HISTORICAL BACKROUND: EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

INTRODUCTION

This part introduces the historical background of international organizations and the creation of the
League of Nations . The history of international organizations is closely related to the history of the
modern nation-state. It is generally agreed that the notion of a centralized territorial sovereign state
came to light in the late 17th century as European monarchs gained power as supreme sovereigns
over their realms. Furthermore, states became the primary actors of the international system which
emerged as a new sphere of political interaction following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

As there is no overarching central authority in the world, the modern international system is
characterized with its anarchic nature. Anarchy here refers to the absence of a central power to
impose and enforce authority on states. Kenneth Waltz, the father of neorealism, sees anarchy as a
constant state of or the threat of war in the international system (Waltz, 1979: 102-103). It is
assumed that states act rationally to survive in such an anarchical international environment to
maximize their power and interests and prevent other agents to be a threat to their existence (March
and Olsen, 1998: 944). However, no state has thus far possessed the ultimate power to survive alone
in an environment where resources for power-maximization are limited. Therefore, without the
ultimate power that would guarantee survival in the international system, states need to cooperate,
at least, to some extent. Thus, the evolution of the international system has proved that states
cooperate on mutual interests and build self-beneficial alliances to attain common goals.

This conceptualization of international politics is based on the English School approach, according to
which the international environment consists of three different spheres that operate simultaneously:

• Rooted in the writings of Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli, the international system refers
to the anarchical international structure and self-centered actors (states), who seek after their
interests in a race of survival and therefore follow power politics.

• Based on Hugo Grotius’ reflections, the international society refers to the trend of institutionalism
of shared interests among states through the creation of regulations, norms, and rules that will be
commonly agreed.

• Embedded in Immanuel Kant’s reflections, the world society indicates individuals, non-state
organizations, and other actors that make of an idealistic international civil society (Wight, 1992: 37-
40).

The international environment, thus, refers to a general framework which encompasses all these
concepts of the English School.

The term, international organization, has a narrower meaning than its modern form in this chapter,
since here the focus is on the emergence of intergovernmental organizations due to their historical
precedence over non-governmental organizations. Although pioneer intergovernmental
organizations were established in the 19th century, socialization among states since the Peace of
Westphalia paved the way for their emergence. This socialization also demonstrated that peace
could be maintained through the creation of international institutions. International
institutionalization has required enduring international bodies in the form of intergovernmental
organizations. Thus, international organizations are the most important outcome of this process.

The chapter also considers states as the main actors of the international system. As such,
international organizations are defined as constructions built upon the early experiences of states’
interaction. The need for international organizations is closely related to states’ relation with peace
and war. The evolution of international relations shows that states have struggled to maintain a
degree of order in the international environment since the Peace of Westphalia. Therefore, peace
has been predominantly interpreted as order. If peace is distorted with a fight among states,
restoring the order would be vital. Over time, states have developed tools for both ending conflicts
and reconstructing order collectively (Ikenberry, 2001: 3). Hence, building and maintaining peace
have been the underlying motives for states in following a long path of institutionalization that
eventually led to the emergence of international organizations.

Against this background, this chapter is divided into four sections: The first focuses on the origins of
international organizations. The second discusses the impact of the nineteenthcentury developments
on institutionalization in international relations. The third considers the pioneer international
organizations and The Hague Conferences. The fourth and final section analyzes the League of
Nations that was established at the end of War World I.

Hugo Grotious is a Dutch philosopher and statesman who lived between 1583 and 1645. His main
importance in the theory and practice of international relations is his contributions to the
development of international law. His works include De Jure Praedae (written c. 1604–6, but
published only in 1868), Mare Liberum (first published 1609), and De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625). To
modern scholars, Grotius’ insights into a number of questions which continue to occupy a central
place in contemporary thought about international relations are striking (Bull, Kingsbury and Roberts,
1992).

THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The discipline of International Relations refers to the Peace of Westphalia that ended the 30 Years’
War in 1648 as “the dawn of the modern international system.” The treaties signed in Münster and
Osnabrück in 1648 indicate the political and diplomatic development that paved the way to the
establishment of international institutions. The Peace of Westphalia ended the feudal system based
on the primacy of the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire and led to the emergence of new political
entities called “sovereign states.” Thus, it indeed marked the beginning of an international milieu
that would facilitate the emergence of nation-states.

The Peace of Westphalia

Consequences of the Peace of Westphalia may be summarized as follows:

• First, the peace treaties were negotiated and signed by the states dominated by the rulers that
were commonly accepted as sovereigns of their realms.

• Second, the physical borders of each state were recognized and commonly accepted. Therefore,
each of these units represented a political entity.

• Third, each sovereign who represented a state was accepted as equal, regardless of the size of
lands they ruled or the nobility o which they belonged.

• Fourth,thoughno international organization emerged as a body until the late 19th century, the way
in which these peace accords were made initialized a method that enabled states to communicate
collectively through diplomatic instruments. Thus, it is possible to assert that the Peace of Westphalia
laid the foundations of collective diplomacy and established the basis of the Congress System that
would help institutionalize the international environment in the following centuries.
The perfect example of the 18th century Congress System is the Utrecht Congress, which convened
in 1713 to end the War of the Spanish Succession. Regardless of their size or strength, all the
European sovereign states were represented at the Congress. They negotiated for the finest “peace”
that they could get at the table. The congress aimed to optimize the European political map and the
political system to satisfy the interests of every state represented.

The main characteristics of the 18th century laid the foundation stone of European collective
diplomacy. These characteristics may be summarized as follows:

• Since war existed as a means for states to achieve their interests, the European political system in
the 18th century was a royal court in which no monarch could dominate on his own. Though some
monarchs had greater reach to power through the richness of the realm they ruled, no ruler had the
absolute means to make a marginal difference to subdue the others. Therefore any conflict rested on
the interest of a single monarch happened to turn into a war in which almost all units involved
attempting to get a share. As Paul Schroeder points out “the motive and rule of all action was to
advance the interests of the state meaning first of all its power, security, and wealth, but also, almost
equally, its monarch’s honour and prestige (considération) and rank among other princes. Reason of
state thus closely linked the state with its monarch and dynasty, but not with its people or
nationality; that link was only beginning to emerge in some countries” (1994: 8).

• Almost all the major conflicts that broke out in Europe were related to royal issues and unsettled
dynastic successions, as in the cases of the Wars of the Spanish Succession, the Wars of the Austrian
Succession and the Seven Years War. However, war-making was costly and the financial means of the
European monarchs only allowed them to wage limited wars with restricted aims.

• Understandably, the Congress System was the direct result of all of the traits mentioned above.
They were convened to end wars and find a way to resolve the conflict and to reach a mutually-
acceptable agreement. All the major conflicts which involved almost all the actors in the European
political system were settled and resolved by major conferences.

• Basically, the Utrecht Congress was a meeting to end an all-out war and construct a collective
rapprochement for peace. In a way, it was an adaptation of the procedures which had worked
effectively in the Peace of Westphalia. As had happened in the course of Utrecht, the congresses
emerged as adequate platforms to end wars only; however, states were hesitant to apply to this
instrument to other international issues. Therefore other congresses that were held in the 18th
century had the same characteristics as those of Utrecht, that is, they were all “peace” congresses. In
that sense, these were “ad hoc” meetings.

