POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
KA-POLI NOTES What does “Freedom of Religion” mean?
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BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
What is Religion?
It is any specific system of belief, worship, conduct, etc. often
involving a code of ethics and philosophy; profession of faith
to an active power that binds and elevates man to his creator.
Where did the word religion come from?
Religion -> Religuin -> Religio
Bond between man and God. Hence, religion is a theistic
concept, the centrality of this philosophy or belief in God.
Does that mean, that religion does not extend to non-theistic
philosophies?
No, the concept of religion has been expanded to include
non-theistic beliefs.
What is the meaning of “Religion” as per Aglipay vs. Ruiz?
A profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to its Creator.
What is the meaning of “Religion” as per Davis vs. Beason?
One’s views of his relations to His Creator and to the
obligations they impose of reverence to His being and
character, and obedience to His Will.
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Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to
believe, or the freedom to act or not to act according to what
one believes.
How can freedom of religion be violated?
This freedom is violated when no one is compelled to act
against one’s belief or is prevented from acting according to
one’s belief.
What does “Church” mean as per the case of Imbong vs.
Ochoa?
The religious congregations collectively.
What does “Conscientious Objector” mean as per the case of
Imbong vs. Ochoa?
A person who, because of principles of religious training and
moral belief, is opposed to do his or her obligation regardless
of its cause. A conscientious objector may be released from
the obligation.
Is there an “exception” to the non-rendering of service in case
of religious reasons?
Yes. In cases of life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures.
What is the principle of separation of Church and State?
Mutual respect. The State cannot meddle in the internal affairs
of the Church, much less question its faith and dogmas or
dictate upon it. On the other hand, the Church cannot impose
its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the
citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs,
even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
To what extent is the freedom of religion guaranteed?
The freedom of religion is guaranteed to the extent that a
person may:
(1.) Worship God according to the dictates of his conscience;
(2.) Not to worship God at all;
(3.) Entertain notions respecting his relationship with God;
(4.) Exhibit sentiments in such form of worship not injurious
to the equal rights of others; and
(5.) Prohibit any legislation for the support of religion
because the State cannot establish a Church, aid one, aid
all, and participate in purely religious activities.
What are the three (3) aspects in the freedom of religion
clause?
(1.) The non-establishment clause;
(2.) The free exercise clause; and
(3.) No religious test clause.
What is the no religious test clause?
Religion cannot be made as a basis for qualification or
disqualification for the exercise of civil or political rights. One
has the right to believe or not to believe in any kind of religion
or religious activity.
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Non-establishment clause
The State cannot set up a church, nor pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions; or prefer one religion over another,
nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from
Church against his will, or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion.
Manifestations of the non-establishment clause
(1.) Exemption from taxation of properties actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious purposes
(2.) Optional religious instruction in public elementary and
high schools
(3.) Citizenship requirement of ownership of educational
institutions, except these established by religious groups
and mission boards; and
(4.) Appropriation allowed where ecclesiastic is employed in
armed forces, in a penal institution, or in a government-
owned orphanage or leprosarium.
What are the two-fold aspects of the right to religious
profession and worship?
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold
aspect:
(1.) Freedom to believe - Absolute as long as the belief is
confined within the realm of thought.
(2.) Freedom to act on one’s beliefs - Subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect
the public welfare.
What is “Freedom to Believe”?
The individual is free to believe or disbelieve as he pleases
concerning the hereafter. He may:
(1.) Indulge his own theories about life and death;
(2.) Worship any god he chooses, or none at all;
(3.) Embrace or reject any religion;
(4.) Acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that
appeals to his reverence;
(5.) Recognize or deny the immortality of his soul—in fact,
cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone see
fit.
However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be
hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to
believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his
beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so.
Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. Men may believe what
they cannot prove. Everyone has a right to his beliefs and he
may not be called to account because he cannot prove what
he believes.
What is “Freedom to Act on One’s Beliefs”?
Where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or
omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so
becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this
liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights
guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a
proper regard for the rights of others. It is an error to think
that mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the
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State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare.
The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent
religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if
such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction
and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable
requirements or prohibitions of the law.
Is the free exercise clause absolute?
No. It is subject to the police power of the State. The freedom
of religion must be exercised in good faith.
When is there a violation of the free exercise clause?
There is a violation when the element of coercion is present.
When is the non-establishment clause violated?
When the State uses its rights, authority, funds, and resources
behind an activity that is essentially and intrinsically religious.
What does the phrase “directly or indirectly” refer to?
It refers to the manner of appropriation of public money or
property, not as to whether a particular act involves a direct
or a merely incidental benefit to any church. Otherwise, the
framers of the Constitution would have placed it before “use,
benefit or support” to describe the same. Even the exception
to the same provision bolsters this interpretation. The
exception contemplates a situation wherein public funds are
paid to a priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher,
or dignitary because they rendered service in the AFP, or to
any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium. That a priest belongs to a particular church and
the latter may have benefited from the money he received is
of no moment, for the purpose of the payment of public funds
is merely to compensate the priest for services rendered and
for which other persons, who will perform the same services
will also be compensated in the same manner.
What would be the effect if the holding of religious rituals
within the halls of justice would be prohibited?
To disallow the holding of religious rituals within halls of
justice would set a dangerous precedent and commence a
domino effect. Strict separation, rather than benevolent
neutrality/accommodation, would be the norm. Thus, the
establishment of Shari’a courts, the National Commission for
Muslim Filipinos, and the exception of Muslims from the
provisions of the RPC relative to the crime of bigamy would
all be rendered nugatory because of strict separation. The
exception of members of INC from joining a union or the non-
compulsion recognized in favor of members of the Jehovah’s
Witness from doing certain gestures during the flag
ceremony, will all go down the drain simply because we insist
on strict separation.
Does not the holding of masses at the basement offend non-
Christians?
No. Our Constitution ensures and mandates an unconditional
tolerance, without regard to whether those who seek to
profess their faith belong to the majority or to the minority. It
is emphatic in saying that “the free exercise and enjoyment of
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religious profession and worship shall be without
discrimination or preference.” Otherwise, accommodation or
tolerance would just be mere lip service. One cannot espouse
that the Constitutional freedom of religion ensures tolerance,
but, in reality, refuses to practice what he preaches. One
cannot ask for tolerance when he refuses to do the same for
others.
Is the freedom to believe absolute?
Yes. As long as the belief is confined within the realm of
thought.
What is an ecclesiastical affair?
