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PS4304

LECTURE 5 NOTES

CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

1. Introduction

In this theme, we look at conflict and regional approaches to conflict resolution, with an
exclusive focus on the role of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in intra-state
conflict resolution.

Learning outcomes

At the end of the Theme you should be able to:

 Discuss the approaches that have been adopted in conflict resolution in southern Africa
 Assess the performance of the SADC Organ in conflict resolution

2. Conceptualising conflict

- Matlosa (1999:165) defines conflict as “the incompatibilities of interests, choices, goals,

and ideas over the distribution of power and scarce resources among many actors”.
- It may be defined as “a social situation” in which “at least two parties try to acquire the
same set of scarce material or immaterial resources at the same time” (Ohlson and
Stedman in Matlosa, 2004:165.
- It is “a violent and armed confrontation and the struggle between groups, between the
state and one or more groups, and between two or more states. In such a confrontation
and struggle, some of those involved are injured and others killed” (Bujra in Nhena,
2004:12).
- The nature of conflict depicted in these definitions is that in involves:
 Lack of compatibilities over some values or resources
 Struggle or confrontation which may be either violent or non-violent
- When it is violent, it is counter-productive since it may lead to the destruction of property
and human life and as such it is undesirable.

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- But when it is non-violent, it is not necessarily problematic as it may lead to political

development and sustainable peace, reconciliation and political stability (Ibid).
- NB: Conflicts occur, as we can see from the above definitions, at different levels. It
also inheres in all societies, but the challenge is how each society manages it.

3. What can be done to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflict?

Some of the suggested peaceful means of conflict resolution include the following:

- Transform the system of actors, issues and actions away from the focus on
incompatibilities (move towards principled compromise)
- Reduce the level of the destructive behaviour of violence to non-violence levels if
incompatibilities persist (move towards conflict de-escalation and containment of
violence).
- Solve the basic incompatibilities as perceived by the protagonists to ensure a mutually
satisfactory, sustainable and durable political settlement (move towards eradication of
incompatibilities)
- Transform the entire conflict mapping and change the relationship between the
protagonists from that of conflict to that of peace (move towards conflict transformation
and peace-building) (Ohloson and Stedman in Matlosa, 1999:168).
- The above means of conflict resolution presuppose the existence of internal actors
committed to dealing with conflict situations. But the problem in southern Africa is that
these are not always available.
- Protagonists have often been unwilling to employ these measures for many reasons,
including the desire to hold on to one’s position and the unwillingness to compromise.
- NB: Lesotho’s conflict from as back as 1994 to date, which led to the intervention of
SADC is a case in point.
- Even the external actors have not achieved much in their efforts to effectively resolve
intra-state conflict in the region, hence its persistence.
- In the case of southern Africa, there has been a persistence of violent conflict, for
example in Lesotho for about a quarter-century now, Zimbabwe since the 2000 elections;
the Democratic Republic of Congo; Mozambique with now Islamic insurgency;
Madagascar.

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4. What has been the role of the SADC in resolving regional conflicts and with what level of
success or otherwise?

SADC Treaty 1992 art. 9 establishes SADC has adopted a two-pronged approach to conflict
resolution in the region: mediation and in rare cases enforcement through the SADC Organ on
Politics, Security and Defence generally.

a. On the use of the Organ

NB: Our notes are drawn from Makoa (2004) ‘Conflict resolution in Southern Africa: Trading
democracy for peace?’ In Nhema A. G. (ed), The quest for peace in Africa: Transformations,
democracy and public policy. Addis Ababa. This book is in the University library.

- Makoa reviews the performance of the SADC as the regional conflict resolution
mechanism since its formation in 1996.
- He highlights the objectives of the Organ (see the Protocol for details. I have uploaded
it on Thuto), which include for our purpose here:
o To promote peace and security in the region.
o To protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against
instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state and inter-
state conflict and aggression. [emphasis added].
o Prevent, contain and resolve intra and inter-state conflict by peaceful means and
consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a
matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed. [emphasis added].
- Makoa begins by noting that the creation of the Organ was a sign of the member states’
quest for peace, which he defines as “security and political” and regards these two values
as “both a condition for democracy and foreign direct development”.
- But he critiques the underlying assumptions of the Organ’s creation that:
i. It is premised on the state-centric conception of security, which gives primacy to the
state while ignoring human security and its orientation is towards track-one
diplomacy (i.e. diplomatic engagement at the state level to the exclusion of social
groups/ civil society.

