TARLAC STATE UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF LAW
TRIAL
RE: LETTER COMPLAINT OF FABIANA, 02 JULY 2013

Facts:

The administrative matter stems from the claim of death benefits by the heirs of the late Marlon
Fabiana against manning agent Maritime Corporation and its principal Air Sea Holiday.
Complainant Merlita Fabiana hereby accuses CA Justices of having defied the resolution
promulgated by the Court whereby the Court had allegedly fixed with finality complainant’s
claims for death benefits and other monetary claims, including damages and attorney’s fees,
against the Maritimes Company arising from the death of her husband.

Issue: Whether or not the CA Justices willfully disobeyed the resolution promulgated by the
Court.

Ruling:

No, the CA Justices did not willfully disobey the resolution because the complainant’s initiation
of the comlplaint would take the respondent Justices to task for their regular performance of
their office. Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought against any Judge or Justice
in relation to the performance of official functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of
appropriate judicial remedies, nor substitutes for such remedies. In re: Verified Complaint of
Engr. Oscar, the Court reiterated that a judge’s failure to correctly interpret the law or to properly
appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily incur administrative liability, for to hold
him administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he
has erred, will be nothing short of harassment and will make his position doubly unbearable. His
judicial office will then be rendered untenable, because no on called upon to try the facts or to
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.
Administrative sanction and criminal liability should be visited on him only when the error is so
gross, deliberate and malicious, or is committed with evident bad faith, or only in clear cases of
violations by him of the standards and norms of propriety and good behavior prescribed by law
and the rules of procedure, or fixed and defined by pertinent jurisprudence.
IBM DAKSH BUSINESS v. ROSALIE S. RIBAS, 11 JULY 2018

Facts:

Ribas was employed by IBM as a customer care specialist. Ribas was issued a show cause
memo for her absences. Despite her written explanation, she was then formally charged with
violation of the company’s code of conduct for being absent for several days without leave or
proper prior notice. Thereafter, having established that respondent committed the imputed acts,
she was issued a termination letter. Arguing that her dismissal was illegal, respondent filed a
complaint before the LA. According to her, her absences were justified as she had a delicate
pregnancy condition. The IBM maintains that respondent was dismissed for cause and after
compliance with due process. The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC
reversed and set aside the LA decision, ruling that respondent was illegally dismissed, ordering
thus petitioner to reinstate to her former position and to pay her backwages. The CA 11th
Division rendered a decision denying petitioner’s petition and affirming the NLRC’s resolution.
The CA sustained the NLRC’s findings that there was a valid dismissal but respondent should
be reinstated to her former position sans backwages. The decision became final and executory.
The CA 6th Division granted the respondent’s petition and setting the resolution. Specifically, the
CA ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed for employment and thus should be reinstated
with payment of backwages.

Issue: Did the 6th Division err in reversing and setting aside the NLRC decision.

Ruling:

Yes, the 6th Division erred in reversing and setting aside the NLRC decision because the CA 11th
Division decision has became final and executory even before the rendition of the assailed
decision. In the exercise of the Court’s administrative supervision over the CA, the Court finds it
proper and necessary to point out the CA’s patent procedural blunder in failing to consolidate
the petitions despite notice. There is no question that the two petitions before the CA involved
the exact same parties, same set of facts, and assailed the same NLRC Resolution. Further, the
issues are not merely closely related but in fact, entirely identical as they both involved
questions on the validity of respondent’s dismissal from employment, propriety of reinstatement,
and the propriety of awarding backwages. Section 3(a), Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals, has forthrightly mandated the consolidation of related cases assigned to
different Justices. Thus, unlike in the trial stage where the consolidation of cases is permissive
and a matter of judicial discretion, in the appellate stage, the rigid policy is to make the
consolidation of all cases and proceedings resting on the same set of facts, or involving identical
claims or interests or parties mandatory. Regardless of whether or not there was a request
therefor, consolidation should be made as a matter of course. Indeed, this mandatory policy
eliminates conflicting results concerning similar or like issues between the same parties or
interests even as it enhances the administration of justice. The only exceptions to the rule on
the immutability of final judgments are 1. Correction of clerical errors; 2. Nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party; 3. Void judgments; and 4. Whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. None of
these exist in this case. The case at bar is simply brought about by the patent procedural
mistake committed in the appellate court.
GOODLAND COMPANY, INC. v. BANCO DE ORO-UNIBANK, INC., 11 FEBRUARY 2019