By the turn of the 18th century, states did not have any explicit intention for establishing a
permanent organization, partly because the monarchial ties created a collective spirit through which
sovereigns of Europe found common ways to conduct European political order. Accordingly, when
diplomacy failed, the Congress System was the most efficient option to re-activate it. However, it
should be noted that the Congress System was the first step in the evolution of the collective
diplomacy and cooperation among states.

The Congress of Vienna

Throughout the 18th century, the European system underwent a stratification in which relatively
more powerful states struggled for dominance. However, as stated earlier, no one state was strong
enough to dominate the others. On the contrary, a balance of power emerged that rested on
counterbalancing coalitions in which almost all states took part, regardless of their power capabilities
(Kaplan, 1957: 685-687). Both the dynastic kinship and the Congress System supplied the primary
tools for the mechanism of the European politics making diplomacy more effective and war less
destructive in an attempt to sustain order. Therefore, states showed little interest in creating any
permanent organization that might threaten their sovereignty.

The French Revolution and the French Revolutionary Wars utterly ended the European balance of
power mechanism by destroying the dynastic kinship. The Revolution also distorted the Congress
System replacing multilateral diplomacy with bilateral treaties made during the Revolutionary Wars.
Since France was a republican regime, the previous dynamics of diplomacy that was depended on
dynastic kinships had no longer significance. Therefore, for other major European powers, the war
was the only way of interaction with France.

As Napoleon became the Emperor of France, the old European order went into a steep decline.
When Napoleon declared himself the “Emperor”, he was anything else but a royal. The royal houses
of Europe felt hapless to communicate with a ruler who claimed to have derived his power from the
people and the revolution. Napoleon’s claims seemed simply illegitimate to the other royals.
Consequently, he sought legitimacy by resorting to arms, and while doing that, he took the legitimacy
he rested on to any new territory gained, thus destroying the old rule and building his own scheme
(Lee, 1982: 18).

Despite the power of France, the European monarchies were not eager to give into Napoleon’s
demands without a fight. The European monarchies formed Coalitions to counter Napoleon’s
menace. Though most of the coalitions failed and dissolved by Napoleon’s established military
superiority, new ones re-emerged almost immediately. The structures of these coalitions paved the
way for the oncoming European political system and order.

The coalitions against Napoleon were formed through treaties that were “intended to ensure the
loyalty of the members of this coalition to one another, to sustain the willingness of its members to
fight the war through to a successful conclusion, and to prevent its members from making separate
peace with France at the expense of one another” (Rich, 1992: 3). Therefore with such new
characteristics, these coalitions were profoundly different from those made in the 18th century since
they “contained political, territorial and economic provisions that all members deemed essential to
safeguard and promote their individual interests and to ensure the future stability of Europe as a
whole” (Rich, 1992: 3). In this respect, the coalitions which in definition had loose characteristics
were transformed into alliances with obligatory and coercive features.

In March 1814, four major powers of Europe, namely England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria came to
an agreement and signed the Treaty of Chaumont to form the coalition that would eventually defeat
Napoleon. However, due to its characteristics and the commitments made by the signatories, the
treaty amounted to an alliance. The signatories reaffirmed their commitments to the previous
agreements and decided not to make a separate peace until all other objectives achieved. These
“other objectives” defined in secret articles comprised a settlement of a new European system to
restore or replace the older system that was utterly distorted by Napoleon. Article 32 of the Treaty of
Chaumont required the convention of a general congress within two months following the signature
of the treaty by the plenipotentiaries of the belligerents to regulate the arrangements which were to
complete the provisions of the peace treaty signed with France (Mowat,1922: 5). The definite aim of
the four major powers was to implement the new conditions agreed upon the post-Napoleonic
European political system.

All the European states that had taken part in the Napoleonic Wars replied positively to the
invitation. The Congress convened in November 1814 in Vienna. Nevertheless, the decision-making
process was carried out by the four major powers that were the signatories of the Treaty of
Chaumont. Throughout the Congress of Vienna, these powers singlehandedly drew the new
European map, dissolved Napoleonic states, restored the old monarchies that Napoleon dismissed
and made extensive border changes through annexations (Mowat, 1922: 7-8). A brief period in which
Napoleon came to power in France once again caused some nuisance. However, this short reign did
not upset the functioning of the Congress, and the decisive defeat of Napoleon at the Battle of
Waterloo sealed his fate. However, Napoleon’s coup clearly demonstrated that the effects of the
French Revolution were still being felt throughout Europe.

Following the Battle of Waterloo, the major powers signed two separate alliance treaties
consecutively, the Holy Alliance and the Quadruple Alliance. The former, signed on 18 September
1815, was a proclamation of the three East European monarchies, that is, the royal houses of
Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Romanov. The scheme of the alliance was proposed by Alexander I of
Russia and appeared as a manifesto of absolute monarchy. Its content refers to a spectrum from
divine right of the kings that appear in Holy Scriptures to Christianity’s value system in which a king
was to rule with justice and love his subjects as the shepherd of a flock or a family father (Mowat,
1922: 23-24). The alliance was proposed as a spiritual formation of the three sects of Christianity. The
three monarchs would remain united by the bonds of a true fraternity. With the Alliance, all three
monarchs accepted each other as equals and brothers. The monarchs promised to rule their subjects
based on Christian values such as charity, justice, and peace as well as to stay united in helping each
other to fulfill the role given to them by their God. Under such an agreement, the parties accepted to
employ any effective measure toward helping one another.

The content of the Holy Alliance was an explicit manifesto for the legitimacy of the absolute
monarchy’s sovereignty over the people who had recently experienced wthe French Revolution and
the Napoleonic Wars. Almost all European powers were forced to muster huge armies to fight
against the citizen army of the French Republic and then Napoleon’s French Empire. Such an
experience elevated the submissive subjects of the monarchical regimes to a higher consciousness of
liberty and to a sense of nationality. Therefore, the Eastern monarchies built a bloc to counter any
liberal or nationalist uprising by their “subjects.” As the three absolute monarchies, Russia, Austria
and Prussia formed the foundation of Holy Alliance, all European states were called to adhere to its
principles in order to be accepted as equals. Except for England being a liberal monarchy that could
not affiliate with the rhetoric of the Holy Alliance, all the other monarchies responded positively to
the call and signed the alliance. Following the restoration of the French monarchy, the Holy Alliance
was born as the second successful formation of the restoration following the Napoleonic Wars. As
such, the rules of the Holy Alliance provided the basis on which the new peace in Europe would be
established. However, Britain also decided to join the alliance. As a result, the treaty establishing the
Quadruple Alliance was signed on 20 November 1815. However, this does not mean that Britain
embraced the values of the absolute monarchies, nor did Britain and other members of the
Quadruple Alliance stop seeing France and the effects of the French Revolution as a threat to their
regimes. Yet, despite all these, once again, peace came to Europe.

THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF

INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The Concert of Europe

R. B. Mowat (1922: 4-5) indicates that the Congress of Vienna reinstituted the status of the European
powers that had deteriorated during the French Revolutionary War and the Napoleonic Wars. In this
respect, its goal was far from creating a new European system but to restore the older system. Thus,
the Congress of Vienna acted as a linkage between the 18th and 19th centuries in the evolution of
international institutionalization. Even though the Congress did not lead to the birth of any
international organization, the characteristics of the new European order paved the way for future
institutions.

