, the fund was allocated for the RDC-
CAR to pursue social preparation of the CAR into an autonomous region, and this task was not among the
regular functions of the RDC but a special project or extra work. The COA-CAR ruled that such is not
considered social preparation nor additional tasks but one of the functions of the RDCs through Section
4(j) of EO No. 325. Further, the COA-CAR confirmed that there was no appropriation for incentives and
honoraria. The latter decision was affirmed by the COA proper.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COA is in error in ruling that social preparation is not an additional task under
the law.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the NEGATIVE. The general averment of ―pursuing social
preparation of the CAR into an autonomous region‖ does not suffice to prove that a project was
undertaken to warrant disbursements for the payment of honoraria. According to the Department of
Budget and Management's (DBM) Circular No. 2007-2, a special project is a duly authorized inter-office
or intra-office undertaking of a collective group of government officials and employees that is not one of
the regular functions of their respective agencies. The petitioners suggested a clear result that would help
socially prepare the CAR for regional autonomy. They did this by presenting the idea of a special project
and an honorarium, but they did not include any approved activities or tasks that would be done to reach
that goal. The RDC-CAR consistently disregarded its burden to prove the validity or legality of the
disallowed incentives by failing to present an approved special project plan. Thus, absent a specific
project and its supporting documents, it deserved to be an activity still within the regular function of the
RDC-CAR, not as a special project or extra work.
 SEFYAN MOHAMED vs. REPUBLIC

(GR No. 220674)

DOCTRINE: Naturalization laws are strictly construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant.

FACTS: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petitioner’s motion to take his oath as a
Filipino on the ground that the documents related to his admission that he went to the United States of
America (USA) in relation to his duties as the public relations officer of the Qatar embassy were not
identified, authenticated, or marked as evidence. Furthermore, the petitioner’s overseas trip prevented the
decision granting Philippine citizenship from becoming executory. However, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) ruled in favor of Mohamed, stating that his overseas travel during the intervening period was
involuntary and required by his professional calling. As this case was elevated before the Court of
Appeals (CA), the OSG argued that Mohamed had not yet filed his petition for naturalization, less than
one year after he submitted his supplemental declaration, and he failed to substantiate his qualifications
with competent evidence. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC for insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mohamed shall be granted Philippine citizenship.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the NEGATIVE. Courts must ensure that only those persons
fully qualified under the law are accorded the privilege of having Philippine citizenship. Corollarily,
naturalization laws are strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden
of proof rests on the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the law.
The absence of one jurisdictional requirement is fatal to the petition, as this necessarily results in the
dismissal or severance of the naturalization process. In this case, Mohamed failed to prove that he
possessed all qualifications for naturalization, as he did not endeavor to prove that Edna and Mary Joy, as
presented by Mohamed, are credible persons nor have a high degree of reputation in the community for
honesty and integrity. Nevertheless, the affidavits of Edna and Mary Joy contained general statements
without specifying the instances showing Mohamed would be a good citizen of the Philippines. There
were no factual bases and were mere recitals of Mohamed’s absence of disqualifications. Moreover, the
economic relationship between Mary Joy and Mohamed created doubt about her impartiality in her
testimony about Mohamed’s willingness to be a Filipino citizen. Mostly, Mohamed failed to substantiate
that he was not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable disease, and the two witnesses were
silent on this matter.
 NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION (TransCo) vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(GR No. 246173)

DOCTRINE: Officers who participated in the approval of disallowed allowances or benefits are
presumed to have acted in good faith in the performance of their duties.

FACTS: Several employees were separated from service as a result of granting the franchise to the
National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP). The dismissed employees were granted separation
pay through two Board Resolutions but were disallowed in the audit either because they were given to
contractual employees whose services are not considered and accredited as government service per their
service agreements or because they represented an excess in the separation pay given. The individual
recipients, including the approving and certifying officers, except for the TransCo Board of Directors,
were held liable to settle the disallowed amounts in the Notice of Disallowance (ND) issued. The COA
CGS Cluster 3 resolved the issue, ruling that only the members of the Board of Directors were ordered to
refund the amount of disallowed retirement benefits they received. The decision was affirmed by the
COA proper. In this petition, TransCo faults COA proper for holding the approving and certifying
officers liable for the return of the excess separation pay on the grounds of good faith.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COA Proper erred in imposing liability against officers.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. The general rule is that officers who
participated in the approval of disallowed allowances or benefits are presumed to have acted in good faith
in the performance of their duties. It is also recognized as a certain badge of good faith and diligence that
may be considered in absolving officers of liability. There was good faith that favored these officers and
excused them from solidary liability to settle the disallowed amount. The TransCo officials merely relied
on the TransCo board resolutions in approving and certifying the release of the separation pay. The
approving and certifying officers had the duty to implement the board resolutions. It was proven when
Aguilar was directed to implement it in accordance with his mandate, and, of course, there was no
controlling jurisprudence or ruling yet on the issue of applying the rounding-off method in 2009
disbursements.
 . ENGR. ALEX PAGUIO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(GR No. 223547)

DOCTRINE: Procedural rules should be treated with the utmost respect and due regard because they are
precisely designed to effectively facilitate the administration of justice.

FACTS: The Notice of Disallowance (ND) was issued, disallowing the disbursement referring to the
benefits, incentives, and compensations of the Pagsanjan Water District (PAGWAD) Board of Directors
through the issuance of five Board Resolutions, with an aggregate amount of P283,965.00 for the lack of
legal basis. It was found that benefits were not approved by the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA), making the petitioners liable to settle the disallowed transactions. The COA RO IV-A denied
their appeal, stating that Executive Order No. 7 expressly suspended the grant of the year-end financial
assistance and cash gift. In filing the motion for reconsideration, the COA Proper denied their motion for
being filed out of time.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COA Proper erred in dismissing their petition.

RULING: The Supreme Court responded in the NEGATIVE. The 2009 revised rules of procedure
prescribe a period of six months, or 180 days, to appeal an auditor’s decision to the regional director up to
the COA proper from the receipt of the ND. In this case, the petitioners admit that their appeal before the
COA proper was filed beyond this reglementary period. They received the documents on May 23, 2012,
and filed an appeal to the COA RO IV-A on November 14, 2012, or after 175 days. They received the
copy of the decision from COA RO IV-A on April 23, 2014, so they have 5 days or until April 28, 2014,
to file an appeal to the COA proper, but they filed the Petition for Review before the COA proper on
April 30, 2014, two days late from the prescribed period. In asking for the relaxation of procedural rules,
the Supreme Court denied it since the petitioners did not give any explanation as to why they failed to
comply with procedural rules upon filing the petition for review two days late.
 PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO - LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP LABAN) vs. COMELEC

(GR No. 225152)

DOCTRINE: The Court recognizes that the state is interested in ensuring that the electoral process is
clean and ultimately expressive of the true will of the electorate.

FACTS: PDP LABAN filed a Petition for Certiorari questioning COMELEC En Banc Resolution No.
10147, as the poll body exceeded the limits of its delegated rule-making authority and violated Section 14
of RA No. 7166, which mandates that the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) must be
filed within 30 days after the elections. Furthermore, they argued that the original deadline should be
retained to avoid perceptions of partiality.

Previously, COMELEC reminded election candidates and political parties to submit their SOCEs within
30 days of the May 9, 2016 national elections. Any submission filed beyond June 8, 2016, would not be
accepted. However, a resolution was issued, extending the filing deadline to June 30, 2016.

COMELEC insisted that the 30-day period to file SOCE is extensible, absent any prohibition from the
language of the law. The Office of the Solicitor General disagreed, asserting that the filing of SOCEs 30
days after the elections is mandatory and not ad infinitum.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC can validly extend the deadline for SOCE submission.

RULING: The Supreme Court held in NEGATIVE. The language of Section 14 of RA No. 7166 is
unambiguous, and the required SOCEs must be filed within 30 days after the elections – that is the basic
rule in statutory construction. This contradicts COMELEC’s interpretation that the commas separating the
phrase "within 30 days after the day of the election" from the rest of the first sentence of Section 14 of
RA 7166 do not make the period to file SOCE extendable within 30 days.

Notably, the stated phrase was preceded by the phrase "Every candidate and treasurer of the political
party shall" and followed by the phrase "File in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full,
true, and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election." The
word "shall" implies that the statute imposes a duty that may be enforced, particularly if the public favors
this meaning or where the public interest is involved. Thus, the word "shall" in the first sentence of
Section 14 of RA 7166 extends to the observance of mandatory filing within the 30-day period.
Therefore, COMELEC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed resolution.
 PNOC- EXPLORATION CORP. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(GR No. 244461)

DOCTRINE: The general policy is to give due deference to the COA’s constitutional prerogatives in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion, not only based on the doctrine of the separation of powers but also
on their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.

FACTS: The COA Auditor found that PNOC-EC failed to secure the Audit Commission's written
concurrence in the engagement of Baker Botts’ legal services, violating two existing COA Circulars.
Consequently, the Notice of Suspension (NS) was issued, effectively suspending the legal fees paid to the
international law firm and requiring PNOC-EC to settle the suspended amount by submitting its required
written concurrence, unless it would result in disallowance.

However, the written concurrence was not granted as it was not obtained before the engagement of the
private counsel. The COA proper affirmed the non-granting decision. PNOC-EC sought liberality in the
application of the rules on the engagement of private counsel, citing the urgency to secure proper
representation in international arbitration as justification for its admitted failure to obtain COA’s written
concurrence.

ISSUE: Whether the COA shall grant PNOC-EC’s application for written concurrence for liberality
reasons.

RULING: The Supreme Court stated in the NEGATIVE. There is no question about the legality of the
engagement with Baker Botts since the factual conditions were established. However, since the petition
attacked the procedural motives in issuing the Legal Retainer Review (LRR) of not granting the
application for written concurrence, as required, it deserves to be remanded back to the COA for the
determination of the propriety of exempting them from the written concurrence requirement.

Such determination entails the evaluation of purely factual and evidentiary matters not available on
record, which is beyond the scope and purview of this judicial review. Thus, it is not for the Court to
evaluate and determine because the Court is tasked with reviewing whether the COA’s actions are tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
 POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM)
vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(GR No. 244461)

DOCTRINE: Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

FACTS: PSALM continued to reimburse Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses (EME) to its
officers and employees with certifications, despite being advised by the COA Audit Team that there was
no allowance for using certification as an alternative supporting document for reimbursement claims.
After the EME was disbursed in 2008, a Notice of Suspension was issued on the grounds that it lacked the
documents required under the existing COA circular. The NS required them to submit receipts
corresponding to the 2008 EME disbursements. Unwilling to comply, the auditor issued the Notice of
Disallowance (ND), disallowing the disbursement of the 2008 EME and making the approving and
certifying officers, including individual payees, liable to settle the disallowed amount. The appeal before
the COA Corporate Government Sector (CGS) was denied and eventually became final executory as no
motion to reconsider or petition for certiorari was filed. The same fate befell the ND for the 2009 EMA
disbursements, for which the appeal was dismissed for lack of merit. The petitioners argued that COA
Circular's prohibition on disbursing funds with only certification as supporting documents is not
applicable because it derives its authority to disburse EME from the General Appropriations Act.

ISSUE: Whether or not COA Circular No. 2006-21 applies to PSALM.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the AFFIRMATIVE. COA Circular No. 2006-001 is issued
specifically to all GOCCs, GFIs, and their subsidiaries without distinctions, as can be inferred from the
express statement under its scope and coverage. Also, one of the paragraphs of the COA Circular
specifically mentions GOCCs that derive their authority to grant EME from the GAA to be covered by the
Audit Guidelines. Thus, the explicit language of the circular is clear and needs no interpretation.
Therefore, whether a GOCC derives the authority to disburse EME from its charter or from the GAA, the
rules laid down in COA Circular 2006-001 shall govern.
 FLORENTINA SOBREJUANITE-FLORES vs. PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS
COMMISSION (PRC)

(GR No. 251816)

DOCTRINE: The State has closely regulated the practice of all branches of medicine to protect the
health and safety of the public from the potential deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among
practitioners.

FACTS: The petitioner applied for registration as a psychologist without examination, citing Section 16
of RA No. 10029, the Philippine Psychology Act of 2009. However, the Board of Psychology (BOP)
informed her of insufficient work experience and failure to update her professional education. She
appealed to the PRC, claiming eligibility for exemption, but her appeal was denied due to a lack of
substantiation regarding her 10 years of work as a psychologist and the absence of professional education
updates. The Court of Appeals upheld this decision. She contested the validity of Section 16 of the law.

ISSUE: Whether Section 16 of RA 10029 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the AFFIRMATIVE. The Court found no constitutional
violation rendering the law void, as it enjoys the presumption of validity. Section 16 is not in conflict with
the equal protection clause, given the presence of elements or requisites in the law, particularly the
completion of at least 100 hours of updating workshops and training programs.

There is no dispute about the dissimilarities between those with a bachelor's degree and those pursuing
advanced studies in psychology. The policy's purpose is to regulate the practice of psychology and protect
the public from incompetent individuals providing psychological services.

The Court agreed that Florentino is not qualified for the exemption, lacking a doctoral or master’s degree
in psychology. Instead, she holds a bachelor's degree and may be exempted under Section 16(c) if she
accumulates a minimum of 10 years of work experience in practice. Section 16(c) emanates from the
valid exercise of police power, especially for those engaging in learned professions requiring scientific or
technical knowledge, subject to reasonable and fair admission requirements, as seen in the field of
medicine.
 ANTONIETA ABELLA, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(GR No. 238940)

DOCTRINE: The right to a speedy disposition of cases is not a magical invocation that can
automatically compel courts or any justice-administering agency to rule in one’s favor.

FACTS: The COA Regional Office XIII issued a Notice of Disallowance (ND) disallowing the
disbursement of Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses (EME) paid by the government of Butuan
City to certain officials. The City Government of Butuan continued to appropriate and grant EME to its
officials until 2010, resulting in the NDs issued by the COA. The COA Proper denied their appeal for
lack of merit. The petitioners argued that COA RO XIII took more than 1 year and 4 months during the
proceedings before they rendered the decision on the contested NDs and that the COA Proper took 3
years and 7 months to resolve the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were denied their right to the speedy disposition of the case.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the NEGATIVE. The right to a speedy disposition of the
case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured; or when, without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. There is a four-fold factor to determine if the defendant was not
afforded this right through the balancing tests, including 1) the length of delay, 2) the reason for delay, 3)
the defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of his right, and 4) the prejudice to the defendant resulting from
the delay. COA does not refute that it took a substantial period of time before the appeals were resolved,
as it covers 94 disallowances, which, together with the COA RO, sifted through and reviewed 94 sets of
records from 2004 to 2009. As a matter of course, they had to conduct a thorough audit of the transactions
and research the applicable laws and jurisprudence to judiciously determine the propriety of the EME
disbursements. Furthermore, throughout the proceedings, the petitioners failed to seasonably question the
violation of their right to a speedy disposition, even though their case was still in the COA Regional
Office and the COA Proper. They could have filed a manifestation or a motion for early resolution of
their case or invoked their right on appeal but failed to do so.
 MAMERTO AUSTRIA vs. AAA & BBB

(GR No. 205275)

DOCTRINE: Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14 and Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play.

FACTS: Memerto, a public school teacher, was convicted by the RTC of five counts of acts of
lasciviousness committed against the private complainants, both 11-year-old female students. As the trial
judge who handled these criminal cases was promoted, the new presiding judge acquitted all the counts
charged against the accused-appellant and acted on the Motion for Reconsideration filed after the issuance
of the Joint Order.

However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the ruling of the RTC, citing that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the constitutional requirement that a decision must express
clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based. The joint orders that acquitted Mamerto are
void, and double jeopardy will not attach.

At this point, Memerto invoked his right against double jeopardy, citing that the joint orders acquitting
him are already final and not subject to review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the new presiding judge acted in grave abuse of discretion on the joint orders
acquitting Memerto.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the AFFIRMATIVE. The private complainants sufficiently
established that the joint orders that acquitted Memerto were rendered with grave abuse of discretion that
is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic exercise of judgment bereft of any factual and legal
justification. This was in violation of Section 14 and Article VIII of the Constitution, and the parties to a
litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons
that led to the conclusions of the court. The Joint Orders are mere recitals of facts with a dispositive
portion, neither containing an analysis of the evidence nor a reference to any legal basis for the
conclusion. Thus, the Joint Orders, which simply copied the allegations of Memerto in his motions for
reconsideration and memoranda, are void for failure to meet the standard set forth in Section 14, Art. VIII
of the Constitution.
 AMPATUAN VS COA (DECEMBER 2021)

DOCTRINE: Liability for audit disallowances depends on the nature of the disallowance, the duties and
responsibilities of the officers involved, and their extent of participation in the disallowed transaction. The
mere position of the head of an agency does not automatically make an official personally liable for
disallowances. Liability requires a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of
the official.

FACTS: This case involves a petition for certiorari filed by Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, the former Regional
Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), against the Commission on Audit
(COA). The COA issued a Notice of Disallowance (ND) disallowing an aggregate amount of
₱79,162,435.00 in payments made to a certain supermarket (Superama) through cash advances taken by
Adham G. Patadon, the Chief Supply Division/Special Disbursing Officer of the ARMM. The
disbursement was found to be illegal and irregular due to various violations of COA circulars and
procurement laws. Petitioner Ampatuan was held liable for his alleged failure to monitor the activities of
Patadon and for failing to ensure that government resources were managed in accordance with the law.
Ampatuan filed several motions for reconsideration, but they were all denied by the COA. He then filed
this petition, seeking relief from the final and executory judgments.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is entitled to relief from a final and executory judgment.

RULING: The petition is meritorious. It has been held that a public officer who had direct participation
in the approval or certification of the disallowed transaction is liable, yet they were excluded from civil
liability in view of the absence of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence.
 ANCHETA ET AL VS COA (FEBRUARY 2021)

DOCTRINE: The case involves the interpretation and application of Republic Act No. 6758, also known
as the Salary Standardization Law. The law provides that all allowances, except for certain specified ones,
shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates. Additional compensation not integrated into the
salary rates may be authorized for incumbents as of July 1, 1989. The law also establishes the principle of
non-diminution of pay. The case also clarifies that local water districts (LWDs), including SWD, are
government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) subject to the provisions of RA No. 6758.

FACTS: This case involves a petition for certiorari filed by Irene G. Ancheta and other officers and
employees of the Subic Water District (SWD) against the Commission on Audit (COA). The petitioners
allege that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing certain benefits granted to SWD
officers and employees in 2010. The COA issued a decision and resolution affirming the disallowance of
the benefits. The petitioners argue that the benefits were authorized by letters from the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) and that they should not be held liable for the refund of the disallowed
amounts.

ISSUE: Whether the disallowance of the 2010 benefits is proper.

RULING: Yes, the disallowance was proper. As to the rice allowance, medical allowance, Christmas
groceries, year-end financial assistance, mid-year bonus, and year-end bonus granted to SWD officers and
employees by virtue of the authority given to the DBM under the first sentence of Section 12 of RA No.
6758, petitioners are, however, not incumbents as of July 1, 1989. We stress that the Court has
consistently construed the qualifying date to be July 1, 1989, or the effectivity date of RA No. 6758, in
determining whether an employee was an incumbent and actually receiving the non-integrated
remunerations to be continuously entitled to them. Accordingly, the DBM Letters, which authorized the
grant of these disallowed benefits as an established practice since December 31, 1999, were erroneous
and cannot be relied upon. Petitioners cannot, by their own interpretation, change the meaning and intent
of the law. The grant of the Christmas groceries, year-end financial assistance, mid-year bonus, and year-
end bonus to SWD's officers and employees, being based on mere advisories, is unauthorized and
appropriately disallowed regardless of incumbency. As for the Christmas groceries granted to the Board
of Directors: As earlier intimated, RA No. 6758 does not apply to the LWD board of directors. Therefore,
the additional compensation given to the SWD Board of Directors is governed under PD No. 198, as
amended by RA No. 9286. Section 13 of PD No. 198, as amended by RA No. 9286, allows the grant of
allowances and benefits to LWD directors, in addition to the per diems that they receive as compensation,
subject to the board's prescription and the approval of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA).
However, no board resolution or LWUA approval for the additional benefits of SWD directors was
alleged or proved in this case. Thus, the grant of such benefits to the Board of Directors was unauthorized
and properly disallowed.
 ARCENA VS COA (FEBRUARY 2021)

DOCTRINE: The court emphasized that procedural rules should be treated with the utmost respect and
due regard, as they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases and ensure the efficient
administration of justice. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege that must be exercised strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the law. The court also recognized the COA’s exclusive authority to
define the scope of its audit, establish auditing rules and regulations, and examine and settle all accounts
pertaining to government funds and properties.

FACTS: This case involves a petition for certiorari filed by Cresencio D. Arcena, the president of Berlyn
Construction and Development Corporation, against the Commission on Audit (COA). Arcena challenges
the decisions of the COA, which sustained the Notice of Disallowance (ND) issued against him and
Berlyn Construction. The ND was issued due to alleged irregularities in the implementation of
infrastructure projects for the Philippine Marine Corps. The COA dismissed Arcena’s petition for review
for being filed out of time. Arcena argues that the projects were already settled accounts and the COA’s
computation was incorrect.

ISSUE: Whether Arcena’s petition for review is filed out of time. Whether the projects settled accounts
and the COA’s computation are incorrect.

RULING: The court ruled that Arcena’s petition was indeed filed out of time and that the projects were
not settled accounts. The court also upheld the COA’s computation, stating that it was based on
substantial evidence and in accordance with COA standards. The court dismissed the petition for
certiorari.
 Brasales vs Borja (June 2021)

DOCTRINE: The court has exclusive power of discipline and supervision over all court personnel.
Violations of reasonable office rules and regulations are classified as a light offense punishable by
reprimand for the first offense, suspension of one to thirty days for the second offense, and dismissal from
service for the third offense.

FACTS: This case involves a complaint filed by Judge Marlo C. Brasales against Maxima Z. Borja, the
Clerk of Court IV of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Koronadal City, South Cotabato. The
complaint alleges that Borja approved the leave of absence applications of a court stenographer without
the authority to do so. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Borja be found
guilty of violating reasonable office rules and regulations and be suspended for 30 days with a stern
warning.

ISSUE: Whether Maxima Borja is guilty of a violation of reasonable office rules and regulations.

RULING: The court adopted the OCA’s finding of guilt but modified the recommended penalty,
imposing a reprimand instead.
 DBP VS COA (MARCH 2021)

DOCTRINE: The COA is the sole agency that examines, audits, and settles all accounts pertaining to the
entire bureaucracy, including private entities that receive public funds. The COA also faces a steady
influx of petitions for money claims and requests for relief from accountability.

FACTS: On February 6, 2012, the DBP received a copy of the COA decision but did not file any motion
for reconsideration or a petition to the Supreme Court. On March 27, 2012, Mario P. Pagaragan
(Pagaragan), the Vice President/Officer-In-Charge of DBP's Program Evaluation Department, submitted
confidential letters to the COA asking it to reconsider its decision dated February 1, 2012. The letters
explained that Section 261(g)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits the grant of a salary increase
within 45 days before a regular election. Therefore, President Arroyo's post facto approval of DBP's
compensation plan on April 22, 2010, is void because it was made within the 45-day period before the
May 10, 2010 elections. On April 13, 2015, the COA treated Pagaragan's letters as a motion for
reconsideration and exercised its power under Section 52 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445, or the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, to open and revise settled accounts. The COA found the
motion meritorious and reversed its decision.

ISSUE: Whether the COA is guilty of unjustified delay in acting on Pagaragan's letters and resolving
DBP's motion for reconsideration.

RULING: This recourse ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the COA. The DBP argues that the COA's
decision dated February 1, 2012, is already final and executory without a motion for reconsideration or
appeal filed within 30 days from notice, from February 6, 2012, until March 7, 2012. Also, Section 52 of
PD No. 1445 cannot justify opening DBP's account absent fraud, collusion, or error of calculation, or the
discovery of new and material evidence. At any rate, Pagaragan is a stranger to the case and has no legal
standing to move for reconsideration. The DBP also claims violations of its rights to due process and
speedy disposition of cases. The COA did not give DBP the opportunity to comment on Pagaragan's
letters. The DBP became aware of these letters only upon receipt of the COA Decision dated April 13,
2015. Further, it took the COA four years to resolve DBP's motion for reconsideration. Lastly, former
President Arroyo's approval of the DBP's compensation plan on April 22, 2010, merely confirmed the
salary increases given to its senior officers and did not constitute a grant of new privileges.
 AES Watch et el vs COMELEC

DOCTRINE: Judicial review may be exercised only when the person challenging the act has the
requisite legal standing, which refers to a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have
sustained or will sustain direct injury due to its enforcement.

FACTS: AES-WATCH, et al., filed a petition for mandamus seeking the COMELEC to faithfully
implement the directive in the Bagumbayan case. They claimed that the COMELEC had not adopted
measures for the VVPAT's "auditability" and proposed a "camerambola" solution. Additionally, AES-
WATCH, et al. asked to declare the prohibition on poll watchers taking photographs of the proceedings
during the elections as unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not AES-WATCH, et al. lack legal standing to file the petition for lack of material
interest.

RULING: AES-WATCH, et al. and Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. have legal standing, but not
United Filipino Consumers & Commuters, Froilan Dollente, and Teofilo Parilla. Judicial review may be
exercised only when the person challenging the act has the requisite legal standing, referring to a personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
its enforcement. The party's interest must also be material, distinguished from a mere interest in the
question involved or a mere incidental interest. It must be personal and not based on a desire to vindicate
the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.
In this case, AES-WATCH, et al. assail the constitutionality of the prohibition on poll watchers from
taking photographs of the proceedings during the elections, as well as the COMELEC's compliance with
the Bagumbayan ruling. However, they did not allege any material injury or claim that they are poll
watchers, registered voters, candidates, members of a political party, or members of an accredited citizens
group in the 2019 National Elections. Nevertheless, we deem it proper to relax the requirement of legal
standing, given AES-WATCH, et al.'s allegation that they are filing the petition as citizens.

