TC-11

8th C.L. AGARWAL MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

BEFORE THE HON’BLE

SUPREME COURT OF INDONIA

Petition invoked under Art. 32 of the Constitution of Indonia

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN

PETITION No. /2022

MRIGYANKI …. PETITIONER

VERSUS.

UNION OF INDONIA & ORS. …. RESPONDENT

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S

COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDONIA
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………………II

LIST OF ABBREVATIONS …………………………………………………………….IV

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES …………………………………………………………….VI

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION…………………………………………………..VIII

SATTEMENTS OF FACTS……………………………………………………………...IX

ISSUES RAISED ………………………………………………………………………….XI

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ………………………………………………………..XII

1. THAT THE EXCLUSION OF WIDOWS FROM BECOMING THE CHIEF PRIEST

IS AN INVALID CUSTOM.
2. THAT EXCLUSION OF WIDOWS THROUGH THE NOTIFICATION BY THE
TEMPLE AUTHORITIES IS VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.
3. THAT EXCLUSION OF WIDOW FROM COOKING BHOG IS VIOLATION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.
4. THAT THE ACT OF DENYING ENTRY OF WIDOWS IN DANDESHWARI
TEMPLE BY THE AUTHORITIES IS VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED …………………………………………………………..XIV

1. THAT THE EXCLUSION OF WIDOWS FROM BECOMING THE CHIEF

PRIEST IS AN INVALID CUSTOM…………………………………………XIV

1.1 APPOINTMENT OF THE CHIEF PRIEST IS A SECULAR PRACTICE AND

NOT A RELIGIOUS PRACTICE.

1.2 THAT THE TERMINATION VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.

2. THAT EXCLUSION OF WIDOWS THROUGH THE NOTIFICATION BY

THE TEMPLE AUTHORITIES IS VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS………………………………………………………………………..XIX

2.1 THAT THE IMPUGNED NOTIFICATION VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.

2.2 THAT THE IMPUGNED NOTIFICATION IS VIOLATIVE OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS.

3. THAT EXCLUSION OF WIDOW FROM COOKING BHOG IS

VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT…………………….……….XXIV

3.1 THAT THE EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICE IS VIOLATIVE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.

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3.2 THAT THE EXCLUSION OF WIDOW FROM COOKING BHOG VIOLATES HER RELIGIOUS
RIGHTS.

4. THAT THE ACT OF DENYING ENTRY OF WIDOWS IN DANDESHWARI

TEMPLE BY THE AUTHORITIES IS VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT……………………………………...………………………………XXVIII
4.1 THAT THE BAN VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 14 OF
THE COI.

4.2 THAT THE BAN VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 17 OF
THE COI.

4.3 THAT THE BAN VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS MENTIONED UNDER ART. 21 AND
ART.25 OF COI.

4.4 THAT THE DANDESHWARI TEMPLE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A RELIGIOUS

DENOMINATION.

4.5 THAT THE WORD MORALITY INCLUDES CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY

PRAYER FOR RELIEF ……………………………………………………… …XXXVI

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LIST OF ABBREVATIONS

Abbreviation Corresponding Expansion

& And

¶ Paragraph

v. Versus

AIR All India Reporter

Annex. Annexure

Anr. Another

Art. Article

cl. Clause

Cri. LJ Criminal Law Journal

HC High Court

Hon’ble Honourble

Ors. Others

COI Constitution of India

P&H Punjab and Haryana

J&K Jammu and Kashmir

Const. Constitution

Del Delhi

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Kar Karnataka

Ker Kerala

Bom Bombay

Cal Calcutta

S. Section

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases Online

IWLA Indian Women Lawyers Association

A.P. Andhra Pradesh

SCR Supreme Court Reporter

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES REFERRED

A.S.Narayana Deekshitulu Vs. State of A.P. & Ors, 1996 (9) SCC 548 --------------------------------------------- XV
Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu and Anr, AIR 2016 SC 209. -------------------------------- XXIX
Aishat shifa v. State of Karnataka, 2022 SC 842 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ XV
Anuj Garg & others v. Hotel Association of India & others, AIR 2008 SC 663. ---------------------------------- XIX
Bhuri Nath v. State of J&K, AIR 1997 SC 1711 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- XIII
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 SCC 615. ------------------------------------------------------------- XXIV
Charu Khurana & others v. UOI & other, W.P. No. 78 of 2013 ------------------------------------------------------ XIX
Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University, 1989 AIR 903. ------------------------------------------------------------------ XXVI
Dr. Noorjehan Safia v. the State of Maharashtra, AIR 2017 (NOC) 45 (BOM). -------------------------------- XXVII
Elephant G. Rajendran v. The Registrar General, 2023 SCC Online Mad 4095. -------------------------------- XXIV
Executive Officer of Sri Nachiar Devasthanam Srivilliputhur v. Pattu Ammal & Other, LNIND 2011 BMM 1157
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ XV
Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Commit. & ors. v. C.K. Rajan & ors, AIR 2004 SC 561. ------------------- XIX
H. H. Shri Swamiji Of Shri Admar Mutt, Etc vs The Commissioner, Hindu Religious, AIR 1980 SC 1. ------ XXI
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, AIR ONLINE 2018 SC 243. --------------------------- XXIX
Justice KS Puttaswamy retd v UOI, 2019 (1) SCC 1. -------------------------------------------------------------- XXVIII
Keshavananda Bharti v. Union of India (1973) 4 SCC 225. -------------------------------------------------------- XXIV
Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, 1980 AIR 707 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ XVII
Mahadeb Jiew v. B.B. Sen, AIR 1951 CAL 563. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- XIX
Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoil, (1996) 8 SCC 525. --------------------------- XVI
Menka Gandhi V. UOI, AIR 1978 SC 597. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- XVIII
N. Adithayan v. The Travancore Devaswom Board & ors, AIR 2002 SC 3538 ----------------------------------- XIX
N. Adithayan vs The Travancore Devaswom Board & Ors, AIR 2002 SC 3538 --------------------------------- XVII
Nallor Marthandam Vellalar v.Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment and Ors, AIR 2003
SC 4225 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- XXXI
National Textile Workers' Union v. P.R. Ramakrishnan, (1983) 1 SCC 228. ------------------------------------ XVIII
Navtej Singh v UOI, AIR 2018 SC 4321 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ XXIII
NCT of Delhi v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 606 ------------------------------------------------------- XXXI
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner UP, AIR 1963 SC 996. ----------------------------------------------- XVIII
Rev. Stanislaus vs State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors, 1977 SCR (2) 611. ----------------------------------------- XXIV
S.P. Mittal v. UOI, AIR 1983 SC 1 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- XVI
S.R. Bommai v. UOI, 1994 AIR 1918 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- XXV
Sastri Yagnapurushadji And Others vs Muldas Brudardas Vaishya & anrs, 1966 AIR 1119 -------------------- XVI
Seshammal & ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 2 SCC 11 ---------------------------------------------------------- XV
Shakti Vahini v. UOI, AIR 2018 SC 1601. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- XXIII