The most significant outcome of the Congress of Vienna was the creation of a new diplomatic and
political system in Europe, which is referred to as the Concert of Europe. The Concert mainly rested
on a hierarchy that was constructed by the two treaties of the Holy and Quadruple Alliances and also
considered the major powers of Europe as the guardians of the European order. It aimed to preserve
the proven method of the Congress System, though with a significant change, which is that the major
powers now would periodically get together and discuss the issues regarding order and peace in
Europe. This new understanding of diplomacy initially worked and produced a series of four meetings
from 1818 to 1822. However, this new diplomacy lost its esteem later in the 19th century.

The Concert of Europe should be considered as the birth of a new era in both diplomacy and
international institutionalization. As stated above, the meetings and treaties aimed at securing a
redistribution of power in favor of major states. These interactions also produced different types of
“mutual restraint mechanisms,” which would be deployed in the post-World War I order.
Furthermore, these mechanisms were essentially intended to create “mutually reinforcing
institutional layers” that would transform the eighteenth-century balance of power into a hierarchy
based on supposedly peaceprone great powers.

According to John Ikenberry, the Concert of Europe had three major mechanisms:

• The Quadruple Alliance (later Quintuple) that was extended to the peacetime and formed the great
power ensemble.

• The periodical congress system that served as an institutional consultation mechanism among great
powers to maintain the status quo.

• The diffusion of “promulgation of norms and rules of European public law” that gave “the
institutional, territorial, and great-power arrangements in Europe a certain sense of legal-based
legitimacy and authority” (Ikenberry, 2001: 98).

Other institutional characteristics of the Concert of Europe may be summarized as follows:

• Despite the absence of an international organization, the Concert necessitated extensive

communication among European powers. Therefore, the Congress system was reinstituted to solve
territorial, political, economic and even colonial issues that could have disturbed the distribution of
power. With the restoration of monarchies, the homogeneity among European states was re-
established. However, starting from the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, the major powers came
to understand that the notion of the classical absolute monarchy was in decline and that power and
legitimacy were about to lie with the people rather than with the state. The rapid rise of liberalism
and nationalism triggered the 1848 Revolutions, and almost all European monarchies transformed
into constitutional regimes. This brought the era of absolute monarchies to an end and
deemphasized the dynastic kinship in international politics.

• The congress system introduced by the Concert of Europe was different from the older system
(Ikenberry, 2001:105). In the 18th century, conferences occasionally met to end wars and negotiate
the terms of peace. However, after 1815, an ongoing series of conferences filled the agenda of
European politics. Moreover, these conferences served as a joint management mechanism,
establishing a common trend of how territorial disputes could be resolved through negotiations.
Moreover, the congress system provided a common understanding with European states to develop
a security community within the continent.

• Despite the rise of liberalism and nationalism in the 19th century and the dissolution of absolute
monarchies, dynastic kinship still acted as a network in diplomacy. Royal family ties were still
functional; international problems were regularly negotiated in royal gatherings. Monarchs were
credible mediators for settling international conflicts. However, power shifted to public decision-
makers within states, and the role of the royals ended (Bridge and Bullen, 1980: 13-15).

• Finally, the Concert system was geographically limited to Europe. Its mechanisms only applied to
the European political community. In other words, nonEuropean states were excluded from the
collective diplomacy of the 19th century. The Concert, therefore, failed to be based on a universal
legitimacy.

In sum, retrospectively, the war can be seen as a way of interaction among states and a tool through
which states promoted common concerns, norms and institutions. As Bull argues, “war has a dual
aspect” (1977: 181-182). On the one hand, it compels states to prevent and contain the fighting due
to its potential destructive results for the international society. On the other hand, war “is a means of
enforcing international law, of preserving the balance of power” (Bull, 1977: 181-182). It is an
instrument to promote and conduct the rules and institutions of international society to restore
order for its members, which are sovereign states.

The Decline of the Concert of Europe

Both domestic and international developments in European politics weakened the cohesion among
the great powers in taking collective action for the maintenance of peace. Still, holding conferences
as a diplomatic channel facilitated the endurance of the Concert among the great powers.
Nevertheless, calling for an international congress became a seldom choice of states, and this was
observed only when they did not have the capacity to end the disputes through bilateral negotiation.

Two major meetings, namely the Paris Congress in 1856 and the Berlin Congress in 1878, were
significant examples of the Concert System in the second half of the 19th century. Although both
were convened after the wars between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, they had broader outcomes
that contributed to the rise of international institutionalization by providing legal instruments.

For example, Protocol 23 signed at the Paris Congress provided a reference to a third-party
mediation for the resolution of international disputes, although it did not impose mandatory
measures on states. (Mowat, 1922:112). Article 15 of the Final Act of the Paris Congress was a
remarkable improvement in international institutionalization since it established an international
commission for the supervision of the Danube River. The establishment of the International Danube
Commission for the regulation of free navigation in the river was the first initiative in forming an
international body for the governance of a particular international issue.

Another noteworthy outcome of the Berlin Congress was the codification of principles conducting
the naval warfare as the 1856 Paris Declaration on the Maritime Law illustrates (Mowat, 1922: 112).
As such, these international conferences provided a groundwork for socialization among states and
the creation of international norms and institutions.

During the Berlin Congress held in 1878, Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck who served both as
the organizer and the chair of the Congress established an influential model of secretariat for future
organizations. Moreover, the Berlin Congress was the first international meeting where previously-
formed committees examined all issues ahead of the Congress. As such, the success of the Berlin
Congress was attributed to the preparatory meetings of these committees (Bridge and Bullen, 1980:
124). Following the Berlin Conference, these organizational procedures became common practice in
future conferences.

The Concert of Europe and its congress diplomacy had both positive and negative outcomes by the
end of the 19th century:

• The congress system proved to be the best mechanism for mediation and arbitration among
European powers. Besides, meeting periodically at the congresses contributed to the construction of
a collective identity among Europeans, because the common diplomatic language and codes created
shared understandings among states. However, the system was confined to Europe. NonEuropeans
were neither familiar with the congress diplomacy nor shared a common understanding of diplomacy
and customs.

• The Concert contributed to the cooperation among European states for maintaining peace as well
as the governance of the system. However, it did not produce permanent international bodies for
resolving the disputes. Nor did it contribute to the institutionalization of international regulations
and norms by way of codifying them into international law. The Concert never encouraged its
members to create further organizations. As such, it was only an instrument of collective diplomacy,
not an organizational body to regulate the international system. Its structure was determined by the
great powers which produced rival blocks by the end of the century.

• In European politics the congress system served as a tool of peacebuilding after the armed
conflicts. However, it failed to prevent the confrontations of Europeans with non-European powers
as the cases of US-Spanish War of 1898 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 illustrated.

• Although tthe congress system was the primary tool of great power diplomacy, the outcome of the
congresses never surpassed the will and interests of their organizers. In other words, the Concert was
designed to favor the great powers and contribute to their common interests. Probably, this is the
most negative legacy of the Concert for future international organizations, because it undermined
the principle of sovereign equality.