An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed, or
form of worship of the church, or the adoption and
enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and
regulations for the government of the membership, and the
power of excluding from such associations those deemed
unworthy.
State the Constitutional provisions on the principle of
separation of State and Church.
The 1987 Constitution expressly provides for the following
provisions, giving life to the policy of separation of the Church
and State; thus:
(1.) The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
(2.) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights.
(3.) No public money or property shall be appropriated,
applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other
religious teacher, or dignitary is assigned to the AFP,
penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
What is the “Lemon Test”?
The Lemon Test is a three-pronged test, which includes the
following:
(1.) W/N the Statute has a secular legislative purpose
(2.) W/N its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion
(3.) W/N the Statute must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion
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Tests in determining Free Exercise Clause violations
(1.) Clear and Present Danger Test - When words are used in
such circumstance and of such nature as to create a clear
and present danger that will bring about the substantive
evil that the State has the right to prevent.
(2.) Conscientious Objector Test - Will the regulation force a
legitimate conscientious objector to perform an act
against his will and conscience?
(3.) Compelling State Interest Test - The test determines
whether the respondent’s right to religious freedom has
been burdened and ascertains respondent’s sincerity in
his religious belief.
What are the three (3) prongs of the Compelling State Interest
Test?
(1.) “Has the statute or government action created a burden
on the free exercise of religion?” - The courts often look
into the sincerity of the religious belief, but without
inquiring into the truth of the belief, but without
inquiring into the truth of the belief because the Free
Exercise Clause prohibits inquiring about its truth.
(2.) “Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify
this infringement of religious liberty?” - The government
has to establish that its purposes are legitimate for the
State and that they are compelling. It must precisely
show how and to what extent those objectives will be
undermined if exemptions are granted.
(3.) “Has the State, in achieving its legitimate purposes, used
the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the State?” - The analysis
requires the State to show that the means in which it is
achieving its legitimate state objective is the least
intrusive means.
What are the approaches of the Courts to the Freedom of
Religion?
(1.) Strict Separationist - Erects an absolute barrier to formal
interdependence of religion and State. Religious
institutions could not receive aid whether direct or
indirect, from the State. Nor could the State adjust its
secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs
placed on believers. Only the complete separation of
religion from politics would eliminate the formal
influence of religious institutions and provide for a free
choice among political views; thus, a strict “wall of
separation” is necessary.
(2.) Strict Neutrality (Separationist View or Government
Neutrality Theory) - Requires that the State must be
neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers
and non-believers; it examines only whether government
action is for a secular purpose and does not consider
inadvertent burden on religious exercise; a rigid reading
of the principle of separation between Church and State.
(3.) Benevolent Neutrality or Accomodation - An approach
that looks further than the secular purposes of
government action and examines the effect of these
actions and examines the effect of these actions on
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religious exercise; the Court will strive to accommodate
religious beliefs and practices when it can within flexible
constitutional limits. The Philippines adheres to this.
Three kinds of accommodation
(1.) Mandatory Accommodation - Accommodation is
required to preserve free exercise protections and not
unconstitutionally infringe on religious liberty or create
penalties for religious freedom.
(2.) Permissive Accommodation - The State may, but is not
required to, accommodate religious interest.
(3.) Prohibited Accommodation - When establishment
concerns prevail over potential accommodation
interests. It is also when the Court finds no basis for a
mandatory accommodation nor it determines that the
legislative accommodation runs afoul of the
establishment or free exercise clause.
May a secular or governmental test be required for the
exercise or enjoyment of religious rights or religious freedom?
For example, licensure examination for priests?
No, that already amounts to the establishment of State
religion because the State would be providing for such
standards. Further, it blurs the separation of the Church and
the State.
Aglipay vs. Ruiz
G.R. No. 45459. March 13, 1937
Facts:
➔ Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, seeks the issuance of a writ of
prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts
from issuing ang and selling postage stamp
commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress.
➔ In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced that he
would order the issuance of postage stamps to
commemorate the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress.
➔ Mons. Aglipay Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in
the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty,
requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine
Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the
Philippines.
➔ The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of
prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant
case, although he admits that the writ may properly
restrain ministerial functions.
Issue: W/N there is a violation of the non-establishment
clause under Section 5, Article III of the Constitution.
Held: None. In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent
Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under
the provisions of Act. No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What
it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to
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determine when the issuance of special postage stamps
would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the
phrase does not authorize the violation of the Constitution.
The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to
advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this
country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an
event considered of international importance "to give
publicity to the Philippines and its people".
While the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be
said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious
character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the
Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government. The Government should not be embarrassed in
its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less
religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which
could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation.
The main purpose should not be frustrated by its
subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated.
What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but
Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that
congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the
stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with
an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if
any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim
and purpose of the Government.
Doctrine: What is granted by our Constitution is RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, not mere religious toleration. Religious freedom as a
constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound
reverence of religion and is not a denial of its influence in
human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates nab to his Creator is
recognized.
There was a question on the validity of the act of PPC in
printing, issuance of the INC commemorative centennial
stamps paid for by PPC using public funds. It was alleged that
there was disbursement of public funds violative of the
Constitution as the same is tantamount to religious activity
violative of the principle of separation of church and state and
the non-establishment of religion clause. PPC contended that
there was no use of public funds as the printing of the stamps
did not redound to the benefit of INC as the proceeds went
to PPC. The act was intended to promote tourism and that any
sectarian benefit to INC was merely incidental. It was
contended that the religious nature of the INC stamp makes
the same unconstitutional since it violates the prohibition
against the State establishing a religion. Is the contention
correct?
No. The State adopts the rule on benevolent neutrality when
it pertains to religion. The policy of the State is on the
inviolability of the principle of separation of church and state.
The rationale of the rule is summed up in the familiar saying,
“strong forces make good neighbors.” The idea is to delineate
the boundaries between the two institutions and, thus, avoid
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
encroachments by one against the other because of a
misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive
jurisdictions. The demarcation line calls on the entities to
“render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and
unto God the things that are God’s.” The wall between the
Church and the State exists along with the recognition of
freedom of religion. Jurisprudence would reveal that these
principles allow the broadest exercise of religious freedom
without infringing the non-establishment clause.
The PPO printed stamps commemorating the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress in the Philippines. It was
challenged on the ground that it was violative of the
separation of the Church and State and the non-
establishment clause. Is the contention correct?
No. It merely advertised the Philippines as a site of the
Eucharistic Congress to attract more tourists.
