Basic Human Values: Theory, Measurement, and Applications

Shalom H. Schwartz

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Schwartz, S. H. (2006). Les valeurs de base de la personne: Théorie, mesures et applications

[Basic human values: Theory, measurement, and applications]. Revue française de
sociologie, 42, 249-288.

This research was supported by Israel Science Foundation Grant No. 921/02.
 1

Abstract

Applying the values construct in the social sciences has suffered from the absence of an

agreed-upon conception of basic values, of the content and structure of relations among these

values, and of reliable methods to measure them. This article presents data from over 70

countries, using two different instruments, to validate a theory intended to fill part of this gap.

It concerns the basic values that individuals in all cultures recognize. The theory identifies 10

motivationally distinct values and specifies the dynamics of conflict and congruence among

them. These dynamics yield a structure of relations among values common to culturally

diverse groups, suggesting a universal organization of human motivations. Individuals and

groups differ in the priorities they assign to these values. The article examines sources of

individual differences in value priorities and behavioral and attitudinal consequences that

follow from holding particular value priorities. In doing so, it considers processes through

which values are influenced and through which they influence action.
 2

Values have been a central concept in the social sciences since their inception. For both

Durkheim (1893, 1897) and Weber (1905), values were crucial for explaining social and

personal organization and change. Values have played an important role not only in

sociology, but in psychology, anthropology, and related disciplines as well. Values are used

to characterize societies and individuals, to trace change over time, and to explain the

motivational bases of attitudes and behavior.

Despite or, perhaps, because of the widespread use of values, many different

conceptions of this construct have emerged (e.g., Boudon, 2001; Inglehart, 1997; Kohn,

1969; Parsons, 1951; Rokeach 1973). Application of the values construct in the social

sciences has suffered, however, from the absence of an agreed-upon conception of basic

values, of the content and structure of relations among these values, and of reliable empirical

methods to measure them (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Rohan, 2000). This article presents a

theory intended to fill the part of this gap concerned with the values of individuals (Schwartz,

1992, 2005a).

The theory concerns the basic values that people in all cultures recognize. It identifies

ten motivationally distinct value orientations and specifies the dynamics of conflict and

congruence among these values. Some values contradict one another (e.g., benevolence and

power) whereas others are compatible (e.g., conformity and security). The "structure" of

values refers to these relations of conflict and congruence among values, not to their relative

importance. If value structures are similar across culturally diverse groups, this would suggest

that there is a universal organization of human motivations. Of course, even if the types of

human motivation that values express and the structure of relations among them are

universal, individuals and groups differ substantially in the relative importance they attribute

to their values. That is, individuals and groups have different value “priorities” or

“hierarchies.”
 3

This article explicates the theory of personal values and describes two different

instruments to measure the values it identifies. Data gathered with these instruments in over

70 countries around the world have validated both the contents and structure of values

postulated by the theory. I will also examine some sources of individual differences in value

priorities and some of the behavioral and attitudinal consequences that follow from holding

particular value priorities. In doing so, I will consider processes through which values are

influenced and through which they influence action.

The Theory of Value Contents and Structure

The Nature of Values

When we think of our values we think of what is important to us in life. Each of us

holds numerous values (e.g., achievement, security, benevolence) with varying degrees of

importance. A particular value may be very important to one person but unimportant to

another. The value theory (Schwartz, 1992, 2005a) adopts a conception of values that

specifies six main features that are implicit in the writings of many theorists:1

(1) Values are beliefs linked inextricably to affect. When values are activated, they become

infused with feeling. People for whom independence is an important value become aroused if

their independence is threatened, despair when they are helpless to protect it, and are happy

when they can enjoy it.

(2) Values refer to desirable goals that motivate action. People for whom social order, justice,

and helpfulness are important values are motivated to pursue these goals.

(3) Values transcend specific actions and situations. Obedience and honesty, for example, are

values that may be relevant at work or in school, in sports, business, and politics, with family,

friends, or strangers. This feature distinguishes values from narrower concepts like norms and

attitudes that usually refer to specific actions, objects, or situations.

1
e.g., Allport, 1961; Feather, 1995; Inglehart, 1997; Kohn, 1969; Kluckhohn, 1951; Morris, 1956;
Rokeach 1973; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987.
 4

(4) Values serve as standards or criteria. Values guide the selection or evaluation of actions,

policies, people, and events. People decide what is good or bad, justified or illegitimate, worth

doing or avoiding, based on possible consequences for their cherished values. But the impact of

values in everyday decisions is rarely conscious. Values enter awareness when the actions or

judgments one is considering have conflicting implications for different values one cherishes.

(5) Values are ordered by importance relative to one another. People’s values form an

ordered system of value priorities that characterize them as individuals. Do they attribute more

importance to achievement or justice, to novelty or tradition? This hierarchical feature also

distinguishes values from norms and attitudes.

(6) The relative importance of multiple values guides action. Any attitude or behavior

typically has implications for more than one value. For example, attending church might express

and promote tradition, conformity, and security values at the expense of hedonism and

stimulation values. The tradeoff among relevant, competing values is what guides attitudes and

behaviors (Schwartz, 1992, 1996). Values contribute to action to the extent that they are relevant

in the context (hence likely to be activated) and important to the actor.

The above are features of all values. What distinguishes one value from another is the

type of goal or motivation that the value expresses. The values theory defines ten broad values

according to the motivation that underlies each of them. Presumably, these values encompass the

range of motivationally distinct values recognized across cultures. According to the theory, these

values are likely to be universal because they are grounded in one or more of three universal

requirements of human existence with which they help to cope. These requirements are:

needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and

survival and welfare needs of groups.

Individuals cannot cope successfully with these requirements of human existence on

their own. Rather, people must articulate appropriate goals to cope with them, communicate
 5

with others about them, and gain cooperation in their pursuit. Values are the socially

desirable concepts used to represent these goals mentally and the vocabulary used to express

them in social interaction. From an evolutionary viewpoint (Buss, 1986), these goals and the

values that express them have crucial survival significance.

I next define each of the ten values in terms of the broad goal it expresses, note its

grounding in universal requirements, and refer to related value concepts. To make the

meaning of each value more concrete and explicit, I list in parentheses the set of value items

included in the first survey instrument to measure each value. Some important value items

(e.g., self-respect) have multiple meanings; they express the motivational goals of more than

one value. These items are listed in brackets.

Self-Direction. Defining goal: independent thought and action--choosing, creating,

exploring. Self-direction derives from organismic needs for control and mastery (e.g.,

Bandura, 1977; Deci, 1975) and interactional requirements of autonomy and independence

(e.g., Kluckhohn, 1951; Kohn & Schooler, 1983; Morris, 1956). (creativity, freedom,

choosing own goals, curious, independent)[self-respect, intelligent, privacy]

Stimulation. Defining goal: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life. Stimulation

values derive from the organismic need for variety and stimulation in order to maintain an

optimal, positive, rather than threatening, level of activation (e.g., Berlyne, 1960). This need

probably relates to the needs underlying self-direction values (cf. Deci, 1975). (a varied life,

an exciting life, daring)

Hedonism. Defining goal: pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself. Hedonism

values derive from organismic needs and the pleasure associated with satisfying them.

Theorists from many disciplines (e.g., Freud, 1933; Morris, 1956; Williams, 1968) mention

hedonism. (pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgent) 2

2
Though it is an important value, happiness is not included, because people achieve it through
 6

Achievement. Defining goal: personal success through demonstrating competence

according to social standards. Competent performance that generates resources is necessary

for individuals to survive and for groups and institutions to reach their objectives.

Achievement values appear in many sources (e.g., Maslow, 1965; Rokeach, 1973). As

defined here, achievement values emphasize demonstrating competence in terms of

prevailing cultural standards, thereby obtaining social approval. (ambitious, successful,

capable, influential) [intelligent, self-respect, social recognition]3

Power. Defining goal: social status and prestige, control or dominance over people

and resources. The functioning of social institutions apparently requires some degree of status

differentiation (Parsons, 1951). A dominance/submission dimension emerges in most

empirical analyses of interpersonal relations both within and across cultures (Lonner, 1980).

To justify this fact of social life and to motivate group members to accept it, groups must

treat power as a value. Power values may also be transformations of individual needs for

dominance and control (Korman, 1974). Value analysts have mentioned power values as well

(e.g., Allport, 1961). (authority, wealth, social power)[preserving my public image, social

recognition]

Both power and achievement values focus on social esteem. However, achievement

values (e.g., ambitious) emphasize the active demonstration of successful performance in

concrete interaction, whereas power values (e.g., authority, wealth) emphasize the attainment

or preservation of a dominant position within the more general social system.

Security. Defining goal: safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and

of self. Security values derive from basic individual and group requirements (cf. Kluckhohn,

1951; Maslow, 1965; Williams, 1968). There are two subtypes of security values. Some serve

attaining whatever outcomes they value (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000).

