Bay‘ah of Ali b.

Abi Talib

Aliؓ b. Abi Talib was rendered allegiance on Friday/Saturday, 18/19

zu'l-hijja 35 AH.1

The third caliph of Islam after the Prophet Mohammad‫ ﷺ‬is

assassinated by certain Egyptians aided by Medinans and qurrā’2 of
Basra and Kufa. Ali b. Abi Talib was at the time in the Prophet's
mosque - between the hujra and the mimbar3 - among his coterie that

1
As confirmed by numerous sources cited by the Iraqi school itself (Hisham
al-Kalbi, Abu Mikhnaf, Amir al-Sha‘bi, al-Mada‘ini from Ibn Hanafiyya and
Abu al-Mulayh, Wahb b. Jarir from Saleh b. Kaysan and al-Zuhri. Ibn Jarir
al-Tabari wrote: “People reckon it (Ali's Bay‘ah) from the day Uthman was
killed.” The date of Friday the 25th of zu'l-Ḥijja, a full week after the caliph
regicide, likewise proposed by the Iraqi school of Alid polemical historiography
championed by Sayf b. Umar is unreliable alongside all reports that aim to
facilitate any interregnum designed to excuse Ali of any and all responsibility
involving the caliph murder. The historical accounts found in our sources are
better understood as representations of events formulated to the fancy of
narrators and collectors; their views, tendencies, and biases; surroundings,
socio-political groupings, and religious convictions; all contribute in shaping
news and gossip of the day and it is these personal perspectives that survive as
'historical records'. To syphon actual history and reconstruct events as they truly
unfolded is nigh impossible given the lack of contemporary and independent
sources, yet despite conflicting reports a narrative based on probability can be
construed with relative degree of confidence by means of a tedious process of
eliminating the tendentious elements within; applying pertinent techniques of
textual criticism within this plethora of narrations and allowing circumstances to
speak beyond the plain polemical retrospective narratives.
2
Men who attained prominence during the conquest period (ahl al-ayyam) and
disputed Caliph Uthman'sؓ centrist policies by claiming personal and provincial
ownership of fay’ land.
3
Something Iraqi historiography in Sayf b. Umar al-Tamimi and Ja‘far b.
Abdullah al-Mohammadi attempted to diminish by removing Ali from the scene
of the crime. They not only fail to mention his presence at the mosque but have
him arrive in the city after Uthman had been murdered and upon hearing the
was leading the Medinan dissidence4, conversing another veteran
companion Sa‘dؓ b. Abi Waqqas who was sent by Marwan b.
al-Hakam to negotiate on cessation of the siege as the Caliph Uthman
had expressed to mend his ways in accordance with demands made by
the malcontents. Sa‘d on his part tries to warn Ali that the caliph was
on the verge of being killed if not intervened. Ali on the other hand
blamed Uthman for favouring and persisting with his cousins and
clansmen (banu Umayya). While they were thus engaged Mohammad
b. Abi Bakr enters their presence arriving - as it would seem - straight
from the house (Dār) of Uthman5 and whispers the news of Uthman's
death to Ali, upon which Ali holds Sa‘d's hand, lifts him up, and
rejoins: “What good is his (Uthman's) repentance now!” Sa‘d at once