What is the proof that the main objective of selling the stamps
is indeed tourism?
The design of stamp - Philippine archipelago
How did the SC define “Religion” in this case?
Religion is a profession of faith to an active power that binds
and elevates man to his creator.
Garces vs. Estenzo
G.R. No. L-53487. May 25, 1981
Facts:
➔ This case was already cited under Art. II, Sec. 6.
➔ Barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, adopted
Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of
Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia."
➔ That resolution provided for (1) the acquisition of the
image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a
waiting shed as the barangay's projects. Funds for the
two projects would be obtained through the "selling of
tickets and cash donations".
➔ Funds were raised by means of solicitations and cash
donations of the barangay residents and those of the
neighboring places of Valencia. With those funds, the
waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of
San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the
barangay council for four hundred pesos.
Issue: W/N there was a contravention of the constitutional
provisions that "no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion"
Held: No. The questioned resolutions do not directly or
indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty,
nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of
any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with
private funds, not with tax money. The construction of a
waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.
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The wooden image was purchased in connection with the
celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San
Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any
religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious
beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the
fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron
saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was
celebrated.
If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta
and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity
intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as
the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded
as illegal.
As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-
religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural
communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery
of the lives of the masses.
We find that the momentous issues of separation of church
and state, freedom of religion and the use of public money to
favor any sect or church are not involved at all in this case
even remotely or indirectly. It is not a microcosmic test case
on those issues.
Doctrine: The wooden image was purchased in connection
with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron
saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring
any religion nor interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio
residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass.
Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed
in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is
nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and
having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended
to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the
acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as
illegal. As noted in the resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-
religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural
communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery
of the lives of the masses.
If the image of St. Vincent Ferrer is acquired through
solicitations from the community with a resolution of the
barangay, is this violative of the Constitution?
No. Even if the acquisition was through solicitations from the
community with a resolution from the barangay, the same was
done without tax money, hence, it is constitutional.
Do regular courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving
the expulsion or excommunication of members of a religious
institution?
No. The expulsion or excommunication of members of a
religious institution or organization is a matter best left to the
discretion of the officials, the laws and canons, of the said
institution or organization. It is not for the courts to exercise
control over church authorities in the performance of their
discretionary and official functions. It is for the members of
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the religious institutions or organizations to conform to just
church regulations. In the words of Justice Miller, “all who
unite themselves to an ecclesiastical body do so with an
implied consent to submit to the Church government and
they are bound to submit to it.”
American Bible Society vs. City of Manila
G.R. No. L-9637. April 30, 1957
Facts:
➔ The American Bible Society’s (ABS) Philippine agency has
been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel
portions throughout the Philippines and translating the
same into several Philippine dialects.
➔ The acting City Treasurer of Manila informed ABS that it
was conducting the business of “general merchandise”
without providing itself with the necessary Mayor’s
permit and municipal license fees in violation of
Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos.
2529, 3028, and 3364 and required ABS to secure the
corresponding permit and license fees.
➔ ABS protested this requirement, but the City Treasurer
demanded that ABS deposit and pay. SO, to avoid the
closing of its business, as well as further fines and
penalties, ABS paid to the defendant under protest.
➔ Thus, ABS filed a petition rendering the said Ordinances
illegal and unconstitutional.
➔ However, the City of Manila replied, maintaining that the
assailed ordinances were enacted by the Municipal Board
of the City by virtue of the power granted to it by Section
24444, subsection (m-2) of the Revised Administrative
Code.
CONTENTION OF AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY
Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000 are unconstitutional and
illegal insofar as its society is concerned because they provide
for religious censorship and restrain the free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession.
CONTENTION OF THE CITY OF MANILA
Ordinance No. 3000 of the City of Manila is of general
application and not particularly directed against institutions
like the American Bible Society. It also does not contain any
provisions prescribing religious censorship nor restraining the
free exercise and enjoyment of any religious profession.
Further, they argued that the Ordinances in question are no
longer in force as the law under which they were promulgated
have been expressly repealed by the Revised Manila Charter.
Issue: W/N the Ordinances in question violates the
constitutional mandate of one’s freedom to religion.
Held: Yes. Article III, Section 7 guarantees the freedom of
religious profession and worship. Religion has been spoken of
as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to its creator. Further, it has reference to one’s
views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations
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they impose of reverence to His being and character, and
obedience to His Will.
The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it
the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of
such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom
of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present
danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent.
Here, the license fee is imposed upon ABS for its distribution
and sale of bibles and other religious literature. It may be true
that the price asked for the bibles and other religious
pamphlets was a little bit higher than the actual cost of the
same, but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the
business or occupation of selling the said merchandise for
profit.
Further, Ordinance No. 2529 cannot be applied for doing so
would impair ABS’ free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination
of religious beliefs. In addition, this ordinance is not
applicable to ABS and the City of Manila is powerless to
license or tax the business for it would impair ABS’s right to
their free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession
and worship.
However, with respect to Ordinance No. 3000, which requires
the obtention of the Mayor’s permit before any person can
engage in any of the businesses, trades, or occupations, there
was no charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the
Constitution. Thus, it cannot be considered unconstitutional.
Doctrine: The Constitutional guaranty of free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship comes with it
the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint
can be justified by the clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State had the right to prevent.
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119673. July 26, 1996
Facts:
➔ Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious
organization, has a television program entitled "Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and
on Channel 13 every Sunday.
➔ The program presents and propagates petitioner's
religious beliefs, doctrines and practices oftentimes in
comparative studies with other religions.
➔ Sometime in the months of September, October and
November 1992, petitioner submitted to the respondent
Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television the
VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121
and 128.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
➔ The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public
viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute
an attack against other religions which is expressly
prohibited by law."
➔ Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV
program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program
Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128.
➔ In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power
under PD No. 1986 in relation to Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code.
➔ On January 4, 1993, the trial court held a hearing on
petitioner's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
The parties orally argued and then marked their
documentary evidence. Petitioner submitted the
following as its exhibits, viz.:
➔ (1) Exhibit "A," respondent Board's Voting Slip for
Television showing its September 9, 1992 action on
petitioner's Series No. 115 as follows: REMARKS:
 There are some inconsistencies in the particular
program as it is very surprising for this program to
show series of Catholic ceremonies and also some
religious sects and use it in their discussion about
the bible. There are remarks which are direct
criticism which affect other religions.