On the other hand, United Filipino Consumers & Commuters, Froilan Dollente, and Teofilo Parilla failed
to establish that they have the requisite personal and substantial interest. They did not sustain any direct
injury or are in danger of suffering any damages from the assailed COMELEC actions. They were silent
on what capacity they are seeking for intervention. They claimed that the issues are of "transcendental
importance" but failed to allege any interest in the outcome of the case.
 [G.R. No. 207853, March 20, 2022]

CLARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, AND GOVERNANCE

COMMISSION FOR GOCCS (GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS), PETITIONER-INTERVENOR, VS. ASSOCIATION OF CDC
SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL UNION, RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: Renegotiation of government employment terms and conditions requires the President's
approval and compliance with relevant laws. Contracts violating the law are null and void.

FACTS: The government-owned corporation, Clark Development Corporation (CDC), entered into a
revised collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with its supervisory employees union, granting them
additional benefits. The Governance Commission for Government-Owned and-Controlled Corporations
(GCG) determined that the CBA violated the moratorium on salary and benefit increments in
government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs) without the President's specific authorization.
The employees' union, ACSP, filed a complaint against the CDC's failure to implement the CBA. The
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator (AVA) ruled in favor of ACSP, presuming the President's approval of
the CBA's economic provisions. The CDC appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which upheld the
AVA's decision. The CDC then elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the renegotiated terms and conditions of government employment in the CBA, which
were not approved by the President and violated relevant laws, are valid and enforceable.

RULING: The Court ruled in favor of the CDC. The revised economic provisions in the CBA were
declared void due to their violation of the moratorium on salary and benefit increases in GOCCs, as
stipulated in Executive Order No. 7, Series of 2010. The Court emphasized that government employees'
right to self-organization and collective bargaining is subject to limitations, and only non-law-fixed terms
and conditions can be negotiated. Additionally, the Court established that the President's approval of
additional benefits cannot be presumed, and any assumption of such approval is unfounded. As a result,
the economic terms of the CBA were deemed invalid and unenforceable.
 [G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022 ]

ANGELO CASTRO DE ALBAN, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(COMELEC), COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT, AND COMELEC EDUCATION AND
INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, RESPONDENTS.
DOCTRINE: The focus of this Petition for Certiorari is the constitutionality of the Commission on
Elections' (Comelec) authority to motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) of a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and the
proper interpretation of its provision pertaining to the candidate's bona fide intention to run for public
office.

FACTS: Angelo Castro De Alban, an independent candidate for the May 13, 2019, senatorial elections,
faced a petition from the Comelec Law Department to declare him a nuisance candidate. The petition
claimed he lacked genuine intent for public office, couldn't financially support a nationwide campaign,
and had no clear proof of financial capacity. De Alban argued he had sincere intentions, supported by his
government platforms and campaign efforts. Despite his defense, on December 6, 2018, the Comelec First
Division declared him a nuisance candidate, emphasizing his failure to establish financial capacity. De
Alban's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file a Petition for Certiorari, asserting
grave abuse of discretion by the Comelec. He argued that the relevant legal provisions did not apply to
senatorial candidates, and he questioned the constitutionality of certain clauses. The Office of the
Solicitor General defended the Comelec's decision, asserting the applicability of the law and the
constitutionality of Section 69 of the Omnibus Elections Code (OEC), citing De Alban's lack of financial
capacity as the reason for his nuisance candidate status.

ISSUE: Whether the Comelec possesses the constitutional power to reject or invalidate the Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) of a candidate deemed a nuisance under Section 69 of the Omnibus Elections Code, and
if there exists a contradiction between Section 69 and Republic Act No. 6646.

RULING: The court's ruling in this case states that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has the
constitutional power to reject or invalidate the certificate of candidacy (CoC) of a candidate considered a
nuisance under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). However, the court found that the
COMELEC acted unlawfully in canceling Angelo Castro De Alban's CoC. The court emphasized that the
denial or cancellation of a candidate's CoC involves quasi-judicial functions and must follow procedural
due process. The court criticized the COMELEC for lacking substantial evidence and making flawed
inferences in declaring De Alban a nuisance candidate. While affirming the constitutionality of the
COMELEC's authority under Section 69, the court overturned the resolution that declared De Alban a
nuisance candidate due to an incorrect interpretation of the law and insufficient evidence.
 ARMANDO G. ESTRELLA & LYDA CHUA vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(GR No. 252079)

DOCTRINE: Competitive public bidding aims to protect the public interest by providing them with the
best possible advantages and preventing suspicions of favoritism and anomalies.

FACTS: The Commission on Audit issued a Notice of Disallowance, disallowing payments for the four
contractors contracted by the DPWH for an 8-phased flood control project with modifications amounting
to an aggregate of ₱36 million due to irregularities, including the splitting of SARO and contracts for
project implementation. Armando Estrella was held liable to settle the disallowance.

However, the COA NGS ruled that there was no illegal splitting of contracts because the modification
into 8 phases was justified by the urgency of completion. Nonetheless, Estrella’s liability was upheld due
to irregularities and non-compliance in the procurement process, specifically no public bidding, and
improper post-qualification procedures. This decision was affirmed by the COA proper.

The petitioners argued that there was no loss on the part of the government since the contractors had
completed the project and fully rectified the defects found.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COA Proper erred in upholding liability against Estrella.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.

Records show that the original project was modified into eight separate contracts. The modification
requested on December 22, 2009, was approved on December 28, 2009.

The approval cited by COA did not comply with the pre-procurement requirements, and public bidding
was not conducted considering the substantial changes to the specifications of the project (completion
time and budget allotted) made to the said project.

The BAC officers, including Estrella, were tasked with conducting post-qualification evaluations of the
winning bidders but appeared to fail in evaluating their eligibility during the specified period.

Citing the reasons why the Notice of Disallowance was issued, the two winning bidders failed to comply
with the requirements set by the IRR of RA 9184 regarding the experience of the contractor on a similar
project previously conducted or completed. Estrella recommended the award without conducting the post-
qualification evaluation.
 [G.R. No. 254830. June 27, 2022]

ENGR. JOSE S. DELA CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. FIRST BUKIDNON ELECTRIC

COOPERATIVE, INC. (FIBECO), RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of the National Electrification Administration (NEA) over administrative
matters involving electric cooperative general managers.

FACTS: Jose S. Dela Cruz began his career with First Bukidnon Electric Cooperative, Inc. (FIBECO) as
a line employee and eventually worked his way up to the general manager. Following an administrative
complaint filed in 2007, Dela Cruz was found guilty and terminated by the FIBECO Board of Directors, a
judgment later upheld by the NEA. Despite cases involving improper dismissals, the Court upheld the
NEA's jurisdiction. Dela Cruz then sought benefits in accordance with FIBECO Board Resolution No. 05-
2014 and NEA Memorandum No. 2005-015. FIBECO argued against it, citing NEA authority and Dela
Cruz's dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dela Cruz is entitled to retirement benefits.

RULING: The Petition for Review on Certiorari is rejected. The Court of Appeals-Cagayan de Oro City
decision and resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 08417-MIN, dated July 29, 2019, and September 14, 2020,
respectively, are upheld, except for the removal of the retirement benefits award.
 [ G.R. Nos. 235965-66. February 15, 2022 ]

RENE C. FIGUEROA, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION,

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR AND PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,
RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE: An accused has no duty to bring himself to trial, and if excessive and vexatious delays fall
short of the constitutional guarantee of a prompt resolution of cases, he must be spared the ordeal and
expense of a full-fledged trial.

FACTS: On June 21, 2011, the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) filed a
corruption complaint against Rene Figueroa and other officers. The Ombudsman recommended charging
them with violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019. Despite seeking reconsideration,
Rene and his co-accused faced denial. Subsequently, the Ombudsman brought the charges before the
Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Special Prosecutor proposed amendments to include the middle names
of the accused and correct Rene's designation. The Sandiganbayan accepted the amended charges,
considering them formal changes without altering the nature of the offense. In response, Rene tried to
dismiss the charges, claiming there was an unreasonable delay in the case handling. However, the
Sandiganbayan rejected the motion, stating that the delay was reasonable and part of the normal justice
process. The court found no violation of Rene's right to a speedy disposition of cases and no intentional
delay by the prosecution. This prompted Rene to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition. On the other
hand, the People of the Philippines argued that the Sandiganbayan did not violate Rene's right to a speedy
disposition of cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not the delay in the initial investigation violated Rene Figueroa's constitutional right
to a rapid elimination of cases.

RULING: The petition is granted. The court clarifies that the right to speedy disposition of cases is
different from the right to a speedy trial and can be invoked before any tribunal. Factors considered
include the length of delay, the reason for the delay, assertion of the right, and prejudice caused. In this
case, the Ombudsman exceeded the time for preliminary investigation, failed to justify the delay, and the
accused did not waive their right. The Sandiganbayan's resolution is set aside, and the criminal cases are
dismissed for violating the accused's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases.
 [ G.R. No. 252411. February 15, 2022 ]

METRO LAUNDRY SERVICES, REPRESENTED BY ROWELA T. TINDOG, HEIR OF

PROPRIETOR, MS. ELIZABETH T. TINDOG, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION
PROPER, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AND THE CITY OF MANILA, RESPONDENTS

DOCTRINE: This case involves a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64 and Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The petition challenges the Commission on Audit (COA) Proper Decision No. 2020-043,
dated January 10, 2020.

FACTS: After the initial contract between Metro Laundry and Ospital ng Maynila Medical Center
(OMMC) ended, OMMC continued to use Metro Laundry's services without a written contract for a
longer duration. OMMC provided certifications and justifications confirming the actual services provided
by Metro Laundry. The City of Manila recognized its responsibility and included Metro Laundry's claim
in its budget but failed to release the funds.

ISSUE: Whether the COA Proper gravely abused its discretion in denying Metro Laundry's money claim
due to the irregularities that attended the extension of its contract of service with OMMC.

RULING: The court finds merit in the petition, emphasizing that the non-filing of a motion for
reconsideration (MR) does not justify dismissal. Despite the procurement law violations in the extended
contract between Metro Laundry and OMMC, the court affirms that payment for services rendered on
behalf of the government cannot be avoided, even if the contract is irregular or void. The court references
previous cases to support the principle of quantum meruit, allowing compensation for completed services
despite contract irregularities. The COA is tasked with determining the fair value of Metro Laundry's
services from April 1, 2011, to December 31, 2011, and the City of Manila is instructed to compensate
Metro Laundry based on this evaluation. This decision does not preclude any legal action against Ospital
ng Maynila Medical Center officials for potential violations of the law.
 [ G.R. No. 253724. February 15, 2022 ]

PELAGIO T. RICALDE, OLIVER B. BUTALID, EFREN V. LEAÑO, BOBBY G. FONDEVILLA,

AND ESTELLA F. JIMENEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
COMMISSIONER MICHAEL G. AGUINALDO, COMMISSIONER JOSE A. FABIA,
COMMISSIONER ROLAND C. PONDOC, DIRECTOR MA. CORAZON S. GOMEZ,
SUPERVISING AUDITOR MANUEL A. BAES, AND AUDIT TEAM LEADER LIBRADA R.
SANTELICES, RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE: Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court, in conjunction with Rule 65, seeks judicial review
of the Commission on Audit (COA) Proper Decision No. 2020-263 [2], which upheld with modification
the COA National Government Sector (NGS) audit.

FACTS: The Bureau of Investments (BOI) engaged the services of attorneys, namely Atty. Dennis
Gascon, Atty. Francesca Custodio-Manzano, and Atty. Madonna Clarino, through service agreements.
These agreements pertained to providing legal guidance and assistance to the BOI on various matters.
However, after a post-audit, the Commission on Audit (COA) issued Notices of Disallowances, stating
that the salaries paid to the attorneys were not allowed because the necessary approvals were not
obtained. The COA upheld these disallowances, and the decision became final. Butalid, Ricalde, and
Leaño contested the decision and appealed to the COA Proper, arguing that the attorneys were hired as
technical assistants and not as legal advisers. The COA Proper denied their appeal but exempted the
attorneys from liability. The petitioners then filed a petition challenging the application of COA Circular
No. 86-255 and asserting that the hiring of the attorneys was justified due to the BOI's need for additional
technical staff. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) advocated for the dismissal of the petition,
citing procedural concerns and regulatory violations. Subsequently, Butalid and Ricalde joined the
petition.

ISSUE: Stripped of the non-essentials, the Court reckons that the only issue for resolution is whether the
COA Proper correctly sustained the disallowance of the payments to Atty. Gascon, Atty. Manzano, and
Atty. Clarino, including the BOI officers' liability thereon.

RULING: The court partially grants the petition. It affirms the disallowance of payments due to the
failure to comply with COA Circular No. 86-255. However, the court clarifies that the approving and
certifying officers do not need to refund the disallowed amount. The COA Proper has already determined
that the payees can keep the payments they received for their services. The court emphasizes that the
approving and certifying officers are jointly liable, and their liability can be reduced based on the
principle of quantum meruit. The court acknowledges exceptions to the requirement of filing a Motion for
Reconsideration and the finality of judgments, taking into account matters of substantial justice.
 NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI) vs. CONRADO M. NAJERA

(GR No. 237522)

DOCTRINE: The burden to establish charges rests upon the complainant.

FACTS: NBI agent Najera posed as a customer in a disco and amusement center to verify a complaint for
human trafficking. As he provided two lady entertainers who offered sexual pleasure for a fee, he
announced a raid and apprehended 27 employees. Francis Quilala, one of the apprehended employees,
filed an administrative complaint against the raiding team before the NBI, mainly contesting that Conrado
ransacked the premises, instructed other agents to confiscate cigarettes, mobile phones, and money from
the cash register, and attempted to extort half a million pesos in exchange for the employee’s freedom.
The NBI found that the raid was unauthorized, and the agents failed to coordinate the operation with the
Anti-Human Trafficking Division and the Violence Against Women and Children Division. The NBI
charged the raiding team with grave misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Anti-Graft and
Corruption Court found Conrado guilty of Grave Misconduct, but the Court of Appeals (CA) partly
reversed it to simple misconduct as the allegations for robbery and extortion were unsubstantiated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Conrado is guilty of grave misconduct.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the NEGATIVE. There is no substantial evidence to hold
Conrado liable for grave misconduct. There is no evidence to establish extortion because the NBI failed to
present competent evidence and merely relied on Francis’ unsubstantiated narrations, which became
insufficient to sustain the administrative charge. Hence, it is always demanded of the complainant to
present a panoply of evidence in support of the allegation. The NBI did not submit substantial evidence
that Conrado performed the raid without authority from his superior, as Chief Peneza, a key person in this
case, decided not to become involved in the investigation due to unexplained reasons. Worse, the NBI did
not exert any effort to obtain any certification or affidavit from Chief Peneze, constituting the failure of
the NBI to present a material witness. Conrado is not completely absolved from any administrative
liability since he did not bother to inform the Anti-Human Trafficking Division about the raid that
infringed the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2003.
 SOCIAL HOUSING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. vs.
SOCIAL HOUSING FINANCE ASSOCIATION
(GR No. 237729)

DOCTRINE: A law must authorize the benefit before it may be granted to government officials or
employees.

FACTS: The parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement, but later, the parties renegotiated the
economic provisions and adjusted several benefits of the said agreement until the Governance
Commission informed the Social Housing Finance that they had no authority to negotiate new increases
and benefits. In effect, the Finance Association revoked the said new benefits and increases effective
immediately, including granting the annual SONA amounting to P50,000 per employee that ripened into a
regular benefit.

The Employees Association requested reconsideration, but the Finance Association denied the same until
they entered into another CBA. The Employees Association submitted the controversy before the Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators (PVA) until the latter ruled in favor of the Employees Association to comply with
the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the PVA, citing the non-jurisdiction of the body over the
case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CBA is effective and not contrary to law.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

The SOHEAI and SHFC may establish in their CBAs such terms and conditions that are not contrary to
law. Notably, there are existing and subsequent laws prohibiting GOCCs like SHFC from negotiating the
CBAs' economic provisions.

EO No. 7 and RA No. 10149 were already effective before the negotiation and execution of the 2011 and
2013 CBAs between SOHEAI and SHFC. To be sure, the Governance Commission did not approve the
economic terms of the CBAs and informed SHFC that it cannot implement the new benefits and
increases. On this score, we stress that GOCCs officials and employees are not entitled to benefits and
increases without the approval of the President or the Governance Commission. Corollarily, the SHFC's
revocation of the CBAs' economic provisions can hardly amount to diminution of benefits. Suffice it to
say that SOHEAI is not entitled to the new benefits and increases which yield neither legal nor binding
effect.

Yet, the SONA bonus was given merely as a gratuity since no anchored law for it and finally, the same is
not even mentioned in the 2011 and 2013 CBAs. It is neither made part of the wage, salary or
compensation of the employee, nor promised by the employer and expressly agreed upon by the parties.
Thus, they are not entitled to the SONA Bonus.
 ARTURO SULLANO vs. PEOPLE (GR No. 232147)

DOCTRINE: Objects falling within the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to
have the view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence.

FACTS: The Malay Police Station received a text message from an anonymous informant that a
passenger, wearing camouflage shorts, was carrying a firearm on board a bus. The station coordinated
with a certain officer for the conduct of a checkpoint in front of the municipal plaza to verify the tip.

As the police officer flagged down the bus and upon their embarkation, the police officer asked the man
to alight, and after the inquiry, they identified the accused appellant as a security officer but failed to
show his authority. The police officer yielded a loaded caliber .45 pistol and live ammunition from two
magazines.

Upon being informed of his constitutional rights, arrested, and brought to the police station, he was
charged and found guilty by the RTC of violating the Omnibus Election Code relating to the Gun Ban.
The decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals.

The accused appellant argued that the conduct of the checkpoint was illegal since the police officers failed
to put up the necessary signage and warning to the public. Thus, the search and arrest against him are
illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of Arturo is illegal and unconstitutional.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the NEGATIVE.

The checkpoints conducted were pursuant to the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC, warranted by the
exigencies of public order, and conducted in a way least intrusive to the motorists. Supported by
jurisprudence, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel of the bus owner
through an instance of information that a certain passenger carries contraband or illegal articles while in
transit or en route.

As the checkpoints are valid for instances of warrantless arrest, the items seized were caught in plain
view, rendering them admissible as evidence. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling within the
plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have the view are subject to seizure and
may be presented in evidence. The requirements were present in this case.

The police officers conducted a checkpoint after receiving a report that an individual possessed a gun
while on board a bus, and upon contact with the bus, the police asked for permission to board. The police
officer came across the firearm when he saw it in the accused-appellant’s half-open belt bag in his plain
view. Thus, the police officer had the proper grounds to arrest him and confiscate the contraband in his
possession.

Nevertheless, the violation of possession of a firearm during an election gun ban is deemed proper.
 RICARDO TRINIDAD vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (GR No. 227440)

DOCTRINE: No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that public office is a public trust and
enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency.

FACTS: Ricardo Trinidad served as an Engineer II in the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), tasked to oversee laborers of the Oyster Program designed to provide jobs to Filipinos as
gardeners or cleaners. Trinidad signed the daily time records of the involved persons in this case, but it
was found that some of them were either employed as traffic aides of MMDA or field coordinators of a
certain Congresswoman, and received double and even triple compensation from the three government
agencies, including this one.

Thus, the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman filed an administrative case for dishonesty, gross
negligence of duty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against
Ricardo and other approving authorities involved for signing workers’ DTR.

The Ombudsman found him guilty of gross neglect of duty and meted out the penalty of dismissal from
office. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). In this petition, Ricardo argues that his
act of signing the DTRs should not be considered as negligence because he was in good faith when he
relied on the work of his subordinate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ricardo’s reliance on the logbook by his subordinate constitutes gross
negligence.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the NEGATIVE.

Ricardo was tasked with supervising the labor workers under the Oyster Program of the DPWH, yet he
failed to exercise his due diligence to verify the workers reporting for duty. In fact, he never alleged in his
pleadings that he saw them report for duty and never exerted any effort to supervise them.

Even assuming that Ricardo's claim is true, he was still duty-bound to perform even a minor task. A
public officer's duty, no matter how minuscule, must still be diligently accomplished. Although
supervising the workers of the Oyster Program may have consisted of a very small percentage of
Ricardo's tasks, he was still duty-bound to faithfully accomplish it and not simply entrust it to his
subordinate.

Thus, Ricardo cannot be excused for having merely relied on his subordinate, even if it was done in good
faith. However, his negligence in this case cannot be considered as gross.
 CRIMINAL LAW

JOEL MACASIL vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

(GR No. 226898)

DOCTRINE: The Court cannot overemphasize the admonition to agencies tasked with preliminary
investigation to shield the innocent from precipitate, spiteful, and burdensome prosecution.

FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) found probable cause to charge Joel Macasil and other
officials with a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and Falsification of Public Documents under Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code. Allegedly, 32 infrastructure projects under his certification were
overstated/bloated and overpaid.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of Ombudsman erred in finding probable cause to criminally charge
Macasil.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the AFFIRMATIVE. The violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019 has specific elements, none of which can be satisfied to establish that Macasil violated the stated
provision. First, Macasil was a material engineer for the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH). However, it was proven that he did not act with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
inexcusable negligence. This was confirmed after finding that Macasil was not the officer who certified
the percentage of completion of the affected infrastructure and their compliance with the approved plans
and specifications, as evidenced by the attached SWA. Finally, the Revised Penal Code provides elements
for falsification, but none of these were applicable to the acts of Macasil to justify a criminal complaint
against him since the alleged untruthful statements when he certified the SWAs were not supported by
evidence. Macasil did not certify the work accomplished for the infrastructure projects, nor was he the
responsible officer to make such a certification.
 PEOPLE vs. ROBERTO G. CAMPOS

(GR No. 252212)

DOCTRINE: The perpetrator is not personally known to a witness but can be reasonably identified.

FACTS: Eric Sagun and Marilou Zafranco-Rea reported a robbery incident to the police station,
describing the suspect as "medyo malaki katawan" (of medium build). An armed man suddenly entered
the house of Eric and his girlfriend, Emeliza P. Empon. He took Emeliza’s cell phone from the center
table in the living room. Emeliza shouted to stop the assailant, but he pointed a gun at her and shot her in
the chest, causing her death.

After the two described the suspect, the authorities arrested a man named Roberto G. Campos, and both
Eric and Marilou confirmed that he was the one who robbed and killed Emeliza. Consequently, Roberto
was charged with the complex crime of robbery with homicide before the RTC. The trial court found him
guilty, and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Roberto questioned the out-of-court
identification, arguing that the descriptions provided were insufficient.

ISSUE: Whether or not the out-of-court identification is proper.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in NEGATIVE. One mode of out-of-court identification is the
police lineup, where the witness selects a suspect from a group of people. In determining the admissibility
and reliability of such identification, five factors are considered, and the eyewitnesses in this case
satisfied the totality of the circumstances test.

First, they personally observed the incident and narrated how the assailant entered the house, took the
personal property, and shot the victim. Second, they maintained total focus on the sole perpetrator of the
crime, with no competing events to draw their attention away. Most importantly, the description provided
by Eric and Marilou to the police investigators matched the physique of the suspect during the lineup.

While the description "medyo malaki katawan" was admittedly generic and referred to the perpetrator’s
body build rather than his face, the Court has been lenient in testing the accuracy of any prior description.
 PEOPLE vs. CARLO DIEGA

(GR No. 255389)

DOCTRINE: An accused is responsible not only for the rape he personally committed but also for the
other counts of rape that his co-conspirators perpetrated, even if they remain unidentified or at large.

FACTS: AAA and her friend JJJ were walking home after tending to a grocery store. En route, a certain
Ismael blocked their way and invited AAA to hang out. As JJJ left and went home, Ismael brought her to
his friends Obat, alias Kalbo, and Carlo. Obat suggested having a drinking session, and they proceeded to
the riverbank.

As the drinking session continued, AAA felt dizzy and started to doze off. She laid down and saw Carlo
remove her pants and underwear. AAA tried to kick him, but someone held her legs apart, and another
person held her hands. AAA then felt someone spitting on her vagina. Carlo went on top of AAA,
inserted his penis into her vagina, and made pumping motions. Afterwards, alias Kalbo, Ismael, and Obat
took turns having carnal knowledge of AAA. Throughout, AAA was crying and shouting, but no one
came to her aid.

The RTC found Carlo guilty of rape and gave credence to AAA's account, supported by medical findings,
concluding that Carlo and his three companions conspired to commit the crime of rape. Carlo argued the
credibility of AAA and maintained his defenses of denial and alibi, asserting that he did not rape AAA as
he was at his home located near the crime scene.

ISSUE: Whether or not AAA became inconsistent with her statements against the accused-appellant.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in NEGATIVE. There was no inconsistency in AAA’s
testimony regarding who raped her. To be sure, there is proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt that Carlo
and his three companions conspired and took turns raping AAA. Thus, the victim was raped four (4)
times.

In several cases, the Court held that the accused-appellant is responsible for rape not only for the act he
committed but also for the other counts of rape perpetrated by his co-conspirators, even if they remain
unidentified or at large. With the help of the cases decided, each one of them is guilty of three rapes, for
the one they committed and the two they helped their companions commit. Thus, Carlo must be held
liable for four counts of rape.
 PEOPLE vs. JERRICO JUADA

(GR No. 252276)

DOCTRINE: In the prosecution of criminal offenses, conviction is not always based on direct evidence.