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The effect of state-centric or track-one diplomacy, with its strong leanings

towards the realist theory, according to him, is that it “is an exclusively
government-sponsored and controlled system of conflict management”. It does
not leave any scope for civil society’s participation in conflict resolution.
ii. It assumes that governments are an embodiment of citizens’ security and they cannot
pose any threat to it. Yet, he argues, there is a possibility that governments
themselves may be threats to peace and national security.
- Makoa seems to adopt a classical liberal conception of security, which acknowledges that
possibility and a real fact in southern Africa. i.e. governments in southern Africa are
sometimes a real threat to human security.
- For him, liberalism warns us about conflating the concepts of nation and state and
subsuming the interests of the people under those of the state. i.e. the interests of the state
are not always similar to those of the citizens. If anything, the main culprits in human
rights violations are the state agents.
- According to Makoa, Locke and Mills “stressed civil control of state institutions,
especially when the completion for state power is central to the conflict, making it
difficult for the complainants or opposition to accept the government and state-controlled
institutions as impartial arbiters in conflict situations”. That is when the conflict is over
political power, the opposition finds it difficult to accept state institutions since these are
controlled by their political opponents.
- According to him, SADC’s conception of and approach to conflict resolution “carries
serious consequences for democracy”. Hence his argument that “democracy as an
important value (or something that all human beings find valuable) is traded for peace”.
That is to say, peace becomes more valued than democracy, which ought to lay the very
basis for peace.
- In your view, which is more valuable? Which should come be prioritised?
Methodologically, where does the causal arrow go between the two?
- This is because, according to him, “there is no civil society participation in the institution
or visible scope for parliamentary control over the Organ by SADC member states’
national parliaments”.

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- Again, he continues, the invocation (use) of the Organ remains the privilege or even a
right of governments as it is anchored on the principles of sovereignty and non-
interference of member states in each other’s internal affairs.
- It is used only with the invitation of member states to suppress their political opponents.
- For him, then the Organ is not a panacea for conflict, but rather machinery for squashing
the democratic and civil rights of citizens.
- As such, the Organ is “an instrument of a group of states led by those who use it to satisfy
their quest to stay in power”.
- In conclusion, he reiterates the SADC’s quest for peace and political stability,
democracy and civil liberties as contained in the Protocol establishing the Organ.
- But the shortcoming is that there is no avenue for popular participation in decision-
making regarding the use of the Organ and effective check on those who control it.
- The Organ cannot be a guarantee for civil liberties and democracy, given its statist
orientation.
- Despite its stated objectives of promoting negotiated settlement, it is used to suppress
conflict.
- It also conflates the concepts of state and citizens and subsumes the latter under the
former and defines the aspirations and interests of these two as congruent.
- It has, in his own words, a “dangerous assumption that the state cannot fan political
conflict or that citizens cannot challenge their governments’ actions and policies”. But
in a democracy, citizens have the right to challenge their governments and demand
accountability from them.

What should be done then?

- For him, the Organ has to be transformed so that it solves regional problems of lack of
peace and stability and be made peace-making machinery rather than the conflict
suppression device that it is.
- It should be made an instrument that will benefit all member states rather than powerful
ones such as South Africa.
b. Mediation

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SADC has also used mediation as a conflict management mechanism in all intra-state conflicts as
we will see below.
What is Mediation?
“…a process of managing conflict in a diversity of settings by an outside or third-party, with the
aim of reaching some form of agreement between the belligerents” (Greig and Diehl in Pisani,
2020:46)
“…a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of or accept an offer
of help from, an individual, group, state, or organisation to settle their conflict or resolve their
differences without resort to physical force or invoking the authority of the law (Khadiagala,
2020:16).
Why would conflicting parties accept mediation?
- Conflicting parties accept mediation when they reach a “mutually hurting stalemate”.
That is when both parties perceive that unilateral solutions are unattainable and when the
costs of further violence are increasing (Zartman in Khadiagala, 2020:17).
SADC Mediation in Lesotho and Madagascar
a. The Lesotho case
Deleglise (2020) ‘Lessons from mediating Lesotho’s political disputes’ in Gilbert Khadiagala G.
& Deleglise D. (eds) Southern African Security Review. Maputo. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

- Deleglise (2020) provides a comprehensive treatment of the SADC mediation in Lesotho

conflicts from the mid-1990s
i. The 1994 crisis: When King Letsie III dissolved the BCP government for
refusing to reinstate his dethroned father King Moshoeshoe II; the factional
fighting between the two barracks of the army over a pay rise.
NB: SADC mediation through the then Presidents Masire of Botswana, Mandela of
South Africa and Mugabe of Zimbabwe led to the reinstatement of the BCP
government and King Moshoeshoe II to his throne
ii. Post-1998 election crisis: The newly formed LCD had won the elections in all
but one of the 80 constituencies. The BCP, BNP, and MFP protested the outcome
alleging fraud and the most violent conflicts ensued with Maseru and other towns
torched.

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o SADC used a two-pronged intervention: one diplomatic and another enforcement

through the military forces from Botswana and South Africa. The diplomatic
effort led to the establishment of the Independent Political Authority (IPA), which
reviewed the First-Past-The-Post electoral system and introduced the MMP. The
enforcement effort led to the restoration of law and order.
iii. The post- 2007 election conflict: The main political parties the LCD and
ABC had formed pre-election alliances that undermined the spirit of the MMP
systems and denied small parties’ parliamentary representation. The
opposition protested the allocation of the PR seats.
- SADC sent Retired President Masire to mediate but he failed because the
government was not cooperative. Ultimately, the crisis was resolved through the
efforts of the local civil society organisations and the CCL. It came in the form of an
amendment to the electoral Act 2011 by removing the second ballot and providing for
the vote cast by voters to be used in calculating both the party and candidates.
- 2014 crises: a power struggle between the then Prime Minister Thabane of the ABC
and his Deputy, Metsing of the LCD under the first coalition government, leading to
security crises as the PM fired the commander of the army, who in turn refused to
leave office and had some elements of the LDF carry out an operation interpreted as
an attempted coup d’état, forcing the PM to flee to South Africa.
- SADC intervened by facilitating an early election in 2015 without addressing the
root causes - the security crises, thus postponing rather than solving the crises. After
the elections, the security crisis continued unabated as the new DC-led coalition of
seven parties the Commander of the LDF was assassinated by his colleagues and the
government requested SADC to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate the
circumstances around this assassination.
- Thus, a commission was established which produced a report, recommending the
prosecution of the involved army personnel in the attempted coup as well as other
serious crimes (see Kapa, 2021:198).
- SADC also facilitated dialogue between all political leaders, which led to the reform
process under the NRA.

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- Deleglise (2020:150) provides lessons learnt in the SADC mediation efforts in

Lesotho as follows:
 They have led to the de-escalation of conflicts but not durable peace
because they fail to deal with the mainspring of conflicts and the
authorities have been reluctant to abide by their agreements.
 Lesotho’s peace agreements were short-term and premised on elections as
a panacea for future conflict transformation; most, if not all of Lesotho’s
peace agreements had a provision to convene an election as a formal sign
that the mediation had been successfully concluded.
 Substantive components such as security sector reform and governance
(SSR/G) are critical yet often ignored in the mediation processes.
 A common and significant obstacle to implementing Lesotho’s peace
accords has been the resistance or outright refusal by state authorities to
proceed with political settlements that require compliance with the SADC
recommendations emanating from mediation.
 There is a need for a broader set of peace-building mechanisms to
consolidate peace and prevent conflict recurrence through reconciliation,
institution-building, and political and economic transformation.
 Such mechanisms should include a neutral structure and capacity within
the state to resolve future conflicts and complaints, a means for the
peaceful resolution of public grievances before they become a source of
conflict in society, and a means of preventing future conflicts.
NB: The NRA has proposed that the Council of State (reformed) should be
empowered to resolve political conflict and that anyone who feels his/her life
is in danger due to political conflict should through the Council of State seek
sanctuary at the King’s Palace. Whether or not this proposal will be adopted by
parliament remains to be seen
 Deleglise’s general message is that SADC peace-making efforts and missions
in Lesotho from the 1990s to date varied greatly in duration and outcome, but
they all led to the successful termination of those conflicts at the time and
have contributed positively to conflict de-escalation, most of the peace

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agreements signed have not correlated with durable peace (Deleglise

2020:150)

b. Madagascar
Key reading: Gavin Cawthra G. (2020) ‘Mediation in Madagascar: Democratic transition and
unconstitutional change’, in Gilbert Khadiagala G and Deleglise D (eds) Southern African
Security Review. Maputo: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
 Cawthra (2020:163-164) captures in detail the SADC intervention in the Madagascar
conflict from the 2009 presidential elections. He provides some contextual background to
the Malagasy political system and the central role played by the military in politics.
 He makes the following bold observation about SADC’s intervention:
SADC’s response can be described as muddled, hypocritical, and
foolish; it nearly pushed Madagascar out of SADC. Indeed, if the
organisation’s response had been realised, it may have brought about a
political and military disaster [Emphasis added] (Cawthra, 2020:167).
 He begins by noting that Madagascar cannot by any measure be regarded as a
consolidated democracy.
 He notes the following features of the political system:
 political party system is non-existent, power is personalised and based on
patronage with a zero-sum approach.
 no real established political parties, only ‘camps’ or at best self-styled
‘movements’ attached to previous and existing presidents.
 Each election, especially presidential campaigns and their results, seems to
provoke a new crisis of political legitimacy, the worst being the events of 2009.
 Politics in Madagascar is characterised by complexity, fragmentation, and
obscurity all of which have helped to prevent a decline into civil war.
 There is also no threat from neighbouring states or opportunities for political
rebels to use neighbouring territories as bases.
 Thus, potential conflict must be contained within the boundaries of the Malagasy
state.

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 Additionally, within the territory itself, political mobilisation is made difficult by

the island’s inaccessibility and variations in topography, climate, and social
systems.
 There are no clear-cut ethnic divisions or ideological differences between
competing parties
 Political competition is mainly on the spoils of office in a zero-sum game within
weak democratic and judicial institutions.
 Due to the French influence, the presidential system is very strong, leading to the
presidency being a highly contested institution
 NB: The presidency has been at the centre of periodic crises requiring
external mediation.
 Elections are flashpoints for conflict in Madagascar as elsewhere in Africa.
The nature of the conflict.

 The conflict was between Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka (former president) over
the election results. The former had the backing of the military and the latter had
his militia, which was eventually dissolved.
 Ratsiraka eventually fled to France and the country’s High Constitutional Court
recognised Ravalomana as the president.
 Madagascar became a member of SADC under Ravalomanana in 2005.
 He became unpopular with “the security forces, (allegedly through meddling in
promotions), attempting some rationalisation of the bloated and poorly managed
institutions and was rumoured to be pressing the armed services to do business
with his companies” (ibid:166).
 Chaos ensured in the capital Antananarivo, resulting in civilian deaths mounted
(estimated to be over 100)
 A small but vital unit of the army based in Antananarivo mutinied and
demanded that Ravalomanana should resign and he did resign.
 But the military did not take over power, they instead promptly appointed
Rajoelina as President.

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 Ravalomanana went into exile in South Africa with some of his followers. As
before, the High Constitutional Court was soon to rule in favour of the usurper:
thereafter Rajoelina ruled through a High Authority for the transition to a civilian-
military junta.
SADC Reaction:

 The AU and SADC had adopted policies requiring them to act against
unconstitutional changes of government.
 At the time of the coup, the SADC Organ was headed by Swaziland, with the
previous chair Zimbabwe playing a supportive role yet these countries.
 NB: These two sought to restore democracy to Madagascar through military
intervention.
 The AU and SADC suspended Madagascar pushing it to restore its deposed
president Ravalomanana.
 Mswati proposed military intervention and was supported by Mugabe.
Reaction from Madagascar
 This move angered Rajoelina and the Malagasy security forces, which prepared to
repel any ‘invasion’ from SADC forces.
 Rajoelina threatened to pull Madagascar from the SADC membership.
Other actors
 Other actors, got involved to defuse the crisis. These actors preferred
mediation to SADC’s restoration of Ravalomanana.
 South Africa took over the chairmanship of the Organ, and SADC appointed
the former President of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, as the mediator
supported by the South African Embassy in Antananarivo.
 As a result of the mediation efforts by SADC, and AU, agreements were
signed by the conflicting parties which provided, among others, for
transitional arrangements that excluded all former presidents, including
Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka from taking part in the next elections.
The outcome of the mediation

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 In the end, all key actors (South Africa, SADC, the AU and the ICG) succeed
to stabilise Madagascar through mediation.
 There were many reversals but they all turned out to be temporary as many
innovative conflict resolution approaches were developed and used, including
amnesties for the former presidents for their unconstitutional actions.
 New presidential elections were held in 2014 in which Hery
Rajaonarimampianina, a new figure, emerged with a majority in a vote that
was generally regarded both locally and internationally as free and fair.
 Political stability returned during the lead-up to the next elections in 2018 but
another crisis ensued again over the status of the former presidents.
 Both Ravalomanana and Rajoelina were eligible to run but, the incumbent
regime sought to exclude them with the help of parliament that introduced
changes in the law to make their exclusion permanent.
 Their supporters took to the streets thus brewing new violence, and causing
South Africa through SADC to intervene successfully again, leading to the
elections held in November 2018.
 Rajoelina won the elections (described by international observers as
sufficiently free and fair and endorsed by the courts) by a 55% margin against
the incumbent Rajaonarimampianina’s 7%, and later in 2019, also won
parliamentary polls but Ravalomanana’s camp refused to accept the outcome.
Conclusion
o Cawthra raises a number of important issues in his conclusion, including that for our
purpose, relative stability has been restored to Madagascar, and mediation has
played an essential part in this.
o But there is no guarantee that a further crisis most likely revolving around presidential
contestation will not take place.
o Madagascar has avoided collapse or civil war, and the security institutions have
remained intact.
o There is currently an AU-driven Security Sector Reform (SSR) process underway.

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