THE RISE OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE HAGUE CONFERENCES

Until 1898, therewas not any attempt to establish sophisticated international political institutions.
However, growing commercial relations in the 19th century created a sound environment where
trade transformed the world into a global market. Thus, shared economic interests that required
regulations gained more prominence over individual state interests. The development of
transportation and communication also shortened distances and intensified inter-societal relations.
Growing demands for faster and more quality services worldwide required the creation of
international organizations to manage economic relations. The Metric Union (1875), the
International Copyright Union (1886), and the International Sugar Union (1902) were the most telling
examples of international organizations that were established for regulating the international
market. Furthermore, the International Telegraphic Union(1865),theUniversalPostalUnion(1874),and
the International Union of Railway Transportation (1890) emerged as the key international
organizations in coordinating international communication and cross-border transportation.
(Schecter, 2010: xxvixxvii). These public international organizations were formed by international
treaties among states.
They were designed to deal with specific common problems toward promoting the relations among
the signatory states. Their aim was to address economic and technical issues rather than political
matters (Barkin, 2006: 5).

According to Schechter, these early public international unions had numerous functions. They served
as the:

• Collection point and clearinghouses for information,

• Centers for collective decisions on the solution of common problems,

• Tools for the coordination of national policy and practices,

• Agencies for promoting uniform standards in their fields.

Particular river commissions also fulfilled regulatory, administrative, supervisory, and adjudicatory
functions (Schechter, 2010: lxvii).

Despite the emergence of international economic organizations, their mandate only covered low-
politics issues. However, states were strictly reluctant to share their authority with any international
body concerning high-politics , which refer to political and military affairs. Nonetheless, a civil
initiative in Switzerland successfully created the first international regulatory organization for war:
the International Committee for Relief to Wounded in 1863 that was later renamed as the
International Committee of the Red Cross. Subsequently, twelve countries signed the First Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field in August
1864. This convention marked the first of a series of international treaties that established the
foundation of the international law for the protection of the victims regardless of nationality in times
of inter-state armed conflicts.

The First Hague Conference

As non-European powers such as the United States and Japan increased their influence in world
politics, the power distribution in the international system began to change by the 1890s. This
demonstrated that the international system underwent a transformation and became more global,
despite the fact that European states still kept their supremacy. Due to the challenge of non-
European actors, the capacities of European great powers began to decline. For this reason, the
Concert System failed when non-European powers were involved in international affairs and global
political-military rivalry. Although the Concert successfully managed the anarchy of the European
system, it was ineffective on the global scale. Under these circumstances, the previously-established
international economic institutions proved that international cooperation could have incorporated
more states than earlier times.

In August 1898, Russian Tsar Nicholas II called for a conference to “seek to arrest the constantly
increasing development of armaments and thus contribute to a durable peace” (White, 1912: 1).
After receiving positive feedback from other countries, the Dutch government organized an
international meeting in The Hague. The First Hague Conference was held in May 1899 with the
attendance of 26 states. Two months of negotiations concluded with the adoption of a collection of
international treaties.

Despite its scope, The Hague Conference was a pioneer in international relations with its original
contributions to diplomacy and international affairs. Its aims, method, and results significantly
differed from previous international conventions.
• The international conventions during the Concert System were ad hoc peace conferences called for
the collective management and resolution of particular international crises. Their outcomes
concerning international norms and international law were not the primary concern. These
congresses such as the Paris (1856) and the Berlin (1878) Congresses were rather ‘great power
meetings’ and reflected strong characteristics of great power hierarchy of the Concert System.

• The Hague Conference, on the other hand, was the first international meeting that was based on a
higher sense of equality among states, regardless of their power status, and more universal
representation. All 59 sovereign states were invited to the conference from every corner of the
world. Out of its 26 participants, 20 states were from Europe, four from Asia, and two from the
Americas. As such, The Hague Conference can be considered as the first global conference in the
history of the international relations. It was a universal assembly of states that convened to reach a
common compromise for a specific issue, armament, which would be a menace to peace if an action
were not taken (Foster, 1904: 14-16).

• Previous international conventions were held in order to resolve specific international crises.
However, The Hague Conference was organized to conduct negotiations on a general topic rather
than a particular crisis. It did not address any territorial or political problem. Nor did it seek a
thirdparty mediation. Instead, the conference aimed to direct the attention of the invited
governments to a collective problem that might pose a threat to all sides if a collective action would
not be taken.

• During The Hague Conference, three independent committees were formed to work on these
issues: armament, arbitration, and the rules and customs of war. Although this working procedure
had been first introduced at the Berlin Congress, the committees proved to be more efficient as the
assemblies of state interaction at The Hague Conference. The committees prepared their reports to
be discussed in the final meetings of the conference. The final act was the outcome of this
procedure, which was successfully conducted for the first time.

Although it failed to achieve its primary objective of disarmament, the conference still had important
outcomes. The adoption of the Convention of the Pacific Settlement of International Controversies
was one of its most significant achievements. The First Hague Convention provided a legal basis for a
unique mediation mechanism by neutral states as well as international inquiry commissions for the
investigation of international disputes. Moreover, it paved the way for the creation of a Permanent
International Court of Arbitration (The Advocate of Peace, 1906: 72).

The Conference also produced two other conventions. The first was the codification of the
previously-agreed norms and regulations of land warfare, while the second was about the status of
the Red Cross regarding the naval warfare. The participant states also agreed upon three declarations
concerning the use of certain types of ammunition and weapons in times of war (Choate, 1913: 13).

The major outcome of The Hague Conference was the creation of the International Court of
Arbitration, which was designed as a permanent international body for states to settle international
disputes by judicial means. This showed the will of the participant states to reinforce the role of
international law in international relations. Established in The Hague, the International Court of
Arbitration received its first case in 1902, a dispute between the US and the United Mexican States.
Although its establishment was welcomed, states were reluctant to bring their cases before the
court, since it had no compulsory jurisdiction. The ratification of The Hague conventions by the state
parties also took longer than two years. Despite these shortcomings, the court proved its
effectiveness in solving disputes. Until 1905, it had concluded five cases in which great powers such
as Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the US stood before the court. Furthermore, they were
abided by its decisions, thus giving the court international recognition and prestige on the highest
level possible (The Advocate of Peace, 1906: 73).

The First Hague Conference was an initial step toward interstate cooperation for regulating the
international system for the benefit of each state. However, several issues were left unresolved. For
instance, compulsory jurisdiction was not adopted and it was left to the will of states, because states
were not eager or ready to limit their sovereignty (White, 1912: 132). The limitation of armaments,
the immunity of private property on the high seas, and the bombardment of ports and towns by
naval forces were also left unresolved at the Conference.

The Second Hague Conference

Although US Secretary of State John Hay called for a second conference in October 1904, it was not
held at that time due to the Russo-Japanese War (Choate, 1913: 50). The Russo-Japanese War itself
was a major test for the first conference. On the one hand, belligerents respected the principles
adopted at the Hague Conference to limit violence in warfare to some extent. On the other hand, the
war showed that arbitration was not the preferred method of resolving inter-state disputes.

After the end of the Russo-Japanese War, the Russians also called for a second conference.The US
insisted on the participation of the Latin Americans in the conference; as a result, a total of 44
countries attended The Second Hague Conference. Because of this, the Second Conference was
accepted as the first real “World Congress” in the history of modern international relations (Choate,
1913: 51).