3
Achievement values differ from McClelland's (1961) achievement motivation. Achievement
motivation concerns meeting internal standards of excellence. It is expressed in self-direction values.
 7

primarily individual interests (e.g., clean), others wider group interests (e.g., national

security). Even the latter, however, express, to a significant degree, the goal of security for

self (or those with whom one identifies). The two subtypes can therefore be unified into a

more encompassing value. (social order, family security, national security, clean,

reciprocation of favors)[healthy, moderate, sense of belonging]

Conformity. Defining goal: restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to

upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms. Conformity values derive from

the requirement that individuals inhibit inclinations that might disrupt and undermine smooth

interaction and group functioning. Virtually all value analyses mention conformity (e.g.,

Freud, 1930; Kohn & Schooler, 1983; Morris, 1956; Parsons, 1951). As I define them,

conformity values emphasize self-restraint in everyday interaction, usually with close others.

(obedient, self-discipline, politeness, honoring parents and elders)[loyal, responsible]

Tradition. Defining goal: respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and

ideas that one's culture or religion provides. Groups everywhere develop practices, symbols,

ideas, and beliefs that represent their shared experience and fate. These become sanctioned as

valued group customs and traditions (Sumner, 1906). They symbolize the group's solidarity,

express its unique worth, and contribute to its survival (Durkheim, 1912/1954; Parsons,

1951). They often take the form of religious rites, beliefs, and norms of behavior. (respect for

tradition, humble, devout, accepting my portion in life)[moderate, spiritual life]

Tradition and conformity values are especially close motivationally; they share the

goal of subordinating the self in favor of socially imposed expectations. They differ primarily

in the objects to which one subordinates the self. Conformity entails subordination to persons

with whom one is in frequent interaction—parents, teachers, bosses. Tradition entails

subordination to more abstract objects—religious and cultural customs and ideas. As a

corollary, conformity values exhort responsiveness to current, possibly changing

 8

expectations. Tradition values demand responsiveness to immutable expectations from the

past.

Benevolence. Defining goal: preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with

whom one is in frequent personal contact (the ‘in-group’). Benevolence values derive from

the basic requirement for smooth group functioning (cf. Kluckhohn, 1951; Williams, 1968) and

from the organismic need for affiliation (cf. Korman, 1974; Maslow, 1965). Most critical are

relations within the family and other primary groups. Benevolence values emphasize voluntary

concern for others’ welfare. (helpful, honest, forgiving, responsible, loyal, true friendship,

mature love)[sense of belonging, meaning in life, a spiritual life].

Benevolence and conformity values both promote cooperative and supportive social

relations. However, benevolence values provide an internalized motivational base for such

behavior. In contrast, conformity values promote cooperation in order to avoid negative

outcomes for self. Both values may motivate the same helpful act, separately or together.

Universalism. Defining goal: understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection

for the welfare of all people and for nature. This contrasts with the in-group focus of

benevolence values. Universalism values derive from survival needs of individuals and

groups. But people do not recognize these needs until they encounter others beyond the

extended primary group and until they become aware of the scarcity of natural resources.

People may then realize that failure to accept others who are different and treat them justly

will lead to life-threatening strife. They may also realize that failure to protect the natural

environment will lead to the destruction of the resources on which life depends. Universalism

combines two subtypes of concern—for the welfare of those in the larger society and world

and for nature (broadminded, social justice, equality, world at peace, world of beauty, unity

with nature, wisdom, protecting the environment)[inner harmony, a spiritual life]

 9

An early version of the value theory (Schwartz, 1992) raised the possibility that

spirituality might constitute another near-universal value. The defining goal of spiritual

values is meaning, coherence, and inner harmony through transcending everyday reality. If

finding ultimate meaning is a basic human need (e.g., Niebuhr, 1935), then spirituality might

be a distinct value found in all societies. The value survey therefore included possible

markers for spirituality, gleaned from widely varied sources. (a spiritual life, meaning in life,

inner harmony, detachment)[unity with nature, accepting my portion in life, devout]. As

noted below, spirituality is not a value that has a consistent broad meaning across cultures.

The Structure of Value Relations

In addition to identifying ten basic values, the theory explicates the structure of dynamic

relations among the values. The value structure derives from the fact that actions in pursuit of

any value have consequences that conflict with some values but are congruent with others. For

example, pursuing achievement values typically conflicts with pursuing benevolence values.

Seeking success for self tends to obstruct actions aimed at enhancing the welfare of others who

need one's help. But pursuing both achievement and power values is usually compatible.

Seeking personal success for oneself tends to strengthen and to be strengthened by actions

aimed at enhancing one's own social position and authority over others. Another example:

Pursuing novelty and change (stimulation values) is likely to undermine preserving time-

honored customs (tradition values). In contrast, pursuing tradition values is congruent with

pursuing conformity values. Both motivate actions of submission to external expectations.

Actions in pursuit of values have practical, psychological, and social consequences.

Practically, choosing an action alternative that promotes one value (e.g., taking drugs in a cultic

rite—stimulation) may literally contravene or violate a competing value (obeying the precepts

of one’s religion—tradition). The person choosing what to do may also sense that such

alternative actions are psychologically dissonant. And others may impose social sanctions by
 10

pointing to practical and logical inconsistencies between an action and other values the person

professes. Of course, people can and do pursue competing values, but not in a single act.

Rather, they do so through different acts, at different times, and in different settings.

The circular structure in Figure 1 portrays the total pattern of relations of conflict and

congruity among values. Tradition and conformity are located in a single wedge because, as

noted above, they share the same broad motivational goal. Conformity is more toward the

center and tradition toward the periphery. This signifies that tradition values conflict more

strongly with the opposing values. The expectations linked to tradition values are more abstract

and absolute than the interaction-based expectations of conformity values. They therefore

demand a stronger, unequivocal rejection of opposing values.

Viewing values as organized along two bipolar dimensions lets us summarize the

oppositions between competing values. As Figure 1 shows, one dimension contrasts ‘openness

to change’ and ‘conservation’ values. This dimension captures the conflict between values that

emphasize independence of thought, action, and feelings and readiness for change (self-

direction, stimulation) and values that emphasize order, self-restriction, preservation of the past,

and resistance to change (security, conformity, tradition). The second dimension contrasts ‘self-

enhancement’ and ‘self-transcendence’ values. This dimension captures the conflict between

values that emphasize concern for the welfare and interests of others (universalism,

benevolence) and values that emphasize pursuit of one's own interests and relative success and

dominance over others (power, achievement). Hedonism shares elements of both openness to

change and self-enhancement.

Although the theory discriminates ten values, it postulates that, at a more basic level,

values form a continuum of related motivations. This continuum gives rise to the circular

structure. To clarify the nature of the continuum, I note the shared motivational emphases of

adjacent values: (a) power and achievement--social superiority and esteem; (b) achievement and
 11

hedonism--self-centered satisfaction; (c) hedonism and stimulation--a desire for affectively

pleasant arousal; (d) stimulation and self-direction--intrinsic interest in novelty and mastery; (e)

self-direction and universalism--reliance upon one's own judgment and comfort with the

diversity of existence; (f) universalism and benevolence--enhancement of others and

transcendence of selfish interests; (g) benevolence and tradition--devotion to one's in-group; (h)

benevolence and conformity--normative behavior that promotes close relationships; (i)

conformity and tradition--subordination of self in favor of socially imposed expectations; (j)

tradition and security--preserving existing social arrangements that give certainty to life; (k)

conformity and security--protection of order and harmony in relations; (l) security and power--

avoiding or overcoming threats by controlling relationships and resources.

In sum, the circular arrangement of the values represents a motivational continuum. The

closer any two values in either direction around the circle, the more similar their underlying

motivations; the more distant, the more antagonistic their motivations. The idea that values

form a motivational continuum has a critical implication: The division of the domain of value

items into ten distinct values is an arbitrary convenience. It is reasonable to partition the domain

of value items into more or less fine-tuned distinct values according to the needs and objectives

of one’s analysis. Conceiving values as organized in a circular motivational structure has an

important implication for the relations of values to other variables. It implies that the whole set

of ten values relates to any other variable in an integrated manner. I return to this implication

below.

Measuring Value Priorities

The Schwartz Value Survey

The first instrument developed to measure values based on the theory is now known

as the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992, 2005a). The SVS presents two lists of

value items. The first contains 30 items that describe potentially desirable end-states in noun
 12

form; the second contains 26 or 27 items that describe potentially desirable ways of acting in

adjective form.4 Each item expresses an aspect of the motivational goal of one value. An

explanatory phrase in parentheses following the item further specifies its meaning. For

example, ‘EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)’ is a universalism item; ‘PLEASURE

(gratification of desires)’ is a hedonism item.

Respondents rate the importance of each value item "as a guiding principle in MY

life" on a 9-point scale labeled 7 (of supreme importance), 6 (very important), 5, 4

(unlabeled), 3 (important), 2, 1 (unlabeled), 0 (not important), -1 (opposed to my values). 5

People view most values as varying from mildly to very important. This nonsymmetrical

scale is stretched at the upper end and condensed at the bottom in order to map the way

people think about values, as revealed in pre-tests. The scale also enables respondents to

report opposition to values that they try to avoid expressing or promoting. This is especially

necessary for cross-cultural studies because people in one culture or subculture may reject

values from others cultures. The SVS has been translated into 47 languages.