FACTS: A man wearing a white cap, red, and blue jacket, whose face was covered with a blue
handkerchief, shot Florante in the temple. At that time, Florante was aboard and driving his owner-type
jeep. Thereafter, the man took Florante’s two bags. Amalia, a traffic enforcer, and her companion, another
enforcer, steered away to safety, but the perpetrator chased after them on his motorcycle.

The witnesses gathered, through their collaborative testimonies, that Jerrico was the perpetrator, and then
the RTC convicted Jerrico, holding that circumstantial evidence exists that he committed the crime of
robbery with homicide. Jerrico elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, claiming that the prosecution
failed to prove his identity as the perpetrator of the crime and that the RTC failed to consider his defense
and alibi. The CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the circumstantial evidence failed to prove Jerrico’s criminal liability.

RULING: The Supreme Court held in NEGATIVE. The Rules of Court allow resort to circumstantial
evidence as long as certain conditions are satisfied, such as (1) there is more than one circumstance, (2)
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain that
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused's guilt. Here, none of the prosecution
witnesses testified having seen Jerrico kill and rob Florante. Yet, the corpus of circumstantial evidence
constitutes an unbroken chain of events pointing to Jerrico’s guilt. To the unprejudiced mind, these
proven facts, when weaved together, lead to no other conclusion but Jerrico’s culpability for the crime.
 PEOPLE vs. LEO ILAGAN

(GR No. 244295)

DOCTRINE: The presumption of regularity in the performance of duties by law enforcers cannot prevail
over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent.

FACTS: The PDEA buy-bust team went to the residential apartment of the accused-appellant. As the
latter gave the shabu to the informant, the informant revealed himself as a police officer. Backup
members rushed to the scene and apprehended the accused-appellant. There was no media representative
present, as the accused-appellant allegedly went straight to the police station, and the plastic sachet
containing the suspected shabu was taken out and marked in the presence of Councilor Hinggan.

After the items were seized, photographed, and examined during the physical inventory, the accused-
appellant was charged and then indicted for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs before
the Regional Trial Court in Calamba City and found guilty. He appealed the RTC’s decision before the
Court of Appeals (CA), but the latter appellate court affirmed the decision. The accused-appellant argued
that irregularities affected the integrity of the corpus delicti, resulting in a broken chain of custody for the
seized items.

ISSUE: Whether there were irregularities during the buy-bust operation.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in AFFIRMATIVE. Upon reviewing the records, it was
revealed that there was a broken chain of custody with regard to the links that the prosecution must
satisfy. To ensure the preservation of the identity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs, the presence
of insulating witnesses, a representative from the National Prosecution Service (NPS), or the media shall
be checked.

The first link displayed infirmities since the shabu was marked only in front of Councilor Hinggan, and
the police officers did not provide a sufficient explanation for such a failure to summon the media or the
NPS representative. The infirmities reflected in the second link as the seized items were not transferred to
the investigating officer, since the name and signature of such an officer were not transcribed in
documents such as Salaysay, Request for Laboratory Examination, and Request for Drug Test.

The third link became questionable since there is no information on how the police office handled the
seized items and transferred them to the custody of the forensic chemist, and the fourth link was failed by
the Court after the chemist failed to state precautions taken in safekeeping the seized drugs, upon the
stipulations made in lieu of the chemist’s testimony.
 LEONIDES QUIAP vs. PEOPLE

(GR No. 229183)

DOCTRINE: The Court cannot tolerate the lax approach of law enforcers in handling the very corpus
delicti of the crime.

FACTS: An entrapment operation was set to pursue a certain Kacho. After the police officer flagged
down the jeepney where the suspected man was boarded, Kacho was about to throw out of the window a
small object wrapped with electrical tape. He was held by a police officer and asked to unwrap the object,
which yielded a small plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. Kacho was identified as the
accused-appellant in this case. After being marked, prepared, delivered, and examined, the substance was
positively identified as shabu. Consequently, the accused-appellant was charged with a violation of RA
9165. The RTC found him guilty, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Leonides
questioned the validity of his arrest and raised the failure of the police officers to comply with the proper
handling and custody of the dangerous drug.

ISSUE: Whether or not the custody of the dangerous drug is invalid.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the AFFIRMATIVE. The records revealed a broken chain of
custody. In this case, the absence of the required insulating witnesses during the inventory and
photograph of the seized item raises serious doubts about the integrity of the chain of custody.
Admittedly, there was no representative from the media, the Department of Justice, or any elected public
official. Worse, there was no attempt on the part of the buy-bust team to comply with the law and its
implementing rules. The police officers did not describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the seized item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession of the dangerous drug. There is no stipulation from the police officer on how the seized
items fell into the hands of the forensic chemist. Thus, it must be stressed that while law enforcers enjoy
the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent.
 LUIS QUIOGUE vs. BENITO ESTACIO

(GR No. 218530)

DOCTRINE: There is no such thing as a presumption of bad faith in cases involving violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

FACTS: Estacio passed a resolution granting separation benefits to the Independent Realty Corporation
Group of Companies (IRC). Based on that resolution, Estacio received the separation pay as an outgoing
IRC Vice President, 14th-month pay, and an extra bonus. This prompted the filing of a complaint-
affidavit before the Ombudsman Benito Estacio on the ground that Estacio’s receipt of emoluments
caused undue injury to the government in violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019. Estacio countered that
the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over him since he is not a public official, and the release of separation
pay, 14th-month, and extra bonus was done in good faith, valid under the principle of the business
judgment rule. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. Although he is a
public official, his act of receiving the questioned benefits was not done in the performance of official
functions, an essential element of the offense. Importantly, Estacio’s participation in the approval is not
tainted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross, inexcusable negligence. The petitioner insisted
that such constitutes evident bad faith on the part of Estacio because his motive in approving such a board
resolution was really to benefit himself.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Estacio constitute evident bad faith.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the NEGATIVE. It is undisputed that the board resolution
that granted separation pay benefits is a corporate act, and Estacio is only one of the board of directors of
IRC. It revealed that the corporation has previously granted separation benefits enjoyed by IRC
employees to its officers. In issuing the board resolution, the IRC board of directors simply recognized
that it was equitable to grant the same separation benefits enjoyed by IRC employees to its officers. There
is no evident bad faith or perverse motive or ill will on the part of Estacio, as there was no showing that
he was unduly favored by the board resolution’s issuance. Estacio’s participation in the approval of the
board resolution cannot be construed as bad faith since any benefit that he may have derived from the
board resolution is purely incidental to the position he was then occupying and cannot be deemed an act
intended to cause undue injury to any party or the government.
 FRANKLIN REYES JR. vs. PEOPLE

(GR No. 244545)

DOCTRINE: The presence of insulating witnesses is the first requirement to ensure the preservation of
the identity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs.

FACTS: The police officer frisked the accused-appellant after he took out a small plastic sachet
containing a white crystalline substance and three other sachets during the buy-bust operation. After
bringing Reyes to the police station, the buy-bust team contacted the media and barangay officials, but
only Kag. Helen Bulaun arrived. The suspected substance tested positive for the presence of shabu, and as
a result, Reyes was charged with illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs before the Regional Trial
Court.

The RTC convicted Reyes, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Reyes argued that the
police officers failed to comply with the chain-of-custody rule.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a break in the chain of custody of the seized items.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the AFFIRMATIVE. The records reveal a broken chain of
custody. The absence of a representative from the National Prosecution Service or the media as an
insulating witness during the inventory and photography of the seized item raises serious doubts about the
integrity of the first link. In this case, only Kagawad Bulaun signed the inventory of evidence, yet the
operative failed to provide any justification showing that the integrity of the evidence had been preserved.
They did not describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of
the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of it. Worse, Kagawad
Bulaun admitted that she was not present during the marking and inventory of seized items.
 JASPER TAN vs. PEOPLE

(GR No. 232611)

DOCTRINE: Failure to comply with the safeguards provided by law in implementing the search warrant
makes the search unreasonable.

FACTS: The buy-bust operation successfully targeted Jasper, and a search warrant was served on him. In
the presence of Barangay Captain Emerenciana Velasco, the police searched Jasper’s room and recovered
marked money, drug paraphernalia, and a white crystalline substance in six large plastic sachets and two
small plastic sachets found on a table and on top of a cabinet inside Jasper’s room. The white substances
all tested positive for shabu. The RTC convicted Jasper of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs
under RA 6425. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).

Jasper contested the validity of the search warrant, arguing that it lacked a specific description of his
house and premises. Furthermore, he asserted that the search was invalid because he was already arrested,
and his movement was restricted when the search was conducted, violating his right to witness the search.

ISSUE: Whether or not the seized items are admissible as evidence and if his arrest is illegal.

RULING: The Supreme Court posited in the AFFIRMATIVE. This Court was convinced that the
prosecution failed to prove Jasper’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt; hence, he must be acquitted. The
evidence indicates that only the barangay captain witnessed the search, which concluded in violation of
Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, specifically providing that no search of a house, room, or any
other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his
family, or, in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality. As Jasper, the lawful occupant of his house being searched, or any of his family members, was
absent, the police officers do not have the discretion to substitute their choice of a witness for those
witnesses prescribed by the rules, specifically in this case, the barangay captain.
 Cacdac vs Mercado (June 2021)

DOCTRINE: The case establishes that for the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be present, the
attack must have been made in a manner that ensures the victim’s inability to defend himself or retaliate.
Contradictory testimonies and the location of the wound led the court to conclude that treachery was not
proven.

FACTS: This case involves the attack and serious injury inflicted by Marcos Mercado on his brother-in-
law, Rufino Lopez. Mercado was charged with the crime of frustrated murder and was convicted and
sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal. The lower court found the
qualifying circumstance of treachery to be present.

ISSUE: Whether Marcos Mercado is guilty of frustrated murder.

RULING: The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court’s decision. Instead, the Supreme Court
found Mercado guilty of frustrated homicide and reduced his sentence to ten years and one day of
reclusion temporal.
 [G.R. No. 239215. July 12, 2022]

RANDY MICHAEL KNUTSON, ACTING ON BEHALF OF MINOR RHUBY SIBAL

KNUTSON, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ELISA R. SARMIENTO-FLORES, IN HER CAPACITY
AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 69, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TAGUIG
CITY, AND ROSALINA SIBAL KNUTSON, RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE: The legal pursuit to determine the eligibility of individuals as defined by criminal law can
be intricate. An example of such complexity is whether the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004, also known as Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, permits a father to seek protection and
custody orders when the mother is accused of committing violence against their child.

FACTS: In 2005, an American citizen named Randy Knutson married Rosalina Knutson in Singapore,
and they had a daughter named Rhuby. The couple resided in the Philippines, but their relationship
deteriorated due to Rosalina's extramarital affairs and gambling activities. Randy provided financial
support to Rosalina and Rhuby, but Rosalina's actions became harmful to Rhuby's well-being. This
included leaving Rhuby with strangers, accumulating gambling debts, selling family properties, and
engaging in abusive behavior towards Rhuby.

To address the situation, Randy filed a petition for protection orders under RA No. 9262 (Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act) against Rosalina, citing the harmful environment for Rhuby.
However, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed Randy's petition, stating that RA No. 9262 does not
cover cases where a mother abuses her own child. The court justified its decision by referring to the law's
definition of offenders and victims, highlighting that a child's mother is not considered an offender under
RA No. 9262.

Furthermore, the court reasoned that protection orders are specifically designed to prevent violence from
an offender against a woman or her child, not from a mother against her own child. Additionally, the
court pointed out that the law grants custody to female victims but does not provide the same level of
protection to a husband who is not considered a "woman victim of violence."

Randy requested reconsideration, arguing that the term "any person" in RA No. 9262 should not be
limited to male offenders and that the law should be interpreted broadly to protect all victims of violence.
However, the RTC denied the motion, maintaining its interpretation that the law does not apply to
situations where a mother abuses her own child.

Unsatisfied with the RTC's decision, Randy filed a Petition for Certiorari before a higher court, claiming
that there was a grave abuse of discretion. He asserted that RA No. 9262 should be applicable to
safeguard his daughter from the violence inflicted by her mother, regardless of the gender of the
perpetrator.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of Republic Act No. 9262, also known as the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act, are applicable in cases where a mother, regardless of gender,
causes harm and violence to her own child.
RULING: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) justified the dismissal of the petition by contending that the
law does not apply when the alleged offender is the mother. However, the Supreme Court, in its decision,
asserted that the law does cover instances where a mother inflicts violence upon her child. The Court
underscored that Republic Act No. 9262 employs gender-neutral language, emphasizing the legislative
intent to safeguard both women and children. Rejecting the RTC's narrow interpretation, the Supreme
Court argued that such an approach contradicts the law's objectives and the international commitments of
the country. The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the RTC orders, and directed the issuance
of a permanent protection order.
 [ G.R. No. 229265. February 15, 2022 ]

SILVINO B. MATOBATO, SR., PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

[G.R. No. 229624]

WALTER B. BUCAO AND CIRILA A. ENGBINO, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN-SPECIAL FIFTH DIVISION AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE: A public official may still be held accountable under the "threefold liability rule" even if
they are found not guilty of any crimes. If the acquittal is solely civil, the dismissal of the criminal case
does not terminate the civil obligation, and the offense for which the accused is found not guilty does not
give rise to civil liability. The preponderance of the evidence is the required standard of proof to prove
civil culpability.

FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Pantukan passed Resolution No. 164, Series of
1994, authorizing the transfer of municipal funds from the Land Bank of the Philippines to the Davao
Cooperative Bank (DCB). Silvino B. Matobato, Sr., the Municipal Treasurer, executed the fund transfer
and opened a time deposit account with DCB from 1994 to 1998. DCB faced insolvency in 1998 and was
subsequently placed under receivership, preventing the Municipality of Pantukan from withdrawing the
deposited amounts.

In its 1998 Annual Audit Report, the Commission on Audit (COA) found that the Sangguniang Bayan
treated the funds deposited with DCB as idle funds and recommended filing criminal and administrative
charges against municipal officials. The Ombudsman filed charges, including violations of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, against Silvino B. Matobato, Sr., Walter B. Bucao, Cirila A. Engbino, and
others.

The Sandiganbayan, after trial, acquitted the accused in Criminal Case No. SB-10-CRM-0015 based on
reasonable doubt. Despite the acquittal, the Sandiganbayan held the accused civilly and solidarily liable
for the municipality's unrecovered funds amounting to P9.25 million due to negligence. Silvino, Walter,
and Cirila were charged with negligence: Silvino, as Municipal Treasurer, failed to exercise reasonable
care; Walter and Cirila, as Sangguniang Bayan members, neglected their duty by not conducting due
diligence before authorizing the fund transfer.

The court rejected Silvino's argument that he couldn't be held civilly liable pending DCB's liquidation,
stating that damage had already occurred to the municipality. The court affirmed the Sandiganbayan's
decision, holding Silvino, Walter, and Cirila civilly and solidarily liable to indemnify the Municipality of
Pantukan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the public officials who were found not guilty, Silvino B. Matobato, Sr., Walter
B. Bucao, and Cirila A. Engbino, should still be held jointly and civilly accountable for the money that
the municipality has not been able to recover even though they were found not guilty of any crimes.
RULING: The court dismissed the petitions and affirmed the Sandiganbayan's decision in Criminal Case
No. SB-10-CRM-0015. Despite the acquittal on criminal charges, the accused, Silvino B. Matobato, Sr.,
Walter B. Bucao, and Cirila A. Engbino, were held civilly liable. The court clarified that dismissing
criminal charges doesn't extinguish civil liability, especially when negligence is evident. Silvino,
accountable under Section 101 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, failed in his duty by not exercising
reasonable care in transferring municipal funds to Davao Cooperative Bank. The court highlighted
Silvino's negligence in ignoring warning signs and relying on DCB's financial stability despite risks.
Walter and Cirila couldn't invoke the presumption of regularity due to negligence in approving the fund
transfer. The court referred to Section 340 of RA No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), holding
other local officers accountable for funds through their participation. The ruling stressed that despite
DCB's liquidation status, damage had occurred, and the accused were responsible for the municipality's
loss of funds. The court upheld the Sandiganbayan's decision, emphasizing the accountability of public
officials for public resources. RA No. 3019 was the basis for the criminal charges, and PD No. 1445
governed accountability for municipal funds. The court's decision highlighted the legal framework
guiding the case and the importance of upholding public trust in managing government resources.
 [ G.R. No. 250852. October 10, 2022 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOHN FRANCIS SUALOG,

ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DOCTRINE: The core issue in the appeal before this Court, assailing the Court of Appeals-Cebu City's
(CA) Decision 1 dated May 31, 2019, in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 02515, is the presence of qualifying
circumstances raising the killing to the category of murder.

FACTS: John Francis Sualog (John Francis) was charged with three counts of murder before the
Regional Trial Court of Culasi, Antique, Branch 13 (RTC). The charges were in connection with the
killings of Amado Chavez Maglantay (Amado), Eppie U. Maglantay (Eppie), and Jessa Amie U.
Maglantay (Jessa). The information alleged that on October 12, 2003, John Francis, armed with a bolo,
attacked and fatally stabbed each victim in the presence of qualifying aggravating circumstances such as
evident premeditation, treachery, taking advantage of nighttime and superior strength, and the
commission of the offense characterized by cruelty, adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime.
During the trial, the prosecution presented witnesses who testified to the events of the killings and the
victims' cause of death. John Francis pleaded guilty and waived his right to present evidence. The RTC
found John Francis guilty of three counts of murder, appreciating the qualifying circumstances, and
imposed the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for each case.

John Francis appealed the RTC's decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the prosecution
failed to allege the specific facts constituting the qualifying aggravating circumstances and to prove the
essential elements of murder. The CA affirmed John Francis's conviction, ruling that he waived any
objection to the sufficiency of the information by not raising the issue during the trial. The CA also found
that treachery was proven based on the sudden and unexpected manner of the attacks, but it did not
appreciate evident premeditation and unlawful entry. The CA modified the amount of moral damages and
corrected a clerical error in the RTC's decision. John Francis now brings the appeal before the Supreme
Court, reiterating his arguments regarding the alleged insufficiency of evidence and the failure to
establish the qualifying circumstances of murder.

ISSUE: Whether the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were properly
alleged in the information.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that even though the information lacked specific details regarding the
qualifying circumstances, John Francis forfeited his right to challenge these defects by not filing a motion
to quash or a motion for a bill of particulars. The Court emphasized that the failure to utilize these
remedies constitutes a waiver of the right to dispute the inaccurate statement of aggravating and
qualifying circumstances. Thus, the trial court appropriately considered the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JERRIE ARRAZ Y
RODRIGUEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DOCTRINE: This case involves trafficking in persons, rape, and the violation of the "Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012," Republic Act No. 9208, as amended by Republic Act No. 10364 (Expanded
Anti-Trafficking Act of 2012).

FACTS: Jerrie Arraz y Rodriguez, the accused, is charged with acting as a promoter, agent, and handler
for [AAA252353] in Quezon City between March 2014 and the end of June 2014. He is accused of
knowingly and unlawfully procuring, recruiting, hiring, maintaining, providing, housing, and acquiring
the victim for sexual exploitation, namely prostitution, in exchange for money or other incentives.
According to the prosecution, these crimes were carried out using force, intimidation, compulsion, and
taking advantage of the victim's vulnerabilities. The accused reportedly utilized the internet to promote
and market the victim, including engaging in "online chat" with consumers or clients. The prosecution
further alleges that the accused first portrayed the victim in online talks with foreigners through indecent
displays or pornographic images. Following that, the accused is charged with coercing the victim into
being exploited by foreigners, including those identified as "Gunter," "John," and "Patrick James Powell"
[Patrick], for monetary benefit. These activities are deemed to have caused harm and prejudice to the
victim.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jerrie Arraz y Rodrigues is guilty of qualified human trafficking, rape, and
violating the "Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012."

RULING: In May 2017, the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Jerrie Arraz of several
charges, including violating the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, the Anti-Rape Act, and the Anti-
Cybercrime Act. The court found that Jerrie took advantage of the vulnerability of the victim,
AAA252353, by entertaining and employing her for sexual exploitation over 60 days. Jerrie was also
convicted of rape, and the court ordered him to pay various damages to his victims. Jerrie questioned the
credibility of his victim, claiming that she had taken explicit photos of him, that his arrest was invalid,
and that the RTC unfairly ignored his pleas of denial. He appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On June
18, 2019, the Court of Appeals affirmed Jerrie's conviction but modified the civil and compensatory
damages amounts. The court affirmed the district court's findings and found no reason to depart from
them. Victim AAA252353 detailed her traumatic experiences with Jerrie and her clients, including her
rape and human trafficking incidents. The Court of Appeals held that Jerrie questioned the victim's
credibility and blatantly took photos of himself, that his arrest was invalid on the grounds of incitement,
and that the RTC had rejected his denial of the arrest. Jerrie's appeal was dismissed, alleging that it had
unfairly ignored his defenses. Jerrie was convicted of various crimes, including violating the Anti-
Trafficking Act, rape, and the Cybercrime Prevention Act. The court ordered Jerrie to pay the victims a
large fine and restitution. The Court of Appeals deemed Jerrie's subsequent appeal without merit. Jerrie
was found guilty of three counts of rape and a violation of the Cybercrime Prevention Act. The court
upheld the credibility of victim AAA252353, who spoke with courage about her traumatic experience
during the trial. Jerrie's defense against her restraining order was deemed weak, and the court ruled that
Jerrie's arrest resulted from a legitimate arrest operation, rejecting Jerrie's claim that he was the victim of
her instigation. The court handed down appropriate sentences, including life imprisonment and fines for
qualified human trafficking, eternal solitude for rape, and life imprisonment for cybersex. Financial
compensation was also ordered for the damages. The district court's judgment was affirmed with some
modifications.
 ARLENE HOMOL Y ROMOROSA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: The case involves estafa, which encompasses unfaithfulness or grave abuse of confidence.

FACTS: Dr. Jelpha Robillos hired Arlene Homol as a clinic secretary and assigned her the task of
collecting installment payments from jewelry customers. Arlene received P1,000.00 from a customer,
Elena Quilangtang, for a gold bracelet on March 2 and 8, 2002. However, Arlene did not give this money
to Dr. Robillos and resigned from her job on March 14, 2002. When Dr. Robillos reminded Elena of her
unpaid installments the next day, Elena claimed to have already paid Arlene. Consequently, Dr. Robillos
filed a criminal complaint against Arlene for qualified theft, alleging that Arlene took P1,000.00 without
consent, intending to gain, and in violation of the trust placed in her as a collector. Arlene pleaded not
guilty during the trial and acknowledged receiving the P1,000.00 but maintained that she had remitted it
to Dr. Robillos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arlene Homol y Romorosa is guilty of the crime of Estafa.

RULING: On July 26, 2004, the RTC convicted Arlene of estafa for unfaithfulness or misuse of
confidence under RPC Article 315, paragraph 1(b). The RTC ruled that Arlene misused the funds and
violated the trust of both Dr. Robillos and Elena. The Court found Arlene Homol y Romorosa guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of committing Estafa as defined in subdivision No. 1, paragraph (b) of Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and she is to be penalized under the third paragraph of the same
article. Under the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby imposes a sentence on
the said accused, ranging from a minimum of three months and eleven days to a maximum of one year
and one day of imprisonment. Additionally, the accused is ordered to indemnify Dr. Jelpha J. Robillos in
the amount of P1,000.00, which represents the sum misappropriated by the accused.
LEO ABUYO Y SAGRIT, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: Self-defense and defense of relatives clearly state that a person has the right to repel
unlawful aggression committed by others towards one’s life or loved ones.

FACTS: On August 16, 2011, Leo Abuyo and his wife were attacked by Cesar Tapel and his son, Charles
Tapel. Leo swerved his motorcycle to evade the attack and sought refuge in his father's house. However,
Cesar followed and stabbed Leonardo, prompting Leo to defend himself. Leo used a bolo to protect
himself, inflicting fatal wounds on Cesar. Leo surrendered to the authorities and was charged with
homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not Leo Abuyo y Sagrit is guilty of the homicide offense.

RULING: Leo Abuyo y Sagrit was sentenced to homicide by the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte Branch
38, with a sentence of 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day as a minimum to 8 years of prison mayor as a
maximum. However, Leo pleaded not guilty at the trial, citing self-defense and defense of a relative, but
the RTC convicted Leo as he failed to prove all the elements of self-defense. Nevertheless, the RTC
mitigated the circumstances of incomplete self-defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender. The accused is further adjudged to pay the heirs of Cesar Tapel y Bacerdo civil
indemnity of P50,000.00, moral damages of P50,000.00, and temperate damages of P30,000.00. Later,
Leo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, where the petition was denied under the Court of Appeals
in C.A., G.R. CR No. 41325, but later the petition was granted, and the previous decision was reversed.
Petitioner Leo Abuyo y Saglit is acquitted of the crime of homicide and ordered to be released
immediately from detention.
 [ G.R. No. 216453. March 16, 2022 ]

OLIGARIO TURALBA Y VILLEGAS, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: The case involves a conviction for Carnapping, defined and penalized under Republic Act
(RA) No. 6539.

FACTS: Gregorio was driving his Honda CRV from Kalakan, Olongapo City, to buy some bread when
he parked his car ten (10) meters away across Mulawin bakery, but he left his keys inside the vehicle.
When he went back, he noticed his car was already moving towards Peping Mami along Caron Street. He
immediately flagged down a tricycle and pursued his car until the car was caught in traffic congestion
along Brill Street, 20th Street, West Bajac Bajac, Olangapo City. Gregorio held Olgiario, the one who
stole the car, until the police arrived at the scene and arrested him, and one of the police officers found a
butterfly knife upon body inspection. Oligario was arrested but pleaded insanity. With the presented
evidence from his doctor, Dr. Ma. Lourdes Labarcon Evangelista, she assessed Oligario with psychosis
(―nawawala sa sarili) due to the use of alcohol and methamphetamine.