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Shayara Bano v. UOI, (2017) 9 SCC 1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- XXII

Shri Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, 1980 AIR 707 ------------------------------------------------------------------ XXV
Smartha Brahmin Living in the State of Tamil Nadu & v. Union of India & Ors, S.A. No. 1609/2000. ------- XVI
Smt. Vidya Bal & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra, PIL No. 55 of 2016. ------------------------------------------ XXVII
Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi and Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors, (1997) 4 SCC 606.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- XXX
Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255. ------------------------------------------------- XIII
State of Rajasthan v. Shri Sajjan Lal Panjawat & others, 1975 AIR 706. -------------------------------------------- XX
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkarhabib, 1952 AIR 75. ---------------------------------------------------- XVIII
Thangamani v. The Collector, W.P. No. 23021 of 2012. ----------------------------------------------------------- XXVII
The Environment Consumer…. v. UOI, W.P. No. 659 of 2007. ---------------------------------------------------- XXII
Trustee Hidaya Educational & Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala, 2020 SCC Ker 31 (India), Subhashini v. District
Collector, 2020 SCC Ker 4080 (India) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- XXXII
Vijay Singh v. State of U. P., AIR 2012 SC 2840. -------------------------------------------------------------------- XXV
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011. ------------------------------------------------------------------ XXIII

STATUTES

Civil Rights Act, 1955 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- XXX

India Const. art. 13(1).------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- XX
India Const. art. 14 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- XVII
India Const. art. 15. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- XVII
India Const. art. 21 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- XXV
India Const. art. 25 (2) (a). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- XV

INTERNATIONAL TREATISES AND CONVENTIONS

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.----------------------------------------------------------------- XXII

The Convention on the Elimination of All Form of Dicrimination against Women. ----------------------------- XXII
Universal Declaration of Human Rights -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- XXII

COMMITTEE REPORTS

Vrindavan Committee Report (Environment and Consumer Protection Foundation v. UOI & ors.), W.P. (Civil)
No. 659 OF 2007.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ XXIII

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Books Referred

Durga Das Basu, "Commentary on the Constitution of India", (8th ed., 2008) Udai Raj Rai,
Fundamental Rights and Their Enforcement., (1st ed., 2011)
M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, (8th ed., 2018)
Constitutional Law of India, (8th ed, 2018).
Jagadish Swarup Constitution of India, (L.M. Singhvi, 3rd ed., 2013)
Bhagwat Gita As it is (2020)
Prof. S.K.Ramchandra Rao, “The Agama Encyclopedia”

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

THE PETITIONERS HAVE APPROACHED THIS HON’BLE SUPREME COURT UNDER ARTICLE 32

OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDONIA.

Art. 32, the constitution of India:

Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part:

(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for enforcing the
rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.

(2) The Supreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs like habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this
Part.

(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses 1 and 2,
Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2)

(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution.

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STATEMENT OF FACT

BACKGROUND

Mrigyaniki and Devashya were married in 2005 and had two children, Kshmika and Amasya.
Devashya served as the Chief Priest of Vrindvasini Temple for 20 years until he contracted a
deadly virus in April 2021 and was quarantined in only contact with his family members. This
disease of Devashya led to his death and later passed away on 19th October 2021. Mrigyaniki,
the young widow, took over the role of Chief Priest during his illness.

After Devashya's death, Mrigyaniki adhered to customary rituals for widows, including
shaving her head and giving up colourful clothing and jewellery. The customs also demanded
her to walk barefoot all her life, being absent on all auspicious occasions including marriage
and festivals. She was also removed from the position of Chief Priest due to customary
practices prohibiting widows from holding such roles. This act by the temple authorities was a
major setback after her husband’s death as she was the sole bread earner of the family.

The Vrindvasini Temple Trust issued a notification vide no- 111/2021 on November 2021
inviting applications for the Chief Priest position. The criteria included residency in Meharganj
state, Brahman caste, proficiency in the state language, and being single, married, or a widower
but not a widow. As a widow, Mrigyaniki was ineligible to apply for the position even after
serving for almost 7 months.

Further, as a matter of fact she was the sole provider for her family, Mrigyaniki sought
employment but lacked educational qualifications, leading her to work as a cook for various
events and festivals. However, she was denied the opportunity to cook the first meal of the
harvest festival at Vrindvasini Temple due to her widowhood, causing her distress and
humiliation.

In search of solace, Mrigyaniki and other widows travelled to Mateshwari Temple but were
barred from entry to the Dandeshwari temple by the watchman citing a longstanding
prohibition against widows entering the temple which they tried to enter under the perception
of the temple to be Mateshwari. Despite protests, they were denied access due to an age-old
custom.

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Mrigyaniki's daughter helped her send a postcard to the Apex Court, seeking legal intervention
or assistance in addressing the discrimination and mistreatment faced by widows in the village
for freely professing their religious faith and entering the temple. To which the honourable
Supreme Court entertained the postcard sent by Mrigyaniki as the writ petition and took
cognizance of the violation of the fundamental rights of the Mrigyaniki.

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ISSUES RAISED

THE FOLLOWING ISSUES ARE RAISED BEFORE THIS COURT

ISSUE 1

WHETHER THE TERMINATION OF A WIDOW FROM BEING THE CHIEF PRIEST OF THE

TEMPLE IS VALID OR NOT?

ISSUE 2

WHETHER THE EXCLUSION OF WIDOWS THROUGH THE NOTIFICATION NO. 111/2021 BY

THE VRINDVASINI TEMPLE TRUST IS IN VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER

THE COSTITUION OF NDONIA?

ISSUE 3

DOES WIDOW’S EXCLUSION FROM COOKING THE BHOG AMOUNT TO VIOLATION OF

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF INDONIA?

ISSUE 4

WHETHER THE ACT OF DENYING ENTRY TO THE WIDOWS IN THE TEMPLE BY THE

DANDESHWARI TEMPLE AUTHORITIES VIOLATE THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDONIA?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1.THAT THE EXCLUSION OF WIDOWS FROM BECOMING THE CHIEF PRIEST

IS AN INVALID CUSTOM.
.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the petition challenges the
termination of a widow from the Chief Priest position at Vrindavasini Temple, arguing that the
exclusion is baseless, perpetuating social stigma. Custom alone is not a law; it requires
recognition by a sovereign authority. Agama shastra, guiding temple practices, does not bar
women, as reflected in the temple's application notice. Hindu scriptures, including Agamas, do
not prohibit widows from being chief priests. The Bhagwat Gita emphasizes equal worship
opportunities. State laws in Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala ensure non-discriminatory
temple access. Chief priest appointments are secular administrative decisions, as clarified in
the Seshammal case. The temple lacks characteristics for separate religious denomination
status. The termination violates fundamental rights, particularly Article 25, and goes against
court rulings that emphasize equality and competence over marital status in temple roles.
Competent widows like Mrigyaniki deserve equal opportunities in temple service.

