Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Objectives
Structure
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Corporate Governance and stakeholders
3.3 Need for Regulatory and Institutional Interference
3.4 International Committees on Corporate Governance
3.5 Corporate Governance Committees in India
3.6 Corporate Governance Regulations in India
3.7 Summary
3.8 Self-Assessment Questions
3.9 References/Further Readings
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The new regulatory framework and institutional developments have increased
the need for good corporate governance is obvious. When multiple
stakeholders are involved in creating a successful corporation, it is important
that wealth created in that process is distributed properly and fairly to these
multiple shareholders. In the absence of good corporate governance, the
wealth is distributed unevenly. For instance, several thousands of
shareholders and employees of Enron have lost their savings when companies
like Enron failed on account of governance issues. Investment in equity is
also risky but investors know that risk is always related with business. If a
company fails on account of competition or change of technology or any
other business related issues, we can expect equity holders bear such risk for
the higher expected reward. On the other hand, if a business fails only on
account of governance issues, then some regulatory intervention is certainly
required to set right occurrence of such events. The need for regulatory
48
intervention is emphasized when business failures on account of governance Regulations and
Committees
issues happen frequently and at large scale. The Mississippi Scheme and
South Sea Bubble were major governance failures which occurred three
centuries back. They were classical examples of how the nexus between few
individuals and those who are in power ruin several thousands of small
shareholders. Though such scandals come up periodically, there was no
comprehensive attempt to regulate corporate governance until the London
Stock Exchange initiated the process in 1991 when UK faced several high-
profile failures like Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI),
Polly Peck and Maxwell.
Though each case is different, the underlying issue is the failure of corporate
governance by those who are managing the company and such failure affects
several millions of shareholders savings. Such major failures happening
around the same time in 1990-91 shaken the confidence of investors in the
UK and London Stock Exchange (LSE) appointed a committee under Sir
Adrian Cadbury, the most respected CEO of Cadbury confectionary empire.
Soon the regulators realized that there are several components of governance
issue and each one of them should be studied in detail to draw necessary
regulations. What followed is appointment of more committees with the task
of assigning one such objective for each of the committees. As the corporate
governance failures started appearing in several countries, there was a sudden
realization for a formal regulation and each country has followed the LSE
model of appointing committees to come out with specific recommendations
suitable for their countries. In this unit, we will discuss some of the
international and national committees on corporate governance and their
recommendations.
Activity 1
How corporate governance led failures are different from business failures?
Whether better governance helps in preventing business failures?
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
Committees in UK
The Committee was set up in May 1991 by the financial reporting council,
the London Stock Exchange under the Chairmanship of Sir Adrian Cadbury
to look into financial aspects of corporate governance. The Committee’s
objective was ‘to help raise the standards of corporate governance and the
level of confidence in financial reporting and auditing by setting out clearly
what it sees as the respective responsibilities of those involved and what it
believes is expected of them’. The board of directors' accountability to
shareholders and the society was investigated by the committee. It published
its report and associated code of best practices in December 1992, laying out
the governance mechanisms required to strike a balance between the board of
directors' fundamental power and their necessary responsibility. Openness,
51
Corporate integrity, and accountability were identified as three essential criteria of good
Governance
governance by the committee. The committee made several
recommendations which are as follows:
52
The main effects of the Cadbury Report are: First, Cadbury encourages firms Regulations and
Committees
to alter the structure of their boards, separating the roles of CEO and
chairman and setting a minimum limit for the number of NEDs. Secondly,
the Code encourages firms to establish audit committees whose membership
is entirely non-executive. Thirdly, it contributes to the growing pressure on
institutional investors to make positive use of their voting power.
This committee's code of best practices was divided into four sections:
1) Remuneration committee.
2) Disclosures.
3) Remuneration policy.
4) Service contracts and compensation:
1) Board
The board should prepare a charter of its responsibilities, ensure
compliance with all laws, have a formal and transparent procedure for
appointed and remuneration of directors and appraise the performance of
the board, chairperson, chief executive officer and individual directors.