 This program is criticizing different religions, based
on their own interpretation of the Bible.
 The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation
of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration
of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because
nowhere it is found in the bible that we should do
so.
Issue: W/N the respondent Board has the power to review
petitioner's TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.”
Held: YES. The power of MTRCB under PD No. 1986. The law
gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all
"television programs." By the clear terms of the law, the Board
has the power to "approve, delete and/or prohibit the
exhibition and/or television broadcast of television programs"
In the judgment of the BOARD applying contemporary
Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for
being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good
customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the
Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to
encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime,
such as but not limited to:
(1.) Those which tend to incite subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or sedition against the State, or otherwise
threaten the economic and/or political stability of the
State;
(2.) Those which tend to undermine the faith and confidence
of the people, their government and/or duly constituted
authorities.
(3.) Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes;
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(4.) Those which serve no other purpose but to satisfy the
market for violence or pornography;
(5.) Those which tend to abet the traffic in and use of
prohibited drugs;
(6.) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good
name and reputation of any person, whether living or
dead;
(7.) Those which may constitute contempt of court or of any
quasi- judicial tribunal, or pertain to matters which are
sub-judice in nature (emphasis ours).
The law also directs the Board to apply "contemporary Filipino
cultural values as standard" to determine those which are
objectionable for being "immoral, indecent, contrary to law
and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic
of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous
tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a
wrong or crime."
Petitioner contends that the term "television program" should
not include religious programs like its program "Ang Iglesia
ni Cristo." A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene
section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that
"no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed."
We reject petitioner's submission which need not set us adrift
in a constitutional voyage towards an uncharted sea.
We have also laboriously defined in our jurisprudence the
intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right to religious
profession and worship. To quote the summation of Mr.
Justice Isagani Cruz, our well-known constitutionalist:
Religious Profession and Worship. It has a two-fold aspect,
viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs.
The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the
realm of thought.
The second is subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
(1.) Freedom to Believe: The individual is free to believe (or
disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He
may indulge his own theories about life and death;
worship any god he chooses, or none at all. However
absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they are
hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom
to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove
his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do
so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith.
(2.) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs: But where the
individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions
that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes
subject to the authority of the State. As great as this
liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with
a proper regard for the rights of others. The inherent
police power can be exercised to prevent religious
practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such
practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction
and not merely for the purpose of evading the
reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.
Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: 'The constitutional
provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did
not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil
immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious
dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of
religious dogma.
The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring
about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil
which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious
detriment to the more overriding interest of public health,
public morals, or public welfare.
A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be
seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court
against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a
volatile area of concern in our country today.
First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility
against all prior restraints on speech, including religious
speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the
presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with
furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to
overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden,
its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case
at bar.
Second. The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-
rated petitioner's TV series for "attacking" other religions,
especially the Catholic church. An examination of the
evidence, especially Exhibits "A," "A-1," "B, "C," and "D" will
show that the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some
of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The
videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they
were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by
the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good
customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under
section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses
petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to
free exercise of religion. The respondent Board may disagree
with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that
gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however,
unclean they may be. In line, respondent board cannot
squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply
because it attacks other religions, even if said religion
happens to be the most numerous church in our country.
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The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and
it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling
ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of
ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for
it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas
that can fan the embers of truth.
Third. The respondents cannot also rely on the ground
"attacks against another religion" in x-rating the religious
program of petitioner. Even a side-glance at section 3 of PD
No. 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify
an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's television
program. The ground "attack against another religion" was
merely added by the respondent Board in its Rules. We
respectfully disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not
synonymous with the word "offend."
Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the
respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule.
In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held:
"The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right
can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression
on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent."
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further
ruled that ". . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to
prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community that infringement of religious
freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent
necessary to avoid the danger."
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board,
affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely
bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the
subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against
another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type
of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and
imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech,
including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical
fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent
evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the clear and
present danger test to the case at bar because the issue
involves the content of speech and not the time, place or
manner of speech. The contention overlooks the fact that the
case at bar involves videotapes that are pre-taped and hence,
their speech content is known and not an X quantity. Given
the specific content of the speech, it is not unreasonable to
assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can
determine whether its sulphur will bring about the substantive
evil feared by the law.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
SYNOPSIS OF THE RULING
Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by
the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present.
CAN BE REGULATED BY THE STATE. — Public broadcast on TV
of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal
belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and
ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise
of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will
bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive
evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious
detriment to the more overriding interest of public health,
public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the
exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but
history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as
religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in
our country today.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH; PRIOR RESTRAINTS, ENJOINED. —
Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility
against all prior restraints on speech, including religious
speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the
presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with
furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to
overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden,
its act of censorship will be struck down.
An examination of the evidence, especially Exhibits "A," "A-1,"
"B," "C," "D" will show that the so-called "attacks" are mere
criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of
other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the
respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet
they were considered by the respondent court as indecent,
contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited
from public viewing under sections 3(c) of PD 1986.
The ground "attack against another religion" was merely
added by the respondent Board in its Rules. This rule is void
for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine that
administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter
and spirit of the law they seek to enforce. The word "attack" is
not synonymous with the word "offend."
It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of speech. It
must be emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986,
included "attack against any religion" as a ground for
censorship. The ground was not, however, carried over by PD
1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no
other intent.
GROUND FOR RESTRAINTS.
(1.) In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court
held: "The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries
with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any
restraint of such right can be justi􏰁ed like other restraints
on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a
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clear and present danger of any substantive evil which
the State has the right to prevent."
(2.) In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further
ruled that ". . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary
to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community that infringement
of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the
smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.
(3.) Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech,
cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the
showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has
taken the life of a reality already on ground.
Presently in the United States, the clear and present danger
test is not applied to protect low value speeches such as
obscene speech, commercial speech and defamation.
Be that as it may, the test is still applied to four types of
speech:
(1.) speech that advocates dangerous ideas,
(2.) speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction,
(3.) out of court contempt
(4.) and release of information that endangers a fair trial.
Hence, even following the drift of American jurisprudence,
there is reason to apply the clear and present danger test to
the case at bar which concerns speech that attacks other
religions and could readily provoke hostile audience reaction.
It cannot be doubted that religious truths disturb and disturb
terribly.