ISSUE: Whether or not Oligario’s defense of insanity is valid, and if so, whether it should result in his
acquittal of criminal liability or only serve as a reduced circumstance in his liability.

RULING: Oligario was found guilty of Carnapping by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, in Olongapo
City. Oligario Turalba y Villegas was found guilty of carnapping and sentenced to a term of
imprisonment ranging from 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months. The court rejected Oligario's
insanity defense because he was unable to demonstrate that he was legally insane at the time of the crime.
The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the conviction, ruling that Oligario's illness did not absolve him of
criminal guilt. The CA disagreed with Oligario's claim that his insanity should be considered a qualifying
component. Oligario's petition for certiorari was dismissed because he failed to effectively show his
mental state and insanity. The court highlighted that insanity is an exception, not the rule, and that it must
be established with clear and convincing evidence, which Oligario did not provide in this case.
 TAHIRA S. ISMAEL AND AIDA U.AJIJON, Petitioners, versus PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. Nos. 234435-36

DOCTRINE: The prosecution in a criminal case must implead all individuals who are indispensable in
the consummation of the offense charged. Failure to include necessary parties in the information violates
the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them.
This is a Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, challenging the
Decision dated August 2, 2017, and the Resolution dated September 19, 2017, of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. 28278 and 28279.

FACTS: Since 1997, the Municipality of Lantawan in Basilan has been facing difficulties in paying its
GSIS premiums. When Ismael became mayor in 2001, the outstanding balance increased due to
accumulated penalties. Collection letters were sent to the mayor's office, but the obligation remained
unsettled. As a result, the municipality's members' loan privileges were suspended. A complaint for
malversation of public funds was lodged against Ismael and the municipal treasurer by Vice Mayor Felix
B. Dalugdugan and other officials and employees. The Ombudsman charged them before the
Sandiganbayan with violation of certain laws. The Sandiganbayan convicted Ismael and the municipal
treasurer, sentencing them to imprisonment and disqualification from holding public office. The motion
for reconsideration was denied, leading to this appeal seeking the dismissal of the criminal cases. The
petitioners argue that the absence of the municipal accountant and budget officer in the charges
invalidates them. They also claim a violation of their right to a speedy disposition of cases. On the merits,
they argue that their failure to remit the GSIS contributions was due to factors beyond their control. They
believe they should be exempt from liability.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners' right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them
was violated; whether petitioners' right to the speedy disposition of cases was violated; and whether the
Sandiganbayan correctly convicted petitioners of: (a) violation of Section 3.3.1, in relation to Section
17.2.3 of the IRR of RA No. 8291; and (b) violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.

RULING: The verified petition for review on Certiorari is partially granted. The Decision dated August
2, 2017, and the Resolution dated September 19, 2017, of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos.
28278 and 28279 are modified as follows: In Criminal Case No. 28278, petitioners Tahira S. Ismael
(Ismael) and Aida U. Ajijon (Ajijon) are acquitted of the charge under Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA)
No. 3019; and (2) In Criminal Case No. 28279, Ajijon is found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
violating Section 52(d) of RA No. 8291, in relation to Section 17.2.3 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, and is thus sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from one
(1) year, as a minimum, to three (3) years, as a maximum, and to pay a fine of PHP 3,000.00. She shall
further suffer absolute perpetual disqualification from holding public office and from practicing any
profession or calling licensed by the government. On the other hand, Ismael is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 52(g) of RA No. 8291 in relation to Section 17.2.6 of its
Implementing Rules and Regulations and is thus sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from two (2) years, as a minimum, to four (4) years, as a maximum, and to pay a
fine of PHP10,000.00. She shall also suffer the penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification from
holding public office and from practicing any profession or calling licensed by the government.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,-versus-MILO LEOCADIO y LABRADOR,
Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 227396

DOCTRINE: Rape with homicide perpetrated against a child is a heinous crime that not only causes
physical harm and violates the victim's honor but also inflicts lasting outrage upon society. One such
illustration is present in this appeal I assailing Decision 2 dated September 15, 2015, of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06148.

FACTS: On March 26, 2002, the parents of a 12-year-old girl named AAA227396 asked her to go and
collect payment for rice cakes from their neighbor, Milo Leocadio y Labrador. However, AAA227396 did
not return home, and her parents became worried and reported her disappearance to the police. In the
course of their investigation, barangay officials discovered AAA227396's lifeless body in Milo's house.
She was found underneath Milo's bed, with a cloth wrapped around her mouth and nose and her hands
tied and twisted behind her back. The autopsy findings revealed that AAA227396 had died from
suffocation, and she had also suffered numerous injuries and abrasions on various parts of her body. Milo
admitted to causing AAA227396's death but claimed it was accidental, denying any involvement in
raping her.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove Milo's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for the complex crime of rape with homicide.

RULING: The Decision dated September 15, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No.
06148 is affirmed with modifications as to the award of damages. Accused-appellant Milo Leocadio y
Labrador (Milo) is found guilty of rape with homicide and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole. Milo is also directed to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of
PHP 100,000.00 as civil indemnity, PHP 100,000.00 as moral damages, PHP 100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and PHP 50,000.00 as temperate damages, all with legal interest at the rate
 PEOPLE vs. DIEGO FLORES

(GR No. 26471)

DOCTRINE: The non-compliance with the required procedure created a serious gap in the chain of
custody.

FACTS: The Muntinlupa City Police Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group planned
a buy-bust operation against Diego based on information and a surveillance report that he was selling
shabu to jeepney drivers. The transaction commenced until Diego handed a plastic sachet containing a
white crystalline substance to a certain police officer. The police drew his gun, identified himself as a
police officer, and the entrapment team rushed to apprehend the accused. After the custodial process, the
seized substance was tested for shabu, and Diego was formally charged with a violation of Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165. The RTC convicted Diego of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether there is a broken chain of custody for the seized items.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. At that time, a crowd was forming,
and their presence might cause a commotion, creating the potential for Diego to resist arrest with help
from his relative. Here, there was no representative from the media, the Department of Justice, or any
elected public official; hence, it raises serious doubts about the integrity of the chain of custody, including
its inventory and photographs. As admitted, the buy-bust team no longer waited for the required witnesses
to deliver the suspected drugs to the crime laboratory. The absence of the required insulating witnesses
during the inventory and photographing of the seized items raises serious doubts about the integrity of the
chain of custody. In this case, it is unacceptable that members of the buy-bust team had ample opportunity
to prepare and make the necessary arrangements to observe the procedural requirements of RA 9165.
Hence, Diego must be acquitted of the charge against him, given the prosecution’s failure to prove an
unbroken chain of custody.
 PEOPLE vs. JEMUEL PADUA

(GR No. 244287)

DOCTRINE: In the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, the contraband itself constitutes the
very corpus delicti of the offenses, and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction.

FACTS: The Binangonan Police Station planned a buy-bust operation against Jemuel, alias "Maton,"
based on information and a surveillance report indicating that he was selling illegal drugs in Brgy. Libis,
Binangonan Rizal. After Jemuel handed the police officer a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance, the poseur-buyer introduced himself as a police officer, and the entrapment team rushed to
apprehend the subject, who resisted arrest and was eventually frisked. The police officers conducted an
inventory of the seized items in the presence of a barangay official after marking the sachet. After
examination, the seized items tested positive for shabu. Finally, Jemuel was charged and convicted of
violating Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 by the RTC, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether there is a broken chain of custody.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. It is important to note that the absence
of required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable
reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses
under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. The prosecution must demonstrate that earnest efforts
were employed in contacting the representatives as required by law. "A sheer statement that the
representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were
employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances, is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse."
Police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance but must, in fact, also
convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure and that,
under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable. In this case, only an elected public official
signed the inventory of the evidence at the place of arrest. Worse, the items were photographed at the
police station without the presence of any insulating witness. However, the operatives failed to provide
any justification for non-compliance, showing that the integrity of the evidence had all along been
preserved. They did not describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. The
utter disregard for the required procedures created a significant gap in the chain of custody.
 PEOPLE vs. ZAINODIN GANDAWALI, ET AL

(GR No. 242516)

DOCTRINE: The presence of insulating witnesses is the first requirement to ensure the preservation of
the identity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs.

FACTS: The Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group of Camp Karingal, Quezon City,
planned a buy-bust operation against Zainodin, Jenelyn, and Nurodn based on a tip that they were selling
shabu. After the arrangement meeting, the set-up for the buy-bust took place at SM Fairview. When
Nurodin handed a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance, the entrapment team rushed in
and arrested the accused-appellants.

As the team left the mall, they proceeded to Greater Lagro Brgy. Hall, where they conducted an inventory
and photography of the seized item. The police officer personally delivered the marked item to the
forensic team for examination, which eventually tested positive for shabu.

The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, convicted the accused-appellants of the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. However, they contested that the police officers did not observe the proper handling and
custody of the seized items during the buy-bust operation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the chain of custody of the seized items is not broken.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the NEGATIVE.

The absence of a representative from the National Prosecutions Office (NPS) or the media as an
insulating witness to the inventory and photographing of the seized item cast serious doubt on the
integrity of the first link. Thus, the presence of insulating witnesses is the first requirement to ensure the
preservation of the identity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs.

In this case, only an elected public official signed the inventory of evidence. There was no attempt on the
part of the buy-bust team to comply with the law and its implementing rules. The operatives likewise
failed to provide any justification showing that the integrity of the evidence had been preserved all along.
They did not describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of
the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
 PEOPLE vs. MARVIN BALBAREZ

(GR No. 246999)

DOCTRINE: If the presence of any or all the insulating witnesses was not obtained, the prosecution
must allege and prove not only the reasons for their absence but also the fact that earnest efforts were
made to secure their attendance.

FACTS: The municipal police of Los Baños, Laguna, planned a buy-bust operation against one of the
top ten drug personalities within the municipality. It was reported that he was selling shabu in Brgy.
Malinta. After Marvin handed a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance, the entrapment
team rushed in and arrested Marvin.

Police Officer Ramos marked the seized items, and his team took photographs of them at the police
station, forwarding the contrabands for laboratory examinations. The results stated that the seized items
were positively identified as shabu, leading to Marvin being charged with the violation of Sections 5 and
11, Art. II of RA 9165. The RTC convicted Marvin of the charges, but the Court of Appeals partially
granted the decision, holding Marvin guilty of illegal possession and acquitting him on illegal sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not the chain of custody of the seized items was broken.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

In this case, the absence of the required insulating witnesses during the inventory and photographing of
the seized items puts serious doubt on the integrity of the chain of custody. Admittedly, there was no
representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official. The
allegation that Marvin made a scene during the arrest, which prompted the police to leave the crime
scene, was unsubstantiated. Moreover, there was no attempt on the part of the buy-bust team to comply
with the law and its implementing rules. The operatives likewise failed to provide any justification
showing that the integrity of the evidence had all along been preserved.

Furthermore, the link between the investigating officer and the forensic chemist was not established with
certainty. The police officers did not describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of
the same.
 PEOPLE vs. RONALD LAGUDA

(GR No. 244843)

DOCTRINE: Conspiracy occurs when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

FACTS: The Manila Police District received information that one of the suspects in the robbery incident
was seen on Blumentritt Street, Sampaloc, Manila. The authorities went to the target area, and the
informant pointed to one of the men sitting on the street, identified as Ronald Laguda, who was then
arrested.

At the station, the victims identified Laguda as the one who wielded an ice pick and robbed them on April
19, 2012, while they were in a jeepney traversing along Dimasalang Road, Sampaloc, Manila. The
accused forcibly took the bags of the victims containing cash and personal items. After that, he
disembarked from the jeepney and proceeded to the driver’s seat of a nearby vehicle where three other
men were waiting. The man then started to drive the tricycle away, and one of the three men pointed a
gun at the jeepney from which the passengers alighted and shouted for help. The police officers heard the
pleas and approached the jeepney. Immediately, the man drove the tricycle back to the scene, and one of
his companions shot one police officer in the forehead, causing his death. The four robbers fled the scene.

Ronald was charged with the complex crime of robbery with homicide before the RTC. The RTC’s
decision favored convicting the accused, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling. The CA denied his
explanation that he drove the tricycle away from the scene, and for an unknown reason, they turned
around, and his companion shot one of the police officers who responded. Mostly, he insisted that he was
an accomplice since he was only driving the vehicle at that moment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ronald is an accomplice.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the NEGATIVE.

First, as specified in the factual antecedents, the elements in committing robbery were present. To sum up,
Ronald’s primary objective was to rob the jeepney passengers, and the killing of a certain police officer
was only incidental to prevent the apprehension of the robbers and facilitate their escape.

The Court dismissed Ronald’s claim that he is only liable as an accomplice as he was only driving the
motorcycle, but it was contrary. Ronald’s participation was not only to drive the getaway vehicle. As
discussed earlier, Ronald was the person who robbed the passengers. Also, he played a crucial role in the
homicide when he drove the tricycle back to the crime scene to give his companion a better vantage point
to shoot PO2 Magno. If he had no intention to harm the policeman, Ronald could have continued to drive
away from the scene.
 PEOPLE vs. NICO MAZO AND JOEY DOMDOMA

(GR No. 242273)

DOCTRINE: The presence of insulating witnesses is the first requirement to ensure the preservation of
the identity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs.

FACTS: The Station Anti-Illegal Drugs - Special Operations Task Group planned a buy-bust operation
against Nico Mazon based on information that he was selling drugs in Brgy. La Paz, Makati City. After
Nico retrieved three plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance from his left pocket, the
entrapment team rushed upon the pre-arranged signal and arrested Nico, Joey, and Joy.

The police officers proceeded to the barangay hall where they conducted an inventory and photographed
the seized items in the presence of Brgy. Kagawad Christopher Cabo. After the investigation, the police
officer personally delivered the confiscated items for examination, and the seized items yielded positive
results for shabu. The three accused were charged with violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA
9165.

The RTC convicted Nico and Joey of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, but Joy was acquitted;
eventually, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a broken chain of custody.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

The chain of custody rule requires the conduct of an inventory and photograph of the seized items
immediately after seizure and confiscation, which is intended by law to be made immediately after, or at
the place of apprehension. If not practicable, the implementing rules allow the inventory and photograph
as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending
team. In this case, the inventory and photograph of the confiscated items were not made immediately at
the place of arrest but at the barangay hall. The police officers only made a general statement that the
place of arrest was hostile without elaborating any threat to their security.

The absence of a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media as an insulating witness
to the inventory and photograph of the seized items puts serious doubt on the integrity of the confiscated
items. Admittedly, only an elected public official signed the inventory of evidence. There was no attempt
on the part of the entrapment team to comply with the law and its implementing rules despite the planned
buy-bust operation. Worse, it appears that the barangay official was absent when the drugs were seized.
The prosecution stipulated that Kagawad Cabo "had no personal knowledge as to the circumstances
regarding the alleged confiscation of the items x x x." On this point, it must be stressed that the presence
of the witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but, more importantly, at the time of the
warrantless arrest.
 PEOPLE vs. ROWENA BUNIEL AND ROWENA SIMBULAN

(GR No. 243796)

DOCTRINE: Police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their noncompliance but must, in
fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and
that under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable.

FACTS: The District Anti-Illegal Drugs, Special Task Group (DAID-SOTG) of Manila Police District
organized a buy-bust operation after a confidential informant discussed that he made a deal with a certain
Weng for the delivery of sample shabu. The informant agreed to meet with Weng at Sta. Cruz, Manila.

As the transaction commenced, Weng placed the buy-bust money in her right pocket and gave a small
plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance to the police officer as the poseur-buyer. After she
gave the substance, the entrapment team rushed and frisked Weng and her companion and proceeded to
the police station as rain poured.

At the MPD office, the police officer marked the plastic sachet subject of the sachet in the presence of
Rene Crisostomo, a member of the media connected with the tabloid Remate, conducted an inventory,
and prepared the forms and receipts for the custodial possession. Then, turnover in the crime laboratory
for examination of which positively identified the substance as shabu. Proper charges were filed against
the accosted persons.

The RTC convicted Buniel of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
while acquitted Simbulan of illegal possession.

ISSUE: Whether or not the chain of custody is broken.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

The presence of insulating witnesses is the first requirement to ensure the preservation of the identity and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs. In this case, there is no showing that the marking and inventory
were done in the presence of the three insulating witnesses. The first and second photographs submitted in
evidence only show that only the police officer marking the plastic sachets in the presence of accused-
appellant and Simbulan; while the third photograph, the buy-bust money and the marked plastic sachets.
That the marking and inventory were done without the insulating witnesses is evident in the testimony of
Crisostomo, who is a kagawad of another barangay and a media practitioner, that "he did not see the two
(2) accused when he signed the inventory."

And even if Crisostomo was present, he signed the inventory as a member of the media. In the prepared
documents, the police officer is the lone signatory. Meanwhile, the police officers did not explain the
absence of a representative from the DOJ and another elected public official. To be sure, there was no
earnest effort, nay attempt, on the part of the buy-bust team to comply with the law.
 PEOPLE vs. XXX

(GR No. 243988)

DOCTRINE: A "love affair" neither justifies rape nor serves as a license for lust.

FACTS: After more than 4 years, AAA, a 29-year-old woman, was pasturing a cow when XXX suddenly
dragged her into the shrubs. XXX removed AAA’s underwear, covered her mouth with clothes, and went
on top of her. Thereafter, XXX inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA resisted and hit XXX with a piece
of wood and a stone. In fact, AAA disclosed that she had sex with XXX several times, but he threatened
to kill her if she told her mother.

Moving forward, BBB, the father of AAA, observed that her daughter was constantly feeling sick and
vomiting until her daughter confessed her pregnancy and pointed to XXX as the father of the child. BBB
confronted XXX before the barangay, and he expressed his willingness to marry AAA, but the plans for
marriage did not push through until AAA gave birth with XXX’s promise to support the child.

Thus, XXX was charged with rape and sexual abuse before the RTC. The RTC convicted XXX for rape
but acquitted him of sexual abuse after the trial court gave credence and considered XXX’s admission that
he had sexual intercourse with AAA but alleged that they were lovers and admitted AAA’s mental
disability. The RTC’s decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not XXX’s sweetheart theory acquits him from the charge of rape.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the NEGATIVE.

First, all the elements of statutory rape were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Foremost, it was
established that AAA is incapable of giving rational consent and has not reached the level of maturity that
would give her the capacity to make prudent decisions, especially on matters involving sexuality. A series
of psychological tests revealed that AAA is mentally retarded.

Verily, the "sweetheart" theory must be supported by convincing evidence, such as mementos, love
letters, notes, and photographs. However, XXX's theory of consensual sex is barren of probative weight.
He failed to substantiate his claim and offered only self-serving assertions. Further, the testimony of the
accused's close relative is necessarily suspect and cannot prevail over AAA's unequivocal declaration that
XXX "did not court [her]" and "was not even [her] boyfriend." Even assuming that they have a
relationship, XXX cannot force AAA to have sex against her will.
 TAXATION LAW

METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM (MWSS) vs. CENTRAL

BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, ET AL

(GR No. 215955)

DOCTRINE: The tax-exempt status of a government instrumentality is not lost when it grants the
beneficial use of its real property to a taxable person.

FACTS: MWSS received a real property tax computation from the Pasay City Treasurer’s Office
amounting to ₱166,629.36 in real property tax for 2008.

MWSS filed a protest letter against Pasay City Mayor Peewee Trinidad, arguing that MWSS is a public
utility and a government instrumentality, and its properties and facilities are exempt from real property
tax. Due to the inaction of the LGU of Pasay City, this case was appealed before the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals (LBAA).

However, the LBAA ruled that MWSS is liable to pay real property taxes since MWSS is a Government-
owned and Controlled Corporation (GOCC) and not a mere instrumentality of the government itself.
Thus, the doctrine of tax exemption is not applicable.

The Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA) denied MWSS’s petition, stating their failure to
question the legality of the assessment before the City Assessor in accordance with the Local Government
Code. They chose not to discuss the substantial merits of the case since this is not relevant when it comes
to the collection of real property tax.

ISSUE: Whether or not MWSS, being a government instrumentality, is liable for the LGU’s payment of
real property tax.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the AFFIRMATIVE.

MWSS is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and, as such, is exempt from
payment of real property taxes. It is true that the Executive and Legislative Branches have explicitly
classified MWSS as a government instrumentality with corporate powers through the passage of
Executive Order No. 596 and Republic Act No. 10149.

The factual allegation that the beneficial use of MWSS’s properties in Pasay was given to Maynilad by
virtue of a concession agreement was not proved and was merely based on a sweeping conclusion. Thus,
MWSS is not liable to the LGU of Pasay City for real property taxes.

The tax exemption of its properties, however, ceases when the beneficial or actual use is alleged and
proven to have been extended to a taxable person, rendering all the assessments issued in the name of
MWSS void.
 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC) vs. PROVINCE OF PAMPANGA

(GR No. 230648)

DOCTRINE: The power of taxation is sometimes called the power to destroy; it should be exercised
with caution to minimize injury to the proprietary rights of the taxpayer when levying taxes, fees, and
charges.

FACTS: The NPC received an assessment letter from the provincial treasurer of the province of
Pampanga relative to the collection of franchise tax. They protested the assessment, arguing that its power
generation is no longer considered a public utility operation requiring a franchise. Thus, NPC can no
longer be regarded as a business subject to a franchise tax under Section 137 of the Local Government
Code of 1991.

As they appealed to the RTC, they invoked their exemption under RA 9136, or the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act (EPIRA Law). However, the RTC ruled in favor of the LGU, stating that entities
engaged in the supply of electricity to the contestable market are not considered public utilities required to
secure a franchise. Since the NPC is selling electricity to the province of Pampanga, the NPC is liable to
pay a franchise tax. Aggrieved, the NPC filed the petition before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

Since the Provincial Treasurer failed to specify in the letter the amount of tax that the assessment covered,
the CTA Second Division decided to set the case aside and remand it. Such a decision was affirmed by
the CTA En Banc.

In this petition, NPC raised the lack of details in the assessment letter as tantamount to a violation of due
process of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Province of Pampanga failed to observe the due process requirements in a
deficiency local tax assessment.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

Section 195 of the Local Government Code states that the local treasurer shall issue a notice of
assessment stating the nature of the tax, fee, or charge, the amount of deficiency, surcharges, interests,
and penalties. Due process requires that taxpayers be informed in writing of the facts and law on which
the assessment is based to aid the taxpayer in making a reasonable protest.

In this case, the NPC was deprived of its right to due process of law because the tax assessment issued by
the Treasurer of the province of Pampanga is null and void and of no force and effect.

The assessment letter hardly complies with the requirements; although it stated that they were imposing
franchise tax and penalties for such non-payment or late payment, the details about the amount of the
alleged deficiency tax, surcharges, interest, penalties, and even the prescriptive period were absent.
 [ G.R. Nos. 225750-51, July 28, 2020 ]

KEPCO PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, PETITIONER, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE, RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINES: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) may compromise an assessment when
there is reasonable doubt about the validity of the claim against the taxpayer, or the financial position of
the taxpayer clearly shows an inability to pay the tax.

FACTS: Kepco received a preliminary assessment notice for alleged deficiencies in income tax, value-
added tax (VAT), expanded withholding tax, and final withholding tax (FWT) for the taxable year 2006.
Subsequently, Kepco received a Final Letter of Demand (FLD) on October 30, 2009, specifying
deficiency VAT and FWT amounts. Kepco filed its protest on November 26, 2009.

On June 25, 2010, Kepco filed a petition before the CTA Division (docketed as CTA Case No. 8112).
After trial, the CTA Division partly granted Kepco's petition on December 6, 2013, canceling the
deficiency FWT assessment and compromise penalties. Kepco was ordered to pay deficiency VAT plus
interest and surcharges. Motions for reconsideration were denied.

Not satisfied, Kepco elevated the case to the CTA En Banc on May 5, 2014. The CTA En Banc, in its
decision on November 26, 2015, dismissed Kepco's petition for being filed out of time and granted the
CIR's petition. Kepco filed the instant petition on August 3, 2016. The CIR, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a comment on May 29, 2017, and Kepco replied on June 14, 2017.

ISSUE: Whether the compromise agreement entered into by Kepco with the CIR is valid.

RULING: The power of the CIR to enter into compromise agreements for deficiency taxes is explicit in
Section 204(A) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code. The CIR may compromise an assessment
when reasonable doubts as to the validity of the claim against the taxpayer exist, or the financial position
of the taxpayer demonstrates a clear inability to pay the tax.

Kepco's case falls under paragraph e of RR No. 30-2002, as amended by RR No. 08-2004, where the
assessment became final due to Kepco's failure to appeal the inaction or "deemed denial" of the CIR to
the CTA within 30 days after the expiration of the 180-day period. There is reason to believe that the
assessment is lacking in legal and/or factual basis.

Regarding whether the CIR properly accepted Kepco's offer for compromise, as "the assessment is
lacking in legal and/or factual basis," the general rule is that the authority of the CIR to compromise is
purely discretionary, and the courts cannot interfere with his exercise of discretionary functions, absent
grave abuse of discretion. In this case, no grave abuse of discretion exists, as Kepco complied with the
procedures prescribed under the BIR rules on the application and approval of a compromise settlement on
the ground of doubtful validity.
 CIR vs FILMINERA

DOCTRINE: To qualify as zero-rated export sales, a Value Added Tax (VAT)-registered taxpayer
selling goods to a Board of Investments (BOI)-registered enterprise must provide proof of actual
exportation.

