Constitutional Law 1

February 11, 2024

John Carlo Villaseñor
Exercise of Governmental Powers: Separation, Blending, Delegation of Powers

The Exercise of Government Power

There are three branches of the government — legislative, executive and judicial. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution
has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government.

Separation of Powers

Article VI, Section 1: The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved in the people by provision on
initiative and referendum.

Article VII, Section 1: The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

Article VII, Section 1: The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.

Rationale: It aims to prevent a concentration of authority in one person or group of persons that might lead to
an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of our republican institutions. It is intended to
secure action, forestall overaction, to prevent despotism and to obtain efficiency.

Interdependence: Even as a department may not control, interfere with or encroach upon the acts done
within the constitutional competence of the other, the departments have to interact with one another to
achieve unity of purpose.

Blending of Powers: In the performance of a constitutional task, one department acts in a manner
complimentary or supplementary to the other. For example, bills are passed by Congress and sent to the
President for his approval. The Executive Department prepares the budget and submits it to Congress that uses
it as basis for enacting the general appropriations act.

Checks and balances: The Constitution gives each department certain powers by which it may definitely
restrain the others from improvident action, thereby maintaining the balance among them and preserving the
will of the sovereign expressed in the Constitution. The President’s veto power, the power of Congress to over-
ride the veto, the power of impeachment, and the court’s power to declare legislative and executive acts
unconstitutional are examples of checks and balances under the constitution.

Political Question Doctrine: A political question is a question of policy, one that involves the wisdom of the
acts of the executive and legislative branches of government, or one that is left for the people to decide in
their sovereign capacity. Political questions are beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry in deference to the
separation of powers doctrine.
 Delegation of Powers

Constitutional doctrine: It is a well-entrenched principle of constitutional law that generally, legislative power
may only be exercised by the legislative branch, and may not be delegated to the other branches of
government. No department of government, be it legislative, executive, or judicial except when authorized by
the constitution, can abdicate authority of escape responsibility by delegating any of its powers to another
body. Any attempt at such delegations of power is void under the maxim, “potesta delegata non po test
delegari.”

Ethical basis of the rule: It is based on the principle that a delegated power constitutes not only a right but
also a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another. The power to whose judgment, wisdom and patriotism this high prerogative has
been entrusted cannot relieve itself off the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power
shall be delegated nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of any other body for those to
which alone the people have seen fit to confide the sovereign trust.

When allowed: It is well-established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable
activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate
authority to promulgate rules and regulations and implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for
the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that
the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes.

Valid delegation: Delegation of legislative power is authorized in the following cases:

A. By direct constitutional grant
1. Tarriff powers to the President
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject
to such limitation and restrictions as it may impose, tarrif rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government. (Article VI, Section 28 (2))
Rationale: There is the necessity of giving to the Chief Executive the authority to act
immediately on certain matters affecting the national economy lest delay may result in
hardship to the people. The President must be able to respond quickly to changes
happening in tariff structures and rates as these may cause possible adverse consequences
to the economy. The legislative process is much too cumbersome for the speedy solution of
some economic problems, especially relating to foreign trade.

2. Emergency Powers to the President

In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President
for a limited period and subject to suck restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
(Article VI, Section 23 (2))
Scope: The scope off the grant is the exercise of such “powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy.” Thus, subject to restrictions that Congress may provide, the President is given powers to dela
with the emergency. The conditions for the grant of emergency powers are as follows:
1. There must be a war or other national emergency
 2. The delegation must be for a limited period only
3. The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as Congress may provide.
4. The emergency power must be exercised to carry out a declared national policy.

3. Rule Making Power to the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement and constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rues shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court. (Article VIII, Section 5 (5))
Scope: On the basis of this power, the Supreme Court has promulgated the Rules of Court, the rules on
admission to the bar, the creation and operation of the integrated bar, and rules on legal assistance to the
underprivileged. The power to make rules for the above-named subjects is lodged exclusively in the Supreme
Court, and Congress has no power to cause any amendment thereto.

4. Delegated Powers to Local Governments

Each local government sha have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy
taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue
exclusively to local governments. (Article X, Section V)
Scope: The above constitutional grant of power allows local governments to create its own sources of revenue
and levy taxes. The delegation also encompasses the powers specifically enumerated under the Local
Government Code that is subsumed under the so-called general welfare clause. The power is exercised
principally by the enactment of ordinances by the local legislative councils.

5. Rule Making Powers of Constitutional Commissions

The Commission on Elections, Civil Service Commission and the Commission on Audit being
independent bodies have been granted by the Constitution rule-making p0owers as can be
gleaned from the following provisions.

Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice
before it or before any of its offices. Such rues however shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. (Article IX-A, Section 6)

The Commission on Elections shall promulgate its own rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. (Article IX-e, Section 3)

The Commission on Audit shall have exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance for irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures,
or uses of government funds and properties. (Article IX-D, Section 2 (2)) Likewise, Article XIII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution empowers the Commission on Human Rights to “adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules Court.”
B. By legislative grant: Delegation of powers to administrative bodies
- Subordinate legislation: This involves the power of administrative agencies, granted by an enabling
law, to make implementing ruies and regulations. They are tested by their conformity to the
standards set by, and their ability to carry out the legislative intent contained in the primary law.
- Rationale for administrative regulation: This has been brought about by the increasing complexity
of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
myriad problems demanding its attention.
- Tests of valid delegation of powers: There are several tests for determining whether delegation is
unlawful:
a. Completeness Test: A law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the
legislature that nothing is left to judgment of the delegate. What cannot be delegated is the
authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the
inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness o the measure enacted. The legislature
does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and
what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in
which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between
delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its
execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be
made.
b. Sufficiency of Standards Test: The statute must not only define a fundamental legislative policy,
mark its limits and boundaries, and specify the public agency to exercise the legislative power. It
must also indicate the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. To
void the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least
that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It
is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive and
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied if the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose off the act considered as
a whole.
 Structure and Power of Government
The Constitution is the fundamental law of the land. The present political structure of the Philippines was
defined by the 1987 Constitution, duly ratified in a plebiscite held on February 2, 1987 and proclaimed ratified
on February 11, 1987.

The Philippines is a republic with a presidential form of government wherein power is equally divided among
its three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. One basic corollary in a presidential system of
government is the principle of separation of powers wherein legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the
Executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. The Legislative branch is authorized to make
laws, alter, and repeal them through the power vested in the Philippine Congress. This institution is divided
into the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Executive branch is composed of the President and the
Vice President who are elected by direct popular vote and serve a term of six years. The Constitution grants
the President authority to appoint his Cabinet. These departments form a large portion of the country’s
bureaucracy. The Judicial branch holds the power to settle controversies involving rights that are legally
demandable and enforceable. This branch determines whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part and instrumentality of the government. It is
made up of a Supreme Court and lower courts. The Constitution expressly grants the Supreme Court the
power of Judicial Review as the power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance or regulation unconstitutional.

The Constitutional Commissions

General Provisions.
1. The independent constitutional commissions are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit [Sec. 1, Art. IX-A].
2. Safeguards insuring the independence of the Commissions:
- They are constitutionally created; may not be abolished by statute.
- Each is expressly described as “independent”
- Each is conferred certain powers and functions which cannot be reduced by statute.
- The Chairmen and members cannot be removed except by impeachment.
- The Chairmen and members are given a fairly long term of office of seven years.
- The Chairmen and members may not be reappointed or appointed in an acting capacity

Inhibitions/Disqualifications
- Shall not, during tenure, hold any other office or employment.
- Shall not engage in the practice of any profession.
- Shall not engage in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be
affected by the functions of his office.
- Shall not be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or
privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. 4

Rotational Scheme of Appointments.

The first appointees shall serve terms of seven, five and three years, respectively. After the first commissioners
are appointed, the rotational scheme is intended to prevent the possibility of one President appointing all the
Commissioners. In Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 140335. December 13,2000, it was held that in
order to preserve the periodic succession mandated by the Constitution, the rotational plan requires two
conditions:
(1) The terms of the first commissioners should start on a common date; and (2) Any vacancy due to death,
resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the
term.

Decisions.
1. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it
within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. [Sec. 7, Art. IX-A],
a) The provision of the Constitution is clear that what is required is the majority vote of all the
members, not only of those who participated in the deliberations and voted thereon in order that a
valid decision may be made by the Constitutional Commissions. Under rules of statutory
construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained [Estrella v. Comelec, G.R. No. 160465, May 27, 2004],
This ruling abandons the doctrine laid down in Cua v. Comelec, 156 SCRA 582.
b) In Dumayas v. Comelec, G.R. No. 141952-53, April 20, 2001, because two Commissioners who had
participated in the deliberations had retired prior to the promulgation of the decision, the Supreme
Court said that the votes of the said Commissioners should merely be considered withdrawn, as if
they had not signed the resolution at all, and only the votes of the remaining Commissioners
considered for the purpose of deciding the controversy. Unless the withdrawal of the votes would
materially affect the result insofar as votes for or against a party is concerned, there is no reason to
declare the decision a nullity. In this case, with the withdrawal of the votes of Commissioners
Gorospe and Guiani, the remaining votes among the four incumbent commissioners, still
constituting a quorum at the time of the promulgation of the resolution, would still be 3 to 1 (and
thus, be a vote of the majority) in favor of the respondent.

2. As to the need to expedite resolution of cases and the 60-dayperiod for decision, in Alvarez v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 142527, March 1, 2001, the Supreme Court said that the Comelec has numerous cases before it where
attention to minutiae is critical. Considering the Commission’s manpower and logistical limitations, it is
sensible to treat the procedural requirements on deadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence to deadlines
might induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time. This is
not what the framers had intended.

3. Any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof.
a)In Aratuc v. Comelec, 88 SCRA 251, the Supreme Court held that when it reviews a decision of the
Comelec, the Court exercises extraordinary jurisdiction; thus, the proceeding is limited to issues
involving grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess of jurisdiction, and does not ordinarily
empower the Court to review the factual findings of the Commission. In Loong v. Comelec, G.R. No.
133676, April 14, 1999, the Court reiterated that certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
appropriate remedy to invalidate disputed Comelec resolutions, i.e., final orders, rulings and decisions
of the Comelec rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
b) In Reyes v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125129, March 29, 1999, the Court said that under Rule 64,
Sec. 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments or final orders of the Commission on Audit may be
brought by an aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65. Even before the
effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the mode of elevating cases decided by the Commission
on Audit to the Supreme Court was only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by the
Constitution. The judgments and final orders of COA are not reviewable by ordinary writ of error or
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court. Only when the COA acts without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
 c) In the case of decisions of the Civil Service Commission, however, Supreme Court Revised Circular 1-91,
as amended by Revised Administrative Circular 1 -95, which took effect on June 1,1995, provides that
final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable by certiorari to the Court of
Appeals within fifteen days from receipt of a copy thereof. From the decision of the Court of Appeals,
the party adversely affected thereby shall file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
d) Thus, in Mahinay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152457, April 30, 2008, the Supreme Court held that the
proper mode of appeal from the decision of the Civil Service Commission is a petition for review under
Rule 43 filed with the Court of Appeals.
e)In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, November 17, 2004, because the petitioner
imputed to the Court of Appeals “grave abuse of discretion” for ruling that he had no legal standing to
contest the disapproval of his appointment, the Supreme Court said that “grave abuse of discretion is a
ground for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court”. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court resolved to give due course to the petition and to treat it appropriately as a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The grounds alleged shall be deemed “reversible
errors", not “grave abuse of discretion”.

The CSC
A Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least 35 years of age, with proven capacity for public administration, and must not have
been candidates for any elective position in the election immediately preceding their appointment. They shall
be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven [7]
years without reappointment. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity. See Brillantes v. Yorac, supra..

The COMELEC
A Chairman and six [6] Commissioners who shall be natural born Filipino citizens, at least 35 years of age,
holders of a college degree, and have not been candidates in the immediately preceding election. Majority,
including the Chairman, must be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years. [Sec. 1, Art. IX-C]. They shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven [7] years without reappointment. No member shall be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. See Brillantes v. Yorac, supra..

The COA
A Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural born Filipino citizens, at least 35 years of age, CPAs
with not less than 10 years of auditing experience or members of the Philippine Bar with at least 10 years
practice of law, and must not have been candidates in the election immediately preceding the appointment.
At no time shall all members belong to the same profession [Sec. 1(1), Art. IX-D]. They shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment [Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-D].

Sandiganbayan
PD 1606
WHEREAS, the new Constitution declares that a public office is a public trust and ordains that public officers
and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall
remain at all times accountable to the people; WHEREAS, to attain the highest norms of official conduct
required of public officers and employees, Section 5, Article XIII of the New Constitution provides for the
creation of a special court to be known as Sandiganbayan; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby order and
decree as follows:
Section 1. Sandiganbayan; composition; qualifications; tenure; removal and composition. A special court, of
the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice, to be
known as the Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a Presiding Justice and eight Associate Justices
who shall be appointed by the President. No person shall be appointed Presiding Justice or Associate Justice of
the Sandiganbayan; unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least 40 years of age and for at
least ten years has been a judge of a court of record or been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines
or has held office requiring admission to the bar as a pre-requisite for a like period.
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;
(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with
other crimes; and
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office.

The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a
penalty higher than prision correccional, or its equivalent, except as herein provided; in other offenses, it shall
be concurrent with the regular courts.
Ombudsman
Office of the Special Prosecutor
National Commissions