Facts:

BDO filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money with application for preliminary
attachment against Guy, petitioner Goodland, and the other debtor corporations. BDO alleged
that Goodland and other debtor corporations, through Guy, obtained loans from EPCI; that they
are guilty of fraud in the performance of their obligation; that Guy, who was the controlling
stockholder of the debtor corporations, conspired with the debtor corporations to cause the
commencement of the negotiations with EPCI regarding the dacion of the property owned by
Goodgold only for the purpose of fraudulently delaying and ultimately evading the settlement or
collection of their loan obligations. The RTC issued an order granting BDO’s application for a
writ of preliminary attachment. Goodland and Richgold filed a motion to lift attachment and/or
partial discharge of attachment and to stop implementation thereof on account of excessive
attachment. Guy, on the other hand, filed a motion to lift/discharge and to stop further
implementation thereof; while Goodgold filed an Ad Cautelam motion to discharge attachment.
The RTC issued an order discharging the properties of Guy and Goodland on the ground that
the properties of Goodgold covered by the title were sufficient to cover the claims of BDO. RTC
issued an order denying the motion of BDO and partly granting Goodgold’s motion in so far as it
order the discharge of the title and the reinstatement of Goodland’s property. Goodland moved
for reconsideration, however, it was denied. The CA granted the petition of BDO finding that the
legal requisites for attachment of Guy’s properties were duly proven, reinstated the attachment
on the said properties. However, as to the properties of Goodgold, the CA ruled that there was
no sufficient basis to include the same in the writ, except for the other property. The CA found
that there was an identity of parties and issues between the two petitions for certiorari, and thus,
a judgment in one would result in res judicata in the other.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari must be dismissed.

Ruling:

Yes, the petition must be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. Litis pendentia is a ground
for the dismissal of an action when there is another action pending between the same parties
involving the same cause of action, thus, rendering the second action unnecessary and
vexatious. Res judicata, on the other hand, exists if the following requisites concur: 1. The
former judgment or order must be final; 2. The judgment or order must be on the merits; 3. It
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
4. There must be between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject. Matter
and cause of actinon. In this case, the Court finds that the CA correctly dismissed the petition
for certiorari on the ground of litis pendentia. As aptly found by the CA, the parties and issues
raised in the said case were identical to that other CA decision. In the other CA decision, the
BDO sought to reinstate the attachment of the properties of Guy on the ground that the
remaining attached properties were insufficient to secure its claim. On to the other CA decision,
Goodland claimed that its attached property should be discharged as the total current market
value of the attached properties of its co-defendants were more than enough to cover the
amount claimed by respondent BDO. Clearly, both petitions for certiorari raised as an issue the
sufficiency or insufficiency of the attached properties. The resolution of the said issue thus
prevented the other from resolving the same issue.
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
GMA NETWORK INC. v. CENTRAL CATV, INC.