FACTS: Filminera Resources entered into an Ore Sales and Purchase Agreement with the Philippine
Gold Processing and Refining Corporation (PGPRC). For the third and fourth quarters of the fiscal year
ending June 30, 2010, Filminera Resources filed amended quarterly VAT returns and claimed a refund of
unutilized input VAT due to its zero-rated sales to PGPRC. After the CIR denied the refund claims,
Filminera Resources filed petitions for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). Initially, the CTA
Division denied Filminera Resources' refund claims, stating that the company had failed to prove that its
sales to PGPRC qualified as export sales subject to the zero percent (0%) rate. Filminera Resources
sought reconsideration and submitted a BOI Certification dated January 27, 2010, which indicated that
PGPRC had exported 100% of its total sales volume. In response, the CTA Division amended its decision
and granted Filminera Resources' refund claims. The CIR appealed to the CTA En Banc, arguing that the
BOI Certification did not meet the legal requirements to support Filminera Resources' refund claims and
that the certification was issued after the period in question. The CTA En Banc denied the CIR's motion
for reconsideration, affirming its previous decision.

ISSUE: Whether the BOI (Board of Investments) Certification submitted by Filminera Resources
sufficiently meets the legal requirements to support its claim for a tax refund of unutilized input Value
Added Tax (VAT) attributed to zero-rated sales.

RULING: No.
Under Section 112(A)(5) of the 1997 NIRC, the seller may claim a refund or tax credit for the input VAT
attributable to its zero-rated sales, subject to certain conditions. These conditions include being VAT-
registered, engaging in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales, filing the claim within two years after
the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, and attributing the creditable input tax due or
paid to such sales. Additionally, in the case of zero-rated sales, the acceptable foreign currency exchange
proceeds must be duly accounted for in accordance with Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas rules and
regulations.

Filminera Resources fulfilled the first and third requisites, being a VAT-registered taxpayer that filed
refund claims within the prescribed period. However, the company failed to prove that its sales to PGPRC
for the specified quarters of FY 2010 were export sales. Without the BOI certification attesting to the
actual exportation by PGPRC of its entire products during that period, the sales cannot be considered
zero-rated export sales. Since the second requisite is not met, further discussion of the fourth requirement
is unnecessary.

In conclusion, Filminera Resources Corporation is not entitled to a refund or the issuance of a tax credit
certificate in the amount of P111,579,541.76, representing its unutilized input value-added tax attributable
to zero-rated sales during the specified quarters of the fiscal year ending June 30, 2010.
 [G.R. No. 215159. July 05, 2022 ]

CHEVRON HOLDINGS, INC. (FORMERLY CALTEX ASIA LIMITED), PETITIONER, VS.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: The Court will not reject a request for a refund of unutilized input Value-Added Tax
(VAT) on zero-rated sales simply because the taxpayer lacks "excess" input VAT from the output VAT,
as the law does not mandate such a requirement for eligibility. The Court may not construe a statute that
is free from doubt; neither can we impose conditions nor limitations when none are provided for. The
appeal filed as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenges the
Decision dated May 6, 2014, and the Amended Decision dated October 28, 2014, of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) En Banc in CTA EB No. 940.

FACTS: Chevron Holdings, a corporation based in Delaware, USA, with a Regional Operating
Headquarter (ROHQ) in the Philippines, requested a refund of unutilized input VAT for the taxable year
2006. With zero-rated and regular-rated sales, the corporation provided services to its affiliates. Despite
incurring input taxes on these services, Chevron Holdings did not compensate them against output taxes
because substantial amounts were carried forward from previous quarters. Chevron Holdings filed a
Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) after the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(CIR) failed to reply to an administrative claim for reimbursement.

The petitions were initially denied by the CTA Division because they were filed before the 120-day time
for the CIR to act on the administrative claim had expired. The motion for reconsideration filed by
Chevron Holdings was also dismissed. However, the CTA En Banc overturned the decision, finding that
the claims were filed in a timely manner, taking into account the validity period of a BIR determination.
The CTA En Banc permitted only a fraction of the input VAT attributable to zero-rated sales, citing the
necessity for sufficient documentation, and denied certain amounts due to a lack of supporting papers and
failure to comply with invoicing requirements. It also observed no excess input VAT for the later quarters
of 2006 and limited the refundable amount. Furthermore, it declared the input tax carry-over invalid due
to the absence of supporting documents.

ISSUE: Whether the sales rendered to Chevron Holdings' non-resident foreign affiliates qualify for VAT
zero-rating under Section 108(B)(2) of the Tax Code; (2) whether Chevron Holdings is required to
substantiate its excess input tax carried-over from the previous quarters in the amount of P55,784,357.71
to be entitled to refund or credit of unutilized input taxes arising from zero-rated sales from January 1 to
December 31, 2006; and (3) whether the CTA En Banc properly charged against Chevron Holdings'
output tax liabilities the validated input taxes and only when there existed excess input taxes that it allows
the refund.

RULING: The instant Petition for Review docketed as CTA Case No. 7776 and the Petition for Review
docketed as CTA Case No. 7813 are hereby denied for having been prematurely filed and are dismissed
for lack of cause of action. The other issues raised became moot and academic. The petitioner's motion
for partial reconsideration is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated May 6, 2014, is
hereby amended to reflect the additional amount allowed for refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate
in the amount of Forty[-]Seven Thousand Four Hundred Nine and Twenty-Four Centavos ([P]47,409.24),
representing the unutilized excess input VAT for the first quarter of 2006, which is attributable to its zero-
rated sales for the same period. The instant Petition for Review docketed as CTA Case No. 7776 and the
Petition for Review docketed as CTA Case No. 7813 are hereby denied for having been prematurely filed
and are dismissed for lack of cause of action. The other issues raised became moot and academic.
Premises considered, [Chevron Holdings'] "Motion for Reconsideration" is hereby denied for lack of
merit.
 PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION Petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT Respondent.

G.R. No. 218068

DOCTRINE: This Petition for Certiorari, filed under Rule 64 and Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,
challenges the Commission on Audit's (COA) Decision No. 2012-1202 dated August 2, 2012, and
Resolution dated March 9, 2015, in COA CP Case No. 2012-025.

FACTS: The dispute involving Westmont Bank (formerly Associated Bank, now United Overseas Bank
of the Philippines) originated from the PDIC Corporate Auditor's 1st Indorsement dated August 24, 2000.
The Corporate Auditor identified financial assistance granted to Westmont Bank by PDIC, amounting to
Php 1,656,830,000.00, which included a waived buyback agreement, early buyback incentives, deferred
regular interest, a refund of regular interest, and the abolition of PDIC interest spread. The Corporate
Auditor contended that these measures amounted to the release or condonation of Westmont Bank's
principal obligations and interests, prejudicial to PDIC's interests. Despite recognizing PDIC's power to
compromise, condone, or release claims, the Corporate Auditor invoked Section 369 of Presidential
Decree No. 1445, as amended, to justify the COA's review. The case was then forwarded to the COA
proper. On the other hand, the case involving Keppel Monte Savings Bank (KMSB) stemmed from the
Corporate Auditor's Notice of Suspension dated September 17, 1998, suspending the audit of
P325,000,000.00 charged to PDIC's Expense-Cost for the Rehabilitation of KMSB. This amount was part
of non-performing loans purchased by PDIC from KMSB. The Corporate Auditor recommended the
write-off of the P325,000,000.00 due to uncertainties in collection, but the Notice of Suspension was not
lifted despite PDIC's compliance. In a joint memorandum dated May 23, 2007, the LAO-C Director
opined that COA's approval was not necessary for PDIC's exercise of power but advised a review of the
transactions. The PDIC Supervising Auditor, in response, indicated that the transactions had already been
post-audited.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the NFD;
2. Whether there was unreasonable delay, amounting to grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the
COA in resolving the case;
3. Whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in recommending to deny the
condonation/write-off; and
4. Whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the NDs.
5. Whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding the PDIC BOD liable to settle
the disallowance.

RULING: The petition is deemed without merit. The first issue addresses the proper issuance of the
Notice of Finality and Demand (NFD) under Section 9, Rule X of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of
the Commission on Audit (COA). Although the NFD was appropriately issued, the petition is not
rendered moot, as it was filed within the stipulated period before the COA decision reached finality. The
second issue challenges the alleged inordinate delay in the COA's resolution of the case. It emphasizes
that the right to a speedy disposition of cases, as constitutionally mandated, is not automatically violated
by every delay. In the case at hand, the court argues that the complexities involved in auditing significant
transactions, coupled with varying rulings from COA officers, justify the extended timeline. Additionally,
the court rejects the application of a strict 60-day period, as COA proceedings on matters like these don't
involve adversarial cases. Moreover, the court criticizes the petitioner, the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC), for not timely invoking its right to a speedy disposition. The third issue affirms the
COA's authority and duty to recommend the condonation and release of claims, citing legal provisions
and jurisprudence that grant such powers. The court stresses that the COA has the constitutional mandate
to examine, audit, and settle all accounts of the government, including those of government-owned or
controlled corporations (GOCCs). The fourth issue supports the COA's factual findings, stating that,
absent any grave abuse of discretion, the court accords respect and finality to these findings. The fifth
issue addresses the liability of the PDIC Board of Directors for disallowed amounts, contending that the
PDIC BOD's gross negligence and failure to comply with mandatory provisions justify their liability.
Consequently, the court dismisses the petition and affirms the COA decision, resolutions, and notices of
disallowance.
 UNIMASTERS CONGLOMERATION INCORPORATED, PETITIONER, VS. TACLOBAN
CITY GOVERNMENT, PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE, PHILIPPINE
TOURISM AUTHORITY, AND THE PROVINCE OF LEYTE, RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: Co-ownership of a property involving government entities and private corporations

requires careful consideration of contractual agreements to establish individual liabilities and
responsibilities. A Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed on September 26, 2014, pursuant to Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. This petition aims to overturn Decision dated August 22, 2014, issued in CTA EB
No. 901 by the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc.

FACTS: Leyte Park Hotel Inc. (LPHI), co-owned by Assets Privatization Trust (APT), the Province of
Leyte, and the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA), entered into a lease contract with Unimasters
Conglomeration Incorporated (UCI) in 1994. The contract stipulated that real property taxes would be the
responsibility of the lessor (LPHI). UCI initially paid its rentals and taxes but ceased payments in 2000,
leading to demands from APT/PMO. Despite these demands, UCI failed to settle its obligations, retaining
possession without payment. The City Treasurer of Tacloban sought unpaid real property taxes, resulting
in a collection case before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA held UCI liable for
P22,826,902.20, affirming the liability for realty taxes from 1995–2004. The CTA deferred the resolution
of the contractual obligation issue pending another case. UCI appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging
the application of the beneficial use principle and arguing that the Republic assumed tax payment
responsibility through PMO, PTA, and the Province of Leyte, waiving tax exemption.

ISSUE: Whether or not UCI is responsible for covering the real property taxes of LPHI, notwithstanding
the ownership by tax-exempt entities and the presence of a contractual clause assuming responsibility for
tax liabilities.

RULING: The Court ruled that UCI is responsible for paying real property taxes. Although the property
is owned by entities exempt from taxes, UCI was granted the beneficial use of the property as a taxable
entity. According to the beneficial use principle, the responsibility for real property taxes lies with the
taxable entity that has the beneficial use and possession of the property. Even if there is a contract
provision stating UCI's liability for taxes, the enforceability of that provision is a separate matter that will
be addressed in another case. Therefore, UCI's appeal is denied, and the CTA's ruling is affirmed.
 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PHILEX MINING CORP.

(GR No. 230016)

DOCTRINE: When the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, they must be given
their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

FACTS: Philex Mining filed its claims for a refund with the Department of Finance’s One-Stop Center
after submitting its VAT returns to reflect excess input tax arising from its zero-rated sales. Subsequently,
Philex filed two separate petitions before the Court of Tax Appeals, which were partly granted by the tax
court division.

However, the Commissioner from the BIR moved to reconsider the decision, alleging that the judicial
claim for a refund was premature, Philex did not submit the required checklist of documents, and Philex
failed to comply with the accounting requirements. Nevertheless, the CTA denied their motion for lack of
merit, and it was affirmed by the CTA En Banc.

The CIR attacked Philex Mining for not complying with the provisions under Revenue Regulation No.
16-2055.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philex Mining failed to prove that it filed the monthly VAT declarations as
required by the Tax Code and the said Revenue Regulations.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the NEGATIVE.

The CTA aptly held that there was nothing in the Tax Code or in RR No. 16-2005 that would suggest that
the subsidiary journals and monthly VAT declarations are part of the substantiation requirements that
must be complied with for a claim for tax refund or credit.

Under Sec. 110 of the Tax Code, creditable input taxes must be evidenced by a VAT invoice or official
receipt, which must, in turn, be issued in accordance with Secs. 113 and 237. The reason for strict
compliance with invoicing requirements is that only a ―VAT invoice or official receipt‖ can give rise to
any input from domestic purchases of goods or services. Thus, without input tax, there is nothing to
refund.

The language used in Sec. 110 is plain, clear, and unambiguous: input taxes must be evidenced by validly
issued invoices and/or official receipts containing the information enumerated in Sections 113 and 237.
The law does not require that subsidiary journals where the sales and purchases were recorded also be
kept.
 CIVIL LAW

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.

(GR No. 218378)

DOCTRINE: Unjust enrichment, as provided under the Civil Code, is not a catch-all provision that can
be conveniently invoked when a party has suffered a loss.

FACTS: The Benguet Electric Cooperative (BENECO) filed a complaint before the RTC against the
National Power Corporation (NPC) for injunction, damages, and other relief. This originated from the
demand letter issued by NPC to BENECO for its underbilling from May 2000 to February 2004,
amounting to ₱157,743,314.43, and requiring BENECO to pay the amount. BENECO refused to pay the
underbilling and argued that it resulted from NPC’s failure to discover the error in the metering device.
To elaborate, an NPC employee studied BENECO’s operations and discovered its low system losses. It
was found by BENECO’s billing meter that the CTR was set at 75/5 instead of 140/5, meaning that NPC
had been billing BENECO half the correct amount of electricity. The RTC ruled in favor of BENECO,
stating that BENECO cannot be faulted for the wrong multiplier and that NPC’s failure to determine the
error is a case of negligence, and it must bear the consequential losses, which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals (CA). NPC insists that BENECO is liable for the underbilling because it consumed the
electricity from NPC but only paid half of the actual price; otherwise, BENECO will be unjustly enriched.

ISSUE: Whether or not BENECO’s non-payment of the underbilling constitutes unjust enrichment.

RULING: The Supreme Court averred in the NEGATIVE. Although the CA is correct that BENECO is
liable for the underbilling of the power bills corrected within the 90-day period based on Section 25 of the
Transition Contract, it is not on the principle of unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment exists when a
person unfairly retains a benefit, money, or property against the fundamental principles of justice, equity,
and good conscience, as embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code, which requires that a person return
something at the expense of another without just or legal grounds. This principle does not automatically
apply when one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of another. It is necessary to show that the
enrichment of one party is without a just or legal basis and that the plaintiff has no other action against the
other party. Hence, there is no unjust enrichment when the person who benefited has a valid claim to such
a benefit. The NPC and BENECO executed a Contract of Sale of Electricity and a Transition Contract for
the Supply of Electricity to govern their rights and obligations in the supply of electric power and energy.
Therefore, any action that one may bring against the other shall be based on the provisions of their
contract. Thus, the principle of unjust enrichment will not apply.
 DANILO SANTIAGO JIMENEZ ET AL vs. DAMIAN F. JIMENEZ

(GR No. 228011)

DOCTRINE: As an innocent mortgagee with a superior lien, its rights to foreclose on the property are
reserved.

FACTS: The Jimenez siblings filed a complaint for the annulment of the deed of donation, TCT No. N-
217728, and the deed of real estate mortgage before the RTC of Quezon City, with the prayer for
injunction. The extrajudicial sale proceeded as scheduled.

They discovered that the estate, left by their late father (Corona), was involved through an executed Deed
of Donation in favor of Damian. Through the deed of donation, TCT No. RT-122097 (Corona’s lot) was
canceled. Eventually, Damian mortgaged the said property to Calubad and Keh in consideration of a loan,
which was annotated by another TCT.

The RTC found that Corona's signature was forged, declared the deed void, but sustained the validity
issued in the name of Calubad and Keh after finding them innocent mortgagees, for value and good faith.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

They argued that while Calubad and Keh may be mortgagees in good faith, they are not purchasers, as
they became aware of Sonia’s adverse claim when they purchased the property during the public auction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Calubad and Keh are not the purchasers of the contested property.

RULING: The Supreme Court held in the NEGATIVE.

The Court rejected the jurisprudential reliance supporting the argument that Calubad and Keh are not
purchasers, instead using the doctrine produced in the case of BPI vs. Noblejas, wherein the Court ruled
that any subsequent lien or encumbrance cannot defeat the rights of an innocent mortgagee as a purchaser
in a foreclosure sale.

Accordingly, Sonia’s adverse claim cannot prevail over Calubad and Keh’s rights as mortgagees in good
faith and purchasers in the foreclosure sale.

Being mortgagees in good faith, they have a superior lien over that of Sonia, and their right to foreclose is
reserved. Thus, the mortgagee’s purchase of the property back on October 23, 2002, is retroactive to the
date of the mortgage registration on May 21, 2001, making the sale superior to the adviser's claim on July
12, 2002.
 HERMELINA RAMA & BABY RAMA LAURON vs. SPS. NORGA & SPS. RAMA

(GR No. 219556)

DOCTRINE: The required written notice by the seller is mandatory and indispensable for the 30-day
redemption period to commence.

FACTS: The petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale, redemption, and other reliefs
after the failure of conciliation proceedings with the assistance of the barangay before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC).

This was after the petitioners discovered that Ricardo Rama sold his ¼ undivided share to the spouses
respondents without their knowledge. During the proceedings, the petitioners offered to redeem the
property, but it was rejected. The spouses entered the property and had it surveyed for partition.

In defense, the spouses Nogra claimed that Ricardo gave a written notice of sale to Hermelina as
evidenced by a postal return slip. Hermelina had sufficient knowledge of the conveyances due to her
participation in the ejectment case against Lucina, and Ricardo admitted to Hermelina that he sold his
share to the spouses during one of its proceedings. Mostly, Hermelina’s right to redeem Ricardo’s share
had lapsed when she filed the pleading.

The latter argument was not favored by the RTC but set aside by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not Hermelina validly exercises her right to redemption by filing a complaint.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the AFFIRMATIVE.

Article 1623 of the New Civil Code substantially provides that the right of legal redemption (pre-
emption) shall not be exercised except within 30 days from notice in writing by the prospective vendor or
by the vendor. The required written notice by the seller is mandatory and indispensable for the 30-day
redemption period to commence.

The explicit requirement of written notice may only be dispensed with upon a showing that co-owners
already had sufficient knowledge of the sale and were guilty of laches in the exercise of their redemption
rights. Absent these factors, the strict letter of the law must apply.

In this case, Hermelina cannot be faulted for exercising her redemption right upon receipt of the Deed of
Absolute Sale because it was only at that time that all uncertainties as to the sale, its terms, and its validity
were settled. Thus, the 30-day redemption provided by the Civil Code should be reckoned from
Hermelina’s receipt of the Deed of Absolute Sale, concluding that Hermelina validly and enforced her
right of redemption through the filing of the complaint within the 30-day period.
 BELINDA ALEXANDER vs. SPS. ESCALONA

(GR No. 238940)

DOCTRINE: The absence of consent renders the contract void and inexistent.

FACTS: The spouses, respondents, filed a complaint for annulment of documents with damages against
Belinda and Reygan before the RTC after Belinda insisted on the legitimacy of her contracts despite the
spouses' explanation not to sell the unregistered parcels of land. They averred that they never transferred
the said Lot 2, but Reygan fraudulently sold it to Belinda, and Hilaria did not consent to the waiver of
rights over Lot 1, and that such controversy was not meant to convey ownership to Reygan. Belinda
sought to dismiss the case on the grounds of laches and prescription, which were upheld in favor of the
decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint for being time-barred and ordering the spouse respondents
to vacate the premises and pay damages. But it was set aside by the Court of Appeals. Belinda maintained
that Lots 1 and 2 belong to Jorge, and contracts over these lots are valid. She echoed that she is a buyer in
good faith entitled to ownership.

ISSUE: Whether or not Belinda acquired vested rights over Lot 1 and contracts over Lot 2 are valid.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the NEGATIVE. Sps. Escalona remained the lawful owners
of Lot 1 and 2. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity, and extent do not depend upon events
foreign to the will of the holder, or to the existence of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate
and perfect in itself and not dependent upon contingency. Rights are considered vested when the right to
enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, perfect, or fixed and irrefutable. Here, Reygan
and Belinda did not show any vested rights over Lot 1 because the transaction between them happened in
1998 when the Family Code was implemented. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code governs this
transaction, not the Civil Code, which renders void any alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal
property without the consent of the other spouse. It is undisputed that Sps. Escalona did not transfer Lot 2
to Reygan since there is no document purporting to convey Lot No. 2 from Sps. Escalona to Reygan.
Neither Jorge nor Hilaria consented to the transfer of Lot 2 from Reygan to Belinda. Consequently, the
transactions over Lot 2 are void because Reygan never acquired ownership, which he can validly convey
to Belinda. Thus, with the absence of consent required for the contract to be perfected, the contract of sale
for Lot 2 is void.
CENTRAL BAY RECLAMATION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION COMMISSION ON
AUDIT

(GR No. 252940)

DOCTRINE: It is basic that an assignor or seller cannot assign or sell something he does not own at the
time the ownership or the rights to ownership are to be transferred to the assignee or buyer.

FACTS: The COA disapproved the Compromise Agreement between the Central Bay Reclamation and
the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA), stating that the stipulation to transfer the reclaimed land
from PRA to Central Bay’s qualified assignee is a circumvention of the Court’s decision, which declared
void the amended JVA for violating the constitutional prohibition against private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land in the public domain except through a lease. Additionally, COA
denied the money claims, consisting of squatter relocation costs, an additional item of advances, and
professional fees for a lack of supporting documents. Central Bay filed a petition alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of CA in non-approval of the Compromise Agreement and insisted that it will not
own the reclaimed land but will be assigning it to a qualified individual.

ISSUE: Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion while disapproving the Compromise
Agreement.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE. The Compromise Agreement obliged PRA to
transfer the reclaimed land to Central Bay’s qualified assignee. Yet, this scheme grants Central Bay
beneficial ownership or equitable title, which means that Central Bay will hold the reclaimed land other
than by lease, violating the constitutional ban. The assignee cannot acquire greater rights than those
pertaining to the assignor since the former is merely subrogated to the rights and obligations of the
assignor, and they are bound by exactly the same conditions that held the assignor under the original
parties’ transactions. Thus, the proscription against corporate ownership of alienable land is absolute and
clear in the text of Sec. 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
 [ G.R. No. 237449, December 02, 2020 ]

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF AIDA A. BAMBAO, LINDA A. KUCSKAR,

PETITIONER, VS. COSME B. SEKITO, JR., RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: ART. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.

In international law, the party seeking the application of a foreign law to a dispute or case bears the
burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded
and proved, as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. They are presumed
to know only domestic or forum law.

FACTS: On February 5, 2000, Aida died as a widow in her residence in Long Beach, California. On
March 27, 2000, Cosme filed a Petition for the Allowance of Will/Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem
(allowance of the will) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. Cosme prayed to be
appointed as the Special Administrator of Aida's estate pending the issuance of letters testamentary and as
the guardian ad litem of Aida's adopted minor child, Elsa Bambao (Elsa). Meanwhile, Linda A. Kucskar
(Linda), the decedent's sister and one of the heirs named in the will, opposed the petition and claimed that
she was the one defraying all of Elsa's expenses. Linda added that Aida left real estate property in
Calbayog City, which was excluded from the petition.

During the trial, Cosme presented authenticated copies of Aida's will as well as her Revocable Living
Trust (living trust). The parties stipulated that these documents are faithful reproductions of the originals.
In due course, the RTC appointed Cosme as the special administrator of Aida's estate but designated
Cosme and Linda as Elsa's co-guardians. Subsequently, the RTC submitted the petition for resolution
regarding the allowance of the will. On August 4, 2011, the RTC granted the petition and ordered the
issuance of a certificate of allowance for the will.

Aggrieved, Linda elevated the case to the CA. On August 31, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings
pursuant to the rule on substantial compliance. The appellant proceeds to point out the defects in the
attestation clause, mentioning that it does not specify the number of pages used and fails to state that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of three witnesses. Also, there were only
two attesting witnesses, which is less than the required number.

ISSUE: Should Aida's will be considered for probate?

RULING: Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad. A foreign will can
have legal effects in our jurisdiction.

ART. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed
in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Here, it is undisputed that Aida is a naturalized American citizen and that she executed the will in
California, United States of America, where she was residing at the time of her death. As such, the
Philippine courts must examine the formalities of Aida's will in accordance with California law. Yet, it is
settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in this jurisdiction, and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them.

It is the hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the
burden of proving the law under the doctrine of processual presumption, which, in this case, the
petitioners failed to discharge.

In international law, the party seeking the application of a foreign law to a dispute or case bears the
burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded
and proved, as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. They are presumed
to know only domestic or forum law.
 Alba vs. Arollado

DOCTRINE: Prescription of actions is interrupted when (1) they are filed before the court, (2) when
there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, or (3) when there is any written acknowledgment
of the debt by the debtor.

FACTS: Regina is the sole proprietor of Libra Fishing, engaged in selling crude oil, petroleum products,
and related merchandise. Nida purchased on credit from Libra Fishing crude oil and other petroleum
products. As payment for the July 26, 2000, November 12, 2000, and November 27, 2000 purchases,
Nida issued three checks which were dishonored by the drawee banks. On May 15, 2013, Regina
demanded payment for the outstanding balance, but Nida failed to heed the demand. Thus, on June 4,
2013, Regina filed a complaint for a sum of money against Nida. Nida admitted that she issued the three
dishonored checks but claimed that she already settled the amounts through installment payments. She
averred that she religiously paid her obligations to Regina and denied any outstanding liability. Granting
there are still unpaid amounts, Regina's right to collect had already been prescribed since the transaction
took place more than ten years ago.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reckoning date of the prescriptive period for actions based upon an oral
contract is from the date of the last partial payment of the outstanding debt by the debtor.