news describe him immediately leaving Medina as an act of disavowing the

deed of the rebels (See: al-Tabari's Tarikh, Ibrahim, 4/392).
4
Headed by Ammar b. Yasirؓ, the chief architect of the Medinan agitation
against Uthman (See: Balazuri's Ansab, Zakkar, 6/174, Tabari 4/353, 5/6). His
constant presence during the siege and that of Mohammad b. Abi Bakr, another
frontmost agitator, is inferred from a highly tendentious anti-Marwanid report
by al-Waqidi from Abd al-Rahman b. Aswad along with a direct accusation on
Ali of emboldening discontent and fanning the flames coming from the camp of
the banu Umayya, Uthman's sole aides.
5
Reports are at odds over the extent of the role played by Ibn Abi Bakr in the
assassination itself. All unanimously describe him intruding with vicious intent
Uthman's presence and taking hold of the old man's beard. Here, though, reports
diverge; some (Sayf, Abu'l-Mu‘tamir) insist Ibn Abi Bakr recanted at Uthman's
mention of his father's name, grew penitent and left the scene, only for rebels to
enter and assault the old man thereafter. While other unapologetic ones
(Ya‘qub-Watthāb) have Mohammad play ringleader on whose signal Kinana
al-Tujibi pierces Uthman's skull with an iron-head (Tabari 3/371f). One report
from otherwise Alid sympathiser Waqidi goes so far as to describe Mohammad
himself inflicting the first of many fatal blows (Tabari 4/393, Also: Khalifa 175,
Balazuri 6/212). Incidentally, both Mohammads, Ibn Abi Bakr and Ibn Ja‘far
aka Ibn ‘Awn; half-brothers through the mother Asma’ bt. Umays who after the
passing of Ja‘far b. Abi Talib and then Abu Bakrؓ married Ali, were reproached
for their role in regicide. Both were mentored by Ali, the surrogate father.
leaves for his home on the outskirts as the city begins to rumble with
cries and clamour of the caliph murder6 while Ali himself heads for
the Dār.7 A group of Ansar8 follow along urging Ali to take the reins
of government.9 Ali, however, is hesitant given the questionable
6
(Tabari 4/377-8 Waqidi-Musa b. Uqba). It is inexplicable why in lieu of tribal
custom; that is for the host to take the hand of the most distinguished guest
whilst rising, Ali is instead portrayed in a manner that would amount to
disrespect. By this time palpable friction existed between Ali and Zubayrؓ b.
al-Awwam; two prime contenders for the caliphate, their sons on opposite poles
in the Uthman affair; one protecting its gate and other(s) burning it down
(Tabari 4/392). The insertion therefore of Ali taking Abu Habiba's hand who but
a Zubayrite client is either out of transmitter error or an act of extreme
self-indulgence on Abu Habiba's part. More probable the reconstruction above.
7
It is hard to ascertain which dār is here alluded. While the version of Ibn
Hanafiyya's khabar produced by al-Mada’ini and al-Mohammadi (Tabari) have
him leave for his house (dārahu), Ishaq b. Yusuf's (Balazuri) more apologetic
telling has Ali insist on leaving for Dār al-Uthman, despite Ibn Hanafiyya's
efforts to persuade against doing so. Other reports mentioned below have Ali
leave instead for the main market on his way to the enclosure of banu Amr b.
Mabzul (See: Note 16).
8
Multiple reports depict a large number of companions - Muhajirun and Ansar -
visited Ali after he had secluded himself to his remote estate up in Khaybar
known as 'al-Bughaygha'. However, there's good evidence within other Iraqi
texts that this gathering of companions was not very heavy on numbers and
certainly not unanimous, probably consisting of some dissident Ansar at the
beginning led by Ammar b. Yasir and Sahl b. Hunayf, while a vast majority
would eventually come to pledge Ali come the next day. Nor did they seek Ali
out as if he were in hiding, Ali's presence and activity there and then is well
documented. Tradition in general tries to portray Ali as trying to alienate
himself from the rebels and being undesiring of the caliphate, while
circumstantial evidence paints a picture to the contrary
9
Exactly when and where this took place; the very day or next morning; at the
marketplace, or Ali's house is open to preference given the variety within extant
reports. The former, in light of Amir Sha‘bi's khabar, seems a safer assumption.
Ali, much like earlier 'rashidūn' caliphs, was deemed worthy in line with his
qudāma, sābiqa, sharāfa, and qarāba. Hereditary legitimacy gained prominence
later under dynastic rules.
circumstances inasmuch as an assumption of power at this immediate
juncture would cement apprehensions of collusion in the crime of the
caliph murder, besides there lacking the requisite condition of a shura
committee Umarؓ b. Khattab had constituted with respect to the
electoral legitimacy of an amir.10 Yet his aides in Ammar and Ashtar
keep pressing upon Ali the urgent need and necessity of establishing
their authority before other claimants raise their flags. Ashtar opens
his hand and Ali pulls it back. “For the third time!” exclaims Ashtar
invoking Ali's long besought ambition for the caliphate: “If you turn it
down again by God you will only look at it with pain for ages!” The
elderly Ammar is able to shake off his hesitancy by stating that if Ali
were not to abide by their wishes the resulting fitna of infighting
would see Ali as the first casualty.11 Ali concedes and the people

10
Two Iraqi accounts attempted to explain Ali's hesitancy; his preference for
subordination: “Innī lakum wazīran khayrun minnī amīran” (Ibn Hanafiya); his
suggestion for a shura (Sha‘bi). The former should be discarded as unhistorical
given the fact that Ali always held himself a prime contender for nothing short
of the caliphate (See: Ibn Asakir 42/439) and held no subordinate office during
the first three tenures, while the latter acceptable though conditionally (See:
Note 14). What prompted this legislation was a show of intent by Ammar (less
probably al-Zubayr) that after Umar dies Ali's bay‘ah would be forced through
without consulting other parties of interest, citing Abu Bakr's appointment as an
example where the matter was decided spontaneously, without consideration
(falta). Umar on the other hand retorted that the person of Abu Bakr required no
deliberation, elucidated the gravity of situation prevalent at the portico of banu
Sa‘ida, and sternly censored henceforth any suggestion where communal
consensus and consultation is disregarded. As it would transpire, Ammar,
though muhajir but close to Medinans (Yathribites) through tribal affiliation and
very much anti-Quraysh aristocracy (Makhzum, Umayya) plays a central role in
those twenty-four hours which saw Uthman, an Umayyad patrician, fall, and
Ali, unprivileged Hashimite, ascend.
11
Ammar's “latanşibanna nafsaka..” ultimatum is telling. Ali's aides meant to
push through his bay‘ah before another abrupt election (falta) or committee
formation (shura) for neither had previously proved them of benefit. Sayf on the
other hand through his Iraqi authorities Mohamamd and Talha attempted to tone
down Ammar's activity in Ali's enterprise by means of employing generic
surrounding him begin to show their fealty in the bazar, then head off
for the courtyard of banu Mabzul near Baqi‘ al-Gharqad where his
Ansari support was apparently based. People gather along the way as
they walk through the market; the youth chant and carry palm
branches as Ashtar leads the entourage. Ali enters the house of Amr b.
Mihsan al-Ansari ordering him to lock the door, leaving the crowd
outside banging at the gate.12

At this point it was evidently necessary for Ali to secure the pledge of
other aspirants to the caliphate; primarily Talha b. Ubaydillah and
Zubayr b. al-Awwam, and his supporters are quick to seize the
initiative as they bring both to the courtyard so as to bind them by
oath. Ali personally delegates Hukaym b. Jabala al-Abdi to bring in
Zubayr who would later remark about his ordeal that: ‘A bandit from
among the bandits of Abd al-Qays drove me to render bay‘ah
unwillingly; that too with a sword upon my neck.’13 Malik al-Ashtar

imports; e.g. Ammar's warning to Ali becomes in Sayfian narrative ‘the rebels
compelling the Medinese to elect one of the three; Ali, Talha, or Zubayr.’
12
Based on the accounts of al-Sha‘bi and Abu al-Malih cited by Abu al-Hasan
Mada’ini (Tabari).
13
Ali's delegation of Hakim is typically curtained by Sayf whose Iraqi
authorities Mohammad and Talha insist it was the rebels from Basra who of
their own accord brought Zubayr before Ali. Zubayr had distanced himself from
the Uthman affair when the siege got hostile and was probably not in Medina
the day of the murder (Tabari 4/392). Imaginably, it must have taken them a
large chunk of the day to bring Zubayr in, which for the purpose of our timeline
would place the private pledge in the aḥata of banu Mabzul at approximately
late afternoon on Friday (See: Note 16). Reports though are conflicting, some
suggest only Talha made the Friday pledge while Zubayr was brought the next
morning. It is however unlikely that Zubayr, himself a contender, aligned with a
rival like Talha abruptly without there being legit precedence i.e. Ali's initiative.
A drastically different account (Tabari 4/432 Zubayr b. Bakkar-Musa b. Uqba)
which could be tendentious given Abu Habiba's affiliation has al-Zubayr play a
defying hero and Ali a covetous deceiver.
would conduct this the first of two formal bay‘ah coronations,
spreading a cloak over Ali he joyously proclaims: “What are we
waiting for? O Ali, stretch forth your hand!” Ali extends his hand and
Ashtar becomes the first person to render the new caliph allegiance.
He then turns to Talha and Zubayr, “Come on, pledge allegiance!
Come Talha! Come Zubayr!” Both oblige though albeit out of
reluctance and intimidation. Ali recognises the need for this pledge to
take place openly for all to see as to avoid future misgivings.

After having secured oaths for Ali from his main rivals Ammar,
acknowledging its necessity, now feels more open towards a dialogue
or mushawara and attends as Ali's representative a gathering at
Makhrama's house the very night, convened to address the issue of
succession, where however the overriding sentiment is pro-talion and
pro-Talha.14 The meeting ends in disagreement over the matter15 and
the group of Ansar return to Ali the next morning who now heads to
the mosque with the interest of presenting before the people
(predominantly the Ansar) his candidature.16
14
Reported by Ibn Asakir on the authority of Mohammad b. Amr b. Alqama.
Apparently, this meeting of prominent, if not most eminent, companions could
not attain a status significant enough to bring the main contenders on the same
platform vis-a-vis the ahl al-shura. Apparently, responsibilities post caliph
murder proved too much for some (Sa‘d, Ibn Umar), while the two who would
present their candidature had no fond memories of the shura committee which
saw Talha left absent and Ali unimpressed, hence their subsequent promptness.
To Ali, the condition of shura presented more a hurdle to surpass than an
obligation deserving duty.
15
The Qurasyhite Abu Jahm al-‘Adawi insisted on and Ammar objected to the
condition of retaliation for Uthman's murder resulting in a deadlock. The
meeting was probably convened with Talha's approval who now joined hands
with those demanding blood-vengeance to enhance his position and counter
Ali's initial move after himself playing significant part in the regicide.
16
Like every detail regarding the episode there's much confusion in what is
reported about the chronology of events, as such any sequence can only be
accepted with a relative degree of confidence. Given the variety of extant
accounts achieving certainty with regards to a particular timeline will remain
elusive. There are, however, good reasons to prefer either of the timelines; the
one which we have adopted based on al-Kalbi's assertion placing Uthman's
murder on early Friday morning against Sayf et al who reported it late
afternoon. Timing the murder is key in establishing when the two (private and
public) pledges took place. If Uthman died early morning, not late afternoon,
there naturally remained plenty of time for events related to the private pledge
to transpire on Friday.
al-Kalbi and al-Mas‘udi, despite their Alid lenience, place the private pledge in
the house of Amr b. Mihsan and/or the courtyard of banu Mabzul on Friday and
the public pledge conducted in the mosque on Saturday. The conservative
chronology of al-Mada’ini who cites three good authorities in substantiation
places both the private and public pledges on Saturday, timing the murder at
Friday evening, and showing Ali circumspect and cautious. Of Mada’ini's
authorities, Sha‘bi is, notwithstanding, quite vague on the timeline. Mada’ini's
Sha‘bi narrative goes as follows: ‘When Uthman was killed, Ali comes to the
marketplace, people gather around to render him allegiance which Ali tries to
ward off, only for Ashtar to successfully persuade him’, suggesting a tight
sequence which appears to lean more towards al-Kalbi who also cites al-Sha‘bi
as one of his authorities. Mada’ini then tries to enforce his thesis via Ibn
Hanafiyya and Abu al-Malih, the latter is precise and adamant both pledges took
place on Saturday, even though the date he mentions coincides with Friday, the
day of the murder (“eighteen nights having elapsed in zu'l-Hijjah”). As for Ibn
Hanafiyya, there are four versions of his khabar but only al-Mada’ini's (from
Abu Mikhnaf) hints at Saturday only pledge (not two pledges) by listing the
time of the murder on Friday evening that leaves little span for further
developments; hence a day's hiatus is implied when read with Abu al-Malih's
sequence in mind. Yet the khabar of itself indicates a pledge no later than
Saturday evening (recall the night precedes the day in Arab lunar yowm). The
intent and nature of the khabar is polemical meant to satisfy prevalent critiques
surrounding very events, especially in what al-Mohammadi produces, and while
his and Sayf's week-long layoff is evidently of design, Mada‘ini's more
pragmatic narrative also carries with it an air of Alid apology. Both Mohammadi
and Mada’ini have Ali forthwith seek seclusion to his house (baytahu
/manzilahu), whereas, versions of the same khabar produced by Balazuri from
Ishaq b. Yusuf have Ali enter not his but the house (al-bayt/al-dār i.e. of
Uthman); yet both may well represent a development of Alid polemics meant to
serve as an alibi against his presence at bayt al-Amr b. Mihsan or ahata banu
Mabzul. Such craft of adaptation, interpolation, substitution, is rife within
tellings and writings of a politically transitioning era (See: Note 31).
If then what Hisham al-Kalbi - a prolific Kufan traditionist - states is correct,
which all things considered seems likely, it would add an air of ominousness to
But word soon reaches Ali and company of Talha and Zubayr's
opposition17 vis-a-vis the duo's seizing of the keys to the bayt al-māl.
Upon reaching the mosque Ali finds a favourable crowd gathered
around Talha to render him allegiance as the wealthy Talha was
distributing sums among them. The Qurayshite elder Abu Jahm b.
Huzayfa, coming out of the crowd around Talha, addresses Ali
mockingly: “Look at this man whose cousin is slain and wealth
plundered and yet he flees into oblivion!”18 Striking a nerve as it
would appear the Alid camp moves into action and devises a plan of
its own to neutralise Talha's counterplay. They now set off for the bayt
al-māl, Ali has the gate of the treasury broken down ordering the
money be brought out. As soon as word spread to those who had
gathered around Talha that Ali had taken the treasury and was
graciously handing out money for all, people abandoned the former

the entire episode, for it would place Ali's bay‘ah - the first secret one - not a
day, certainly not a week, but only hours after the assassination; thereby lending
considerable credence to contentions of complicity. Accordingly, after receiving
in the mosque the news of Uthman's murder Ali does not proceed to his private
estate as in what Mada‘ini postulates through the report of Ibn Hanafiyya; nor
does he wait on a decision till Saturday as Abu al-Malih asserts, but rather
ventures straight for the banu Amr's enclosure after a detour through the
marketplace (Kalbi-Sha‘bi). What Khalid b. Sumayr and Ibn Atiyya narrate also
lends credence to al-Kalbi. On the flip side, Saleh b. Kaysan does speak of a
Saturday only pledge but his sequence is the other way around; ‘Ali is rendered
allegiance in the mosque, then goes to banu Amr's mosque to receive further
pledges’; a sequence that may be unlikely in light of piling evidence to the
contrary but cannot be discarded offhand given al-Zuhri lending it weight in
“faraqiya'l-mimbar.” His “yurīdu manzilahu..” contests Abu Mikhnaf's “dakhala
baytahu.”
17
al-Sha‘bi: “takhallafā ‘ani'l-bay‘ah.” Saturday morning, evidently after their
Friday pledge which they felt was coerced.
18
Based on reports by Balazuri from Wahab b. Jarir-Miswar b. Makhrama and
Ibn Sa‘d-Ibn ‘Atiyya.
and rushed towards the latter. Thus Ali is able to lure people away
from his foe, leaving Talha in the lurch.19

Then Ali enters the mosque and ascends the pulpit cheered on by a
charged crowd; sandals in one hand and a bow in the other, wearing a
turban, a cape and waist-wrap. The first command to extend from the
pulpit-cum-throne is the commission of Malik al-Ashtar to fetch the
treasury keys from and subdue Talha, Ali's main rival for the caliphal
throne whose homage in the public sphere was essential to lend Ali's
election credibility. Talha, now alone and helpless, tries to stall by
saying: “Let me see what others do.” But Ashtar offers no respite,
unsheathing his sword he tells Talha: “You better swear allegiance or
by God I will strike you right between your eyes!” He drags Talha all
the way to the mosque and brings him before Ali.20 “There is no way
out of this!” resignedly concedes Talha as he and Zubayr approach the
pulpit. Ali duly takes the treasury keys from them.

Talha and Zubayr opt to play nice in view of making best out of a lost
cause as both step forward to become the first to render bay‘ah. Ali

19
Various akhbar ascribe variant motives for and accounts of taking the treasury.
One (al-Marwazi) to pull the plug on Talha after being requested aid by his
brother Uthman. Another (al-Mohammadi) portrayal has Ali precondition the
treasury for accepting bay‘ah, demanding that Talha and Zubayr voluntarily
hand him over the keys so he, unlike his predecessor, ensures equitable
distribution. Both are tendentious fable and therefore discarded. Interestingly,
Sayf leaves but 'two sacks' for the 'rebels' to pillage.
20
Usama b. Zaydؓ bore witness the two were forced under the sword (Sayf). Sa‘d
b. Abi Waqqas, while confirming their unwillingness, could not confirm the part
of coercion (Waqidi). Even Ali accepted the two were forced but only so that
schism might be averted (Sayf). Sayf says the Kufan and Basran rebels sent
Ashtar and Hukaym to bring Talhah and Zubayr respectively. What he framed
as 'rebels' were for a fact Ammar and Ibn Abi Bakr's faction of Medinans who
brought Talha for the first Friday pledge, for the second Saturday iteration it
was Ali himself who delegated Ashtar to retrieve the treasury keys as reported
by al-Sha‘bi.
makes them a generous albeit ostensive offer: “If you so desire,
pledge me allegiance, if not, I'll render you the bay‘ah.”21 Suspecting
speciousness and breathing an air of intimidation they turn him down:
‘We will give you allegiance for you are more worthy than us. You are
Amīr al-Mu’minīn!’ Upon seeing Talha be the first companion of the
Prophet to give allegiance a bedouin Habib b. Zu’ayb utters a
premonition of sorts: “This matter begins with a paralyzed man, it
won't end well.” Then the rest, predominantly āmmatu'l-Ansar, step
forward and offer homage. Talha and Zubayr, aiming to derive some
payoff for their cooperation in Ali's enterprise, ask him for
governorships of Barsa and Kufa, which Ali declines by saying: ‘You
are to stay with me. I need you to share the burden, for I would be lost
without you!’ At which Talha is said to have remarked distastefully:
“A dog poking his nose in the dirt is all we'll get from this!”22

Then Ali turns his attention to subdue potential opponents who as

erstwhile components of Umar's shura might grudge at the abruptness
of the matter and feel left out not greatly dissimilar to how Ali himself
felt at appointment of the first caliph, or those who might even
harbour aspirations of their own. To bind them by oath was essential
in the advancement of Ali's quest to gain legitimacy in his enterprise.

21
Words reported by Wahb b. Jarir from al-Zuhri (Tabari 4/429) whose general
hypothesis presents Ali's pledge coming about only in consequence of Talha's
activity. The dispute was essentially between Talha and Uthman of which Ali
remained aloof, only interjecting in order to exact retribution in favour of his
felled kinsman and snatch from the former what Ali was more entitled to (See:
Balazuri 6/208ff). As such, Ali's offer must have been purely for the gallery. But
why make an offer so if all of Ali's measures were indeed in response to Talha's
indecorous initiative? If the exchange is historical, the thesis preceding it is not.
22
Though reported in the instance it's likely this request was put forward a day
or two later, not personally, but perhaps through an emissary like al-Mughira b.
al-Shu‘ba al-Thaqafi (See: Balazuri 3/10).
Accordingly, Sa‘d b. Abi Waqqas is brought before the pulpit23, who,
unlike Talha and Zubayr, comes without posing any altercation. Ali
tells him to render allegiance but Sa‘d, though holding grudge nor
carrying personal aspirations, declines citing a lack of consensus over
Ali's election: “O Abu'l-Hasan, I will give bay‘ah when none but me
remains.” Ali prods whether his authority would be challenged to
which Sa‘d responds assuringly: “Have faith, you have nothing to fear
of me.” Ali is content and orders his men to: “Make way for Abu
Ishaq.”24

Ali then sends Kumayl b. Ziyad for another prospective candidate,

Abdullahؓ b. Umar b. Khattab who is brought ‘by the neck with a
sword unsheathed upon his head’25 possibly due to his apparent
refusal to comply. Ali tells him to pledge, Ibn Umar bluntly refuses by
casting objection on the enterprise: “Not until people altogether have
agreed upon you.” Ali then asks for a surety or guarantor that he
would not leave Medina vis-a-vis raise his own flag or join up with
Mu‘awiya with whom Ali was preparing to go to war. Ibn Umar once
more disagrees to comply: “I don't see why I should!” Upon seeing
Abdullah's contemptuous demeanour Ali's lieutenant Ashtar startles
into action: “This man has secured your whip and sword, allow me to
cut off his head!” “No, let him be. I'll be his guarantor,” Ali calms the
scene: “By God I have found him as ill-mannered as a man as he was
as a child.” As the Medinese render allegiance and Ali's caliphate is
23
Reports do vary, but whether Sa‘d or Ibn Umar was the first to be brought
after Talha and Zubayr is inconsequential.
24
The Abbasid Caliph Mansur wrote to al-Nafs al-Zakiyya: “‫ودعا سعداً إلى بيعته‬
‫ ثم بايع معاوية بعده‬،‫( ”فأغلق بابه دونه‬al-Mubarrad). Apparently, Sa‘d removed himself
from Medina hereafter and when Ali came calling again he shut his door on him
for good. Taken figuratively it would simply mean Sa‘d distanced himself from
Ali.
25
A detail reported by Abu Mikhnaf (Balazuri 3/8) and censored by al-Mada’ini
(Tabari 4/428).
established in the capital, Ibn Umar pays Ali a visit to reprimand him
over neglecting what he believed was due: “O Ali fear God! Do not
usurp the government without consultation (of a shura council).”26
Day or so later27Ali goes out looking for Ibn Umar in the interest of
delegating him towards Mu‘awiya: “Come Abu Abd al-Rahman!
Come here man! These are letters I have just written up: Get on your
saddle and take them to Syria.” “Remember God and the Final Day!”
spurns back Ibn Umar: “I have nothing whatsoever to do in this
matter. So if the Syrians want you they will come to you in obedience
and if they do not want you I shall do nothing to avert them from
you.” Ali left Ibn Umar with menacing words, attempting to exert
authority by forcing the issue: “You will go, willingly or unwillingly,”
prompting Ibn Umar to flee for Mecca the very night. Morning after,
when informed of Abdullah's flight with rumours afloat of his
departure to Syria to join up with Muawiya, Ali becomes irate and
sends out scouts to look for him at every route. Such was the state of
urgency and panic that the whole of Medina appeared in a state of
frenzy and commotion. Only upon assurance from his daughter and
Umar b. Khattab's wife Umm al-Kulthum that Abdullah had in fact
fled to Mecca not Syria were Ali's nerves eased.28

The great majority of ahl al-Madinah at the time that included mainly
the anti status-quo Ansar in general, their clients and slaves, and those
who had come upon the capital from the provinces rendered

26
“.‫ ”يَا علي اتق هَّللا َوال تنتزين َعلَى أمر األمة بغير مشورة‬Reported by Balazuri from
Hisham-Sha‘bi. A startling exchange offering insight into what the opposition,
even neutrals at the time, thought of the manner in which power was assumed.
27
Not months, as suggested by Sayf who aims to assert thereby that Ibn Umar's
refusal to pay Ali homage was confined to fighting ahl al-qibla, otherwise, he
maintained obedience.
28
Balazuri from Affan b. Muslim-Khalid b. Sumayr, Tabari from Sayf b. Umar.
allegiance and helped establish Ali's caliphate. But even among the
Medinites there were notable exceptions among the khawas,
especially with regard to fighting ahl al-Qibla. When Ali summoned
Mohammad b. Maslama, known as the knight of the Prophet, and
asked him to join his jihad against the Syrians, the latter excused
himself on the basis of Prophetic ban on participating a civil war.
Wahban b. Sayfi likewise recalled particular prophetic guidance.
Usama b. Zayd, despite expressing deep affection for Ali, could not
bring himself to follow his cause: ‘You are dearest and most esteemed
to me... I would follow you be it between the jaws of a lion; yet the
Prophet advised not to fight any man who testifies lā ilāha illa'Allāh!’
Whether these individuals had otherwise pledged Ali allegiance is
uncertain. Ali seemed content with offering affordable leeway to
people of prominence when they showed no hostile intentions towards
the newly established order. Among other prominent figures within
the Ansar who not only abstained but opposed Ali's election are the
Khazrajites Zayd b. Thabit; the compiler of the Qur’an. Hassan b.
Thabit, Ka‘b b. Malik, and Nu‘man b. Bashir; the Prophet's poets and
foremost Ansaris. The Badrite Muhammad b. Maslama and the
Uhdite Rafi‘ b. Khadij. Maslama b. Makhlad, Fadala b. Ubayd,
another Badrite Ka‘b b. ‘Ujra, Salama b. Salāmah b. Waqsh, Abdullah
b. Sallam, and Abu Sa‘id Sa‘d b. Malik al-Khuzri who initially
abstained but later favoured the Alid cause.

The Quraysh in general opposed the Medinan coup d'etat and most of
Ali's opposition would gather at Mecca, none more prestigious than
the ahl al-bayt vis-a-vis the mothers of the believers, particularly
Aishaؓ. She would be joined by Talha and Zubayr four months after
they paid homage to Ali, which they contested was void ab initio. The
whole of banu Umayya naturally opposed the election and demanded
retribution as a condition for rendering allegiance, which was never
forthcoming.29 Such the vehemence of opposition there that the
appointment letter of Khalid b. Ās over Mecca wherein it stated that
he was to take bay‘ah on Ali's behalf was seized and a youth from
Abd al-Shams (clan of Uthman) tore it with his teeth and threw it
away for people to trample on it near the ZamZam well.30 However,
after defeating the opposition alliance in the battle of Basra, Ali
would stamp his authority over the Hejaz and appoint his governors.
Distinguished opposition to Ali's bay‘ah included the Badrite Qudama
b. Maz‘un, Umar's governor over Basra Abu Musa Ash‘ari, the
prolific hadith narrator Abu Hurayra, Suhayb b. Sinan al-Rumi, the
Prophet's servant Anas b. Malik, and Jurist Imran b. Husayn. Other
prominent figures are Ali's own brother Aqil b. Abi Talib, sons of
Abu Bakr and Umar b. Khattab; Abd al-Rahman and UbaydAllah, the
son of the great Khalid b. Walid Abd al-Rahman, and the astute
al-Mughira b. Shu‘ba al-Thaqafi.31
29
Sayf (Tabari 4/437) has Ali willing but unable to exact revenge given the lack
of circumstances amidst rebel takeover, when as a matter of fact, from Ali's
perspective blood-vengeance was never meritted seeing how Uthman's murder
was justifiable. When addressed by commanders of the Syrian army Sharahbil
and Ma‘n to testify to Uthman's wrongful assassination he reportedly answered:
“‫( ”إني ال أقول ذلك‬See: Waq‘at Siffin 201-2, Tabari 5/8).
30
Balazuri from Wahb b. Jarir-Saleh b. Kaysan.
31
Yet Mughira is shown to have advised Ali to retain Uthmani governors,
especially Muawiya, be it on a temporary basis so that a peaceful transition
would be possible, which the latter turned down favouring Ibn Abbas's input
(Balazuri from Abu Mikhnaf 3/10-11). This demonstrates again how Ali was
open-hearted enough to provide considerable space to dignitaries, whether out
of magnanimity of character or compromise of circumstance is hard to
ascertain. Perhaps both factors weighed in. Mughira would soon leave Medina
to join the Meccan opposition. It is also of note that the piece of advice Ibn
Abbas offered Ali with regard to distancing himself from the affair (Tabari
4/438 was initially, or should it be said originally, offered by al-Mughira (4/392
Sayf-Sha‘bi), perhaps more as a monition. But since this aspect reflected badly
on Ali; an advice as shrewd as this can't be seen to have come from the enemy
so as to lend it credit and conversely discredit the protagonist, the account was
redacted (Sayf-Mohammad/Talha) to replace al-Mughira with an amicable
The master narrative - Sunni and Shi‘a - maintains Ali's dispassion for
the caliphate based on his reclusion during the week long rein of
rebels over Medina and in spite of repeated efforts made by
companions to persuade him into accepting the baton, Ali turns the
mantle down opting instead a role of subordination. Finally through
the companions' - both Muhajirin and Ansar - consensus over and
persistence on his person and the unanimity of the people altogether
in wanting to pledge, Ali is moved to partake the burden given the
precarity of the situation in order to save Islam and lives of Muslims.
As such, the people of Madinah whose authority was accepted, even
binding upon the rest declared him caliph, whereas, those few who
refused him homage out of ignorance, covet, or envy endangered the
religion and brought upon the ummah the curse of civil war (fitna).
Thus, Ali b. Abi Talib impressed upon his dissenters and detractors:
‘This pledge of allegiance, unlike those of his predecessors, carried

secretary and elder of the Abbasid dynasty Abdullah b. Abbas. Composition of

this nature where Ali is shown to be involved in activity he ought to have been
but was in fact not is prevalent throughout important polemical narratives. Such
as the portrayal of Ali playing mediator between Uthman and the Egyptian
malcontents at ẓu Khushub when it is more likely the role was performed by
Mohammad b. Maslama (Tabari 4/375ff Waqidi-Sufyan). Perhaps within Alid
circles the need was felt that like Sa‘d and Ibn Umar Ali too should have
distanced himself from the affair, or at least followed al-Zubayr's example of
leaving Medina during the siege; for had he done so the majority of those who
later gravitated towards the opposition would themselves have sought Ali out
for the leadership, so much so that akhbaris among them began to relate tellings
and formulate parallel narratives of that being how events actually transpired.
Thus Ali is said to have removed himself to his remote estate post exhaustion
trying to help Uthman, and the companions all in unison including Talha and
Zubayr had to plead Ali repeatedly into taking up the mantle not out of personal
want but for ummah's sake (Cf. Note 16). He in all probability did nothing of
sort, attested by various sources including the witness of Ibn Abbas (Sayf M/T):
“.‫ فتأتي مكه فتدخل دارك وتغلق عليك بابك‬،‫”تخرج حين قتل الرجل أو قبل ذلك‬
with it the stamp of consensus, therefore, one who rejects it reneges
from the religion of Islam’.32

Conversely, his activity that day which does not include opting
privacy tells a different story, one in which we find Ali unsure but
eager to take the baton33 and the people who pushed him through;
those whose leaders carried personal or financial grudge against
Uthman, were predominantly a group of Ansar and dissident factions
from the provinces who had grown ill of Quraysh aristocracy's
privilege and perks at their expense which Ali promised to undo.34
While Ansar in general supported Ali, it can be said that most of the
Muhajirun opposed him. Among the former too there were
distinguished exceptions, hence a collective unanimity among the
companions, even that of the people's, can scarcely be established.
Though he probably believed his person would benefit the ummah,
the abruptness with which homage was accepted reeks selfish motive,
and even though Ali no doubt wanted people altogether to agree upon
32
As represented by al-Dinawari in what is a composition reflecting decades
worth of development in Alid polemics projected back in the form of speech:
“.‫ وانها لم تكن فلته‬،‫ من ردها رغب عن دين االسالم‬،‫”وان هذه بيعة عامه‬
33
See e.g. al-Hasan's protest: ‫ك بِبَ ْي َع ٍة َحتَّى تَجُو َل‬ َ ُ‫َأ َمرْ ت‬
َ ‫ك ِحينَ سار الناس الى عثمان َأال تَ ْب ُسطَ يَ َد‬
َّ َ‫ فََأبَيْتَ َعل‬،َ‫ فَِإنَّهُ ْم لَ ْن يَ ْقطَعُوا َأ ْمرًا ُدونَك‬،‫ب‬
‫ي‬ ِ ‫( َجاِئلَةُ ْال َع َر‬Tabari 4/456-8, 4/227ff). Ali long
held desire and claim over the vicegerency as apparent in dispute with Abu Bakr
over the saqifa affair. While his wife felt entitled to her father's material
inheritance Ali laid claim over political heirship based on blood relation to the
Prophet and service in Islam. Once his uncle Abbas advised him to visit the
Prophet during his fatal illness to seek the vicegerency but Ali decided against it
fearing a denial would carry lasting impression (Tabari-Ibn Abbas), or because
he felt over-confident no one would dare usurp their (banu Hashim's) right
(Balazuri-Jabir b. Abdullah). Ali held no 'subordinate' office during three reigns
as a sign of protest or mutual mistrust.
34
See: Tabari 4/336ff, 4/355, 5/91. Reduction of stipends for the old-guard was
one of the innovations (aḥdāth) introduced by Uthman over which he was much
maligned by affectees who turned to Ali in seeking satisfaction for grievances.
Ali would remonstrate with and chastise the caliph on their behalf.
his candidature, seeing the reality of the situation he knew a shura was
unaffordable, therefore, allowing his aides to make required moves.
Given the questionable circumstances which saw a regicide and a
coup with the Medinese at the centre of it, the capital was
compromised in exerting morally the authority a caliphal pledge
customarily carried, hence, those who objected on grounds of
rectification (işlaḥ) and retribution (intiqām) or out of personal envy
and ambition were no more responsible for the fitna than those who
lorded it.35

35
Ali said: “‫( ”لو ظننت أن األمر يبلغ ما بلغ ما دخلت فيه‬Balazuri from al-A‘mash).