Each board should have an audit and a remuneration committee and
there should be separation of chairperson and CEO as far as possible.
2) Risk Management
The board is responsible for the total process of risk management and its
effectiveness. A board committee in liaison with management is to set
risk strategy policies, determine company’s risk appetite and review the
internal control systems. Management is accountable to the board for
designing, implementing and monitoring the process of risk management
and integrating it into the day-to-day activities of the company.
3) Internal Audit
Companies should have an independent, objective and effective internal
audit function that has the respect and co-operation of both the board and
management. The head of internal audit is to be appointed with the
concurrence of the audit committee and should have ready and regular
access to the chairperson of the company and the chairperson of the audit
committee.
4) Integrated Sustainability Reporting
Stakeholder reporting requires an integrated approach. Every company
should report at least annually on the nature and extent of its social,
transformation, ethical, safety, health and environmental management
policies and practices.
5) Accounting and Auditing
The board should appoint an audit committee that has a majority of
independent non-executive directors. The majority of the members of the
audit committee should be financially literate. The chairperson should be
an independent non-executive director and not the chairperson of the
board. The committee will recommend the appointment of external
auditors, aim for efficient audit processes and review the non-audit
services that may be performed by the auditors.
54
6) Relations with Shareholders Regulations and
Committees
Companies should enter into constructive engagement with institutional
investors based on mutual understanding of objectives. Companies
should ensure that each item of special business included in the notice of
annual general meeting is accompanied by a full explanation of the
effects of the proposed resolution. The results of all decisions taken at
company meetings should be publicly disseminated promptly on the
conclusion of the meeting to ensure that all shareholders (particularly
those who were unable to attend) are informed.
7) Communication
It is the board’s duty to report a comprehensive, objective, balanced and
understandable assessment of the company’s position to stakeholders.
Reporting should address material matters of significant interest and
concern to all stakeholders.
• Committee recommends that for the purpose of the audit committee for
listed companies with a market capitalization above $200 million, both
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) adopt the following definition of
independence “Members of the audit committee shall be considered
independent if they have no relationship to the corporation that may
interfere with the exercise of their independence from management and
the corporation”.
• Listing rules with both NYSE & NASD require that the Audit committee
charter should mention that the boards of directors and audit committee
(representatives of shareholders) have ultimate power to select, evaluate
or replace the outside auditor whenever required.
• Listing rules with both NYSE & NASD also require that the audit
committee should take appropriate actions to ensure the independence of
outside auditor.
Activity 2
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
56
3.5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COMMITTEES Regulations and
Committees
IN INDIA
As seen in several other countries, India also witnessed a couple of securities
market scams and frauds and public confidence turned very low at one point
of time when companies started misusing the economic freedom. A few
committees have been formed to assess the corporate governance status in
India and recommended set of governance code and standards. Some of the
important recommendations of these committees are discussed here.
• Any listed companies with a turnover of Rs. l00 crores and above should
have professionally competent, independent, non-executive directors,
who should constitute at least 30 percent of the board if the Chairman of
the company is a non-executive director, or at least 50 percent of the
board if the Chairman and Managing Director is the same person.
• Companies should not re-appoint directors who have not been able to
attend 50% or more meetings.
• All key information that must be reported to, and placed before, the
board.
• The board meeting should be held at least four times a year with a
maximum time gap of four months between any two meetings all the
information regarding major issues of the company should be placed
before the board.
SEBI accepted the key recommendations of the Birla Committee, which were
incorporated into Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement of the Stock
Exchanges.
58
● the statutory auditor-company relationship, so as to further strengthen the Regulations and
Committees
professional nature of this interface;
● the need, if any, for rotation of statutory audit firms or partners;
● the procedure for appointment of auditors and determination of audit
fees;
● restrictions, if necessary, on non-audit fees;
● independence of auditing functions;
● measures required to ensure that the management and companies
actually present ‘true and fair’ statement of the financial affairs of
companies;
● the need to consider measures such as certification of accounts and
financial statements by the management and directors;
● the necessity of having a transparent system of random scrutiny of
audited accounts;
● adequacy of regulation of chartered accountants, company secretaries
and other similar statutory oversight functionaries;
● advantages, if any, of setting up an independent regulator similar to the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in the SOX Act, and if so,
its constitution; and
● the role of independent directors, and how their independence and
effectiveness can be ensured.