RULE APPLIES TO VIDEO TAPES THAT ARE PRE-TAPED. — It is
also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the clear and
present danger test to the case at bar because the issue
involves the content of speech and not the time, place or
manner of speech. The contention overlooks the fact that the
case at bar involves videotape that are pre-taped and hence,
their speech content is known and not an X quantity. Given
the specific content of the speech, it is not unreasonable to
assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can
determine whether its sulphur will bring about the substantive
evil feared by the law.
Doctrine: Public broadcast on TV of its religious program
brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a
medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The
Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom
can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear
and present danger of some substantive evil which the State
is duty bound to prevent. However, it is inappropriate to apply
the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because
the issue involves the content of speech and not the time,
place or manner of speech. The contention overlooks the fact
that the case at bar involves videotape that are pre-taped and
hence, their speech content is known and not an X quantity.
Given the specific content of the speech, it is not unreasonable
to assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
determine whether its sulphur will bring about the substantive
evil feared by the law.
Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Cebu
G.R. No. 95770. March 1, 1993
Facts:
➔ This is a two special civil action for Certiorari, Mandamus
and Prohibition involving the following cases:
 In G.R. No. 95770, "Rose Ebralinag, et al. vs.
Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
and Manuel F. Biongcog, Cebu District
Supervisor," the petitioners are 43 high school
and elementary school students in the towns
of Daan Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Carcar, and
Taburan, Cebu province. All minors, they are
assisted by their parents who belong to the
religious group known as Jehovah's Witnesses
which claims some 100,000 "baptized
publishers," in the Philippines.
 In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs.
Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
and Antonio A. Sangutan," the petitioners are
25 high school and grade school students
enrolled in public schools in Asturias, Cebu,
whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses. Both
petitions were prepared by the same counsel,
Attorney Felino M. Ganal.
➔ All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from
their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for
refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act
No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No.
8 dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions.
➔ Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not
to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite
the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts
of worship" or "religious devotion” which they "cannot
conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God"
➔ They consider the flag as an image or idol representing
the State.
➔ They think the action of the local authorities in
compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends
constitutional limitations on the State's power and
invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the
Constitution protects against official control.
➔ This is not the first time that this issue was raised, it was
also raised in the case of Gerona et. al. v. Secretary of
Education where the court upheld the expulsion of the
students.
➔ The ruling in Gerona have been incorporated in Section
28, Title VI, Chapter 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987,
specifically Paragraph 5, Section 28 thereof, " 5. Any
teacher or student or pupil who refuses to join or
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participate in the flag ceremony may be dismissed after
due investigation."
➔ However, the petitioners herein have not raised in issue
the constitutionality of the above provision of the new
Administrative Code of 1987. They have targeted only
Republic Act No. 1255 and the implementing orders of
the DEC
➔ Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to
persuade the children of Jehovah's Witnesses to obey
the memorandum.
➔ In the Buenavista Elementary School, the children were
asked to sign an Agreement (Kasabutan) in the Cebuano
dialect promising to sing the national anthem, place
their right hand on their breast until the end of the song
and recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag, but they
refused to sign.
➔ The students who were expelled appealed to the
Secretary of Education Isidro Carino but the latter did not
answer to their letter.
➔ On October 31, 1990, the students and their parents filed
these Special Civil actions alleging that the public
respondents acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion — (1) in
ordering their expulsion without prior notice and
hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process,
their right to free public education, and their right to
freedom of speech, religion and worship.
➔ On November 27, 1990, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction commanding the respondents to immediately
readmit the petitioners to their respective classes until
further orders from this Court.
➔ Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take
part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not
engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend
their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of
country through the observance of the flag ceremony.
They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony
to show their respect for the right of those who choose
to participate in the solemn proceedings.
Issue: W/N the students may be expelled on the ground of
refusal to take part in the flag ceremony.
Held: No. Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion
of the petitioners from the schools is not justified. What the
petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony,
not exclusion from the public schools where they may study
the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of
government, and learn not only the arts, science, Philippine
history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or
profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect
for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights
and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec.
3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula.
Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses
from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to
receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect
and promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . .
and to make such education accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
The Supreme Court hold that a similar exemption as in the
case of Victoriano v. Elizalde, may be accorded to the
Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag
ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however
"bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others.
Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag
ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non
vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must
be afforded their right to the exercise of their religion, "this
should not be taken to mean that school authorities are
powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches
of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both
religious and patriotic, of other persons.
If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony
while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see
how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a
grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public.
Furthermore, forcing a small religious group, through the iron
hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their
religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or
respect for duly constituted authorities.
Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it
been said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the
individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also
guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his
mind.
The salutes is a symbolic manner of communication that
conveys its message as clearly as the written or spoken word.
As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any
more than it can be prohibited in the face of valid religious
objections like those raised in this petition. To impose it on
the petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when
their religion bids them to be silent. This coercion of
conscience has no place in the free society.
Doctrine: It is the right of the public-school students to refuse
to salute to the Philippine flag on account of their religious
scruples.
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What are the two-fold aspects to the right of religious
profession and worship according to Justice Cruz?
(1.) Freedom to believe - it is absolute as long as one is
confined within the realm of thought
(2.) Freedom to act on one’s belief - this is subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare.
What are the two (2) guarantees in the freedom of religion
clause?
(1.) The non-establishment clause; and
(2.) The free exercise clause.
May school children who are members of a religious sect
known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses be expelled from school for
refusing to take part in the flag ceremony?
No. The act was a part of their religious freedom. Religious
freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest
priority and the amplest protection among human rights for
it involves the relationship of man and his creator.
What caused the Supreme Court to uphold the exception?
It was the conviction that by exempting them from saluting
the flag, singing the national anthem, and reciting the
patriotic pledge, this small group which admittedly
compromises “a small portion of the school population” will
not shake up this part of the globe and suddenly produce a
nation “untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with
reverence for the flag and love of country, or admiration for
national heroes.” After all, what they were merely asking was
exemption from flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public
schools where they may study the Constitution, the
democratic way of life and form of the government, and
Philippine history. Expelling or banning would force a very
small religious group to violate their religious beliefs would
hardly be conducive to further learn how to love their country
or respect authorities.
According to Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his
dissenting opinion in German vs. Barangan, what is the sole
justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise
of religious freedom?
The existence of a grave and present danger of a character
both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent.
In the case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, the
Court upheld the exemption of members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo, from the coverage of a closed shop agreement
between their employer and a union because it would violate
the teaching of their church not to join any labor group.
Not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws
of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of
conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some
'compelling state interests' intervenes." We hold that similar
exemptions may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with
regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may
QUESTION EXPLANATION
seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in
the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such
The courts often look into the
patriotic exercises. While the highest regard must be afforded
sincerity of the religious belief,
their right to the exercise of their religion, "this should not be
but without inquiring into the
taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to
1. Has the statute or truth of the belief because the
discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace
government action Free Exercise Clause prohibits
by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and
created a burden on inquiring about its truth. The
patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention
the free exercise of sincerity of the claimant’s belief
during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers
religion? is ascertained to avoid the
salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
mere claim of religious beliefs
patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may
to escape a mandatory
possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present
regulation
danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health or any other legitimate public interest that the State
In this step, the government
has a right (and duty) to prevent.
has to establish that its
purposes are legitimate for the
Estrada vs. Escritor
2. Is there a sufficiently state and that they are
A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006
compelling state compelling. Government must
interest to justify this do more than assert the
Facts: infringement of objectives at risk if exemption
➔ This case was already cited under Art. II, Sec. 6. religious liberty? is given; it must precisely show
➔ Complainant Alejandro Estrada requested Judge Jose F. how and to what extent those
Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial objectives will be undermined
Court of Las Piñas City, for an investigation of if exemptions are granted.
respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said
court, for living with a man not her husband, and having 3. Has the state in
The analysis requires the state
borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada achieving its legitimate
to show that the means in
believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act that purposes used the
which it is achieving its
tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be least intrusive means
legitimate state objective is the
allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear possible so that the
least intrusive means, i.e., it has
that the court condones her act. Consequently, free exercise is not
chosen a way to achieve its
respondent was charged with committing "disgraceful infringed any more
legitimate state end that
and immoral conduct" under the Revised Administrative than necessary to
imposes as little as possible on
Code. achieve the legitimate
religious liberties
➔ As a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s goal of the state?
Witnesses, respondent asserted that their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs
A look at the evidence that the OSG has presented fails to
and has the approval of her congregation. In fact, after
demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
ten years of living together, she executed a "Declaration
interests" which could limit or override respondent’s
of Pledging Faithfulness."
fundamental right to religious freedom. Neither did the
➔ Insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is
government exert any effort to show that the means it seeks
nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement.
to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive
means.
Issue: W/N there is compelling state interest
The OSG contends that the State has a compelling interest to
Held: NO. There is no compelling state interest.
override respondent’s claimed religious belief and practice, in
order to protect marriage and the family as basic social
The Compelling State Interest Test involves a three-step
institutions. The Solicitor General, quoting the Constitution
process. We explained this process in detail, by showing the
and the Family Code, argues that marriage and the family are
questions which must be answered affirmatively and in
so crucial to the stability and peace of the nation that the
sequence:
conjugal arrangement embraced in the Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness should not be recognized or given
effect, as "it is utterly destructive of the avowed institutions of
marriage and the family for it reduces to a mockery these
legally exalted and socially significant institutions which in
their purity demand respect and dignity."

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 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Parenthetically, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Carpio
echoes the Solicitor General in so far as he asserts that the
State has a compelling interest in the preservation of marriage
and the family as basic social institutions, which is ultimately
the public policy underlying the criminal sanctions against
concubinage and bigamy. He also argues that in dismissing
the administrative complaint against respondent, "the
majority opinion effectively condones and accords a
semblance of legitimacy to her patently unlawful
cohabitation..." and "facilitates the circumvention of the
Revised Penal Code."
Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically
articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred
position in the hierarchy of rights — "the most inalienable and
sacred of human rights," in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is
not enough to contend that the state’s interest is important,
because our Constitution itself holds the right to religious
freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specific terms the
state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which
must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to
religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate
the Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself.
Thus, it is not the State’s broad interest in "protecting the
institutions of marriage and the family," or even "in the sound
administration of justice" that must be weighed against
respondent’s claim, but the State’s narrow interest in refusing
to make an exception for the cohabitation which respondent’s
faith finds moral. In other words, the government must do
more than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given; it
must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives
will be undermined if exemptions are granted. This, the
Solicitor General failed to do.
The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim,
cannot be merely abstract or symbolic. The State cannot
plausibly assert that unbending application of a criminal
prohibition is essential to fulfill any compelling interest, if it
does not, in fact, attempt to enforce that prohibition. In the
case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. The State has never sought to
prosecute the respondent nor her partner. The State’s
asserted interest thus amounts only to the symbolic
preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling
state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has
used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve
the legitimate goal of the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to
achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as
possible on religious liberties. Again, the Solicitor General
utterly failed to prove this element of the test.
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Doctrine: The COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST involves a
three-step process. We explained this process in detail, by
showing the questions which must be answered affirmatively
and in sequence: 1. Has the statute or government action
created a burden on the free exercise of religion?; 2. Is there a
sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this
infringement of religious liberty?; 3. Has the state in achieving
its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more
than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state?
The compelling State interest test involves a three-step
process. Explain.
(1.) “Has the statute or government action created a burden
on the free exercise of religion?” – The courts often look
into the sincerity of the religious belief, but without
inquiring into the truth of the belief because the Free
Exercise Clause prohibits inquiring about its truth as held
in Ballard and Cantwell. The sincerity of the claimant’s
belief is ascertained to avoid the mere claim of religious
beliefs to escape a mandatory regulation.
(2.) “Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify
this infringement of religious liberty?” – The Government
has to establish that its purposes are legitimate for the
State and that they are compelling. The Government
must do more than just assert the objectives at risk if the
exception is given; it must precisely show how and to
what extent those objectives will be undermined if the
exceptions are granted.
(3.) “Has the State, in achieving its legitimate purpose, used
the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the State?” – The analysis
requires the State to show that the means in which it is
achieving its legitimate state objective is the least
intrusive means.
The application of the compelling state interest test could
result to three situations of accommodations:
(1.) Mandatory accommodation would result if the Court
finds that accommodation is required by the Free
Exercise Clause.
(2.) If the Court finds that the State may, but is not required
to, accommodate religious interests, permissive
accommodation results.
(3.) If the Court finds that that establishment concerns
prevail over potential accommodation interests, then it
must rule that the accommodation is prohibited.
In the 2003 decision of Estrada, the SC ruled that the non-
establishment and free exercise clauses are always at war, and
that they cannot co-exist. However, in its 2006 resolution, the
SC clarified that earlier decision. Why did the SC say in its
earlier decision that they cannot co-exist or why are they
inconsistent with one another?
In the 2006 decision, it was stated that the non-establishment
clause, the government is not allowed to do anything that will
influence religion, while in the free exercise clause there is an
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
expectation and obligation from and of the government is to
perform all within its power to allow the people to freely
exercise their belief and their right. However, in the 2006 it
was clarified that they can actually co-exist.
How the SC reconcile the co-existence of the non-
establishment and free exercise clause in 2006?
These two religion clauses are not intended to serve 2
masters. They are intended to serve the same objective, which
is to deny the government of power to influence or interfere
with religious practices and beliefs.
Where did the word religion come from?
Religion -> Religuin -> Religio
Bond between man and God. Hence, religion is a theistic
concept, the centrality of this philosophy or belief in God.
Does that mean, that religion does not extend to non-theistic
philosophies?
No, the concept of religion has been expanded to include
non-theistic beliefs.
What are the 4 elements of Religion?
(1.) Belief in God, or at least some parallel belief that
occupies a central place in the believer’s life.
(2.) It must involve a moral code, which transcends individual
belief.
(3.) There must be a demonstrable sincerity.
(4.) There must be associational ties.
What is the compelling state interest test?
This test involves a three-step process, which answers the
following questions:
(1.) Has the statute or government action created a burden
on the free exercise of religion?
(2.) Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify
this infringement of religious liberty?
(3.) Has the state, in achieving its legitimate purpose, used
the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary?
This test results in the three kinds of accommodation under
the Religion Clauses.
What are the three kinds of accommodation under the
Religion Clauses?
(1.) Those which are found to be constitutionally compelled
(mandatory accommodation) - Results when the Court
finds that accommodation is required.
(2.) Those which are discretionary or legislative (permissive
accommodation)
(3.) Those which the religion clauses prohibit (prohibited
accommodation) - The Court finds no basis or it
determines that the accommodation runs afoul the free
exercise clause.
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What kind of “wall of separation” is mandated by the
Constitution between the Church and State?
(1.) Separationist wall of separation
◆ Strict separation - There is an absolute
impregnable wall of separation between the
Church and State.
◆ Strict neutrality or separation - All
governmental acts are applicable without
discrimination.
(2.) Benevolent neutrality or accommodation - The Church is
the subordinate institution that’s why there should be a
wall to protect the weaker one from the stronger one.
This is also known as the wall of accommodation. This is
also called the “second theory of governmental
neutrality” as per Justice Carpio.
A strict separationist believes that the Establishment Clause
was meant to protect the State from the Church, and the
State’s hostility towards religion allows no interaction
between the two. According to this Jeffersonian view, an
absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and
State needs to be erected. Religious institutions could not
receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the State. Nor
could the State adjust its secular programs to alleviate
burdens. Only the complete separation of religion from
politics would eliminate the formal influence of religious
institutions and provide for a free choice among political
views.
Governmental neutrality theory (separationist) finds basis in
Everson vs. Board of Education where the Court that the State
must be neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and non-believers. State power is no more to be
used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.
Strict neutrality, however, is not hostile to religion, but it is
strict in holding that religion may not be used as a basis for
classification for purposes of governmental action, whether
the action confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or
obligations. Only secular criteria may be the basis of
government actions.
➔ The problem with this is if applied in interpreting the
Establishment Clause, it could lead to a de facto voiding
of religious expression in the Free Exercise Clause. It
could lead to a brooding and pervasive devotion to the
secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the
religious, which is prohibited by the Constitution.
The theory of benevolent neutrality or accommodation is
premised on a different view of the wall of separation. This
theory recognizes that religion plays an important role in
public life. This shows the preference for one theological
viewpoint: the existence of and potential intervention by a
god (over the contrary theological viewpoint of atheism).
➔ This theory believes that accommodation of religion may
be allowed to allow individuals and groups to exercise
their religion without hindrance.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
➔ The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s
religion.
➔ Justice Brennan - The government may take religion into
account as to exempt, when possible, from generally
applicable governmental regulation, individuals whose
religious beliefs and practices would otherwise be
infringed, or to create without State involvement an
legislature which would recognize the religions and their
practices.
➔ What is sought in this theory is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an
exemption from its application or its burdensome effect,
whether by the legislature or the courts.
Smith Doctrine
➔ The difficulty in defining and limiting the term “religion”
in today’s pluralistic society
➔ The belief that courts have no business determining the
significance of an individual’s religious beliefs
However, the Smith Doctrine is a dangerous precedent
because it subordinates fundamental rights of religious belief
and practice to all neutral, general legislation.
What is the Jeffersonian Concept?
A wall of separation must exist between the State and the
Church to protect the State from the Church.
In the Philippines, what do we adhere to?
Benevolent neutrality or accommodation (theory) and
mandatory and permissive accommodation (kind of
accommodation)
Imbong vs. Ochoa
G.R. No. 204819. April 8, 2014
The facts, issues, and resolutions stated or discussed here are
only the ones which are connected to the current topic. - Lara
Facts:
➔ Herein petitioners assailed the constitutionality of R.A.
10354 or the Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law)
on the ground that it violates the right to religious
freedom.
➔ The petitioners contended that the RH Law violated the
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it
authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement
of contraceptives as these are believed to be contrary to
their beliefs, which is included in the said constitutional
mandate.
➔ It was also alleged that the RH Law threatens
conscientious objectors as it compels medical
practitioners to provide for medical services although it
is against their religious beliefs and convictions.
➔ Further, the petitioners questioned the formulation of
the mandatory sex education in schools as it is an affront
in their religious beliefs.
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➔ In return, the respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
petitions.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
➔ June 18, 1966 – RA 4729, an act to regulate the sale,
dispensation, and/or distribution of contraceptive drugs
and devices
➔ June 21, 1969 – RA 5921, dispensing of abortifacients or
anti-contraceptional substances and devices which only
be sold with a proper prescription by a duly licensed
physician
➔ December 11, 1967 – the Philippines, adhering to the UN
Declaration on Population, enacted measures to
promote male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate
population grown.
➔ August 16, 1971 – RA 6365, an act establishing a national
policy on population, creating the commission on
population and for other purposes
➔ December 8, 1972 – PD 79, made family planning a part
of broad educational program
➔ August 14, 2009 – RA 9710, the Magna Carta for Women,
which, among others, mandated the State to provide for
comprehensive health services and programs for
women, including family planning and sex education.
The use of contraceptives and family planning methods
evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public
health, particularly reproductive health.