RULING: No. An action based upon a written contract prescribes in 10 years, whereas one predicated on
a contract not in writing must be commenced in 6 years. Regina's right to collect a sum of money against
Nida must be enforced within six years under Article 1145 of the Civil Code. Relative thereto, Article
1150 of the same code provides that the prescriptive period for actions that have no special provision
ordaining otherwise shall be counted from the day they may be brought. The legal possibility of bringing
the action determines the starting point for the computation of the period of prescription. This accrual
refers to the cause of action, which is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates the rights of
another. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of
the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant
to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. It is only when the
last element occurs that a cause of action arises.

In this case, the check issued to settle the obligation for the July 26, 2000 purchases was dishonored by
the drawee bank on August 25, 2000, and the November 12, 2002, and November 27, 2002, checks were
both dishonored on April 4, 2003. The dishonor of the three checks resulted in a breach of the contract for
non-payment. At this point, the right to bring an action for the collection of a sum of money accrues.
Counting six years from there, Regina had until August 25, 2006, to collect the amount covered by the
July 26, 2000, check and until April 4, 2009, for the November 12 and 27, 2002, checks. Regina filed the
complaint on June 4, 2013; hence, the action had already been prescribed. To be sure, the prescription of
actions is interrupted when (1) they are filed before the court, (2) when there is a written extrajudicial
demand by the creditors, or (3) when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. In
this case, however, Regina filed the complaint in court only on June 4, 2013, and issued the demand letter
only on May 15, 2013, when the prescriptive period to collect had already set in.
 Banico v. Stager

DOCTRINE: The lawyer's mistake in drafting the written instrument will not prevent its reformation if
the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties show that their true intention was not disclosed in
the document.

FACTS: Lydia owns a 6,100-square-meter property on Boracay Island. In 1991, Lydia offered to sell the
entire property to Ulysses, but he only agreed to buy an 800-square meter portion suitable for building a
beach resort. They signed a Deed of Absolute Sale for this portion on February 8, 1992. Ulysses paid for
the 800-square-meter portion and took possession of the flat terrain. However, he later realized that the
land described in the deed referred to the elevated and rocky part, not the flat area he bought. Lydia
convinced Ulysses to purchase an additional 400-square meter portion adjacent to the flat terrain for
P160,000 on an installment basis. Ulysses agreed, with the condition that Lydia would amend the deed to
reflect the correct location, area, and consideration. On October 19, 1992, they signed a contract to sell
the 400-square-meter lot. Ulysses made an initial payment, and Lydia issued a receipt. Ulysses began
constructing a resort and paid the remaining amount. In 2001, Lydia presented a notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale, dated December 6, 2001, with the correct property description for the 800-square meter
lot. Ulysses did not sign it due to the omission of the proper consideration. In 2002, Ulysses filed a
lawsuit against Lydia, seeking specific performance and damages. In 2015, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) ordered the reformation of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 8, 1992, to reflect the correct
location of the 800-square meter lot and determined an unpaid balance of P6,600 for the 400-square meter
lot. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In 2017, the CA denied the reformation of the
contract, citing prescription and stating that Ulysses' lawyer caused the ambiguity. It reduced Ulysses'
unpaid balance for the 400-square meter lot to P5,860 and dismissed his claim for damages.

ISSUE: Whether the contract should be reformed to accurately reflect the parties' intention and the
correct property description for the 800-square meter lot.

RULING: Yes. The complaint and the prayer for relief clearly indicate that this is a case for the
reformation of the instrument. Ulysses alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 8, 1992, did
not express the correct description of the lot he bought and requested Lydia to execute an amended deed
of sale containing all the parties' stipulations. An action for reformation of the instrument may prosper
only when the following requisites are met: (1) there must have been a meeting of the minds of the
contract parties; (2) the instrument does not express the true intention of the parties; and (3) the failure of
the instrument to express the true intention of the parties is due to mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or
accident. The burden of proof lies with the party who insists that the contract should be reformed. In this
case, all these requisites are present.

However, in Huibonhoa v. Court of Appeals, a lawyer's oversight in drafting the instrument was not
considered a valid reason for reformation. In that case, the petitioner failed to prove what mistake
allegedly suppressed the parties' actual agreement and simply relied on the oversight of her counsel in
preparing the document. We ruled that the error cannot be attributed to all the contracting parties, and any
ambiguity should be interpreted against the petitioner. The present case is distinctly different. Unlike in
Huibonhoa, Ulysses was able to substantiate his claim that the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated February 8,
1992, did not express the true intention of the parties regarding the description of the lot. There is
overwhelming evidence that the real subject of the contract pertains to the flat terrain and not the elevated
and rocky northern part of Lot No. 199, as evidenced by proven and admitted facts, as well as the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. Consequently, there is no reason to attribute the
mistake of Ulysses' counsel to him. As appropriately noted by the RTC, the parties are not experts in
understanding the technical description of the land. The fact that it was Ulysses' counsel who prepared the
deed of sale should not prevent the reformation of the instrument.

Therefore, when considering the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 8, 1992, it is evident that it failed
to reflect the true intention of the parties. Consequently, Ulysses can validly request reformation of the
instrument. The strictness of the legal rule that a written instrument should be the final and unchanging
criterion for the rights and obligations of the contracting parties is tempered to prevent the effect of
mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident. We will now determine whether prescription bars
Ulysses' action for the reformation of the instrument.
 Commoner Lending Corporation vs Sps Villanueva

DOCTRINE: It is settled that the literal meaning shall govern when the terms of a contract are clear and
leave no doubt as to the parties' intention. The courts have no authority to alter the agreement or make a
new contract for the parties. Their duty is confined to the interpretation of the terms and conditions that
the parties have made for themselves without regard to their wisdom or folly. The courts cannot supply
material stipulations or read into the contract words that it does not contain. It is only when the contract is
vague and ambiguous that the courts are permitted to interpret the agreement and determine the intention
of the parties.

FACTS: Spouses Voltaire and Ella Villanueva borrowed P100,000 from The Commoner Lending
Corporation (TCLC) with a 24% annual interest rate, using Lot No. 380-D as security. They repaid a total
of P82,680 but failed to settle the remaining P41,340, prompting TCLC to initiate foreclosure of the
property. An auction sale took place on December 7, 2004, where TCLC emerged as the sole bidder and
was granted a certificate of sale on December 14, 2004. The final deed of sale was executed in favor of
TCLC on January 31, 2006.

Spouses Villanueva contested the foreclosure, alleging that the mortgage agreement didn't explicitly grant
TCLC the power to sell the property. They argued that the mortgage allowed TCLC to possess the
property without a judicial order, constituting a prohibited pactum commissorium. Furthermore, they
claimed they only learned of the foreclosure in January 2005, denying receipt of any foreclosure notice.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed their complaint, finding the foreclosure valid. The RTC held
that there was no pactum commissorium and that the mortgage clause merely expressed Spouses
Villanueva's willingness to an extrajudicial foreclosure sale.

Unsatisfied, Spouses Villanueva appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the RTC's
decision. The CA declared the foreclosure, certificate of sale, and final deed of sale null and void, arguing
that TCLC lacked the authority to foreclose the mortgage, and paragraph 3 of the real estate mortgage
indicated the borrowers' willingness for an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, but not TCLC's power to
conduct one. TCLC sought reconsideration but was denied, leading to this petition. TCLC argued that the
mortgage granted the authority to foreclose and sell the property to repay the debt. Spouses Villanueva
contended that TCLC was only given the right to possess the property but not to foreclose the mortgage
for non-payment.

ISSUE: Whether or not TCLC had the legal authority to foreclose the mortgage and sell the mortgaged
property to satisfy the Villanuevas' debt

RULING: Yes. It is settled that the literal meaning shall govern when the terms of a contract are clear
and leave no doubt as to the parties' intention. The courts have no authority to alter the agreement or make
a new contract for the parties. Their duty is confined to the interpretation of the terms and conditions that
the parties have made for themselves without regard to their wisdom or folly. The courts cannot supply
material stipulations or read into the contract words it does not contain. It is only when the contract is
vague and ambiguous that the courts are permitted to interpret the agreement and determine the intention
of the parties.
Specifically, in extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage, a unique power to sell the property is
required, which must be either inserted in or attached to the deed of mortgage. The special power or
authority to sell finds support in civil law. Foremost, in extrajudicial foreclosure, the sale is made through
the sheriff by the mortgagees acting as the agents of mortgagors-owners. Hence, there must be written
authority from the mortgagor-owners in favor of the mortgagees. Otherwise, the sale would be void.
Moreover, a special power of attorney is necessary before entering "into any contract by which the
ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration."
Thus, the written authority must be a special power of attorney to sell.

Here, it is undisputed that no special power to sell was attached to the real estate mortgage. TCLC relied
on the express provision of paragraph 3 of the agreement, allowing it "to take any legal action as may be
necessary to satisfy the mortgage debt." Yet, the CA construed the provision as a mere grant of authority
to foreclose but not to sell the property. On this point, we find a reversible error on the part of the
appellate court.

Indeed, while it has been held that a power of sale will not be recognized as contained in a mortgage
unless it is given by express grant and in clear and explicit terms, and that there can be no implied power
of sale where a mortgage held by a deed absolute in form, it is generally held that no particular formality
is required in the creation of the power of sale. Any words are sufficient to evidence an intention that the
sale may be made upon default or other contingency. In this case, paragraph 3 of the real estate mortgage
sufficiently incorporated the required special power of attorney to sell. It expressly provides that the
mortgaged property shall be foreclosed, judicially or extrajudicially, upon failure to satisfy the debt and
that TCLC, the mortgagee, is appointed as the attorney-in-fact of Spouses Villanueva, the mortgagors, to
do any legal action as may be necessary to satisfy the mortgage debt.

The court emphasized that obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the parties
and should be complied with in good faith. It noted that Spouses Villanueva, who freely entered into the
real estate mortgage contract, could not renege on their obligation.
 DAR Employees Association vs COA

DOCTRINE: Without a doubt, receiving public funds without a valid basis or justification is already an
undue benefit that gives rise to the obligation to return. The civil law principles of solutio indebiti and
unjust enrichment found this obligation. The recipients' good faith or bad faith is immaterial in the
determination of their liability.

FACTS: The case involves the disallowance of disbursements made by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Regional Office No. 02 (DAR-R02) for Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA)
Incentives. These incentives were paid to DAR-R02 officials and employees for their achievements from
2008 to 2009, totaling ₱6,598,000. However, the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed these
disbursements, stating that they were charged against the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) Fund, which is a special fund created for a specific purpose, and this violated the government
auditing code. The DAR-R02 argued that the CARP Fund was considered consolidated and operationally
one with Fund 101 (DAR's general fund) and that the CNA Incentives could be sourced from CARP Fund
savings. The COA upheld the disallowances, holding the DAR-R02 officers and employees solidarily
liable to return the disallowed amounts and the payees liable up to the amounts they received, based on
the principle of solutio indebiti. The DAREA, representing its rank-and-file members, sought relief from
the COA's decision, claiming good faith and seeking to avoid refund. The COA maintained the validity of
the disallowances and argued that good faith does not exempt the recipients from liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the recipients, including the rank-and-file employees, should be held liable to
refund the disallowed amounts.

RULING: Yes. The court clarified that the extent of one's participation in a disallowed transaction is a
determinant of liability. While in the past, passive recipients who received disallowed amounts in good
faith were sometimes excused from returning the funds; recent legal precedents changed this approach.
The court ruled that good faith is not determinative of liability concerning unlawful expenditures.

The court stated that civil law principles such as solutio indebiti (an obligation to return what has been
received without a valid basis) and unjust enrichment apply to cases of unlawful expenditures. Recipients
of such funds are generally liable to return them unless they can prove their entitlement to what they
received or show that certain justifications, such as undue prejudice or social justice considerations,
exempt them from the obligation to return.

In this case, the court found that the COA's order to refund the CNA Incentives to DAREA's members
was proper. The court held that the DAR-R02 had no valid basis to release these incentives, which
constituted unjust enrichment and an obligation to refund the recipients. Furthermore, the court found no
evidence to support the claim that the incentives were given in consideration of services rendered. None
of the recognized justifications that might excuse liability were present in this case, and the court did not
perceive any undue prejudice that would prevent the recipients from being held liable.

The court also noted that the rank-and-file employees had participated in the negotiation and approval of
the CNA Incentives, either directly or indirectly, which provided them with knowledge about the
requirements for the valid release of these incentives. Therefore, they could not claim ignorance about the
necessity of proper justification for receiving these funds.

In conclusion, the court upheld the COA's order for DAREA's members to refund the CNA Incentives
they received, emphasizing that civil law principles, rather than good faith, determine liability in cases of
unlawful expenditures. Compassionate justice considerations are meant for clearly meritorious cases and
should not be used to deplete public funds in favor of undeserving individuals. The court's decision
supported the government's agrarian reform programs and, ultimately, the Filipino farmers.
 [G.R. No. 244076, March 16, 2022]

FELIX CHINGKOE AND ROSITA CHINGKOE, PETITIONERS, VS. FAUSTINO CHINGKOE

AND GLORIA CHINGKOE, RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE: The presumption of regularity accorded to notarized documents in the case can be
overturned with clear and convincing evidence. This includes a deed of absolute sale over real property;
pleadings can reveal imperfections and mistakes in writing documents.

FACTS: Faustino Chingkoe (Faustino) and his wife, Gloria, are the registered owners of the property. At
one time, Faustino allowed his brother Felix to occupy the said property. Upon the request of their
mother, Tan Po Chou, Faustino signed a Deed of Sale over the property in favor of his brother Felix.
Their mother assured them that she would keep the updated Deed of Sale as she just wanted to appease
Felix, who was becoming an alcoholic. On the other hand, Felix claimed he had the property since 1989,
after five years of occupying the subject property, or on October 10, 1994. Felix purchased the property
for P3,130,000.00, but Faustino refused to surrender the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 8283, which
prevented him from transferring the land name to his. Later, Felix discovered that Faustino had
mortgaged the property to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC); this drove Felix to file a
complaint against Faustino for damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals reversed the court decision by giving credence and
disregarding the presumption of regularity according to the notarized Deed of Sale.

RULING: In the Court of Appeals decision, the Court finds for the plaintiffs, spouses Felix and Rosita
Chingkoe, and declares the existence and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale over real property
as described in and covered by TCT No. 8283 registered under the name of the defendants, spouses
Faustino and Gloria Chingkoe, as acknowledged on October 10, 1994, before notary public Reynaldo Z.
Calabio. They are also awarded a total of P50,000.00. Spouses Faustino and Gloria are ordered to pay the
spouses Felix and Rocita. Felix filed a partial reconsideration with RTC to include an order to surrender
the property, while Faustino, seeking reversal, filed an appeal. Wherefore, the Court finds for the
plaintiffs, spouses Felix and Rosita Chingkoe, and declares the existence and due execution of the Deed
of Absolute Sale over real property as described in and covered by TCT No. 8283 registered under the
name of the defendants, spouses Faustino and Gloria Chingkoe, as acknowledged on October 10, 1994,
before notary public Reynaldo Z. Calabio. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision and reinstated the
RTC's judgment. The Court held that the CA's findings were not supported by the records. It emphasized
that Tan Po Chu's testimony was insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the notarized
Deed of Sale. The Court also pointed out that Faustino's arguments are weak, and the evidence before
them proves both the validity of the sale agreement as well as the party's intent in its execution. On these
grounds, the petition is granted. Reversed is the decision adopted by the Court of Appeal on April 30,
2018, in CAFORG.R. CV 106434. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 101, Quezon City,
dated May 12, 2014, and its Order dated July 30, 2015, in Civil Case No. Q-95-22865 are reinstated.
 [G.R. No. 250618. July 20, 2022]

JENNIFER A. DEDICATORIA, PETITIONER, VS. FERDINAND M. DEDICATORIA AND

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE: Psychological incapacity as a basis for declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36
of the Family Code is a legal concept, not a medical one.

FACTS: Jennifer and Ferdinand got married in 1995. However, in 2014, Jennifer filed for the
nullification of their marriage, claiming that Ferdinand was psychologically incapable. During the trial,
Jennifer described Ferdinand's irresponsible behavior, immaturity, and dependence on his parents. She
alleged that Ferdinand neglected their child, remained unemployed, and eventually started living with
another woman. Jennifer presented the testimony of a clinical psychologist, Dr. Montefalcon, who
diagnosed Ferdinand with dependent personality disorder. The trial court granted the nullification, but the
Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision, questioning the sufficiency of evidence regarding the
juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Ferdinand's incapacity. The CA deemed Jennifer's
testimony and the psychologist's report lacking, emphasizing the absence of an independent source and
insufficient proof of the incapacity's permanence. Jennifer's appeal argues that the CA erred in
disregarding the clinical diagnosis, while the Republic contends that Ferdinand's behavior does not satisfy
the legal criteria for psychological incapacity, as laid out in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina). The
Republic points out the one-sided nature of the study and the lack of a personal examination of Ferdinand.

ISSUE: Whether there was enough evidence given to indicate psychological incapacity for the Court to
declare the marriage null and void.

RULING: The Court accepts the Petition for Review on Certiorari, overturning the CA's decision and
restoring the trial court's verdict that declares the marriage null and void. The comprehensive body of
evidence, comprising Jennifer's statement, the narrative of a longstanding acquaintance (Anarose), and the
assessment by a clinical psychologist (Montefalcon), establishes Ferdinand's psychological incapacity.
The proof of juridical antecedence is derived from accounts of Ferdinand's upbringing and childhood
experiences. The CA's insistence on an independent source lacks merit, as Montefalcon's evaluation
incorporates testimonies from various witnesses. The seriousness and incurability of Ferdinand's
incapacity are evident in his persistent and pervasive characteristics, rendering him incapable of fulfilling
marital duties. The absence of a personal examination of Ferdinand does not undermine the validity of the
expert diagnosis. The evidence effectively supports the declaration of the marriage's nullity under Article
36 of the Family Code.
 [G.R. No. 241370. April 20, 2022]

MUNICIPALITY OF BAKUN, BENGUET, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY MAYOR FAUSTO T.

LABINIO, PETITIONER, VS. MUNICIPALITY OF SUGPON, ILOCOS SUR, HEREIN
REPRESENTED BY MAYOR FERNANDO C. QUITON,* SR., RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: In cases involving property disputes, the sufficiency of evidence and the clarity of border
definitions are critical considerations in determining ownership.

FACTS: The case revolves around a disagreement concerning a 1,117.20-hectare land parcel between the
Municipality of Bakun, represented by Mayor Fausto T. Labinio, and the Municipality of Sugpon,
represented by Mayor Gernando C. Quiton Sr. A joint committee established by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan was tasked with resolving the dispute. Following this, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued
Joint Resolution No. 1, Series of 2014, assigning the land to Bakun. Sugpon contested this decision,
leading the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to overturn the resolution, contending that Bakun's cited laws did
not distinctly define the municipal boundaries. Sugpon submitted maps as evidence, illustrating that the
contested area fell within its territorial jurisdiction. The RTC sided with Sugpon, granting the land to the
municipality. Bakun appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), but the CA upheld the RTC's decision,
underscoring the adequacy of Sugpon's evidence in establishing its territorial jurisdiction. The CA also
denied Bakun's motion for reconsideration. Seeking the Supreme Court's intervention, Bakun argues that
it presented stronger evidence and that the boundary between the municipalities had already been
determined by previous laws. In response, Sugpon contends that the petition raises factual questions and
asserts that the CA correctly ruled in its favor.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bakun's evidence and reliance on prior legislation should be used to overturn
lower court decisions.

RULING: Bakun's petition for review was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Court stated that, as a
court of last resort, it does not generally re-evaluate factual findings. The findings of the CA and RTC
were supported by the evidence submitted, which included maps, certifications, tax reports, and petitions
establishing Sugpon's jurisdiction over the contested territory. The Court also determined that the
historical legislation mentioned by Bakun did not adequately establish the municipal boundaries. As a
result, the lower court's decisions were affirmed.
 [G.R. No. 230711. August 22, 2022]

CAROLYN T. MUTYA-SUMILHIG, PETITIONER, VS. JOSELITO T. SUMILHIG AND

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE: Psychological incapacity, for the purposes of nullity under Article 36, must be present at
the time of marriage, even if it becomes noticeable only after the wedding. It refers to a lasting aspect of a
spouse's personality that renders them unable to comprehend and fulfill their essential marital
responsibilities. Witness testimonies indicating consistent behaviors can be considered evidence.

FACTS: In 1984, Carolyn and Joselito met and entered into a romantic relationship. They eventually got
married in 1987. However, their relationship was troubled by Joselito's vices, specifically his habits of
gambling and excessive drinking. As time went on, Joselito's irresponsibility worsened after the birth of
their children, resulting in instances of physical and verbal abuse. Eventually, Carolyn decided to leave in
1990 due to Joselito's vices and abusive behavior.

In 2010, Carolyn filed a petition for the nullity of their marriage, stating that Joselito's psychological
incapacity was the reason. Throughout the trial, expert testimonies and evidence were presented,
highlighting Joselito's immature and irresponsible conduct, which was diagnosed as Antisocial-Dependent
Personality Disorder.

Initially, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied Carolyn's petition, deeming the evidence insufficient.
The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld this decision, citing deficiencies in the evidence presented. Now, the
current petition aims to overturn the CA's ruling, arguing that, when considering all the evidence as a
whole, it supports Joselito's psychological incapacity claim. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General disputes the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting that Joselito's problems are attributed to
personal flaws rather than a legitimate psychological disorder.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient proof of Joselito's psychological incapacity to perform his
essential marital obligations.

RULING: The Court rules that Joselito's psychological incapacity has been proven. The testimonies and
expert opinions presented clearly show that his dysfunctional behaviors and diagnosed personality
disorder significantly impeded his ability to comprehend and fulfill his fundamental marital obligations.
The evidence meets the criteria of juridical antecedence and incurability as stipulated in Article 36 of the
Family Code. As a result, Carolyn's marriage to Joselito was deemed null and void from its inception.
 [ G.R. No. 203992. August 22, 2022 ]

ANTONIO S. QUIOGUE, JR., PETITIONER, VS. MARIA BEL B. QUIOGUE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE: This case involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. It includes a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, in which the petitioner alleges psychological incapacity as grounds
for annulling the marriage.

FACTS: Antonio S. Quiogue, Jr. filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against his wife,
Maria Bel B. Quiogue, citing psychological incapacity. Antonio claimed that their separation, which
began in 1998, resulted from mutual psychological incapacities that hindered them from fulfilling marital
obligations. Maribel, in response, argued that Antonio's womanizing and violent behavior led to their
separation.

During the trial, Antonio presented evidence of Maribel's ill-tempered and confrontational behavior,
including sending obscene messages and using their children to deliver insulting letters. Witnesses,
including an office staff member and a psychiatrist, supported Antonio's claims. The psychiatrist
recommended nullification based on psychological incapacity.

Maribel countered by denying the allegations, stating that she discovered Antonio's infidelity through
anonymous calls and letters. Their daughter, Marie Antonette, testified about her father's extramarital
affairs and acknowledged the presence of Ynes Gamila in their household.

ISSUE: Whether or not the psychological incapacity alleged by the petitioner, Antonio S. Quiogue, Jr.,
and supported by evidence justifies the nullification of the marriage.

RULING: The court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, Antonio S. Quiogue, Jr., and declared
his marriage with Maria Bel B. Quiogue null and void based on Antonio's psychological incapacity. The
court determined that Antonio exhibited psychological incapacity as defined in Article 36 of the Family
Code, which prevented him from fulfilling essential marital obligations. The ruling emphasized that
psychological incapacity should not be strictly viewed from a medical perspective and should be
considered incurable from a legal standpoint. The court dismissed the argument that Dr. Garcia's
psychiatric evaluation was flawed due to Maribel's non-participation in clinical examinations. Instead, the
court took into account the overall evidence, including interviews, testimonies, and letters, which
supported Antonio's claim of psychological incapacity.
 [ G.R. No. 190057. October 17, 2022 ]

SPOUSES ADOLFO B. VELARDE AND ANTONINA T. VELARDE, SPOUSES ROMULO B.

VELARDE AND JEAN T. VELARDE, BELLA B. VELARDE, BENEDICTO B. VELARDE,
ISABELLE V. DIAZ, AND CARMELITA B. VELARDE, PETITIONERS, VS. HEIRS OF
CONCEPCION CANDARI, RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE: When a contract is properly signed and executed, it is assumed to be valid unless there are
specific allegations and evidence of fraud. If someone wants to challenge the legitimacy of the contract,
they have to provide clear and convincing proof of any irregularities. This Court resolves the Petition for
Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court (Rules), assailing the Decision
dated October 30, 2008, and the Resolution dated September 29, 2009, of the Court of Appeals-Cebu City
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 72998.

FACTS: Adolfo B. Velarde and others (referred to as the petitioners) are the lawful heirs of Isagani S.
Velarde. In 1978, Concepcion Candari sold the land to Isagani with a repurchase option within five years.
In 1986, Concepcion relinquished her ownership of the lots to Isagani and the petitioners through a
quitclaim and waiver of rights. Following Isagani's passing, Concepcion laid claim to the ownership,
prompting the petitioners to file a complaint to settle the title dispute.