• It should be obligatory for the Board of a company to lay down the code
of conduct for all Board members and senior management of a company
and it shall be posted on the website of the company. The annual report
of the company shall contain a declaration to affirm the compliance
signed off by the CEO and COO.
Activity 3
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
The Companies Bill, vetted twice by the Parliamentary Panel, was passed by
the Lok Sabha on December 18, 2012 and by the Rajya Sabha on August 8,
2013. On receiving the assent of the Hon’ble President of India on August
29, 2013, it was notified on August 30, 2013 as the Companies Act, 2013
(Act 18 of 2013) consisting of 470 Sections and 7 Schedules.
The New Companies Act, 2013, is in line with some of the best practices
followed globally and brings a renewed focus on improved corporate
governance by way of better structure, more rigorous checks and balances
and greater independence of all key members including boards and auditors.
Under this law, various provisions were made under at least 11 heads viz.
Composition of the Board, Woman Director, Independent Directors,
Directors Training and Evaluation, Audit Committee, Nomination and
Remuneration Committee, Subsidiary Companies, Internal Audit, SFIO, Risk
Management Committee and Compliance to provide a rock-solid framework
for Corporate Governance.
● “Every listed public company shall have at least one-third of the total
number of directors as independent directors and the Central
Government may prescribe the minimum number of independent
directors in case of any class or classes of public companies.”
● The Act prescribes size for the board to be maximum fifteen directors,
and appointment of more than 15 directors requires approval of
shareholders in General Meeting.
The LODR regulations identify corporate governance principles (in line with
OECD principles). In the event of the absence of specific requirements or
ambiguity, these principles would serve as a guide to the listed entities.
Based on recommendations of Kotak committee the regulations were
significantly revised and updated in 2018.
63
Corporate Some of the provisions of corporate governance specified in “Regulation 17
Governance
to 27” of the “Securities and Exchange Board of India (Listing Obligations
and Disclosure Requirements), Regulations, 2015 are:
Activity 4
Examine the corporate Governance report of one public and one private
sector bank. Have the provisions discussed above been complied with?
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
3.7 SUMMARY
Major corporate failures reflected a break-down in the governance structure
of corporates. Loss of millions of dollars of investors’ money highlighted the
urgency of regulating governance. Several committees were set up across the
globe to examine how to improve the governance standards. Though it would
be difficult to achieve perfection in governance issues unless all those who
are connected with the company decided to follow highest ethical standards,
the effort was to minimize the scope for misgovernance. These committees
which examined the issue identified three important aspects in governance
are - Board, Audit and Disclosure. Hence, the recommendations of these
committees and subsequent regulations have mainly addressed the issue of
how to improve the effectiveness of board, quality of audit and transparency
in disclosure. 65
Corporate
Governance 3.8 SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS
1) What is the role of Board in corporate form of business? How the Board
can be made effective as per the recommendations of various
committees?
2) Audit committees are interface between auditor and the Board. What are
the functions of Audit Committee and how they discharge this interface
function effectively?
3) What are the committees related to Board? What value addition they
bring for improving the corporate governance?
4) Summarize important recommendations of Cadbury Committee and
Kumara Mangalam Birla Committee.
5) Narayana Murthy Committee has made a few recommendations which
were not observed in other committees’ recommendations. What are they
and how they would improve the governance standards?
6) What is the role of institutional investors in improving the corporate
governance?
7) Why many committees have recommended separation of CEO and
Chairman of the Board to improve governance?
8) Corporate governance in initial stages were more of improving the
quality of governance but recent committees are recommending punitive
measures for governance failures — Do you agree that governance can
be improved through such punishment?
66