Facts:

GMA filed with NTC a complaint against Central CATV to stop it from soliciting and showing
advertisements in its cable television system, pursuant to Section 2 of EO 205. Under this
provision, a grantee’s authority to operate a CATV system shall not infringe on the television
and broadcast markets. GMA alleged that the phrase television and broadcast markets includes
the commercial or advertising market. Central admitted the airing of commercial advertisement
on its CATV network but the EO 205 expressly allowed CATV providers to carry advertisements
and other similar paid segments provided there is consent from their program providers. After
GMA presented and offered its evidence, Central filed a motion to dismiss by demurrer to
evidence claiming that the evidence presented by the complainants failed to show how the
Central acts of soliciting and/or showing advertisements infringed upon the television and
broadcast market. The NTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint. It
ruled that since EO 205 does not define infringement, EO 436 merely clarified or filled in the
details of the term to mean that the CATV operators may show advertisements, provided that
they secure the consent of their program providers. In the present case, the documents
attached to the respondent’s demurrer to evidence showed that its program providers have
given such consent. Although the respondent did not formally offer these documents as
evidence, the NTC could still consider them since they formed part of the records and the NTC
is not bound by the strict application of technical rules. The CA upheld the NTC ruling. The NTC
did not err in considering the pieces of evidence that were attached to its demurrer to evidence
since administrative agencies are not bound by the technical rules of procedure.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the order of the NTC granting the motion to
dismiss by demurrer to evidence.

Ruling:

Yes, the CA erred in affirming the order of the NTC granting the motion to dismiss by demurrer
to evidence because the NTC disregarded the rule on demurrer by allowing the submission of
respondent’s evidence while depriving the petitioner of the opportunity to question, examine ore
refute the submitted documents. The rule on demurrer to evidence provides that after the
plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal
on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his
motion is denied he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence. In other words, the issue to be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer
to evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for based on the facts and the
law. In the present case, the NTC considered both the insufficiency of the allegations in the
complaint and the insufficiency of the complainant’s evidence in light of its interpretation of the
provisions of EO 205 and EO 436. The NTC ruled that the complainants, including the
petitioner, failed to prove by substantial evidence that the respondent aired the subject
advertisements without the consent of its program providers, as required under EO 436. The
NTC, therefore, has issued the assailed order upon a consideration of the applicable laws and
the evidence of the petitioner. On this score, the grant of the demurrer suffers no infirmity. While
an administrative agency is not strictly bound by technical rules of procedure in the conduct of
its administrative proceedings, the relaxation of the rules should not result in violating
fundamental evidentiary rules, including due process. In the present case, the NTC proceeded
against the very nature of the remedy of demurrer to evidence when it considered the
respondents evidence, specifically the certifications attached to the respondent’s demurrer to
evidence.
ZAMBALES v. ZAMBALES, 03 APRIL 2019

Facts:

Plaintiffs-appellants are the surviving children of Enrique, the sole heir of Blas, who died
intestate. Blas is the registered owner of parcel of land. A document denominated as
extrajudicial settlement with waiver of rights and sale was executed by Joaquina, the surviving
wife of Enrique waived, renounced, ceded, transferred and conveyed all their rights, interest and
shares over their 1/7 undivided interest over the land covered by OCT in favor Domingo, who, in
turn, accepted the waiver and transfer made by his co-heirs and expressed his appreciation and
gratitude to them in the same document. After more than two decades, plaintiffs-appellants filed
the instant complaint to cancel the document as extrajudicial settlement with waiver of rights
and sale. Plaintiff-appellants filed a complaint for cancellation of TCT and extrajudicial
settlement among heirs with waiver of rights and sale with prayer for preliminary injunction. The
defendant-appellee filed a motion to dismiss stating the complaint is barred by res judicata as
the issue of the heirship of Domingo has been settled and that the questioned deed was
categorically admitted in evidence. It was opposed stating that the parcels of land enumerated
in the said approved compromise agreement are the properties of the late Enrique and that they
have nothing to do with the property. In an order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss.
Thereafter, the defendant-appellee filed an answer with counterclaim stating that the complaint
was barred by prescription as the document sought to be nullified was executed 21 years ago,
and that the validity of the same was expressly admitted in civil case. Salvacion filed a motion to
dismiss on demurrer to evidence which the RTC granted. It held that while the petitioners
submitted testimonial evidence to show the subject extrajudicial settlement was allegedly
forged, which would thus render the subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto void, herein
petitioners did not offer the said document nor the titles sought to be cancelled during trial. It
noted that during the hearing the counsel for petitioners categorically manifested that they were
not offering exhibits. The CA upheld the grant of demurrer to evidence because the evidence
presented by petitioners was insufficient to prove the essential averments in their complaint,
underscoring the fact that the document itself sought to be annulled, the extrajudicial settlement
among heirs with waiver of rights and sale, was not offered in evidence. Also, the petitioners did
not bother to attach the titles sought to be annulled that purportedly originated from OCT.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in upholding the grant of demurrer to evidence.