2. THAT EXCLUSION OF WIDOWS THROUGH THE NOTIFICATION BY THE

TEMPLE AUTHORITIES IS VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indonia that the petition
challenges the exclusion of widows from the Chief Priest position at Vrindavasini Temple,
citing violations of fundamental rights and human rights principles. It argues that the practice
violates Article 14 of the Constitution of Indonia, which ensures equality before the law. The
arbitrary exclusion is also contrary to the principles laid down in the Maneka Gandhi case,
emphasizing equality and the prohibition of discrimination. Additionally, the exclusion violates
Article 15(3) which prohibits laws against women. The impugned notification contradicts
international agreements like CEDAW, which safeguard women's rights. Legal precedents,
such as those in the Guruvayoor Devaswom case, emphasize equality in religious
appointments. Widows' empowerment is crucial, as highlighted by committee reports. Thus,
the notification's exclusionary practice is unconstitutional and violates international human
rights standards, demanding its reconsideration.

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3. THAT EXCLUSION OF WIDOW FROM COOKING BHOG IS VIOLATION OF

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of that the petition contends that the
exclusion of widows from cooking bhog in Vrindavasini Temple violates fundamental rights,
specifically Article 14, ensuring equality. The discriminatory practice solely based on marital
status infringes upon the right to equality before the law. Reference is made to the Shayara
Bano case, emphasizing gender equality in personal laws. The exclusion also contravenes
Article 15, prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sex, and Article 21, ensuring the right to
live with dignity. Furthermore, Article 17, addressing untouchability, is invoked, highlighting
the stigmatization of widows. The petition argues that the exclusion violates religious rights
under Articles 25 and 26, as widows are entitled to freely practice their religious beliefs without
discrimination. Constitutional morality is emphasized, asserting that societal morality cannot
supersede it. Finally, the petition invokes Srimad Bhagavad Gita to highlight the Lord's
acceptance of offerings based on a clean heart, emphasizing the inclusivity of the religion.

4. THAT THE ACT OF DENYING ENTRY OF WIDOWS IN DANDESHWARI

TEMPLE BY THE AUTHORITIES IS VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the petition contends that the
ban on widows' entry to Dandeshwari Temple violates fundamental rights under Article 14 of
the Constitution due to an unjust classification based on marital status. It invokes the
prohibition of untouchability under Article 17, arguing that considering widows as impure
perpetuates social ostracism. Additionally, the petition claims a breach of Article 21, asserting
that the exclusion compromises widows' dignity, and it underscores their equal right to worship
under Article 25. The argument extends to constitutional morality, emphasizing that practices
infringing fundamental rights should be invalidated. The petition challenges the classification
of Dandeshwari Temple as a religious denomination under Article 26, asserting it fails to meet
the necessary criteria. Ultimately, the plea urges the court to declare the ban unconstitutional,
emphasizing the need to protect widows' fundamental rights and uphold constitutional
principles.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1.THAT THE EXCLUSION OF WIDOWS FROM BECOMING THE CHIEF PRIEST

IS AN INVALID CUSTOM.
.

1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court that the termination of the
widow from the position of Chief Priest on the pretext that their customs disallow
widows from becoming the chief priest is baseless and is based on improper social
evils and considering widows as polluted and stigmatized women.

2. Further, it is submitted that any custom alone cannot be deemed to be a law and there
must be some authority or even religious faith as an authority as affirmed by the
thinkers Austin and Holland and other Jurisprudential Thinkers in their analytical
theory, where they have propounded that “custom as a source of law and establishes
that it may be a source of law but not the law itself. Custom derives its force through
an Act of the Sovereign and, since there is no recognition, they need not be followed
by the Sovereign.”

3. It is contended before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in the case of Sri
Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore1. It was observed that “Agamas are
treatises of ceremonial law dealing with such matters as the construction of temples,
installation of idols therein and conduct of the worship of the deity”. In the case at
hand, the agama shastra nowhere bars women from becoming archaka that is chief
priest of any temple and the same is also reflected in the notification of invitation of
application given by Vrindvasini temple where it does not bar any woman from
applying for the position of Chief priest of the temple.

4. Further, in the case of Bhuri Nath v. State of J&K2 it was held that “It has also been
held that compilation of treatises on construction of temples, installation of idols
therein, rituals to be performed and conduct of worship therein, known as “Agamas”
came to be made with the establishment of temples and the institution of Archakas,

1
Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255.
2
Bhuri Nath v. State of J&K, AIR 1997 SC 1711.

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noticing at the same time the further fact that the authority of such Agamas came to
be judicially recognized.”

5. Further, it is submitted that the custom which allows the exclusion of widows from
the position of the chief priest has no rational basis as various Hindu religious
scriptures do not bar widows from becoming the chief priest including Agamas,
Vishnu smriti and Manu Smriti.

6. It is humbly submitted Hon’ble Supreme Court that The Bhagwat Gita3 indicates this
explicitly in the following slokas:

ये यथा मां प्रपद्यन्ते तांस्तथैव भजाम्यहम् | मम वत्मार्नुवतर्न्ते मनुष्या: पाथर् सवर्श:

[In whatever way men identify with Me, in the same way do I carry out their; men
pursue my path, in all ways.]

यो यो यां यां तनुं भक्त: श्रद्धयािचर् तुिमच्छित |तस्य तस्याचलां श्रद्धां तामेव िवदधाम्यहम्

[Whatever form any devotee with faith wishes to worship. I make that faith steady.]

7. It is further submitted that drawing inference from different state enacted legislation
pertaining to the eligibility of becoming chief priest, ceremonies and rituals. It is
submitted that “Maharashtra Hindu Places of Public Worship Act, Tamil Nadu
Temple Entry Authorisation Act and Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Act.
Lays down the definition of “Temple" as a public place of Hindu worship, accessible
to the Hindu community or any section thereof, for religious observances, further it
is submitted that regardless of custom, law, or court order, every Hindu place of
worship open to the public must allow access to all Hindu sections and classes
without obstruction or discrimination in worship or religious activities, ensuring
equal rights for Widows.

8. It is contended before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that in the case of Executive
Officer of Sri Nachiar Devasthanam Srivilliputhur v. Pattu Ammal & Other4
Madras High Court, it was held that “The purpose of the temple is to provide

3
A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupad, Bhagwat Gite As it is 11,21 (2020)
4
Executive Officer of Sri Nachiar Devasthanam Srivilliputhur v. Pattu Ammal & Other, LNIND 2011 BMM
1157.