Concepcion refuted the sale and transfer of ownership, asserting that she inherited the properties in 1977.
She accused the petitioners of fraudulently obtaining the deeds and titles. The trial court ruled in favor of
the petitioners, recognizing them as the rightful owners. However, upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
(CA) favored Concepcion, declaring the deeds and titles invalid and ordering the properties to be returned
to her. The CA justified its decision by accepting Concepcion's fraud allegations and contending that the
parcel obtained from Rizalina was not properly included in the legal proceedings. The CA's ruling
overturned the judgment of the trial court, instructing the petitioners to return the properties to
Concepcion. The petitioners' request for reconsideration was denied. As a result, they filed the present
petition to challenge the decision of the CA.

ISSUE: Whether the petition should be dismissed for failure of all the petitioners to sign the Verification
and Certificate against Forum Shopping; and whether the action for quieting of title should prosper.

RULING: The Petition for Review on certiorari is granted. In this case, there is a disagreement over
properties between the petitioners and Concepcion Candari. Although the court generally does not make
factual determinations, it does step in when conflicting findings arise. The court acknowledges that the
Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping follow the rules, even if not all the petitioners
have signed.

Upon closer examination, the complaint, originally identified as a quieting of title, is categorized as an
accion reivindicatoria. The court distinguishes actions to quiet title from declaratory relief, emphasizing
that quieting title requires demonstrating a clouded title due to invalid documents. The court refers to
Articles 476 and 477 of the NCC, which outline the requirements for quieting title.
There are two sets of properties in dispute: one from a sale with a right of repurchase and another from a
sale with Rizalina. The court disagrees with the CA's assertion of fraud, arguing that the presence of a
judicial order under Article 1607 does not automatically imply fraud. It maintains that the deeds are
properly notarized and that fraud must be proven rather than assumed.

The court determines that Concepcion's testimony consists of general denials without specific evidence. It
affirms the validity of the notarized deeds and acknowledges the petitioners' equitable title resulting from
the pacto de retro sale. The court disregards the importance of the dates when the Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) was issued and concludes that the petitioners have the right to full ownership. As a result, the
CA's decision is overturned, reinstating the trial court's ruling in favor of the petitioners.
ROWENA PATENIA-KINATAC-AN, ET AL. vs. ENRIQUETA PATENIA-LAPINED ABO-ABO,
ET AL

(GR No. 238325)

DOCTRINE: The donation of an immovable property must be made in a public document.

FACTS: The petitioners filed an action to cancel the TCT through a Deed of Donation that rendered null
and void the land title consisting of the 9,600-square-meter parcel of land owned by Sps. Patenia. They
alleged that the signatures of the deceased spouses were forged. However, the RTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit as the petitioners failed to present preponderant evidence of the forgery and
ineffectiveness of the donation. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC
despite the petitioners' arguments that the donation is void because the notary failed to require the parties
to sign the notarial register.

ISSUE: Whether or not defective notarization renders the donation void.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the NEGATIVE. Here, what transpired between Sps. Patena
and the respondents was a donation of an immovable property that requires strict compliance with Art.
749 of the Civil Code. It provides that in order for the donation of the immovable property to be valid, it
must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges
that the donee must satisfy. The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate
public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor. The present
deed of donation was executed and acknowledged before the notary public in 2002, when there was no
rule yet that required the parties to sign the notarial register. Indeed, the new rules cannot be given
retroactive effect if they would cause injustice or impair vested rights.
 PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE (PMO) vs. MARIANO NOCOM

GR No. 250477)

DOCTRINE: If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.

FACTS: The Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed the contract of lease executed between the Board
of Liquidators (the Reparations Commission) with a right to renovate the 5-storey building located in
South Harbor, Port Area, Manila. COA reasoned that the disallowance of the lease was due to the non-
submission of a duly approved construction/rehabilitation plan.

Mariano filed an action for Specific Performance against the Board and its officers before the RTC. In the
course of the trial, the RTC approved a Compromise Agreement between Asset Privatization and
Mariano, where they ratified the amended contract of lease. Until the PMO sent him another letter stating
that the contract would expire on September 3, 2016, reminded him to vacate the building, and informed
him that they stopped accepting rental payments.

Mariano filed an action for injunction before RTC Makati City, and the latter trial court ruled that the
expiration of the amended lease contract was on February 11, 2018, not on Sept. 3, 2016, since both
parties renewed the 20-year lease period. Mostly, the PMO violated the contract by prematurely
terminating it.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is ambiguity in the amended contract of lease in terms of the date of
effectivity.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the NEGATIVE.

In this case, the issue as to the correct expiration date of the amended contract of lease entails an
interpretation of the compromise agreement vis-à-vis the respective rights of the parties.

The process of interpreting a contract requires the court to make a preliminary inquiry as to whether the
contract before it is ambiguous. A contract provision is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two reasonable
alternative interpretations. Where the written terms of the contract are not ambiguous and can only be
read one way, the court will interpret the agreement as a matter of law.

Here, there is no ambiguity in the language of the compromise agreement. The parties explicitly provided
for an extension of the lease period. There is nothing in the agreement showing that the parties intended to
renew the contract of lease for another 20 years. Otherwise, they could have expressly done so. Thus, the
compromise agreement leaves no room for equivocation or interpretation.
 STRONG FORT WAREHOUSE CORPORATION vs.

REMEDIOS T. BANTA (GR No. 222369 & 222502)

DOCTRINE: A mortgage is merely an accessory agreement and does not affect the principal contract of
the loan.

FACTS: Earlier, the Supreme Court affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals to expunge from the
records the complaint filed by Remedios to nullify the Real Estate Mortgage in security of her loans from
Westmont Bank, as evidenced by several promissory notes. This favored Westmont Bank's move to
expunge the formal offer because of the unreasonable delay in its submission. The evidence that was
expunged referred to the Questioned Documents Report issued by the NBI and PNP, stating that the
questioned signatures on the documents and the standard signature of Remedios are not signed by one and
the same person.

Then, another civil case that Remedios filed against Antonio and Westmont Bank to nullify the deed of
real estate mortgage and various promissory notes, alleging that her signatures on the said documents
were forged. The RTC decided in favor of Remedios; hence, the loan contracts are invalid against the
plaintiffs, and the defendant cannot hold her personally liable for any of these loans. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner herein contested that the nullification of the subject deeds of mortgages, being an accessory
contract, does not affect the validity of the promissory notes as the principal contracts of the said loan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the promissory notes are still valid despite the nullity of the real estate mortgages.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT ruled in the NEGATIVE.

The nullity of the REM does not invalidate the loan as evidenced by promissory notes executed by
Antonio; this renders that a mortgage is merely an accessory agreement but can be considered as
instruments evidencing the indebtedness, although they may be void.

The nullity of the subject deeds of real estate mortgage on account of the forged signature of Remedios
does not result in the invalidation of the loan obligation of Antonio. This is supported by a certain
jurisprudence that the liability on the principal contract still subsists notwithstanding the illegality of the
mortgage.

Where a mortgage is not valid, the principal obligation is not rendered null and void since it becomes
mature and demandable in accordance with the stipulation pertaining to it.
 COMMERCIAL LAW

BPI VS LCL CAPITAL (SEPTEMBER 2021)

DOCTRINE: The computations of the redemption price in cases where the mortgagee is a bank are
governed by Section 78 of Republic Act No. 337, also known as the General Banking Act. This provision
mandates that the redemption price shall consist of the principal obligation, interest at the rate specified in
the mortgage, expenses of foreclosure, and other related costs. The redemption price must be based on the
amount due under the mortgage deed, not the bid price. Real estate taxes are chargeable against the
mortgagor who had actual or beneficial use and possession of the property, regardless of ownership.

FACTS: This case involves a dispute between the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) and LCL Capital,
Inc. (LCL) regarding the correct computation of the redemption price and the applicable interest rate.
LCL obtained a loan from Far East Bank and Trust Co. (FEBTC) in 1997, secured by a real estate
mortgage. BPI later merged with FEBTC and became the surviving corporation. When LCL failed to pay
the loan, BPI initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and eventually acquired the foreclosed
properties. LCL filed a case to annul the consolidation of ownership, which was granted by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The Court of Appeals partly granted BPI’s petition for certiorari, ruling that the
redemption price should be computed based on the principal obligation and the stipulated interest rate of
17% per annum. However, the CA affirmed the exclusion of real estate taxes from the redemption price.
Both parties filed separate petitions for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the petitions of both parties are correct.

RULING: Once a judgment becomes final, all issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to
rest. No further action can be taken on the decision except to order its execution. The redemption price
must be computed based on the principal obligation of P3,000,000.00 or the amount due under the
mortgage deed with interest at the rate of 17% per annum specified in the mortgage contract. In addition
to the principal and interest, the redemption price must include the expenses of foreclosure. LCL is
ordered to reimburse BPI the amount representing the payment of real estate taxes. Considering the
absence of sufficient records to arrive at the exact figures, it is proper to remand the case to the RTC for
computation of the redemption price and for the reception of further evidence solely for such purposes.
 ETHICS

HAGONOY WATER DISTRICT, ET AL vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

(GR No. 247228)

DOCTRINE: Palpable disregard of laws and pertinent directives amounts to gross negligence.

FACTS: The petitioners imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Audit
(COA) in denying the entitlement of Hagonoy Water District (HWD) employees to rice allowance,
asserting that such actions by the COA violate the principle of non-diminution of pay.

In 2012, the HWD released an anniversary bonus and rice allowances to its officials and employees,
pursuant to its Board Resolution. However, in 2013, a Notice of Disallowance (ND) was issued,
disallowing the HWD disbursement of ₱408,000 worth of rice allowance paid to employees hired after
July 1, 1989. The disallowance was grounded upon Section 12 of RA No. 6758 and COA Resolution No.
2004-006, which allow the grant of additional allowances and benefits on top of the standardized salary
rates.

The Regional Office of the COA denied the petitioners' appeal to revoke the ND, and later, the COA
Proper sustained the validity of the issued NDs with the modification that passive recipients should not be
required to refund the amount of the disallowed benefits since they received them in good faith.

ISSUE: Whether the members of the HWD Board of Directors were held solidarily liable to refund the
disallowed amounts of rice allowance.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the NEGATIVE. The COA gravely erred in excusing the
passive recipients’ liability to return the rice allowance they individually received based solely on good
faith. Mere receipt of public funds without a valid basis or justification is already an undue benefit that
gives rise to the obligation to return what was unduly received, following the principles of solutio indebiti
and unjust enrichment.

There was no showing that the grant of rice allowance in 2012 had a proper legal basis, and there was no
evidence to demonstrate that the 2012 rice allowance was given in consideration of actual service
rendered or work accomplished. In fact, through the Board Resolution, the rice allowance was granted to
recognize the excellent performance and loyalty of HWD employees for the year 1992.

This failed to provide any genuine or bona fide equitable consideration relevant to the nature, purpose,
and amount of the grant that would warrant the recipients’ absolution from their civil obligation to the
government. Thus, the petitioners cannot validly argue that the board and officers should be exempted
from liability.
 DANILO SANCHEZ vs. ATTY. DINDO ANTONIO PEREZ

(AC No. 12835)

DOCTRINE: A lawyer-client relationship is fiduciary in nature and imbued with the utmost trust and
confidence.

FACTS: The RTC dismissed the complaint filed by Danlo for annulment of contract, recovery of
possession of real property, and damages due to his counsel, respondent Atty. Perez, failing to appear
during the pre-trial conference. Despite Danilo's request to reschedule the pre-trial twice, Atty. Perez did
not attend the hearing, resulting in the dismissal of the complaint.

Danilo repeatedly sought updates on the proceedings from Atty. Perez but received no response. It was
only when he and his cousin inquired that they learned about the dismissal of the case.

Atty. Perez defended himself, claiming diligence in handling the case. However, the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP recommended a 6-month suspension of his law practice, a decision adopted by the
IBP Board of Governors. After reconsideration, the suspension was reduced to 3 months.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Perez violated the lawyer-client relationship with Danilo Sanchez.

RULING: The Supreme Court answered in the AFFIRMATIVE. The lawyer’s duty of competence and
diligence includes not only reviewing entrusted cases and providing legal advice but also properly
representing the client in court, attending hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings, and
prosecuting cases with reasonable dispatch. There is convincing evidence that Atty. Perez failed to
exercise the required diligence in handling his client’s case.

In this instance, Atty. Perez demonstrated carelessness by not attending the pretrial and successfully
moving to reschedule it, ultimately leading to the dismissal of Danilo's case. Furthermore, Atty. Perez
neglected to inform Danilo about the case's status, leaving him in the dark until he inquired and
discovered the dismissal due to his counsel's absence.
 [ A.C. No. 12456, September 08, 2020 ]

IN RE: ORDER DATED OCTOBER 27, 2016 ISSUED BY BRANCH 137, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, MAKATI IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14-765, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MARIE
FRANCES E. RAMON, RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE: SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court; grounds
therefor.— A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Once a lawyer is disbarred, there is no penalty that could be imposed regarding his privilege to practice
law. Nevertheless, the corresponding penalty should be adjudged for recording purposes on the lawyer's
personal file with the Office of the Bar Confidant, which should be taken into consideration in the event
that he subsequently files a petition for reinstatement.

FACTS: Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon was suspended from the practice of law for a period of five
years. The Court en banc found that Atty. Ramon engaged in dishonest and deceitful conduct. Atty.
Ramon obtained a substantial amount from her clients and made them believe that she could assist in
redeeming the foreclosed property because she is working in the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation. Yet, Atty. Ramon did not notify her clients that she was no longer connected with such
agency. Worse, Atty. Ramon took advantage of her client's full trust and falsely informed them that she
had initiated the redemption proceedings.

A further examination of related incidents relative to the same respondent shows that she was complicit in
an elaborate scheme to sell fake Court of Appeals decisions. In March of 2016, she was arrested by the
National Bureau of Investigation for allegedly selling fake CA decisions.

In its order, RTC Branch 137 recommended a penalty of DISBARMENT from the practice of law against
respondent Lawyer Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon for her deceitful conduct, disrespect to the IBP and to
the Supreme Court of the Philippines, and violation of Canons 1, 1.02 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The IBP Board of Governors modified the penalty from disbarment to indefinite suspension from the
practice of law.

ISSUE: Can an additional penalty be imposed on a disbarred lawyer?

RULING: No, the additional penalty can no longer be imposed on Atty. Ramon because of her previous
disbarment.
Atty. Ramon defied the suspension order and appeared as a private prosecutor in a criminal case. As such,
Atty. Ramon is administratively liable for willfully disobeying the lawful order of a superior court and
appearing as an attorney without authority. Apropos is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, thus:

SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court; grounds therefor.— A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphases supplied.)

Once a lawyer is disbarred, there is no penalty that could be imposed regarding his privilege to practice
law. Nevertheless, the corresponding penalty should be adjudged for recording purposes on the lawyer's
personal file with the Office of the Bar Confidant, which should be taken into consideration in the event
that he subsequently files a petition for reinstatement.

Lastly, the Court may impose a fine upon a disbarred lawyer who committed an offense prior to
disbarment. The Court does not lose its exclusive jurisdiction over other offenses a disbarred lawyer
committed while he was still a member of the legal profession. In this case, Atty. Ramon disobeyed the
orders of the IBP Commission without justifiable reason when she did not file an answer and did not
attend the mandatory conference despite due notice. Hence, Atty. Ramon must pay a fine of ₱ 5,000.00.

Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon is GUILTY of unauthorized practice of law in violation of Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months.
However, this penalty can no longer be imposed considering that she has already been disbarred.
Nevertheless, the penalty should be considered in the event that she should apply for reinstatement.

Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon is also meted a FINE in the amount of ₱ 5,000.00 for disobedience to the
orders of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. These payments shall be made within ten days of notice of
this decision.
 [A.C. No. 12709, September 8, 2020]

LILIA YUSAY-CORDERO,COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JUANITO AMIHAN, JR.,

RESPONDENT

DOCTRINE: If a member of the Philippine Bar notarizes a document without authorization or

commission, they may be subjected to disciplinary action. Performing notarial acts without such a
commission is a violation of the lawyer's oath to obey the laws, specifically the Notarial Law.

FACTS: In 1976, spouses Hector Cordero (Hector) and Lilia Yusay-Cordero (Lilia) executed a special
power of attorney authorizing Lilia's father, Quirico Yusay Sr. (Quirico, Sr.), to sell and mortgage land
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-102992. Accordingly, Quirico, Sr., mortgaged the
property to the bank and surrendered the certificate of title. On January 22, 2004, Hector passed away. In
2015, Lilia finished paying the loan and received the certificate of title from the bank. However, Lilia
noticed an annotation on the title pertaining to a "Deed of Portion Sale" between her, as the seller,
represented by her father Quirico Sr., and Quirico Y. Yusar, Jr., and Alberto Y. Yusay, as buyers. The
deed was notarized on December 11, 2003, by Atty. Juanito S. Amihan, Jr. (Atty. Amihan, Jr.).

Upon verification, Lilia discovered that Atty. Amihan, Jr. was not a commissioned notary public in 2003
and that no copy of the deed was recorded with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). Accordingly, Lilia filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Amihan, Jr., before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Canons of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

ISSUE: Did Atty. Amihan violate the lawyer's oath and the Canons of Professional Responsibility
(CPR)?

RULING: Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time
when they have no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary
action. Performing notarial acts without such a commission is a violation of the lawyer's oath to obey the
laws, specifically the Notarial Law. Also, by making it appear that they are duly commissioned when they
are not, they are, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's
oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct." Here, it is undisputed that Atty. Amihan, Jr. notarized the deed
in 2003. However, the office of the clerk of court certified that Atty. Amihan, Jr. was not commissioned
as a notary public in that year and did not file a copy of the deed. The investigating commissioner
likewise confirmed with the RTC that Atty. Amihan, Jr., had no notarial commission in 2003.

Considering that this is Atty. Amihan, Jr.'s first infraction and that the case involved only one document,
we deem it proper to impose the penalties of immediate revocation of the notarial commission,
disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for one year, and suspension from the
practice of law for a period of one year.
 YUSAY-CORDERO VS AMIHAN (A.C. NO. 12709, SEPTEMBER 2020)

DOCTRINE: Notarization ensures the authenticity and reliability of a document, converting a private
document into a public one. It is a substantial engagement of public interest, and the protection of that
interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as a notary public. A lawyer
who notarizes a document without the required commission is guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath and
engaging in deliberate falsehood, prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

FACTS: This case involves the administrative liability of a lawyer, Atty. Juanito S. Amihan, Jr., who
notarized a document without a notarial commission. Lilia Yusay-Cordero filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Amihan, Jr., for violating the lawyer’s oath and the Canons of Professional
Responsibility. It was discovered that Atty. Amihan, Jr., notarized a deed in 2003, but he did not have a
valid notarial commission during that time. The Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Amihan, Jr.,
guilty of deliberate falsehood and recommended the revocation of his notarial commission,
disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for two years, and a two-year suspension
from the practice of law. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors modified the
penalty, reducing the suspension to one year.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Amihan, Jr., is guilty of deliberate falsehood and recommended the revocation of
his notarial commission.

RULING: The Court adopts the IBP's findings with modifications as to the penalty. Notarization ensures
the authenticity and reliability of a document. It converts a private document into a public one and renders
the document admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative
agencies, and the public at large must be able to rely on the acknowledgment executed by a notary public
and appended to a private instrument. Moreover, notarization is not an empty routine. On the contrary, it
engages the public interest to a substantial degree, and the protection of that interest requires preventing
those who are not qualified or authorized to act as a notary public. Corollarily, a lawyer who notarizes a
document without the required commission is guilty of violating the lawyer's oath and is deemed to
engage in deliberate falsehood. The suspension in the practice of law, the prohibition from being
commissioned as a notary public, and the revocation of his notarial commission, if any, shall take effect
immediately upon the respondent's receipt of the decision.
 Bukidnon Coop Bank vs Atty. Arnado

DOCTRINE: Rule 10.01 states that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in the Supreme Court (SC), nor shall he mislead or allow the SC to be misled by an artifice."

FACTS: Bukidnon Cooperative Bank engaged the services of Asiatique International Travel & Tours
Services to arrange hotel accommodations and purchase airplane tickets for a trip to Singapore for its
board of directors and employees. An advance payment of P244,640.00 was made to Asiatique
International. However, a day before departure, the trip was postponed due to unconfirmed
accommodations, and Bukidnon Cooperative sought a refund, which Asiatique International did not grant.
As a result, Bukidnon Cooperative filed a legal action for a sum of money against Mr. Encabo, the owner
of Asiatique International. Mr. Encabo explained that the airline tickets were non-refundable, and any
reimbursement was contingent on the airline's approval, with processing through the VIA Philippines
system.

At the pre-trial conference, electronic tickets provided by Cebu Pacific Airline were marked as evidence,
but they were later found to be altered and not genuine. Bukidnon Cooperative filed a disbarment
complaint against its opposing lawyer, Atty. Arnado, alleging that he failed to verify the authenticity of
the evidence and allowed the presentation of fraudulent documents in court. Atty. Arnado claimed good
faith, stating that he had no expertise to determine the authenticity of the electronic tickets and had no
indication they were not genuine. Subsequently, Bukidnon Cooperative withdrew the disbarment case
against Atty. Arnado, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended the dismissal of the complaint, affirming that Atty. Arnado did not know about the
evidence alteration.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Arnado should be held accountable for his role in presenting an altered
document.

RULING: Yes. The issue in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers is their fitness to continue in the
practice of law, aimed at protecting the court and the public against reprehensible practices. Therefore, the
dismissal of the administrative case cannot depend solely on the complainant's unilateral decision, as the
complainant is considered merely a witness, especially if the records can establish the liability of the
erring lawyer. Hence, Bukidnon Cooperative's withdrawal of the case will not automatically result in the
dismissal of the disbarment complaint.

Notably, the lawyer's oath mandates members of the bar to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any court." Also, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
candor, fairness, and good faith to the Court. Specifically, Rule 10.01 states that a lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled
by an artifice. In this case, Atty. Arnado failed to meet the standards of candor and honesty towards the
court.

It was established that the electronic tickets pre-marked as exhibits were altered. The representative of
VIA Philippines attested to this fact, and Mr. Encabo failed to substantiate that any error occurred in the
system. Atty. Arnado cannot use the excuse that he has no expertise to determine the authenticity of these
documents, especially when the introduction of such evidence can potentially mislead the trial court. Atty.
Arnado cannot solely rely on his client's narrations without making inquiries when the circumstances call
for more meticulousness. Lawyers must diligently familiarize themselves with the nature of the cases they
represent. It is their duty to advise clients and ensure that their representation remains within the bounds
of the law. However, Atty. Arnado failed to examine the electronic tickets and notice that some of them
had no booking reference number. It does not matter that Mr. Encabo printed and handed the tickets for
pre-marking. The fact remains that Atty. Arnado did not exercise greater care to prevent the Court from
being misled. His indifference further negates any claim of good faith.

In this case, it was not established that Atty. Arnado had prior knowledge of the alteration or that he
willfully submitted false evidence for pre-marking. On the contrary, the judicial affidavit of Mr. Encabo
clarified that Atty. Arnado had no involvement in the preparation and printing of the documents.
However, Atty. Arnado's carelessness does not absolve him of liability. In a similar case, Berenguer v.
Carranza, a lawyer was reprimanded for introducing a false affidavit due to inattention. A lawyer's oath
should be taken seriously, and every lawyer must do their best to live up to it. Courts must be able to rely
on the submission and representations made by lawyers regarding the presentation of evidence, whether
oral or documentary. Even without intent to deceive, a lawyer cannot escape responsibility for conduct
that falls short of impeccability.
 Capinpin vs. Espiritu

DOCTRINE: Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the legal profession of unworthy
members of the bar and preserve its nobility and honor. While the Supreme Court has the power to
discipline lawyers through these proceedings, it does so vigilantly to uphold its preservative principle.
Substantial evidence is the proper evidentiary threshold in disbarment cases.

FACTS: Leolenie R. Capinpin filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Rio T. Espiritu, alleging that he
had maliciously and unlawfully used his legal knowledge. Capinpin claimed that Atty. Espiritu, her
former legal adviser and retained counsel, advised her to execute a Deed of Sale in his favor as part of a
mortgage arrangement with Banco de Oro (BDO). She further alleged that she had given Atty. Espiritu
P200,000 to settle her BDO debt. Capinpin sought Atty. Espiritu's disbarment, accusing him of using
unethical tactics. Atty. Espiritu denied receiving money from Capinpin and countered that he had never
been her legal counsel, as he was employed by the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) in Quezon City from
1990 to 1994. He argued that the properties were acquired through valid transactions and that Capinpin's
acceptance of the Joint Motion to Dismiss in a court case ratified his actions.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Espiritu's actions warrant disbarment based on allegations of unethical conduct
and misuse of legal knowledge for personal gain.

RULING: No. There is no evidence that Atty. Espiritu was retained as Capinpin's counsel. Capinpin's
claim that she engaged Atty. Espiritu's services for her civil cases, particularly involving BDO, lacks
factual basis. In Civil Case No. Q93-15901, Capinpin's Answer filed before Branch 82 of the RTC-QC
was signed by Atty. Dionisio Maneja, Jr., indicating that Atty. Espiritu did not represent Capinpin in that
civil case. The mention of Atty. Espiritu in the Answer was not as a lawyer but as a prospective buyer of
Capinpin's property. Similarly, the letter addressed to BDO's Chief Legal Counsel, Atty. Irene Ishiwata,
dated August 4, 1993, and signed by Atty. Espiritu, was not conclusive proof of an attorney-client
relationship. In Civil Case No. 0-91-10383, Atty. Espiritu signed the Motion to Set Case for Reception of
Rebuttal Evidence as attorney-in-fact of Capinpin, but an attorney-in-fact is not necessarily authorized to
practice law. Capinpin's claim of an attorney-client relationship lacked supporting evidence, such as the
Special Power of Attorney she purportedly executed in favor of Atty. Espiritu or a receipt for the money
allegedly entrusted to him.