Ruling:

No, the CA did not err in upholding the grant of demurrer to evidence because apart from the
fact that the extrajudicial settlement among heirs with waiver of rights and sale sought to be
annulled and the titles to be cancelled were not offered in evidence, the extrajudicial settlement
itself alluded to in the testimonial evidence presented was not offered in order to allow the trial
court to determine the veracity of the claims of the witnesses. Likewise, a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 pertains to questions of law and not to factual issues. A question of law
which the Court may pass upon must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by litigants. It bears emphasis that the factual findings of the appellate court
generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the
trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or
that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. As a rule, the
jurisdiction of the court is limited to a review of errors of law allegedly committed by the
appellate court. It is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings. The issues and arguments raised by the petitioners are factual
matters that were threshed out and decided upon by the trial court which were subsequently
affirmed by the appellate court. The findings and conclusions of both the RTC and the CA in this
case are all in accord: that the grant of a demurrer to evidence was proper when, upon the facts
and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to the relief sought. As correctly held by the CA,
where the evidence of the plaintiff together with such inferences and conclusions as may
reasonably be drawn from it does not warrant recovery from the defendant, a demurrer to
evidence should be sustained.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. v. FE ROA GIMENEZ, 11 JANUARY 2016

Facts:

The Republic, through the PCGG, instituted a complaint for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages against Gimenez spouse before the Sandiganbayan. The
complaint seeks to recovery ill-gotten wealth acquired by the spouses as dummies, agents, or
nominees of former President Marcos. During trial, the Republic presented documentary
evidence attesting to the positions held, business interest, income, and pertinent transactions of
the Gimenez. The RP presented the testimonies of Atty. Javier, Head of the Sequestered
Assets Department of PCGG and of Daniel, Director of the R&D of PCGG. Witnesses testified
on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez. The Sandiganbayan
denied a motion to recall Daniel’s testimony. The RP manifested that it was no longer
presenting further evidence. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the RP 30 days to file its
formal offer of evidence. The RP moved for an extension of 30 days, within which to file its
formal offer of evidence. This motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a resolution of the
same date. The RP moved for an additional 15 days within which to file its formal offer of
evidence. This motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a resolution. The first assailed
resolution, the Sandiganbayan noted that RP failed to file its formal offer of evidence
notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date it terminated its
presentation of evidence. Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the filing of its formal offer
of evidence. Ignacio Gimenez filed a motion to dismiss on demurrer to evidence. He argued that
the RP showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of action. The RP
filed a motion for a motion for reconsideration and to admit attached formal offer of evidence.
The pertinent portions of the RP’s offer of documentary exhibits attached to the motion. In the
second assailed resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied the RP’s motion and granted the
Gimenez’ motion to dismiss because the RP failed to prosecute its case for an unreasonable
length of time and to comply with the court’s rules.

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that RP waived the filing of its formal offer
of evidence and in granting Gimenez’s motion to dismiss on demurrer to evidence.