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opportunity for public worship of the Deity. When a congregation of worshippers

participate in the worship, a particular attitude of aspiration of devotion gets
developed and confers great spiritual benefit”.

1.1 APPOINTMENT OF THE CHIEF PRIEST IS A SECULAR PRACTICE AND NOT

A RELIGIOUS PRACTICE.

9. It humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court that in the case of Seshammal
& Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu5 it was held “That being the position of an Archaka, the
act of his appointment by the trustee is essentially secular. He owes his appointment to
a secular authority. Any lay founder of a temple may appoint the Archaka. The Shebaits
and Managers of temples exercise essentially a secular function in choosing and
appointing, the Archaka.” in the instant case at hand the position of the chief priest is
a secular practice rather than a religious practice, therefore it can be regulated as per
Article 25(2) (a).

10. It is humbly submitted that it is pertinent to note that the state can regulate secular
practices as held in the case of A.S.Narayana Deekshitulu Vs. State of A.P. & Ors6
that “There is a distinction between religious service and the person who performs the
service; performance of the religious service according to the tenets, Agamas, customs
and usages prevalent in the temple etc. is an integral part of the religious faith and
belief and to that extent the legislature cannot intervene to regulate it. But the service
of the priest (archaka) is a secular part.”

11. Further, in the case of Aishat shifa v. State of Karnataka7 it was observed that
“Secularism, as adopted under our Constitution, is that religion cannot be intertwined
with any of the secular activities of the State. Any encroachment of religion in secular
activities is not permissible.”

12. Further, in the case of S.P. Mittal v. UOI8 It is submitted that the Hon’ble Court laid
down the conditions in which a religious establishment may be recognised as a separate
religious Denomination and the three requirements are as follows “:(1) it must be a

5
Seshammal & ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 2 SCC 11.
6
A.S.Narayana Deekshitulu Vs. State of A.P. & Ors, 1996 (9) SCC 548.
7
Aishat shifa v. State of Karnataka, 2022 SC 842.
8
S.P. Mittal v. UOI, AIR 1983 SC 1.

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collection of individuals who have a system of belief or doctrine that they regard as
conducive to their spiritual well-being, i.e., a common faith; (2) a common
organization; (3) designation of a distinctive name. It necessarily follows that the
common faith of the community should be based on religion and that they should have
common religious tenets and the basic cord which connects them, should be religion
and not merely considerations of caste or community or societal status.”

13. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that in the present case, the
worshippers of Lord Bhupati does not have a common or distinct organization nor do
they have a distinct name, Thus it is further submitted that Vrindavasini Temple fails
the test laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme court of India in the case of S.P. Mittal v.
UOI9 and further in the case of Sastri Yagnapurushadji And Others vs Muldas
Brudardas Vaishya & anrs.10 where the Swaminarayan sect contended that they fall
under a separate religious denomination and challenged the Bombay Harijan Temple
entry act of 1947. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that the Swaminarayan
sect is not a separate part of Hinduism and thus provisions of the Bombay Harijan
temple act are valid and intra vires. Further in the case of Smartha Brahmin Living in
the State of Tamil Nadu & v. Union of India & Ors.11 Hon’ble Supreme Court
dismissed the Special Leave Petition of Smartha Brahmins who contended for the status
of Religious Denomination the court concurred with the reasoning of the HC and stated
that it failed the tests of Religious Denomination laid down in the S.P. Mittal Case12.

1.2 THAT THE TERMINATION VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.

14. It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in the case of
Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoil13, it was held that
personal laws conferring inferior status on women contradict the constitutional
principle of equality. Derived from religious scriptures, such laws must align with the

9
S.P. Mittal, supra note 7.
10
Sastri Yagnapurushadji And Others vs Muldas Brudardas Vaishya & anrs, 1966 AIR 1119.
11
Smartha Brahmin Living in the State of Tamil Nadu & v. Union of India & Ors, S.A. No. 1609/2000.
12
S.P. Mittal, supra note 7.
13
Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoil, (1996) 8 SCC 525.

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Constitution to avoid becoming void under Article 13. In the present case, the custom
barring widows from becoming chief priests is deemed invalid.

15. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that in the case of Krishna
Singh v. Mathura Ahir14 the issue before the court of Law was whether a Shudra could
become a sanyasi, “it was held that any handicap suffered by a Shudra according to the
personal law would be in violation of Articles 1415 and 1516 of the Constitution”,
drawing parallel from the above judgment it is pertinent to note that discrimination
based on marital status strictly goes against the principal of equality.

16. In the case of N. Adithayan vs The Travancore Devaswom Board & Ors17 Hon’ble
Supreme Court ruled that non-Brahmins have the right to perform temple rituals if
trained. Historical Brahmin exclusivity likely stems from societal barriers, not inherent
rights. The Constitution's Article 25 emphasizes freedom of religion, stating caste,
gender, or marital status is not a criterion for the chief priest position; knowledge of
rituals matters, In the instant case at hand Despite being a widow, Mrigyaniki, who
served as Chief Priest during her husband's illness, is competent and eligible for the
position, upholding Article 25 rights.

17. In light of the arguments, it is humbly submitted that excluding widows from the chief
priest position based on invalid customs violates fundamental rights, as no scripture
bars them. Chief priest appointment is secular, regulated by law, not religious.
Terminating widows breaches equality principles upheld by court precedents.
Competent widows like Mrigyaniki deserve equal opportunity under Article 25.

2. THAT EXCLUSION OF WIDOWS THROUGH THE NOTIFICATION BY THE

TEMPLE AUTHORITIES IS VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.

2.1 THAT THE IMPUGNED NOTIFICATION VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS.

18. It is Humbly submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court is the protector and Guarantor
of Fundamental rights18 and the States have the legal obligation to protect and promote

14
Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, 1980 AIR 707.
15
India Const. art. 14.
16
India Const. art. 15.
17
N. Adithayan vs The Travancore Devaswom Board & Ors, AIR 2002 SC 3538.
18
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner UP, AIR 1963 SC 996.

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human rights, including the right to social security, and ensure that people can realize
their rights without discrimination19. The impugned notification dated 1st November
2021, by which Vrindvasini Temple Trust invited an application for the position of
Chief Priest for the Vrindvasini Temple is in clear violation of the basic structure of the
constitution of Indonia.

19. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the practice of excluding
widows from the position of the chief priest is against the principle of equality which
is embedded in Part III of the constitution of Indonia and as per Article 14 of the
constitution of Indonia “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law
or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”

20. It is further submitted that in the case of Menka Gandhi V. UOI20 Justice Bhagwati
said that Equality is against the arbitrariness of State action. So, this doctrine ensures
equality of treatment. “The Seven-Judge Bench held that a trinity exists between Article
14, Article 19, and Article 21. All these articles must be read together. Any law
interfering with personal liberty of a person must satisfy a triple test: (i) it must
prescribe a procedure; (ii) the procedure must withstand the test of one or more of the
fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in each
situation; and (iii) it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Article 14.” And
in the instant case at hand the action of temple authority is arbitrary and clearly violates
the Golden Triangle.

21. It is humbly submitted that in the case of State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali
Sarkarhabib21 the Hon’ble court itself has made a remarked judgment that "In order to
pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled viz. (i) that
the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
those that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that the
differentia must have a rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the Act.
The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are
distinct and what is necessary is that there must be nexus between them." And in the
instant case at hand there the exclusionary practice of barring widows from becoming

19
National Textile Workers' Union v. P.R. Ramakrishnan, (1983) 1 SCC 228.
20
Menka Gandhi V. UOI, AIR 1978 SC 597.
21
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkarhabib, 1952 AIR 75.

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the chief priest of the vridvasini temple has no intelligible differentia and the object to
be achieved by such an act is in clear violation of the fundamental rights of the widows.

22. It is humbly submitted that Article 15 of the constitution emphatically bars

discrimination on specific grounds, including sex. Any bias against a widow solely
based on her marital status contravenes the essence of Article 15. further, in the case of
the case of Anuj Garg & others v. Hotel Association of India & others22 and hereafter
in the case of Charu Khurana & others v. UOI & other23s, where the Hon’ble Supreme
Court itself has emphasized that gender bias in any form is opposed to principal of
equality

23. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that this exclusionary
practice also violates Article 15(3) which says that “No laws can be against the women”
and the term law means not only Parliament made laws but also all laws enshrined
under Art. 13(1)24 includes rules, regulations, ordinances, customs and usage, therefore
this practice stands in complete contradiction to Article 15(3) as it was observed in the
case of Mahadeb Jiew v. B.B. Sen25, where P.B. Mukherjee, J. observed that: The
words women and children used in Article 15(3) means making special provision in
favour of women and children and not against them.

24. It is further submitted that in the case of Guruvayoor Devaswom Case26, Hon’ble
Supreme Court upheld the appointment of non-believers to the temple trust board. In
the N. Adithayan Case27, the SC ruled that no custom pre-existing in the Constitution
could exclude non-Brahmins from performing puja in temples if they were otherwise
trained and qualified drawing parallel from the above legal precedents it can be deduced
that there shall be no discrimination in the appointment of chief priest.

25. Further, it is submitted that in the case of Seshammal & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu28
it was held that the appointment of the chief priest is a secular practice, therefore, it is
pertinent to note that such a practice is outside the ambit of religious or essential

22
Anuj Garg & others v. Hotel Association of India & others, AIR 2008 SC 663.
23
Charu Khurana & others v. UOI & other, W.P. No. 78 of 2013.
24
India Const. art. 13(1).
25
Mahadeb Jiew v. B.B. Sen, AIR 1951 CAL 563.
26
Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Commit. & ors. v. C.K. Rajan & ors, AIR 2004 SC 561.
27
N. Adithayan v. The Travancore Devaswom Board & ors, AIR 2002 SC 3538.
28
Seshammal, supra note 4.

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practice, further in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Shri Sajjan Lal Panjawat &
others29,14 where the hon’ble Court it was observed that Appointments violating
fundamental rights under Article 25 can be legally contested and nullified. Regulations
are needed to govern public religious trusts in line with constitutional provisions,
ensuring adherence to Article 25 and other relevant articles.

26. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that from the above
judgment, it can be deduced that the impugned notification is contrary to the provisions
of the constitution as it violates fundamental rights enshrined under part III of the
constitution of Indonia.

2.2 THAT THE IMPUGNED NOTIFICATION IS VIOLATIVE OF BASIC HUMAN

RIGHTS.

27. It is submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that Gender equality and neutrality
are considered as the heart of human rights and values. The fundamental principle of
UDHR was adopted by world leaders in 1945 as "equal rights of men and women", and
protecting and promoting women's human rights is the responsibility of all States for
the attainment of equality between women and men, and the elimination of all forms of
discrimination against women are fundamental human rights and values.

28. Further, it is submitted that Article 430 of the 1981 Declaration requests all States to
“take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of
religion or belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, political, social and cultural life”.

29. It is submitted that Art. 18 (3)31: "Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others." In the instant case at hand, there has been a gross violation of basic human
rights of the widows by excluding them from the position of chief priest.

29
State of Rajasthan v. Shri Sajjan Lal Panjawat & others, 1975 AIR 706.
30
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
31
supra note 31.

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30. It is humbly submitted that the exclusion of widows, but not widowers, from the
position of chief priest violates the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which prohibits distinctions based on
sex, impairing women's rights compared to men.

31. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that CEDAW, Articles 1-
3, 5(a), 10(h), 12, 16(e)32 (outlining women’s rights to equality in law and practice,
to health including access to family planning information and services, and to
determine the number and spacing of children, and defining states’ duty to eliminate
cultural prejudices based on stereotyped roles for men and women). Further, ICCPR,
Articles 2(1), 6, 7, 1733 (protecting the rights to life, non-discrimination and equality,
freedom from torture and ill-treatment, and privacy).

32. Further, it is submitted that in a committee report constituted under the guidelines of
the Honourable Supreme Court it was observed that “The rehabilitation of widows
necessitates their empowerment as autonomous individuals, distinct from familial
dependence. Recognition of their inherent worth demands integration into societal
structures34”

33. Further, the counsel submits that if there is any relevance to the unequal law in history
or is relevant due to some historical reasons which justify the law as in the present case
where widows are excluded from the position of the chief priest is based on the
reasoning of an age old custom then such laws bound to wear out with the passage of
time as it was reiterated by Justice Y.V.Chandrachud in the judgment of Shri Admar
Mutt Case35, while giving reference to a legal maxim as “Ces-sante Ratione Legis
Cessat Ipsa Lex'' which speaks that:-“Reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason
of any particular law ceases, so does the Law itself.”

34. Further, it was observed in the case of The Environment and Consumer ... vs UOI36,
that widows are outcasted from society, considered impure and even socially ostracized.

32
The Convention on the Elimination of All Form of Dicrimination against Women.
33
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
34
Vrindavan Committee Report (Environment and Consumer Protection Foundation v. UOI & ors.), W.P.
(Civil) No. 659 OF 2007.
35
H. H. Shri Swamiji Of Shri Admar Mutt, Etc vs The Commissioner, Hindu Religious, AIR 1980 SC 1.
36
The Environment Consumer…. v. UOI, W.P. No. 659 of 2007.

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Further, it was held that it was the constitutional duty to protect and preserve the rights
of the widows.

35. In light of the arguments, the impugned notification for the position of Chief Priest at
Vrindvasini Temple violates the Constitution and basic human rights principles.
Excluding widows’ breaches of international agreements such as CEDAW. Legal
precedents emphasize equality in religious appointments. Widows' empowerment is
vital, as highlighted by committee reports. In conclusion, the notification's exclusionary
practice is unconstitutional, violating fundamental rights and international human rights
standards.

3. THAT EXCLUSION OF WIDOW FROM COOKING BHOG IS VIOLATION OF

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT.

3.1 THAT THE EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICE IS VIOLATIVE OF FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS.

36. It is Humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court that denying widows the
participation in cooking Bhog, infringes upon Article 14 of the Constitution, which
safeguards the right to equality before the law. Such practices, solely based on marital
status, violate fundamental rights by subjecting widows to disparate treatment within
the territorial jurisdiction of Indonia, emphasizing the imperative that the State must
refrain from denying any individual equal protection under the law.
37. It is argued before this Hon’ble Court that all people are equal in the eyes of God as
well as the Constitution further the exclusion of widows in cooking bhog is in clear
violation of her right to equality as held in the case of Shayara Bano v. UOI37, It
underscored that practices which undermine the rights and dignity of women cannot be
justified under religious or cultural traditions. The right to equality guaranteed under
Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be taken away by personal laws which are contrary
to the constitutional mandate.

38. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonia
that the exclusion of widows from cooking bhog is a clear violation of Article 15, as
discussed in the above issues, gender justice is a fundamental component of the Indian

37
Shayara Bano v. UOI, (2017) 9 SCC 1.

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Constitution and no one be it the state or the judiciary can violate the same38..In the
case of Navtej Singh v UOI39, held: “A discriminatory act will be tested against
constitutional values. A discrimination will not survive constitutional scrutiny when it
is grounded in and perpetuates stereotypes about a class constituted by the grounds
prohibited in Article 15(1). If any ground of discrimination, whether direct or indirect,
is founded on a stereotypical understanding of the role of the sex, it would not be
distinguishable from the discrimination which is prohibited by Article 15 on the
grounds only of sex. If certain characteristics grounded in stereotypes are to be
associated with entire classes of people constituted as groups by any of the grounds
prohibited in Article 15(1), that cannot establish a permissible reason to discriminate.”
Drawing parallel from the said it can be deduced that there has been gross violation of
article 15 by the temple authorities.

39. It is further submitted that there has been a gross violation of Article 2140 as it
guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. In the case of Maneka Gandhi Article
21 of the Constitution of India guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The
right to life under Article 21 is not restricted to a mere animal existence but includes
the right to live with dignity. Any act which offends human dignity or is injurious to the
human persona cannot be regarded as a valid exercise of the legislative power.",

It is submitted that Any practice that compromises the dignity of widows, such as
exclusion from religious rituals, is a clear violation of Article 21. Further, the State must
protect the rights and dignity of individuals, especially marginalized and vulnerable
groups such as women and children41.

40. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the selective ban on the Petitioner
for cooking Bhog by the temple Authorities directly violates the very basic purpose of
Article 17 which applies to both state and non-state actors, further the said exclusion
pertains to casting a stigma on the widows. In the case of the purview of Article 17 was

38
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011.
39
Navtej Singh v UOI, AIR 2018 SC 4321.
40
India Const. art. 21.
41
Shakti Vahini v. UOI, AIR 2018 SC 1601.

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extended wherein the exclusionary practices were based on the notion of impurity and
Hierarchy42.

3.2 THAT THE EXCLUSION OF WIDOW FROM COOKING BHOG VIOLATES

HER RELIGIOUS RIGHTS.

41. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonia
that; Article 25 and Article 26 of the Indian Constitution are about the Right to Freedom
of Religion. Article 25(1) guarantees to every person and not only to the citizens of
India, the “freedom of conscience” and “the right freely to profess, practice and
propagate religion”. In Vridvashini temple Widow is not allowed to cook bhog in the
temple violates these Fundamental Rights under Art.14 and Art.15. As it discriminates
on the basis of the marital status of a woman.

42. In Rev. Stanislaus vs State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors43, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that “Article 25(1) guarantees the right to practice religion to every individual and
the act of practice is concerned, primarily, with religious worship, rituals and
observations” In the instant case at hand all individuals irrespective of sex, caste, or
race have the right to practice, follow and worship the religion of their choice and the
right to practice religion under Art. 25(1) 44encompasses a non-discriminatory right that
is equally available to Widows.

43. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonia
that the exclusion is inconsistent with constitutional morality45 and fundamental rights
must be guided by the principles of constitutional morality and not societal morality46.
Neither public order nor public health will be at peril by allowing widows to cook bhog.
Where a constitutional court finds that a provision violates constitutional morality, it
must be struck down.

44. It is submitted before this Hon’ble court that Article 13 of the Indian Constitution
mandates that any “law” that is in violation of a fundamental right is void in nature.

42
Elephant G. Rajendran v. The Registrar General, 2023 SCC Online Mad 4095.
43
Rev. Stanislaus vs State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors, 1977 SCR (2) 611.
44
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 SCC 615.
45 S P Gupta, supra note 7.
46 Keshavananda Bharti v. Union of India (1973) 4 SCC 225.

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The Allahabad High Court in Vijay Singh v. State of U. P47. and Shri Krishna Singh
v. Mathura Ahir48 held that “The definition of law cannot be restricted to Article 13(2)
alone and therefore “laws in force” would include customs or usage, having the force
of law.” Thus, customs are not exempted from the process of Judicial Review. Thus,
the court here is free to strike down any “custom” or “usage” which is in contravention
of the fundamental rights of a person

45. Further in the case of S.R. Bommai v. UOI49 Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, observed:
“While the citizens of this country are free to profess, practice and propagate such
religion, faith, or belief as they choose, so far as the state is concerned which is, from
point of view of the state, the religion, faith, or belief of a person is immaterial. To it
all are equal and all are entitled to be treated equally.”

46. It is further submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonia
that shloka from Shrimad Bhagwat Gita “patram puspam phalam toyam, yo me bhaktya
prayachchhati, tad aham bhakty-upahrtam, asnami prayatatmanah”50 Chapter 9 verse
26 which in English Translates to "If one offers Me with devotion a leaf, flower, fruit
or water, I affectionately accept that offering of the clean hearted devotee." It is
submitted that the only condition for offering bhog to the lord is a clean heart, asserting
that no one should be barred from making offerings.

47. In the light of the arguments, it is apparent that there has been a gross violation of
Fundamental rights of the widow by barring her from cooking bhog at Vridvashini
temple therefore such an exclusionary practice in the name of custom and usage is a
deterrent to the basic structure of the constitution of Indonia.

47
Vijay Singh v. State of U. P., AIR 2012 SC 2840.
48
Shri Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, 1980 AIR 707.
49
S.R. Bommai v. UOI, 1994 AIR 1918.
50
Bhagwat Gite As it is, supra note 3.

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4. THAT THE ACT OF DENYING ENTRY OF WIDOWS IN DANDESHWARI

TEMPLE BY THE AUTHORITIES IS VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT.

4.1 THAT THE BAN VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS MENTIONED IN

ARTICLE 14 OF THE COI.

48. It is humbly submitted before that equality mandates treating individuals similarly
situated equally. The ban on widows' entry violates this principle, constituting a clear
infringement of constitutional equality and other rights bestowed upon Indian citizens.
The Ban of Entry of widows is thus a clear violation of the constitutional mandate of
equality, and other rights provided to the citizens of India.

49. It is submitted in the case of Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University51, the Hon’ble SC held
that, as per Article 14, any law being discriminatory in nature must have the existence
of intelligible differentia and the same must bear a rational nexus with the object sought
to be achieved.

50. Further, in the instant case in hand, the classification based on marital status Is not
intelligible, and neither the object sought to be achieved is constitutionally valid. There
already exists a classification between men and women as separate classes, so there
cannot be any further sub-classification among women based on Marital status.
Therefore, the exclusionary practice per se violates the sacrosanct principle of equality.

51. The counsel herein submits the case of State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar52,
the Supreme Court of India, stated the twin test for reasonable classification. The court
held that for the classification to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled:

i. Classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes

those that are grouped together from others and
ii. The differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved
by the Act.

51
Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University, 1989 AIR 903.
52
Anwar Ali Sarkarhabib, supra note 18.

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52. Further, it is contended that in the case of Dr. Noorjehan Safia v. the State of
Maharashtra53 and Smt. Vidya Bal & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra54, the Bombay
High Court while dealing with the prohibition on women’s entry into the dargah and
the shrine area at Shani Shingnapur temple held that ban on entry of women contravenes
the fundamental rights of a person. The court in the latter case stated that the “State
must ensure their access. Provisions in law already allow this. Nothing prevents women
from entering, it added that if men were granted entry to a place of worship, women
should enjoy access too.” So, in the present case, the entry of Women of a certain age
cannot be restricted.
53. Further, the counsel humbly submits that in the case of Thangamani v. The Collector55,
Erode District the court ordered that the widow and her son be allowed to enter the
temple, as like our fact the temple authority restricted the entrance of the widow inside
the temple and court in their cognizance allowed and permitted the entrance along with
police protection.

4.2 THAT THE BAN VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT MENTIONED IN

ARTICLE 17 OF THE COI.

54. Further, it is submitted that according to Section 7(c) of the Civil Rights Act, 195556,
which criminalizes the encouragement and incitement to practice untouchability in any
form whatsoever. As in the instant case even, the exclusionary practice has the impact
of casting a stigma on a widow for it considers them polluted and thereby has a huge
psychological impact on them which resultantly leads to violation of Article 17.
Untouchability based on social factors, notions of purity, and pollution comes under the
ambit of Art.17.
55. Further, the counsel herein submits that in the case of Elephant G Rahendra v. The
registrar General and others57, the Hon’ble Court held that the scope of Article 17 is
much wider. It is going beyond the specific Caste-based practice. The term
‘untouchability’ also includes all practices of social ostracism and exclusion and further
has their bases on ritual-based ideas of purity/pollution and hierarchy/subordination.

53
Dr. Noorjehan Safia v. the State of Maharashtra, AIR 2017 (NOC) 45 (BOM).
54
Smt. Vidya Bal & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra, PIL No. 55 of 2016.
55
Thangamani v. The Collector, W.P. No. 23021 of 2012.
56
Civil Rights Act, 1955
57
Elephant G Rahendra, supra note 31.

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56. Further taking the facts in consonance with the cases mentioned the counsel submits
that in the instant case even, the exclusionary practice has the impact of casting a stigma
on widows and thereby has a huge psychological impact on them which resultantly
leads to violation of Article 17. Untouchability based on social factors, notions of
purity, and pollution comes under the ambit of Art.17.

4.3 THAT THE BAN VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS MENTIONED

UNDER ART. 21 AND ART.25 OF COI.

57. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonia
that in the case of Justice KS Puttaswamy retd v UOI58, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India unanimously reaffirmed the right to privacy as a fundamental right under the
Constitution of India and held that the right to privacy is integral to freedoms
guaranteed across fundamental rights, and is an intrinsic aspect of dignity, autonomy,
and liberty. And any form of exclusionary practice pertaining to women based on their
marital status undermines their dignity by violating Article 21 of the Constitution.

58. Further, the counsel submits that Article 25(1) protects the individual right to worship
and widow devotees have an equal right to worship under Article 25. In Rev. Stanislaus
vs State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors59, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “Article
25(1) guarantees the right to practice religion to every individual and the act of
practice is concerned, primarily, with religious worship, rituals and observations”.
Hence all individuals irrespective of sex, caste, or race have the right to practice, follow
and worship the religion of their choice and the right to practice religion under Art.
25(1) encompasses a non-discriminatory right that is equally available to both men and
women of all age groups professing the same religion.

59. Further, it is humbly submitted that the denial of entry of women is also inconsistent
with constitutional morality. It has been contended before this Hon’ble Supreme Court
of Indonia that in this instant case, the extent and scope of morality under Articles 25

58
Justice KS Puttaswamy retd v UOI, 2019 (1) SCC 1.
59
Rev. Stanislaus, supra note 32.

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and 26 will have a wider ambit and will include constitutional morality as there is a
violation of fundamental Rights.
60. Herein the case at hand, there has been a violation of morality under Article 25(1) as
all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess,
practice, and propagate religion. Moreover, Article 26(b) is not unfettered – it is again
subject to the limitations of public order, morality, and health. As in the case of Adi
Saiva Sivachariyargal v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu and Anr.60 The hon’ble court held that
“This right given to religious denomination, must be read in a manner which preserves
equally the rights of the individuals and such a condition is necessary so that all the
rights go in harmony with one another. The requirement of constitutional conformity is
very important and if a religious practice is outside the protective umbrella given by
Articles 25(1) and 26(b), the law would certainly take its own course.”

61. Further, it is submitted that in the case of Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State
of Kerala 61it was observed that “The temple’s denominational right to manage its own
internal affairs, under Article 26(b), was subject to the State’s social reform mandate
under Article 25(2)(b). Article 25(2)(b) provides that the State can make laws to reform
Hindu denominations.” In the instant case at hand, neither public order nor public
health will be at peril by allowing entry of a widow. Not allowing the widow to worship
themselves hurts their constitutional morality. Where a constitutional court finds that a
provision violates constitutional morality, it must be struck down.

