DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED

•
SECRET CENTRAL 'VEIL 1 SINCE AGENCY

SOURCESMITHODS,EXEMPTION
MICROFILMED WAR CRIMES° I SCLOGURI

VIA AIR
OCT 2 41969
E WATCH MO. SGAA 3)
-74-17A-40
DOC. MICRO. SER.
DATE: -c4;i66510-14-064

TO : Chief, SR INFO: Chief, SE

FROM 19 FEB

SUBJWT: General-- OMR REDNOOD/Psych/AECROAK/AERODYNAL2C/AEPARADE

Specific- Information requested by Headquarters

REF"TIENCS: SGAW-17674, 16 December 195.7 Hemovi ,•rom ProJeuT

ACTION RE0C79 TvD: See paragraph lad, 2-d.

CS ■, asaAriaation:. 7
Juii # f- 9 s-/ 3 /a 47/3
Box:, Nadi, //

The following is the information requested by you in the referenae memorandum:

1c Re paragraph 2 9 ref.

eo The total scheduled and random AERODYNAMIC transmitter hours have been
increased during the past three months from 16 in September to 411 in December.
This represents a very substantial increase over the transmitter time authorized
by the AERODYNAMIC Communications Annex., dated 3 November 1953, which authorizes
three 15-minute broadcasts per week on one transmitter or a total of approximately
three transmitter hours per month.

b. The time authorized by Communications Annexes represents the minimum

transmitter time to be alloted to each respective show. The total amount of
transmitter time actuallyavailable at PYPEX for these radio shows is considerably
more then the total time required by all Communications Annexes put together;
it varies sometimes to a large degree from day-to-day, depending on tne workload
provided by activities other than radio broadcasts. The allocation of' this
extra transmitter time among the various radio shows (nine in all) is done by
NEMCA jointly with the respective case officerr, on the basis of time provided
by the approprli,ate Communications Annex. Consequently, alth AECROAK ',;ommunicatiena
Annex still non-existant and the AERODYNAMC and AEPARADF Annexes each calling
for only three transmitter hours a month, the position of the SR/PP field case
officer when negotiating additional transmitter time with WEMCA has been weak
infiead. The fact that AECROAK has been given so much transmitter time (760 hour:
average p/m) must be attribtued to the effect of Headquarters post-Hungarian
Revolution policy calling for greater emphasis on Russian language propaganda
directed to Great-Russian elements in the MST/ and the ce-operation of WEMCA.

C0 In fulfillment of Headquarters reouest stated in DIR-045F7„ dated

21 January 1958, ' TEMA has added a total of one hour fixed schedule transmitter
time daily on two transmitters and two frequencies oetween 1830Z and L90074
This was the only open transmitter time available during the soacallei
"desireable audience time". It will raise the monthly total of AT:RODYNAlaC
transmitter hours to 75.

0_9 LI / 2-‘ dSA

 SECRET
SGAA ) 1116
Page
19 Fib
d. At the present time the only available transmitter time at PYRTI is the
"undesireable audience time", i.e. between the hours of 2300Z and 0030Z, and
0300Z0 Thus, if still more transmitter time is requested by Headquarters fer
AERODYNAMIC show, it will be necessary to take some time away from one of the
other SR shows in order to give it to AERODYNAMIC. Increasing broadcasting
time of one project at the expense of another is a matter of policy and is
out of bounds of field case officer's jurisdiction; therefore, any further
increase in AERODYNAMIC transmitter time will require specific instructions
from Headquarters.

2. Re paragraph 3, ref,

a. Jamming of PYREX broadcasts heard by the local Monitoring Unit has been
a subject of study by WENCA for some time Checkin g of frequencies used by the
jammers helped to establish the fact that jamming heard locally is akywave
'jamming and that it could not be effective in the target areas. Hence, it
was assumed that the main purpose of this skywave jamming was to create confusior
and force us into using drastic measures such as constant changing of frequenciet
during a broadcast, making it extremely difficult for a potential listener eo
find and/or follow our broadcasts. We .had indeed obliged the So e iets by using
these evasion tactics, until last December it was decided to Quit using it.
This decfniion was based mainly on two factors:

1) It was assumed on the strength of certain facts of technical neture

as well as information concerning cast and general complexity of jamming
operations that the Soviets at the present time do not posses 2 foolproof
jalming system; although, technically it is possible to develop such a
sestem. Consequently, it was assumed that while jamming may be quite
effectiee in some large centers, thereare many large areas in the USSR
'ohere jamming is much less effective or ineffeetive. The most recent
estimate of the cost of Soviet jamming system in the USSR given in
eimonthly Jamming Report, dated 6 December 1957, which is part of
YITAPY EMW Brief, is as follows:

Investment in Transmitters (1600), Buildings, Antennas

and Auxilliary Equipment •180 million

Annual operation cost 75

In addition the Soviets could not possibly use all the power ne(2ded to
completely jam all anti-Communist broadcasts ao it would caAse iltrierenep
with their own broadcasts at homc

2) Information found in poriodic reports of an i Eu(Aloxe y:t.who

has been monitoring SHULAC broadcasts beamed o th are.,
monitoring operation has been run jointlby TJEITA d SHELLAC case oftiocr
for aperoximately LTonths The agent has ben Oxen sCiedules of
both fixed time and randcm time SHELLAC broadcasts eed th,a
data of the skyvave jammers heard in AthEils The results e fr Jive been.
as follows:

SECRLI
 . SECRET:
'a:AA 5:2=ntk*/''3 / Li 6
Pagel
i 9 FE91958
a) The agent did not hear the s17-nav ,7: japJmers herd io Adons.
He heard groundwave jammers. The effectiess of these jaiAcrs varie64
depending on the atmospheric conditions, often mainv them quito effective
in the central area of Bucharest. Their effeetiveness housver,
diminished in the outlying areas of the city, Lnd was ,,,eak or nL1 In
a large area out in the country whore the broadcasts ',acre 'n.ar41,

b) He thought that random time broadcasts were peferable

to fixed scheduled time broadcasts because the Communists jammers
mere always waiting for the latter9 ready to pounce on them with
the opening sound, while jammin: of the farmer proved less eoreiseeint
and less effective

c) He thought that use oC evasion tactics males listening to

tit broadcast extremely difficult and must have a discoulaging
effect on potential listeners

b. The fact that Bucharest is the primary target of anti-Coumunist broad-

casts beamed into Rumania „ makes the ':eek of developing effect:l ye jannirw a much
easip r one for the Rumanian government. In the European USSR,for examplu, with its
huge territory and multiple densely populaed areas, the prob l em of Y:4intaining
an effective jamming system must be infinitely more difficult and costly.

c. Encouraged by tee results of the SHELLAC monitoring operation which

produced a gregt deal of desired information9 'ZITICA has submitted a memorandum
to Chief, S J requesting that if possible, similar monitoring operations
be inaugura*Vma in he U3SR using KUBARK personnel in order to "obtain
information that is necossar7 to get a true picture regarding the degree . of
effectiveness of the present broadcasts beamed into the USSR, and that may be
used to increase their effectiveness in the future".

d. We strongly recommend that this rk=i,quest be given a serious consideration

by SR/PP„ Washington, The weake!A point of Our radio acivities has almost
complete lack of inforrration regarding the degree of audibility and intelJlgthility
of our broadcasts in the target f-:.reas, This uncertainty regardin the c:&rrec
of penetration of Soviet jamming by our broadcasts has been responsible to
a large degree for lack of enthusiasm toward our radio p y.opaganda activitIe
among Headquarters personnel.. Cn.sequently, radio prio pac,,anda ho,s been derdoi-,ed.
to the Iva of "marginal activitik:s", with only 4 half-hearted effort being ulad
to keep it going. .

e. This situation undoubtedl' T pleases the Soviets to no end.e as the dctm:.-

mination and the fury with 19-Mch t..ey have been jamming o .ar brkste in order
to prevent them, from being heard b2J ;Le Soviet proles quite conclusieely
that they have ereat fear for the offect those brodeests . rra have on their 7)cop37:
and their awn fate if heard regli!la Ratner than. p.1 m'r41.d it not he
logical ther, to becimn e'np, mo-fe anta.Ji. the SoviEts
in trying to beet the tn thAr srfoit to sty LheAd of us in thi7
game just as we are determined in 1-iti-c.7 the SOVleS in *,hc gaale of control
of outer space since they lathed their Sputnik
 SECRET
SGAA t=4 41-Pie-7‘ 311i4)

g FF 1958
f. Monitoring of AECROAK broadcasts as a means of evaluating the effective-
ness of Soviet jamming in target areas and the technical q ualities of the bread-
casts had b n suggested in the past bet jJut to no avail. We hope.
that success of SHaLLAC monitoring oper6rrons in providing valuable information
will help to stimulate new interest in Headquarters towards monitoring on our
radio broadcasts in the USSR.

g. ';;e suggest that periodic monitoring operations be considered in such areas

as Moscow, Leningred, Kiev, Odessa, the Caucasus, or any other areas where U. S.
Embassy personnel are allowed to travel. We also suggest that, if possible,
Soviet radio receivers be used in the operations. WEMCA is ready to furnish
necessary broadcasting achedules, suerestine at the same time that all monitor-
ing details be wcrked out at the staff level.

3. Re paragraph 5, ref.
We shall send each month, beginning February, a complete set of scripts
produced in tae field together with tee regular monthly progress report.

40 Re paraeraph 6, ref.
So far we have not been able to de much in regard to investigating the local
aussian Crthodox Church situation, Theeefore, we have nothing to report on the
subject It this time,

5. Re paragraph 7, ref.

The Whole matter of Creek broadcasts to the peoples behind trie iron Curtain
in ',heir res pecting languages is at preset t in a state of flux. It seems that
tali, responsibility for running these broadsasts is being transferred from one
manistry to another ana, it will be two or .:iree months before this matter
Fettled. In the meantime, a project has been approved, which provides for
financial support of this activity by KUHAR:% We have been told that the
Creek authorities are ready to resume broadcasts to Bulgaria and Albania with
which Greece has no diplomatic relations. Uawever, it is anticipated that we
will run into difficulty when trying to get the Russian language show on the
air, as the Greeks feel that this may anger ihe lecal Sovt,A Ambassador.
At any rate, if the Russian language hroadcats are approved, they will have
to be superficially of the most inoffensive rature--nothing openly anti-
Soviet, mostly straight news. We are expectci to furnish the nrograns.
This will still allow us to give the Soviet listenera a considerable amount
of information otherwise withheld from them their own authorities, thus
making the effort worth our while. Hcwevers 6roadcasts of this sort
require careful study and selection of subjeco and s1. 7=11 -1 prescTit ption-
For more detajlod informaticm see SG1-0951 And. 5CAIV-.)00h,
 t
NtEr , , , • :-- ---1 _

onilh 3 6)
19 FEB 195 a
6. Re paragraph 8 9 ref%
Our status tla guests of METAPHOR will soon cease, de have been asked by
the METAPHOR case officer and have agreed to chip in beginning with 1 April 1958
in paying rent for the space on the 3rd floor where their office and recording
studio are located„ The monthly rent is 4230 drachmae (141.•fl), Our share will
be 1,000 drachmae ($3333). Another 1 9 000 drachmae will be contributed by
OBTEST, another boarder, The present arrangement will have to be continued and
the hardships and inconveniences disregarded, unpleasant and adverse as they are
as no other facilities are available under, present corditionso

HMPASC;hos

3 February 1958
L 3
Distributiong
SR
2 - SE

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