The score for the importance of each value is the average rating given to items

designated a priori as markers of that value. The number of items to measure each value

ranges from three (hedonism) to eight (universalism), reflecting the conceptual breadth of the

values. Only value items that have demonstrated near-equivalence of meaning across cultures

in analyses using multi-dimensional scaling (SSA; Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 2005a) and

confirmatory factor analysis (CFA; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004) are included in the indexes.

Across 212 samples (national representative, teacher, student), alpha reliabilities of the 10

values average .68, ranging from .61 for tradition to .75 for universalism (Schwartz, 2005b).

The Portrait Values Questionnaire

4
This followed Rokeach’s (1973) idea that ends values and means values function differently. My
research suggests that this distinction has no substantive importance (Schwartz, 1992). One item in
the 56-item SVS (1988) was dropped and two others added in the revised 57-item version (1994).
5
Schwartz (1994) explains the rational for preferring rating of value importance to ranking.
 13

The Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) is an alternative to the SVS developed in

order to measure the ten basic values in samples of children from age 11, of the elderly, and

of persons not educated in Western schools that emphasize abstract, context-free thinking.

The SVS had not proven suitable to such samples. Equally important, to assess whether the

values theory is valid independent of method required an alternative instrument.6

The PVQ includes short verbal portraits of 40 different people, gender-matched with

the respondent (Schwartz, 2005b; Schwartz, et al., 2001). Each portrait describes a person’s

goals, aspirations, or wishes that point implicitly to the importance of a value. For example:

“Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his

own original way” describes a person for whom self-direction values are important. “It is

important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things” describes

a person who cherishes power values.

For each portrait, respondents answer: “How much like you is this person? Responses

are: very much like me, like me, somewhat like me, a little like me, not like me, and not like

me at all. We infer respondents’ own values from their self-reported similarity to people

described implicitly in terms of particular values. Respondents are asked to compare the

portrait to themselves rather than themselves to the portrait. Comparing other to self directs

attention only to aspects of the other that are portrayed. So, the similarity judgment is also

likely to focus on these value-relevant aspects.

The verbal portraits describe each person in terms of what is important to him or her.

Thus, they capture the person’s values without explicitly identifying values as the topic of

investigation. The PVQ asks about similarity to someone with particular goals and aspirations

(values) rather than similarity to someone with particular traits. The same term can refer both

to a value and a trait (e.g., ambition, wisdom, obedience). However, people who value a goal

6
Both Brocke and Bilsky (2005) and Oishi, Schimmack, Diener, and Suh (1998) have subsequently
developed paired comparison instruments based on the SVS to measure the ten basic values.
 14

do not necessarily exhibit the corresponding trait; nor do those who exhibit a trait necessarily

value the corresponding goal. For example, people may value creativity as a guiding principle

in life but not be creative. And some creative people may attribute little importance to

creativity as a value that guides them.

The number of portraits for each value ranges from three (stimulation, hedonism, and

power) to six (universalism), reflecting the conceptual breadth of the values. The score for the

importance of each value is the average rating given to these items, all of which were

designated a priori as markers of a value. All the value items have demonstrated near-

equivalence of meaning across cultures in analyses using multi-dimensional scaling (SSA;

Schwartz, 2005b). Across 14 samples from 7 countries, alpha reliabilities of the ten values

averaged .68, ranging from .47 for tradition to .80 for achievement (Schwartz 2005b).

The designers of the European Social Survey (ESS: www.europeansocialsurvey.org)

chose the theory and the PVQ as the basis for developing a human values scale to include in

the survey. The ESS version includes 21 items, most from the PVQ and a few revised to

encompass additional ideas in order better to cover the content of the ten different values.

Across 20 representative national samples, Alpha reliabilities of the values with this version

averaged .56, ranging from .36 (tradition) to .70 (achievement). These reliabilities reflect the

fact that only two items measure each value (three for universalism). Equally important,

given the constraint of so few items, the decisive factor in selecting items was to maximize

coverage of the varied conceptual components of each value rather than to increase internal

reliability. As seen below, despite low reliabilities these values predict behavior and attitudes

systematically.

Correcting Response Tendencies

Respondents differ in their use of the response scales both in the SVS and the PVQ.

Some people rate most abstract values very important as guiding principles or most portraits
 15

very similar to themselves. Others use the middle of the response scales, and still others rate

most values unimportant or most portraits dissimilar to themselves. The scale should measure

people’s value priorities, the relative importance of the different values. This is because it is

the tradeoff among relevant values, not the absolute importance of any one value, which

influences behavior and attitudes. Say, two people rate tradition values 4. Despite the same

absolute score, tradition values obviously have higher priority for a person who rates all other

values lower than for one who rates all other values higher. To measure value priorities

accurately, one must correct individual differences in use of the response scales. To correct,

we center each person’s responses on his or her own mean (details in Schwartz, 2005a, 2006).

This converts absolute value scores into scores that indicate the relative importance of each

value to the person, i.e., the person’s value priorities.

Cross-Cultural Evidence for the Theory of Value Content and Structure

As evidence for the theory, I bring the findings of assessments with data using the

SVS and data using the ESS version of the PVQ. The SVS data were gathered between 1988

and 2002 from 233 samples from 68 countries located on every inhabited continent (total N=

64,271). The samples include highly diverse geographic, cultural, linguistic, religious, age,

gender, and occupational groups. Samples include those that represent a nation or a region in

it (16), grade k-12 school teachers (74), undergraduate students from a variety of fields (111),

adolescents (10), and adult convenience samples (22).

For each sample, I prepared a matrix of Pearson correlations between the 56 or 57

value items. I analyzed this matrix with Similarity Structure Analysis (SSA) (Borg & Shye,

1995; Guttman, 1968). This nonmetric multi-dimensional scaling technique maps items as

points in a multidimensional space such that the distances between the points reflect the

interrelations among the items. The greater the conceptual similarity between any two items,

the more related they should be empirically and hence the closer their locations should be in
 16

the multidimensional space. The SSA provides 2-dimensional spatial maps of relations among

values, like that shown in Figure 2, but without partition lines. The a priori assignment of items

to values guides the partitioning of the maps.

If the motivational content of values is the most powerful principle that organizes

people's value priorities, the relations among value items in the two-dimensional space should

reflect this content. Specifically, it should be possible to partition the space into distinct

regions containing the items that represent each of the 10 values. If the theory accurately

describes the structure of value relations, then the observed regions should form a circular

pattern similar to the theoretical structure of Figure 1. Because values form a motivational

continuum, the decisions about exact boundaries are arbitrary. Items near the boundaries of

adjacent values inevitably overlap somewhat in meaning. Consequently, in analyses in many

samples, value items from adjacent types of values may intermix rather than emerge in clearly

distinct regions. Rules for partitioning are described in Schwartz (1992, 2005a).

Figure 2 presents an example of SSA results for 57 value items from the aggregate

sample across all nations. Marker values are in bold. The locations of specific items in

regions of basic values in this figure completely support both the content of each value and

the circular structure of relations among them. Analyses in single samples typically show at

least small deviations such as intermixing of items from conceptually adjacent values and

misplacement of a few value items to nearby regions. In separate analyses in 233 samples,

however, every value formed either a distinctive region or an intermixed region with a

conceptually adjacent value in at least 96% of samples. Spirituality items formed a distinct

region in only 38% of samples. The proposed spirituality items emerged most frequently in

the tradition, benevolence, universalism, and security value regions, respectively.

These data show that people in most cultures respond to ten types of values as distinct

and that the broader value orientations captured by adjacent values are discriminated nearly
 17

universally. Findings with the 21 item PVQ used in the ESS lead to the same conclusion. An

SSA based on the responses of 35,161 respondents from 20 countries yields a spatial array of

items that can be partitioned into 10 distinct regions, each encompassing the a priori value

markers. Moreover, the order of the values regions follows the theorized circular structure.

Separate analyses in each of the 20 countries that completed the values scale yield structures

very similar to Figure 2. In 15 countries, the ten values form ten distinct regions. In the

remaining five countries, eight values form distinct regions and the items of two conceptually

adjacent values intermix.

The SSA analyses provide graphic evidence to support the value theory across

cultures, measuring values with two quite different methods. Confirmatory factor analyses

provide more formal statistical tests of the content and structure of values. Schwartz and

Boehnke (2004) demonstrated configural invariance for ten latent value factors across 23

countries, using the SVS. Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz (2005) had to unify pairs of

values that are motivationally close into seven latent factors to obtain configural and metric

invariance across the 20 ESS countries. It was probably necessary to unify values because the

21-item ESS instrument measures each value with so few items.

Another question addressed in this research concerns whether the ten basic values

identified by the theory are comprehensive. Do they leave out any broad values to which

individuals across societies attribute at least moderate importance? It is difficult definitively

to reject the possibility that some universal values are missing. But the findings make this

unlikely. Collaborators in many different countries added value items they thought might be

missing in the SVS. When included in the SSAs, these items typically emerged in regions

appropriate to their meanings (e.g., national identity in security; chastity in conformity).

Thus, they identified no new, potentially universal values.

Were any basic types of values missing, we would expect empty regions in the SSA
 18

maps. To test whether the analyses were sufficiently sensitive to identify potentially missing

values, I ran SSAs on the SVS data after intentionally excluding values. Only after dropping

all the items from two adjacent values did empty regions appear. The absence of empty

regions in the full SSAs therefore implies that no broad value orientations are missing. Future

theorizing may suggest additional, narrow values. It is likely, however, that the values in the

theory cover the full range of broad, near-universal values.7

The Pan-Cultural Baseline of Value Priorities8

Individuals differ substantially in the importance they attribute to the ten values. At the

societal level, however, consensus regarding the hierarchical order of the values is

surprisingly high. Across representative samples, using different instruments, the importance

ranks for the ten values are quite similar. Benevolence, universalism, and self-direction

values are most important. Power and stimulation values are least important. Tradition

values, measured with the SVS and full PVQ also have low importance, but the two items

used in the 21-item PVQ of the ESS yield moderate importance ratings. Security values are

4th, conformity values 5th or 6th, hedonism 7th, and achievement 6th to 8th. This hierarchy

provides a baseline to which to compare the priorities in any sample. Such comparison is

critical for identifying which, if any, of the value priorities in a sample are distinctively high

or low. A sample may rank benevolence highest, for example, but compared with other

samples the importance rating of this value may still be relatively low.

Why is there a pan-cultural consensus on value priorities? And why this particular

hierarchy of values? The pan-cultural consensus likely derives from the adaptive functions of

values in maintaining societies and from shared human nature (e.g., Campbell, 1975; Parsons,

7
Wach and Hammer (2003) added sets of items intended to measure ‘verité rationnelle’ and ‘verité
non rationnelle’ to the PVQ in a French national sample. The former items emerged with self-
direction whose goal they express. The latter formed a region between power and security. As
formulated, however, those items measured beliefs more than values.
8
Schwartz & Bardi (2001) provide a detailed examination of this topic on which this section draws.
 19

1951; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). Socializers and social control agents will discourage values

that clash with the smooth functioning of significant groups or the larger society. Values that

clash with human nature are unlikely to be important.

The basic social function of values is to motivate and control the behavior of group

members (Parsons, 1951). Two mechanisms are critical. First, values serve as internalized

guides for individuals; they relieve the group of the necessity for constant social control.

Second, people invoke values to define particular behaviors as socially appropriate, to justify

their demands on others, and to elicit desired behaviors. Socializers seek, consciously or not,

to instill values that promote group survival and prosperity. To explain the pan-cultural value

hierarchy, we must explain why particular values are viewed as more or less desirable across

societies. 9

Three demands of human nature and requirements of societal functioning are especially

relevant for explaining the observed pan-cultural value hierarchy. (1) Most important is

promoting and preserving cooperative and supportive relations among members of primary

groups. The most critical focus of value transmission is to develop commitment to positive

relations, identification with the group, and loyalty to its members. (2) Second, individuals

must be motivated to invest the time, the physical and the intellectual effort needed to

perform productive work, to solve problems that arise during task performance, and to

generate new ideas and technical solutions. (3) Third, it is socially functional to legitimize

gratification of self-oriented needs and desires to the extent this does not undermine group

goals. Rejection of all such gratification would frustrate individuals, leading them to withhold

their energies from the group and its tasks.

9
This does not mean that the pan-cultural value hierarchy reflects individual tendencies to respond in a
socially desirable manner to value surveys. The personality variable of social desirability does not
correlate consistently with the importance individuals attribute to the values that are high in the pan-
cultural hierarchy (Schwartz, et al., 1997).
 20

The high importance of benevolence values (1st) derives from the centrality of positive,

cooperative social relations in the family, the main setting for initial and continuing value

acquisition. Benevolence values provide the internalized motivational base for such relations.

They are reinforced and modeled early and repeatedly.

Universalism values (2nd) also contribute to positive social relations. They are

functionally important primarily when group members must relate to those with whom they

do not readily identify, in schools, work-places, and so on. They may even threaten in-group

solidarity during times of intergroup conflict. Therefore, universalism values are less

important than benevolence values.

Security (4th) and conformity (5th) values also promote harmonious social relations. They

do this by helping to avoid conflict and violations of group norms. But these values are

usually acquired in response to demands and sanctions to avoid risks, control forbidden

impulses, and restrict the self. This reduces their importance because it conflicts with

gratifying self-oriented needs and desires. Moreover, the emphasis of these values on

maintaining the status quo conflicts with innovation in finding solutions to group tasks.

Acting on tradition values (overall 8th) can also contribute to group solidarity and thus to

smooth group functioning and survival. But tradition values find little expression in the

behavior that interaction partners have a vital interest in controlling. They largely concern

commitment to abstract beliefs and symbols.

Pursuing power values (10th) may harm or exploit others and damage social relations.

Still, they have some importance because power values help to motivate individuals to work

for group interests. They also justify the hierarchical social arrangements in all societies.

Self-direction (3rd) values serve the second and third basic functions of values without

undermining the first. They foster creativity, motivate innovation, and promote coping with

challenges the group may face in times of crisis. Behavior based on these values is
 21

intrinsically motivated. It satisfies individual needs without harming others. Hence, it rarely

threatens positive social relations.

The moderate importance of achievement values (7th) may reflect a compromise among

the bases of value importance. On the positive side, these values motivate individuals to

invest in group tasks. They also legitimize self-enhancing behavior, so long as it contributes

to group welfare. On the negative side, these values foster efforts to attain social approval

that may disrupt harmonious social relations and interfere with group goal attainment.

The importance of hedonism (6th) and stimulation (9th) values derives from the

requirement to legitimize inborn needs to attain pleasure and arousal. These values are

probably more important than power values because, unlike power values, their pursuit does

not necessarily threaten positive social relations.10

Roots of the Dynamic Structure of Value Relations

Having shown that the structure of relations among values may be universal, we now

look more closely at the possible roots of this structure. Thus far, we identified congruence

and conflict among the values that are implicated simultaneously in decisions as one dynamic

principle that organizes the structure of values. Close examination of the structure suggests

other dynamic principles (see Figure 3).11

A second principle is the interests that value attainment serves. Values in the top

panel of Figure 3 (power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction) primarily

regulate how one expresses personal interests and characteristics. Values in the bottom panel

(benevolence, universalism, tradition, conformity, security) primarily regulate how one

relates socially to others and affects their interests. Figure 1 shows that security and

10
Schwartz and Bardi (2001) use these same principles to explain the major deviation from the pan-
cultural hierarchy found in sub-Saharan African samples where conformity is most important.
11
The value theory specifies the order of the 10 values. Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the same order, but
each orients the circle differently. Rotation of the multi-dimensional representation of values does not
affect the meaning of the structure.
 22

universalism values are boundary values. They primarily concern others’ interests, but their

goals also regulate pursuit of own interests.

Relations of values to anxiety are a third organizing principle. Pursuit of values on the

left in Figure 3 serves to cope with anxiety due to uncertainty in the social and physical

world. People seek to avoid conflict (conformity) and to maintain the current order (tradition,

security) or actively to control threat (power). Values on the right (hedonism, stimulation,

self-direction, universalism, benevolence) express anxiety-free motivations. Achievement

values do both: Meeting social standards successfully may control anxiety and it may affirm

one’s sense of competence.

The anxiety aspect of the value structure relates to the two basic self-regulation

systems that Higgins (1997) has proposed. One system regulates avoidance of punishment

and focuses people on the goal of preventing loss. Security needs, obligations, and the threat

of loss trigger this system. Values on the left in Figure 3, most centrally security and

conformity, motivate this type of self-regulation. They guide attention and action to avoid or

overcome actual or potential danger. Higgins’ second system regulates pursuit of rewards and

focuses people on the goal of promoting gain. Nurturance needs, ideals, and opportunities to

gain trigger this system. Values on the right in Figure 3, most centrally self-direction,

motivate this type of self-regulation. They guide attention and action to intrinsically

rewarding social, intellectual, and emotional opportunities.

The structure of relations among the ten values may also have a biogenetic basis. The

ten values map exactly onto four innate drives proposed by Lawrence and Nohria (2002.

Presumably, these drives emerged as a set of decision guides in the course of evolution and

are central to human nature. The four drives are: (1) to acquire—to seek, take, control, and

hold material and status resources and pleasurable experiences; (2) to bond—to form social

relationships and develop mutually caring commitments; (3) to learn—to know, comprehend,
 23

believe, appreciate, and understand their environment and themselves via curiosity; (4) to

defend—to defend themselves and their valued accomplishments whenever they perceive

them to be endangered. The drives to acquire and to bond often come into conflict when

taking decisions about an action, as do the drives to learn and to defend.

Each value appears to express one drive or a blend of two. Values transform drives

into desirable goals that are available to awareness and that can therefore be used in

conscious planning and decision-making. The matches are as follows: benevolence—to bond;

universalism—to bond + to learn; self-direction—to learn; stimulation—to learn (+ to acquire

pleasurable experience); hedonism—(to learn) + to acquire pleasurable experience;

achievement—to acquire; power—to acquire + to defend; security—to defend; conformity

and tradition—to defend + to bond. This mapping of values onto drives goes around the value

circle (Figure 1). The oppositions between values parallel the conflicts between drives that

Lawrence and Nohria (2002) identify. The matching of values to drives suggests that an

innate basis may help account for the near-universality of the value structure.

Sources of Individual Differences in Basic Values

Processes Linking Background Variables to Value Priorities

People’s life circumstances provide opportunities to pursue or express some values

more easily than others. For example, wealthy persons can pursue power values more easily,

and people who work in the free professions can express self-direction values more easily.

Life circumstances also impose constraints against pursuing or expressing values. Having

dependent children constrains parents to limit their pursuit of stimulation values. And people

with strongly ethnocentric peers find it hard to express universalism values. In other words,

life circumstances make the pursuit or expression of different values more or less rewarding

or costly.
 24

Typically, people adapt their values to their life circumstances. They upgrade the

importance they attribute to values they can readily attain and downgrade the importance of

values whose pursuit is blocked (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). Thus, people in jobs that afford

freedom of choice increase the importance of self-direction values at the expense of

conformity values (Kohn & Schooler, 1983). Upgrading attainable values and downgrading

thwarted values applies to most, but not to all values. The reverse occurs with values that

concern material well-being and security. When such values are blocked, their importance

increases; when they are attained easily, their importance drops. Thus, people who suffer

economic hardship and social upheaval attribute more importance to power and security

values than those who live in relative comfort and safety (Inglehart, 1997).

People’s age, education, gender, income and other characteristics affect their

socialization and learning experiences, the social roles they play, the expectations and

sanctions they encounter, and the abilities they develop. Thus, differences in background

characteristics largely determine the differences in life circumstances to which people are

exposed, which, in turn, affect their value priorities. This section examines key socio-

demographic variables as crucial antecedents of individual differences in value priorities.

Age and Life Course

As people grow older, they tend to become more embedded in social networks, more

committed to habitual patterns, and less exposed to arousing and exciting changes and

challenges (Glen, 1974). This implies that conservation values (tradition, conformity,

security) should increase with age and openness to change values (self-direction, stimulation,

hedonism) decrease. Once people enter families of procreation and attain stable positions in

the occupational world, they tend to become less preoccupied with their own strivings and

more concerned with the welfare of others (Veroff, Reuman, & Feld, 1984). This implies that
 25

self-transcendence values (benevolence, universalism) increase with age and self-

enhancement values (power, achievement) decrease.12

The first column of Table 1 reports correlations of age with values across the 20 ESS

countries. The number of countries in which the correlation was in the same direction as the

overall correlation appears in parentheses. All the observed correlations confirm the expected

associations and support the probable processes of influence. All associations are monotonic.

Gender

Various theories of gender difference lead researchers to postulate that men

emphasize agentic-instrumental values like power and achievement, while females emphasize

expressive-communal values like benevolence and universalism (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005).

Most theorists expect gender differences to be small. Column 2 of Table 1 supports

expectations regarding both the nature and strength of value relations to gender in the ESS

data. Analyses with the SVS and PVQ instruments across 68 countries yield similar results.

Gender differences for eight values are consistent, statistically significant, and small;

differences for conformity and tradition values are inconsistent. Both evolutionary and social

role theories help to explain how adaptations to prehistoric and/or current life circumstances

might produce the observed gender differences (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005).

Education

Educational experiences presumably promote the intellectual openness, flexibility,

and breadth of perspective essential for self-direction values (Kohn & Schooler 1983). These

same experiences increase the openness to non-routine ideas and activity central to

stimulation values. In contrast, these experiences challenge unquestioning acceptance of

prevailing norms, expectations, and traditions, thereby undermining conformity and tradition

values. The increasing competencies to cope with life that people acquire through education

12
For more detail, see Schwartz (2005b).
 26

may also reduce the importance of security values. Column 3 of Table 1 reveals the expected

positive correlations of years of formal education with self-direction and stimulation values

and negative correlations with conformity, tradition, and security values.

In addition, education correlates positively with achievement values. The constant

grading and comparing of performance in schools, emphasizing meeting external standards,

could account for this. The associations of education with values are largely linear, with the

exception of universalism values. Universalism values begin to rise only in the last years of

secondary school. They are substantially higher among those who attend university. This may

reflect both the broadening of horizons that university education provides and a tendency for

those who give high priority to universalism values to seek higher education.

Income

Affluence creates opportunities to engage in discretionary activities and to choose

one’s life style freely. It reduces security threats and the need to restrict one’s impulses and to

maintain supportive, traditional ties. Higher income should therefore promote valuing of

stimulation, self-direction, hedonism, and achievement values and render security,

conformity, and tradition values less important. The correlations between total household

income (12 categories) and value priorities, in column 4 of Table 1, support these

expectations. Income contributed to higher stimulation, self-direction, achievement, and

power values, primarily in the upper third of the income distribution.

The Pattern of Value Relations with Other Variables: An Integrated System

Most research on the antecedents or consequences of values has examined empirical

relations between a few target values and a particular background variable, attitude, or

behavior (e.g., social class and obedience—Alwin, 1984; equality and civil rights--Rokeach,

1973). The value theory enables us to treat peoples’ value systems as coherent structures. It

allows us to relate the full set of values to other variables in an organized, integrated manner.
 27

The critical idea is the circular motivational structure of values. This structure has two

implications for value relations: (1) Values that are adjacent in the structure should have

similar associations with other variables. (2) Associations of values with other variables

should decrease monotonically in both directions around the circle from the most positively to

the most negatively associated value. That is, the order of associations for the whole set of ten

values follows a predictable pattern. If a background variable, trait, attitude, or behavior

correlates most positively with one value and most negatively with another, the expected

pattern of associations with all other values follows from the circular value structure.

The data in Table 2 illustrate this pattern. Table 2 lists the values in an order

corresponding to their order around the circular structure of value relations (cf. Figure 1). The

correlations in Table 2 generally exhibit both features of value relations. Adjacent values

have largely similar associations with the background variables and the associations of the

values largely decrease monotonically in both directions around the circle from the most

positively to the most negatively associated value.

The integrated structure of values makes it easier to theorize about relations of value

priorities to other variables. Once theory identifies the values likely to relate most and least

positively to a variable, the circular motivational structure then implies a specific pattern of

positive, negative, and zero associations for the remaining values. Next, one develops

theoretical explanations for why or why not to expect these implied associations. The

integrated structure serves as a template that reveals “deviations” from the expected pattern.

The association of education with achievement values is one such deviation. Deviations are

especially interesting because they direct us to search for special conditions that enhance or

weaken relations of a variable with values (Schwartz, 1996).13

13
For example, Sagiv and Schwartz (1995) show how unique aspects of relations among Jews,
Muslims, and Christians in Israel modify associations of value priorities with readiness for contact
with out-groups.
 28

Predicting Behavior with Basic Values

Do people’s value priorities influence their behavior in systematic, predictable ways? I

first examine processes through which values can influence behavior. Then I describe

exemplary studies of value-behavior relations.

Linking Processes

Value activation. Values affect behavior only if they are activated (Verplanken &

Holland, 2002). Activation may or may not entail conscious thought about a value. Much

information-processing occurs outside of awareness. The more accessible a value, i.e., the

more easily it comes to mind, the more likely it will be activated. Because more important

values are more accessible (Bardi, 2000), they relate more to behavior.

Value-relevant aspects of situations activate values. A job offer may activate

achievement values and a car accident may activate security values. Even coincidental

increases in the accessibility of a value, say by coming across value-relevant words in a

puzzle, increase chances it will be activated. If it is a high-priority value, it may then lead to

behavior. Focusing attention on the self may also increase value-behavior relations because it

activates values that are central to the self-concept, values of high importance. Verplanken

and Holland (2002) demonstrated these effects in experiments where they manipulated the

accessibility of values in one study and self-focus in another. Activation experiments are

particularly important because they show that activating values causes behavior. The studies

of value-behavior relations discussed below cannot demonstrate causality. Although the

reasoning is causal, they are all correlational.

Values as a source of motivation. People’s values, like their needs, induce valences on

possible actions (Feather, 1995). That is, actions become more attractive, more valued

subjectively, to the extent that they promote attainment of valued goals. People who value

stimulation would likely be attracted to a challenging job offer whereas those who value
 29

security might find the same offer threatening and unattractive. High-priority values are

central to the self-concept. Sensing an opportunity to attain them sets off an automatic,

positive, affective response to actions that will serve them. Sensing a threat to value

attainment sets off a negative affective response.

Values may influence the attractiveness of actions even without conscious weighing

of alternatives and their consequences. We rarely realize the influence of our values when we

choose which program to watch on TV, for example. Conscious thought may later modify the

attractiveness of actions by bringing their many consequences to mind (e.g., impacts of taking

a new job on the family). Basic values also affect action through the specific attitudes they

underlie. Even when values motivate people, they are unlikely to act unless they believe they

have the capacity to carry out the action and that it is likely to produce the desired outcomes

(Feather, 1995).

Influence of values on attention, perception, and interpretation in situations. High

priority values are chronic goals that guide people to seek out and attend to value-relevant

aspects of a situation (Schwartz, Sagiv, & Boehnke, 2000). One woman may attend to the

opportunities a job offers for self-direction, another to the constraints it imposes on her social

life. Each defines the situation in light of her own important values. Each interpretation

suggests that a different line of action is desirable. Value priorities also influence the weight

people give to each value issue. Even if both women recognize the same value-relevant

opportunities and constraints, the weight they give them will differ depending on their value

priorities.

Influence of values on the planning of action. More important goals induce a stronger

motivation to plan thoroughly (Gollwitzer, 1996). The higher the priority given to a value, the

more likely people will form action plans that can lead to its expression in behavior. Planning

focuses people on the pros of desired actions rather than the cons. It enhances their belief in
 30

their ability to reach the valued goal and increases persistence in the face of obstacles and

distractions. By promoting planning, value importance increases value-consistent behavior.

Exemplary Studies

As a first example of value-behavior relations, consider three studies of everyday

behavior. Bardi and Schwartz (2003) generated ten sets of 6-10 behaviors that primarily

express one of the ten basic values. Participants completed the SVS. Later, they rated how

frequently they had performed each behavior in the past year, relative to their opportunities to

perform it. In studies 2 and 3, intimate partners or close peers rated participants’ behavior too.

The behavior indexes were the average frequency ratings of the behavior items that express

each value.

Column 2 and 3 of Table 2 list the correlations between each value and its relevant

behaviors. All correlations with self-reported behavior are significant and most are

substantial. With other-reported behavior, all but the security correlation are significant. Self-

reports probably exaggerate value-behavior relations, other reports probably underestimate

them.

Some values correlate more strongly with their relevant behaviors than others do.

Why? In this study, normative group pressure was greatest for security, conformity,

benevolence, and achievement behaviors. Yielding to normative pressure, even when a

behavior opposes one’s own values, weakened value-behavior relations. Second, external

pressure is weaker for behaviors that express values of little importance to the group,

permitting own values to have more influence. Tradition and stimulation values had

especially low mean importance in these groups. Hence, priorities for these values showed

stronger value-behavior correlations.

A study of cooperative behavior in the laboratory (Schwartz, 1996) illustrates the

crucial idea of trade-offs between competing values in guiding behavioral choice. Typically,
 31

the consequences of a behavior promote the expression or attainment of one set of values at

the expense of the opposing values in the circle. To predict a behavior successfully, we must

consider the importance of the values the behavior will harm as well as those it will promote.

The probability of a behavior depends on the relative priority a person gives to the relevant,

competing values.

Participants who completed the SVS were paired with another student to play a

game. They were to choose one of three alternatives for allocating money between self and a

member of their group whose identity was not revealed. Each would receive the amount of

money they allocated to self plus the amount their partner allocated to them. The cooperative

choice entailed taking the equivalent of 1є for self and giving 0.8є to the other. Compared to

the other choices, this meant sacrificing a little of what one could gain (0.2є) and giving the

maximum to the other. The other two choices were both not cooperative, maximizing either

one's absolute gain (individualism) or relative gain (competing).

Analyses of the consequences of cooperative and noncooperative behavior for the

goals of the ten values suggested that benevolence and power values, opposed in the circle,

are most relevant. Cooperation is more a matter of conventional decency and thoughtfulness

in this setting than of basic commitment to social justice. Hence, benevolence values should

relate to cooperation most strongly. Power values should relate most strongly to

noncooperation. They emphasize competitive advantage and legitimize maximizing own

gain even at the expense of others. The correlations in column 3 of Table 2 confirm the

hypothesis. Benevolence correlates most positively, power most negatively. Moreover, as

expected, based on the motivational structure of value relations, the order of the correlations

follows the order around the value circle from benevolence to power.

Analyzing the data in another way demonstrates clearly that trade-offs among

competing values guided behavior. Splitting the sample at the median on benevolence and on
 32

power values and crossing these sub-samples yielded four groups. In the group that valued

benevolence highly and gave low importance to power values, 87% cooperated. This was

twice the rate in any other group (35%-43%). Thus, to elicit a high level of cooperation

required both high priority for values that promote cooperation (benevolence) and low

priority for values that oppose it (power).

Voting. The next example of how value systems relate, as integrated wholes, to

behavior takes us outside the laboratory. There were two main coalitions in the Italian

elections of 2001, center-right and center-left. Both coalitions championed liberal democracy.

But there were also policy differences. To the extent that citizens recognize these differences,

the values whose attainment is most affected by them should influence their voting patterns.

The center-right emphasized entrepreneurship and the market economy, security, and

family and national values. The intended consequences of such a policy are compatible with

power, security, and achievement values. But they may harm the opposing values in the value

circle, universalism and, perhaps, benevolence. The latter values call for promoting the

welfare of others even at cost to the self. And universalism values express concern for the

weak, those most likely to suffer from market-driven policies. In contrast, the center-left

advocated social welfare, social justice, equality, and tolerance even of groups that might

disturb the conventional social order. The intended consequences of such a policy are

compatible with universalism and benevolence values. They conflict, however, with pursuing

individual power and achievement values and with security values that emphasize preserving

the social order.

Thus, political choice in these elections consisted of a trade-off between power,

security, and achievement values on the right and universalism and benevolence values on the

left. On that basis, I hypothesized: Supporting the center-right vs. center-left correlates most

positively with the priority given to power and security values and most negatively with the
 33

priority given to universalism values. Correlations with the priority of achievement values

should also be positive, and those with benevolence values negative. Stated as an integrated

hypothesis for the whole value circle: Correlations should decline from most positive for

power and security values to most negative for universalism values in both directions around

the circle (cf. Figure 1).

Adults from the Rome region completed the PVQ and reported the coalition they had

voted for in the 2001 election. We coded vote as (0) for center-left and (1) for center-right.

We computed point-biserial correlations of voting with the 10 values, controlling gender, age,

income, and education. Column 4 of Table 2 presents correlations between value priorities

and voting for the center-right.

As hypothesized, the correlation of universalism was the most negative, and the

correlation of benevolence was negative too. The positive correlations with security, power,

and achievement were also significant. Figure 4 portrays the pattern of correlations, showing

the expected sinusoidal curve that reflects the motivational continuum of values. To put the

strength of these correlations in perspective, note that correlations of individuals’ income,

occupation, education, gender, marital status, and age with vote were all less than .08.

Moreover, values explained almost three times as much variance in voting as did the Big 5

personality traits (Caprara, et al., 2005).

For a final illustration of the effects of basic values on behavior, we turn to political

activism. Data are from 1244 French citizens in the 2003 national representative sample of

the ESS. The 21-item PVQ measured value priorities. Political activism was measured as the

number of politically relevant, legal acts out of nine that respondents reported performing in

the past year (e.g., contacting a politician, participating in a public demonstration, boycotting

a product). Because universalism values promote social justice and environmental

preservation—goals of much activism—they should correlate most strongly with activism.

 34

Because activism is risky and oriented to change, security and conformity should show the

most negative correlations. Both reasoning about the motivations underlying activism and the

order of the integrated motivational circle of values suggested weaker positive correlations

for benevolence and self-direction values and weaker negative correlations for power and

tradition values.

Column 5 of Table 2 presents both the zero-order correlations of value priorities with

political activism and the correlations controlling five socio-demographic variables. These

correlations fully confirm expectations. Figure 4 portrays the pattern of correlations,

revealing the expected sinusoidal curve that reflects the motivational continuum of values

with one exception. Stimulation values show a higher than expected positive correlation. This

deviation from the curve points to the fact that political activism is motivated not only by

ideological considerations such as those that express universalism or security values. The

simple pursuit of excitement also plays a role.14

To conclude this section, consider the effects of basic values on an attitude of major

concern in Europe today, opposition to immigration. Three items in the ESS measured

opposition to accepting ‘other’ immigrants—those of a different race/ethnic group, from

poorer European, and poorer non-European countries. Here I focus on the sample of 1125

native born residents of France.15

Opposition to ‘other’ immigrants in the current French atmosphere likely reflects

concern with preserving the status quo—protecting personal and social security, preserving

secular and Christian French traditions, and maintaining widespread norms. Those for whom

security, tradition, and conformity values are especially important should more strongly

oppose immigration. In contrast those who value openness to change should feel less

14
Schwartz (2006) reports analyses of individual and country differences in political activism in all 20
ESS countries.
15
Schwartz (2006) reports analyses of individual and country differences in opposition to immigration
in 15 West European countries.
 35

threatened and might welcome enrichment of their society. Thus, people for whom self-

direction, stimulation, and hedonism values are especially important should oppose

immigration less. Moreover, those who cherish universalism values, with their goal of

acceptance, appreciation, and concern for the welfare even of those who are different, should

oppose immigration least.

The observed pattern of correlations fully supports these hypotheses. Security values

correlate most positively with opposition (.39) and universalism values correlated most

negatively (-.28). The other predicted correlations are also significant (all >/.15/, p<.001). In

order to provide a fuller picture of the antecedents of opposition to accepting ‘other’

immigrants in France, I regressed opposition on the value priorities and on the following

background variables: age, gender, years of education completed, marital status, having ever

had children at home, having been unemployed for 3 months or more, subjective assessment

of adequacy of household income, degree of religiosity. Figure 5 presents results of the

regression.

Universalism values predicted opposition most strongly (negative), followed by

security values (positive). Thus, the tradeoff between giving high priority to promoting the

welfare of all others (universalism values) and avoiding personal, national, and interpersonal

threat (security values) has the greatest impact on readiness to accept ‘other’ immigrants.

Older people, those who are married, and women oppose immigration more, perhaps because

they feel more threatened by perceived social disruption. Greater education and religiosity

predict less opposition, whereas tradition values predict more opposition. Since religiosity is

in the regression, the finding for tradition values signifies opposition based on protecting non-

religious customs and ways of doing things.

Conclusion
 The values theory has identified ten basic, motivationally distinct values that people

in virtually all cultures implicitly recognize. The validity of this claim does not depend on the

way we measure values. The ten basic values emerge whether people report explicitly on

their values (SVS) or whether we infer people’s values indirectly from their judgments of

how much various other people are like them (PVQ). The values theory applies in

populations exposed to westernized schooling but also in populations with little or no

education. We still do not know whether the theory applies in more isolated tribal groups

with minimal exposure to urbanization, mass media, and the market economy.

Especially striking is the emergence of the same circular structure of relations among

values across countries and measurement instruments. People everywhere experience conflict

between pursuing openness to change values or conservation values. They also experience

conflict between pursuing self-transcendence or self-enhancement values. Conflicts between

specific values (e.g., power vs. universalism, tradition vs. hedonism) are also near-universal. I

suggested several dynamic processes that may account for the observed circular structure.

These processes may point the way toward a unifying theory of human motivation.

An astonishing finding of the cross-cultural research is the high level of consensus

regarding the relative importance of the ten values across societies. In the vast majority of

nations studied, benevolence, universalism, and self-direction values appear at the top of the

hierarchy and power, tradition, and stimulation values appear at the bottom. This implies that

the aspects of human nature and of social functioning that shape individual value priorities

are widely shared across cultures. I proposed an initial, functionalist explanation of this

phenomenon. It deserves much more analysis in depth.

Individual value priorities arise out of adaptation to life experiences. Adaptation may

take the form of upgrading attainable values and downgrading thwarted values. But the

reverse occurs with values that concern material well-being and security. Socio-demographic
 1

characteristics contribute to explaining individual differences in value priorities because they

represent different sets of life experiences. In keeping with the structure of values identified

by the theory, antecedents affect priorities in a systematic manner. They tend to enhance the

importance of values that are adjacent in the value circle (e.g., conformity and security) but to

undermine the importance of the competing values (e.g., self-direction and stimulation). I

have drawn only the simplest picture of the separate, linear effects of a few background

variables. Future research must address possible interactions among background variables.

Values influence most if not all motivated behavior. The values theory provides a

framework for relating the system of ten values to behavior that enriches analysis, prediction,

and explanation of value-behavior relations. It makes clear that behavior entails a trade-off

between competing values. Almost any behavior has positive implications for expressing,

upholding, or attaining some values, but negative implications for the values across the

structural circle in opposing positions. People tend to behave in ways that balance their

opposing values. They choose alternatives that promote higher as against lower priority

values. As a result, the order of positive and negative associations between any specific

behavior and the ten values tends to follow the order of the value circle.

This chapter several examples of how value priorities relate to behavior and attitudes.

Researchers in more than 30 countries have used the system of ten basic values to understand

and sometimes to predict other individual differences. Among the behaviors studied are use

of alcohol, condoms and drugs, delinquency, shoplifting, competition, hunting, various

environmental and consumer behaviors, moral, religious and sexual behavior, autocratic,

independent and dependent behavior, choice of university major, occupation and medical

specialty, participation in sports, social contact with out-groups, and numerous voting studies.

Among attitudinal variables studied are job satisfaction, organizational commitment,

trust in institutions, attitudes toward ethical dilemmas, toward the environment, sexism,
 2

religiosity, and identification with one’s nation or group. Among personality variables

studied are social desirability, social dominance, authoritarianism, interpersonal problems,

subjective well-being, worries, and the Big 5 personality traits. This proliferation of behavior,

attitude, and personality studies testifies to the fruitfulness of the values theory and its

promise for future research.

 3

References

Allport, G.W. (1961). Pattern and growth in personality. New York: Holt, Rinehart &

Winston.

Alwin, D. F. (1984). Trends in parental socialization values: Detroit, 1958-1983.

American Journal of Sociology, 90, 359-382.

Bandura, A. (1977). Self efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change.

Psychological Review, 84, 191-215.

Bardi, A. (2000). Relations of values to behavior in everyday situations. Unpublished

doctoral dissertation. The Hebrew University.

Bardi, A., & Schwartz, S. H. (2003). Values and behavior: Strength and structure of

relations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 1207-1220.

Berlyne, D.E. (1960). Conflict, arousal and curiosity. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Borg, I., & Shye, S. (1995). Facet theory: Form and content. London: Sage.

Boudon, R. (2001). The origins of values: Essays in the Sociology and Philosophy of

Beliefs. New York: Transaction Publishers.

Brocke, B. & Bilsky, W. (2005, July). The measurement of value preferences by paired

comparisons. Paper delivered at the 1st European Association for Survey Research

Conference, Barcelona, Spain.

Buss, D.M. (1986). Can a social science be anchored in evolutionary biology? Four

problems and a strategic solution. Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales, 24, 41-50.

Campbell, D. T. (1975). On the conflicts between biological and social evolution and

between psychology and moral tradition. American Psychologist, 30, 1103-1126.

Caprara, G. V., Schwartz, S. H., Cabaña, C., Vaccine, M., & Barbaranelli, C. (2005).

Personality and politics: Values, traits, and political choice. Political Psychology,
 4

Davidov, E., Schmidt, P., & Schwartz, S. H. (2005, July). Bringing values back in: A

multiple group comparison with 20 countries using the European Social Survey. Paper

delivered at the 1st European Association for Survey Research Conference, Barcelona, Spain

Deci, E.L. (1975). Intrinsic motivation. New York: Plenum.

Durkheim, E. (1893/1964). The division of labor in society. Glencoe, IL.: Free Press.

Durkheim, E. (1897/1964). Suicide. Glencoe, Il.: Free Press.

Durkheim, E. (1912/1954). The elementary forms of religious life. Glencoe, IL: Free

Press.

Feather, N. T. (1995). Values, valences. and choice: The influence of values on the

perceived attractiveness and choice of alternatives. Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 68, 1135-1151.

Freud, S. (1930). Civilization and its discontents. London: Hogarth Press.

Freud, S. (1933). New introductory lectures in psychoanalysis. New York: Norton.

Glen, N. D. (1974). Aging and conservatism. Annals of the American Academy of

Political and Social Science, 415, 176-186.

Gollwitzer, P. M. (1996). The volitional benefits of planning. In P. M. Gollwitzer & J. A.

Bargh (Eds.), The Psychology of action. New York: Guilford.

Guttman, L. (1968). A general nonmetric technique for finding the smallest coordinate

space for a configuration of points. Psychometrica, 33, 469-506.

Higgins, E.T. (1997). Beyond pleasure and pain. American Psychologist, 52, 1280-

1300.

Hitlin, S. and J. A. Piliavin (2004). Values: Reviving a dormant concept. Annual Review

of Sociology, 30, 359-393.

Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and postmodernization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press.
 5

Kluckhohn, C. (1951). Values and value-orientations in the theory of action: An

exploration in definition and classification. In T. Parsons & E. Shils (Eds.), Toward a general

theory of action (pp.388-433). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kohn, M. L. (1969). Class and conformity. Homewood, Il.: Dorsey Press.

Kohn, M.L., & Schooler, C. (1983). Work and personality. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Korman, A. (1974). The psychology of motivation. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Lawrence, P. R., & Nohria, N. (2002). Driven: How human nature shapes our choices.

San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass.

Lonner, W.J. (1980). The search for psychological universals. In H.C. Triandis & W.W.

Lambert (Eds.), Handbook of cross-cultural psychology. Perspectives: Vol. 1. Boston: Allyn

& Bacon.

Maslow, A.H. (1965). Eupsychian management. Homewood, IL: Dorsey.

McClelland, D.C. (1961). The achieving society. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand.

Morris, C.W. (1956). Varieties of human value. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Niebuhr, R. (1935). An interpretation of Christian ethics. New York: Harper.

Oishi, S., Schimmack, U., Diener, E., & Suh, E. (1998). The measurement of values and

individualism-collectivism. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 1177-1189.

Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. Glencoe, Il. : Free Press.

Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values. New York: Free Press.

Rohan, M. J. (2000). A rose by any name? The values construct. Personality and Social

Psychology Review, 4, 255-277.

Sagiv, L., & Schwartz, S.H. (1995). Value priorities and readiness for out-group

social contact. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 437-448.

Sagiv, L., & Schwartz, S. H. (2000). Value priorities and subjective well-being: Direct

relations and congruity effects. European Journal of Social Psychology, 30, 177-198.
 6

Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theory and

empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social

psychology (Vol. 25) (pp. 1-65). New York: Academic Press.

Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the content and structure of

values? Journal of Social Issues, 50, 19-45.

Schwartz, S.H. (1996). Value priorities and behavior: Applying a theory of integrated

value systems. In C. Seligman, J.M. Olson, & M.P. Zanna (Eds.), The psychology of values:

The Ontario Symposium, Vol. 8 (pp.1-24). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Schwartz, S. H. (2005a). Basic human values: Their content and structure across

countries. In A. Tamayo & J. B. Porto (Eds.), Valores e comportamento nas organizações

[Values and behavior in organizations] pp. 21-55. Petrópolis, Brazil: Vozes.

Schwartz, S. H. (2005b). Robustness and fruitfulness of a theory of universals in

individual human values. In A. Tamayo & J. B. Porto (Eds.), idem pp. 56-95.

Schwartz, S. H. (2006). Value orientations: Measurement, antecedents and consequences

across nations. In Jowell, R., Roberts, C., Fitzgerald, R. & Eva, G. (Eds.) Measuring attitudes

cross-nationally - lessons from the European Social Survey. London: Sage.

Schwartz, S.H., & Bardi, A. (1997). Influences of adaptation to communist rule on value

priorities in Eastern Europe. Political Psychology, 18, 385-410.

Schwartz, S. H., & Bardi, A. (2001). Value hierarchies across cultures: Taking a

similarities perspective. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32, 268-290

Schwartz, S. H., & Bilsky, W. (1987). Toward a psychological structure of human

values. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 550-562.

Schwartz, S. H., & Boehnke, K. (2004). Evaluating the structure of human values with

confirmatory factor analysis. Journal of Research in Personality, 38, 230-255.

 7

Schwartz, S. H., Melech, G., Lehmann, A., Burgess, S., & Harris, M. (2001). Extending

the cross-cultural validity of the theory of basic human values with a different method of

measurement. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32, 519-542.

Schwartz, S. H., & Rubel, T. (2005) Sex differences in value priorities: Cross-cultural

and multi-method studies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,89,

Schwartz, S. H., Sagiv, L., & Boehnke, K. (2000). Worries and values. Journal of

Personality, 68, 309-346.

Schwartz, S. H., Verkasalo, M., Antonovsky, A., & Sagiv, L. (1997). Value priorities and

social desirability: Much substance, some style. British Journal of Social Psychology, 36, 3-18.

Sumner, W. G. (1906). Folkways. Boston: Ginn & Co.

Veroff, J. Reuman, D., & Feld, S. (1984). Motives in American men and women across the

adult life span. Developmental Psychology, 20, 1142-1158.

Verplanken, B., & Holland, R. W. (2002). Motivated decision making: Effects of

activation and self-centrality of values on choices and behavior. Journal of Personality and

Social Psychology, 82, 434-447.

Wach, M., & Hammer, B. (2003). La structure des valeurs, est-elle universelle? Genèse et

validation du modèle compréhensif de Schwartz. Paris: L’Harmattan.

Weber, M. (1905/1958). The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. New York:

Scribner’s.

Williams, R. M., Jr. (1968). Values. In E. Sills (Ed.), International encyclopedia of the

social sciences. New York: Macmillan.

 1

Table 1: Correlations of Values with Age, Gender, Education, and Income in 20 Countries in

the European Social Survey

Age Gender (Female) Education Income

Value (N=35,030) (N=35,165) (N=34,760) (N=28,275)

Security .26 (20) .11 (20) -.20 (20) -.12 (20)

Conformity .32 (20) .02 (13)† -.22 (20) -.14 (20)

Tradition .33 (20) .08 (20) -.22 (20) -.16 (20)

Benevolence .13 (20) .18 (20) -.04 (11)† -.05 (15)

Universalism .15 (19) .12 (20) .06 (16) -.01 (14) †

Self-Direction -.08 (15) -.06 (19) .19 (20) .10 (18)

Stimulation -.37 (20) -.09 (20) .16 (19) .11 (18)

Hedonism -.33 (20) -.06 (18) .08 (15) .08 (19)

Achievement -.26 (20) -.12 (20) .14 (20) .12 (19)

Power -.09 (18) -.14 (19) .02 (13)† .08 (19)

†Correlation does not differ significantly from zero.

In parentheses is the number of countries with correlations in the indicated direction.

Due to missing data, the number of respondents varies slightly around the indicated Ns.
 2

Table 2. Correlations of Value Priorities with BehaviorA

Behavior across Contexts Cooperation in Vote for Political

(SVS) a Game Center-Right Activism
vs. Center-Left
Israel (SVS) (PVQ21)
(PVQ) Italy
Self-Report Other-Report Israel France
Values N= 293 N=141 N=90 N=2849B N=1244B

Power .52*** .25*** -.37*** .14** -.14***

(-.14***)C
Achievement .38*** .20** -.19* .08** -.07*
(-.10**)

Hedonism .55*** .29*** -.18* .01 .11***

(.09**)

Stimulation .64*** .35*** -.08 -.03 .21***

(.15***)

Self-direction .47*** .29*** .06 -.08** .17***

(.12***)

Universalism .51*** .24*** .32** -.28** .28***

(.26***)

Benevolence .43*** .18* .38*** -.18** .10***

(.12***)

Tradition .70*** .42*** .12 .07** -.16***

(-.13***)

Conformity .40*** .18* .01 .10** -.19***

(-.14***)

Security .31*** .10 -.08 .20** -.31***

(-.22***)

A
Values are corrected for scale use (see text).
B
Ns vary slightly due to missing data.
C
In parentheses are partial correlations controlling age, gender, education, income, and
marital status

***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, 1-tailed.

 3
OPENNESS SELF-
TO Self-Direction Universalism TRANSCEN-
CHANGE DENCE

Benevolence
Stimulation

Hedonism Tradition

Conformity

Achievement

SELF- CONSER-
ENHANCEMENT Power Security VATION

Figure 1. Theoretical model of relations among ten motivational types of value

 4
SECURITY POWER
ACCEPTING MY* PRESERVING SOCIAL POWER*
PORTION IN LIFE *PUBLIC IMAGE
AUTHORITY*
WEALTH*
MODERATE* NATIONAL
SECURITY*
SENSE OF
TRADITION *BELONGING SOCIAL
* *RECIPROCATION *RECOGNITION
OBEDIENT OF FAVORS

RESPECT
*CLEAN ACHIEVEMENT
*DEVOUT FOR* *SOCIAL ORDER
TRADITION *FAMILY SECURITY *AMBITIOUS
*DETACHMENT HONOR HEALTHY* *INFLUENTIAL
*ELDERS *POLITE- *SUCCESSFUL
NESS
*SELF *CAPABLE
DISCIPLINE
*HUMBLE HEDONISM
INTELLIGENT
CONFORMITY * PLEASURE*
*SELF-INDULGENCE
BENEVOLENCE LOYAL* *
RESPONSIBLE
ENJOYING LIFE*
*
HONEST* *MEANING SELF- EXCITING LIFE*
IN LIFE
TRUE* RESPECT STIMULATION
FORGIVING* *HELPFUL FRIENDSHIP *PRIVACY VARIED*LIFE

MATURE LOVE* *WISDOM *CHOOSING *DARING

SPIRITUAL*LIFE OWN GOALS
*WORLD AT PEACE
*SOCIAL
JUSTICE WORLD OF *CREATIVITY
BEAUTY* *INDEPENDENT
INNER HARMONY* *CURIOUS
UNIVERSALISM PROTECT* *UNITY WITH SELF-DIRECTION
ENVIRONMENT NATURE
EQUALITY* BROAD* *FREEDOM
MINDED

Figure 2. 2-Dimensional Smallest Space Analysis: Individual Level Value Structure Averaged Across 68 Countries
 5

Anxiety-based values Anxiety-free values

Prevention of loss goals Promotion of gain goals
Self-protection against threat Self-expansion and growth

Regulating how Self-Enhancement Openness to Change

one expresses
personal interests Achievement Hedonism
& characteristics
Personal Focus Power Stimulation

Self-Direction

Conservation Self-Transcendence
Social Focus
Regulating how Security Universalism
one relates
socially to others Conformity Benevolence
and affects them
Tradition

Figure 3. Dynamic underpinnings of the universal value structure

 6

Figure 4. Value Priorities and Behavior

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1
Correlations
0

-0.1

-0.2

-0.3

-0.4

Pow Ach Hed Sti SDir Uni Ben Tra Con Sec
Values
 7

France: Opposition to ‘Other’ Immigrants

ESS 2003, N=1111 Native Born
Universalism V

-.25 Rsq .282

Security V .20

Age .18
3 Item Index
-.15 of Opposing
Education
Immigration
Religiosity -.12

.10
Married
.07
.07
Tradition V

Gender
All beta coefficients shown, p<.02

Figure 5. Regression to Predict Opposition to ‘Other’ Immigrants by Native Born French