The Second Hague Conference was held from June to October 1907, ending with the declaration of
the final act. Similar to the former conference, the Second Conference fell short of producing an
agreement on the limitation of armaments, but there was a progress on arbitration. The most
controversial debate was over an agreement to arbitrate contract debts. As such, the final act
introduced a certain degree of obligation on the state parties to arbitrate by declaring that “nations
bound themselves, each to the other and to all the world, not to resort to force for the collection of
contract debts due from one nation to the citizens of another nation, without first exhausting the
resources of arbitration” (Choate, 1913: 61).

At The Second Hague Conference, thirteen conventions and one declaration were signed. They were
mostly related to arbitration, regulations on war as well as land and naval warfare.

Other important outcomes of the Conference may be summarized as follows:

The first was the adoption of the Convention relative to the Opening of the Hostilities which provided
a formal procedure for states to declare a war. The second was the Convention relative to the
Establishment of an International Prize Court which proclaimed the establishment of an international
prize court that would deal with the resolution of conflicts related to the status of a captured ship in
times of war. The third was the plan to hold a third peace conference in the coming eight years.
Despite its ambitious nature, The Second Hague Conference fell short of the expectations of the
international society. First, only a small number of states ratified the conventions accepted at the
Conference. Second, the principle of arbitration failed because of international crises that eventually
led to the outbreak of World War I. Due to the war, the International Prize Court was not officially
established. The war also made it impossible to convene a third peace conference in 1915.

In conclusion, both conferences were of great importance to institutionalization in international

relations. They set models for future broad multilateral meetings. The Second Hague Conference, for
instance, was the first real “World Congress.” In general, the Hague Conference provided platforms
where states interacted equally, regardless of their size and power in world politics. Last but not
least, the introduction of the principle of arbitration and the establishment of a permanent
international court paved the way for future international institutions.

A NEW BEGINNING: THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The Hague Conferences were a promising start of the international cooperation among states.
Nevertheless, the international society was still at its formative stage. The dynamics of the
international system were more effective. States tried to strengthen their power through arms races
or building alliances. The great powers preferred the Concert System as a mechanism for conflict
management, relying on the fact that there was no all-out European war since the Congress of
Vienna in 1815. The balance of power among the great powers gradually became dysfunctional and
rival alliances were created soon after the Congress. By the early 1900’s the great powers followed a
relatively confrontational foreign policy. Therefore, despite the efforts at The Hague Conferences,
the outbreak of a major war became more likely in the international system. The inability of the great
powers to control the course of the Balkan Wars and the Austro-Serbian crisis after the assassination
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June 1914 triggered a major European War. All major
European powers entered the war by the first week of August. With the involvement of Japan and
the US, the war turned into a ‘World War’.

The Impact of the First World War

World War I had destructive consequences for the nineteenthcentury international system. First, the
European dominance over the international system ended, since the major European Powers lost
their power capabilities after the war. Furthermore, the existing mechanisms and instruments of
European diplomacy lost their effectiveness and failed to bring the fighting to an end. The US
emerged as a world power. In this environment, US President Woodrow Wilson declared his
Fourteen Points as the main principles for a general peace. Wilson’s Fourteen Points heralded the
end of the hegemonic position of Europe in international politics. Although Wilson outlined the US
vision for both general and regional issues, his most appealing proposal was the creation of a
permanent international organization for the maintenance of peace. The 14th and final point states
that “ [a] general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of
affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small
states alike” (Moore, 1919: 70). Consequently, the establishment of a permanent international
organization, the League of Nations, was at the top of the agenda when the Paris Peace Conference
convened in January 1919 to negotiate the terms of peace.

The Establishment of the League of Nations

Since the Second Hague Conference, there was a growing ‘peace front’ of political and civil society
groups advocating the creation of an international organization. Zara Steiner (2000: 265) states that
the war acted as a major catalyst for “reform movements within and outside elected governments in
both the victorious and defeated states for the reconsideration of the premises on which the ‘old
diplomacy’ rested and [they] demanded an overhaul of the diplomatic machinery of the prewar
order.” There was a general belief that the prewar governments were primarily responsible for the
outbreak of the major war. Particularly in Britain and the US, there were also peace movements
consisting of intellectuals, civil pressure groups, and politicians who had adopted an anti-war posture
(Wertheim, 2011: 797-834; Laity, 2001: 216-237).
According to Wilson’s proposal, the League of Nations was supposed to be a community of
democratic regimes which would accept the resolution of disputes through diplomacy and
arbitration. The League would act as an assembly of states that would contribute to the development
of international law. However, it was designed to be an intergovernmental organization rather than a
supranational institution. It was considered a transition from the ‘old diplomacy’ to the ‘new
diplomacy’ that would rely on a higher degree of compulsory jurisdiction. It was accepted that the
great powers would still act as the core of the post-war system but “power balancing would be
replaced by more legal and rule-based mechanisms of power management and dispute resolution”
(Ikenberry, 2001: 117).

The Allied powers accepted the Fourteen Points, though with some reservations, as both their war
aims and the basis of the post-war system. Following the end of World War I in November 1918, the
Paris Peace Conference convened in January 1919 to negotiate the post-war settlement. The creation
of an international organization, namely the League of Nations, following the end of the War was
regarded as an effective instrument to prevent future wars and to maintain international peace. In
fact, the War had severely disrupted the world economy and led to massive casualties, especially in
the European theatre. As such, not only decision-makers but also the Western public opinions
supported the idea that devastating wars could have been avoided if nations had solved their
international disputes through deliberation and negotiation without resorting to force. Sharing this
faith, the leaders of the Allied and Associated countries, at the very beginning of the Paris Peace
Conference, began to work on the covenant of the post-war intergovernmental organization as an
integral part of a general peace treaty.

Although the establishment of an international organization was widely welcomed, its scope and
mandate were subject to debate. The US, Britain, and France proposed their own plans for the
postwar organization that framed the initial discussions. The US proposal drafted by E. M. House
(Colonel House), the British proposal by Lord Phillimore Commission, and the French proposal by
Leon Bourgeois Commission. Jan Christian Smuts from South Africa declared a final plan. At the
beginning of the Paris Peace Conference, it was decided that the covenant of the League of Nations
would become an integral part of the general peace treaty and an independent committee would
work on its drafts (Bennett, 2010: 26).

The committee on the Covenant of the League of Nations began to work on 3 February 1919 in Paris
and consisted of nineteen members, two from each great powers and one from relatively small
countries. Its chairman was US President Woodrow Wilson. Each major country came forward with
different priorities. For Wilson, the most important element of the post-war international body was a
general guarantee system that would ensure the existing territorial integrity and political
independence of each member state against any external aggression (Northedge, 1986:30). Britain,
on the other hand, opposed Wilson’s general guarantee system as this provision would make any
change of frontiers impossible under all circumstances. The British representative, Lord Robert Cecil,
proposed the following extra provision: member states could “advise the reconsideration of treaties
which have become inapplicable and consideration of international conditions whose continuance
might endanger the world peace” (Henig, 2010:35). The French priority was the prevention of future
German aggression against France. As such, France tried to provide some mechanisms facilitating its
own security against Germany and was in favor of the creation of an international military force at
the disposal of the League. For France, this international force was to enforce the provisions of the
Covenant and to deter any international crises but also particularly to secure itself against any future
German aggression (Henig, 2010: 46-47).
After extensive work, the final draft of the League’s Covenant was presented to the peace conference
on 28 April 1919 and it was adopted unanimously (Miller, 1921: 398-424). It was decided to locate
the headquarters of the League in Geneva, Switzerland and to appoint Sir Eric James Drummond as
its first Secretary General. While Britain, France, Japan, and Italy became the initial non-permanent
members of the Council of the League, a number of countries were invited to sign the Covenant to
become its original members. After being authorized by the committee, SecretaryGeneral
Drummond began recruiting staff for the new organization, using an office in London as the
temporary headquarters. Eventually, the League of Nations officially came into being on 10 January
1920, when the Covenant was adopted as part of the Treaty of Versailles.

The Organizational Structure of the League of Nations

Including the victorious allies and neutral countries, 44 states initially became the original members
of the League. The number of the League’s member states rapidly increased, and 63 countries
became member states of the League by 1939. Although the idea of a permanent international
organization for maintaining peace was championed by US President Wilson, the US officially never
joined the organization, because the US Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles and the League of
Nations. The states that were later admitted to the League included Bulgaria and Austria in 1920,
Hungary and Romania in 1922, Germany in 1926, Turkey in 1932, and the USSR in 1934. However,
some states withdrew from the League’s membership such as Brazil in 1926, Japan in 1933, Germany
in 1933, and Italy in 1937.

The main organs of the League of Nations were the Assembly, the Council, and the Secretariat. This
structure clearly shows that the League was designed as a global parliament where states would
socialize and collectively manage the peace, which was hardly won after four years of total war.

The Assembly: The Assembly was one of the principal bodies of the League. It was composed of one
to three representatives from each member state, and therefore reflected the universal
characteristic of the League. States were also able to send experts, substitutes, and delegates to its
sessions. The Assembly was the League’s body where all member states were equally represented.
Regardless of their size or power, each member had only one vote. As such, the Assembly provided
an equal opportunity to each member, including relatively small states, to let its voice heard.

Although the Covenant suggested that the Assembly would meet every three or four years, at its first
meeting in 1920, the Assembly decided to hold sessions once a year. Article 3 of the Covenant stated
the General Assembly “may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the
League or affecting the peace of the world.” However, such issues were generally left to the Council.
Each meeting of the Assembly usually started with a general assessment on the previous year’s work
or the planning of the next year’s agenda. Topics discussed in the plenary sessions were deliberated
in advance in the preparatory committees. The plenary sessions met publicly and were open to any
member. Therefore, resolutions in the plenary sessions were adopted without further discussion.
Although the Council appeared to be the principal organ to deal with urgent international problems,
the Assembly had important powers too. It was the sole authority over the budget of the League. It
had authority to decide on the admission and expulsion of a member as well as the revision of
treaties. A decision of the Assembly, and of the Council in fact, had to be taken by a unanimous vote
of the member states participating in the voting. Over time, it became customary that any member
who disagreed with the majority during preparatory committee meetings would not vote in the
meeting of the Assembly (Herbert,1933: 69-73).

The Council: The Council was designed to be the other central body of the League of Nations. It was
primarily responsible for the maintenance of peace. The agenda of the Council covered various topics
from frontier adjustments or border disputes that emanated from the inconsistent peace treaties to
the governments’ unfair treatment of refugees and minorities, from the administration of specific
areas and settlements given to the League to the mediation of disputes among states. The Council
held regular meetings every three months and, if necessary, could hold extraordinary sessions. The
Council had four permanent members- namely, England, France, Japan, and Italy- and three non-
permanent members who were selected by the Assembly for a three-year term. The initial
organization of the Council showed that the great powers hoped to protect their privileged positions
over other states. However, the great power supremacy in the Council eventually ended for several
reasons. First, following the US refusal to join the League, the seat reserved for the US was left
unoccupied. Second, the number of non-permanent members was increased to six in 1922 and to
nine in 1926. In the early years, the Council members were represented by elder statesmen or
professional diplomats. From 1923 until its demise, foreign ministers represented their countries in
the Council, a move that reinforced the Council’s power within the League.

The Secretariat: The Secretariat consisted of a Secretary-General and staff who were responsible for
the administrative affairs of the organization. This body represented the organizational structure of
the League and contributed to the cooperation and collaboration among its various departments.
The staff included members from all parts of the world. The staff members of the Secretariat were
responsible to the SecretaryGeneral and to the organization as a whole. They were expected to serve
independently of their own governments (Bennett, 2010: 33). As such, the Secretariat represented
also the universal identity of the League. Throughout its history, the League had three Secretaries-
General: Sir Eric James Drummond from Britain (1919-1933), Joseph Avenol from France (1933-
1940), and Séan Lester from Ireland (1940-1946).

Apart from the main organs, there were numerous auxiliary organizations represented within the
structure of the League. These were practically divided into two categories: the first included
organizations that were designed to assist the League in fulfilling its role to maintain peace through
judicial and political methods. The Permanent Court of International Justice (it was independent
from the League but acted as an advisory board), the Permanent Mandates Commission, the
Minorities Commission, and several other commissions were under the first category. The second
category of organizations had an economic and humanitarian character. The International Labor
Organization and the International Health Organization were the two most notable examples of this
category.

The League of Nations was an unprecedented development in the history of IR. However, it had both
strengths and weaknesses.

The strengths of the League of Nations may be summarized as follows:

• The main strength of the League of Nations was the ideology of peace upon which it was built.
However, this was also its main weakness. The League was founded on a hope of world peace. It was
expected to offer cooperation and a sense of collectiveness among states by creating universal
standards that would equally apply to all members and pave the way for international society
(MacMillan, 2001: 93).

• Despite the fact that war was still an option, it was believed that the League would both offer and
promote other political and diplomatic choices for states such as mediation and arbitration. After the
four-year fighting, it was thought that states would prefer diplomatic rather than military options. In
this regard, the League was considered a platform where multilateral diplomacy could function.
Therefore, it was not surprising that the substantial parts of the Covenant were about the measures
on preventing a future war. A Covenant-breaking state would be accepted as committing an act of
war against all members, and therefore the League would activate those sanctions that the Council
would suggest. These sanctions ranged from political isolation to a joint military intervention.
Although the Covenant provided important tools against aggressors, it left the enforcement of such
sanctions to member states.

• The post-war wave of republicanism and democratization gave the League a great impulse, as both
governments and civil societies demanded visible institutions that would guarantee the maintenance
of peace. In this regard, the League of Nations was considered a revolutionary attempt in terms of
“civilization” of international relations (MacMillan, 2001: 94). The League was the first permanent
international organization which had a complex organizational structure. It also provided a common
platform for the representatives of both states and civil society as well as its own bureaucrats to
negotiate and cooperate for mutual interests.

• The League showed great interest in global and trans-national issues such as labor, health, and
refugees. Even though they were regarded by states as secondary over political issues, the work of
the League demonstrated that these issues were closely related to the maintenance of peace. These
issues proved to be significant challenges in the post-war world. For instance, the Spanish influenza
took the lives of millions of people around the world in 1918. Furthermore, millions were forced to
migrate from their homelands, as the post-war treaties drew new borders in Eastern Europe. The
League established independent organizations and committees concerning these problems, aiming to
provide with people better conditions of labor, health, and living. The organization sought solutions
to transnational problems such the welfare of women and children, the abolition of slavery, and the
improvement of the conditions of refugees. The League also put a tremendous effort into
disarmament and decolonization. However, they remained inconclusive due to the reluctance of the
major powers to cooperate on political issues.

The weaknesses of the League of Nations may be summarized as follows:

• The primary problem of the League was the assumed equality among its members. As it was a
design of the victorious states of World War I, the US, Britain, France, Japan, and Italy were given
permanent membership in the Council. After the US rejection of the League of Nations, the Council
was dominated by European powers. Although it was one of the permanent members, Japan became
quickly disillusioned when the principle of racial equality was not accepted (Burkman, 2008: 80-86).

• Due to the absence of the US as well as the reluctance of Japan and Italy, the Council was
dominated by Britain and France. Each member had a different expectation from the post-war
organization. Britain perceived the League as an instrument to guarantee its primacy in world affairs
and a safety valve for the status quo. On the other hand, France, because of the security concerns
that Germany caused, expected that the League could guarantee its security and manage a favorable
European status quo (Kissinger, 1994: 235). Thus, the weak cohesion among the great powers was
one of its major weaknesses.

• The League did not fairly represent the political and geographical structure of the world. Apart
from the US absence, the defeated countries and the Soviet Union were not invited to the
membership. It was not until 18 September 1934 that the League of Nations adopted a resolution on
the admission of the USSR into the League. This essentially damaged the principle of universality as a
wish for characteristic of the League. Furthermore, the League only represented one-third of the
world in geographical terms.

• Another problem was the voting procedure. The Assembly and the Council could make a decision
only by a unanimous vote. In theory, it seemed that every state had a veto, reinforcing the image of
equal representation. However, in practice, the unanimous voting rule enabled the great powers to
prevent smaller states, who comprised the majority in the League, from taking decisions against their
interests. Moreover, this voting rule was more prone to creating deadlocks or delays in decision-
making processes, and therefore undermined the efficiency of the League.

• Probably the most significant weakness of the League was the lack of credible instruments at its
disposal to enforce its own decisions. Although the Covenant provided with the League an important
degree of power and authority over its members and defined several instruments such as
condemnation, arbitration, and sanctions, the effective deployment of these instruments
predominantly relied on the collective action on the part of the members. Moreover, the unanimous
voting procedure also paralyzed the organization to take punitive measures against rule breakers a
member or a group of members objected to these measures. In fact, being aware of this problem,
the Council always refrained from taking strong actions. More importantly, the League did not
possess its own military force. Without such instruments, the League’s prestige and credibility were
largely depended upon the will of its members. As the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the
Italian invasion of Abyssinia showed, the reluctance of its powerful members to take strong measures
for the maintenance of peace was the leading factor of its failure.

The Performance of the League of Nations

Following the war, individual peace treaties had been signed with the Central powers. However,
these treaties did not bring the long-waited peace to Europe. Because, the peace treaties signed at
the Paris Peace Conference suffered from significant shortcomings. The European map changed
considerably. New states emerged on the territories of the former Central powers. Millions of people
had to change their citizenships. Minorities and refugees became serious transnational issues. The
war kept the governments financially and economically very weak. Unemployment rates increased.
Revolutionary ideologies began to attract more supporters. Governments were unsuccessful in
solving the problems. These were the post- war conditions in which the League of Nations was born.

Since its inception, the League of Nations, however, became a hope for world peace. It was built
upon the pre-war efforts of peace movements both at the international and national levels. The
League was based on the experience of The Hague Conferences. They had created an idea of a
genuinely international organization that would not only act as an intergovernmental but also as a
transnational institution. The League generated a collective identity through which international
system, international society, and world society had the opportunity to co-exist. The League was not
only an organization but also an assembly of nations.

The historical development of the League of Nations can be divided into three main stages:

The Heyday of the League of Nations

The 1920s marked the golden age for the League when the organization both established itself as an
efficient working institution and received support from the member states. Apart from moral
support, the members also provided financial support with the organization, whose annual budget
was between 2.5 and 7 million US dollars. With this support, the League was able to deal better with
various problems that might endanger peace.

The League had five major objectives:

• to prevent future wars,

• to enforce disarmament,
• to promote the international law,

• to provide with people better conditions of living,

• to enforce the peace treaties signed in Paris, primarily the Treaty of Versailles.

During the early 1920s, the League proved its potential with regard to preventing wars. The League’s
Council was instrumental in the settlement of the border dispute between Germany and Poland in
Upper Silesia in 1922, theCorfu incident between Italy and Greece in 1923, the border clashes
between Greece-Bulgaria in 1925, and the Mosul question between Great Britain and Turkey.

The initial success of the League can be explained by several interrelated factors: first, the League
represented the post-war peace, and no government preferred to take action that could where and
when it could find itself in a position of being considered as an aggressor. Second, during the 1920s,
the League tested its authority on disputes mostly between small or middle powers. Third, the
League showed sufficient resilience in suggesting solutions but never imposed its decisions on
governments. As observed in the Corfu incident, the Council kept changing its decisions until an
acceptable solution was found. Fourth, the League was successful in arbitration and earned
credibility in adjudicating between the member states. During the 1920s, almost thirty cases were
brought before the League and most of them were settled.

The League contributed to solving the problems of the post-war international society. The
organization tried to address the economic problems of the European states in the 1920s through
developing new political and economic tools. For instance, the League saved countries, such as
Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Greece, from total bankruptcy. As for disarmament, the League had a
distinct advantage during the 1920s. Fortunately, the European states did not have sufficient
resources for armament. For this reason, they needed to use diplomatic and other non-coercive
means rather than military force in order to solve their disputes. This increased the need for
arbitration offered by the League. However, almost every state was aware that the tools and
mechanisms provided in the Covenant were weak and insufficient. Particularly, middle and small
countries, in an attempt to balance the power of major states, called for disarmament as the focal
point of the new collective security system. The Assembly prepared several drafts on disarmament
measures. The first proposal failed in 1923 when the major powers, except France, refused to sign it.
The second proposal developed a new understanding of security based on arbitration, mutual
security, and disarmament. The Geneva Protocol was signed in 1925 and entered into force in 1928.
However, the Protocol proved ineffective, because Britain did not join it.

One of the paradoxical responsibilities of the League was the enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles.
The Treaty of Versailles reflected the French fear of the German revenge, and imposed harsh terms
on Germany. Both the US and Britain hoped that the League would constitute a common ground for
improving the terms of Versailles. However, the rigid attitude of France due to its security concerns
became the main obstacle. What is more, France temporarily invaded the Ruhr region when
Germany failed to pay its war reparations in 1923. With the support of the US and Britain, the
German economy began to recover through the Dawes Plan. In contrast with the French policy,
Germany preferred international cooperation over revenge. The outcome of the German cooperation
was the Locarno Pacts of 1925 in which France, Germany, Belgium, Britain, and Italy mutually
guaranteed the peace and the post-war borders in Western Europe. The League’s Council was
mandated to oversee bounder violations. Furthermore, France, Germany, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia signed another series of treaties that guaranteed the status quo in Eastern Europe.
Germany’s cooperative approach was rewarded: Germany was admitted to the League.
The Locarno Pacts showed that the major powers’ stance on peace determined the role that the
League could play in security issues and, as a matter of fact, in world politics. During its early years,
the League enjoyed a greater influence over intergovernmental relations mostly due to the
collaborative approach of the major powers toward international issues as the Locarno Pacts
illustrated.

The Decline of the League of Nations

The Great Depression of 1929 created a worldwide economic recession. Almost every state suffered
from the devastating results of the global economic crisis. Therefore, all governments around the
world shifted their attention from international issues to the domestic economic problems. However,
the late 1920s marked the peak of the peace and collective-security initiatives. The Briand-Kellogg
Pact of 1928 was a major achievement , because the Pact was the first legal document where the
siignatories renounced the use of force and resorting to war for achieving their national interests.
Article I of the Pact stated that “The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their
respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one
another.” Besides, the Litvinov Protocol led to the rapprochement with the Soviet Union and paved
the way for the Soviet admission to the League. “The Litvinov Protocol is the common name of an
international peace treaty concluded in Moscow on February 9, 1929. Named after the chief Soviet
diplomat moving the negotiations forward, Maxim Litvinov, the treaty provided for immediate
implementation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact by its signatories, thereby formally renouncing war as a
part of national foreign policy” (www.en.wikipedia.org).

From the early 1930s on, the League began to face significant challenges that actually tested its
capacity for maintaining the peace of the Versailles Treaty. The first major crisis was the Japanese
occupation of the Chinese territory of Manchuria in September 1931. The Manchuria crisis showed
all weaknesses of the League’s Covenant. On the night of September 18, 1931, an explosion along the
Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway served as a pretext for Japanese troops to seize
Mukden. On September 21, reinforcements arrived from Korea; during the ensuing weeks Japanese
control expanded throughout Northern Manchuria and across the entire region at the end of three
months. Chiang Kai-shek adopted a policy of non-confrontation, counting on the League of Nations to
settle the crisis. The Lytton Commission, appointed by the League, found Japan to be the belligerent
but instituted no meaningful consequences.

Japan then withdrew from the League and maintained its occupation of Manchuria until 1945 (http://
media.hoover.org). The Manchuria crisis was one of the major blows to the League, since the
aggressor state imposed its own will on the organization and escaped intact (Burkman, 2008: 165-
193). The League also received another damage with the German withdrawal from the organization
in October 1933.

Another challenge that the League faced during the 1930s was the Italian invasion of Ethiopia
(Abyssinia) in 1935. Italy had expansionist ambitions in Somali and Eritrea in the early 1930s. After a
series of border clashes, Ethiopian King Haile Selassie wanted to submit the issue to arbitration, but it
was refused by Italy. The Ethiopian government brought the issue before the Council. However, the
British and French noninterference in the Italian plans in East Africa further helped Mussolini delay
the Council’s decision (Rich, 2003: 175).

After the refusal of a final British and French reconciliation effort, Italy began a full-scale invasion of
Ethiopia in October 1935. The world watched while the Italian armed forces crushed the opponents.
Since Italy used mustard gas, which was banned by international treaties, the League decided to act
more swiftly. The Council unanimously (except for Italy) adopted a resolution condemning Italy as the
aggressor and proposed military, economic, and political sanctions under Article 16 of the Covenant.
In the Assembly, fifty members out of fifty-four accepted imposing sanctions on Italy toward taking
collective action against an aggressor. A committee was formed to coordinate the implementation of
the sanctions and member states agreed on the following actions: suspending arm and military gear
sales to Italy; ending credits to the Italian government; prohibiting imports from Italy as well as the
sale of critical strategic materials needed for arms industry (Bennett, 2010: 37).

However, the League’s reaction failed due to the lack of the British and French support to the
sanctions (Kissinger, 1994: 299). The sanctions indeed had hurt the Italian economy, but they were
never enough to force Italy to stop the aggression. Because, food, coal, steel, and oil were exempted
from sanctions, and Italy was not restricted from using the Suez Canal. What is more, in July 1936
when Mussolini declared Italy’s victory in Ethiopia, the Assembly succumbed to the British proposal
on dropping the sanctions on Italy, despite opposition from smaller states. The Italian invasion of
Ethiopia demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the League and its measures, when they were not
supported by the great powers.

The Demise of the League of Nations

The failure of the League to prevent the Italian aggression marked a major blow to the organization.
In fact, such crises only demonstrated the weakness of the League, because of the same reasons.
First, the great powers were divided so that they were not able to collectively manage the post-war
system. The US stayed away from the European diplomacy, and both Britain and France were too
weak to counter the revisionist policies of Germany, Italy, and Japan. As it was obvious in the
Ethiopian crisis, concessions further showed the weaknesses of the major powers and encouraged
the revisionist countries to push their own agendas. Second, both the League and its members were
disappointed by the British and French hypocrisy. This situation created a vast gap between the great
and small powers and diminished the efficiency of the League. It clearly showed that the great
powers prioritized their own self-interests over common interests. Therefore, the League was
weakened by the absence of the great power support when the organization was in need of
leadership. Third, proposals for strengthening the Covenant and collective security by middle and
small states were neglected or rejected by the great powers.

After the Ethiopian crisis, the optimism that sustained the League disappeared. The League proved
ineffective in taking measures against Germany when it abrogated the Versailles Treaty. After 1936,
Germany remilitarized the Rhineland by breaking the rules of the Treaty of Versailles and Locarno
Pacts and annexed Austria as well as occupied Czechoslovakia. Hitler destroyed the post-war security
arrangements in Europe which the League was supposed to oversee. Furthermore, Germany, Italy,
and the Soviet Union intervened in the Spanish Civil War, whereas Japan invaded China. On all these
occasions, the League remained ineffective or just stood idly. When Germany invaded Poland in
September 1939, there was no application submitted to the League to investigate and take a decision
on the issue. The politically important action was taken when Finland appealed to the League for the
military assistance against the Soviet aggression in 1939: expelling the Soviet Union from the
organization.

During the course of World War II, the activities of the League were interrupted, and neither the
Assembly nor the Council held sessions. In the final years of the war, the idea for the establishment
of a future international organization was on the Allies’ agenda. In fact, when the United Nations
(UN) was established, the League still officially existed. The Assembly of the League held a final
meeting in Geneva and declared that all its technical missions and properties were transferred to the
recentlyestablished UN. With this declaration, the League officially ceased to exist on 16 April 1946.

Assessing the League of Nations

The League of Nations cannot be considered as the responsible party for the failures between 1920
and 1939. From its onset, neither its design nor its power matched its responsibility to manage
international politics. The effectiveness of the organization was closely tied to the support,
coordination, cohesion, and cooperation of its members as well as their mutual understanding of
peace. However, this was never achieved. Besides, states were always inclined to protect their own
interests rather supporting common goals (MacMillan, 2001: 95).

The League was the first international institution that was built on the positive and negative
experiences of the previous centuries. However, the post-war system proved to be problematic for
the League to sustain multiple contradictory roles. The League was never able to produce regulations
and norms for the post-war order and failed to promote the international law. The League also fell
short of creating a sense of equality among its members, since it was open to the interference of the
great powers.

The League evidently showed that international organizations were the most effective ways of
institutionalization in international relations. However, it also revealed that states might be reluctant
to share their sovereignty with international bodies. Therefore, the League’s potential was
circumscribed by state sovereignty, which prevented the organization from receiving the necesssary
support to keep the peace.

Nevertheless, the League of Nations constitutes a significant case in the history of international
organizations. It was the first institution with such a complex structure and designed to operate as an
actor with some degree of autonomy. Its legacy, both negative and positive, was instrumental in
designinga more advanced organization: the UN.