STUDENT NUMBER: 6779847

Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 2

5G network threat landscape ..................................................................................................................... 3

Smart Homes, Smart Cities, Smart & Smart Transports: .......................................................................... 4

EHealth ...................................................................................................................................................... 6

My thoughts on how 5G security can resolve these threats. ..................................................................... 9

Smart Homes, Smart Cities, Smart & Smart Transports ........................................................................... 9

EHealth .................................................................................................................................................... 13

Potential Security Solutions............................................................................................................. 13

5G system security solution .................................................................................................................... 14

3rd Generation Partnership Project ......................................................................................................... 15

3GPP 5G Network Architecture .............................................................................................................. 16

3GPP 5G Security Architecture .............................................................................................................. 17

References.................................................................................................................................................... 22
Can new services like smart homes, smart cities, transportation, and eHealth be secured via
5G networks?

INTRODUCTION

5G is the fifth generation of mobile networks that offers faster data transfer speeds, reduced latency, and
increased bandwidth compared to its predecessor, 4G. With 5G technology, users can experience seamless
connectivity and enhanced user experience, enabling them to stream high-quality videos, play games, and
access cloud-based applications with ease. Several sectors, including healthcare, transportation, and
manufacturing, are anticipated to undergo significant transformation as a result of Internet of Things (IoT)
devices and smart infrastructure. Moreover, 5G will support the development of novel technologies like
augmented reality (AR) and virtual reality (VR), which will lead to the development of novel concepts and
uses (Liu, 2020).

Figure 1 5G Networks

The adoption of 5G technology creates new security issues because of the greater number of connected
devices and quicker data transmission speeds. 5G network security encompasses several aspects, such as
device security, network security, and data security. It's crucial to utilize cutting-edge encryption methods
like end-to-end encryption to protect data privacy and prevent unauthorized access. Theft or modification
of data may also be prevented by using secure network protocols, which are crucial components of the 5G
network design, must be protected. To address these issues, security solutions such as network slicing,
secure SDN, and virtualization security are being developed and implemented to ensure the deployment of
5G technology is safe (Park, 2021).

5G network threat landscape

The usage of 5G technology has facilitated the adoption of smart homes, smart cities, smart transportation,
and eHealth applications. Nevertheless, this also generates new security issues as the number of connected
devices increases and more data is produced and exchanged across networks. In this report, we will outline
the threat landscape associated with 5G networks for each of these new applications (Haque, 2022).

Figure 2 ENISA draws Threat Landscape of 5G Networks

Source: (Enisa, 2019)

Smart Homes, Smart Cities, Smart & Smart Transports:

5G technology is expected to revolutionize several industries, including the smart homes, smart cities and
smart transports sector. However, the adoption of 5G networks in smart homes, smart cities and smart
transports also poses unique security challenges. For new applications in smart homes, smart cities, and
smart transportation, we will explain the 5G network threat environment in this paper, including any
possible risks and weaknesses (Saeed, 2019).

• Device security:

The proliferation of IoT devices in smart homes, smart cities and smart transports increase the risk of
security breaches. Malicious actors can compromise devices such as smart locks, thermostats, and cameras,
leading to unauthorized access and data theft.

• Network security:

The attack surface and likelihood of cyberattacks are increased by 5G technologies in smart homes, smart
cities, and smart transportation. Network protocols like DNS and DHCP have vulnerabilities that hackers
might exploit to perform distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks or steal sensitive data. DHCP
(Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) and DNS (Domain Name System) are two crucial networking
technologies that enable computer communication and connection (Sharma, 2022).

Figure 3 DHCP & DNS

Source: (Educba, 2021)

• Data security:

The data collected by smart homes, smart cities and smart transports devices is sensitive and can be used
for malicious purposes. Attackers can steal data and use it for identity theft, financial fraud, or blackmail.

• Privacy concerns:

Smart homes, smart cities and smart transports devices can collect data on user behavior and activities,
leading to privacy concerns. The data collected can be used to profile users and target them with
personalized ads or content.

• Physical security:

Smart homes, smart cities and smart transports devices can control physical access to the home, making
them a target for physical attacks. Malicious actors can compromise smart locks or security systems, gaining
access to the home.

• Emergency response security:

Smart homes, smart cities and smart transports applications can be used for emergency response
management, such as detecting earthquakes or floods. However, these applications are also vulnerable to
cyber-attacks, leading to false alarms or delayed responses.

Figure 4 Cyber security in a 5G World

Source: (Yoni Kahana, 2019)

• Critical Infrastructure Security:

The deployment of 5G technology in smart homes, smart cities and smart transports applications, such as
autonomous vehicles and traffic management systems, increases the risk of cyber-attacks that could lead to
service disruptions, accidents, or even physical damage. Attackers may exploit vulnerabilities in the
infrastructure's software, firmware, or hardware to take control of the system or disrupt its functionality
(Rani, 2022).

• Safety and Security Risks:

Smart homes, smart cities and smart transports applications can pose significant safety and security risks if
not adequately secured. For example, attackers may compromise the navigation systems of autonomous
vehicles, causing accidents or hijacking the vehicle remotely.

EHealth

• Personal Health Information Security:

EHealth applications collect sensitive personal health information, such as medical history and biometric
data, which must be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure. Attackers may target eHealth
systems to steal this data and use it for identity theft, fraud, or other malicious purposes (Shah, 2020).

• Privacy Concerns:

EHealth applications may collect sensitive information about patients, including their medical history,
biometric data, and lifestyle choices. This information is valuable to advertisers or other third parties, who
may use it to target patients with personalized ads or content. Attackers may also use this information for
blackmail or other malicious purposes.

• Medical Device Security:

EHealth applications rely on medical devices, such as insulin pumps or heart monitors, to monitor and treat
patients. These devices can be vulnerable to cyber-attacks, which may result in serious health consequences
or even death.

• Fraud and Abuse:

EHealth applications may be vulnerable to fraud and abuse if not adequately secured. For example, attackers
may use stolen patient data to file false insurance claims or obtain prescription drugs (Fuentes, 2017).
As the deployment of 5G networks in smart cities, smart homes, smart transport, and eHealth grows, so do
the potential threats and vulnerabilities. In this report, we will discuss how 5G security can address these
threats, with specific headings for each application.

Figure 5 5G network and the threat landscape.

Source: (Ijaz Ahmad, 2017)

More security will be required for critical infrastructure that 5G will link in order to secure both its own
safety and the safety of society as a whole. Considering how much of society is reliant on electrical and
technological devices, a security hole in the internet power supply systems might be devastating. We are
aware of how important data is for making decisions, but what if information gets distorted while being
delivered through 5G networks? Hence, it is essential to identify the major security flaws in 5G networks,
bring attention to them, and think about any possible solutions that can lead to safe 5G systems (Ahmad,
2017).

The following is a list of the fundamental issues with 5G that Next Generation Mobile Networks (NGMN)
highlights and that have received a lot of attention in the literature (Döhler, 2021):

1. Flash network traffic: Many cutting-edge ideas and user equipment (IoT).
2. Security of radio interfaces: Encryption keys for radio interfaces are sent over channels that are not
secure.
3. The integrity of the user data plane Cryptography is unable to provide a guarantee for the safety of the
user data plane.
4. Service-driven restrictions on the security architecture should be included as a required security
measure for the network. These restrictions should allow for the application of security measures to be
voluntary.
5. Security when roaming: A user's security preferences are preserved when they switch from the
network of one operator to that of another operator thanks to roaming security. Because of this, roaming
is becoming a riskier activity.
6. Distributed denial of service attacks on the infrastructure: control channels that aren't encrypted and
visible network control elements.
7. The Non-Access Stratum (NAS): Layer of 3GPP Protocols is an Example of a Distributed Control
System That Needs to Work Together.
8. DoS attacks on end-user devices: End-user device operating systems, applications, and configuration
data are not protected by security measures.
 Figure 6 Security threat landscape in 5G networks

Source: (Ijaz Ahmad, 2019)

My thoughts on how 5G security can resolve these threats.

Smart Homes, Smart Cities, Smart & Smart Transports

• End-to-End Security:

In order to ensure that data transported from one device to another is encrypted and secure, end-to-end
security procedures should be used. This covers things like secure booting, firmware upgrades, and
encryption mechanisms. Overview of Risks to the Whole 5G Network A network's three most crucial
functions are its network function (NF, NFn), network exposure function (NEF), and network repository
function (NRF) In the evolving 5G threat scenario, managing encrypted data from end to end is another
consideration. Encryption makes it more difficult to observe traffic within 5G networks, and online services
encrypt their traffic even more. By 2020, it is anticipated that 80% of all online traffic will be encrypted,
with encrypted traffic growing by more than 90% annually (Lam, 2020).

While network traffic encryption greatly increases privacy and security, it also makes it more difficult for
network administrators to monitor data and determine if it is harmful or not. The encryption systems used
by mobile, cloud, and online applications are well-implemented and employ keys and certificates to
determine who they may trust.

Figure 7 End-to-end 5G Network

Source: (Robert Abbas, 2019)

• Network Segmentation:

Network segmentation can help prevent attacks by separating devices into different zones, allowing
administrators to control traffic and access. This will help limit the impact of a breach or attack. Network
segmentation provides separate security services for each segment of the network. This enhances security,
increases network performance, and gives you more control over network traffic. Security is only as strong
as its weakest link, as we all know. Because it is so simple to break into a large flat network, it has a large
attack surface. However, the network traffic in each sub-network is kept separate when a large network is
divided into smaller ones. This limits the attack surface and makes lateral movement more difficult. As a
result, the network segments prevent attackers from moving laterally across the network even if the network
perimeter is breached (Upadhyay, 2020).

• Authentication and Access Control:

To prevent users who shouldn't be able to access devices or systems from doing so, effective authentication
and access control methods should be implemented. This covers things like biometric authentication, multi-
factor authentication, and access control rules. Today, the Authentication Security Module solution from
Ericsson was unveiled. It is based on a physical dedicated module for centrally managing authentication
processes in 5G Core networks. The solution's objective is to boost security while protecting user privacy.
This is made possible by the Hardware Security Module (HSM) of the Thales 5G Luna).

• Device Authentication:

To guarantee that only approved devices may access the network, device authentication should be put into
place. To stop illegal alterations, this also entails employing firmware upgrades and secure booting.

Figure 8 5G Secure Authentication and Subscriber Privacy solution

Source: (Ericsson and Thales Partner, 2021)

• Threat Intelligence and Monitoring:

In order to identify threats and respond to them in real time, threat intelligence and monitoring systems
should be in place. This entails keeping a look out for unusual activity, such as a rapid spike in network
traffic, and setting up automated reactions to reduce the danger. The Internet of Things (IoT) will enable
billions of devices and services, including high-speed video, autonomous vehicles, healthcare apps, and
smart cities.

Figure 9 Securing the 5G connectivity to scale the digital economy

Source: (Mobileum, 2021)

• Secure Communication:

Use of secure communication protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS), which encrypt data while
it is in transit and prevent eavesdropping as well as interception, is recommended. Transport Layer Security
(TLS) is a protocol that encrypts data that is being sent over the Internet. This protocol is very effective for
protecting private and sensitive information such as passwords, credit card numbers, and personal
correspondence from prying eyes such as hackers.
 Figure 10 Transport Layer Security (TLS)

Source: (Jays, 2016)

• Safety Measures:

Safety measures, such as redundancy and failover systems, should be implemented to prevent accidents or
disruptions in critical infrastructure.

EHealth

• Data Encryption:

Data encryption measures, such as end-to-end encryption, should be implemented to protect sensitive
patient data from unauthorized access.

• Device Authentication:

Device authentication should be implemented to ensure that only authorized devices can access the network.
This includes using secure booting and firmware updates to prevent unauthorized modifications.

• Potential Security Solutions

We believe that emerging technologies like SDN and NFV may contribute to a more affordable solution to
these issues. If needed, SDN may distribute resources, such as bandwidth, across various network segments.
To determine if traffic levels are increasing in SDN, the controller may get network data from networking
hardware using the south-bound API. In order to better serve users, services may be moved from the central
network cloud to the edge thanks to NFV. Only in areas with a large number of UEs may virtual slices of
the network be set aside to accommodate flash network traffic (Ahmad, 2018).

Describe the 5G system security solution and compare it to the security of earlier mobile
network generations. Show how Internet security (IPsec) is used in the 5G core and how 5G
devices can be connected using non-3GPP interfaces (such as Wi-Fi).

5G system security solution

5G networks are designed with security as a top priority, as compared to previous generations of mobile
networks. The 5G system security solution includes a range of security measures that provide end-to-end
protection for data and devices. Here, we will contrast the 5G security solution with the security measures
used in older generations of mobile networks.

Data in transit was protected by security methods like authentication and encryption in earlier mobile
network generations including 3G and 4G. These safeguards weren't always end-to-end, however, so there
were certain places in the network where information may be hacked or intercepted. Moreover, distributed
denial of service (DDoS) assaults, which might impair network services, were less protected against on
previous mobile networks (Khan, 2019).

The 5G security solution, in contrast, incorporates end-to-end security safeguards including secure
firmware upgrades, secure booting, and encryption protocols. The network slicing and virtualization
security capabilities, which provide users more control over network traffic and better attack prevention,
are supported by the 5G system architecture. One of the important security characteristics of the 5G core
network is the usage of Internet Protocol security (IPsec) (IPsec). IP-based networks, such as the internet,
may have end-to-end security thanks to the protocol suite known as IPsec. To safeguard data when it is
being sent between user equipment (UE) and the core network, it is employed in the 5G core network.

In addition, non-3GPP interfaces like Wi-Fi may be used to link 5G devices for data transfer. The IPsec
protocol is used by 5G networks to create secure tunnels between the UE and the non-3GPP network in
order to guarantee the security of these connections. This offers end-to-end security for data exchanged
across non-3GPP interfaces. The overall goal of the 5G security solution is to meet the constantly changing
security risks that affect contemporary networks. The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of network
resources may all be guaranteed in 5G networks by adopting end-to-end security methods, virtualization,
and network slicing. This security solution includes the use of IPsec, which offers a defined, widely-used
protocol for guaranteeing the security of data in transit, in the 5G core network and for connecting 5G
devices to non-3GPP interfaces (Roseti, 2021).

3rd Generation Partnership Project

The 5G network, which will serve as the primary means by which people will connect to the communication
network, will facilitate the Internet of Things and extensive heterogeneous connections by the year 2020.
The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) R15 is over, and several standardization groups are
virtually done debating and testing 5G communication technology. The experimental commercial network
has already undergone testing as the 5G era of mobile internet draws near. There may be flawless
compatibility between 2G, 3G, 4G, Wi-Fi, and other access technologies thanks to the 5G network.
Moreover, it could provide advantages like speeds of more than 10Gb/s, very low latency, outstanding
dependability, a huge user capacity, support for very high mobility, and others. Moreover, 5G can support
more mobile Internet application scenarios, such as vehicle connection, ultra-high definition visual
communication, multimedia interaction, and mobile industrial automation. The Internet of Things (IoT)
also uses it for a number of purposes, such as mobile medical, smart homes, industrial control, and
environmental monitoring. To enable the "Internet of Things," hundreds of billions of devices must be
linked to the 5G network (Kim, 2020).

The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has established a full set of specifications for the security
architecture and key management of 5G networks. These standards are aimed to cope with the increasing
security risks that contemporary networks encounter and to make sure that data and devices are protected
from beginning to finish. In this article, we will look at the 3GPP standards for security architecture and
key management, as well as the security challenges and possibilities that come with emerging technologies
like Software Defined Radio (SDR), Network Function Virtualization (NFV), and Multi-access Edge
Computing (MEC) (Cao, 2019).
 Figure 11 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)

Source: (https://3gpp.org/)

Security Architecture and Key Management in 5G Networks

The Service-Based Architecture (SBA), which offers a scalable and adaptable framework for delivering
network services, is the foundation of the 3GPP security architecture for 5G networks. The SBA has security
components like key management, authentication, and encryption that are intended to safeguard network
devices and data. The Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP), which offers security services for data traffic
entering and leaving the network, is one of the main elements of the 5G security architecture. Establishing
secure connections, managing security policies, and defending against threats like DDoS attacks are all
tasks that fall under the purview of the SEPP (Ghosh, 2019).

In addition, the 3GPP standards specify a range of key management protocols for 5G networks, including
the Key Management Protocol (KMP) and the Key Agreement Protocol (KAP). These protocols are
designed to ensure the secure exchange of cryptographic keys between network entities, and to protect
against attacks like key theft and replay attacks.

3GPP 5G Network Architecture

Fig. shows that the bulk of the 3GPP 5G system is composed of the 5G Core network (5GC) and the 5G
Radio Access Network ((R)AN). The bulk of the 5GC is composed of the User Plane Function (UPF), the
Authentication Server Function (AUSF), the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF), the
Session Management Function (SMF), and a few other network functions. After it is connected to the 5GC,
the AUSF will be replaced by the AMF to provide mutual authentication with the UE. In the 5G radio
access network, the 5G base station gNB mainly uses radio waves to connect with the UE. By providing a
few more entities and services, the 5G system increases the network's capabilities over the current
LTE/LTE-A system (Lin, 2021).

Figure 12 Network Architecture of 5G.

To make the design easier to understand, we collectively refer to them as 5G Network Function (NF). (1)
The most important of these new 5G network functions are Unified Data Management (UDM), Policy
Control Function (PCF), Network Exposure Function (NEF), Network Repository Function (NRF),
Structured Data Storage Network Function (SDSF), and Application Functions (AF). The ability of any
network activity to communicate when required is something that must always be kept in mind. (2) The 5G
system may be used to connect a non-3GPP access network, such a WLAN, to the 5G core network. This
also occurs in the 5G radio access network. The UE must connect to the Non-3GPP Interworking Function
(N3IWF) in the 5G network when using a non-3GPP access network to reach the 5G core network.

3GPP 5G Security Architecture

As shown in Figure, the 3GPP committee has designed six security levels. What they are as follows: A user
equipment (UE) requires a set of security features known as network access security (I) in order to
authenticate and access services over a network securely, including 3GPP access and non-3GPP access,
and in particular to protect against attacks on the radio interfaces. Moreover, it includes sending the serving
network's (SN) user equipment with the security context for access security (UE). Network nodes can
securely exchange user plane and signaling data thanks to the group of security traits together referred to
as network domain security (II). A collection of security controls known as user domain security allows
users to access mobile equipment in a secure manner (III). Due to a set of security features known as
application domain security, applications in the user domain and the provider domain may send and receive
messages in a secure manner (IV). Security for domains in Service-Based Architectures (SBA) (V): SBA
security features that encompass network element registration, discovery, and authorization security as well
as service-based interface protection. A security measure's visibility and configurability (VI) qualities
enable the user to determine whether it is active or inactive (Cao, 2020).

Figure 13 Overview of Security Architecture.

Enabling Technologies and Security Threats

Software Defined Radio (SDR), Network Function Virtualization (NFV), and Multi-access Edge
Computing (MEC), among other new 5G network enabling technologies, open up possibilities for new
services and applications but also pose security risks that need to be addressed (Blanco, 2017).

SDR enables the use of software-based radios, which can be reconfigured to support different wireless
standards and frequencies. This flexibility can increase the attack surface of the network, as attackers may
be able to exploit vulnerabilities in the software or firmware of the radio. Attackers can take advantage of
the programmability of an SDN network if they have control of the control plane. Attackers could alter the
network configurations and steal data. With the use of SDN, there are faster detections of threats which

means there are also faster eliminations of threats as they are received in real time. As SDN’s depend on
software to operate, a breach is likely with a faulty

Figure 14 SDRs play a central role in various markets.

Source: (Per Vices, 2021)

NFV allows for the virtualization of network functions, which can improve network agility and reduce
costs. However, this also introduces new security risks, as virtualized functions may be vulnerable to attacks
like VM escape and hypervisor attacks. NFV’s also allow for problems with data leakage between separate
tenants. This can lead to a service interruption and data leakage. The security, adaptability, and effectiveness
of 5G networks with the utilization of NFV can be greatly improved as NFV’S allow effective production
of specialized security services. Another advantage of NFV’S are their quick deployment of innovative
services and it is carried out by seeing each of the network functions as single and independent factors
 Figure 15 Network function virtualization (NFV)

Source: (Daniel Noworatzky, 2021)

MEC allows for the deployment of computing resources at the network edge, which can reduce latency and
improve performance for time-sensitive applications. However, this also increases the attack surface of the
network, as attackers may be able to exploit vulnerabilities in the edge computing resources. Since these
devices oversee housing processes and storage resources in MEC, attackers may use weaknesses in edge
devices to jeopardize the security of data being handled at the edge. Despite, all this MEC may still be used
in 5G networks in order to produce highly secured performance communication services, the network only
needs to be monitored and given the best security precautions in order to perform at its best. Examples of
some applications that use MEC technology in 5G networks include Internet of Things (IoT), and driverless
cars. For these applications to be utilized, an ultra-reliable, low-latency communication (URLLC) would
be needed.
 Figure 16 Multi-access edge computing

Source: (AVSYSTEM, 2021)

Conclusion

The 3GPP standards on security architecture and key management provide a comprehensive framework for
securing 5G networks. However, new enabling technologies like SDR, NFV, and MEC present new security
threats that must be addressed. To ensure the security of 5G networks, it is important to adopt a multi-
layered approach to security, including end-to-end encryption, network segmentation, and continuous
monitoring and analysis of network traffic (Olimid, 2020). It is safe to say that there are quite a number of
security risks associated with eHealth, smart cities, and smart transportation. In this short but concise paper,
we have looked at some of the threats faced with the use of 5G networks and the various 3GPP standards
that can be used to protect them.

5G securities can tackle several issues in developing sectors, including eHealth, smart cities, smart homes,
and intelligent transportation. The long-term viability and safety of 5G networks will depend on the
practical application of security measures and continual adaptability to new problems.
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