Ruling:

Yes, the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that RP waived the filing of its formal offer evidence
and in granting Gimenez’ motion to dismiss on demurrer to evidence because RP was able to
file its formal offer of evidence, albeit, belatedly. The Rules lays down the procedure for the
formal offer of evidence. Testimonial evidence is offered at the time a witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence, on the other hand, are offered after the presentation of a
party’s testimonial evidence. Offer of documentary or object evidence is generally done orally
unless permission is given by the trial court for a written offer of evidence. The Rules specifically
provides that evidence must be formally offered to be considered by the court. Evidence not
offered is excluded in the determination of the case. Failure to make a formal offer within a
considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. The rule on formal offer of
evidence is intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of due process. Parties must be given
the opportunity to review the evidence submitted against them and take the necessary actions
to secure their case. Hence, any document or object that was marked for identification is not
evidence unless it was formally offered and the opposing counsel was given an opportunity to
object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it. However, the court
has adopted a liberal approach regarding technical rules of procedure in cases involving
recovery of ill-gotten wealth. RP hurdled 19 years of trial before the Sandiganbayan to present
its evidence as shown in its extensive formal offer of evidence. A demurrer to evidence may be
issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the
plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn
therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be
sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact
favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable
therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case,
or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be
sustained where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.
JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS
SPOUSE VILLUGA v. KELLY HARDWARE, 18 JULY 2012

Facts:

Kelly filed with RTC a complaint for a sum of money and damages against Villuga. Villuga made
purchases of various construction materials from Kelly. Despite several demands, oral and
written, Villuga fail and refuse to comply with. In their answer, it was alleged that they do not
remember the exact amount as no copy of the documents evidencing the purchases were
attached to the complaint. The RTC issued an order deferring resolution of the motion for partial
judgment on the ground that there is no clear and specific admission on the part of the
petitioners as to the actual amount that they owe respondent. Kelly filed its second amended
complaint again with leave of court modifying the period covered by the complaint. It confirmed
the partial payment. Villuga denied the allegation. Kelly filed a motion to expunge with motion for
summary judgment claiming that Villuga’s comments on the Request for admission is a mere
scrap of paper as it was signed by the counsel. In their opposition to motion to expunge with
motion for summary judgment, Villuga argued that the request for admission is fatally defective,
because it did not indicate or specify a period within which to answer; that the verification by
Villuga’s counsel is sufficient compliance with the Rules. The RTC granted the motion to
expunge with motion for summary judgment. The CA affirmed the orders of the RTC.

Issue: Whether CA erred in affirming the orders of the RTC.

Ruling:

No, the CA did not err in affirming the summary judgment rendered by the RTC because the
petitioner’s defense of partial payment in their answer to the second amended complaint, in
effect, no longer raised genuine issues of fact that require presentation of evidence in full-brown
trial. The Rules on Summary Judgment provides that a party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading
in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admission
for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. The motion shall be served at
least 10 days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing
affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least 3 days before the hearing. After the hearing, the
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions,
and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue at any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The situation became different, however, when respondent subsequently filed its Second
Amended Complaint admitting therein that petitioners, indeed, made partial payments. In the
instant case, it is difficult to believe that petitioners do not know how their payment was applied.
Instead of denying knowledge, petitioners could have easily asserted that their payments of
P110,301.80 and P20,000.00 were applied to, and should have been deducted from, the sum
sought to be recovered by respondent, but they did not, leading the court to no other conclusion
than that these payments were indeed applied to their other debts to respondent leaving an
outstanding obligation of P259,809.50. Hence, the summary judgment of the RTC in favor of
respondent is proper.
MUNICIPALITY OF TIWI v. ANTONIO B. BETITO, 09 JULY 2010

Facts:

The Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed a resolution authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer to
represent Tiwi and its barangay in the recovery of their rightful share in realty taxes. As a result,
Mayor Corral, representing Tiwi, and respondent and Atty. Lawenko entered into a contract of
legal services. The contract provided, among others, that Atty. Lawenko would receive a 10%
contigent fee on whatever amount of realty taxes that would be recovered by Tiwi through their
efforts. The OP opined that the MOA entered into by NPC and Albay merely recognized and
established NPC’s realty taxes. Atty. Carpio further clarified that the sharing scheme and those
entitled to the payments to be made by NPC under the MOA should be that provided under the
law, and since Tiwi is entitled to share in said realty taxes, NPC may remit such share. The
present controversy arose when Atty. Lawenko sought to enforce the contract after rendering
the legal services which allegedly benefited Tiwi. The Sangguniang Bayan passed a resolution
but denied that said resolution authorized then Mayor Corral to enter into the contract. Atty.
Lawenko filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and/or partial summary judgment.
The RTC rendered a partial judgment on the pleadings in favor of respondent because the
petitioners’ answer to the complaint failed to tender an issue. It noted that petitioners did not
specifically deny under oath the actionable documents in this case, particularly, the contract of
legal services and the resolution. Consequently, the genuineness and due execution of these
documents are deemed admitted pursuant to the Rules. The CA affirmed the RTC order.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC order.

Ruling:

Yes, the CA erred in affirming the RTC order because the trial court erred in ruling that the
genuineness and due execution of the contract of legal services was impliedly admitted by
petitioners for failure to make a sworn specific denial thereof as required by the Rules. This rule
is not applicable when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument. The
rule provides that a judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the complaint
tenders several issues. A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the truth of all the
material and relevant allegations of the opposing party and the judgment must rest on those
allegations taken together with such other allegations as are admitted in the pleadings.
However, when it appears that not all the material allegations of the complaint were admitted in
the answer for some of them were either denied or disputed, and the defendant has set up
certain special defenses which, if proven, would have the effect of nullifying plaintiff’s main
cause of action, judgment on the pleadings cannot be rendered. In the instant case, a review of
the records reveal that respondent and petitioners set up multiple levels of claims and defenses,
respectively, with some failing to tender an issue while others requiring the presentation of
evidence for resolution. In the instant case, the contract was executed between the Atty.
Lawenko and Tiwi. None of the petitioners, who are incumbent elective and appointive officials
of Tiwi as of the filing of the complaint, were parties to said contract. Nonetheless, in their
subsequent pleadings, petitioners admitted the genuineness and due execution of the contract.
The premise that the genuineness and due execution of the contract has already been
established. As a result of these admissions, the issue, at least as to the coverage of the
contract, may be resolved based on the pleadings as it merely requires the interpretation and
application of the provisions of the resolutions.
SHIMIZU PHILS v. MRS. LETICIA MAGSALIN, 20 JUNE 2012

Facts:

Petitioner claims that one Leticia, doing business as Karen’s Trading, had breached their
subcontract agreement for the supply, delivery, installation, and finishing parquet tiles for certain
floors in the petitioner’s condominium. The breach triggered the agreement’s termination. The
petitioner sent a notice to FGU Insurance Corporation demanding damages pursuant to the
surety and performance bonds the former had issued for the subcontract. FGU was duly served
with summons. With respect to Leticia, however, the corresponding officer’s return declared that
both she and Karen’s Trading could not be located at their given addresses, and that despite
further efforts, their new addresses could not be determined. FGU filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint. The petitioner filed its opposition to the motion. FGU filed a motion for leave of court
to file a third party complaint. For failure of petitioner to prosecute, the case was dismissed. The
CA dismissed the appeal and agreed with FGU. All the subsequent motion for reconsideration
were dismissed.

Issue: Whether the order of dismissal is valid.

Ruling:

Yes, the order of dismissal is void because it simply states its conclusion that the case should
be dismissed for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but does not state the facts on which this
conclusion is based. Dismissal of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized
under the Rules. A plain examination of the dismissal order shows that it is an unqualified order
and, as such, is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice. Dismissal of actions which do not
expressly state whether they are with or without prejudice are held to be with prejudice. As a
prejudicial dismissal, the dismissal order is also deemed to be a judgment on the merits so that
the petitioners complaint can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata. Procedurally,
when a complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the
dismissal has the effect on adjudication on the merits. An adjudication on the merits, it is
imperative that the dismissal order conform with the rules on judgment, final order and entry
thereof. A trial court should always specify the reasons for a complaint’s dismissal so that on
appeal, the reviewing court can readily determine the prima facie justification for the dismissal.
A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based
leave the parties in the dark and is especially prejudicial to the losing party who is unable to
point the assigned error in seeking a review by a higher tribunal.
ARMANDO GO v. EAST OCEANIC LEASING AND FINANCING CORP, 19 JANUARY 2018