It is important to emphasize that the disbarment of lawyers aims to purge the legal profession of unworthy
members, preserving its nobility and honor. The Supreme Court exercises its disciplinary power in
disbarment proceedings with utmost vigilance to uphold this principle. In such cases, the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant to present substantial evidence. Mere allegations, suspicion, and speculation
are not sufficient. Lawyers, like any accused, enjoy the presumption of innocence in suspension or
disbarment proceedings. In this case, Capinpin failed to provide substantial evidence to prove Atty.
Espiritu's misuse of legal knowledge and deceptive appropriation of her properties. Capinpin's claim of
simulated property sale could not be substantiated, and thus Atty. Espiritu's alleged engagement in
unlawful and dishonest conduct through falsifying the deed of sale remains unestablished.
 Costenoble vs Atty Alvarez

DOCTRINE: When a lawyer agrees to act as counsel, he guarantees that he will exercise that reasonable
degree of care and skill demanded by the character of the business he undertakes to protect the clients'
interests and take all necessary steps or perform all necessary acts. A lawyer's neglect of a legal matter
entrusted to him/her constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable.
Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the
lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client. It makes him answerable not just to his client
but also to the legal profession, the court, and society.

FACTS: Rita P. Costenoble filed a complaint against Atty. Jose L. Alvarez, Jr. for fraudulent acts. She
hired Atty. Alvarez, Jr. to register two parcels of land and paid him P115,000 for fees and expenses. Atty.
Alvarez, Jr. assured her that the title transfer would be completed by September 2011. However, he failed
to do so and became unresponsive to Costenoble's attempts to contact him.

She then sought assistance from the Office of the Barangay, but Atty. Alvarez, Jr. did not appear. In 2012,
Costenoble sent him a demand letter asking for the return of the certificates of title and the P115,000 she
had paid. Subsequently, she filed a complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for Atty.
Alvarez, Jr.'s disbarment due to dishonesty, fraudulent acts, and unprofessional conduct.

Atty. Alvarez, Jr. failed to submit a verified answer and position paper, leading to his case being
submitted for resolution. The investigating commissioner recommended a one-year suspension from the
practice of law. The IBP Board of Governors adopted this recommendation but increased the three-year
suspension period. The case was then forwarded to the Court for final action.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Alvarez, Jr. is administratively liable for neglect of duty and failure to
return the money and documents given to him by Costenoble.

RULING: Yes. The practice of law is a profession. It is a form of public trust, the performance of which
is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character. When a lawyer agrees to
act as counsel, he guarantees that he will exercise that reasonable degree of care and skill demanded by
the character of the business he undertakes to protect the client's interests and take all necessary steps or
perform all necessary acts. He is duty-bound to exert his best efforts and serve his client with utmost
diligence and competence. This obligation is borne by the fiduciary relationship between a lawyer and his
client, which prescribes great fidelity to the lawyer. Accordingly, lawyers are required to maintain, at all
times, a high standard of legal proficiency and to devote their full attention, skill, and competence to their
cases, regardless of their importance and whether they accept them for a fee or for free.

A lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him/her constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he
must be held administratively liable. From the perspective of ethics in the legal profession, a lawyer's
lethargy in carrying out his duties is both unprofessional and unethical. It betrays his avowed fidelity and
renders him unworthy of the client's trust and confidence. Ingrained in this professional duty is the
lawyer's obligation to hold in trust and account for all amounts of money and properties of his client that
may come into his possession. A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf
of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the money for his own. Such an act is a
gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics.

In this case, the legal service of Atty. Costenoble engaged Alvarez, Jr. to register her properties. Atty.
Alvarez, Jr. received pertinent documents and a check worth P115,000.00 for fees and expenses, as
evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt. However, Atty. Alvarez, Jr. failed to perform his engagement
to register the properties of Costenoble despite repeated follow-ups by Costenoble. Atty. Alvarez, Jr. did
not respond and even refused to meet with her. Atty. Alvarez, Jr. neglected to perform his duties and
failed to return Costenoble's money, including the documents he received despite demand. These acts of
Atty. Alvarez, Jr. clearly violate Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 17, and Canon 18, Rule 18.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 [ A.M. No. MTJ-21-001] [FORMERLY A.M. No. 20-12-45-MTCC]. December 6, 2022 Espinosa
Case OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE RUFINO S.
FERRARIS, JR., BRANCH 7, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, DAVAO CITY, AND
VIVIAN N. ODRUÑA, CLERK OF COURT III, SAME COURT, RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE: The public's trust in the judicial system significantly relies on the courts' efficient and
timely handling of cases and related matters. Individuals working on tasks related to the administration of
justice, from the presiding judge to the lowest clerk, are required to carry out their responsibilities with
the highest efficiency and responsibility. This dedication is vital for maintaining public trust in the
judiciary.

FACTS: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit of Branch 7 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC, Br. 7) in Davao City. This audit was prompted by the upcoming
retirement of Judge Rufino S. Ferraris, Jr. During the audit, several issues were discovered, including
irregularities and delays in the court's operations, such as delays in rendering judgments, resolving
pending motions, executing writs, and adhering to court procedures. Judge Ferraris, Jr., and Ms. Vivian
N. Odruña, the Clerk of Court, were found administratively liable for these shortcomings. Both Judge
Ferraris, Jr., and Ms. Odruña provided their comments, and the OCA recommended specific penalties for
their respective administrative liabilities.

ISSUE: Whether the irregularities and delays revealed in the judicial audit of Branch 7, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC, Br. 7) in Davao City justify the administrative liabilities imposed by the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) on Judge Rufino S. Ferraris, Jr., and Ms. Vivian N. Odrua, and whether
the suggested penalties are appropriate in addressing the identified shortcomings.

RULING: Former Judge Rufino S. Ferraris, Jr., was found guilty of two serious accusations of gross
negligence of duty, one less serious charge of simple neglect of duty, and one less serious charge of
breaking Supreme Court norms by the Court. Fines totaling P270,004.00 are given, with a reduction to
P135,002.00 after mitigating factors are considered. Ms. Vivian N. Odrua is found guilty of two serious
charges of gross neglect of duty and one less serious charge of simple neglect of duty. Fines totaling
P235,003.00 are issued, with a reduction to P117,502.00, as well as a strong warning not to repeat such
behavior.
 JOEL PILAR vs. ATTY. CLARENC BALLICUD

(A.C. No. 12792)

DOCTRINE: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by the written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

FACTS: Kalen, born Weartech Philippines (KWP), engaged the services of Atty. Ballicud to draft legal
documents, such as policies on retirement benefits, voluntary resignation, and a shareholder's agreement,
from 2010 to 2013. Upon the termination of the respondent lawyer’s engagement, KWP found out that
EAT, their rival company, was registered with the SEC on March 27, 2013, with Atty. Ballicud as its
President and one of the incorporators. This prompted Pilar to file a disbarment complaint against Atty.
Ballicud with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for representing clients with conflicting
interests. Pilar alleged that Atty. Ballicud then used the confidential information he received as KWP's
retained counsel to build EAT and profit at the expense of KWP in violation of Rule 1.02, Canon 1; Rule
7.03, Canon 7; Rules 15.03 and 15.07, Canon 15; Rule 19.02, Canon 19; and Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP found Atty. Ballicud guilty of
violating the prohibition against the representation of conflicting interests under Rule 15.03 of the CPR
for putting up a corporation in direct competition, at least in the wholesale market, with his existing client.
The Investigating Commissioner's recommendation of Atty. Ballicud's suspension from the practice of
law for one year was adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lots are being used for public or quasi-public purposes.

RULING: The Court agrees with the factual findings of the IBP but deems it proper to modify the
penalty, reducing it from 1 year to a 6-month suspension from the practice of law.

Jurisprudence has developed three tests to determine the existence of a conflict of interest: First, whether
a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim on behalf of one client and, at the same time, to
oppose that claim for the other client. Second, whether acceptance of a new relation would prevent the
full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Third, whether the lawyer would be
called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired
through their connection or previous employment. This case falls under the second test. Atty. Ballicud
caused the registration of EAT with the SEC on March 27, 2013, or before the termination of his services
with KWP in July 2013.

Considering that EAT and KWP's primary purposes are the same, save for the inclusion of "wear-resistant
linings" as KWP's product and the phrase "retail basis including importing and exporting of said
products" in EAT's primary purpose, both companies clearly belong to the same industry. In the
circumstances, Atty. Ballicud's new relation with EAT would prevent the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to KWP and would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in
the performance of his duty.
 NAPOLEON S. QUITAZOL vs. ATTY. HENRY S. CAPELA (AC No. 12072)

DOCTRINE: A lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him constitutes inexcusable negligence for
which he must be held administratively liable.

FACTS: Napoleon filed a Complaint before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline against the lawyer
respondent for the violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, alleging that Atty.
Capela continued being absent during the hearings, constituting neglect of his duty to represent him in a
civil case for breach of contract and damages.

With Atty. Capela's continued absence in the hearings of the case, Napoleon was constrained to agree to
the Compromise Agreement. It was revealed that Atty. Capela was absent during the preliminary
conference and the hearing for the possible compromise. Feeling shortchanged, Napoleon demanded the
return of the motor vehicle and P38,000 as an acceptance fee, but Atty. Capela did not yield.

Atty. Capela did not submit his answer and was absent during the mandatory conference. Thus, upon the
recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Capela was found guilty of violating Canon
18, 18.3, 7, and 11 of the CPR and recommended to be suspended for 6 months. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted the said recommendation.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT adopted the findings of the IBP.

When a lawyer agrees to act as counsel, he guarantees that he will exercise the reasonable degree of care
and skill demanded by the character of the business he undertakes, to protect the client's interests, and
take all steps or do all acts necessary. Thus, lawyers are required to maintain, at all times, a high standard
of legal proficiency and to devote their full attention, skill, and competence to their cases, regardless of
their importance and whether they accept them for a fee or for free.

It is necessary that lawyers, whenever they take on their client's causes, pledge to exercise due diligence
in protecting the client's rights. Their failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of
a good father of a family makes them unworthy of the trust reposed in them by their client and makes
them answerable to their client, the courts, and society.

Here, Atty. Capela’s legal services were engaged by Napoleon to handle a civil case, and he was entrusted
to win the case on his behalf. In his manifestation, Atty. Capela entered his entry of appearance and filed
an answer, but the failure of being a counsel to Napoleon started when he became absent during the
hearings required by the Court until Napoleon was forced to accept a Compromise Agreement without
any interventions or advice from his lawyer when he needed it the most. Thus, this constitutes a failure for
Atty. Capela to cater to his client through negligence, and the 6 months of suspension in the practice of
law is deemed proper.
 RE: ORDER - LUIS ALFONSO BENEDICTO VS. ATTY. JOHN MARK TAMAÑO

(A.C. No. 12274)

DOCTRINE: The notary public's failure to make the proper entry or entries in the notarial register
concerning his notarial acts is a ground for the revocation of his commission or the imposition of
appropriate administrative sanctions.

FACTS: The Corporate Secretary of United Cadiz Sugarcane Planters Association (UCSPAI), Luis
Alfonso R. Benedicto, filed a verified complaint against Atty. John Mark for the permanent revocation of
his notarial commission. It was alleged that notarized General Information Sheets (GIS) of the
Association were notarized without the affiants for personal appearances for the years 2010, 2011, 2012,
2013, and 2014. Also, Atty. John assigned the notarial particulars of documents he previously notarized
and entered in his notarial register on the association’s GIS which concluded that those were not recorded
in his notarial books.

Atty. Tamaño admitted that he found out about the unrecorded notarized GIS, and he learned from his
staff that they failed to enter those five GIS in his notarial books. Effectively, the Order stated that Atty.
Tamaño found guilty of his failure to record in his notarial register the notarized GIS of the UCSPAI from
2010 to 2014 and revoked the lawyer respondent’s notarial commission.

As the case referred to the OBC, the latter recommended that the lawyer be suspended from the practice
of law for 2 years and be perpetually disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public.

ISSUE: Whether the notary public, Atty. John Mark Tamaño, should face the revocation of his notarial
commission and appropriate administrative sanctions due to his failure to make the required entries in the
notarial register concerning notarized documents.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT adopted the recommendation of OBC.

Rule VI of the Notarial Rules stated that the details required to be written in the notarial register of a
notary public shall be recorded in the notarial register at the time of the notarization of the certain
document. Failure to record the same is a ground for the revocation of his commission or any imposition
of administrative sanctions.

Here, Atty. Tamaño did not deny notarizing the five UCSPAI's GIS and even stated that the affiants
appeared before him for the notarization of the GIS. However, he failed to record the GIS in his notarial
register. Atty. Tamaño assigned the entries of the notarial details of UCSPAI's GIS for the years 2010 up
to 2014 to five distinct documents. Undoubtedly, the GIS of UCSPAI for the years 2010, 2011, 2012,
2013, and 2014 are not found in Atty. Tamaño's notarial register.

There is no doubt that Atty. Tamaño's failure to record the GIS in his notarial book is inexcusable and
constitutes gross negligence in carefully discharging his duties as a notary public. By failing to record
proper entries in the notarial register, Atty. Tamaño violated his duty under Canon 1 of the CPR to uphold
and obey the laws of the land, specifically, the Notarial Rules, and to promote respect for law and legal
processes.
 Thus, it is correct for Atty. Tamaño to be suspended from the practice of law for one year and be
disqualified from reappointment as a notary public for 2 years effective from revocation.
 SYLVIA R. RIVERA vs. ATTY. BAYANI DALANGIN
(AC No. 12724)

DOCTRINE: Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach to promote the public's faith in the legal profession.

FACTS: Slyvia filed a Complaint for disbarment against Atty. Dalangin on the grounds of deceit and
dishonesty before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. It was found that Atty. Dalangin previously
acted as Sylvia's counsel, and the notarization of the deed of absolute sale was deemed anomalous.

The respondent lawyer admitted that he became counsel for the plaintiff-appellants in the civil case until
the latter was pending before the Court of Appeals. Emily de Luna, wife of Nicasio Rivera, a party in the
mentioned civil case, provided details on how the respondent became their lawyer. She admitted to
having lost their case before the RTC and the CA, so in their desire to appeal the Decision to the Supreme
Court, they sought the help of the respondent, who was then working at the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO). He helped them prepare their Motion for Reconsideration before the CA without consideration,
although they told him that V2 of the property would go to him. This resulted in an Amended Decision
favorable to them.

Concerning the Deed of Sale, it was admitted that the respondent lawyer prepared and notarized the deed
for P4 million in favor of the Sps. Wy, which became anomalous, dishonest, and done in bad faith,
intended to prejudice the rights of the complainant.

The respondent is found to have violated his Lawyer's Oath, the Canons of Professional Responsibility,
and failed to faithfully comply with the rules on notarial practice. Therefore, it is recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for 2 years and that his present notarial commission be revoked, with
disqualification from reappointment for 2 years.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT adopts the findings of the IBP CBD with modification.

The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal
processes. To the best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid
any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of
his character but also inspires respect and obedience to the law on the part of the public.

Here, Atty. Dalangin exhibited dishonesty in feigning that he did not represent Sylvia. As the evidence
adduced, there is no way Atty. Dalangin could forget that Sylvia is his client.

Likewise, Atty. Dalangin cannot deny that Sylvia is Teofilo's wife or that she has an interest in the
disputed land. As such, Atty. Dalangin should have been circumspect in notarizing the deed of absolute
sale over Teofilo's property, knowing that a legal heir was left out. The transaction disregarded the rules
on succession, stating that the widow is a compulsory heir of the decedent. Corollarily, Atty. Dalangin
should have refused the notarization of the deed.
 SALVACIO C. ROMO vs. ATTY. ORHEIM T. FERRER (AC No. 12833)

DOCTRINE: A lawyer is a trustee of all client's funds and properties that may come into his possession.
The failure to render an accounting upon demand deserves administrative sanctions.

FACTS: Salvacio filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Ferrer for failure to account for the
funds entrusted to him before the IBP CBD. In 2006, he engaged the services of Atty. Ferrer in
prosecuting an action for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Amanda Yu.

Yu settled the case and gave a total amount of P375,000 to Atty. Ferrer on different dates but only
remitted P80,000 to Salvacion. Salvacion already demanded Atty. Ferrer to remit the balance with the
land title as collateral, but Atty. Ferrer did not comply. Upon the sending of the final demand letter, Atty.
Ferrer ignored.

In defense, Atty. Ferrer stated that he remitted P120,000, where the P80,000 was sent to Salvacion, and
the other payments were given personally to Salvacion’s daughter without any receipts since he trusted
Salvacion and her daughter.

The IBP CBD recommended suspending Atty. Ferrer from the practice of law for a period of 2 years, and
that was adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT adopted the findings with modification to the penalty imposed.

A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. The duty to
render an accounting is absolute. The failure to do so upon demand amounts to misappropriation, which is
a ground for disciplinary action, not to mention possible criminal prosecution.

Here, convincing evidence exists that Atty. Ferrer represented Salvacion in a criminal case and that he
received funds for her in the total amount of P375,000.00. However, Atty. Ferrer remitted only
P80,000.00 and unjustifiably refused to return the balance of P295,000.00, despite repeated demands.

Atty. Ferrer did not disprove this evidence but merely argued that he gave the amounts to Salvacion's
daughter. Yet, Atty. Ferrer failed to substantiate this theory. Thus, it is modified to suspend Atty. Ferrer
from the practice of law for only 6 months and was ordered to return the P295,000 plus 6 percent interest
within 10 days.
 PEDRO SALAZAR vs. ATTY. ARMAND DURAN
(AC No. 7035)

DOCTRINE: Every lawyer is enjoined to obey the laws of the land, refrain from doing any falsehood in
or out of court, or consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of
his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts and to his clients.

FACTS: Pedro alleged that he engaged the services of Atty. Duran in a partition case involving the estate
of his (Pedro's) parents. Thereafter, Pedro and Atty. Duran executed two contracts for attorney's fees: one,
a contract on a contingent basis wherein 20% of any and all proceeds of the partition case would be paid
to Atty. Duran; and second, a contract wherein the attorney's fees and acceptance fee were set at
P50,000.00 each, subject to certain conditions. He asked the respondent lawyer to return the excess after
he learned that the value of the LBP bonds was higher than the attorney’s fees as stipulated in the two
contracts.

Sometime in March 1997, Pedro tried to cash the LBP check, but Atty. Duran grabbed it from him and
left further until Pedro learned that the respondent lawyer had already deposited the check in his own
bank account and secured a loan from LBP with the money value of LBP bonds to use as his payment for
the loan. After terminating the services of Atty. Duran, Pedro intervened claiming the 20% of the just
compensation due to Pedro during the motion in the partition case. Eventually, the trial court ordered LBP
to release Pedro's share but withheld 20% of it pending the determination of Atty. Duran's claim.

Atty. Duran averred that the attorney's fees he received from Pedro were reasonable and that he was the
victim who was betrayed by his client.

The IBP CBD recommended that Atty. Duran be reprimanded with a stern warning, with the affirmation
of IBP Board of Governors dismissing the charges of dishonesty, false testimony, and violation of the
lawyer’s oath.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT adopted the findings of IBP CBD.

A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to
the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients."

In this case, Atty. Duran was untruthful and unethical when he testified about his participation in the
check. Atty. Duran stated that he signed in the check as a witness but his signature and account number
were found at the back of the check indicating that complainant indorsed it to him. The IBP-CBP found
Atty. Duran's claim of sudden recollection of the events that actually transpired was too contrived and
convenient to be worthy of belief. Atty. Duran could not have forgotten how he received a check for a
substantial sum, especially the argument that allegedly ensued between him and the complainant on that
day. Further, Atty. Duran himself filed the motion to segregate his supposed share in the just
compensation. Hence, there was a presumption that he prepared for his testimony. For him not to
remember the facts of his own case was, therefore, quite far-fetched.
 ROSALINA TAGHOY vs. CONSTANTINE TECSON III (AC No. 12446)

DOCTRINE: Lawyers must always serve their clients with competence and diligence.

FACTS: The complainants filed a disbarment case against Atty. Tecson after the respondent lawyer
failed to refund P71,000 and P5,000 as professional fees in the engagement of his legal services for the
ejectment case against Rayos including the preparation of the motion for reconsideration.

Atty. Tecson failed to file the position paper for the ejectment case which caused the dismissal of the
appeal. On defense, Atty. Tecson said that he did not submit necessary pleadings and attend the hearings
because of his workload and personal problems.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found that the respondent lawyer violated the Canon 18,
including the Rule 18.01, 18.02, 18.03, and 18.04, of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended that Atty. Tecson be suspended from the practice of law for one year. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted the recommendation but modified the penalty to the period of practice of law
suspension from one to two years and ordered to pay P76,000 to the complainants.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT adopted the findings of IBP CBD.

Lawyers are not obliged to advocate for every person who requests to be their client. However, once they
agree to take up the client's cause, they owe fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed to them. Lawyers who undertake an action are expected to attend to their client's
cause until it becomes final and executory.

In this case, Atty. Tecson neglected his duty to file his client’s position paper and appeal memorandum in
the ejectment that caused the dismissal of the case. This warranted the violation of the lawyer;s failure to
file necessary pleading in accordance to Rule 18.03 of the CPR.

His reason of personal problems and workloads are considered as a lame excuse to justify his infractions
as he could have taken available remedies to ensure that the pleadings were filed including the hiring of
the collaborating counsel or request for a motion to extend time to file pleading. Nothing efforts were
exerted that breached his duty to serve his client with diligence and competence as provided under Canon
18 of the CPR.
 MA. HERMINA TIONGSON vs. ATTY. MICHAEL L. FLORES (AC No. 12424)

DOCTRINE: The lawyer and client alike must only employ fair, honest, and honorable means to
advance their interests.

FACTS: Vincent, a former court employee of RTC, gave a copy of an Order in the case for the
segregation survey of Jacinta Tenorio’s land, registered in favor of her compulsory heirs, to Atty. Flores.
However, upon verification by Hermina, there is no civil case instituted and pending before the RTC, and
the judge's signature was forged.

Although the Order was falsified, Atty. Flores still shared the copy with his client, Arthur Tenorio, and
the latter presented it to the petitioner herein, the caretaker of Rogelio Lira, advising her to refrain from
planting on the land because it will be subdivided, and to inform Hermina that she was no longer the
owner.

Hermina filed a criminal complaint for falsification against Atty. Flores, and the public prosecutor found
probable cause to indict the respondent lawyer for falsification of public documents. Then, the disbarment
complaint was filed as Atty. Flores committed gross misconduct, malpractice, and deceit when he
obtained a forged Court Order and shared it with his client, who used it to coerce her caretaker.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found that Atty. Flores authored the fake Court Order, warranting
the penalty of disbarment in violation of the lawyer's oath and the CPR. Thus, it is recommended to disbar
and strike his name from the roll of attorneys, which was adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT did not adopt the recommendation of IBP CBD to disbar the
respondent.

The supreme penalty of disbarment is imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar.

Here, the IBP recommended disbarment for Atty. Flores because he falsified a court order. It relied on the
principle that he who possessed a forged/falsified document and made use and benefited from it is
deemed the forger/falsifier. Yet, the facts are insufficient to presume that Atty. Flores authored the
falsification. Foremost, Herminia failed to show that Atty. Flores was involved directly or indirectly in
the falsification of the court order and forgery of the judge's signature.

What he did was share the document with his client. Unknown to Atty. Flores, Arthur, et al., utilized the
falsified order to harass Herminia's caretaker. Thus, he must be penalized for his carelessness in
entrusting a forged document to his client despite the danger that it may be used for wrongful purposes.

For this reason, the Supreme Court only suspended Atty. Flores from the practice of law for a period of
one year.
 LILIA YUSAY-CORDERO vs. ATTY. JUANITO AMIHAN JR. (AC No. 12709)

DOCTRINE: Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time
when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary
action.

FACTS: Lilia filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Amihan before the IBP for the violation of
the Lawyer’s Oath and Canon of Professional Responsibility after discovering that Atty. Amihan was not
a commissioned notary public. This discovery occurred after Atty. Amihan notarized the Deed of Portion
Sale, which she partly executed.

However, no copy of the deed was recorded in the Office of the Clerk of Court, leading Lilia to learn that
Atty. Amihan is not a commissioned notary public. As evidenced in her administrative complaint, she
presented corresponding certifications from the clerk of court, while Atty. Amihan denied the allegations.
He claimed that he is authorized to notarize documents with imprints of his rubber stamps, a
recommendation letter stating the expiration of his appointment, oath of office, and appointment as a
notary public in 2004 to substantiate his defense.

On the findings of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Amihan is not a commissioned notary
public and committed deliberate falsehood of the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01 of the CPR. Thus, they
recommended a penalty of the immediate revocation of notarial commission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for 2 years, and suspension from the practice of law for 2 years.
Although they adopted the findings, the IBP Board of Governors reduced the suspension period to 1 year.

RULING: The SUPREME COURT adopted the IBP’s findings.

Notarization ensures the authenticity and reliability of a document. It converts a private document into a
public one, rendering the document admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Where
the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no
authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one,
performing a notarial act without such a commission is a violation of the lawyer's oath to obey the laws,
more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he
is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath
similarly proscribes.

Here, Atty. Amihan notarized the deed, but the clerk of court certified that the respondent lawyer was not
a commissioned notary public, and no copy of the deed was filed. In contrast, Atty. Amihan, Jr. presented
imprints of his rubber stamps for the year 2003. Yet, they do not contain material information such as his
notarial commission number. Atty. Amihan, Jr. also submitted a recommendation letter stating that his
appointment as a notary public expired on December 31, 2003. Nonetheless, the certification from the
clerk of court belied the contents of the letter. The prevailing law at the time of notarization in 2003 was
the Revised Administrative Code, which provides that the oath of office of a notary public and his
commission shall be filed and recorded in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC.