14.

Emotions in Violent Extremism

Nicole Tausch1*, Sidney Bode1, and Eran Halperin2

1
University of St Andrews, School of Psychology and Neuroscience
2
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Psychology

*Corresponding Author: Nicole Tausch, School of Psychology and Neuroscience, St Mary's

Quad, South Street, St Andrews, KY16 9JP; Email: nt20@st-andrews.ac.uk.

Reference:

Tausch, N., Bode, S., & Halperin, E. (in press). Emotions in violent extremism. In: M. Obaidi
& J. Kunst (Eds.), Handbook of the Psychology of Violent Extremism, Cambridge University
Press.

Word count: 9,957 (incl. reference list + figure)

1
 Abstract

This chapter examines how emotions contribute to the development of violent extremism,

drawing on research into emotional drivers of violent intergroup behavior. We first introduce

the concept of emotion and explain the role of cognitive appraisals of events in shaping

emotions. Then, to position emotions within the context of hostile intergroup relations, we

demonstrate how social identities and group processes impact emotional experience. In the

main section of this chapter, we consider the roles of several discrete emotions that motivate

distinct types of behaviors relevant to violent extremism. Using a broad framework of the

radicalization process, we suggest that: (1) Humiliation, shame, and anger in response to self-

or group-relevant experiences are pertinent pre-radicalization as they create a desire to re-

establish a positive self- or group-image and to restore a sense of justice; (2) Contempt,

disgust, and hatred, as emotions that exclude their targets from moral consideration and

motivate their eradication, develop during active radicalization; and (3) Positive emotions,

such as love, joy and pride, which increase commitment and motivate others, characterize the

engagement stage. We draw out implications of our analysis for policy makers, stressing the

importance of responding to the unfulfilled emotional needs that motivate violent extremism.

Keywords: Emotion, social identity, violent extremism, radicalization, deradicalization

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 I couldn’t forget those moving scenes, blood and severed limbs, women and children

sprawled everywhere. Houses destroyed along with their occupants and high rises

demolished over their residents, rockets raining down on our home without mercy.

[...] In those difficult moments many hard-to-describe ideas bubbled in my soul, but in

the end they produced an intense feeling of rejection of tyranny, and gave birth to a

strong resolve to punish the oppressors. (excerpt from Osama Bin Laden’s 2004

address to the American people)

All I ever wanted was to love women, and in turn to be loved by them back. Their

behavior towards me has only earned my hatred, and rightfully so! I am the true

victim in all of this. I am the good guy. Humanity struck at me first by condemning me

to experience so much suffering. I didn’t ask for this. I didn’t want this. I didn’t start

this war… But I will finish it by striking back. I will punish everyone. And it will be

beautiful. Finally, at long last, I can show the world my true worth. (excerpt from

Elliot Rodger’s manifesto ahead of the 2014 Isla Vista attacks)

Whether it is in experiences of humiliation at the hands of others, feelings of revulsion and

hatred in response to the wrongdoings of the powerful, or joy and pride in collective purpose

- emotions play a central role in motivating acts of violence against other groups. As captured

by the excerpts above, the perpetrators of violent acts often express passionate emotions,

whether to appeal to and mobilize their group, or to explain and justify their actions to others.

These emotions can pertain to their own experiences, such as moments of personal

humiliation, or emotions expressed in response to the grievances of an entire group.

In this contribution we draw on empirical findings from psychology and related

disciplines on the role of emotions as drivers of violent intergroup behaviour to examine how

3
emotions may contribute to the development of violent extremism. The chapter is organized

in four parts. First, we introduce the concept of emotion and highlight the importance of

subjective appraisals of events in shaping emotional responses, and the role of distinct

emotions in motivating specific types of behaviour. Second, we give an overview of the role

of groups in emotion generation. We consider the importance of social identities in eliciting

emotions in response to group-relevant events and describe how group processes shape

emotional experience. Third, we summarize the underlying appraisals, goals, and action

tendencies of a range of emotions that we believe are central in understanding radicalization

toward violent extremism. We focus on: a) negative self-conscious emotions, in particular

humiliation and shame, which are elicited through experiences that imply a negative

evaluation of oneself or one’s group (Lickel et al., 2011; McCauley, 2017); b) other-

condemning emotions including anger, contempt and disgust, which are felt in response to

others’ transgressions (Haidt, 2003; Matsumoto et al., 2015), as well as hatred as a emotion

that entails an extreme devaluation of its object (Halperin, 2008; Sternberg, 2003); and c)

positive emotions such as ingroup love, joy, and pride that arise from identification with, and

action on behalf of, a valued group, and that can serve to strengthen commitment and to

inspire other (Hopkins et al., 2016; Tausch & Becker, 2013). Finally, we reflect on the

implications of our analysis for strategies aimed at countering violent extremism.

What is an Emotion?

There is no single agreed-upon definition of emotions, with debate surrounding the

boundaries of a concept that has been used to refer to facial expressions, words, and

experiences (Keltner & Lerner, 2010). Emotions encapsulate patterns of activity across

different bodily systems, involving synchronized psychological, sensory, physiological and

motivational changes that ready the organism to respond effectively to environmental

4
demands (Keltner & Gross, 1999; Scherer et al., 2001). For example, confrontation with a

potentially harmful stimulus triggers the body's "fight-or-flight" response, which includes

cognitive changes like increased alertness, physiological changes such as a rapid heartrate

that facilitate swift action, as well as the subjective experience and overt expression of fear.

Human emotions serve several functions beyond protecting an individual’s immediate

survival. They underpin many social processes, such as maintaining reciprocity and fairness

in cooperative groups, negotiating status hierarchies, reinforcing social norms, and directing

social learning (Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012). A specific set of ‘moral emotions’ facilitate the

interests or welfare of other people and society as a whole (Haidt, 2003). They include the

other-condemning emotions of anger, contempt and (socio-moral) disgust, other-praising

emotions such as gratitude and admiration, the self-conscious emotions of shame, guilt, and

pride, and other-suffering emotions like compassion and sympathy. These emotions

determine, for example, whether we confront, help, or exclude others, emulate their

behaviour, compensate them for our transgressions, or assert ourselves. Emotions also play

vital roles in motivating goal-directed behaviour. Achievement emotions (Pekrun &

Stephens, 2010), such as pride resulting from successful goal-directed behaviour, sadness or

frustration in response to failure, or enjoyment experienced during achievement-related

activities, determine goal commitment and the effort exerted into future action.

Emotions arise from subjective appraisals (i.e., cognitive assessments) of events.

Appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Scherer et al., 2001; Smith & Ellsworth,

1985) assume that the primary appraisal of an event as self-relevant is followed by a

secondary meaning-making process whereby the individual (consciously or unconsciously)

evaluates the event along several dimensions (Keltner & Lerner, 2010). Commonly featured

appraisals include the certainty of an event’s occurrence, one’s coping potential, an

attribution of responsibility (to the self, others, or the situation), one’s ability to control the

5
situation, and whether the event is fair or deserved (Keltner & Lerner, 2010; Moors et al.,

2013).

The pattern of appraisals determines the nature of emotional experience. For example,

anger is aroused when an event is seen as blocking a goal, with high certainty, responsibility

is ascribed to others, and the individual perceives a high amount of control (Lazarus, 1991;

Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). If, however, the event is attributed to uncontrollable situational

factors, sadness is elicited. This approach to emotion generation has three important

implications. First, people who appraise events similarly will experience a similar emotional

response. Second, people who appraise the same event differently will experience different

emotions. Third, we can change (or regulate) emotions by changing appraisals.

Distinct emotions, in turn, motivate distinct types of behavior. The appraisal process

activates emotion-specific goals, which refer to the underlying objectives of an emotion

(Roseman et al., 1994). Emotion goals are closely tied to action tendencies (Frijda et al.,

1989), which are impulses to engage in behaviors that address the underlying motivational

goal. For example, anger with its core appraisals of unjust action, other-blame, and high

control is associated with the emotional goal of correcting wrongdoing. It elicits

confrontational or persuasive/educational action tendencies aimed at serving this goal. The

translation of these general action tendencies into specific behavioral tendencies is a function

of the context in which the emotion occurs, and their enactment further depends on external

factors, such as opportunities or cultural norms (Evers et al., 2005; Halperin, 2016).

Group-based Emotions

Emotion research over the past few decades has shown that individuals experience

emotions not only in response to events that directly impact them, but also on behalf of their

groups, a phenomenon that is highly relevant for understanding radicalization processes.

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While violent extremism has many manifestations, including actions that are undertaken by

so-called “lone wolfs”, violent actors typically perceive themselves as belonging to, and

acting on behalf of, a broader social or ideological group (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006; e.g.,

Miller, 2023). This means that engagement in violent extremism can be understood as a form

of collective action, that is, action that serves group goals (Tausch et al., 2011). The social

identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987) and its application to group-

level emotions (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993) are pertinent to understanding of how

group identities shape emotions.

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) posits that we define ourselves in terms

of our group memberships, to which we attach value and emotional significance. As our

social identities are important sources of esteem, we strive for our groups to compare

favorably to other groups, along valued dimensions. Self-categorization theory (Turner et al.,

1987) proposes that, when a social category is salient, individuals define themselves in terms

of the beliefs, values, and interests that they share with other group members. This process

transforms relations between people in a way that enables them to act collectively (Reicher et

al., 2010). According to intergroup emotions theory (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993),

emotions are the conduits of group-based action. It posits that, when a social identity is

salient, people react to situations that are relevant to group goals, even if these situations have

no direct bearing on the individual. This gives rise to group-based emotions. For example,

people feel angered by an injustice brought upon their group, even if the event has no impact

on them personally, or ‘bask in reflected glory’ after a group’s success without having

contributed to it themselves. The same event can therefore produce qualitatively different

emotions depending on an individual’s current self-construal (Mackie & Smith, 2018). For

example, Dumont et al. (2003) demonstrated that Dutch participants responded with more

7
fear after the 9/11 attacks when a superordinate identity as a Westerner, as opposed to their

national identity, was salient.

Like individual-level emotions, group-based emotions are elicited through an

appraisal process whereby the individual evaluates an event on relevant dimensions such as

goal congruency, responsibility, or control, but from their perspective as a group member.

The same event can therefore be appraised differently (e.g., as more or less unfair) depending

on which identity is salient (Gordijn et al., 2006). Group-based emotions often concern other

groups and derive from the nature of intergroup relations (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002; Cottrell &

Neuberg, 2005). For instance, an outgroup that is viewed as threating or as presenting an

obstacle to group goals, together with an appraisal that one’s group has the resources to cope

with this challenge, arouses anger. If the ingroup is perceived as lacking coping ability,

however, group-based fear is aroused (Mackie et al., 2000). It should be noted that, when

intergroup relations endure over longer periods of time, group-based emotions can turn into

sentiments, which capture temporally stable predispositions towards an outgroup but are

otherwise similar to discrete emotions. These sentiments shape acute emotional responses to

event (Halperin & Gross, 2011). In this chapter we use the term emotion to refer to both

emotions in the traditional sense and to longer-lasting sentiments.

The appraisal process itself does not occur in isolation, but is shaped by the group,

with others serving as reference points for one’s own interpretation of events (Manstead &

Fischer, 2001; Reicher et al., 2010). Social interaction is an important means through which

this occurs, as discussion of events with others allows individuals to discover the sharedness

of experiences and perspectives (Thomas et al., 2014; Thomas et al., 2022). This can

stimulate the reappraisal of events by creating a sense of collective power and fostering the

external attribution of blame (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). For example, a woman’s shame

in response to sexual harassment can be transformed into anger as she discovers that her

8
experience is common and can be collectively challenged, placing blame on the abuse of

power in a patriarchal society rather than her own behaviour.

The literature on radicalization toward violent extremism corroborates the importance

of social interactions over shared grievances. Examining cases of Muslim men who joined

terrorist movements, Sageman (2008) illustrated how discussion in small social networks

made sense of both personal experiences of marginalization and distress over Western

military intervention in Muslim countries through an interpretative frame of a “war on

Islam”, creating a shared sense of outrage together with a resolve to act. Such processes of

radicalization through emotion generation can also take place online (see Smith et al., 2020).

While interactions can shape emotions by shaping appraisals, other group factors

impact emotional experience more directly. Emotional contagion, mimicry, and emotion

learning through observation occur when those exhibiting the emotion share an identity, and

among strongly identified group members (van Kleef & Fischer, 2016). Shared emotion can

take on a normative character and come to define an identity (Thomas et al., 2009). The

activation of an emotion norm (e.g., “women are furious about sexual harassment”) then

triggers the relevant emotion when this identity is salient and important. This facilitates

emotion convergence and collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2004). There is abundant

evidence that distinct group-based emotions predict distinct types of intergroup behaviour

(see Cuddy et al., 2007; Mackie & Smith, 2018; Halperin, 2016). Many studies have shown

that the effect of group-based emotions on orientations toward outgroups goes above and

beyond that of other prominent predictors such as ideology or socio-economic factors

(Halperin et al., 2011; Maoz & McCauley, 2008). These findings underline the role of

emotions as proximal drivers of intergroup behaviour.

Given their mobilizing potential, emotions are often purposefully elicited in group

contexts. This can be achieved through attentional deployment strategies (Goldenberg et al.,

9
2016). For example, animal rights activist groups use emotive visual material depicting

animal cruelty to mobilize others (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995) and videos highlighting the

oppression of Muslims is regularly consumed in jihadi networks (Bartlett & Miller, 2012).

Furthermore, group leaders can become “entrepreneurs of emotion” (Reicher et al., 2010) by

providing mobilizing narratives that weave together appraisals of injustice, blame and

collective strength to up-regulate attack-emotions such as anger and down-regulate inhibiting

emotions like fear (see Matsumoto et al., 2015). Symbolic gestures, such as wearing

particular clothing or engaging in collective rituals, can serve as cultural mechanisms to

maintain commitment to group goals by arousing shared emotions (Goldenberg et al., 2016).

Emotions in Violent Extremism

Violent extremism has been linked to a range of pre-disposing factors at individual,

group, or societal levels of analysis, including experiences of marginalization and political

alienation, group-based economic and social disparities, as well as objection to foreign or

domestic policies (Crenshaw, 2012). Psychologically, these “push factors” (Vengani et al.,

2020) reflect grievances, that is, violated expectations with respect to personal, group, or

societal conditions (Smith et al., 2012). Grievances are important precursors of action

mobilization (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Meta-analytic

evidence indicates that while group-based deprivation is a better predictor of engagement in

collective action, individual deprivation is more strongly related to negative personal

outcomes such as poor physical and mental health (Smith et al., 2012). Some research

suggests that a sense of ‘double deprivation’ (Foster & Matheson, 1995), which may be

created through interpretative frames that connect personal and collective grievances, is

particularly galvanizing (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Sageman, 2008).

10
 Consistent with intergroup emotions theory, relative deprivation research indicates

that affective responses to grievances are the most powerful, proximal drivers of collective

action (van Zomeren et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2012). In this section we give an overview of

several emotions that have been highlighted in the literature on intergroup violence, and

explore their implications for radicalization toward violent extremism. We embed this

analysis in a broad framework of the radicalization process. Although pathways toward

violent extremism are diverse, we can nevertheless identify three broadly-conceived stages:

(1) a pre-radicalization stage, in which personal or group grievances occur that may (or may

not) prompt radicalization; (2) an active radicalization stage, in which individuals or groups

come to espouse a belief system that legitimizes or even necessitates violence; and (3) an

engagement stage, which involves active steps toward committing acts of violence. Figure

14.1 presents a schematic outline of the framework guiding our review. It highlights key

emotions at each stage and emphasizes that the generation of emotion at the individual (i.e.,

micro-) level is embedded in, and influenced by, meso- and macro-level processes, which we

allude to throughout the chapter. Conversely, violent action feeds back into meso- and macro-

level processes, shaping intragroup processes and the wider political context.

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 Macro-level factors
Historical and socio-political context of intergroup relations

Meso-level factors
Social networks and interactions

Micro-level factors
Individual experiences and predispositions

Pre-radicalization Active radicalization Engagement in

violent extremism
Devaluation of identity Bad character of outgroup Belonging and solidarity
A sense of injustice Outgroup moral inferiority Group efficacy
Blocked goals Lack of influence on outgroup Elevation of identity

Humiliation Contempt Love

Shame Disgust Joy
Anger Hatred Pride

Non-violent outcomes
Figure 14.1. A schematic outline of predominant emotions in the radicalization process.
Note. This 3-stage framework serves as an analytical tool to examine the role of emotions in violent extremism. It is not designed to give an exhaustive account of
radicalization processes. Moreover, note that the different stages do not have to be temporally distinct, and that the emotions highlighted can (co-)occur at different stages.

12
Pre-radicalization

We suggest that humiliation, shame, and anger in response to self- or group-relevant

grievances are prominent during the pre-radicalization phase. These emotions create a desire

to re-establish a positive self- or group-image (Lickel et al., 2011) and motivate attempts to

hold perpetrators of unjust actions responsible (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).

Humiliation. Humiliation can be triggered by experiences that undermine one’s

dignity, self-worth, or social standing, including prolonged and repeated experiences of

discrimination or rejection, but can also be experienced vicariously on behalf of a group one

identifies with (e.g., “humiliation-by-proxy”, Khosrokhavar, 2005). It entails “a deep

dysphoric feeling associated with being, or perceiving oneself as being, unjustly degraded,

ridiculed, or put down—in particular, one’s identity has been demeaned or devalued”

(Hartling & Luchetta 1999, p. 264). Thus, humiliation is triggered by a devalued identity (i.e.,

what one is rather than what one does, Klein, 2005) due to the intentional actions of others,

together with an appraisal that this devaluation is unjust. It activates a motivation to restore

dignity and respect and to re-establish a positive identity. The appraisal constellation

underlying humiliation overlaps with aspects of both shame and anger, a complexity reflected

in the responses it evokes. Participants in experimental studies respond to humiliation-

arousing scenarios with both avoidance tendencies typically associated with shame, such as

the desire to withdraw, and approach tendencies usually associated with anger such as

ridiculing the perpetrator in return (Fernández et al., 2015). Similarly, outside of the

laboratory, humiliation predicts contradictory outcomes ranging from internalizing tendencies

such as depression and suicidal ideation to externalizing responses like interpersonal

aggression and rape (see Jonas et al., 2014).

Experiences of humiliation are frequently offered as explanations for cycles of

extreme violence and revenge (e.g., Lindner, 2006; Victoroff, 2005; see McCauley, 2017).

13
Challenging the view that humiliation inevitably motivates violence, a series of empirical

studies of Palestinians living in Gaza and the West bank found that humiliation is negatively

related to support for suicide terrorism (Ginges & Atran, 2008). Interestingly, feelings of

humiliation also suppressed support for acts of intergroup compromise, which led the authors

to suggest that humiliation produces an ‘inertia effect’.

Whether or not humiliation drives people toward violent extremism depends on

further appraisals, in particular with respect to the coping resources that are available to

address humiliating experiences (Fernández et al., 2022). For example, in an analysis of

video messages and biographies, Hafez (2007) demonstrated the themes of humiliation were

central in the accounts given by suicide terrorists in Iraq. But reference to group-based

humiliation was interwoven with several other “ingredients”, such as reference to the evil

nature of Western powers, the impotence of Muslim governments, and a belief that

humiliation can be undone through violent action (see also Fattah & Fierke, 2009). Other

work on caste-based humiliation in India showed that narratives of humiliation can also be

used to mobilize non-violent collective action (Jogdand, 2023). Thus, humiliation does not

inevitably result in violence, although it can be instrumentalized to that end.

Shame. Shame is a highly aversive emotion that is elicited by a sense of inadequacy,

failure, or a perceived violation of societal or personal standards which is attributed to stable

aspects of the self (Tangney et al., 2007). Shame is typically associated with avoidant

behaviour – people who feel ashamed often report a desire to remove themselves from the

shame-inducing event. Similarly, when experienced at the group-level, shame makes people

distance themselves from the group member who committed the wrongdoing, or from the

group identity altogether (Lickel et al. 2011). But the motivation to restore a positive self-

image can also lead to more active and even pro-social responses (Gausel et al., 2012).

14
 Significance Quest Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2013) describes how the need to re-

establish a positive self-view can instigate a process which may lead to violent extremism.

This account suggests that shame-inducing experiences, either those experienced by one’s

group, or personal experiences that are or are not related to a group identity, entail a

perceived loss of personal significance, importance, or effectiveness. The negative arousal

created from such experiences motivates actions to restore a sense of significance. This

process can foster violent extremism in the presence of an ideology that outlines a pathway to

significance through violence, and through embeddedness in social networks that provide

support for and means to engage in violent action. Webber and colleagues (2018) provide

field and experimental evidence for the relationship between the experience (or salience) of

insignificance-inducing situations1 and engagement in violent action or support for extremist

ideas. It should be noted though, as Kruglanski et al. (2013) explain, that the significance

quest can also be directed toward more constructive, non-violent outcomes. Thus, again,

while shame can contribute to the development of violent extremism, this is not an

unavoidable outcome.

Anger. Anger is elicited by an event that frustrates a desired goal and is particularly

strong when the event is viewed as unjust or illegitimate (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). It is

characterized by the motivational goals to remove obstacles and correct wrongdoing and

often motivates individuals to confront the object of their anger (Roseman, et al., 1994;

Halperin & Gross, 2011). Anger is fostered by an appraisal of high coping potential (Lerner

& Tiedens, 2006) and work on intergroup emotions has demonstrated that individuals report

more group-based anger when they feel that their group is strong and agentic (Mackie et al.,

2000).

1
Note that the authors did not distinguish shame from humiliation in this research.

15
 Anger has received much empirical attention in the literatures on political behaviour

and collective action. Overall, there is substantial evidence of anger’s role in motivating

engagement in collective action (e.g., Grant & Brown, 1995; Smith et al., 2008; Van

Zomeren et al., 2004). The cognitive and motivational characteristics of an anger response

have important consequences in the political domain. For example, anger was also shown to

impact information seeking and processing, which can reduce willingness to consider

alternative narratives (e.g. Valentino et al, 2008). It also reduces risk perception and increases

risk taking (Fessler et al., 2004; Lerner & Keltner, 2001), which can embolden people to

support extreme (and risky) responses such as war (Lambert et al., 2011).

Given these characteristics, anger has unsurprisingly been highlighted as one of the

emotional drivers of violent extremism (e.g., Crenshaw, 2012). For example, in a sample of

Muslims in Denmark, Obaidi et al. (2018) demonstrated that anger in response to Western

foreign policies is a positive predictor of willingness to use violence, but also positively

predicts non-violent action intentions. In an analysis of historical speeches by leaders of

ideologically motivated groups held 6 and 3 months before a significant event, Matsumoto

and colleagues (2015) demonstrated that leaders’ expressions of anger (together with

contempt and disgust) increased to a significantly greater level ahead of violent (e.g., the

Nazis’ Kristallnacht), compared to non-violent action (e.g., Gandhi’s Salt march), confirming

anger’s role in motivating violence. However, in their second study, which analyzed both

verbal and non-verbal emotional content in video-recorded speeches, they found no changes

in expressed anger ahead of violent acts (but increases in both contempt and disgust) and

documented a slight increase in anger expression prior to nonviolent acts.

Tausch et al. (2011) disentangled the role of anger from that of contempt by including

both emotions in a series of models predicting action tendencies in several intergroup

contexts (e.g., student protests in Germany, British Muslims' responses to British foreign

16
policy). They found that, once contempt is included, anger does not uniquely predict support

for violence. Rather, anger consistently predicted support for within-system action such as

nonviolent protest or support for ingroup-supporting policies, while contempt uniquely and

consistently predicted support for violent action.

Summary. Our overview of the characteristics and consequences of humiliation,

shame, and anger – emotions which are often denoted core drivers of violent intergroup

conflict (McCauley, 2017) – demonstrates that, while these emotions clearly play a role in

violent intergroup behaviour, their occurrence does not in and of itself motivate violence.

Rather, these emotions can generate a range of responses that address their underlying

motivational goals. In fact, a substantial body of work suggests that these emotions, in

particular anger, are often catalysts for progressive social change (see Thomas et al., 2009).

The complexity of behavioural outcomes is in line with the idea that the link between

emotions and behaviour is a dynamic process through which emotion-arousing events are

continually appraised and reappraised, and emotional responses calibrated over time

(Baumeister et al., 2007). This process is, as we described above, strongly determined by

one’s social environment and shaped by group processes such as leadership. Below we

describe three emotions – contempt, disgust and hatred – that are aroused when the

grievances that give rise to humiliation, shame or anger are appraised in a way that enables

and even facilitates the use of violence as a coping strategy.

Active radicalization

Active radicalization refers to a process whereby individuals or groups become

ideologically committed to violence; that is, they come to espouse a belief system that

legitimizes or even necessitates violent action against an opponent. Research on violent

extremism has demonstrated that active radicalization happens when a violence-supporting

narrative is available (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2013; Saucier et al., 2009) and through direct or

17
vicarious social interactions in which a violence-legitimizing interpretation of reality is

developed (Jasko et al., 2016; Sageman, 2008; Smith et al., 2020). We suggest that active

radicalization involves the hardening of emotions, which entails a shift from situational to

dispositional attributions of the offending behaviour (see Matsumoto et al., 2015).

Specifically, there is a change of focus from the appraised bad actions to the appraised evil

character of an offending party, which removes the possibility of their rehabilitation (Fischer

& Roseman, 2008). This process gives prominence to the more destructive emotions of

contempt, disgust and hatred, which exclude their targets from moral consideration and favor

radical solutions aimed at their eradication (Matsumoto et al., 2015).

Contempt

Contempt conveys one’s disapproval of, and perceived superiority over, another

person or group (Izard, 1977). It often co-occurs with anger but has distinct characteristics

and social functions (Fischer & Roseman, 2008). While anger tends to be focused on specific

incidences of behavior, contempt is elicited when another’s reprehensible actions are

perceived as dispositional, stable, and outside of one’s control. Contempt can develop “on top

of” anger if previous attempts to correct another’s offending behaviour were unsuccessful

(Fischer & Roseman, 2008). Unlike anger, expressions of which can be constructive and

serve to improve relationships, the presence of contempt motivates psychological

disengagement from the object of contempt, who will be treated with less respect and

consideration in future (Fischer & Roseman, 2008; Haidt, 2003). Contempt depersonalizes its

object (Izard, 1977) and dampens prosocial emotions such as compassion and guilt (Gervais

& Fessler, 2017).

In the political domain, people can experience what Miller (1995) termed “upward

contempt”; that is, contempt toward powerful groups or political elites (e.g., a government

engaging in an illegitimate war) and can involve a sense of moral superiority. Applying these

18
ideas to collective action, Tausch et al. (2011) suggested that contempt reduces the need to

adhere to social norms and moral standards and therefore enables actions that challenge the

established social system, including violent action. Tausch et al. (2011) obtained consistent

evidence that contempt predicts violent political actions across several contexts (see also

Travaglino & Moon, 2020). Moreover, textual analyses of the writings of a wide range of

militant extremist groups identified themes that are clearly indicative of contempt, including

the view the current government is illegitimate, oppressive and immoral (Saucier et al.,

2009). Matsumoto et al. (2015) detected an increase in verbal and non-verbal indicators of

contempt toward outgroups in group leaders’ speeches ahead of acts of violence. Together,

this presents converging evidence underlining the role of contempt in violent extremism.

Disgust. Disgust is characterized by revulsion and rejection. This emotion grew out of

a defense mechanism to protect the body from undesirable substances which has evolved into

more complex social forms that are elicited by social transgressions, norm violations, and

“unpalatable” ideas (Haidt, 2003). Beyond denoting group boundaries (Reicher et al., 2016),

disgust is thought to guard the lower boundary of what is considered human (Haidt, 2003).

Like the core disgust associated with ingestion, socio-moral disgust elicits a strong desire to

avoid, expel, or break any associations with an offending entity, which may be accompanied

with a motivation to purify oneself or one’s group by removing any objects or ideas

associated with the object of disgust (Haidt, 2003).

There are many historical examples where extreme violence is preceded by disgust-

evoking metaphors that depict outgroups as vermin and disease-carriers (Taylor, 2007), such

as antisemitic propaganda in Nazi Germany or the depiction of Tutsis during the Rwandan

genocide. How disgust motivates violence is however less clear. Some have argued that the

strong avoidance tendencies associated with disgust may favor indirect (e.g., ostracism) over

direct forms of aggression (Molho et al., 2017). Other findings indicate that disgust can

19
facilitate violence against outgroups indirectly, by eliciting their dehumanization.

Dehumanization serves as a form of moral disengagement from the victims of aggressive or

immoral behaviour (Bandura, 2016) and is a prominent theme in the narratives of militant

extremist groups (Saucier et al., 2009). Experimental evidence indicates that disgust

stimulates dehumanization; participants who had been primed to feel disgust associated the

outgroup more closely with animals than participants in a control group (Buckels & Trapnell,

2013). Moreover, Rousseau et al. (2023) found that disgust experienced among American

participants in response to human rights violations by ISIS in Syria elicited support for

retaliatory human rights violations. This relationship was mediated by dehumanization of the

opponent.

In their ANCODI model, Matsumoto et al. (2015) propose that anger, contempt, and

disgust combine into an explosive emotional mix that motivates violence. Anger as a high

arousal emotion motivates action, contempt leads to the devaluation of others, and disgust

motivates their elimination. They suggest that an event or historical narrative first produces

anger. Reappraisal of the event from a position of ingroup moral superiority elicits contempt.

Finally, further reappraisal evokes disgust, such that the outgroup must be completely

separated from the ingroup and even destroyed.

Hatred. Hatred encompasses an extreme devaluation of its target and is considered

the most destructive emotion in intergroup conflicts. While some scholars view hatred as a

blend of several negative emotions (specifically, anger, contempt, disgust, and fear; see

Sternberg, 2003), others have suggested that hatred is a distinct emotion with a unique

cognitive-appraisal component and specific emotional goals (Halperin, 2008). Hatred is

assumed to be a response to protracted harm, which is appraised as deliberately inflicted and

unjust, and is attributed to the inherent evil character of the perpetrator. It entails a belief that

the negative character of an outgroup is stable over time and unchangeable, and that it is

20
shared by all its members (Halperin, 2008). Accordingly, the emotion goal underlying hatred

is to eliminate or destroy its target (Halperin, 2008); it predicts both support for violence

against the offending outgroup and a decreased desire for compromise (Halperin, 2008;

Halperin et al., 2011). Consistent with this view, hatred is seen as an important driver of

ethnic conflict (Petersen, 2002) as well as of radicalization toward violent extremism (Atran,

2010). For example, in an analysis of personal accounts of radicalization of people formerly

identified with radical Islamism, Larsen (2020) highlighted hatred toward Western culture as

one of the dominant emotions expressed.

Summary. The literature reviewed above strongly suggests that active radicalization

toward violent extremism is likely to involve the interplay of several other-condemning

emotions, which may culminate in hatred and a strong desire to eliminate an outgroup. While

the precise mechanisms of how these emotions play into radicalization is beyond our current

understanding (and likely to be variable), it is conceivable that these emotions are fostered

through narratives that appraise common grievances in a way that puts blame on the

outgroup, presents them as morally inferior, inherently evil, and unchangeable, and identifies

violence as the solution (Matsumoto et al., 2015; Saucier et al., 2009). This interpretation

becomes particularly powerful and motivates action when it is validated through interaction

with reference groups (Smith et al., 2020). It is similarly plausible that violent narratives

resonate with people who already experience contempt, disgust, and hatred toward an

outgroup (see Bilewicz & Soral, 2020) and that these shared emotions serve as the basis for

group identification and acceptance of the narrative.

Engagement

When people take steps toward, and engage in, violent action on behalf of an

extremist group, these negative outgroup-directed emotions are likely to be reinforced and

strengthened (Becker et al., 2011). However, engagement also generates positive emotional

21
experiences associated with being part of a valued group, acting collectively, and achieving

group goals. We suggest here that, while these emotions are consequences of engagement in

violent action, they should also be considered as important drivers of violent extremism. This

is because their actual or even just anticipated (see Shepherd et al., 2013) experience can

strengthen commitment to the cause, and their expression can inspire others to join. Thus,

they can be considered as part of a cyclic process through which motivation is maintained,

action intentions are amplified, and others are drawn into the movement.

Love, Joy, and Pride. Collective action of any kind involves the creation of a

psychological group (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Thomas et al., 2022), which gives rise to

positive emotional experiences. A shift from personal to social identity transforms social

relations between people, increasing intimacy, trust, mutual support, and cooperation

(Reicher et al., 2010) - and creates mutual affection and ‘ingroup love’ (Brewer, 1999).

Belonging to, and identifying with, a valued group has a range of beneficial psychological

consequences. It can provide a source of self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and buffer

against negative experiences such as discrimination. Being validated and supported by others,

and mattering to the group (i.e., having relational value) are intensely positive experiences

(Hopkins et al., 2016). Moreover, engaging in coordinated collective action with others

creates a sense of power and agency (Drury et al., 2005) and creates joy (Barker, 1999).

Positive emotions are less often considered in accounts of violent extremism,

although previous work has emphasized the importance of factors that make extremist groups

appealing, be it an ideology, a sense of purpose, excitement and camaraderie, or status (i.e.

“pull factors” of violent extremism; Vergani et al., 2020). The positive emotions evoked

through collective action also characterize engagement with radical groups (e.g., Larsen,

2020; Sageman, 2008). Violence against an outgroup is often construed as moral and

honorable in defense of a virtuous ingroup (Reicher et al., 2008) and successful violent action

22
stimulates joyous celebration among those who identify with the actors (see Ginges & Atran,

2008). It arouses group-based pride, which is elicited by an appraisal that one’s group’s

action is successful, has met a high standard, is of particular moral value and indeed superior

to that of others (Halperin, 2016). When such positive emotions are experienced or even just

anticipated, it can motivate individuals to stay committed to their course of action, even in the

face of difficulties or costs. The expression of positive emotion through celebration of

successful violent action is also likely to attract others to the cause. Consistent with the

motivating role of positive emotion, research on collective action has shown that the

experience of group-based pride following successful group-based action motivates people to

pursue further actions along the same path (Tausch & Becker, 2013).

Implications for Policymakers and Practitioners

The prominence of emotions in violent extremism should not be equated with

irrationality, which is implied in discourses that emphasize ‘blind’ hatred as motivating

radicalization (Murshed & Pavan, 2011), nor should it be interpreted in terms of a

vulnerability that is exploited by extremist organizations, as is the underlying assumption of

many counter-terrorism programs (see Smith et al., 2020). Rather, emotions reflect the

outcomes of a complex meaning-making process that often takes place through interaction

with others and is influenced by a wider context of intergroup relations and power structures.

Strategies to combat extremist violence should reflect these processes and consider

which emotions can lead to extremist violence, and in turn which potential pathways there are

for minimizing or altering these emotions. We suggest that a deeper understanding of

emotional processes (i.e., emotion generation, emotion expression and emotion regulation)

can improve our toolkit in detecting potential risk of violent extremism, in predicting the

potential impact of various policies and actions on increasing or decreasing the risks, and

23
finally, in developing evidence-based, effective interventions to counter such risks. In the

following paragraphs, we very briefly outline each of these policy implications.

First, we suggest thinking about emotions as a diagnostic tool, a tool that can help in

identifying and then support the prevention or moderation of potential risks to violent

extremism among individuals and groups. Identifying actual risks to violent extremism is a

challenging task because potential terrorist or other radical groups would not publicly declare

their intentions for tactical or even legal reasons. Yet, such groups express their emotions in

internal and sometimes even in external communications. The ability to detect dominant

emotions, based on the nuanced understanding of the unique story (i.e., appraisals, emotional

goals and action tendencies) of each discrete group-level emotion, can meaningfully

contribute to timely and accurate detection of risks. For example, advanced technologies and

sophisticated utilization of sentiment analysis, through Natural Language Processing or other

methodologies, can help security agencies distinguish actual threats of violence from other

propaganda and better prepare themselves vis-à-vis potential threats.

Furthermore, the understanding of the differential role different emotions play in the

three sequential phases of violent extremism depicted in Figure 14.1 constitute a critical tool

for positioning different individuals and groups in the process towards materializing their

radical intentions. Finally, the realization that some negative emotions, like anger, might be

common in people who use violence but are also among those who do not, is important in the

light of some ‘tools’ used to detect extremism such as the ERG22+ used in the United

Kingdom, which includes criteria such as a desire to redress injustice, which are widely

shared and not unique to actors with violent intentions. In these cases, identifying “cocktails”

of emotions and not a single emotion may be more useful. For example, as shown by Shuman

et. al. (2016), whereas anger mixed with hatred leads to support for violence, anger in the

absence of hatred motivates more constructive patterns of behaviour.

24
 Second, emotion theory and research can inform decision makers by providing an

evidence-based tool for anticipating the consequences of various counter-terrorism policies.

When decision makers consider policies, one of their main decision criteria should be the

potential implication of a policy on increasing or decreasing the motivation of groups and

individuals to engage in violent actions. Given that emotions encapsulate cognitive, affective

and motivational components, they provide a predictive framework for the potential

implications of different policies. For example, if one realizes that a certain policy would be

appraised as unjustly shaming a group in the public sphere, then humiliation would probably

be the most dominant emotional reaction, and action tendencies associated with humiliation

are to be expected. On the other hand, a pure act of deterrence, mainly instigating fear, might

be less risky. Similarly, violent or repressive (e.g., stop and search) actions that fuel emotions

such as contempt and hatred can push people along the path of radicalization, mainly because

they feed and confirm the narrative of the outgroup as inherently evil. Moreover, media

organizations should consider emotional responses among those who identify with violent

groups in their news reporting to dampen the arousal of positive emotions such as pride and

joy. Finally, policies that increase or diminish hope for a better future, can push radicals

towards or away actual engagement in violent extremism. On the other hand, policies that

provide people with opportunities for the critical voices to be heard, and even with the sense

that it can potentially impact reality through non-violent means, can reduce the support and

engagement in violent actions.

The third way through which emotion research can influence counter radicalization

policies is via a process that has recently been defined as indirect emotion regulation (see

Halperin, 2014, for a review). Emotion regulation is the process by which individuals

influence which emotions they or others experience and how and when they or others

experience and express them (Gross, 2015). Emotion regulation can involve increasing,

25
maintaining, or decreasing positive or negative emotions (Gross, 2015). Direct emotion

regulation involves training and guiding people in controlling their emotions, which seems

unfeasible for the purposes of deradicalization. Approaches that regulate emotions indirectly,

however, by tailoring accurate messages that tap into the core appraisal themes of the

relevant emotion seem promising. Such messages or interventions can reduce motivation to

engage in violence by targeting the discrete emotion underlying that motivation (see

Halperin, 2014).

For example, if policy makers or security agencies identify hatred as the main driver

of potential engagement in terrorist actions, they should pursue a reverse engineering-style

process that would help shape messages and statements to down-regulate hatred. An indirect

regulation of hatred entails first identifying core appraisals—namely, that the outgroup is

inherently and unchangeably evil (Halperin, 2008) and then counteract these appraisals such

that future evaluations of governmental policies are met with reduced hatred and thus

decreased motivation to use violence. To avoid reactance, such an intervention would need to

be independent of the context of the specific intergroup conflict (Halperin et al., 2011).

Otherwise, people might react in a destructive way, given that the content conveyed to them

constitutes clear contrast to their held worldviews and beliefs. An established intervention to

increase people’s belief that groups generally do change (Halperin et al., 2011), for example,

was shown to reduce hatred across a variety of conflicts, and accordingly can potentially do

so in the context of violent extremism.

26
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