Facts:

Armando Go obtained a loan from East payable in monthly installments until fully paid, as
evidenced by a promissory note that was executed on the same day. Notably, Go’s loan
application was approved on the basis of the report and recommendation of Sy, director of East,
which specified that the purpose of the loan was for the upgrading of the bus fleet and
replacement of old units of Oriental Bus Lines. The issued checks were all dishonored by the
DBP upon presentment for payment with reason account under garnished stamped at the back
of the checks and as shown by the check return slips. The loan became due and demandable.
East filed a complaint against Go before the RTC for collection of sum of money with prayer for
preliminary attachment. The RTC favored East. Go moved for reconsideration, arguing that the
RTC decision is contrary to law because it failed to cite any factual and/or legal basis as to his
civil liability to East.

Issue: Whether the assailed RTC Decision is void for having no basis in fact and in law as
regards his civil liability to East Oceanic.

Ruling:

Yes, the assailed RTC decision is void for having no basis in fact and in law as regards the civil
liability to East. The Constitution expressly provides that no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused
due course or denied without stating the basis therefor. In this case, a review of the records
shows that the RTC had failed to clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it
based its ruling insofar as Go's civil liability to East Oceanic is concerned. There is absolutely no
discussion at all in the assailed Decision as to the RTC's ruling in the collection case,
particularly, on how it arrived at its conclusion finding Go liable to pay East Oceanic "the sum of
P2,814,054.86 plus 6% interest to be computed from the time of the filing of the complaint.
DARE ADVENTURE FARM v. COURT OF APPEALS, 24 SEPTEMBER 2012

Facts:

Petitioner acquired a parcel of land through a deed of absolute sale between the petitioner, as
vendee, and Goc-ong. The petitioner later on discovered the joint affidavit executed by the Goc-
ongs, whereby the Goc-ongs declared that they were the owners of the property, and that they
were mortgaging the property to Ng to secure their obligation subject to the condition that
should they not pay the stipulated 36 monthly installments, the Ngs would automatically become
the owners of the property. With the Goc-ongs apparently failing to pay their obligation to the
Ngs as stipulated, the latter brought a complaint for the recovery of a sum of money, or, in the
alternative, for the foreclosure of mortgage in the RTC. With Goc-ong being declared in default
for failing to file her answer, the RTC rendered its decision declaring Dare the owners of the
parcel of land. The CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment because nowhere in
the allegation on why the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

Issue: Whether the action for annulment of judgment was a proper recourse for the petitioner to
set aside the decision rendered by the RTC.

Ruling:

No, the action for annulment of judgment was not a proper recourse but rather an action for
quieting of title or an action for reconveyance of the property. A petition for annulment of
judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when
other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be
annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Under the rules
on judgment or final orders, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive
between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in
the same capacity. Accordingly, the petitioners resort to annulment of judgment under Rule 47
was unnecessary if, after all, the judgment rendered in the civil case did not prejudice it.
Moreover, Section 1 of Rule 47 extends the remedy of annulment only to a party in whose favor
the remedies of new trial, reconsideration, appeal, and petition for relief from judgment are no
longer available through no fault of said party. As such, the petitioner, being a non-party in the
civil case, could not bring the action for annulment of judgment due to unavailability to it of the
remedies of new trial, reconsideration, appeal, or setting the judgment aside through a petition
for relief.
HEIRS OF YUSINGCO v. AMELITA BUSILAK, 24 JANUARY 2018

Facts: