POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
KA-POLI NOTES
This reviewer is made out of love and fear for the law. Please
do not hesitate to share this material because sharing is caring
and karma always has its ways. #NoToCrabs
DELEGATION OF POWERS
What is the ethical basis of the principle of non-delegation of
powers?
The basis is the principle of potestas delegata non delegari
potest, which means that “a delegated power constitutes not
only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another.
General Rule: Potestas delegata non delegari potest
Exceptions (PETAL):
(1.) Delegations to the people at large – The Congress
further delegates its legislative power by allowing direct
legislation by the people in cases of initiative and
referendum.
(2.) Delegation of emergency powers of the president –
Article 6, Section 23(2). “In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon its next
adjournment.” The conditions for the vesture of
emergency powers in the President are the following:
(a.) There must be war or other national emergency.
(b.) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(c.) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions
as the Congress may prescribe.
(d.) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry
out a national policy declared by the Congress.
Important points:
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o the emergency powers are self-liquidating
unless sooner withdrawn.
o Conferment of emergency powers on the
President is not mandatory on the Congress.
The Congress may choose to hold on to its
legislative powers and validly refuse to
delegate it.
(3.) Delegation of tariff powers of the president – Article 6,
Section 28(2). “The Congress may by law authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts, within the framework
of the national development program of the
Government.” The reason for this delegation is the
necessity, not to say expediency, of giving the chief
executive the authority to act immediately on certain
matters affecting the national economy lest delay result
in hardship to the people.
(4.) Delegation to administrative bodies – The Congress
delegates the so called “power of subordinate
legislation” to administrative bodies. Due to the growing
complexity of modern society, it has become necessary
to allow specialized administrative bodies to promulgate
supplementary rules, so that they can deal with technical
problems with more expertise and dispatch than the
Congress or the courts. Regulations or supplementary
rules passed by the administrative bodies are intended
to fill-in the gaps and provide details to what is
otherwise a broad statute passed by Congress. For the
rules and regulations to be valid and binding, they must
be in accordance with the statute on which they are
based, complete in themselves, and fix sufficient
standards. If any of the requirements is not satisfied, the
regulation will not be allowed to affect private rights.
(5.) Delegation to local governments – This delegation is
based on the principle that the local government is in
better position than the national government to act on
purely local concerns. Legislative power is therefore
given to them for effective local legislation.
Is the doctrine of non-delegation of powers applicable to all
three departments of government?
Yes, but the doctrine is applicable with greater and persistent
force or application against the delegation of legislative
power. Congress may not escape its duties and
responsibilities by delegating its powers to any other body or
authority. Any attempt to abdicate the legislative power is
unconstitutional and void.
Conditions for the Vesture of Emergency Powers in the
President:
(1.) Existence of war or some other national emergency;
(2.) Delegation must be for a limited period only;
(3.) Delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
Congress may prescribe; and
(4.) Emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
national police declared by the Congress.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Note: Conferment of emergency powers on the President is
not mandatory on the Congress. Mere emergency itself
cannot and should not create power.
Power to Declare State of Emergency vs. Emergency Powers
Power to Declare To Exercise
State of Emergency Emergency Powers
(Const. Art. VII, Sec. 18) (Const. Art. VI, Sec. 23)
As to whether constitutional objection can be raised
No legitimate
Manifold constitutional
constitutional objection
issues arise
can be raised
As to requirement of delegation from Congress
Does not require a
Requires a delegation from
delegation from the
the Congress
Congress
What is the Flexible Clause?
Under the Flexible Clause, the President is empowered to:
(1.) Increase, reduce, or remove existing rates of import duty
including any necessary change in classification, but in
no case shall the increased rate of import duty be higher
than a maximum of 100% ad valorem.
(2.) Establish import quotas or ban imports of any
commodity, as may be necessary; and
(3.) Impose an additional duty on all imports not exceeding
100% ad valorem whenever necessary
Requisites for the Exercise of Tariff Power:
(1.) In the interest of general welfare and national security;
and
(2.) Recommendation of NEDA
(a.) Before any recommendation is submitted to the
President by the NEDA, the Tariff Commission shall
conduct an investigation;
(b.) Public hearings by the Tariff Commission shall be
held, wherein interested parties shall be afforded
reasonable opportunity to be present, to produce
evidence and to be heard.
(c.) The Report of the Tariff Commssion shall be
submitted to the NEDA within 30 days after the
termination of the public hearings.
Exception: Recommendation of NEDA is not required in the
imposition of an additional duty not exceeding 10% ad
valorem.
Effectivity of the Order of the President
(1.) For an increase, reduction, or removal of existing
protective rates and the imposition of import quotas or
ban – 30 days after promulgation; and
(2.) Imposition of additional duty not exceeding 10% ad
valorem – at the discretion of the President.
May Congress pass a law leaving the filing of details to an
administrative agency?
Yes, because the administrative agency may have more
expertise in the filing up of details to implement the law, the
validity of the law depends upon the existence of certain
standards.
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What is the justification for the validity of a law that delegates
powers to administrative agencies?
It has been said that with modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of government regulation, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, it was found that neither
the legislative department nor the courts were equipped to
administer them.
The Legislature is not always in session. Its members can agree
only on general policies but not on matters of detail. The
Legislature has no time and competence to possibly foresee
every contingency involved in a particular problem it is
seeking to control.
** PLEASE NOTE **
(This is not part of our case list, but I remember this was discussed in
Election Law under Atty. GS, if I am not mistaken)
La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125346. November 11, 2014
The Supreme Court held in this case that Legislative power
has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of modern life and
many technical fields of governmental functions. This is
coupled by the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the many problems demanding its attention.
The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature
cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To
many of the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence,
let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required
direct, efficacious, and specific solutions.
What is an example of delegation of powers to the people at
large?
(1.) Under the Constitution, the people have reserved in
themselves the power to approve proposed
amendments to, or revisions of the Constitution by way
of referendum or plebiscite; or
(2.) It is based on the principle that sovereignty resides in the
people.
Is the law valid if it delegates the power to ascertain facts and
events upon which application or non-application of the law
depends?
Yes, because there is nothing essentially legislative in
ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis
of the taking into effect of law.
The Legislative cannot delegate its power to make the law, but
it can make a law to delegate its power to determine some
facts or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends
to make, its own actions depend. To deny this would stop the
wheels of government.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
What are the tests in determining whether delegation of
powers is valid or not?
(1.) The completeness test – The law must be complete in all
its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing, he
will have to do is enforce it
(2.) The sufficient standard test – There must be adequate
guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
What is a standard?
A criterion laid down by the legislative department by which
the policy and purpose of the law may be carried out. It
defines the legislative policy, marks its limits, and maps out its
boundaries. It indicates the circumstances under which
legislative command is to be effected.
When Congress delegates the power to fill in details in a law,
should sufficient standards be set forth expressly?
No, a legislative standard need not be expressed. It may
simply be gathered or implied. There is no need for the
standard to be found in the law challenged because it may be
embodied in other statutes.
What are the requirements for the validity of the rules and
regulations issued by administrative agencies?
Administrative regulations must be germane to the objects
and purposes of the law, conform to the standards that the
law prescribes, and must relate solely to carrying into effect
the general provisions of the law.
May a law be passed giving the judge the power to determine
the penalty that may be imposed upon a person charged in
court?
No, because to give the judge the discretion to determine the
period of imprisonment to be imposed on a person violates
the rights of the accused. That would constitute undue
delegation of powers by the Congress as it would give the
judge the discretion to determine what the law is, a power
vested solely in the Congress.
What is the principle of subdelegation of powers? Is it valid?
Subdelegation of power is the transmission of power from the
head of an agency to his subordinates for purposes of
expediency and achieving maximum sufficiency in the public
service.
It is valid and allowable in the Philippines. Subdelegation of
powers are justified by sound principles of organization,
which demand that those at the top be able to concentrate
their attention upon the larger and more important questions
of policy and practice, and their time freed from the
consideration of smaller and far less important matters of
detail. It is further justified by the fact that while the
administrative office may utilize the aid of his subordinates, it
is sufficient that the judgment and discretion are finally
exercised by the officer authorized by law.
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Garcia vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 101273. July 3, 1992
Facts:
➔ On 27 November 1990, the President issued Executive
Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other
duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles
imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of five
percent (5%) ad valorem. This additional duty was
imposed across the board on all imported articles,
including crude oil and other oil products imported into
the Philippines. This additional duty was subsequently
increased from five percent (5%) ad valorem to nine
percent (9%) ad valorem by the promulgation
of Executive Order No. 443, dated 3 January 1991.
➔ Executive Order No. 475 was issued by the President on
15 August 1991 reducing the rate of additional duty on
all imported articles from nine percent (9%) to five
percent (5%) ad valorem, except in the cases of crude oil
and other oil products which continued to be subject to
the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem.
➔ Upon completion of the public hearings, the Tariff
Commission submitted to the President a "Report on
Special Duty on Crude Oil and Oil Products" for
consideration and appropriate action. Seven (7) days
later, the President issued Executive Order No. 478,
dated 23 August 1991, which levied (in addition to the
aforementioned additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad
valorem and all other existing ad valorem duties)
a special duty of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of
imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil
products.
➔ In the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus, petitioner assails the validity of Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478. He argues that Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are violative of Section 24,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which vests the
authority to enact revenue bills in Congress. Hence, the
President may not assume such power of
issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in
the nature of revenue-generating measures.
➔ Petitioner further argues that Executive Orders Nos.
475 and 478 contravene Section 401 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, which Section authorizes the President,
according to petitioner, to increase, reduce or remove
tariff duties or to impose additional duties only when
necessary to protect local industries or products but not
for the purpose of raising additional revenue for the
government.
➔ Thus, petitioner questions first the constitutionality and
second the legality ofExecutive Orders Nos. 475 and 478,
and asks us to restrain the implementation of those
Executive Orders.
Issue: W/N EO Nos. 475 and 478 are undue delegations.
Held: NO. There is no undue delegation.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Turning first to the question of constitutionality, under
Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of
appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of
course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the
Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that
therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they
may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to
the President, that they must be enacted instead by the
Congress of the Philippines.
There is explicit constitutional permission under Section 28(2)
of Article VI to Congress to authorize the President "subject
to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose"
to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates and other duties or
imposts."
The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines, and Sections 104 and 401, the
pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions which
the President explicitly invoked in promulgating Executive
Orders Nos. 475and 478.
Petitioner, however, seeks to avoid the thrust of the delegated
authorizations found in Sections 104 and 401 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, by contending that the President is authorized
to act under the Tariff and Customs Code only "to protect
local industries and products for the sake of the national
economy, general welfare and/or national security."
The Court is not persuaded. There is nothing in the language
of either Section 104 or of 401 of the Tariff and Customs
Code that suggest such a sharp and absolute limitation of
authority.
Petitioner's concept which he urges us to build into our
constitutional and customs law, is a stiflingly narrow one.
Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes
general standards with which the exercise of the authority
delegated by that provision to the President must be
consistent: that authority must be exercised in "the interest of
national economy, general welfare and/or national security."
Petitioner, however, insists that the "protection of local
industries" is the only permissible objective that can be
secured by the exercise of that delegated authority, and that
therefore "protection of local industries" is the sum total or
the alpha and the omega of "the national economy, general
welfare and/or national security." We find it extremely difficult
to take seriously such a confined and closed view of the
legislative standards and policies summed up in Section 401.
We believe, for instance, that the protection of consumers,
who after all constitute the very great bulk of our population,
is at the very least as important a dimension of "the national
economy, general welfare and national security" as the
protection of local industries. And so customs duties may be
reduced or even removed precisely for the purpose of
protecting consumers from the high prices and shoddy quality
and inefficient service that tariff-protected and subsidized
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local manufacturers may otherwise impose upon the
community.
Doctrine: There is explicit constitutional permission to
Congress to authorize the President "subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose" to fix
"within specific limits" "tariff rates and other duties or
imposts".
Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes
general standards with which the exercise of the authority
delegated by that provision to the President must be
consistent: that authority must be exercised in "the interest of
national economy, general welfare and/or national security."
ABAKADA Guro vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 168056. September 1, 2006
Facts:
➔ The various petitioners of this case question the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the
NIRC. Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and
properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation
of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of
services and use or lease of properties. These questioned
provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the
President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1,
2006, after any of the following conditions have been
satisfied, to wit:
i. Value-added tax collection as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
ii. National government deficit as a percentage of
GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-
half percent (1 1/2%).
➔ Petitioners contend in common that Sections 4, 5 and 6
of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the NIRC giving the President the stand-
by authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% when
a certain condition is met, constitutes undue delegation
of the legislative power to tax.
➔ They also argue that the law also effectively nullified the
President's power of control, which includes the
authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her
subordinates like the Secretary of Finance, by mandating
the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance.
Issue: W/N Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337 constitute
undue delegation.
Held: NO. There is no undue delegation of legislative power
but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the
three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance
of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the
doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-
delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest which means
"what has been delegated, cannot be delegated." This
doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such as
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his
own judgment and not through the intervening mind of
another.
With respect to the Legislature, the powers which Congress is
prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or
inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power,
which can never be delegated, has been described as
the authority to make a complete law — complete as to the
time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be
applicable — and to determine the expediency of its
enactment. Thus, the rule is that in order that a court may be
justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation
of legislative power, it must appear that the power involved is
purely legislative in nature — that is, one appertaining
exclusively to the legislative department. It is the nature of the
power, and not the liability of its use or the manner of its
exercise, which determines the validity of its delegation.
Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation of legislative
powers is subject to the following recognized limitations or
exceptions:
(1.) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under
Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2.) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under
Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3.) Delegation to the people at large;
(4.) Delegation to local governments; and
(5.) Delegation to administrative bodies.
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the
law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and
(b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency
to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. Both tests are intended
to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or
bodies the power to determine certain facts or conditions, or
the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a
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statute is, by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature
must prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on
their authority. While the power to tax cannot be delegated
to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and
administration of an exercise of such power may be left to
them, including the power to determine the existence of facts
on which its operation depends. The rationale for this is that
the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the
enactment of legislation is not of itself a legislative function,
but is simply ancillary to legislation.
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative
power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon
which enforcement and administration of the increase rate
under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the
operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006,
contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the
entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon
factual matters outside of the control of the executive.
No discretion would be exercised by the President.
Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the
word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the
word shall connote a mandatory order. Its use in a statute
denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the
idea of discretion.
The Court finds no merit to the contention that the law
effectively nullified the President's power of control over the
Secretary of Finance by mandating the fixing of the tax rate
by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Finance. The Court cannot also subscribe to the position
that the word shall should be interpreted to mean may in view
of the phrase "upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance." Neither does the Court find persuasive the
submission of petitioners Escudero, et al. that any
recommendation by the Secretary of Finance can easily be
brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter
ego of the latter.
Congress simply granted the Secretary of Finance the
authority to ascertain the existence of a fact, namely, whether
by December 31, 2005, the value-added tax collection as a
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or the
national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 1/2%). If
either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of
Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such
information to the President. Then the 12% VAT rate must be
imposed by the President effective January 1, 2006. There is
no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the
discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally
permissible.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Doctrine: The powers which Congress is prohibited from
delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and
exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power, which can
never be delegated, has been described as the authority to
make a complete law — complete as to the time when it shall
take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable — and to
determine the expediency of its enactment. Thus, the rule is
that in order that a court may be justified in holding a statute
unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it must
appear that the power involved is purely legislative in nature
— that is, one appertaining exclusively to the legislative
department. It is the nature of the power, and not the liability
of its use or the manner of its exercise, which determines the
validity of its delegation.
However, there are recognized limitations or exceptions:
(1.) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under
Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2.) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under
Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3.) Delegation to the people at large;
(4.) Delegation to local governments; and
(5.) Delegation to administrative bodies.
What are the tests in determining whether delegation of
powers is valid or not?
(1.) The completeness test – The law must be complete in all
its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing, he
will have to do is enforce it
(2.) The sufficient standard test – There must be adequate
guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
The legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies
the power to determine certain facts or conditions, or the
happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a
statute is, by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature
must prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on
their authority. While the power to tax cannot be delegated
to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and
administration of an exercise of such power may be left to
them, including the power to determine the existence of facts
on which its operation depends.
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Araneta vs. Dinglasan
G.R. No. L-2044. August 26, 1949
Wala siya masyadong facts since sabi ni Justice Tuason, “no practical
benefit can be gained from a discussion of these procedural matters.
The transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure.”
Facts: Herein petitions challenged the validity of the
Emergency Powers Act or CA 671, contending that it is already
inoperative; thus, all the Executive Orders issued under the
said Act has also ceased.
Issues:
(1.) W/N the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any
force and effect – Yes.
(2.) W/N the Judiciary has the power whether the law still
exists – Yes.
Held:
W/N CA671 has ceased to take effect? – YES.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration
of its effectiveness.
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by
virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has
been defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed;
confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent
or scope." The words "limited period" as used in the
Constitution are beyond question intended to mean
restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the
delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it
cannot be said to be an emergency."
It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was
approved with this limitation in view.
The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the
Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the
legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the
constitutional scope of its powers.
The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act
would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new
and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation,
the period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed
out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain;
"that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency
may become permanent law,” for Congress might not enact
the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet
with the approval of the President, and the Congress might
not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would
create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its
powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them
except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back.
This is not right and is not, and ought not to be, the law.
More anomalous than the exercise of legislative functions by
the Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise
of its authority is the fact that there would be two legislative
bodies operating over the same field, legislating concurrently
and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions.
Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested,
be suspended while Congress was in session and be revived
after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be
eliminated. Congress by a two-third vote could repeal
executive orders promulgated by the President during
congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in
the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws
enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; in
two instances it materialized.
There is good basis in the language of Act No. 671 for the
inference that the National Assembly restricted the life of the
emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature
was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or
other causes brought on by the war.
Section 3 provides: "The President of the Philippines shall as
soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of
the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations
promulgated by him under the powers herein granted."
The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only
one meeting of Congress at which the President was to give
an account of his trusteeship. The section did not say each
meeting, which it could very well have said if that had been
the intention.
As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's
statement regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is
enlightening and should carry much weight, considering his
part in the passage and in the carrying out of the law. Mr.
Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special
session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency
Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the
very President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his
autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was only
"for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless
reenacted." These phrases connote automatic extinction of
the law upon the conclusion of a certain period.
What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon
in the same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of
the answer. He said he issued the call for a special session of
the National Assembly "when it became evident that we were
completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most
unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular
session which was to open on January 1, 1942."
If we are to uphold the constitutionality of the act on the basis
of its duration, we must start with the premise that it fixed a
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definite, limited period. As we have indicated, the period that
best comports with the constitutional requirements and
limitations, with the general context of the law and with what
we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its
enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability of
Congress to function, a period ending with the convening of
that body.
W/ N the Judiciary has the power whether the law still exists
– Yes.
Having arrived at this conclusion, we are relieved of the
necessity of deciding the question as to which department of
government is authorized to inquire whether the contingency
on which the law is predicated still exists.
The function of interpreting statutes in proper cases, as in this,
will not be denied the courts as their constitutional
prerogative and duty.
The President's authority in this connection is purely statutory,
in no sense political or directly derived from the Constitution.
By express provision the rules and regulations to be
eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600 and 620,
respectively approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6, 1941,
were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of
adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature,
"unless sooner amended or repealed by the National
Assembly."
The design to provide for the automatic repeal of those rules
and regulations necessarily was predicated on the
consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous repeal of
their source.
CONCLUSION
The truth is that under our concept of constitutional
government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal
circumstances "the various branches, executive, legislative,
and judicial," given the ability to act, are called upon "to
perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities
committed to them respectively." However, the President
should retain his extraordinary powers as long as turmoil and
other ills directly or indirectly traceable to the late war harass
the Philippines.
Doctrine: The delegation of emergency powers to the
president must only be temporary. If it is not, it cannot be said
to be an emergency.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Rodriguez vs. Gella
G.R. No. L-6266. February 2, 1953
Facts: Herein petitioners seek to invalidate EO 545 and 546
on the ground of appropriating sums of money for “essential
public works” and “relief in provinces and cities struck my
typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action, and
other calamities” under the guise of “emergency” as used in
the previous CA 671 (please read Araneta vs. Dinglasan—di
mo to magegets if di mo nabasa yon, ok).
Issue: W/N the emergency powers constituted in both EO 545
and 546 constitutional.
Held: No. The logical view consistent with constitutionality is
to hold that the powers lasted only during the emergency
resulting from the last world war which factually involved the
Philippines when Act No. 671 was passed. That emergency,
which naturally terminated upon the ending of the last world
war.
This is confirmed by the statements of President Quezon, that
Act No. 671 is enlightening and should carry much weight,
considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out of
the law. Mr. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a
special session, who recommended the enactment of the
Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and
who was the very President to be entrusted with its execution,
stated in his autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No.
671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid
unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatic
extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period.
Moreover, the Constitution authorizes the delegation of
powers by the Congress:
(1.) In times of war; or
(2.) Other national emergency.
The emergency expressly spoken of in the title and in section
1 of the Act is one "in time of war," as distinguished from
"other national emergency" that may arise as an after-effect
of war or from natural causes such as widespread earthquakes,
typhoons, floods, and the like. Certainly, the typhoons that hit
some provinces and cities in 1952 not only did not result from
the last world war but were and could not have been
contemplated by the legislators. At any rate, the Congress is
available for necessary special sessions, and it cannot let the
people down without somehow being answerable thereover.
There is no point in the argument that the Philippines is still
technically at war pending the ratification of the peace treaty.
In the first place, Act No. 671 referred to a factual war. In the
second place, the last world war was between the United
States and Japan, the Philippines being involved only because
it was then under American sovereignty. In the third place, the
United States had already signed the peace treaty with Japan,
and the Philippines has become an independent country.
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Reliance is placed on the petition of about seventy
Congressmen and Senators and on House Resolution No. 99,
urging the President to release and appropriate funds for
essential and urgent public works and for relief in the
typhoon-stricken areas. It is enough to state, in reply, that the
said petition and resolution cannot prevail over the force and
effect of House Bill No. 727 formally passed by two chambers
of the Congress. If faith can be accorded to the resolution of
one house, there is more reason for accepting the solemn
declaration of two houses.
We can take judicial notice of the fact that the Congress has
since liberation repeatedly been approving acts appropriating
funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and
many other purposes, with the result that as to such legislative
task the Congress must be deemed to have long decided to
assume the corresponding power itself and to withdraw the
same from the President. If the President had ceased to have
powers with regards to general appropriations, none can
remain in respect of special appropriations; otherwise, he may
accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is
significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the
President to that of continuing "in force" appropriations which
would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even
assuming that the Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether
the President can by executive orders make new
appropriations.
The specific power "to continue in force laws and
appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise
such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the
Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and
enforce its authority."
Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the
President should be allowed to exercise emergency powers
for the sake of speed and expediency in the interest and for
the welfare of the people, because we have the Constitution,
designed to establish a government under a regime of justice,
liberty and democracy.
In line with such primordial objective, our Government is
democratic in form and based on the system of separation of
powers. Unless and until changed or amended, we shall have
to abide by the letter and spirit of the Constitution and be
prepared to accept the consequences resulting from or
inherent in disagreements between, inaction or even refusal
of the legislative and executive departments. Much as it is
imperative in some cases to have prompt official action,
deadlocks in and slowness of democratic processes must be
preferred to concentration of powers in any one man or group
of men for obvious reasons.
The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of
and were careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers
to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other
national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
judgment of the Congress the duty of coping with any
national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it
alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and
should not create power. In our democracy the hope and
survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish
patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the
Constitution.
Doctrine: The emergency expressly is one "in time of war," as
distinguished from "other national emergency" that may arise
as an after-effect of war or from natural causes such as
widespread earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and the like. The
Congress is available for necessary special sessions, and it
cannot let the people down without somehow being
answerable thereover. Shelter may not be sought in the
proposition that the President should be allowed to exercise
emergency powers for the sake of speed and expediency in
the interest and for the welfare of the people, because we
have the Constitution, designed to establish a government
under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy.
People vs. Vera
G.R. No. 45685. November 16, 1937
Facts:
➔ Defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by final
judgment for the crime estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents.
➔ The instant proceedings have to do with the application
for probation filed by Unjieng before the trial court,
under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct
Philippine Legislature.
➔ Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the
granting of probation of Unjieng. The private
prosecution also filed an opposition alleging, among
others, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not
been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the
Constitution, is nevertheless violative of the
Constitution as an undue delegation of legislative
power to the provincial boards of several provinces
because section 11 of said Act No. 4221 endows the
provincial boards with the power to make said law
effective or otherwise in their respective provinces.
Issue: W/N Act No. 4221 is constitutional.
Held: NO. Unconstitutional.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 is section 11 which
reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only in those provinces
in which the respective provincial boards have provided for
the sale of a probation officer at rates not lower than those
now provided for provincial fiscals…"
For the purposes of the Probation Act, the provincial boards
may be regarded as administrative bodies endowed with
power to determine when the Act should take effect in their
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respective provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the
legislature in this respect. As a rule, an act of the legislature is
incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule
or definite standard by which the administrative officer or
board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it. In the case at bar, we do not find any
and none has been pointed to us by the respondents.
The probation Act does not fix and impose upon the
provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the
language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter,
supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial
boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. In other words, the
provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine
for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their
provinces or not at all. If a provincial board does not wish to
have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to
decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a
probation officer. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of
legislative power to the provincial boards.
It is contended, however, that a legislative act may be made
to the effect as law after it leaves the hands of the legislature.
It is true that laws may be made effective on certain
contingencies. The Supreme Court of the United States ruled
that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative
which it may itself rightfully exercise.
The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be
delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in
ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis
of the taking into effect of a law. The legislature, then, may
provide that a law shall take effect upon the happening of
future specified contingencies leaving to some other person
or body the power to determine when the specified
contingency has arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature
has not made the operation of the Probation Act contingent
upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the
provincial board. It leaves the entire operation or non-
operation of the law upon the provincial boards. The
discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and
unlimited. It is bound by no rule — limited by no principle of
expediency announced by the legislature.
Doctrine: As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and
hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may be
guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated
to it. In the case at bar, we do not find any and none has been
pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not
fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or
guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is
granted, if we may use the language of Justice Cardozo in the
recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which
enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion.
In other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces
are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
shall apply to their provinces or not at all. If a provincial board
does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that
it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount
for the salary of a probation officer. This, to our minds, is a
virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA
G.R. No. L-76633. October 18, 1988
Facts:
➔ Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern
Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan,
March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under
Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No.
2 of the POEA.
➔ The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and
P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA
pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2. This circular
prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both
foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring
of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
➔ Petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum
Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power. It contends that no
authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the
said regulation; and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion
which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Issue: W/N there was undue delegation.
Held: No. The principle of non-delegation of powers is
applicable to all the three major powers of the Government
but is especially important in the case of the legislative power
because of the many instances when its delegation is
permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial
powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they
legally pertain. In the case of the legislative power, however,
such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not
necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation
of legislative power has become the rule and its non-
delegation the exception.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative
powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative
bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and
their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has
found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation." With this power, administrative
bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not
have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is
effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code.
These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative
regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been
applied in a significant number of cases without challenge by
the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the
National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not
unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the
delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is
discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it
to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and
equitable employment practices."
Doctrine: With the proliferation of specialized activities and
their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has
found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation." With this power, administrative
bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not
have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is
effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code.
These regulations have the force and effect of law.

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of

government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To
many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific
solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its
delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular
fields assigned to them.

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United States vs. Ang Tang Ho
43 Phil. 1 (1922)
Facts:
➔ In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special
session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An
Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay
and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary
circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to
issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating
the distribution of such products.
➔ Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued
Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August
20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should
be sold.
➔ On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a
ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty
centavos. The said amount was way higher than that
prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of
August 1919.
➔ On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the
said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was
sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00
fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is
an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
➔ The official records show that Act was to take effect on
its approval; that it was approved July 30,1919; that the
Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of
August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the
13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself
was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.
Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the
Governor General.
Held: NO, The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power
to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within
itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the
Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry it
into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no
delegation of power and it is valid.
General. The Legislature does not undertake reasons the
Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that
it may be issued " for any cause," and leaves the question as
to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-
General.
In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of
the Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any
cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not
"an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and
under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which
rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality.
The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause,"
or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or
corn." Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon
which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of
the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale
was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General
issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say
anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and
the defendant is charged with the sale" of one Janet of rice at
the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater
than fixed by Executive Order No. 53."
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868 in so
far as it undertakes to authorize the Governor-General in his
discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and
to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a
crime, is unconstitutional and void.
Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and
does not authorize the Governor-General to fix one price of
rice in Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only purports to
authorize him fix the price of rice in the Philippine Islands
under a law, which is general and uniform, and not local or
special. Under the terms of the law, the price of rice fixed in
the proclamation must be the same all over the Islands. There
cannot be one price at Manila and another at Iloilo.
Doctrine: The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to
enact any law.

The Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use
as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others
without the determination of the insurance commissioner in
respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative
discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the
act could not possibly be put in use.

It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-

General, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the
price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgated
temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of the Act.

By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and

emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-

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Ynot vs. IAC
G.R. No. 78164. July 31, 1987
Facts:
➔ The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal
cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades: "Strike — but hear me
first!'" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats
here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 626-A.
➔ The said executive order reads in full as follows: The
President Marcos has given orders prohibiting the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
requirements of Executive Order No. 626.
i. "SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby
amended such that henceforth, no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another. The carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this Executive Order as
amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may
see fit, in the case of carabaos.
➔ The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when
they were confiscated by the police station commander
of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above
measure.
➔ The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported across provincial boundaries. There is also a
challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative
power by the former President under Amendment No. 6
of the 1973 Constitution wherein Marcos was given
emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that had
the force of law.
Issue: Was there an improper exercise of the legislative power
by the President wherein he was given the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission the power to confiscate
all the carabeef transported and be given to charitable
institutions as he may see fit?
Held: The challenged measure is denominated an executive
order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new
rule instead of merely implementing an existing law.
It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of
taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the
exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6.
whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act
adequately on any matter that in his judgment required
immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency,
issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have
the force and effect of law.
As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise
of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason,
indeed, to question the validity of the executive order.
Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was
supposed to have been made by the President "in his
judgment," a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not
really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this
matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we
confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due
process.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of
the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in
the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the
seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National
Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos."
The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
One searches in vain for the usual standard and the
reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the
said officers must observe when they make their distribution.
There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who
shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by
what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named
can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the
grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.
Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and
sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power
to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers.

It was provided that whenever in his judgment there existed a

grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or

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There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby
declare Executive Order No. 626-Aunconstitutional.
Doctrine: There is an invalid delegation of legislative powers
where such power was granted with unlimited discretion to
the authorities to distribute the property confiscated to whom
it may see fit.
Tablarin vs. Guttierez
G.R. No. 78164. July 31, 1987
Facts:
➔ The petitioners sought admission into colleges or
schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988.
However, the petitioners either did not take or did not
successfully take the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one
of the public respondents, and administered by the
private respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM).
➔ On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the RTC a
Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition,
seeking to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center
for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5
(a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a
condition for securing certificates of eligibility for
admission, from proceeding with accepting applications
for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT
as scheduled and in the future. Trial court denied said
petition. The NMAT was conducted and administered as
previously scheduled.
➔ Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for
Certiorari with this Court to set aside the Order denying
the petition.
➔ In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, offend against the constitutional principle
which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power,
by failing to establish the necessary standard to be
followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical
Education.
Issue: W/N there was undue delegation.
Held: NO. There is no undue delegation.
The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power,
which both flows from the reinforces the more fundamental
rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the
three great departments of government, must be applied with
circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical
Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and
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technical as medical education and the practice of medicine
in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point
in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service
Commission:
"One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the
principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim
of delegatus non potest delegare or delegati potestas non
potest delegare, adopted this practice but which is also
recognized in principle in the Roman Law has been made to
adapt itself to the complexities of modern government, giving
rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
'subordinate legislation,' not only in the United States and
England but in practically all modern governments.
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and
the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of
greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval of
the practice by the courts."
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of
rulemaking authority by an administrative agency like the
Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly
abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v.
Ericta—
"The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically.
It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole.'"
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set
forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the
standardization and regulation of medical education" and in
Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute
itself, and that these considered together are sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation
principle.
For reference, Republic Act 2382, known as the "Medical Act
of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall
govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical
education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians;
and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice
of medicine in the Philippines."
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical
Education. The functions of the Board of Medical Education
are specified in Section 5, and specifically: 5(a) To determine
and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized
college of medicine. Section 7 prescribes certain minimum
requirements for applicants to medical schools.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Doctrine: The maxim of delegatus non potest
delegare or delegati potestas non potest delegare has been
made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern
government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits,
of the principle of “subordinate legislation”. Accordingly, with
the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of
the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by
the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the
courts."
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of
rulemaking authority by an administrative agency like the
Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly
abstract — "The standard may be either expressed or implied.
If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose
of the act considered as a whole."
Pelaez vs. Auditor General
G.R. No. L-23825. December 24, 1965
Facts:
➔ Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez instituted a special civil
action for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction against the Auditor General to restrain him
from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said Executive Orders and/or any
disbarments by the said municipalities on the ground
that it would be null and void as Section 68 has already
been repealed by RA 2370; thus, it constitutes undue
delegation of power.
➔ When Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios
may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a
majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the
"recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated."
Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under
this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create
a municipality which is composed of several barrios,
since barrios are units of municipalities?"
➔ Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory
that a new municipality can be created without creating
new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the
jurisdiction of the new municipality. This theory
overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's
argument, which is that the statutory denial of the
presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a
negation of the bigger power to create municipalities,
each of which consists of several barrios. Thus, stating
that the power of the President to create municipalities
under this section does not amount to an undue
delegation of Legislative Power.
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Issue: W/N the Legislative department may delegate the
power of creating municipalities to the President.
Held: No. As a general rule, the Congress may delegate to
another branch of the government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement, or administration of a
law. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy,
which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate
has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence,
he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only
to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake
it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to
be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks
and balances, and, consequently undermining the very
foundation of our Republican system.
However, this is not the case in this scenario.
The creation of municipalities, is not an administrative
function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative
in character. The question whether or not "public interest"
demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. It is
"purely a legislative question".
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress
to the President is concerned, such grant of authority would
be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of
the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the
democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is
the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold.
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in
question were issued after the legislative bills for the creation
of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass
Congress. A better proof of the fact that the issuance of said
executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative
functions can hardly be given.
This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive,
insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to
the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more
authority than that of checking whether said local
governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as
provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President
cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same
or its officers act within the scope of their authority. He may
not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed
or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty
imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the
corresponding provincial officials take appropriate
disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he veto, set aside or
annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of
its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He
may not even suspend an elective official of a regular
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
municipality or take any disciplinary action against him,
except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding
provincial board.

If the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect,

remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and
including therein the barrio in which the official concerned
resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. Thus, by
merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if
he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local
officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising
over them the power of control denied to him by the
Constitution.
The power of control of the President over executive
departments, bureaus or offices implies no more than the
authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to
interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly,
such control does not include the authority either to abolish
an executive department or bureaus, or to create a new one.
As a consequence, the alleged power of the President to
create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the
exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of
control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus
or offices.

Even if it did not entail an undue delegation of legislative

powers (but it did ok), Section 68, as part of the Revised
Administrative Code, must be deemed repealed by the
subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is
utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory
enactment.

Doctrine: The creation of municipalities, is not an

administrative function, but one which is essentially and
eminently legislative in character. The question whether or not
"public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not
one of fact. It is "purely a legislative question".

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