4.4 THAT THE DANDESHWARI TEMPLE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A

RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION.

62. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble SC that the Dandeshwari Temple does not
constitute a separate Religious Denomination as there are no differences in practices
carried out at Dandeshwari Hindu Temple and thus cannot be accorded the status of
separate religious denominations.

60
Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu and Anr, AIR 2016 SC 209.
61
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, AIR ONLINE 2018 SC 243.

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63. Further, the counsel submits that the devotees of the Dandeshwari temple are just
Hindus and they do not constitute a separate religious denomination under Article 26
of the Constitution as they do not have a common faith or a distinct name.

64. It is humbly argued that the fundamental right of a religious denomination to manage
its internal affairs under Article 26(b) is not unfettered – it is again subject to the
limitations of public order, morality, and health. The word "denomination" has been
defined in the Oxford Dictionary to mean a collection of individuals classed together
under the same name: a religious sect or body having a common faith and Organisation
and designated by a distinctive name. As in the case of S.P. Mittal vs Union of India62,
this Hon’ble court observed that: “It is settled position in law, having regard to the
various decisions of this Court that the words religious denomination" take their colour
from the word `religion'. The expression "religious denomination" must satisfy three
requirements –
(1) it must be a collection of individuals who have a system of belief or doctrine that
they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, i.e., a common faith;
(2) a common organization; and
(3) designation of a distinctive name.

65. It necessarily follows that the common faith of the community should be based on
religion and that they should have common religious tenets and the basic cord which
connects them, should be religion and not merely considerations of caste or community
or societal status.
66. It is submitted in the case of Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple,
Varanasi, and Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors63, this Hon’ble court held that Hindu
believers of the Shaiva form of worship are not denominational worshippers. They are
part of the Hindu religious form of worship. The same stand was taken by this court in
the case of Nallor Marthandam Vellalar v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious and
Charitable Endowment and Ors64., where the court held that the temple at Nellor
owned by the Vellala Community of Marthandam did not constitute a religious

62
S.P Mittal, supra note 7.
63
Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi and Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors, (1997) 4 SCC
606.
64
Nallor Marthandam Vellalar v.Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment and Ors, AIR
2003 SC 4225.

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denomination, and they had common religious tenets peculiar to themselves other than
those which are common to the entire Hindu community.
67. It is humbly contended by the petitioners that the existing structures of social
discrimination must be evaluated through the prism of constitutional morality as
applied in the case of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India 65where it was observed by the
Supreme Court that constitutional morality is “not just the forms and procedures of the
Constitution but provides an enabling framework that allows a society the possibilities
of self-renewal.

68. In light of the arguments, it is humbly submitted that the Dandeshwari Temple is outside
the ambit of Article 26 as the temple is a religious institution of Public character and
there are no exclusively identified followers of the Temple. It is submitted before this
Hon’ble court that Article 13 of the Indian Constitution mandates that any “law” that is
in violation of a fundamental right is void in nature. The Allahabad High Court in Vijay
Singh v. State of U. P66.and Shri Krishna Singh67 v. Mathura Ahir held that “The
definition of law cannot be restricted to Article 13(2) alone and therefore “laws in
force” would include customs or usage, having the force of law.” Thus, Laws which
derive its authority from custom are not exempted from the process of Judicial Review,
the court here is free to strike down any “custom” or “usage” which is in contravention
of the fundamental rights of a person. In the instant case at hand Temple's widow entry
ban violates fundamental rights, a discriminatory class legislation.

4.5 THAT THE WORD MORALITY INCLUDES CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY

69. It is submitted that The doctrine of constitutional morality, crucial in interpreting the
Indian Constitution, safeguards democratic ideals, individual autonomy, and equality.
Rooted in the values of autonomy, liberty, and dignity, it upholds the rule of law.
Violations of constitutional morality, as seen in the exclusion of widows from the
Dandeshwari temple, contradict Article 25(1) concerning freedom of religion. The
doctrine aligns with democratic principles and recognizes the right to privacy and
identity with dignity. The case underscores the need to ensure morality, health, and

65
NCT of Delhi v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 606.
66
Vijay Singh, supra note 33.
67
Shri Krishna Singh, supra note 34.

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religious freedom for widows, emphasizing a harmonious balance between individual

rights and societal values.

70. It is humbly adduced that; the term morality is defined under Article 25(1)which deals
with the aspect of Freedom of religion under COI. In the instant case, there has been a
severe violation of Article 25 (1) which includes the morality and health of those
widows who as a certain class are excluded from entering the temple which in many
ways violates their freedom to practice their religion.

71. It is further submitted that Constitutional morality means adherence to the core
principles of Constitutional democracy68. In the case of NCT of Delhi v. Union of
India69, Constitutional morality in its strictest sense implies a strict and complete
adherence to the constitutional principles19 as enshrined in the various segments of the
document.

72. In light of the arguments, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the ban
on widows' entry into the Dandeshwari Temple infringes on constitutional principles of
equality, dignity, and religious freedom. The argument challenges the classification
based on marital status, emphasizing its lack of intelligible differentia and rational
nexus. The violation of Article 17 against untouchability is highlighted, along with the
broader impact on Article 21 right to live with dignity. Additionally, the petition
contends that Dandeshwari Temple does not qualify as a separate religious
denomination. The case demands a holistic consideration of constitutional morality,
ensuring justice for widows and upholding constitutional values.

68
Trustee Hidaya Educational & Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala, 2020 SCC Ker 31 (India), Subhashini v.
District Collector, 2020 SCC Ker 4080 (India)
69
NCT of Delhi, supra note 49

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ISSUE RAISED, ARGUMENT ADVANCED AND

AUTHORITIES CITED, THE COUNSEL ON THE BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS HUMBLY
PRAYS THAT THE HON’BLE COURT BE PLEASED TO ADJUDGE AND DECLARE THAT: -

• Firstly, The Termination of a widow from being the Chief Priest of the temple as Void.
• Secondly, By a writ of Certiorari or any other writ Quash and set aside the impugned
notification no. 111/2021.
• Thirdly, The Exclusion of Widows from Cooking bhog amounts to a Violation of fundamental
rights under the constitution of Indonia.
• Fourthly, The Exclusion of widows from Dandeshwari Temple as Ultra vires to the Constitution
of Indonia.

AND /OR PASS ANY OTHER WRIT THAT IT MAY BE PLEASED TO, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, EQUITY,
AND GOOD CONSCIENCE, AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE COUNSELS ON BEHALF OF THE

PETITIONER SHALL BE DUTY-BOUND FOREVER PRAY.

Respectfully Submitted

COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONERS

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