WHAT IS THE RH LAW?
The RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the
poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full
range of modern family planning methods, and to ensure that
its objective to provide for the peoples’ right to reproductive
health be achieved. Basically, the RH law is an enhancement
measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women’s health, and population control.
THE PETITIONERS’ GENERAL CONTENTION
The petitioners find deplorable and repugnant that the entire
bureaucracy is made to play in the implementation of the
contraception program to the fullest extent possible, while
using the taxpayers’ money.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH
THE POSITION OF THE PETITIONERS
1. On contraception –
Because of the religious educational and background, they
sincerely believe that these contraceptives are evil. They also
question the State-sponsored procurement, arguing that the
expenditure of their taxes violates the guarantee of religious
freedom.
2. On religious accommodation of the duty to refer –
While the RH law attempts to address religious sentiments by
making provisions for a conscientious objector, the
constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the
law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to
another medical practitioner who would be able to provide
for the patient’s needs. Further, they contend that the RH Law
tends to disregard the religion of Filipinos and authorizing the
use contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex
education, mandatory pro bono reproductive health services
to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those
upon whom they are required.
3. On requiring would-be couples to attend family
planning seminars –
The petitioners claim that they provision forces individuals to
participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it
contravenes their religious beliefs.
THE RESPONDENTS’ POSITIONS
1. On contraception –
The RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of
contraceptives be used, natural or artificial. It neither imposes
nor sanctions any religion or belief. What they only seek is to
serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective, and
quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and
child health. They further assert that the RH Law only seeks to
guarantee an “informed choice” for the masses, which is an
assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion
against his free will. Lastly, by seeking the declaration that the
RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the
Court recognize only the Catholic Church’s sanctioned family
planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry.
2. On religious accommodation of the duty to refer –
The duty to refer does not violate the constitutional guarantee
of religious freedom as it is a carefully balanced compromise
between the interests of the religious objector and of the
citizen who needs access to information and who has the right
to expect that the health care professional in front of her will
act professionally. Whatever burden is placed on the
petitioner’s religious freedom is minimal.
3. On requiring would-be couples to attend family
planning seminars –
It is only a reasonable regulation which provides access to
information. The attendees are not compelled to accept
information given to them. They are completely free to reject
any information they do not agree with and retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without
intervention of the State.
THE CHURCH AND THE STATE
The undisputed fact is our people generally believe in a deity,
whatever they conceive Him or Her to be. The Filipino people
in “imploring the aid of Almighty God” manifested their
spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a
people, shaped by tradition and historical experience.
However, the Framers felt the need to put up a strong barrier
so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the
Church and vice versa.
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The separation of Church and State is based on mutual
respect. Further, the term “church” in its generic sense refers
to a temple, mosque, iglesia, or any house of God which
metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus,
“Church” means the religious congregations collectively.
WHAT TEST IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE?
Only the compelling state interest test can prevail. This test
serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the
same time affording protection to the paramount interests of
the State.
Issue: W/N the RH Law violates the constitutional mandate to
freedom of religion.
Held: It depends.
Note: Matters which deal with faith, practice, doctrine, form of
worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a Church are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the
province of the civil courts.
1. On contraception – CONSTITUTIONAL
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what
the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government. To do
so would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and,
thus, establishing a State religion.
Here, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that
the State cannot enhance its population control program
through the RH Law simply because the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. The
State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any
religion.
The demarcation line between Church and State demands
that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and
unto God the things that are God’s.
2. On religious accommodation of the duty to refer –
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The provision mandate that a hospital or a medical
practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care
and services under the law to another accessible healthcare
provider despite their conscientious objections based on
religious or ethical beliefs.
Here, the conscientious objector’s claim to religious freedom
would warrant an exception from obligations under the RH
Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a
more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an
important secular objective. Necessarily, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law
deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
The Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of
health providers, whether private or public, should be
accorded primacy. A conscientious objector should be exempt
from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law.
Further, in a section, the non-inclusivity of all medical
practitioners is a clear discrimination and violation of the
equal protection clause as the conscientious objection clause
should be equally protective of the religious belief of public
health officers and/or medical practitioners.
3. On requiring would-be couples to attend family
planning seminars – CONSTITUTIONAL
This is a reasonable exercise of police power by the
Government. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to
attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding, and infant nutrition. Those who receive
information during their attendance in the required seminars
are not compelled to accept the information given to them,
are completely free to reject the information they find
unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of
family life without the intervention of the State.
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
The Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit
the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors,
however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate
and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom.
If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable.
In this case, there is no immediate danger to the life or health
of an individual. The burden placed upon those who object
contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a
patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.
General Rule: Healthcare service providers cannot be forced
to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it
would contravene their religious belief.
Exception: Life threatening cases that require the performance
of emergency procedures.
Doctrine: The principle of separation of Church and State is
based on mutual respect. The State cannot meddle in the
internal affairs of the Church, much less question its faith and
dogmas or dictate upon it. On the other hand, the Church
cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the
rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow
its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for
the country.
What are the two guarantees of religious freedom? (Dito 2,
pero sa memaid 3 na, see the first page of this reviewer)
(1.) Establishment clause – Principally prohibits the State
from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as
against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in
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affairs among religious groups. Essentially, it prohibits
the establishment of a State religion and the use of
public resources for the support or prohibition of a
religion.
(2.) Free exercise clause – The respect for the inviolability of
the human conscience. The State is prohibited from
unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of
one’s belief and faith. It assures the free exercise of one’s
chosen form of religion within the limits of utmost
amplitude.
What are the two parts of the guarantee of religious freedom?
(1.) Freedom to believe – This is absolute. The realm of belief
and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one’s
imagination and thought.
(2.) Freedom to act on one’s belief – This is limited and
subject to the awesome power of the State, and can be
enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others.
It is “subject to regulation where the belief is translated
into external acts that affect the public welfare.”
What does “Freedom of Religion” mean?
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to
believe, or the freedom to act or not to act according to what
one believes.
How can freedom of religion be violated?
This freedom is violated when no one is compelled to act
against one’s belief or is prevented from acting according to
one’s belief.
What does “Church” mean?
The religious congregations collectively.
What does “Conscientious Objector” mean?
A person who, because of principles of religious training and
moral belief, is opposed to do his or her obligation regardless
of its cause. A conscientious objector may be released from
the obligation.
Is there an “exception” to the non-rendering of service in case
of religious reasons?
Yes. In cases of life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures.